ML17261A865
| ML17261A865 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1989 |
| From: | MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | RUSSELL W T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8903020621 | |
| Download: ML17261A865 (32) | |
See also: IR 05000244/1988022
Text
'cCEMRATEDD1STKBt'EON
DEMONSTRXT10.i
H'STEMREGULATORY
INFORMATION
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM(RIDS)SSIONNBR-8903020621
DOC.DATE:
89/02/17NOTARIZED-
NODOCKETCIL:50-244
RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester
G05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION
MECREDY,R.C.
Rochester
Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT
AFFILIATION
RUSSELL,W.T.
Region1,OfcoftheDirectorSUBJECT:Forwardsaddiinfoto890106responsetoInspRept50-244/88-22.
DISTRIBUTION
CODE:IEOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR
1ENCLQSIZE:jTITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp
Rept/Notice
ofViolation
ResponseNOTES:License
Expdateinaccordance
with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
05000244~
RECIPIENT
IDCODE/NAME
PD1-3PDINTERNAL:
AEODDEDRONRR/DESTDIRNRR/DLPQ/QAB
10NRR/DREP/EPB
10NRR/DRISDIR9ANUDOCS-ABSTRACT
OGC/HDS2RGN1FILE01EERNAL:LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT
IDCODE/NAME
STAHLE,CAEOD/DEIIB
NRRSHANKMAN,
SNRR/DLPQ/PEB
11NRR/DOEADIR11NRR/DREP/RPB
10NRR/PMAS/ILRB12
01EBEJREGFILE0NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111112211111111NCTE'ZOALL"RIDS"RZCIPIZNIS:
PZZASEHELPUS10REDUCEHASTE!CCÃZACZ'IHEDOCUMENZCDPXBOLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)K)ELIMINATE
VÃ3RHMEFRYDIPIVUBUTIGN
LISTSFORDOCUMENTS
YOUDGNITNEEDfTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR23ENCL23
February17,1989Mr.WilliamT.RussellRegionalAdministrator
U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
RegionI475Allendale
RoadKingofPrussia,Pennsylvania
19406Subject:Supplemental
Information
Inspection
Report88-22R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244.DearMr.Russell:Followingsubmittal
ofourresponse,
datedJanuary6,1989toInspection
Report88-22,wehavediscussed
withmembers'f
.yourStaffboththespecificissuesraisedintheInspection
ReportandthemoregeneralsubjectoftheCondensate
StorageTankdesignandoperational
considerations.
Basedonthesediscussions
andourfurtherreview,webelieveit,appropriate
toclarifyandsupplement
ourpreviousresponse.
Theadditional
information
generally
fallsinthreeareas.First,weareclarifying
ourresponsetoindicatethatonOctober5,1988,manualvalve4318Awasbeingmaintained
asaclosedvalve.Subsequently,
andpriortoourresponsetotheInspection
Report,valve4318Awaslockedintheclosedpositionandwasadded.toourlockedvalveprogram.Second,wehaveperformed.
a.50..59safetyevaluation
ofthepresenceofmanualvalve4318AintheCondensate
StorageTanksystem.Basedonreviewstodate,wehavedetermined
thatvalve4318Ahasbeeninstalled
attheplantforanumberofyears,however,wehavenotbeenabletodocumentwhetheritwaspartoftheoriginalplantdesignorwasinstalled
afterinitiallicensing.
Therefore,
wehaveperformed
theattached50.59safetyevaluation
andhavedetermined
thatthepresenceofthevalvedoesnotconstitute
anunreviewed
safetyquestionorinvolveachangeintheplantTechnical
Specifications.
2Finally,wewishtore-emphasize
apointcontained
inouroriginalresponse.
Inadditiontothespecificreviewswhichwehaveperformed
asidentified
inourpreviousresponseandinthisresponse,
weareperforming
acomprehensive
reviewoftheCondensate
StorageTankincluding
allconnecting
lines.Thisreviewisconsidering
allpreviousplantdesignrequirements
andalsoStationBlackout(lossofallAC)considerations.
Ourresponses
totheInspection
Reportdonotaffectourintenttocompletethisimportant,
evaluation.
PleasecontactusifyouormembersofyourStaffhavefurtherquestions
orconcerns.
Verytrulyyours,RobertC.MeredyGeneralManagerNuclearProduction
RCMN021Attachments
xc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
(original)
~~~~DocumentControlDeskWashington,
D.C.20555xc:GinnaSeniorResidentInspector
L
ATTACHMENT
IViolation
"10CFR50,AppendixB,sectionIIIrequires,
inpart,measuresshallbeestablished
toassurethatappropriate
qualitystandards
arespecified
andincludedindesigndocuments,
anddeviations
fromsuchstandards
arecontrolled.
TheQualityAssurance
ManualGinnaStation,section3,step3.1.3requiresmodifications
involving
achangetothefacilityasdescribed
intheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)haveasafetyevaluation
inaccordance
with10CFR50.59"Contrary
totheabove,onOctober5,1988amodification
involving
achangetotheCondensate
StorageTank,described
inChapterl0oftheUFSARasthemainsourceofwaterfortheAuxiliary
System,wasinstalled
withoutasafetyevaluation
inaccordance
with10CFR50.59."R~esonseRG&Edeniesthisviolation.
RG&EagreesthattheGinnaQAmanualspecifies
thata50.59evaluation
should,beperformed
foranyfacilitymodification
involving
achange.tothefacilityasdescribed
intheUFSAR.However,wedonotagree.thattheaddition'oftheTygontubingtotheCondensate
StorageTanksconstitutes
suchachange.WhatisshownintheUFSARandwasexistingplantconfiguration
isa3/4inchsamplinglinewhichisisolatedbyclosedmanualvalve4318A(UFSARFigure10.7-5).Thisconfiguration
wasnotchangedbytheadditionoftheTygontubeonOctober5,1988.TheTygontubehasbeenaddeddownstream
ofthisvalveanddoesnotaffecttheCSTs.asexplicitly
described
intheUFSAR.Evenifweconsider(andwedid)theapplicability
of10CFR50.59toitemsimplicitly
described
intheUFSAR,currentdraft(December
1988)industryguidancedefinesthisimplicitinclusion
ordescription
asfollows:"Ifthechangealtersthedesign,function,
ormethodofperforming
thefunctionofthelargerstructure,
system,orcomponent
[inthiscasetheCSTs]asdescribed
intheSARthenasafetyevaluation
isrequired."
BecausetheTygontubewasinstalled
beyondamanualclosedvalveitwasandstillisunderstood
thatthismodification
doesnotaltertheCSTs'esign
functionormethodofperformance.
Inaddition,
anyfailureoftheTygontubingcannotinteractwiththeCSTsoraffectanyofthesurrounding
equipment..
(Itshouldbenotedthatvalve4318Aisnowmaintained
lockedclosedunderourlocked,valveprogram.)
When.thismodification
wasmadebyRG&E,theappropriate
consideration
wasgiventothegoverning
requirements
of10CFR50.59.Appropriate
screening
criteriawereappliedtodetermine
theapplicability
of*10CFR50.59.Althoughthedocumentation
maintained
forscreening
thismodification
andconcluding
that50.59didnotapplywasbrief,goodengineering
judgmentwasimplemented
anddocumentation
wasprovided.
RG&Ebelievesthatthedocumentation
supporting
thismodification
adequately
addresses
thesafetyissues.Becausewebelieveintheimportance
ofproperlyapplyingthe50.59requirement,
wehavecontinued
toinstitute
additional
programmatic
guidanceonimplementing
10CFR50.59.Additional
ReviewAmoredetailedreviewoftheadditionoftheTygontubinghasbeendocumented
(seeAttachment
III).Evenunderthescrutinyofa50.59safetyevaluation
(asenclosed),
anUnreviewed
SafetyQuestion(USQ)doesnotresult.ProrammaticImrovements
Asdiscussed
inAttachment
II,aprogrammatic
approachto50.59hasbeenandiscontinuing
tobedeveloped
atGinna.Procedures
havebeenwrittentoensurethatappropriate
screening
criteria,formsarefilledoutinaccordance
withtheGinna50.59program.Thesescreening
formsprovideadequatebasisfor.applying50.59.on*acase-by-case
basis,andwillprovidefor'nadequatedocumentation
ofthebasisfortheconclusions
oftheapplicability
screen'ing
inthosecaseswhere50.59doesnotapply.Inaddition,
RG&Eisinstituting
trainingprogramsontheimplementation
of50.59tomakecertainthatallpersonnel
involvedinperforming
suchevaluations
understand
theRG&E50.59programand'hetechnical
considerations
involvedinapplyingtheprogrammatic
guidance.
Inthefuture,RG&Ewillbeconsidering
theconsolidation
oftheseveralexisting50.59reviewprograms,
suchasthoseforprocedure
reviewsand'Nonconformance
Reportreviews,intoasingleprogram.Thecurrentprogramsdo,however,adequately
addresstherequiredreviews.DateofFullComlianceRG&Ebelievesitiscurrently
incompliance
with10CFR50.59andwiththeGinnaQualityAssurance
Manualasitrelatestotheissuesidentified.
~iQ'IIQ'QgCVQVP%lgpP(v~~
ATTACHMENT
III.Introduction
Inadditionto'addressing
theNoticeofViolation,
weareresponding
tosomeoftheStaff'sassociated
concernsraisedwithintheinspection
reportitself.WewouldliketheStafftounderstand
thestatusofourprograms,
including
thecriticalreviewofourmodification
processandtheinstitution
ofour50.59process.WebelievethatitisevidentthatRG&Ehasaclearunderstanding
ofnotonlytheconcernsexpressed
inthisinspection
report,buttheevolvingconcernsthatrelatetotheseindustrywideissues.ItisourintentthattheStaffunderstand
thatwehavemadestridesindeveloping
comprehensive
programsthatnotonlyaddressconcernsinaspecificmanner,butlookatthebroaderpictureandcanbeseenasanoverallimprovement.
II.50.59ProramImrovements
IqthebodyofInspection
Report88-22,theNRCexpressed
aconcernthatRG&E'sfailuretoperformSafetyEvaluations
hasbeenanNRCidentified
concernformorethan20monthsandisindicative
ofprogrammatic
weaknessin'thecontrolofstationmodifications.
GinnaStationprocedures
areclearintherequirement
todevelopaSafetyEvaluation
insupportofmodifications.
Inadditiontoreviewing
physicalchanges,RG&Ehasadetailedscreening
programand.50.59guidanceforrevisions
madetoprocedures.
Thesafetyevaluation
processforbothmodifications
andprocedure
changeshasbeenimprovedthroughthecontinuing
development
ofdetailedguidance.
Thisguidancedocuments
theimpactsthateachevaluator
mustconsiderforaspecifictypeofchange.Specificexamplesforthesechangesarealsoprovided.
RG&Ehastakenapositiveapproachtodealingwiththe10CFR50.59process.Inmanyrespects,
thishasbeendifficult
becauseoftheevolvingnatureofNRC/industry
guidanceinthisarea.Thisisevidenced
bythefactthateventhemostrecentindustryguidanceisstillconsidered
adraft.Also,aspartofthiseffort,RG&Ewillconducttheretraining
ofaffectedpersonnel.
Thiswillincludediscussion
ofspecificprocedural
requirements,
identified
interfaces,
andtherequirements
oftheGinna50.59program.Anotherconcernexpressed
bythestaffwasthatRG&Eisnotperforming
50.59evaluations
forallmodifications
thatinvolveplantequipment
described
intheUFSAR.RG&Eiscommitted
totherequirements
toperform50.59evaluations,
butdoesnotbasethisdecisiontoperforma50.59evaluation
simplyonwhetherornotthe~4~~y
equipment
isdescribed
intheUFSAR.Itisourposition.thatifachangeaffectsthefacility,
asdescribed
intheUFSAR,eitherexplicitly
orimplicitly,
a50.59evaluation
shouldbecompleted.
Thisisnotourlastdetermining
factor,however.RG&Econservatively
appliestherequirements
of50.59withoutlosingperspective
ontheintentoftheregulation.
RG&Ebelievesthatthisregulation
mustbeappliedsothatitremainsmeaningful.
Wehavedeveloped
clear.safetyevaluation
guidance,
andextensive
screening
criteriatoaccomplish
thisgoal.Wehavedonethisinanefforttonotrelyexcessively
uponthehighlevelofengineering
expertise
ofourexistingpersonnel,
buttofurnishclearprogrammatic
controls.
Weunderstand
thatthisprogramdevelopment
hastakentimeandisstillunderway,
butwebelievethattheStaffshouldbeawarethatwesawtheneedforsuchguidanceandhavetakenappropriate,
steps.RG&Ehasneitherignorednordownplayed
theStaff'sconcerns,
buthassystematically
setupanoverallsystemtoaddresstherootcauseofthoseproblems.
III.GDC-34ConcernsAnotherissueraisedaspartoftheInspection
ReportisthattheRG&Ereview"doesnotaddresswhethergoodcommercial-grade
engineering
practices
meetstherequirements
ofGeneralDesignCriterion
(GDC)34".Thefollowing
discussion
providessupplemental
information
toclarifythisterminology
andplaceitinacontextthatmoreaccurately
reflectsRG&E'spastpractices
regarding
thedesignandqualityassurance
controlsappliedtotheCSTs.IrTheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerplantwasdesignedtotheproposedAIFGDCissuedforcommentonJuly10,1967.Itshouldbenotedthatthereisnocomparable
1967AIFGDCwhichaddresses
theresidualheatremovalissueidentified
inGDC34.Theplantwasnotoriginally
designedtomeettheGeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)ofAppendixAof10CFR50,including
GDC34,sincethesecriteriawereissuedinFebruaryof1971.Specifically,
theAFWCSTsweredesignedtotheAmericanWaterWorksAssociation
Standard(AWWA)D100,1965edition.SinceissuanceoftheGinnaProvisional
Operating
License,theAFWSystemhasbeenscrutinized
aspartoftheTMINUREG-0737
effortandtheGinnaSystematic
Evaluation
Program(SEP).DuringtheSEPreviewofTopicIII-1(Classification
ofStructures,
Components,
andSystems-SeismicandQuality),
theFranklinResearchCenterrecognized
thattheCSTsasoriginally
designedmightnotbecapableofmeetingcurrentcompressive
stressrequirements.
Additional
information
regarding
thecompressive
stresscapabilities
oftheCSTswasrequested
intheNRCSERonthistopic.Theinformation
suppliedbyRG&EwasacceptedbytheNRC.
TheCSTs,duetotheirlocationintheServiceBuilding(non-seismicstructure),
lackofprotective
features,
andtheiroriginaldesignpedigree,
havethepotential
forbeingrenderedinoperable
bytheeffectsofseveralpostulated
hazards(i.e.,safeshutdownearthquake,
tornadoes,
floods,missiles,
highenergylinebreakeffectsontheAFWSystem).Itshouldbenotedthatthesepostulated.
hazardsareremoteeventswithlowprobability
ofoccurrence
duringthelifetimeoftheplant.TheGinnaStationdesignaccommodates
theseremoteoccurrences
byincorporating
aSeismicCategoryIsourceofwater(ServiceWaterSystem)available
tothesuctionoftheAFWpumpsandbyhavingavailable
asecond"Standby"
AFWSystem.(TheSAFWSystempermitsdeliveryofAFWflowtotheSteamGenerators
assumingtheoccurrence
ofahighenergylinebreakintheIntermediate
Building.)
Inaddition,
anothersourceofwateravailable
istheyardfirehydrantsystemwhichcanfunctionindependent
ofallACpower.Asaresult,theCSTsarenotrequiredtoremainfunctional
following
thesepostulated
hazards.Withtheuseofindependent
AFWSystemsandtheavailability
ofindependent
andredundant
sourcesofwater,meansareavailable
atGinnaStationtoremovereactordecayheatfromthesecondary
sideoftheSteamGenerators
ataratesufficient
toachieveandmaintainasafeshutdowncondition
following
anydesignbasisevent.Asstatedin10CFR50,AppendixB,SectionIII,designandqualityassurance
controlsshouldbe"commensurate
withthoseappliedtotheoriginaldesign",including
allregulatory
commitments
madesinceGinnaProvisional
Operating
License.ThesecontrolsassurethattheCSTsandchangesmadetheretomeetquality"standards
atleastasstringent
asthoseoriginally
appliedtotheCSTs.TheQAcontrolsplacedontheCSTsarecommensurate
withthecontrolsnecessary
toassurethattheCSTswillproperlyfunctionforthedesignbasiseventsthatrequire-theiroperability
whilebeingsubjected
totheeffectsofthesesamedesignbasisevents.TheCSTsfunctionforUFSARChapter15events,unmitigated
firds,andstationblackout.
Theadverseeffectsoftheseeventshavealimitedimpactontheoperability
oftheCSTs,duetotheCSTs'ocation
intheServiceBuildingandtheassumptions
madefortheseeventscenarios
(forinstance,
theassumption
ofacoincident
lossofoffsitepower,butnottheassumption
ofacoincident
hazardsuchasasafeshutdownearthquake).
Section2.2oftheR.E.GinnaQAmanualrecognizes
thattheCSTsaresafetyrelated,butnotSeismicCategoryIandidentifies
thecontrolsthatapplytothesetanks.TheGinnaAFWdesignwasfoundtobeacceptable
asoriginally
licensedin1969,asreviewedagainstNUREG-0737,
ItemsII.E.1.1andII.E.1.2,
following
theTMIaccident,
andasreviewedagainstSEPTopicsX,"Auxiliary
System",andV-10.B,"Residual
HeatRemovalSystemReliability".
(NotethattheTMIandSEPreviewsessentially
reviewedtheGinnaAFWSystemsagainstthecriteriaofBTPASB10-1,andBTPRSB5-1.)AsaresultofNUREG-0737andtheSEPeffort,RGGEmadenumerouscommitments
andupgradestotheAFWSystems.Theseupgradeswerereviewedbythe
staffandapprovedinaccordance
withtheissuanceofGinna'sfulltermoperating
licenseinDecember1984.TheQAanddesigncontrolsappliedtotheAFWSystem,including
theCSTs,areconsistent
withthesecommitments
andthedesignbaselineestablished
withtheapprovalofthefulltermlicense.RG&Eisawareofthesafetyimportance
oftheCSTsandbelievesthatthequalityassurance
controlsappliedtotheCSTsmeettheoriginaldesignbasis,aswellastheregulatory
commitments
madesincetheProvisional
Operating
Licensewasissued.Whenconsidered
withintheoverallcontextoftheGinnaStationdesign,theQArequirement
appliedtoCSTsareappropriate.
Duetotheissuancerecentlyof10CFR50.63,andRegulatory
Guide1.155,RG&Eisperforming
anadditional
reviewofthedesigncontrolsplacedontheCSTsinthecontextofthisregulatory
guidanceandwillincludeappropriate
upgrades.
IV.Evaluation
ofCSTModifications
Anotherissuediscussed
intheinspection
reportwasthatatechnical
evaluation
fortheinstallation
ofTygontubingdownstream
ofmanualvalve4318Aandcopperpipinghadnotbeenprovidedattheendoftheinspection
period.RG&Ehasperformed
these50.59safetyevaluations
forbothoftheseconcerns(seealsotheresponsetotheNotice'of
Violation
regarding
theTygontubing,whichcontendsthataproper50.59screening
wasperformed
for.theadditionof,theTygontubingpriortoitsinstallation).
ForboththeTygontubingandtheinstallation
oftheHotWater.Systemthesafetyevaluations
concludethatnounreviewed,
safetyquestions
havebeenintroduced.
Theseevaluations
areprovided'inAttachment
III.Znaddition,
asaresultofyourrequest,a50.59safetyevaluation
hasbeenprovidedfortheinstallation
ofmanualvalve4318A.Thisevaluation
alsoconcludes
thatnounreviewed
safetyquestionexists.andisalsocontained
inAttachment
III.
ATTACHMENT
IIISafetEvaluation
fortheHotWaterSstemConnection
TheHotWatersystemconnections
totheCSTsareshownonP&IDs33013-457
and1234.Suctiontothehotwatercirculation
waterpump(MK102)istakenfromtheCSTsthroughmanualvalves8271,8275(CSTB),8270,8274(CSTA),and8276.Hotwaterisrecirculated
backtotheCSTsthrough8299J,8282(CSTA),and8283(CSTB).Thefollowing
sectionsevaluatetheimpacttoplantsafetyoftheconnection
.oftheHotWatersystemtothemainAFWCSTs.Postulated
HazardsandSafeShutdownCaabilitThefollowing
discussion
appliestothepostulated
Hazardslistedbelow:~Adverseweatherphenomena
include;ng
floods,highwinds,snow,andtornadoes
~SafeShutdownEarthquake
~HighEnergyLineBreaks~Externally
orinternally
generated
missilesTheHotWatersystemislocatedadjacenttotheCSTsintheServiceBuilding.
Asaresult,theadverseeffectsofpostulated
hazardsthatcanpotentially
failtheHotWatersystem(andtherebyintroduce
apotential
interaction
withtheCSTs)alsohavethepotential
tofailtheCSTs,sinceinbothcases:1.NeithertheCSTsnortheHotWatersystemarerequiredtobedesignedtowithstand
theeffectsofthehazardspostulated
fortheR.E.Ginnaplant.2.NeithertheCSTsnortheHotWatersystemareprotected
bydesignfeaturessuchasphysicalbarriersto'reserve
theirintegrity
following
postulated
hazards.TheServiceBuildingisnotaSeismicCategoryIstructure
capableofwithstanding
adverseweathereffectsornaturalphenomena.
Forpostulated
hazardsthatpotentially
failtheCSTs,analternate
andindependent
meansofachieving
andmaintaining
asafeshutdowncondition
(thesafeshutdownfunctionofconcernistheremovalofreactordecayheat)isavailable
viatheServiceWatersystemsupplying
.watertoeitherthemainorstandbyAFWsystems.
Asaresult,nosignificant
degradation
inthecapability
ofachieving
andmaintaining
asafeshutdowncondition
willresultduetothehotwatermodification
interface
withtheCSTs.Thecontingency
actionsandalternate
meansofremovingreactordecayheatfollowing
apostulated
hazardremainvalidforthecurrentCSTconfiguration.
ThefailureoftheHotWatersystemfollowing
aseismiceventwhichcouldleadtothedrainingoftheCSTsontotheServiceBuilding'loorisboundedbythepresentanalysisoffailureofCSTsperEWR1023,May20,1975.Thisfloodingscenarioisthesameasthatpreviously
analyzedsincetheHotWatersystemdoesnotintroduce
anewsourceofwater.Inaddition,
theHotWatersystemdoesnotintroduce
anyhighenergylinebreakofconcern,orthepotential
forinternally
generated
missiles.
FiresThemainAFWsystemtakingsuctionfromtheCSTsisusedtoremovedecayheatfollowing
severalpostulated
'nmitigated
fires.Unmitigated
firescanresultinalossofoffsitepowerwhichwouldsubsequently
resultinalossoftheInstrument
Airsystem(IAS).AreviewofPAID33013-457
showsthatthe"effect"ofa,fireresulting
inalossoftheIASisminimalontheCSTsasconfigured
withHotWatersystemconnection.
IftheHotWatersystemisnotinuse,itcanbeisolatedfromtheCSTsviamanualvalves8275,8274,and8299J.Ifthe.HotWatersystemisinuseduringafire,,HotWaterpumps(MK102and115)wouldstoponloss'fACpower.AlthoughtheHotWatersystemcouldbecomeapotential
drainagepathforCST.inventory,
theelevation
ofthehotwaterusers(laundryandhotshowersareatanelevation
equaltothetopoftheCSTs)andtheflowresistance
oftheHotWatersystempipingessentially
maketheHotWatersystemaclosedsystemtodrainage..
AlthoughtheHotWatersystemintroduces
combustibles
intotheServiceBuildingviathegassupplytoheaterMK106,thesafeshutdowncomponents
locatedintheServiceBuilding(CSTs,pipingtotheAFWpumps)shouldnotbeadversely
affected.
Thisisinaccordance
withtheexistinganalysiswhichdealswithfiresintheServiceBuilding.
Thesearemechanical
components
thatmustmaintaintheirpressureboundaryintegrity
toaccomplish
theirsafeshutdownfunction.
TheAppendixRanalysisforGinnaassumesthatexposurefiresdonotcausemechanical
components
tolosepressureboundaryintegrity.
Asaresult,thismodification
doesnotaffectsafeshutdownforfires.Forfiresrequiring
operation
ofthemainAFWsystem,theCSTswillbeoperable,
enablingtheremovalofreactordecayheattoachieveandmaintainasafeshutdowncondition
duringandfollowing
postulated
fires.MitiationofChater15EventsThefollowing
discussion
assessesthesafetyimpactoftheconnection
oftheHotWatersystemtotheCSTsforthefollowing
postulated
UFSARChapter15events,whicharetheonlyeventsforwhichtheAFWsystemisreliedon"asamitigation
feature:
~MainSteamLineBreaks(MSLB)~MainFeedLineBreaks(MFLB)~LossofNormalFeedwater
~LossofACtotheStationAuxiliaries
~LossofExternalElectrical
Loads~LossofCoolantAccidents
(LOCAs)~SteamGenerator
TubeRupture(SGTR)Toassessthepotential
degradation
inthecapability
ofmitigating
theaboveevents,'heHotWatersystemisexaminedforitspotential
adverseinteraction
withtheCSTs.ThefunctionoftheCSTsistomaintainaninventory
of22,500gallonsofcondensate-
gradewaterfortheremovalofreactordecayheatfor2hoursindependent
ofanyACpowersource(TMIItem.II.E.1.1).
TheCSTsalsofunctionastheinitialAFWinventory
sourcefollowing
theoccurrence
ofanyoftheaboveChapter15events(whichresultinthesubsequent
lossof.mainfeedwater
andautoinitiation
ofAFW).Hence,theadverse"effects"
oftheseChapter15eventsareexaminedforthepotential
tofailtheHotWatersystemandtherebydepletetheCSTinventory
throughanadverseinteraction.
Therearetwo"effects"
thatimpactthecurrentCSTconfiguration.
1.MSLBsandMFLBsintheintermediate
buildingcreateadverseeffects(pipewhip,jetimpingement,
temperature,
pressure,
humidity)
thathavethepotential
tofailthemainAFWsystem.MlthreemainAFWpumps(2motordrivenpumps,1turbinedrivenpump)andasignificant
portionofAFWpipingarelocatedintheintermediate
building.
Theeffectsofsomepostulated
MSLBsandMFLBscanfailthemain'AFWsystem.2.MostoftheChapter15eventsassumethecoincident
lossofoffsitepower.LossofnormalACpowerresultsinalossoftheInstrument
Airsystem(IAS)causingairoperatedvalves(AOVs)tofailonlossofsupplyair.ForthecaseofMSLBsorMFLBsintheintermediate
building,
ifthemainAFWsystemfailsthentheCSTsnolongerfunctionastheAFWwatersource.InthiscasethestandbyAFWsystemisplacedintoservice(10minutesforoperatoractionisavailable)
takingsuctionfromtheServiceWatersystem.Thisequipment
islocatedintheStandbyAuxiliary
PumpBuildingandisacompletely
independent
meansofremovingreactordecayheat.Therefore,
thepotential
effectsofMSLBsand,MFLBsontheHotWatersystemhavebeenboundedbythecurrentChapter15analysis.
Asdescribed
inthesectionon"Fires"above,thelossofnormalACpowerdoesnotcreateanadverseinteraction
betweentheHotWatersystemandtheCSTs.TheHotWatersystemiseffectively
aclosedsystem.CSTinventory
willnotbedepletedasaresultoftheassumedcoincidence
ofalossofoffsitepowerfortheChapter15events.Inconclusion,
theconnection
oftheHotWatersystemtotheCSTsdoesnotresultinadditional
consequential
failuresornewfailuremodesthatcreatethepotential
fornew"worstsinglefailures",
ordifferent
eventscenarios.
HotWaterSstemSafetEvaluation
Conclusion
Thissectionsummarizes
thesafetyevaluation
oftheHotWatersystemconnection
totheCSTs.Thissummarygroupspostulated
FiresunderthecategoryofHazards.Theconnection
oftheHotWatersystemtotheCSTsdoesnot,increasetheprobability
ofoccurrence
ofanaccidentpreviously
evaluated
intheGinnaUpdatedFSAR.Asdiscussed
previously,
thefailureoftheHotWatersystemdoesnotcreateaplanttransient
requiring
aprotective
responsefromasafetysystem.Theconnection
oftheHotWatersystemtotheCSTsdoesnotincreasetheconsequences
ofanaccidentpreviously
evaluated
intheGinnaUpdatedFSAR.Asdiscussed
above,thecapability
toachieveandmaintainasafeshutdowncondition
following
theoccurrence
ofpostulated
hazardsisnotdegraded.
TheHotWatersystemdoesnotadversely
interactwithCSTsfortheChapter15eventscenarios.
Asaresult,CSTinventory
isnotdegraded,
mainAFWperformance
isnotimpacted,
andthecapability
toremovereactordecayheatduringandfollowing
thepostulated
Chapter15eventsisnotdegraded.
Therefore,
theintegrity
ofbarrierspreventing
thereleaseoffissionproductsisnotimpacted.
Theconnection
oftheHotWatersystemtotheCSTsdoesnotincreasetheprobability
ofoccurrence
ofamalfunction
.ofequipment
important
tosafetypreviously
evaluated
intheGinnaUpdatedFSAR.Asdiscussed
above,theeffectsofpostulated
HazardsthatcouldfailtheHotWatersystemwouldlikelyalsofailtheCSTssincetheCSTswerenotor'iginally
designedtowithstand
sucheffects.Assuchtheeffectoffailing-the'HotWatersystemisboundedbytheoriginalanalysiswhichassumesfailureoftheCSTs.TheeffectsofChapter15eventshavenoimpactonthecapability
ofCSTstomaintaintheirinventory
forthoseeventsrequiring
theoperation
ofthemainAFWsystem.Thereistherefore
nochangeinthefailureprobability
oftheCSTsforChapter15events.Theconnection
oftheHotWatersystemtotheCSTsdoesnotincreasetheconsequences
ofamalfunction
oftheCSTsforHazardsorChapter15events.Theconsequences
ofsuchmalfunctions
are.therefore
unchanged.
Theconnection
oftheHotWatersystemtotheCSTsdoesnotcreatethepossibility
ofanaccidentofadifferent
typethananypreviously
evaluated
intheGinnaUpdatedFSAR.ThefailureoftheHotWatersystemanditspotential
forinteraction
withtheCSTsdoesnotcreatenewplanttransients
requiring
mitigation.
Theconnection
oftheHotWatersystemtotheCSTsdoesnotcreatethepossibility
ofamalfunction
ofequipment
important
tosafetyofadifferent
typethananypreviously
evaluated
intheUpdatedGinnaFSAR.ThefailureoftheHotWatersystemisessentially
thesameasafailureoftheCSTs.Theinstallation
oftheHotWatersystemdoesnotintroduce
anewordifferent
failuremode.
Theconnection
oftheHotWatersystemtotheCSTsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafety.TheAFWsystemcanstillfunctiontomitigateChapter15events,aswellastoremovedecayheatfor2hourswithoutanACpowersource.Inaddition,
safeshutdowncapability
isnotaffected,
andtheintegrity
offissionproductbarriersisnotcompromised.
Basedontheaboveconclusions,
the,connection
oftheHotWatersystemtothemainAFWCSTsdoesnotintroduce
anunreviewed
safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59.SafetEvaluation
fortheAdditionofonTubinTygontubingwasinstalled
downstream
ofclosedmanualvalve4318AtoprovideameansoflocalCSTlevelindication
independent
ofanyACpowersource.LocalCSTlevelindication
viatheTygontubingwouldbeusedtoallowlocaloperators
todetermine
whentoalignandplaceintooperation
theServiceWatersystemfollowing:
1.ControlComplexFires(SC-3.30.1)
2.CableTunnelFires(SC-3.30.2)
3.Auxiliary
BuildingBasement/Mezzanine
Fires(SC-3.30.3)
The22,500galloninventory
intheCSTsprovidesfor2hoursofreactordecayheatremoval.Thisisconsidered
sufficient
timetoalignandplaceintooperation
theServiceWatersystemintheremoteeventthatanACpowersourcecannotberestoredfor2hoursfollowing
thepostulated
unmitigated
firesidentified
.above.'ence,theTygontubingisnotessential
forsafe.shutdownfollowing
fires..However,itcanprovideoperators
withCSTlevelinformation
toprovideamoreaccuratemeansofdetermining
whenServiceWatershouldbealigned.Itshouldbenoted,thattheR.E.GinnaAppendixRAlternative
ShutdownReportdoesnotidentifyCSTlevelindication
asaplantprocessparameter
thatmulctbemonitored.
forsupporting
safeshutdown.
Theinstallation
ofTygontubingdownstream
ofmanual.valve4318Adoesnotincreasetheprobability
ofoccurrence
ortheconsequences
ofanaccidentormalfunction
ofequipment
important
tosafetypreviously
evaluated
in.theGinnaUpdatedFSAR.TheTygontubingisisolatedfromallplantprocesssystemsviaclosedmanualvalve4318A.Thepressureboundaryprovided,
byclosedmanualvalve4318Aprecludes
thepotential
foradverseprocessinteractions.
TheTygontubingisaflexiblematerialoflowmassthatisnotcapableofphysically
impacting
thesystems,structures,
orcomponents
intheimmediate
vicinity.
Theinstallation
ofTygontubingdownstream
ofmanualvalve4318Adoesnotcreatethepossibility
ofanaccidentormalfunction
ofadifferent
typethananypreviously
analyzedintheGinnaUpdatedFSAR.Asstatedabove,theTygontubingisisolated.
fromallplantsystemsandtherefore
doesnotcreatethepotential
forprocessinteractions
thatcanleadtodifferent
accidents
ormalfunctions.
Theinstallation'of
Tygontubingdownstream
ofmanualvalve4318Adoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefined,inthebasisofanyTechnical
Specification.
TheTygontubingwillprovidealocalindication
ofCSTlevelforfiresthatresultinalossofallAC.Thisindication
providesabettermeansofdetermining
whentoalignServiceWaterintheunlikelyeventofanunmitigated
fire,prolonged
lossofallAC,anddepletion
oftheCSTs.AlthoughsafeshutdowncanbeachievedwithoutthislocalCSTlevelindication,
theTygontubingisbeneficial
forfirerecoveryefforts.SafetEvaluation
fortheAdditionofManualValve4318AThefollowing
constitutes
a10CFR50.59safetyevaluation
fortheadditionofmanualvalve4318AtoasamplinglineontheAuxiliary
(AFW)pumpsuctionheaderfromtheCondensate
StorageTanks.Thisevaluation
isbeingprovidedperanNRCrequest.Thefunctionofmanualvalve4318AistoprovideapressureboundaryfortheAFWCSTsandensurethatCSTdrainagedoesnotoccurviathe3/4inchdiametersamplingline.Thisevaluation
assumestheadditionofthemanualvalvetotheexistingsamplingline.Manualvalve4318AisnormallyclosedandisonlyopenedtoenablelocalCSTlevelindication
viatheTygontubing.Sincethe4318Aisnormallyclosed,itisnotsubjecttoeitherashorttermactivefailureoralongtermpassivefailure.Specifically,'he
valvedoesnothavetochangepositionthrougha'echanical
movementto-accomplish
afunctionnecessary
tomitigateanypostulated
designbasiseventsfortheGinnafacility.
(Itisnot.essential
tohavelocalCSTlevelindication
viatheCSTTygontubingtorecoverfrompostulated
unmitigated
fires.However,thisfeaturedoesenhanceplantsafetyshouldsuchafireoccur.)Itisnotnecessary
topostulate
aspuriousopeningof4318Asinceitismanuallyoperated.
Evenif4318Awasinadvertently
openedduetoanoperatorerror,theassumption
thatCSTdrainagegoesundetected
andthatadesignbasiseventsubsequently
occursisnotcredible.
If4318Aweretobecomeadrainagepathway,CSTlevelindication
woulddetectthelossofinventory.
Therefore,
operatoractioncanrestoretherequiredquantityofwaterorprovideasupplyfromtheServiceWaterSystem.Further,drainageoftheCSTwouldnothaveadetrimental
effectonrequiredequipment,
asisdescribed
intheevaluation
oftheHotWaterSystemConnection.
Theadditionofmanualvalve4318Adoesnotincreasetheprobability
ofoccurrence
ortheconsequences
ofanaccidentormalfunction
ofequipment
important
tosafetypreviously
evaluated
intheGinnaUpdatedFSAR.Manualvalve4318AisanormallyclosedvalvethatprovidesapressureboundaryfortheAFWsysteminventory
source(CSTs),consistent
withcommercial
gradeengineering
practice.
Thereisnosingleactiveorpassivefailurewhichresultsin4318Aopening.Asaresult,theinstallation
of4318Adoesnotimpactanydesignbasisevent.
Theadditionofmanualvalve4318Adoesnotcreatethepossibility
foranaccidentor'alfunction
ofadifferent
typethananypreviously
evaluated
intheGinnaUpdatedFSAR.Manualvalve4318Aisnormallyclosedandnoworstsinglefailurethatisrequiredtobepostulated
fortheGinnastationcancausethepressureboundaryprovidedby4318Atobedegraded.
Asaresult,theAFWinventory
source(CSTs)arenotimpacted.
Theadditionofmanualvalve4'318AdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyGinnaTechnical
Specification.
Thefunctionof4318AistomaintainapressureboundaryfortheCSTs.Thevalvedoesnotperformanessential
functiontomitigateanypostulated
designbasiseventforGinna.Manualvalve4318Ainconjunction
withtheTygontubingenhanceslocalindication
capability
inresponsetopostulated
unmitigated
fires'~>>>>.>>>>>>>>~>>P>>I->>