ML17334B659

Petition Per 10CFR2.206 Requesting That OLs Be Modified, Revoked or Suspended Until Reasonable Assurance That Sys in Conformance W/Design & Licensing Bases Requirements

ML17334B659
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	10/09/1997
From:	LOCHBAUM D A UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
To:	CALLAN L J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
References
2.206, DD-99-03, DD-99-3, NUDOCS 9711180014
Download: ML17334B659 (30)

Text

NOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEINTERNAFILECENTEREXTERNAL:NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL1111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMENUDOCS-ABSTRACTNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1111CATEGORY2REGULA~.YINFORMATION.DISTRIBUTIOYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSXONNBR:9711180014DOC.DATE:97/10/09NOTARIZED:NODOCKETFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONLOCHBAUM,D.A.UnionofConcernedScientistsRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATION'CALLAN,L.J.OfcoftheExecutiveDirectorforOperations

SUBJECT:

Submitspetitionper10CFR2.206recgxestingthatoperatinglicensesbemodified,revokedorsuspendeduntilreasonableassurancethatsysinconformancew/designslicensingrecgxirements.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:DF01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:DirectFlowDistribution:50Docket(PDRAvail)EQ0DUNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR4ENCL4

~\UNIONOFCONCERNEDSCIENTISTSOctober9,1997Mr.L.JosephCallanExecutiveDirectorforOperationsUnitedStatesNuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,DC20555-0001SUBJECTiPETITIONPURSUANTTO10CFR'2.206,DONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTSUNITS1AND2,DOCKETNOS.50-315AND50-316

DearMr.Callan:

TheUnionofConcernedScientistssubmitsthispetitionpursuantto10CFR2.206requestingthattheoperatinglicensesforDonaldC.CookUnits1and2bemodified,revoked,orsuspendeduntilthereisreasonableassurancethattheirsystemsareinconformancewithdesignandlicensingbasesrequirements.AprocesscomparabletothesystemcertificationsrecentlyusedbytheSalemandMillstonelicenseeswouldprovidethisnecessarylevelofassurance.UCSadditionallyrequeststhatapublichearingintothismatter'eheldintheWashington,DCareapriortothefirstunitatDCCookbeingauthorizedtorestart.Atthishearing,wewillpresentinformationsupportingthecontentionsinthispetition.BBackBroundhOnOctober9,1996,theNRCrequestedthatitspowerreactorlicenseesprovideinformationpursuantto10CFR50.54(f)regardingtheadequacyandavailabilityofdesignbasesinformation.TheNRC'sissuedthisrequestasaresultofitsinvestigationsattheMillstonePowerStation.ThelicenseefortheDCCookplantrespondedwithaletterdatedFebruary6,1997,describingtheadministrativecontrolsitusestoprovideassurancethattheCookNuclearPlantisoperatedandmaintainedwithintheestablisheddesignbases.AnNRCteamrecentlyconductedanarchitect/engineerdesigninspectionatDCCook.AccordingtotheNRC'sProjectManagerfor9CCook,thisNRCteamexaminedtwosafetysystemsandtheirsupportingsystems.Theteam'sfindingsforcedthelicenseetoshutdownbothunitsonSeptember10,1997.TheNRCissuedaconfirmatoryactionlettertothelicenseedatedSeptember19,1997,specifyingissuesarisingfromthedesigninspectionthatmustberesolvedpriortorestartingtheunits.Theseissues(listedinAttachment1)includephysicalmodificationstotheplantsandrevisionstotheplants',operatinglicenses.NumerousNRCDailyEventReports(listedinAttachment2)describedthefindings&omdesigninspectionasreportedbythelicensee.TheNRChasnotyetreleasedthedesigninspectionreportandwehavebeentoldthatitwillnotbeissueduntilnextweekattheearliest.PDRnoOCi0Sao03XSHPDRllllllliilllllllllllllllllllllllllllliilI.,['.~~~WashingtonOffice:1616PStreetNWSuite310~Washington,DC20036-1495~202-332-0900~FAX:202-332-0905CambridgeHeadquarters:TwoBrattleSquare~Cambridge,MA02238-9105~617-547-5552~FAX:617-864-9405CaliforniaOffice:2397ShattuckAvenueSuite203~Berkeley,CA94704-1567~510-843-1872~FAX:510-843-3785

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i~~~~October9,1997Page2of4BasisforRuestedActionTheNRCconducte'darchitect/engineerdesigninspectionsatonlysixofitsnearly70operatingpowerreactorlicenseesites.Thesedesigninspectionsexaminedonlyoneorhvosafetysystemsalongwiththeirsupportingsystemsateachsite.TheNRCProjectManagerreportedthatthedesigninspectionatDCCookexaminedtheresidualheatremovalandcomponentcoolingwatersystemsalongwiththeirsupportingsystems.Thesedesigninspectionsfocusedonthefacilities'riginaldesignandthelicensees'onformancewiththesafetyanalysisreports.ThesystemsexaminedbytheNRCatDCCookhadalreadybeencoveredbythelicensee'sdesignbasisdocumentationreconstitutionpr'ogram.Designbasisdocuments(DBDs)forthecontainment,containmentstructure,containmentspray,emergencycorecooling,componentcoolingwater,andresidualheatremovalsystemshadbeenapprovedbythelicenseepriortotheNRCteam'sarrival.ThelicenseeinformedtheNRCthatits'BDprogramhadnotidentifiedanydeficiencieinvolvingequipmentoperability.ThefindingsbytheNRCdesigninspectionteampromptedthelicenseetodeclarebothtrainsoftheemergencycorecoolingsystemsandthecontainmentspraysysteminoperable.TheunitswereshutdownonSeptember8and9,1997.Thelicenseereportedmakingphysicalchangestotheplanttocorrectsomeoftheproblemsandindicatedthatadditionalphysicalchangesmayberequired.ThelicenseehasproposedfixingthespecificoperabilityissuesidentifiedduringtheNRCdesigninspectionandthenrestartingtheunits.Confiningthescopeoftherestartactivitiesinthiswaywouldbetreatingthesymptomsratherthanthecauseoftheproblems.TheNRCdesigninspectionrevealedseriousdeficienciesinthelicensee'sdesigncontrolprograms.Thesedeficienciecrcatcdthespecificproblemsthatforcedtheplantstobeshutdown.Thesedeficiencies>ayalsoberesponsibleforsimilarproblemsinothersafetysystemswhichwerenotexaminedbytheNRC.ItisimportanttonotethattheNRCidentifiedsignificantoperabilityproblemsinsystemsthatthelicenseehadcoveredinrecentlyapprovedDBDs.ThelicenseestatedinitsFebruary6,1997,submittalthat.itverifiesandvalidatestheinformationinitsDBDsviareviewsandphysicalplantwalkdownspriortotheirapproval.Thus,theNRCdiscoveredsignificantproblemsinsystemswhichhadbeencloselyscrutinizedbythelicensee.HadtheNRC'sfindingsinvolvedsystemswhichhavenotyetbeencoveredunderthelicensees'BDprogram,itmightbereasonabletoassumethatthelicenseewouldhaveidentifiicdthematthatlaterdate.However,thereislittlereasontobelievethattheseproblemswouldhave.beenresolvedunlesstheNRChadidentifiedthem.Attachment2listsNRCDailyEventReports(DERs)involvingissuesidentifiedbytheNRCdesigninspectionatDCCook.DERNos.32740,32806,32822,32839,32843,32875,32890,32904,32914,32915,32921,32948,and329S8describepotentialdeficienciesthatappeartohaveexistedatDCCookpriortotheinitiationofitsdesignbasisdocumentationreconstitutioneffortin1992.Thateffortwasthereforeapparentlyunabletodetectthesepotentialdeficiencies.DERNos.32823,32824,32903,32939,and3294Sdescribepotentialdeficienciesthatappeartohavebeenintroducedsince1992.Thus,thelicensee'sdesigncontrolandqualityassuranceprogramsareapparentlyunabletoensurethatthefacilityismaintainedwithinitsdesignbases.

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~~~QOctober9,1997Page3of4IUCSfeelsthatthedesignbasisdocumentationreconstitutionandUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)validationprogramsasdescribedinthelicensee'sresponsetotheNRC's50.54(f)letterlacktherigorandfocusnecessarytoidentifypotentialdesign-relatedoperabilityissues.Ourconvictionissupportedbythefindings&omtheNRCdesigninspection.SincethecorrectionstotheNRC'sfindingswerenotlimitedtomerepaperworkfixesbutincludedactualchangestotheplant'sphysicalconfiguration,thesafetysignificanceoftheseandpotentiallyotherundetectedproblemscannotbeunderstated.I~Thefiawsinthelicensee'sdesigncontrolprogramsmustbecorrected.ThesystemsatDCCook,atleastthosewithasafetyfunction,mustbecertifiedtobecapableofperformingtheirrequiredactionsunderalldesignconditions.Then,andonlythen,cantheunitsbcrestartedwithreasonableassurancethatpublicsafetywillbeadequatelyprotected.ItwouldbeirresponsibletorestarttheseunitsknowingthattheprogrammaticfailuresthatcausedthesafetyproblemsidentifiedbytheNRCteammayhaveproducedcomparableproblemsaffectingtheoperabilityofothersafety'systems.ThelegalprecedentforourpositionisstatedbytheNRC'sAtomicSafetyandLicensingAppealBoardin'heMatterofVermontYankeeNuclearPowerCorporation,MemorandumandOrder(ALAB-138),datedJuly31,1973:"Asageneralrulc,theCommission'sregulationsprecludeachallengetoapplicableregulationsinanindividuallicensingproceeding.10CFR2.758.ThisrulehasbeenfrequentlyappliedinsuchproceedingstoprecludechallengesbyintervenorstoCommissionregulations.Generally,then,anintervenorcannotvalidlyargueonsafetygroundsthatareactorwhichmeetsapplicablestandardsshouldnotbelicensed.Bythesametoken,neithertheapplicantnorthestaffshouldbepermittedto=-challengeapplicableregulations,eitherdirectlyorindirectly..Thus,thosepartiesshouldnotgenerallybepermittedtoseekorjustifythelicensingofareactorwhichdoesnotcomplywithapplicablestandards.Norcantheyavoidcompliancebyarguingthat,althoughanapplicable,regulationisnotmet,thepublichealthandsafetywillstillbe'protected.For,oncearegulationisadopted,thestandardsitembodiesrepresenttheCommission'sdefinitionofwhatisrequiredtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety."[emphasisadded]"Inshort,inorder'forafacilitytobelicensedtooperate,theapplicantmustestablishthatthe'acilitycomplicswithallapplicableregulations.Ifthefacilitydoesnotcomply,oiiftherehasbeennoshowingthatitdoescomply,itmaynotbelicensed."[emphasisadded]TheNRCdesigninspectionatDCCookidentifiedsignificantissueswhichcausedbothunitstobeshutdown.Theseissueswerecausedbyprogrammaticdeficienciesinthelicensee'sdesigncontrolpi'ograms.Acontributingfactorfortheseissuesisthefailureofthelicensee'squalityassuranceandself-assessmentprogramstodetecttheseproblems.Nothinginthereportedfindingsfromthedesigninspectionsupportsaconclusionthatthesefindingsareisolatedconsequences.TheNRC'sdesigninspectioninvalidatesanyshowingthatthisfacilitycomplieswithallapplicable'regulations.Therefore,thedesigncontroldeficienciesmustbecorrectedtopreventfuturenon-complianceswithsafetyregulations.Andjustasimportantly,a.thoroughreviewofallsystemswithsafetyfunctionsmustbe'completedpriortorestarttodetectandcorrectpastnon-compliances.

PJ~Ptlt'I VOctober9,1997Page4of41hrUCS.isnotadvocatingthattheNRCapply-ahigherstandardatDCCook.-Instead,wearerequestingthattheNRCensurethattheDCCookfacilityisinaccordancewiththeminimumsafetystandardswhichconstitutethelegalgroundsfo'rallowingtheunitstooperate.OurrequestisconsistentwiththemeasuresrequiredbytheNRCwhenothersamplinginspectionsfindproblems.WeasktheNRCtoexpandtheinspectionscope.basedupontheidentifiedproblemsjustaswouldberequiredwhensnubber(e.g.,piperestraint)andreactorvesselinternalsinspectionsfoundproblems:'uestedActions*~I'CSpetitionstheNRCtoprotectpublichealthandsafetybypreventingtheunitsatDCCookfromoperatinguntilsuchtimethatthereisreasonableassurancethatallsignificantnon-complianceshavebeenidentifiedandcorrected.ThesystemcertificationprocessrecentlyusedattheSalemGeneratingStationandtheMillstonePowerStationwouldprovidesuchreasonableassurance.WerequestapublichearingonthismatterbeheldintheWashington,DCareabeforeanyunitatDCCookisauthorizedtorestart.Sincerely,auiug'DavidA.LochaumNuclearSafetyEngineerCC:ChairmanShirleyAnnJackson.UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,DC20555-0001.HonorableSpencerAbrahamUnitedStatesSen'ateWashington,DC20510-2203Mr.A.B.Beach,RegionalAdministratorUnitedStatesNuclearRegulatoryCommission.801WarrenvilleRoadLisle,IL60532-4351HonorableCarlLevinUnitedStatesSenate.Washington,DC20510-2202.HonorableFredUptonUnitedStatesHouseofRepresentativesWashington,DC,20515-2206~Attachments:1)DesignInspectionIssues,ThatWillBeResolvedPriortoDCCookRestart2)NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDe'signInspectionFindings=VIg 0JI~SIn'l/Jvs/lP,I'IIrphrIII

~~PyAttachment1DesignInspectionIssuesThatWillBeResolvedPriortoDCCookRestart1Thefollowingissues,quotedverbatim,werespecifiedontheNRC'sConfirmatoryActionLetterdated,September19,1997,asrequiringresolutionpriortorestartofanyDCCookunit:.1.RecirculationSumpInventor'y/ContainmentDeadEndedCompartnientsIssueAnalyseswillbeperformedtodemonstratethattherecirculationsumplevelisadequatetoprevent'ortexing,"orappropriatemodificationswillbemade.[SeealsoAttachment2-PowerReactorEventNumber32890],RecirculationSump-VentingIssue'rr!IIVentingwillbere-installedintherecirculationsumpcover.Thedesignwill-incorporateforeignmaterialexclusionrequirementsforthesump.[See'alsoAttachment2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32875and32903]Thirty-sixHourCooldown,withOneTrainofCooling4Analyseswillbeperformedthatwilldemonstratethecapabilitytocooldowntheunitsconsistentwithdesignbasisrequirementsandnecessarychangestoprocedureswillbecompleted;ES-1.3(SwitchovertoRecirculationSump)Procedure6.Changestotheemergencyprocedureusedforswitchoveroftheemergencycorecooling-andcontainmentspraypumpstotherecirculationsumpwillbeimplemented.Thesechangeswillprovideassurancetherewillbeadequatesumpvolume,withpr'opercorisiderationofinstrumentbiasandsinglefailurecriteria.[SeealsoAtt.2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32806and32904]hll,CompressedAirOverpressureIssueOverpressureprotectionwillbeprovideddownstreamofthe20psig,50psig,andS5psigcontrolairregulatorstomitigatetheeffectsofapostulatedfailedregulator.[SeealsoAttachment2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32939and32988]IResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SuctionValveInterlockIssue'technicalspecificationchangetoallowoperationinmode4withtheRHRsuctionvalvesopenandpowerremovedisbeingprocessed.Approval.ofthischangebytheNRCwillberequiredprior'orestart.[SeealsoAttachment2-PowerReactorEventNumbers32914and32921]-FibrousMaterialinContainmentRemovaloffibrousmaterialfromcontainmentthatcouldclog.therecirculationsumpwillbecorn'pleted.[SeealsoAttachment2-PowerReactorEventNumber3294S]

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Attachment2NRCDailyEventReportson'CCookDesignInspectionFindingsThefollowingsummariesweretakenfromthedailyeventreportsavailableontheNRC'swcbsite(mvw.nrc.gov).~Theonlyeditinginvolveddclctionofunnecessarydetail,suchaswhowasnotifiedabouttheevents,'andtheadditionofclarificationforacronyms.Othcrivisc,thesenarrativesareverbatim.1POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32890UNUSUALEVENT,DECLARED4TECHNICALSPECIFlCAITONREQUIREDSHUTDOWNONBOTHUNITSDUETOINOPERABLECONTAINMENTS+aresultofissuesraisedduringtheongoingarchitect/engi'neerdesigninspection,theliccnscewasreviewingthedesignaspectsofthecontainmcnts(bothunits,havesimilarcontainmcnts).Aflcrconsultingwiththenuclearsteamsupplysystemsupplier(Westinghouse)thelicenseedeterminedthatconcernsexistedaboutwhetheradequatecommunication(flowpaths)existsbetweentheactiveandinactiveportiorisofthecontainmcntsump.Duringcertainscenario,thevolumeofwaterflowbacktothecontainmentrecirculationsumpmaynotbeadequatetosupportlong-termemergencycorecooling(ECC)systems(RHR[residualheatremoval]system,safetyinjectionsystem,chargingsystem)orcontainmentspraypumpoperationduringthcrecirculationphaseofalargeorsmall.brcakLOCA.Thccontainmcntdrainagesystemisdesignedtoensurethatwateren'teringthccontainmentfromthebreachintliereactorcoolantsystem,ECCsystems-injection,andicecondensermeltflowsbackintothe.containmentrecirculationsumpviadrains.Licenseeanalysiswasunabletoconfirmthatsuflicientcommunication-'xistedbctwccninactiveandactivevolumesofthecontainmenttoensureadequatedrainagetotherecirculationsump.-Withoutadequatedrainageintothesump,alowsumplevelwillresult,whichjeopardizeslongtermoperationoftheECCSystemsandcontainmentspraypumpsduetovortcxingandairentrainment.Asaconservativemeasurebecauseoftheseconcerns,thelicensccdeclaredbothtrainsofthcECCSystemsandthe,containmentspraysysteminoperableforbothunitsandenteredTcchnicalSpcciTicationlimitingconditionforoperationactionstatement3.0.3toshutdownbothunits.TheliccnscecommencedshuttingUnit1downfrom100%powerat1655aildUill't2downfi'om100%powerat1728.At2000,thelicenseedcclarcdanunusualeventonbothunitsduetothe'potentiallossofcontainmcntbarrier,onbothunits.Thelicensccplanstoperformfurtheranalysistodeterminetheextentofthcexistingcommunicationbetweentheportionsofthesumpsandwhetherplantmodificationswillbenecessary.~~~Update0311EDTon09/10/97byTillytakenbyMacKinnon*~~IThcunusualcvcntwastcrminatcdandexitedat0303EDTwhen.Unit1cntcrcdmode5(coldshutdown).Unit2cntcredmode5at0015EDT(coldshutdown).fPOWERREACTOREVENT.NUMBER:32875FAILURETOMAINTAINTHECONTAINMENTRECIRCULATIONSUMP1/4"PARTICULATERETENTIONREQUIREMENT(HISTORICALISSUE)Ik.A1/4"particulateretentionrequirementforthecontainmentrecirculationsumpwasnotproperlyestablishedin1979followingsumpmodifications.Thecontainmentrecirculationsumprcquircmenttoretain1/4"particlesistoensurethatcontainmentspray,nozzlesdonotbecomeplugged.Thccontainmcntspraysystemtakessuctionfromthecontainmentrecirculationsumpfollowinginjectionoftherefueling'waterstoragetanksupplyduringalossofcoolantaccident.

~~llr1 IAttachment2(continued)NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspectionFindingsIIIn1979,modificationswereperformedonthecontainmentrecirculationsump.Oneofthemodificationsinvolvedmovinga1/4"rctcntionelementfrominsidetherecirculationsumptotheentranceofthesump.Whenthe'retentionelementwasmoved,thc1/4"retentionrequirementivasnotfullyaddressed,andpathwaysexcccdingthe1/4"requirement,wereinadvertentlyestablished.Thcinadvcrtcntpathwaysestablishedincluded:3/4",ventsintheroofoftherecirculationsumpentrance,thecontainmentsumpdrainlinefromtherecirculationsump,andsmallgapsaroundthesumpentrance.Thesepathwayshavesincebeenelimi'natedorthe1/4"requirementhasbeenestablished.'.Thclicenseeisreportingthefactthatsince1979,untilthe1/4"requirementwasestablishedorthepathwaywaseliminated,thecontainmentrecirculationsumpdidnotmeetitsdesignrcquircment.Thccontainmentrecirculationsumpcurrentlymeetsthe1/4"requircmcnt.Aconditionrcporthas,beenwrittentoinitiateinvestigationintotluseventanddetermineappropriatepreventiveactions.Thiseventwasdctcrminedtobcreportableat0856onSeptember5,1997.l~~~Updateat1905on09/10/97byRandyPtacckenteredbyJolliQ'e~**'IMerfurtherreviewoftheabovecondition,thelicenseeconcludedthatthcemergencycorecooling(ECC)systemwasoutsideitsdesignbasisasaresultofthe1/4"rcquircmcntnotbeingmctfollowingthc1979plantmodifications.Bynotadequatelycoveringthe1/4"particulateretentionrequirement,largerparticleshadthepotentialtoenterthcrecirculationsump.ThcECCSystemhasnotbeenanalyzedfortheselargerparticlesnorisitwithintliedesignoftheECCSystemtohandletheselargerparticles.ThelicenseehasconcludedthatthiseventisalsorcportablctothcNRCinaccordancewiththerequirementsof'0CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(a)unanalyzedcondition,and10CF50.72(b)(2)(iii)(d)accidentmitigation.IPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32903'ONTAINMENTRECIRCULATIONSUMPVENTHOLESHAVESEENFILLEDWITHCONCRETErIAsaresultofquestionsposedbytheNRCarchitect/engineerdesigninspectionteam,thelicenseedetcrmincdthat~thcinletventingrequirementforthccontainmcntrecirculationsumpswasnotproperlymaintainedfollowingmodificationstothcUnit2.sumpin1996andtheUnit1sumpin1997(bothunitshavesimilarcontainmcnts).'hecontainmentrecirculationsumpventingrcquircmentwascstablishcdin1979aspartoftheoriginalsumpdesigntoreducethepotentialforairentrainmentthroughthesump.TheventingrequirementwIasmetthroughthe,additionoffive3/4-inchdiameterholesdrilledinthcroofofthcsumpinlet.(Theholesdidnotmeetthe1/4-inch~diamctcrrequirementasreportedinEvent¹32875.)WhentheseholeswercdiscoveredduringtheUnit21996refuelingoutageandtheUnit11997refuelingoutage,theywereclassifiedasabandonedequipmentholesthatexceededthe1/4-inchparticulateretentionrcquiremcntforthcsumpsandtheywerefilledwithconcrete.

0'I/II IAttachment2(c'ontinued)NRCDailyXventReportsonDCCookDesignInspectionFindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER;32806~INSTRUMENTATIONINDICATIONSUSEDTODETERMINEWHENREFUELINGWATER'TORAGETANKTOCONTAINMENTSWITCHOVERIS'REQUIREDMAYNOTHAVEBEENCORRECTTOPREVENTVORTEXINGINTHECONTAINMENTRECIRCULATIONSUMP.*IDuringtheevaluationofaproposedprocedurechangethataGectsmvitchoverfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)tothecontainmentsumpduringaloss-of-coolant,accident(LOCA),itwasdctermincdthattheinstrumentationindicationsusedtodeterminewhentheswitchoverisrequiredmaynothavebccncorrect.topreventvortcxinginthecontainmcntrecirculationsump.IToaddressthissituation,proceduresassociatedwiththemvitchover(onbothunits)havebeenconservativelychangedtoaccommodatetherelatedinstrumentinaccuracies.ThesechangesassureadequateRWSTwaterisincontainmentbeforemvitchovertoeliminateconcernsthatvorteungwouldoccurinthccontainmcntsumpafterswitchover.TheproblemisthattheRWSTwaterlevelindicatorsareconnectedtotlicsuctionlincthatgoestotheresidualheatrcmov'al(RHR)pumps.Duetothcflowintheselines,theindicatedwaterlevelatwinchtheswitchoverwouldbeinitiatedwouldbelessthantheactualwaterleveloftheRWST(thclicenseewouldbcputtinglesswaterintothecontainmcntthaner~ted).Also,thclicensccsaidthattheyliadsomeinaccuraciesassociatedwitlitheircontainmcntsumpinstrumentation.Thelicenseeadjustedthccontainmcntsumpindicationtoassurethattheyhaveanadequatevolumeinthecontainmenttopreventvortexing.Thelicenseereliesupontwoindicationsformvitchover,RWSTwaterlevelandcontainmcntwaterlevel.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32904.SINGLEFAILUREDURINGRECIRCSUMPSWITCHOVERCOULDBEUNANALYZEDCONDITIONI'IAsaresultofquestionsposedbytheNRCarclutect/engineerdesigninspectionteam,thelicenseedeterminedthatthcpossibilityofasinglefailureduringanaccidentwlulcperformingswitchoveroftheemergencycorecooling~systempumpsfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)suctiontotherecirculationsumpsuctioncouldhaveresultedinthcplantbeinginanunanalyzedcondition.Tlusconditionisoutsidethcplantdesignbasis,anditpotentiallycouldhavepreventedthefulfillmentofasafetyfunctionofstructuresorsystems.Theplantemergency,operatingprocedures(EOPs)ascurrentlywrittenrequirethatthewestresidualheatremoval(BHR)pumpbcthefirstpumpmvitchcdfromthcRWSTsuctiontotherccircsumpsuction.Oncethisis*accomplished,thecentrifugalcharging(CC)pumps'uctionsandthesafetyinjection(Sl)pumps'uctionsarcthenswapped'fromtheRWSTsupplytothedischargeofthewestRHRpump.IfthcwestRHRpumpwerctofailatthis.,pointwhenallCCandSIpumpswerebeingsuppliedfromitsdischarge,priortothceastRHRpumpsuctionbeingtransferredfromtheRWSTtothcrccircsump,allCCandSIpumpscouldalsofailductothclossofsuctionflow.ThiswouldresultinthelossofallhighandmediumheadinjectionwithonlytheflowfromtheeastRHRpumpavailableforinjectionintothereactorcoolantsystem.ThcliccnseciscurrentlyreviewingthcEOPstodetermineanalternatemvitchovcrsequencethatwouldeliminatetheconditionasdescribedabove.l

~~IAt 1Attachment2(continued)NRCDailyEventReports.onDCCookDesignInspectionFindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32939INSTALLEDPLANT.MODIFICATIONINTRODUCEDTHEPOSSIBILITY.OFASINGLEFAILUREWHICHCOULDRESULTINTHELOSSOFBOTHTRAINSOFTHEESFVENTILATIONSYSTEM.At1620on09/16/97,thelicenseedeterminedthataplantmodiTicationinstalledbehveenDecember1996andAugust1997introducedthepossibilityofasinglefailurewhichcouldresultinthelossofbothtrainsoftheengincercdsafetyfeatures(ESF)ventilationsystemif'the85-psiairheaderwastobelost.Priortothcinstallationofthe'plantmodification,theESFventilationsystemcharcoalinletandbypassdampersbothutilizeda20-'psiairheaderandwercpositionedsuchthatthecharcoalbypassdampcrswercnormallyopenandwouldfailclosed;andthccharcoalinletdamperswerenormallyclosedandwouldfailopen.Theplantmodificationinstalledncwbypassdamperswhichrequiredhigherairprcssuretooperateandwere,thercforc,transferredtothc85-psiheader.Ifthe,~85-psiairheaderwaslost,itwouldresultinthc,rcpositioningofthenormallyopenbypassdampersivithoutthe,,openingofthecharcoalinletdampersonbothtrains.Thiswouldresultindeadheadingofthcfiltertrainfansand-lossofcoolingtoemergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS)equipment."POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32988NON-SAFETY~RELATEDAIRHEADERSLACKOVERPRESSUREPROTECTIONf.'uringanarclutecturalengineeringinspectionaquestionwasraisedregardingthelackofovcrpressurcprotcction-onthc20,50and85psigcontrolairheaders.Thcspecificconcernisthepotentialforcommonmodefailureofbothtrainsofsafetyrelatedequipmcntservedbythc,airhcadcrs'.Theovcrprcssurcconditionis'ostulated'tobecausedbyregulatorfailure.Althoughsystemrcvicwshavefoundno,componentfailuremodewhichwouldresultinthedevicesbeingincapableofgoingtotheirfail-safeposition,adesignchangepackagehasbeenpreparedtoprovideovcrprcssureprotection,onthe20,50and85psigheaders.If-POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32914LICENSEEIDENTIFIEDTHATBOTHUNITSHADOPERATEDTHEIRRHRSYSTEMCONTRARYTOTHEDESCRIPTIONINTHEFSAR.'CAt1615EDT,withUnits1and2shutdowninmode5,itwasdctcrminedthatbothunitshaveoperatedcontrarytothcdesignbasisfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemasdescribedintheFinaLSafetyAnalysisrcport(FSAR).FSARChapter9,Section9.3,describestheinterlocksassociatedwiththeresiduallicatremoval(RHR)suctionvalvesfromthcreactorcoolantsystem(RCS).Thesuctionlincvalvesarcinterlockedthroughseparate,channelsoftheRCSsystemprcssuresignalstoprovideautomaticclosureofbothvalveswheneverRCSprcssurecxccedsRHRdesignprcssure..ThcFSARstatesthattheinterlockmaybedcfcatcdwhenthcRCSisopentoatmosphere.However,foranumberofyearsthisinterlockhasbeenprocedurally'defeatedonbothunitstopreventinadvertentclosureandlossofRHRsuctionduringshutdowncoolingoperationbyopeningthevalvesandracking'uttheir.breakersinmode4.'ThcovcrpressurcprotectionaffordedbythcautomaticclosurefunctiondcscribcdintheFSARwasdefeatedwithoutasafetyevaluationbeingpcrformcd.Thislossofautomaticclosurefunctionrepresentsanunanalyzedconditionandis,thcrcforc,reportable.

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~~~~'ttachment2(continued),NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspection.Fin'dingsIPlansaretodegas,dcpressurizc,andopentheRCSonbothunitstoatmosphere.DegaswillstartonUnit1,andwhencompleted,thcunitwillproceedtodepressurizewhileUnit2startsdegasprocedures.WhentheRCSisopentoatmosphereonbothunits,theplantwillbeincompliancewiththeFSAR.Thisconditionwasidentifiedbythe1iccnseeduringanongoingNRCarchitect/engineerinspection.II*~~Updateat2130EDTon9/13/97fiomRobertBlythtoS.Sandin~**Thelicenseehascompleteditssafetyevaluationformode5operationandconcludedthatthcrcwasnounreviewcdsafetyquestionorchangeofoperationasdescribedinthcFSAR.Conscqucntly,degasofUnit1hasbeen"'erminated,andneitherunitwillbcventedtoatmosphere.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32921THELICENSEEIDENTIFIEDTHATBOTHRHRPUMPSHADBEENOPERATEDWHENTHERCSWASDEPRESSURIZED,WHICHISCONTRARYTOTHEDESCRIPTIONINTHEFSAR.Chapter9oftheFinalSafety'nalysisRcport(FSAR)states:'Onlyoneresidualheatremoval'(RHR)pumpwillbe"operatedwhenthereactorcoolantsystemisopentoatmospheretopreventdamagingbothpumpsintheunlikely"eventthatsuctionshouldbelost.'peratingproccdurcsfor,theRHRsystemdonotpreventoperationofbothRHRpumpswhenthcreactorcoolant'system(RCS)isopentoatmosphere,andinthcpast,bothRHRpumpshavebeenrunwhentheRCSwasvcntcdtoatmosphere.IPlantoperatingproccdurcsarebeingreviewedtodeterminetheimpact.ProcedurechangeswillbeimplementedasnecessarytoaddresstheFSARrcquircmcnt.Aconditionrcporthasbccninitiatedtoinvestigate'anddetermineappropriatepreventativeactions.HPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32948ITWASDETERMINEDTHATFIBROUSMATERIALISPRESENTINBOTHUNIT1ANDUNIT2-CONTAINMENTINENOUGHQUANTITYTOPOTENTIALLYCAUSEEXCESSIVEBLOCKAGEOFTHECONTAINMENTRECIRCULATIONSUMPSCREENDURINGTHERECIRCULATIONPHASEOFALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT.In1985,1986,,and1995"Fiberfrax"refractoryinsulationmaterialsinbulk,blanketorboardformwercusedasdammingmaterialwheninstallingfirestopsincabletraysinbothcontainments.Thcspecificationgoverninginstallationofthefirestopsdidnotrequireremovalofthcmaterial,only.statingthatitshouldberemoved"ifnecessary."Thematerialwasnotremoved.Thematerialisprcscntin12cable,traysinUnit1and15cabletraysinUnit2.rWhentheFiberfraxisexposedtowaterorsteam/waterenvironmentitcouldpotentially,breakintosmallpieces',whichcouldbetransportedtotherecirculationsumpbythe-water,flowincontainmentduringalossofcoolantaccident.Onceitreachestherecirculationsumpithasthepotentialtoclogthescrccnsinexcessoftlicdesignvalue.ExcessivescreenblockagecouldresultinECCSinoperabilityduringtherecirculationmode.TheFibcrfraxmaterial,iscurrentlybeingremovedfromthecontainmcnts,andremovalwillbccompletedpriorto,restartoftheunits.Thepossibilitythatthelicensee'sworke'ontrol"processalloweduncncapsulatcdfibrousmaterialtobeinstalledinotherlocationsinsidecontainmentisbeinginvestigated.

AK'PhIJlrktIIPIV 1,Attachment2(continued)NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspectionFindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32740UNITS1&2OPERATEDOUTSIDETHEDESIGNBASISFORSERVICEWATERINLETTEMP'saresultofquestionsposedbymembersoftheongoingNRCdesigninspectionteam,thclicenseehas'eterminedthatUnits1&2haveoperatedoutsidetheplantdesignbasisforservicewaterinlettemperature./'tTheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR),Table9.5-3,listsservicewaterinlettemperaturedesignvalueas76'F.Thisvalueisusedasinputtoanalysessuchascontainmentpeakprcssureandcontrolroomhabitability.Althoughengineeringanalyseswereperformedin1988'raisingthetemperatureto87.5'FaslistedintheplantTcdmicalSpecifications,a10CFR50.59safetyevaluationwasneverperformed,norwasthcUFSARproperly'evised:PlantservicewaterinlettemperatureisthcsameasLakeMichiganwatertcmpcraturc.AreviewofhistoricaldataindicatesthatduringJuly'andAugustofanyyear,LakeMichigan"watertemperatureislikelytoexceedthc76'Fvalue.Specificdatafor1997showsthatLakeMichiganwatertemperature,andthcrcforcplantservicewaterinlet'emperature,wasgreaterthan76'FonJuly17,July18,andAugust4,1997.Allplantsystemswhichutilizeservicewaterasacoolingmediumhavebccndctcrmincdtobcoperable.A10CFR50.59safetyevaluationwillbe-p'erformedandappropriatechangeswillbeincorporatedintothcUFSAR.Thisreportisintendedtocoveranytemperatureexclusionsabove76'Fandbelowthe87.5'FvaluelistedintheplantTechnicalSpecificationsthatmayoccurpriortothecompletionofthc10CFR50.59safetyevaluation.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32822*DISCOVERYTHATANORMALOPERATINGPROCEDUREALLOWEDPLANTOPERATIONWITHCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGEROUTLETTEMPERATURESGREATERTHANTHEDESIGNLIMITSPECIFIEDINTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTDuringthe'ongoingNRCarchitect/engineerdesigninspection,aquestion,wasaskedrelativetoastatementusedinthenormaloperatingprocedureforthecomponentcoolingwater(CCW)system.Thestatementallowsforaheat-exchangeroutlettemperatureforCCWtoreach120'Fforaperiodof3hoursduringnormalcooldownontheresidualheatremovalsystem.Investigationrevealedthatthisstatementdivasintheoriginalissueoftheprocedurein1976.However,no10CFR50.59unreyicwedsafetyevaluationdeterminationdocumentationcouldbefoundtosuppoittlusdesignparameter.Thclicensee'sFinalSafety-AnalysisRcport(FSAR)statesthatthcCCWheatexchangeroutletdesigntemperature's95'F.BasedontheFSARrequiringthe93'Foutlettemperatureandthe.lackofanunrcvicwedsafetyquestiondctcrminationtojustifyoperationcxcceding95'F,theunitswereinaconditionthatallowedoperationoutsidethedesignbasisbecausethcprocedureallowedoperationupto120'Fforaperiodof3hoursduringnormalcooldownontheresidualheatremovalsystem.Theunitsarcn'otcuncntlyinaTechnicalSpecificationlimitingconditionforoperationasaresultoftinsissue.II'Procedurechangeshavebeenmadetoremovethcinappropriatestatement.Aconditionrcporthasalsobeenwrittentoinitiateaninvestigationintothiseventanddetermineappropriatepreventiveactions.

0V/4S41lI

~)~~IAttachment2(continued)NRCDailyEventReportson'DC-CookDesignInspectionFindingsPOWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32823FAILUREOFASAFETYREVIEWTOADDRESSFINALSAFETYANALYSISATTRIBUTESON,ASSOCIATEDCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERCOOLINGREQUIREMENTSDuring,theongoingNRCarchitect/engineerdesigninspection,aquestionwasaskedrelativetodualtraincomponentcoolingwater(CCW)systemoutages.DuringdualtrainCCWoutagcs,CCWcoolingissuppliedtothcspentfuelpool(SFP)heatexchangeronlyfromtheoppositeunit.Ifthatunithasalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),CCWtotheSFPheatexchangerwillisolate.FinalSafetyAnalysisRcport(FSAR)Table9:5-2,footnote3,indicatesthattheSFPheatexchangerisassumedtobconthenon-accidentunit.hThelicenseereportedthefollowinginspectionquestions:r,1)Doesadualtrain-CCWoutagerepresentaconditionoutsidethcplantdesignbasis22)WasthisreviewedaspartoftheprocessofallowingadualtrainCCWoutage2'asedonareviewofFSARTable9.5-2,itwasconcludedthatfootnote3wasestablishedtoclarifywhynovaluesforSFPheatexchangerflowforthcunitundergoingtheLOCAarelistedinthetable.Footnote3reflectnormal'FPcoolingsystemdesignandoperation.IAreviewwasperformedofthesafetyevaluationpcrformcdfortheUnit2fullcoreoflloadwithonetrainofspent--'uelcooling.ThissafetyreviewcoveredtheUnit2refuelingoutageschedulewhichincludedadualtrainCCWoutage.1'ootnote3ofTable9.5-2reprcscntsthenormaldesignofthcSFPcoolingsystem,thatis,theSFPcoolingsystemisdesignedtorcmovethe.heatgeneratedbystoredspentfuelelementsintlic[SFP].Thesystemincorporatestwoseparatetrains.ThesafetyreviewfortheUnit2full.coreoflloadxvithonetrainofspentfuelcoolingaddressedthcFSARsection9.4attributeoftheSFP,coolingdealingwithtimetoboileventsandbulkpooltcmpcraturcrequirements;however,thesafetyreviewfailedtoaddressESARsection9.5attributesassociatedCCWcoolingrcquiremcntsasgiveninTable9.5-2.t'hisissueimpactsbothunits.However,theunitsarenotcurrentlyinaTcchnicalSpecificationlimitingconditionforoperationasaresultofthisissue.,POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32824FAILURETOPERFORMA10CFR50.59EVALUATIONFORAPROCEDURECHANGEINVOLVINGCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERHEAT.EXCHANGEROUTLETTEMPERATURELIMITS~DuringtheongoingNRCarchitect/engineer'esigninspection,aquestionwasaskedrelativetothcfactthatduringthclastUnit2refuelingoutage;anadininistrativelimitof90'Fwasplacedonthecomponentcoolingwater(CCW)system.ThethermalanalysisindicatedthatamaxiinumCCWtempcraturcof90'Fwouldeliminateallmarginassociatedwiththcspentfuelpool(SFP)designassumingadesignflowof3,000.gpm.

+w't'ttllIt Attachment2(continued),,".NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspectionFindingsThefollowinginspectionquestionwasasked:SinceachangeinCCWtcmpcraturcwasrequiredtomeettheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)valueof160'FfortheSFP,wasa10CFR50.59unrevicwcdsafetyevaluationperfoimed?I'helicenseereviewedtliccliangetotheproceduretolimitCCWtcmperaturcto90'F.Thelicenseeconsideredthis~changetobcanadniinistrativechangeonlytolowertheallowabletcmperaturctotheSFPcoolingheatexchanger.'10CFR50.59evaluationwasnotperformedbecauseitwasnotrccognizcdthatthe95'Frequirementwasessentiallybeingchanged.IWithoutthecompletionofanunrevicwcdsafetyquestiondetermination,thcplantwasi'naconditionoutsidethe"designbasis.Theunitsarcnotcurrentlyinatechnicalspecificationlimitingconditionforoperationasaresultofthisissue.1Il'conditionrcporthasbeenwrittentoinitiateactionstoinvestigatethiseventandprovideprcventivcactions.The90'Flimitisnolongerintheoperatingproccdurcs.'POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32839AVAILABLEWATERVOLUMEINRWSTNOTADEQUATEINMODES5AND6DuringtheongoingNRCarchitect/engineerdesign.inspection,NRCinspectorsaskedaquestionaboutthcreactor,coolantmakeuprcquircdaAcra10CFR50,AppendixRfire.Torcsporidtothcquestion,thelicenseereviewedtwoassociateddesigncalculations.Themorerestrictivecalculationwasdeterminedtobcthecalculationofrrccordtomcctthercquircment.Thiscalculation.requires87,000gallonsofavatertobcavailableinthcrefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST).Thevalueof87,000gallonswasapproved,on02/20/90:Duringmodes1through4,plantproccdurcsadequatelyensurethatthisrequirementismet.Duringmodes5and6,plantproceduresarcnot'dcquatctoensurethatthisrequirementismet.rIThcplanthasbeeninmodes5and6manytimessincethisrcquircmcntbecameeffectiveon02/20/90.Basedontlus,theplanthasbeeninanunanalyzedconditionseveraltimessince02/20/90.rCurrentlybothunitsarcinmode1.Thelicensccisreviewingplantoperatingprocedurestodetermine'impactand'illimplementprocedurechancesasneededpriortoeitherunitenteringmodes5or6.ThelicenseeiscontinuingtoevaluatethesubjectcalculationsandplanstosubmitaliccnsceeventrcporttotheNRContinssubject.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:,32843LAKEMICHIGANTEMPERATUREEXCEEDEDPLANTDESIGNBASISLIMITINAUGUST1988'AsaresultofquestionsposedbymembersoftheongoingNRCarchitect/enginccrdesigninspectionteam,thelicenseehas'dctcrminedthatthewatertemperatureofLakeMichigan,thcplant'sultimateheatsink,cxcccdedtheplantdesignbasislaketemperaturelimitof76'Ffor22daysduringAugust1988.I 0~flI1 Attachment2(continued)NRCDailyEventReportsonDCCookDesignInspectionFindingsThecontrolroomisnormallycooledbyanairconditioningsystemwhichutilizesnon-safetyrelatedclullers.ThesafetyrelatedportionofthecontrolroomairconditioningsystemutilizeswaterfromLakeMichiganasthecoolingmedium.Thiswaterwouldbcsupplieddirectlytothecoolingcoilsfollowingmanualrealignment.Atanaveragelaketemperatureof81'Fthatexistedduringthe22dayperiodin>ugust1988,thetemperatureinside'hecontrolroomcouldhavereached110.4'Fhadthenon-safetyrelatedchillersnotfunctioned.Atatemperatureof110.4'F,thelifetimeofsomeinstrumentationinsidethecontrolroom,thesolidstateprotection,system,andthenuclearinstrumentation,isestimatedtobeat150hoursor6.25days.Theimpactofthisshortenedinstrumentlifespanonplantoperationhadnotbeencvaluatcd./Atthetimeofthisevent,theplantTechnicalSpecificationsallowedcontinuousoperationwithcontrolroomtcmpcraturcsupto120'F.TheTechnicalSpecificationshavesincebeenrcviscdsuchthatcontinuedoperationwithcontrolroomtemperaturesincxccssof95'Fisnotpermitted.Operationofthcplantduringthctimeperiodwhenlaketemperatureexceededthedesignbasislimit,withoutanalysisindicatingacceptablecontrolroomcoolingcouldbcmaintainedabovethistemperaturelimit,'andwithoutprocedurestoalertpersonnelofthesituation,isconsideredasoperationinanunanalyzedcondition.Thcinstrumentationwasnotadverselyimpactedbythclughlaketempcraturcsasthenon-safetyrelatedchillcrscontinuedtofunctionandmaintainacceptablecontrol,roomtemperatures.POWERREACTOREVENTNUMBER:32915OVERPRESSUREPROTECTIONOFTHECOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERSYSTEMPIPINGNOTINACCORDANCEWITHTHEANSICODEREQUIREMENTSiChapter9.5oftheFSARsta'tes:Thcreliefvalveonthecomponent[coolingwater]surgetankissizedtorelievethemaximumflowrate,ofwaterthatwouldenterthcsurgetankfollowingaruptureofareactorcoolantthermalbamercoolingcoil.Thesetprcssureassuresthatthcdesignpressureofthccomponentcoolingsystemisnotexceeded.'hepipingdesigncodeatthcCookplantisB31.1.B31.1statesthataninterceptingstopvalvecannotbelocatedbetweenthesourceofpressureandtheprcssurereliefdcvicccreditedforprotectingthepipe.Inthisinstance,theprcssuresourceistherupturedthermalbarrier,theprcssurereliefdeviceisasafetyreliefvalveonthesurgetank.Contrarytothecoderequirement,thcrcaremanualvalvesmaintainedopenbehveenthetwo.ThesevalveswerenotcontrolledinaccordancewithorexemptedfromB31.1,AnevaluationisbeingperformedtodeterminethemostcQcctivemethodofestablishingandmaintainingthccode'cquircmcnt.Aconditionreporthasbeenwrittentoinitiateaninvestigationintothiseventanddeterminetheappropriatepreventativeactions."Tlusconditionwasidentifiedinresponseto'anongoingNRCarchitect/engineerdesigninspection.

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