ML17261B023

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Responds to NRC 890222 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/89-17.Corrective Actions:Personnel Verified Safety Injection Block/Unblock Switch in Proper Position & Operator Procedure 0-1.1 Changed as Indicated
ML17261B023
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/26/1990
From: MECREDY R C
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: RUSSELL W T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 9004040007
Download: ML17261B023 (16)


See also: IR 05000244/1989017

Text

ACCELERATED

DISTRIBUTION

DEMONST$&TIONSYSTEMREGULATORY

INFORMATION

DISTRXBUTION

SYSTEM(RIDS)ESSIONNBR:9004040007

DOC~DATE:90/03/26NOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:50-244

RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester

GAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION

MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester

Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME

RECIPIENT,

AFFILIATION

RUSSELL,W.T;

Region1,OfcoftheDirectorSUBJECT:RespondstoNRC890222ltrreviolations

notedinInspRept50-244/89-17.

DISTRXBUTION

CODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR

ENCL0SIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp

Rept/Notice

ofVilationResponse,

DOCKET05000244RNOTES:License

Expdateinaccordance

with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72)..

05000244,']

RECIPIENT

IDCODE/NAME

PD1-3PDINTERNAL'EOD

AEOD/TPAD

NRRSHANKMAN,S

NRR/DOEADIR11NRR/DREP/PRPB11

NRR/DST/DXR

8E2NUDOCS=ABSTRACZ

REGFIXE'--~02~RGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:

LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL1111,2'111111RECIPIENT

IDCODE/NAME

JOHNSON,A

AEOD/DEIIB

DEDRONRR/DLPQ/LPEB10

NRR/DREP/PEPB9D

NRR/DRIS/DIR

NRR/PMAS/ILRB12

OGC/HDS2RESMORISSEAU,D

NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111l11legsp]57~'-'.ANOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWAS'ONTACT

THEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE

YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION

LISTSFORDOCUMENTS

YOUDON'TNEED!OTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR23ENCL

I~

ROCHESTER

GASffA'ff~ffffRTCIff,ii'TANIANDELECTRICCORPORATION

~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,

N.Y.14849-pppg

March26,1990TCKCRHONC

ARCACOOK71K5462700Mr.WilliamT.RussellRegionalAdministrator

U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

RegionI475Allendale

RoadKingofPrussia,Pennsylvania

19406Subject:ResponsetoNoticesofViolation

Inspection

ReportNo.50-244/89-17

R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244DearMr.Russell:ThisletterisinresponsetotheFebruary22,1989letterfromJonR.Johnson,Chief,ProjectsBranchNo.3toRobertE.Smith,SeniorVicePresident,

RG&E,whichtransmitted

Inspection

ReportNo.50-244/89-17.

Inthatreport,twoviolations

wereidentified.

Thefollowing

providesareplytotheviolations

pursuantto10CFR2.201.RESTATEMENT

OFVIOLATIONS

Duringinspection

attheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantfromDecember12,1989throughJanuary8,1990,thefollowing

violations

wereidentified

andevaluated

inaccordance

withtheNRCEnforcement

Policy(10CFR2,AppendixC):Contrarytotheabove,asafetyinjection

systemdesigndeficiency

wasnotpromptlyidentified

andcorrected

whencorporate

engineering

wasnotifiedonorbeforeOctober20,'989thatfailureofthesafetyinjection

block/unblock

switchcouldblockautomatic

safetyinjection

actuation

onlowpressurizer

pressureorlowsteamlinepressure.

Corporate

engineering

did.notconcludethatthisproblemexistedatGinnauntilaboutNovember17,1989,andsitetechnical

personnel

werenotinformedaboutthedeficiency

untilDecember19,1989.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation

(Supplement

I).~Qo~~l"/0040">0V07200c'ORADOCI=000:..44

FDCA.10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

XVI,andtheGinnaQualityAssurance

Manual,Section16,requirepromptidentification

andcorrection

ofconditions

adversetoqualityincluding

failures,

malfunctions,

deficiencies,

defective

materialandequipment,

andnonconformances.

4

B.10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

V,andtheGinnaQualityAssurance

Manual,Section5,requireactivities

affecting

quality-tobeaccomplished

inaccordance

withinstructions,

procedures,

ordrawingswhichincludeappropriate

quantitative

orqualitative

acceptance

criteriafordetermining

thatimportant

activities

havebeensatisfactorily

accomplished.

Contrarytotheabove,onDecember15,1989,maintenance

wasperformed

onasafety-related

motor-operated

valveinthesafetyinjection

systeminaccordance

withaprocedure

whichincludedaninappropriate

torquespecification.

ThisisaSeverityLevelVviolation

(Supplement

I).RESPONSETOVIOLATION

ARG&EPositiononExistence

ofViolation

Rochester

GasandElectricCorporation

(RG&E)concursthataviolation

ofAppendixB,Criterion

XVIoccurred.

RG&Erecognizes

thatcommunication

betweencorporate

engineering

andsitepersonnel

onissuesofpotential

safetysignificance

shouldbeformalized.

OureffortstoaddressthisconcernareprovidedinSection4,"LongTermEnhancements".

Asexplained

below,RG&Ealsobelievesthatwithrespecttotheissueidentified

onOctober20,1989,weactedinamannerconsistent

withthesafety.significance

ofthematter.2.ReasonforViolation

AsInspection

ReportNo.50-244/89-17

(p.7)indicates,

RG&EreceivednoticeonOctober20,1989,fromWestinghouse

ElectricCorporation

(Westinghouse)

ofanapparentgenericdesigndeficiency

relatedtothetypeofsafetyinjection

(SI)block/unblock

switchusedatvariousWestinghouse

reactors.

TheWestinghouse

letter,datedOctober12,1989,concluded

thata"singlefailureoftheswitch(Westinghouse

OT2)couldblockeithertheautomatic

lowpressurizer

pressureorthelowsteamline

pressureSIsignalinbothtrains"[emphasis

supplied].

Theletteralsostatedthattheprobability

ofswitchfailurewas"10'10'/yr":andthat,whileadesignchangewasrecommended,

thesituation

was"notanimmediate

safetyconcern."

Inaddition,

theWestinghouse

letterreferredtoaLicenseeEventReport(LER),No.88-007-00,

submitted

byWisconsin,

ElectricPowerCompany(Wisconsin

Electric)

onSeptember

16,1988,concerning

thesameissueatthePointBeachNuclearPlant(PointBeach).TheWisconsin

ElectricLERconcluded

that"thiscondition

willnothaveasignificant

impactonthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublicortheemployees

ofthePointBeachNuclearPlant."

'

TheLERnotedthatthePointBeachfacilitywasoperating

at100%capacitywhentheconcernwasidentified

andthatdesignchangewouldnot'emadeuntilthenextscheduled

outage.UponreceiptoftheWestinghouse

notification

onOctober20,1989,RG&E(corporate)

initiated

atimelyreviewforapplicability

toGinnaStation.BasedontheWisconsin

ElectricLERandonWestinghouse's

calculation

ofthelowprobability

ofswitchfailure,itwasapparentthatthematterdidnotconstitute

animmediate

safetyconcern.Whenitwasidentified

thattheswitchconfiguration

wasapplicable

toGinnaStation,aninternalengineering

recommendation

wasmadeconsistent

withtheguidanceoftheWestinghouse

letterandattachedLER,thatanEWRbeinitiated.

Thiswascompleted

onNovember17,1989.Thisrecommendation

wasthenevaluated

withinNuclearSafetyandLicensing,

resulting

inadiscussion

withsitetechnical

supportpersonnel

relativetothissituation

onDecember19,1989.OnDecember20,sitepersonnel

initiated

aGinnaStationEventReportperProcedure

A-25.1(EventNo.89-168).Theeventreportindicated

thatthesitePlantOperations

ReviewCommittee

(PORC)had,onDecember20,1989,concluded

thatplantoperation

couldcontinueforthefollowing

reasons:1.Westinghouse

statedthatthe.probability

offailurewasverylow(i.e.,10'o10'/yr);2.Emergency

Operating

Procedures

directedOperators

tousemanualSIinitiation

whereindicators

showautomatic

initiation

hasfailed;3.Aseparateautomatic

SIinitiating

mechanism

wouldactivatewhencontainment

pressurereached4psig;4.Duringdepressurization,

abistablelightwill'lert

operators

ofablockedSIsignal;and5.Visualverification

oftheSIswitchplungerpositionindicates

thatthecontactsareintheproperposition.

Theviolation

statesthatthetimebetweenOctober20,1989,whenRG&E(corporate)

wasnotifiedbyWestinghouse,

andthecommunication

ofthisinformation

tothesitetechnical

staffonDecember19,1989,showsthattheSIdesigndeficiency

wasnotpromptlyidentified

andcorrected,

andindicates

problemsincommunication

betweencorporate

engineering

andsitepersonnel.

WhileRG&Edoesnotdenythisviolation,

webelievethattheactionstakenbyRG&Ewereappropriate

inviewofRG&E'spreliminary

conclusion

thattheissuedidnotconstitute

animmediate

safetyconcern.

RG&EbelievesthatAppendixB,Criterion

XVIdoesnotestablish

aprecisetimelimitforresolution

ofsafetyissues.Rather,issuessuchas"promptness"

or"timeliness"

aresubjective

mattersthatinherently

dependuponthesafetysignificance

ofthesituation.

GiventhatRGGEhadadocumented

recommendation

fromWestinghouse

thatnoimmediate

safetyconcernexisted(ascorroborated

bythePointBeachLER),itsactionstowardresolution

oftheissuewerepromptandtimely.Anyotherinterpretations

ofCriterion

XVIwouldbecountertopublichealthandsafetybecauseitwouldrequirelicensees

totreatalldeficiencies

ornon-conforming

itemsthesame(i.e.,regardless

ofsafetysignificance).

Thissamebasicphilosophy

wasaffirmedinananalogous

context'inrecentguidanceissuedbyNRC'sOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation

'(NRR).Specifically,

onJuly19,1989,Dr.T.E.Murley,Director,

NRC/NRR,sentamemorandum

toalloftheregionaladministrators

entitled"Guidance

onActionToBeTakenFollowing

Discovery

ofPotentially

Nonconforming

Equipment."

Inhismemorandum,

Dr.Murleystatedthat"[t]hereisnogenerally

appropriate

timeframe

inwhichoperability

determinations

shouldbemade."Forequipment

whichis"clearlyinoperable,"

animmediate

declaration

ofinoperability

shouldbemadeandtheappropriate

technical

specifications

followed.

However,Dr.Murley'smemorandum

contrasts

thissituation

withthosewhereequipment

nonconformances

simplyraisetheissueofoperability.

Insuchsituations

Dr.Murleystatesthat:operability

determinations

shouldbemadebylicensees

assoonasracticable,

andinatimeframe

commensurate

withthealicableeuiment'simortancetosafetusinthebestinformation

available,(e.g.,

analyses,

atestorpartialtest,experience

withoperating

events,engineering

judgement

oracombination

ofthefactors)(emphasis

supplied).

Althoughthisguidancerelatestotimingofoperability

determinations,

itisequallyappropriate

withrespecttoresolution

ofopenitemsunderCriterion

XVI.Consistent

withthisphilosophy

andbasedonthebestinformation

available,

futurecasesofthistypewillberesolved"assoonaspracticable"

andinatimecommensurate

withthesafetysignificance

ofthematter.Communication

betweencorporate

andsitepersonnel

willbeinitiated

promptlyonceapplicability

toGinnaStationisdetermined.

Corrective

StesWhichHaveBeenTakenandtheResultsAchievedCorporate

andsitetechnical

staffandthePORChavereviewedthecircumstances

surrounding

thepotentially

genericdesigndeficiency

relatedtothecontrolroomSIblock/unblock

switch.AsstatedinLER89-016,the.following

actionsweretaken:

Knowledgeable

personnel

inspected

theplungerpositionoftheSIBlock/Unblock

Switchandverifiedthattheswitchcontactswereintheproperposition.

~Operating

Procedure

0-1.1(PlantHeatupFromColdShutdowntoHotShutdown)

waschangedtoaddthefollowing

noteandcheck-off

toStep5.11.6:NOTE:PriortoplacingtheSIBlock/Unblock

Switchtothenormalposition,

stationanoperatorinsidetheMCBindirectobservation

oftheSIBlock/Unblock

Switchtoobservethatbothplungertipsarerecessedinwardaftertheswitchisplaced.tonormalposition.-

Blockswitchplungert'ipspositioninward~AnRG&Eoperatoraidtagwas.placedonthe.MCBadjacenttotheSIBlock/Unblock

Switchdenotingthenote-from0-1.1.~AnRG&EoperatoraidtagwasalsoplacedinsidetheMCBadjacenttotherearoftheSIBlock/Unblock

Switchstatingthefollowing:

Thisistheswitchweverifythattheplunger's

tipsarerecessedinwardwhentheswitchisplacedtonormal(labeledLAK).AspareswitchofsimilardesignhasbeenplacedintheControlRoomforthepurposeoftrainingtheoperators

torecognize

thedifferences

inplungerposition.

Theseactionsareconsidered

adequatetoprovidereasonable

assurance

ofSIsystemoperability

untilthesituation

canbepermanently

dispositioned.

Finally,EWR5025wasinitiated

toprovidefortheinstallation

ofindependent

SIblock/unblock

switchesforeachSItrainwhichisplannedforthe1991refueling

outage.4.Corrective

StesWhichWillBeTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation

RG&Ehasrecentlytakenstepstoupgradetheoverallcorrective

actionprogramforGinnaStation.Theneedforimprovements

wasnotedduringthecourseoftheRHRSystemSafetySystemFunctional

Inspection

(SSFI),andisalsoconsidered

appropriate

duetoRG&E'sinitiation

ofacomprehensive

Configuration

Management/Design

BasisProgram.WeareworkingwiththeNUMARCDesignBasisIssuesWorkingGrouptodevelopanimprovedproblemidentification

andresolution

program.Theimprovedprogramwill:~Improvetheprocessofidentifying,

analyzing,

andresolving

problems;

~ImprovetheRG&Einternalreviewprocess,including

formalized

meansofcommunication

betweencorporate

engineering

andsitepersonnel

onissuesofpotential

safetysignificance;

andPartoftheimplementation

ofthiseffortwillincludespecificprocedural

upgrades,

enhancement

ofourcorrective

actiontrackingsystem,andtheissuanceofacorporate

policywhichaddresses

problemidentification

andreporting.

Webelievethatthisbroadeffort,whenfullyimplemented,

willimproveourcapability

toconsistently

identifyanddisposition

potential

safetyissuescommensurate

withtheirsignificance.

5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedLongtermandshorttermactionsandschedules

havebeendescribed

above.Formalguidanceconcerning

communication

betweencorporate

andsitepersonnel

onidentified

problemissuesisunderdevelopment,

andistargetedforcompletion

byJuly1990.RESPONSETOVIOLATION

BRochester

GasandElectricconcurswiththisviolation

asstatedbelow.ReasonforViolation

Rochester

GasandElectricagreesthat,GinnaStationdoesnothaveanestablished

writtenpolicyregarding

consideration

ofinherentinaccuracy

ofcalibrated

measuring

andtest,equipment

(M&TE)whendeveloping

acceptance

criteria.

As-acommonpractice,

torquingmethodsaddressonlyinstru-ment"indication"

andarenotmeanttoincludetheinstrument

accuracy.

Thispracticeisbasedonthefactthattorqueisonlyageneralindicator

ofboltingpre-loadbecauseoftheinaccuracies,

e.g.,lubrication,

threadfit,threadcondition,

etc.,inherentinthetorqueequation.

Whenhighlyaccurateboltpre-loading

isrequired,

meansotherthantorqueisused,i.e.,studelongation

todetermine

boltpre-load.

TheCorrective

StesWhichHaveBeenTakenandtheResultsAchievedDuetothesuccessful

completion

ofpostmaintenance

testing,noactionregarding

thevalvepackingadjustment

hasbeentaken.A-1603.4,

"WorkOrderScheduling"

wasrevisedtorequireworkandtestingtobecompleted

onindividual

trainspriortostartingmaintenance

onaredundant

train.

'TheCorrective

StesWhichWillBeTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation

1.Administrative

procedure

A-1603.3,

"WorkOrderPlanning"

willberevisedtostateaGinnaStationpolicyregarding

consideration

ofM&TEinherentinaccuracy

andprovidedirection

fordevelopment'f

acceptance

criteriautilizi'ng

thisequipment.

2.Anewprocedure

forpackingadjustment

isbeingdeveloped

toprovidespecificdirection

foradjustment

ofvalvesrepackedundertheValvePackingImprovement

Programandtoprovideamethodofmaintaining

andupdatingvalvepackingdata.TheDateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedTheanticipated

effective

dateoftheaboveprocedures

isMay1,1990,forthemaintenance

procedures

andJune30,1990,fortheadministrative

procedure.

Verytrulyyours,RobertC.MedyDivisionManagerNuclearProduction

GJWN093Enclosures

xc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

(original)

DocumentControlDeskWashington,

D.C.20555AllenR.Johnson.(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorate

I-3Washington,

D.C.20555NicholasS.Reynolds,

Esq.Bishop,Cook,PurcellandReynolds1400L.Street,N.W.Washington,

D.C.20005-3502

GinnaNRCSeniorResidentInspector

~l0