ML17059A355

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Eals.

ML17059A355
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Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	06/10/1994
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ML17059A356	List: ML17059A355 ML18040A132
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00<awZODUI,aoOQDARO'4Ul>OO00'OsUQPOEAILUoc~edePit'exeatPlantSpecificEALGuideline(PEG)NineMilePointUnit26/10/94OperationsSupportServices,Inc.233WaterStreet2ndFloorPlymouth,MA02360

ICg:AU1Op.ModeApplicabilityEU1.1PlantSpecificEA~uideline(A,H,S)NineMh.wintUnit2AnyunplannedreleaseofgaseousorIlquldradloactlvltytotheenvironmentthatexceedstwotimestheradlologlcalTechnicalSpeclflcatlonsfor60minutesorlonger.51(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)5AIIAU1.2<validreadingononeormoreofthefolhwingmonitorsthatexceedsthe"valueshowniRRREKisis;2aha5hmn".~~hrmConfirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleasesindicatesconcentrationsorreleaserateswithareleasedurationof60minutesorlongerinexcessofVote:Ifthemonitorreadingsm~sustainedforlongerthan60minutesandtherequiredassessmentscannotbecompletedwithinthisperiod,thenthedeclarationmustbemadebasedonthevalidreading.Bases

PlantSpecificEA~uideline(A,H,S)NineMii.~ointUnit2RetermUnplanned",asusedinthiscontext,indudesanyreleaseforwhicharadioactivedischargepermitwasnotprepared,orareleasethatexceedstheconditions(e.g.,minimumdilutionhw,maximumdischargefhw,alarmsetpoints,etc.)ontheapplicablepermit.Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.Jnplannedreleasesinexcessoftwotimesthesitetechnicalspecificationsthatcontinuefor60minutesorbngerrepresentanuncontrolledsituationandhence,apotentialdegradationintheevelofsafety.Thefinalintegrateddose(whichisveryhwintheUnusualEventemergencyclass)isnottheprimaryconcernhere;itisthedegradationinplantcontrolimpliedbythefactthathereleasewasnotisolatedwithin60minutes.Therefore,itisnotintendedthatthereleasebeaveragedover60minutes.Forexample,areleaseof4timesT/Sfor30minutesdoesnotexceed'hisinitiatingcondition.Further,theEmergencyDirectorshouldnotwaituntil60minuteshaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdeterminedthatthereleasedurationhasorsilllikelyexceed60minutes.Monitorindications~should'alculatedonthebasisofthemethodohgyofthesiteOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCMcompliancewith10CFR20a~10CFR50AppendixIrequirements.Annualaveragemeteorologyshoukkhahusedukoca4lowocLtodemonstrateIhftalarmmdmnhhrlhftlhhd.fnfuulgnmme.'~ualnfftiy.aaihmmmIftghnignllaftgirhalignmfhagtiYily.mlmmlimihaHtngifnzmdad.Iht~~br.ftnghmgniint:humfiauuQmrftflahrmmhginthrlhftDiaha!BufiaihnHgnilzingSxshm.

ICN'U2PlantSpecificEA~uideline(A,H,S)NineMl>.ntUnit2UnexpectedIncreaseInplantradlatlonorairborneconcentration.Op.ModeApplicabilityiU2.101(PwrOps)02(HSB)03(HSD)04(CSD)05(Refuel)06(Defuel)~AllAU2-4~~tgjagttdirectarearadiationmonitorreadinge>399fjamfhRalarmaQiatQfafhaahhhhrmltinufrummmzunfrull&arm~'ava@0Bases

PlantSpecificEP'uideline(A,H,S)NineMhointUnit2Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.Oiloftheaboveeventstendtohavelongleadtimesrelativetopotentialforradiohgicalreleaseoutsidethesiteboundary,thusimpacttopublichealthandsafetyisverylow.InlightofReactorCavitySealfailure,incidentsattwodifferentPWRsandlossofwaterintheSpentFuelPit/FuelTransferCanalataBWRalloccurringsince1984,explicitcoverageofthesetypesofeventsviaEALs¹1and¹2isappropriategiventheirpotentialforincreaseddosestoplantstaff.ClassificationasanUnusualEventiswarrantedasaprecursortoamoreseriousevent.hhR2rftauirmritmlzatlgnufaahhuiifthefuftlhtt:aammuztrttrfttI.mmh~allirmdiatftrffufdsumublimrmnaiainaauftifttfhxnahr"umdifttfhftfmitiaitnftt;mrmt.EALL~appliestoplantswithlicenseddrystorageofolderirradiatedspentfueltoaddressdegradationofthisspentfuel.EAL¹4~addressesunplannedincreasesinin-plantradiationlevelsthatrepresentadegradationinthecontrolofradioactivematerial,andrepresentapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.~tittnrtf~~fjgtignhtrfthingr~ingtnp~~tht~~gg~~htttn~hgttttfQggg~thftmr~mrnltrft~jfftrtgig~~ginuitiitiftgfJEBEL"lQYQI22KR8%%9fQQIQiRKRQQEIQQllKRQiQnftdKRdkQYQCQQQQRl~~~thftgfaunMrtgintgirtY~gg~ittntthr~I.ThisEALescalatestoanAlertperICAA3,iftheincreasesimPairthftftttrftfrtfsafeoPeration.Qglyguhrtgfttf53hlrhtfiagRglaaH1SIlfttrfttfinthLtKhl.0KQ?MunnfKQRRESrtftrgMKrfKIREthnffufrtrtingrrtQrtfREKHfitttrtQgrnEmfiathnhuthtfhtthrittibrmmd1Kfiaiaathtalarmadvent.

ICN:AA1Op.ModeAppllcabllltyLA1.1PlantSpecificEP'ideline(A,H,S)NineMlt.ntUnit2AnyunplannedreleaseofgaseousorIlquldradloactlvltytotheenvironmentthatexceeds200timesradlologlcalTechnicalSpeclficatlcfor15minutesorlonger.Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)gAIIAA1.25validreadingononeormoreofthefollowingggg+lftmonitorsthatexceedsthe"valueriterionandindicatestheneedtoassessthereleasewithConfirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleasesindicatesconcentrationsorreleaseratesinexcessofdote:Ifthemonitorreadings~~sustainedforhngerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessmentscannotbecompletedwithinthisperiod,thenthedeclarationmustbemade>asedonthevalidreading.iA1.3AA1.4Bases

PlantSpecificEP'ideline(A,H,S)NineMhntUnit2Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.ThiseventescalatesfromtheUnusualEventbyescalatingthemagnitudeofthereleasebyafactorof100.Proratingthe500mR/yrcriterionforbothtime(8766hr/yrandthe200multiplier,theassociatedsiteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Therequiredreleasedurationwasreducedto15minutesinrecognitionoftheincreasedseverity.Monitorindicationsshouklhe~calculatedonthebasisofthemethodologyofwho~~Annualaveragemeteorology4touldka~usedwher+4iowed.

ICff:AA2PlantSpecificEPuideline(A,H,S)NineMii..ntUnit2MajordamagetoIrradiatedfuelorlossofwaterlevelthathasorwillresultIntheuncoveringofIrradiatedfueloutsidethereactorvessOp.ModeApplicabilityiA2.1Qt(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)~AllAA2.2ltttmlttggIgrreportof~~observationofirradiatedfueluncovered.WA2.38.0QQZ8.0B9ZBases

PlantSpecificEP'ideline(A,H,S)NineMii.0ntVnit2ThisICappliestospentfuelrequiringwatercoverageandisnotintendedtoaddressspentfuelwhichislicensedfordrystorage,whichisdiscussedinNUMARCICAU2,UnexpectedincreaseinPlantRadiationorAirborneConcentration.NUREG-0818,'EmergencyActionLevelsforLightWaterReactors,"formsthebasisfortheseEALs.'hmhamEALs~j18ftfibythespecificareawhereirradiatedfuelislocatedsuchasreactorcavity,reactorvessel,orspentfuelpooLThereistimeavailabletotakecorrectiveactions,andthereislittlepotentialforsubstantialfueldamage.Inaddition,NUREG/CR-4982,"SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82,"July1987,indicatesthatevenifcorrectiveactionsarenottaken,nopromptfatalitiesarepredicted,andthatriskofinjuryislow.Inaddition,NRCInformationNoticeNo.9048,"KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"presentsthefollowingititsdiscussion:"Intheeventofaseriousaccidentinvolvingdecayedspentfuel,protectiveactionswouldbeneededforpersonnelonsite,whileoffsitedoses(assuminganexclusionarearadiusofonemilefromtheplantsite)wouldbewellbehwtheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency'sProtectiveActionGuides.Accordingly,itisimportanttobeabletoproperlysurveyandmonitorforKr-85intheeventofanaccidentwithdecayedspentfuel.LicenseesmaywishtoreevaluatewhetherEmergencyActionLevelsspecifiedintheemergencyplanandproceduresgoverningdecayedfuelhandlingactivitiesappropriatelyfocusonconcernforonsiteworkersandKr-85releasesinareaswheredecayedspentfuelaccidentscouldoccur,forexample,thespentfuelpoolworkingfloor.Furthermore,licenseesmaywishtodetermineifemergencyplansandcorrespondingimplementingproceduresaddressthemeansforlimitingradiohgicalexposuresofonsitepersonnelwhoareinotherareasoftheplant.Amongotherthings,movingonsitepersonnelawayfromtheplumeandshuttingofbuildingairintakesdownwindfromthesourcemaybeappropriate."Thus,anAlertClassificationforthiseventisappropriate.Escalation,ifappropriate,wouldoccurviaAbnormalRadIeveURadiologicalEffluentorEmergencyDirectorjudgement.

ICy:AA3Op.ModeAppllcabllltyiA3.1PlantSpecificE~uideline(A,H,S)NineMt..'OintUnit2ReleaseofradioactivematerialorIncreasesInradlatlonlevelswlthlnthefacllltythatImpedesoperationofsystemsrequiredtomalntasafeoperationsortoestablishormalntalncoldshutdown.Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIAA3.2lalidradiationmonitorreadinggreaterthan15mR/hrinfbi;vali+st~pecitic)radiationmonitorreadingsgreaterthan(site-specific)QE!Z~inareasrequiringinfrequentaccesstomaintainplantsafetyfunctions.Bases

PlantSpecificE/"uideline(A,H,S)NineNit.ntVnlt2Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.Qaly~gngQdfLBQLQQdjngQ~QQQQJdQI'QdiaihQRhlfaaYai{}fiaQQQQQmLftQ1QIQQIIGKIlQQiara&mduahmgamaIQzQigffhmuummLQIjiQIhalmhthathrjQfjy.QjMII'.ThisIGaddressesincreasedradiationlevelsthatimpedenecessaryaccesstooperatingstations,orotherareascontainingequipmentthatmustbeoperatedmanually,inordertomaintainsafeoperationorperformasafeshutdown.Itisthisimpairedabilitytooperatetheplantthatresultsintheactualorpotentialsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Thecauseand/ormagnitudeoftheincreaseinradiationlevelsisnotaconcernofthisIC.TheEmergencyDirectormustconsiderthesourceorcauseoftheincreasedradiationlevelsanddetermineifanyotherIGmaybeinvolved.Forexample,adoserateof15mR/hrinthecontrolroommaybeaprobleminitself.However,theincreasemayalsobeindicativeofhighdoseratesinthecontainmentduetoaLOCA.Inthislattercase,anSAEorGEmaybeindicatedbythefissionproductbarriermatrixICs.TheseEALscouldresultindeclarationofanAlertatoaawaitNMP-2duetoaradioactivityreleaseorradiationshineresultingfromamajoraccidentatthe-Thisisappropriateiftheincreaseimpairsoperationsattheoperatingunit.ThisIGisnotmeanttoapplytoincreasesinthecontainmentchmoradiationmonitorsastheseareeventswhichareaddressedinthefissionproductbarriermatrixICs.Norisitintendedtoapplytoanticipatedtemporaryincreasesduetoplannedevents(e.g.,incoredetectormovement,radwastecontainermovement,depleteresintransfers,etc.)'NMP-2abnormaloperatingprocedures,emergencyoperatingprocedures,the10GFR50AppendixRanalysis,identifyingareascontainingsafeshutdownequipment.AreasrequiringcontinuousoccupancygQQJ~includethecontrolrooman~oraocacentral~QQ~~securityalarmstation.Thevalueof15mR/hrisderivedfromtheGDC19valueof5remin30dayswithadjustmentforexpectedoccupancytimes.AlthoughSectionIII.D.3ofNUREG4737,"ClarificationofTMIActionPlanRequirements",providesthatthe15mR/hrvaluecanbeaveragedoverthe30days,thevalueisusedherewithoutaveraging,asa30daydurationimpliesaneventpotentiallymoresignificantthananAlert.asedonQbrtgrmQiradiationlevelswhichresultinexposurecontrolmeasuresintendedtomaintaindoseswithinnormaloccupationalexposureguidelinesandlimits(i.e.,10CFR20),andindoingso,willimpedenecessaryaccess.10

ION:AS1Op.ModeAppllcablllty'LS1.1PlantSpecificE~uideline(A,H,S)NineNit.0ntUnit2Boundarydoseresultingfromanactualorlmmlnentreleaseofgaseousradloactlvltyexceeds100mRWholeBodyor500mRChildThyroidfortheactualorproJecteddurationoftherelease.01(PwrOps)02(HSB)03(HSD)04(CSD)05(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)~All<validreadingononeormoreofthefollowingmonitorsthatexceedsorisexpectedtoexceedheabovecriterionandidicatestheneedtoassessthereleasewith(SPDSonly)dote:lfthemonitorreading(s)issustainedforlongerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessmentscannotbecompletedwithinthisperiod,thenthedeclarationmustbemade)asedonthevalidreading.WS1.3/aliddoseassessmentcapabilityindicatesdoseconsequencesgreaterthan100mRJ92f.vholo4odyor500mRcM4QDEthyroid.AS1.4Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoseratesexceeding100mR/hr~expectedtocontinueformorethanonehour;oranalysesoffieldsurveysamplesindicate4@dQQQthyroiddosecommitmentof500mRforonehourofinhalation.Bases11

PlantSpecificE'ideline(A,H,S)NineMli.ntUnit2Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.The100mRIf'ntegrateddoseinthisinitiatingconditionisbasedontheproposed10CFR20annualaveragepopulationexposure.Thisvaluealsoprovidesadesirablegradient(oneorderofmagnitude)betweentheAlert,SiteAreaEmergency,andGeneralEmergencyclasses.ItisdeemedthatexposureslessthanthislimitarenotconsistentwiththeSiteAreaEmergencyclassdescription.The500mRintegrated4@444yroid~fbggjffdosewasestablishedinconsiderationofthe1$ratiooftheEPAProtectiveActionGuidelinesfor~whotakodyandgZthyroid.asiteboundatydoseof100mR/houreholahodyTEDEor500mR/hourQQ~IILgjtichilcL4hyceid,whicheverismorelimiting(dependsonsourcetermassumptions).basedonTheFSARsourcetermsapplicabletoeachmonitoredpathwayshouldbeusedinconjunctionwithannualaveragemeteorologyindeterminingindicationsforthemonitorsonthatpathway.12

ICyAG1Op.ModeAppllcabllltyKG1.1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle..ttUnit2BoundarydoseresultingfromanactualorImminentreleaseofgaseousradloactlvltyexceeds1000mRWholeBodyor5000mRChildThyroidfortheactualorprojecteddurationoftherelease.Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)gAIIAQ4'4'tvalidreadingononeormoreofthefollowingmonitorsthatexceedsorisexpectedtoexceedheabovecriterionand2@m2mf~~+(SPDSonly)gj~(SPDSonly)Vote:Ifthemonitorreading(s)issustainedforlongerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessmentscannotbecompletedwithinthisperiod,thenthedeclarationmustbemadeiasedonthevalidreading.AG1.3Validdoseassessmentcapabilityindicatesdoseconsequencesgreaterthan1000mR~~halo4~or5000mRQDEcM4thyroid.AG1.4Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoseratesexceeding1000mR/hrIEQf.expectedtocontinueformorethanonehour;oranalysesoffieldsurveysamplesindicatecbildgZthyroiddosecommitmentof5000mRforonehourofinhalation.Bases13

PlantSpecificEAI+uideline(A,H,S)NineMilePciiitUnit2Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.The1000mR~mhotahodyandthe5000mRQQfchiMthyroidintegrateddosearebasedontheEPAprotectiveactionguidancewhichindicatesthatpublicprotectiveactionsareindicatedifthedoseexceeds1rem3EfKwhoh4odyor5remQZcNdthyroid.ThisisconsistentwiththeemergencyclassdescriptionforaGeneralEmergency.ThislevelconstitutestheupperlevelofthedesirablegradientfortheSiteAreaEmergency.Actualmeteorologyisspecificallyidentifiedintheinitiatingconditionsinceitgivesthemostaccuratedoseassessment.Actualmeteorology(includingforecasts)shouldbeusedwheneverpossible.dbasedonsiteboundarydosesforeitherwhoiahc4yTEDEorMkLthyroicl~yfgigwhicheverismorelimiting(dependsonsourcetermassumptions(s).TheFSARsourcetermsapplicabletoeachmonitoredpathwayshouldbeusedinconjunctionwithannualaveragemeteorologyindeterminingindicationsforthemonitorsonthatpathway.14

ICg:HU1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..cUnit2Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectintheprotectedarea.Op.ModeAppllcabllltylU1.1Q1(PwrOps)02(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)gAIIHU1.2Reportbyplantpersonneloftornadostrikingwithinprotectedarea.tU1.3'assessmentbythecontrolroomthataneventUihaMttahasoccurred.HU1.4Vehiclecrashintoareaboundary.plantstructuresorsystemswithinprotectedHU1.5Reportbyplantpersonnelofanunanticipatedexplosionwithinprotectedareaboundaryresultinginvisibledamagetopermanentstructureorequipment.HU1.6Reportofturbinefailureresultingincasingpenetrationordamagetoturbineorgeneratorseals.HU1.715

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMllec...itUnit2Bases,Theprotectedareaboundaryis~ical'hatpartwithinthesecurityisolationzoneandisdefinedinthesitesecurityplan.F~EAL¹~1,NMP-2seismicinstrumentationactuatesat0.01g.Damagemaybecausedtosomeportionsofthesite,butshouldnotaffectabilityofsafetyfunctionstooperate.Methodofdetectioncaahohbasedoninstrumentation,validatedbyareliablesourcAsdefinedintheEPRI-sponsored"GuidelinesforNuclearPlantResponsetoanEarthquake,datedOctober1989,a"feltearthquake"is:"Anearthquakeofsufficientintensitysuchthat:(a)theinventorygroundmotionisfeltatthenuclearplantsiteandrecognizedasanearthquakebasedonaconsensusofcontrolroomoperatorsondutyatthetime,and(b)forplantswithoperableseismicinstrumentation,theseismicswitchesoftheplantareactivated.Formostplantswithseismicinstrumentation,theseismicswitchesaresetatanaccelerationofabout0.01g."EAL¹EJ12isbasedontheassumptionthatatornadostriking(touchingdown)withintheprotectedboundarymayhavepotentiallydamagedplantstructurescontainingfunctionsorsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifsuchdamageisconfirmedvisuallyorbyotherin-plantindications,theeventmaybeescalatedtoAlert.EAL¹Jjgf3allowsforthecontrolroomtodeterminethataneventhasoccurredandtakeappropriateactionbasedonpersonalassessmentasopposedtoverification(i.e.,anearthquakeisfeltbutdoesnotregisteronanyplant-specificinstrumentation,etc.).lull."'"""""*I"'.',.""i'f'tructurescontainingfunctionsandsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifthecrashisconfirmedtoaffectaplantvitalarea,theeventmaybeescalatedtoAlert.ForEAL¹~5,onlythoseexplosionsofsufficientforcetodamagepermanentstructuresorequipmentwithintheprotectedareashouldbeconsidered.Asusedhere,anexplosionisarapid,violent,unconfinedcombustion,oracatastrophicfailureofpressurizedequipment,thatpotentiallyimpartssignificantenergytonearbystructuresandmaterials.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.Theoccurrenceoftheexplosionwithreportsofevidenceofdamage(e.g.,deformation,scorching)issufficientfordeclaration.TheEmergencyDirectoralsoneedstoconsideranysecurityaspectsoftheexplosion,ifapplicable.EAL¹~6isintendedtoaddressmainturbinerotatingcomponentfailuresofsufficientmagnitudetocauseobservabledamagetotheturbinecasingortothesealsoftheturbinegenerator.Ofmajorconcernisthepotentialforleakageofcombustiblefluids(lubricatingoils)andgases(hydrogencooling)totheplantenvirons.ActualfiresandflammablegasbuildupareappropriatelyclassifiedviaHU2andHU3.ThisEALisconsistentwiththedefinitionofanUnusualEventwhilemaintainingtheanticipatorynaturedesiredandrecognizingtherisktonon-safetyrelatedequipment.EscalationoftheemergencydassificationisbasedonpotentialdamagedonebymissilesgeneratedbythefailureorbytheradiologicalreleasesTheselattereventswouldbedassifiedbytheradiologicalICsorfissionproductbarrierICs.EAL¹~7coversevents.eprecursorsofmoreserious16

IQy:HU2PlantSpecificEAluideline(A,H,S)NineMilePt...itUnit2Firewlthlnprotectedareaboundarynotextinguishedwithin15minutesofdetection.Op.ModeApplicabilitylU2.1Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)RAIIfireinbuildingsorareascontiguoustoanyofthefollowin~~cif+areasnotextinguishedwithin15minutesofcontrolroomnotification4acm:Bases17 l0 PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilei.itUnlt2niepurposeofthisICistoaddressthemagnitudeandextentoffiresthatmaybepotentiallysignificantprecursorstodamagetosafetysystems.Thisexdudessuchitemsasfireswithinadministrationbuildings,waste-basketfires,andothersmallfiresofnosafetyconsequence.ThisICappliestobuildingsandareasthatarecontiguousorimmediatelyadjacenttoplantvitalareas.EscalationtoahigheremergencyclassisbyICHA2,"FireAffectingtheOperabilityofPlantSafetySystemsRequiredfortheCurrentOperatingMode".18

Icy:HU3PlantSpecificEAIuideline(A,H,S)NineMlleP~..itUnit2Releaseoftoxicorflammablegasesdeemeddetrimentaltosafeoperationoftheplant.Op.ModeApplicability<U3.1Q1(pwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(GSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)%AllHU3.2disportordetectionoftoxicorflammablegasesthatcouldentertreaboundaryinamountsthatchggghfaffect~operationoftheplant.withinthesiteReportbylocal,countyorstateofficialspersonnelbasedonoffsiteevent.forpotentialevacuationofsiteBases19

PlantSpecificEAIuideline(A,H,S)NineMilePt..itUnit2ThisIGisbasedonreleasesinconcentrationswithinthesiteboundatythatwillaffectthehealthofplantpersonneloraffectingthesafeoperationoftheplantwiththeplantbeingwithintheevacuationareaofanoffsiteevent(i.e.,tankertruckaccidentreleasingtoxicgases,etc.).TheevacuationarealsasdeterminedfromtheDOTEvacuationTablesforSelectedHazardousMaterials,intheDOTEmergencyResponseGuideforHazardousMaterials.20

icy:HU4PlantSpecificEAIuideline(A,H,S)NineMileP~..itUnit2ConfirmedsecurityeventwhichIndicatesapotentialdegradatlonlnthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Q1(Pwrops)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)AAIIlU4.1HU4.2lombdevicediscoveredwithinplantprotectedareaandlttttoutsidethefgjjttittjttgplantvital~rea~Othersecurityeventsasdeterminedfrom~~pecitio)Qggtirj~SafeguardsContingencyPlan.Bases

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle.,tUnit2thisEALisbasedo.Securityeventswhichdonotrepresentatleastapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplant,arereportedunder10CFR73.71orinsomecasesunder10CFR50.72.Theplantprotectedareaboundaryistypicallythatpartwithinthesecuritysoiationzoneandisdefinedinthe(site-specific)securityplan.22

ICN:HU5PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMllePt..tUnit2OthercondltlonsexlstlngwhichInthejudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorwarrantdeclarationofanUnusualEvent.Op.ModeApplicabilityfU5.1Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)~All)therconditionsexistwhichinthejudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorindicateapotentiallegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Bases23

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMllet..tUnit2%isEALisintendedtoaddressunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbythe"mergencyDirectortofallundertheUnusualEventemergencyclass.Fromabroadperspective,oneareathatmaywarrantEmergencyDirectorjudgementisrelatedtolikelyoractualbreakdownofsitespecificeventmitigatingactions.Examplestoconsider'ncludeinadequateemergencyresponseprocedures,transientresponseeitherunexpectedornotunderstood,failureorunavailabilityofemergencysystemsduringanaccidentinexcessofthatassumedinaccidentanalysis,orinsufficientavailabilityofequipmentand/orsupportpersonnel.ItisalsointendedthattheEmergencyDirectorsjudgementnotbelimitedbyanylistofeventsasdefinedhereorasaugmentedbythesite.Thislistisprovidedsolelyasexamplesforconsiderationanditisrecognizedthatactualeventsmaynotalwaysfollowapre-conceiveddescription.24

!CD:HA1PlantSpecificEAIuideline(A,H,S)NineMilePc..tUnit2Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheplantvitalarea.Op.ModeAppllcablllty3A1.1Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)gAIIHA1.2indicatesseismiceventgreaterthan~~Tornadoor4igh~i~windsgreaterthan(sit~ci~QQmphstrikewithintheprotectedareaboundary.3A1.3HA1.4hefolhwingplantstructures:HA1.5Vehiclecrashaffectingplantvitalareas.HA1.?HA1.625

BasesPlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilec..rUnit2EachoftheseEALsisintendedtoaddresseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtoforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortodassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.Escalationtoahigheremergencydass,ifappropriate,willbebasedonSystemMalfunction,FissionProductBarrierDegradation,AbnormalRadReleases/RadiohgicalEffluent,orEmergencyDirectorJudgementICs.EAL¹~1shouldbebasedo+sit~pociflc)FSARdesignbasisofMZ~.Seismiceventsofthismagnitudecancausedamagetosafetyfunctions.EAL¹~2shouldbebasedo+alt~cific)FSARdesignbasisof9Qmph.Windhadsofthismagnitudecancausedamagetosafetyfunctions.EAL¹~3shouldspecify~~pociflc)structurescontainingsystemsandfunctionsrequiredfor~~gggzgfigftEAL¹55i4EAL¹~5isintendedtoaddresssuchitemsasplaneorhelicoptercrash,oronsomesites,traincrash,ocbargecrashintoaplantvitalarea.tlal."~-~-i-"">>"'"iincludeallareascontainingsafety-relatedequipment,theircontrols,andtheirpowersupplies.ThisEALis,therefore,consistentwiththedefinitionofanALERTinthatifmissileshavedamagedorpenetratedareascontainingsafety-relatedequipmentthepotentialexistsforsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.EALgM~coversTheseEALscanalsobegprecursorsofmoreseriousevents.Inparticular,sitessubjecttosevereweatherasdefinedintheNUMARCstationblackoutinitiatives,shouldincludeanEALbasedonactivationofthesevereweathermitigationprocedures(e.g.,precautionaryshutdowns,dieseltesting,staffcall-outs,etc.).26

fog:HA2PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilet..itUnit2Fireorexplosionaffectintheoperabllltyofplantsafetysystemsrequiredtoestablishormalntalnsafeshutdown.Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)gAIISA2.1rhefolhwingconditionsexist:i.Fireorexphsioninanyofthareas:ANDa.Affectedsystemparameterindicationsshowdegradedperformanceorplantpersonnel.eportvisibledamagetopermanentstructuresorequipmentwithinthestructuresorequipmentwithinthespecifiedarea.Bases27

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile...(Unit2III~I'"""""'i'.t'~i~EM"'"'onsultedforequipmentandplantareasrequiredfortheapplicablemode.ThiswillmakeiteasiertodetermineNithefireorexplosionispotentiallyaffectingoneormoreredundanttrainsof:afetysystems.Escalationtoahigheremergencyclass,ifappropriate,willbebasedonSystemMalfunction,FissionProductBarrierDegradation,AbnormalRadReleases/Radiological=ffluent,orEmergencyDirectorJudgementICs.Withregardtoexplosions,onlythoseexphsionsofsufficientforcetodamagepermanentstructuresorequipmentrequiredforsafeoperationwithintheidentifiedplantareasshouldbeconsidered.Asusedhere,anexplosionisarapid,violent,unconfinedcombustion,oracatastrophicfailureofpressurizedequipment,thatpotentiallyimpartssignificantenergytonearby-tructuresandmaterials.Theinclusionofa"reportofvisibledamage"shouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortodassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.TheoccurrenceoftheexplosionwithreportsofevidenceofdeclarationofanAlertandtheactivationoftheTSCwillprovidetheEmergencyDirectorwiththeresourcesneededtoperformthesedamageassessments.TheEmergencyDirectoralsoneedstoconsideranysecurityaspectsoftheexplosions,ifapplicable.28

ICy:HA33p.ModeApplicabilityIA3.1PlantSpecificEAIuideline(A,H,S)NineI@liePt..itUnit2ReleaseoftoxicorflammablegaseswlthlnafacllltystructurewhichJeopardizesoperationofsystemsrequiredtomalntalnsafeoperatortoestablishormalntalncoldshutdown.Gi(pwrops)G2(HSB)03(HSD)D4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuei)QAIIHA3.2leportordetectionoftoxicgaseswithinalltfLfgllttttfjttftfacilitystructureinconcentrationssatwillbelifethreateningtoplantpersonnel:Reportordetectionofflammablegaseswithina~ttilmiftgstructureinconcentrationsthatwill~thesafeoperationoftheplant:Bases29

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilet..itUnit2ThisIChbasedongasesthathaveenteredaplantstructure&fectlngthesafeoperationoftheplant.ThisICappliestobuildingsandareascontiguoustoplantvitalareasorothersignificantbuildingsorareas(i.e.,ServiceWaterPumphouse).TheintentofthisICisnottoincludebuildings[i.e.,warehouses)orotherareasthatarenotcontiguousorimmediatelyadjacenttoplantvitalareas.Itisappropriatethatincreasedmonitoringbedonetoascertainwhetherconsequentialdamagehasoccurred.Escalationtoahigheremergencyclass,ifappropriate,willbebasedonSystemMalfunction,FissionProductBarrierDegradation,AbnormalRadReleases/RadiologicalEffluent,orEmergencyDirectorJudgementICs.30

ICyHA4PlantSpecificEAluideline(A,H,S)NineMilePc..'Unit2Securityeventlnaplantprotectedarea.Op.ModeAppllcabllltylA4.1Q1(Pwrops)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)~AllHA4,2ntrusionintoplantprotectedareabyakosga4orcoyna~gZyl.Othersecurityeventsasdeterminedfrom~~cific)Rgffffl~SafeguardsContingencyPlan.Bases31

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlleP~.itUnit2ThisdassofsecurityeventsrepresentsanescalatedthreattoplantsafetyabovethatcontainedintheUnusualEvent.ForthepurposesofthisIG,thiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.32

ICy:HA54~PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilePi.itUnit2Controlroomevacuationhasbeenlnltlated.Op.ModeAppllcablllty3A5.1Q1(pwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)~All=ntryinto~forcontrolroomevacuation.Bases33

PlantSpecificEAIO:uideline(A,H,S)NineMllePi..itUnit2Withthecontrolroomevacuated,additionalsupport,monitoringanddirectionthroughtheTechnicalSupportCenterand/orotherEmergencyOperationsCenterisnecessary.InabilitytoestablishplantcontrolfromoutsidethecontrolroomwillescalatethiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.34

ICg:HA6PlantSpecificEAIuideline(A,H,S)NineMilePi.itUnit2OtherconditionsexlstlngwhichIntheJudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorwarrantdeclarationofanAlert.Op.ModeAppllcablllty)A6.1Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)~All7therconditionsexistingwhichinthejudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorindicatethatplantefetysystemsmaybedegradedandthatincreasedmonitoringofplantfunctionsisvarranted.Bases35

PlantSpecificEAiO'Uideline(A,H,S)NineMilePi..itUnit2ThisEALisintendedtoaddressunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheEmergencyDirectortofallundertheAlertemergencyclass.36

lCN:HS1PlantSpecificEAluideline(A,H,S)NineMilePi.itUnit2SecurityeventInaplantvitalarea.Op.ModeAppllcablllty)S1.1Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIHS1.2ntrusioninto~gjj~jpgplantvitalarear'yakostikorea~~ggOthersecurityeventsasdeterminedfrom~~ecitic)Gguirjl~SafeguardsContingencyPlanBases37

PlantSpecificEAIO'Uideline(A,H,S)NineMllePi.itUnit2ThisclassofsecurityeventsrepresentsanescalatedthreattoplantsafetyabovethatcontainedintheAlertIGinthatakostilaforcemad~g,hasprogressedfromtheprotectedareatothevitalarea.38

fC¹:HS2PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NlneMlle~..<Unlt2PW4aaelaaRNOp.ModeApplicability)S2.1Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)%Allihefollowingconditionsexist:t.Controlroomevacuationhasbeeninitiated.ROC04UCIRsi~cifio)~minutes.cannotbeestablishedper~acpecTiic)-withinBases39

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMileointUnit2ExpeditioustransferofsafetysystemshasnotoccurredbutfissionproductbarrierdamagemaynotyetbeIndicated.~it~cifgtimefortransferiabasedonanalysisorassessmentsastohowquicMycontrolmustbereestablishedwithoutcoreuncoveringand/orcoredamage.Thistimeshouklnotexceed15minutes.Incoklshutdownandrefuelingmodes,operatorconcernisdirectedtowardmaintainingcorecoolingsuchasisdiscussedinGenericLetter88-17,'LossofDecayHeatRemoval.Inpoweroperation,hotstandby,andhotshutdownmodes,operatorconcernisprimarilydirectedtowardmaintainingcriticalsafetyfunctionsandtherebyassuringfissionproductbarrierintegrity.Escalationofthisevent,ifappropriate,wouldbebyFissionProductBarrierDegradation,AbnormalRadReleases/RadiologicalEffluent,orEmergencyDirectorJudgementICs.5dhraartagttnarntmfiannfthatuhliaantiaafaaslantanaratiana.~aztrnLmtiathmarimarilxrtnihaabilitlrhrnairttainiharaaahzinamahd.auuhtian.IharahrLitiaartnrunriatatrt~thaGannetE6LartihaiitftmuhasizaathanaaffhramaulinunhanmatrgllingthauiantfrgmnirhhhthaQantrulHaun.40

ICgHS3PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.rttUnit2OthercondltlonswhichlnthejudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorwarrantdeclarationofSiteAreaEmergency.Op.ModeAppltcabllltyRS3.1Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Deluel)~All3therconditionswhichinthejudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorwarrantdeclarationofSitebreaEmergency.Bases41

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..ttUnit2ThisEALisintendedtoaddressunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbythe=mergencyDirectortofallundertheemergencyclassdescriptionforSiteAreaEmergency.42

ICy:HG1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle~.hattUnit2Securityeventresultinglnlossofabllltytoreachandmaintaincoldshutdown.Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)gAllAppllcablllty4G1.1HG1.2ossof~~ysicalcontrolc4Qgmthecontrolroomduetosecurityevent.uuafalmhalpatrolaffhaaunuh~hhmnmuahililxdmh.mmuily.mumt.Bases43

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2ThisICencompassesconditionsunderwhichahostileforcehastakenphysicalcontrolofvitalarearequiredtoreachandmaintainsafeshutdown.Ihft~gftrahtrfrhrhr~glgbQy>ahuhlmaihftrmhrxdmaiahmammliaaItmrftfmfhhEhLhmhmnmttdififtrliumhmtahaartfuhntaziulfatmhdhlhfrmalrrtlcatmmfftmuhCrtddfttframmh.44

fCy.HG2PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle..itUnit2OtherconditionsexistingwhichlntheJudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorwarrantdeclarationofGeneralEmergency.Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)~All3G2.17therconditionsexistingwhichinthejudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorindicate:(t)tctualorimminentsubstantialcoredegradationwithpotentialforlossofcontainment,or(2)etentialforuncontrolledradionuclidereleases.ThesereleasescanreasonablybeexpectedoexceedEPAPAGplumeexposurelevelsoutsidethesiteboundary.Bases45

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..tUnit2thisEALisintendedtoaddressunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheEmergencyDirectortofallundertheGeneralEmergencydass.46

fC¹:SU~PlantSpecificEAf+uideline(A,H,S)NineMilePt...itUnit2Lossofalloffsltepowertoessentialbussesforgreaterthan15minutes.Op.ModeApplicability3U'f.1Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)-Q6(Defuel)%Allrhefolhwingconditionsexist:s.Lossofpowert~i~pocTiic)lreaterthan15minutes.ANDforxAtleast~~pocTiic)tttfttemergencygeneratorsaresupplyingpowertoemergencybuses;Bases47

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NlneMilet.tUnit2ProlongedhssofAGpowerreducesrequiredredundancyandpotentiallydegradesthelevelofsafetyoftheplantbyrenderingtheplantmorevulnerabletoacompletehssofACpower(stationblackout).Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexdudetransientormomentarypowerlosses.48

iC¹:SU2PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2InabllltytoreachrequiredshutdownwlthlnTechnicalSpeclflcatlonLlmlts.Op.ModeAppllcabllltySU2.1S1(PwrOps)R2(HSB)~3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIPlantisnotbroughttorequiredoperatingmodewithiQei~ocific)TechnicalSpecificationsLCOActionStatementTime.Bases49

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilei.itUnit2LimitingConditionsofOperation(LCOs)requiretheplanttobebroughttoarequiredshutdownmodewhentheTechnicalSpecificationrequiredconfigurationcannotberestored.Dependingonthecircumstances,thismayormaynotbeanemergencyorprecursortoamoreseverecondition.Inanycase,theinitiationofplantshutdownrequiredbythesiteTechnicalSpecificationrequiresaonehourreportunder10CFR50.72(b)nonwmergencyevents.TheplantiswithinitssafetyenvehpewhenbeingshutdownwithintheallowableactionstatementtimeintheTechnicalSpecifications.AnimmediateNotificationofanUnusualEventisrequiredwhentheplantisnotbroughttotherequiredoperatingmodewithintheallowableactionstatementtimeintheTechnicalSpecifications.DeclarationofanUnusualEventisbasedonthetimeatwhichtheLCO-specifiedactionstatementtimeperiodelapsesunderthesiteTechnicalSpecificationsand,isnotrelatedtohowlongaconditionmayhaveexisted.OtherrequiredTechnicalSpecificationshutdownsthatinvolveprecursorstomoreseriouseventsareaddressedbyotherSystem,malfunctionHazards,orFissionProductBarrierDegradationICs.50

ICg:SU3PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMllet...tUnlt2UnplannedlossofmostorallsafetysystemannunclatlonorlndlcatlonInthecontrolroomforgreaterthan15minutes.81(PwrOps)~2(HSB)~3(HSD)Q4(CSD)05(Refuel)06(Defuel)0AllIU3.1hefolhwingconditionsexist:uLossofannunciatoreANDforgreaterthan15minutes.AND.IntheopinionoftheShiftSupervisor,thelossoftheannunciatorsorindicatorsrequiresncreasedsurveillancetosafelyoperatetheun.ANDLAnnunciatororindicatorlossdoesnotresultfromplannedaction.Bases51

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2ThisICanditsassociatedEALareintendedtorecognizethedNicultyassociatedwithmonitoringchangingplantconditionswithouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciationorindicationequipment.Recognitionoftheavailabilityofcomputerbasedindicationequipmentisconsidered(SPDS,plantcomputer,etc.).'Unplanned'ossofannunciatorsorindicatorexcludesscheduledmaintenanceandtestingactivities.'Compensatorynon-alarmingindications:inthiscontextincludescomputerbasedinformationsuchasSPDS.ThisshouldIncludeallcomputersystemsavailableforthisusedependingonspecificplantdesignandsubsequentretrofits.h~lIb'SklMhmfhagfaahhrthamffthm,ihhrlm.'tisnotintendedthatplantpersonnelperformadetailedcountofinstrumentationlostbutfhausegfthw4~judgementhgfha5455gggudmmfhathresholdfordeterminingtheseverityoftheplantconditions.ThisjudgementissupportedbythespecificopinionoftheShiftSupervisorthatadditionaloperatingpersonnelwillberequiredtoprovideincreasedmonitoringofsystemoperationtosafelyoperatetheunit~.Itisfurtherrecognizedthatmostplantdesignsprovideredundantsafetysystemindicationpoweredfromseparateuninterruptablepowersupplies.Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciatorsismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications,theconcernisincludedinthisEALduetodifficultyassociatedwithassessmentofplantconditions.Thelossofspecific,orseveral,safetysystemindicatorsshouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponentoperabilitystatus.ThiswillbeaddressedbytheirspecificTechnicalSpecification.TheinitiationofaTechnicalSpecificationimposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrumenthsswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.IftheshutdownisnotincompliancewiththeTechnicalSpecificationaction,theUnusualEventisbasedonSU2,InabilitytoReachRequiredShutdownWithinTechnicalSpecificationLimits."(Site-speci~Annunciators~catorforthisEALmustincludethoseidentifiedintheAbnormalOperatingprocedures,intheEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andinotherEALs(e.9.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors,etc.).(Sitaepecfflc)Annunciatorsoc4adicaWforthisEALmustincludethoseidentifiedintheAbnormalOperatingprocedures,intheEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors,etc.).Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses.Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperationduringcoldshutdown,refueling,anddefueledmodes,noICisindicatedduringthesemodesofoperation.ThisUnusualEventwillbeescalatedtoanAlertifatransientisinprogressduringthelossofannunciationorindication.52

ICttf:SU4Fuelcladdegradatlon.PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..tUnit2Op.ModeApplicability3U4.1Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)~AllSU4.2coolantsampleactivityBases53

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..iUnit2ThisICisincludedasanUnusualEventbecauseitisconsideredtobeapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.EAL¹~1addressesg~pecIIQ~radiationmonitorreading,thatprovideindicationoffuelcladintegrity.~EAL¹Qfl4gaddressescoolantsamplesexceedingcoolanttechnicalspecificationsforIodinespike.EscaiatioriofthisICtotheAlertlevelisviathefissionproductbarrierdegradationmonitoringICs.54

ICgSU5RCSleakage.PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilet...itUnit2Op.ModeApplicabilitySU5.1~1(PwrOps)52(HSB)~3(HSD)D4(CSD)05(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIEitherofthefollowingconditionsexist:a.UnidentifiedtogpmOR~~gghmlg~leakagegreaterthanb.identifiedcgggfgZ~gy2gmg~leakagegreaterthan25gpm.Bases55 0

PlantSpecificEAUideline(A,H,S)NineMllea...itVnit2ThisICisincludedasanUnusualEventbecauseitmaybeaprecursorofmoreseriousconditionsand,asaresult,isconsideredtobeapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.The10gpmvaluefortheunidentifiedandpressureboundaryleakagewasselectedasitisobservablewithnormalcontrolroomindications.Lesservaluesmustgenerallybedeterminedthroughtime~nsumingsurveillancetest(e.g.,massbalances).TheEALforidentifiedleakageissetatahighervalueduetothelessersignificanceofidentifiedleakageincomparisontounidentifiedorpressureboundaryleakage.Ineithercase,escalationofthisICtotheAlertlevelisviaFissionProductBarrierDegradationICsorICSA3,"InabilitytoMaintainPlantinColdShutdown.'nlyoperatingmodesinwhichthereisfuelinthereactorcoolantsystemandthesystemIspressurizedarespecified.56

iC¹:SU6PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle.itUnit2Unplannedlossofallonslteoroffsltecommunicationscapabllltles.Op.ModeAppllcablllty3U6.1Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)%All=itherofthefollowingconditionsexist:Urdu'l'b"'labilitytoperformroutineoperations:3R>.Lossofall~hLlttlitt)ftlttgoffsitecommunicationscapability:Bases57

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..tUnit2thepurposeofthisICanditsassociatedEALsistorecognizeahssofcommunicationscapabilitythateitherdefeatstheplantoperationsstaffabilitytoperformroutinetasksnecessary.forslantoperationsortheabilitytocommunicateproblemswithoffsiteauthorities.Thehssofoffsitecommunicationsabilityisexpectedtobesignificantlymorecomprehensivethantheconditionaddressed.by10CFR50.72.Zi"'-'"-'"-'"'-l--'--'t'.',""'--""'-".'W'"adios/walkietalkies).XlanddedicatedEPPphonesystems.ThisEALisintendedtobeusedonlywhenextraordinarymeansarebeingutilizedtomakecommunicationspossible(relayingofinformationfromradiotransmissions,individualsbeingsenttooffsitelocations,etc.).58

ICy:SU7Op.ModeApplfcablllty3U7.1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2UnplannedlossofrequiredDCpowerduringcoldshutdownorrefuelingmodeforgreaterthan15minutes.Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)g4(CSD)~5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAII@hot~ofthefollowingconditionsexist:>usvoltageindicationsAND'BKxhi.FailuretorestorepowertoatleastoneacquiredDCbuswithin15minutesfromthetimeofOss.Bases59

PlantSpecificEAiideline(A,H,S)NineMilei..Unit2ThepurposeofthisICanditsassociatedEALsistorecognizeahssofDCpowercompromisingtheabilitytomonitorandcontroltheremovalofdecayheatduringcoklshutdownorrefuelingoperations.ThisEALisintendedtobeanticipatoryinasmuchastheoperatingcrewmaynothavenecessaryindicationandcontrolofequipmentneededtorespondtotheloss.UnplannedisIncludedinthisICandEALtoprecludethedeclarationofanemergencyasaresultofplannedmaintenanceactivities.Routinelyplantswillperformmaintenanceonatrainrelatedbasisduringshutdownperiods.Itisintendedthatthelossoftheoperating(operable)trainistobeconsidered.Ifthishssresultsintheinabilitytomaintaincoldshutdown,theescalationtoanAlertwillbeperSA3"InabilitytoMaintainPlantinColdShutdown."Pi~pec~~busvoltageshoul4bohbasedontheminimumbusvoltagenecessaryfortheoperationofsafetyrelatedequipment.Thisvoltagevalueshouldincorporateamarginofatleast15minutesofoperationbeforetheonsetofinabilitytooperatethoseloads.Thisvoltageisusuallyneartheminimumvoltageselectedwhenbatterysizingisperformed.Typicallythevaluefortheentirebatterysetisapproximately105voltspercell.Fora56stringbatterysettheminimumvoltageistypically1.81voltspercell.60

ICy.SA1Op.ModeAppllcablllty3A1.1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile~;.itUnit2LossofalloffsltepowerandlossofallonslteACpowertoessentialbussesduringcoldshutdownorrefuelingmode.lQ1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)~4(CSD)~5(Refuel)56(Defuel)QAIIAllofthefollowingconditionsexist:~.LossofpowertQcitezpocific)transformersANDxFailureof~te.specific)AND"FailuretorestorepowertoMeastene.anorgcncykucwithin15minutesfromthetimeoflossofbothoffsiteandonsiteACpower.Bases61

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile~..itUnit2LossofallAGpowercompromisesallplantsafetysystemsrequiringelectricpoweriWhenincoldshutdown,refueling,ordefueledmodetheeventcanbeclassTiiedasanAlert,becauseofthesignificantlyreduceddecayheat,lowertemperatureandpressure,increasingthetimetorestoreoneoftheemergencybusses,relativetothatspecifiedfortheSiteAreaEmergencyEAL.EscalatingtotheSiteAreaEmergency,ifappropriate,isbyAbnormalRadLevels/RadiologicalEffluent,orEmergencyDirectorJudgementICs.Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses.62

lCN:SA2Op.ModeAppllcabllltylA2.1PlantSpecificEAIuideline(A,H,S)NineMilePt.tUnit2Y""PaReactorProtectionsystemsetpolnthasbeenexceededaad~manualscram~1(PwrOps)~2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIyreactorscramhhwhrBases63

PlantSpecificEA>>ideline(A,H,S)NineMilei...Unit2Thisconditionindicatesfailureoftheautomaticanrfrnanttatprotectionsystemtoscramthereactortuihaatrtantzdgghurttultrrfaaiharaauturitalnurnadaattb~tjua[.Thisconditionismorethanapotentialdegradationofasafetysysteminthatafrontlineautomaticprotectionsystemdidnotfunctioninresponsetoaplanttransientandthustheplantsafetyhasbeencompromised,anddesignlimitsofthefuelmayhavebeenexceeded.AnAlertisindicatedbecauseconditionsexistthatleadtopotentiallossoffuelcladorRCS.Amanualscramisanysetofactionsuttahhtttun:~mudamitahurhBO.EbiaEanrfiamrltinuEBLh~rahtanmauifiualitrroufifiarftunIuiaautriatttitrtfttIinathauuitrlitIundmuiihtttfhxtbauanariuhamtaaaauuiitttftuhuilinumahrraautuia.Ibafailmufatrtuinatiu5fiatiunufaiaautuimamfulhntttfhx2ruumhi~initiatiunautiunauhhhuanharauJdlxtalranattharaauhzmntruluunauiarfuaanutuuaaauutantialiuuufaithtrfttalulatfurfKRhunIfarbq.fhuatraafaituiatummauufitiunainBEEharafafinaifnuthxtbamatttnuaufuriTiualihrhufhxthaatraiiabiamaruinufmhuiitiuality.tbauttna1luuuilIi~amuRiauuiraalamTiiuatiunufanhhdfurmnditiunainmhhhthaqauturlainfautahuttfumaaamultuftbaaurammmLJfiatbauuntintrarfuritiua!ItxtrntfaruunditIunamuirinuaiaauturauiainnhhbuumta1hauutantialtbiaattuBSQurfuelularfintagrity.ltiaahuirnuurtanttunutathattbafailtriauftbaraautuiurutautiunairabuniuinitiataanautumatiuaurarnrfuaanutinfarauttraluiuutantlallaituraaufuthtrmstttrnanuriait.inanrfufitattlf.auDtutrrauriufiaaiunrrutftrutharriardauralfatiun.IhaHERaanraanuuthttraafatxfunutlunbtrttuinitaiiaraauturmrama.Iharttfurrt.unuatharmbzhaahtanzzaaattlkmammttrLfaihiaaintbaBERmhmuanftatranuuiantaafttthiinuaut.Ifintrnttdiatamanualautiunatumamtbaiaauturarazzmfulfulluninurauuunitiunufanatrturnatiumamfailtra.thtrahnutbittattuaitbttiulantaafatxurMhnurudtrutJnttturity.ttiatatftutbaautuntatiuauramfahrhIhhrftt~uniauunmatantmithtbaubilumtMufmaitinua~trratamuunaartratbrauiaamfiuatiuna{Hah;an'tfaituraufanatituinatiuazamsignaltuinitiataamuuauftdauramnuuldhaimmttdiatabrfullunatfhxanuuaraturinitiatatfrnaimlmam.Ibarttfura1haEhl.zurdinuinihaIBabailunlxmakarttfaranuaiuihafaituraufirnrnttdiatamanualaurainal64

lingSA3PlantSpecificEAUideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2lnabllltytomaintainplantlncoldshutdown.Op.ModeAppllcabllltySA3.1Q1(Pwrops)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)~4(CSD)55(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIThefollowingconditionsexist:ORBases65

PlantSpecificEA~sideline(A,H,S)NineMllei..Unit2ThisEALaddressescompletelossoffunctionsrequiredforcorecoolingduringrefuelingandcoldshutdownmodes.EscalationtoSiteAreaEmergencyorGeneralEmergencywouklbeviaAbnormalRadLevels/RadiohgicalEffluentorEmergencyDirectorJudgementICs."Uncontrolled"meansthatsystemtemperatureincreaseisnottheresultofplannedactionsbytheplantstaff.TheEALguidancerelatedtouncontrolledtemperatureriseisnecessarytopreservetheanticipatoryphilosophyofNUREG-0654foreventsstartingfromtemperaturesmuchhwerthanthecoldshutdowntemperaturelimit.EscalationtotheSiteAreaEmergencyisbyICSSS,"LossofWaterLevelintheReactorVesselthathasorwillUncoverFuelintheReactorVessel,"orbyAbnormalRadLevels/RadiologicalEffluentICs.66

ICy:SA4Op.ModeAppllcabllltyiA4.1PlantSpecificEAle'uideline(A,H,S)NineMllePi.tUnit2UnplannedlossofmostorallsafetysystemannunclatlonorIndlcatlonIncontrolroomwith.either(1)aslgnlfleanttransientInprogress(2)compensatorynon-alarmingIndicatorsareunavailable.~1(PwrOps)~2(HSB)S3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIrhefollowingconditionsexist:t.LossofannunciatoreANDforgreaterthan15minutes.).lntheopinionoftheShiftSupervisor,thelossoftheannunciatorsorindicatorsrequiresncreasedsurveillancetosafelyoperatetheunit(e).ANDAnnunciatororindicatorlossdoesnotresultfromplannedaction.AND3.Eitherofthefollowing:~AsignificantplanttransientisinprogressOR~Careunavailable.Bases67

PlantSpecificEAIOluideline(A,H,S)NineMilePi.tUnit2ThisICanditsassociatedEALareintendedtorecognizethedNicultyassociatedwithmonitoringchangingplantconditionswithouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciationorIndicationequipmentduringatransient.Recognitionoftheavailabilityofcomputerbasedindicationequipmentisconsidered(SPDS,plantcomputer,etc.).Plannedlossofannunciatorsorindicatorsincludedscheduledmaintenanceandtestingactivities.Itisnotintendedthatplantpersonnelperformadetailedcountoftheinstrumentationlostbuttheusegf4~~~judgementthresholdfordeterminingtheseverityoftheplantconditions.ThisjudgementissupportedbythespecificopinionoftheShiftSupervisorthatadditionaloperatingpersonnelwillberequiredtoprovideincreasedmonitoringofsystemoperationtosafelyoperatetheunit(s).Itisfurtherrecognizedthatmostplantdesignsprovideredundantsafetysystemindicationpoweredfromseparateuninterruptablepowersupplies.Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciatorsismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications,theconcernisincludedinthisEALduetodifficultyassociatedwithassessmentofplantconditions.Thelossofspecific,orseveral,safetysystemindicatorsshouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponentoperabilitystatus.ThiswillbeaddressedbythespecificTechnicalSpecification.TheinitiationofaTechnicalSpecificationimposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrumenthsswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.IftheshutdownisnotincompliancewiththeTechnicalSpecificationaction,theUnusualEventisbasedonSU2"InabilitytoReachRequiredShutdownWithinTechnicalSpecificationLimits."(SI!e-specific)Qnnunciatorscu-hdicatoreforthisEALmustincludethoseidentifiedintheAbnormalOperatingProcedures,intheEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors,etc.)."SignificantTransient"includesresponsetoautomaticormanuallyinitiatedfunctionssuchasscrams,runbacksinvolvinggreaterthan25%thermalpowerchange,ECCSinjections,orthermalpoweroscillationsof10%orgreater."Compensatorynon-alarmingindications"inthiscontextIndudescomputerbasedinformationsuchasSPDS.Thisshouldincludeallcomputersystemsavailableforthisusedependingonspecificplantdesignandsubsequentretrofits.IfbothamajorportionoftheannunciationsystemandallcomputermonitoringareunavailabletotheextentthattheadditionaloperatingpersonnelarerequiredtomonitorIndications,theAlertisrequired.Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperationduringcoldshutdown,refuelinganddefueledmodes.NoICisindicatedduringthesemodesofoperation.ThisAlertwillbeescalatedtoaSiteAreaEmergencyiftheoperatingcrewcannotmonitorthetransientinprogress.68

fc¹:SA5Op.ModeAppllcablllty3A5.1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.itUnit2ACpowercapabllltytoessentialbussesreducedtoasinglepowersourceforgreaterthan15minutessuchthatanyadditionalsinglefailurewouldresultlnstationblackout.51(PwrOps)52(HSB)53(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIfhefollowingconditionsexist(aandb):a.Lossofpowert+si~pecific)greaterthan15minutes.ANDtransformersforxOnsitepowercapabilityhasbeendegradedtogaiy.oneggitfLlgll~ittg~iaef)emergencyBases69

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle..Unit2ThisICandtheassociatedEALsareintendedtoprovideanescalationfromICSU1"LossofAllOffsitePowertoEssentialBussesforGreaterthan15Minutes."TheconditionindicatedbythisICisthedegradationoftheoffsitepowerwithaconcurrentfailureofoneemergencygeneratortosupplypowertoitsemergencybusses.Anotherrelatedconditioncouldbethelossofalloffsitepowerandhssofonsiteemergencydieseiswithonlyonetrainofemergencybussesbeingbaddedfromtheunitmaingenerator,orthelossofonsiteemergencydieselswithonlyonetrainofemergencybussesbeingbackfedfromoffsitepower.ThesubsequenthssofthissinglepowersourcewouldescalatetheeventtoaSiteAreaEmergencyinaccordancewithICSS1"LossofAllOffsiteandLossofAllOnsiteACPowertoEssentialBusses."ExampleEAL¹QE5.1bshouldbeexpandedtoidentifythecontrolroomindicationofthestatusgfoffsite-specificpowersourcesanddistributionbussesthat,ifunavailable,establishasinglefailurevulnerability.70

ICy:SS1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilei'nit2LossofalloffsltepowerandlossofallonslteACpowertoessentialbusses.Op.ModeApplicabilitySS1.151(PwrOps)52(HSB)83(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIILossofalloffsiteandonsiteAGpowerasindicatedby:a.Lossofpowerto~~ecifie)ANDtransformers.>.Failureof~~pecific)AND=.FailuretorestorepowertoMeastoao-~rgoacy4vewithin~~ueific)~minutesfromthetimeofhssofbothoffsiteandonsite4,Cpower.Bases

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2LossofallACpowercompromisesallplantsafetysystemsrequiringelectricpoweriProlongedlossofallAC.powerwillcausecoreuncoveringandlossofcontainmentintegrity,thusthiseventcanescalatetoaGeneralEmergency.Th+sitaspecifgtimedurationshouldbeselectedtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerhsses,butshouldnotexceed15minutes.EscalationtoGeneralEmergencyisviaFissonProductBarrierDegradationorICSG1,'ProlongedLossofAllOffsitePowerandProlongedLossofAllOnsiteACPower."72

lC¹:SS2Op.ModeAppllcablllty3S2.1PlantSpecificEAUideline(A,H,S)NlneMilei.tUnlt2FailureofReactorProtectionsystemInstrumentatlontocompleteorInitiateanautomaticreactorscramonceaReactorProtectionsyslsetpolnthasbeenexceededandmanualscramwasnotsuccessfulnninrir~1(PwrOps)~2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIBases73

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.<Unit2Undertheseconditions,thereactorisproducingmoreheatthanthemaximumdecayheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsaredesigned.ASiteAreaEmergencyisindicatedbecauseconditionsexistthatleadtoimminentlossorpotentialhssofbothfuelcladandRCS.AlthoughthisICmaybeviewedasredundanttotheFissionProductBarrierDegradationIC,itsinclusionisnecessarytobetterassuretimelyrecognitionandemergencyresponse.EscalationofthiseventtoaGeneralEmergencywouldbeviaFissionProductBarrierDegradationorEmergencyDirectorJudgementICs.74

iC¹:SS3PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2LossofallvltafDCpower.Op.ModeApplicability3S3.151(PwrOps)52(HSB)g3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIr,busvoltageindicationsforgreaterthan15minutes.Bases75

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2LossofallDCpowercompromisesabilitytomonitorandcontrolplantsafetyfunctions.ProhngedhssofallDCpowerwillcausecoreuncoveringandlossofcontainmentintegritywhenthereissignificantdecayheatandsensibleheatinthereactorsystem.EscalationtoaGeneralEmergencywouldoccurbyAbnormalRadLevels/RadiologicalEffluent,FissionProductBarrierDegradation,orEmergencyDirectorJudgementICs.Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexdudetransientormomentarypowerlosses.76

ICy:SS4PlantSpecificEAUideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2Completelossoffunctionneededtoachieveormalntalnhotshutdown.Op.ModeApplicability3S4.151(PwrOps)~2(HSB)~3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIBases77

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2ThisEALaddressescompletelossoffunctions,includingultimateheatsinkandreactivitycontrol,requiredforhotshutdownwiththereactoratpressureandtemperature.Undertheseconditions,thereisanactualmajorfailureofasystemintendedforprotectionofthepublic.Thus,declarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyiswarranted.EscalationtoaGeneralEmergencywouldoccurbyAbnormalRadLevels/RadiohgicalEffluent,FissionProductBarrierDegradation,orEmergencyDirectorJudgementICs.78

ling:SS5PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2LossofRPVwaterlevelthathasorwilluncoverfuelIntheRPV.51(PwrOps)52(HSB)~3(HSD)S4(CSD)S5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAII3S5.1SS5.2Bases79

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilei.tUnit2UndertheconditionsspecifiedbythisIC,severecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegritymaynotbeassured.'IIIIhIh'lldl~d5'hhlazmmiraii~tniamtnarallxagnaldaradilmherhttuadanrrtffbarangaiamhhhhzalizmfdafiagratignamaxrtmr.Iuganaraiazzbaamzaniraiignrtfmahttaiihhgaa.RaartfhttihibahaiahdandBGRharrlaramttaihatramurrad.Ztmrahra.dat;larafhnafa2hhamEmargarmxianarranfttd.ifbmdmganauzaniraiiunalncraaaainmaiuziitInmdhihauraaant:artfntmanittghhaldaflagraihnhuraia{Lh)PkhttiruganandaPlmtfgtuQ.mmiiaurtfilmrttniainmaniirraammibnrrefihaaffaiiaradhat;iharaiaaaarafafrttttidharattttiradhxEZaanddat:laraihnofaQamalEmargantntrartttlradThus,declarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyiswarrantedundertheconditionsspecifiedbytheIC.EscalationtoaGeneralEmergencyisviaradiologicaleffluenceICAG1harrhrlaaa.80

ICO:SS6PlantSpecificEAUideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2lnabllltytomonitoraslgnlfleanttransienttnprogress.Op.ModeAppllcabllltySS6.1~1(PwrOps)~2(HSB)53(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIWlofthefollowingconditionsexist:s.Lossof~e-spociTIe)annunciatorsAND:.Indicationsneededtoinonitor~~cific)areunavailable.ANDf.Transientinroress.Bases81

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile,tUnit2ThisICanditsassociateEALareintendedtorecognizetheinabilityofthecontrolroomstafftomonitortheplantresponsetoatransient.ASiteAreaEmergencyisconsideredtoexistifthecontrolroomstaffcannotmonitorsafetyfunctionsneededforprotectionofthepublic.(Q~oci~AnnunciatorsforthisEALshouldbelimitedtoincludethoseidentifiedintheAbnormalOperatingProcedures,IntheEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andinotherEALs(e.g.,radmonitors,etc.).Compensatorynon-alarmingindications"inthiscontextindudescomputerbasedinformationsuchasSPDS.Thisshouldincludeallcomputersystemsavailableforthisusedependingonspecificplantdesignandsubsequentretrofits.'SignificantTransientincludesresponsetoautomaticormanuallyinitiatedfunctionssuchasscrams,runbacksinvolvinggreaterthan25%thermalpowerchange,ECCSinjections,orthermalpoweroscillationsof10%orgreater.@to.spec~Indicationsneededtomonitorsafetyfunctionsnecessaryforprotectionofthepublicmustincludecontrolroomindications,computergeneratedindicationsanddedicatedannunciationcapability.Thespecificindicationsshouldbethoseusedtodeterminesuchfunctionsastheabilitytoshutdownthereactor,maintainthecorecooledandinaeoolablegeometry,toremoveheatfromthecore,tomaintainthereactorcoolantsystemintact,andtomaintaincontainmentintact.Planned"actionsareexcludedfromtheisEALsincethelossofinstrumentationofthismagnitudeisofsuchsignificanceduringatransientthatthecauseofthelossisnotanamelioratingfactor.82

iC¹:SG1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2ProlongedlossofalloffsltepowerandprolongedlossofallonslteACpower.Op.ModeApplicabilitySG1.1R1(Pwrops)~2(HSB)~3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIprolongedlossofalloffsiteandonsiteAGpowerasindicatedby:a.Lossofpowertospecific)ANDtransformers.xFailureof~~pecific):.Atleastoneofthefolhwingconditionsexist:~RestorationofggmttLtaatleastoneemergencybuswithin~~pocTiic)2hoursisnotlikelyOR~(Bases83

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2LossofallACpowercompromisesallplantsafetysystemsrequiringelectricpoweri.ProlongedlossofallACpowerwillleadtohssoffuelclad,RCS,andcontainment.Thgai~peciflc)hourstorestoreACpowercanbebasedonsiteblackoutcopinganalysisperformedinconformancewith10CFR50.63andRegulatoryGuide1.155,"StationBlackout,asavailable,withappropriateallowanceforoffsiteemergencyresponse.AlthoughthisICmaybeviewedasredundanttotheFissionProductBarrierDegradationIC,itsinclusionisnecessarytobetterassuretimelyrecognitionandemergencyresponse.ThisICisspecifiedtoassurethatintheunlikelyeventofprolongedstationblackout,timelyrecognitionoftheseriousnessoftheeventoccursandthatdeclarationofaGeneralEmergencyoccursasearlyasisappropriate,basedonareasonableassessmentoftheeventtrajectory.Thelikelihoodofrestoringatleastoneemergencybusshouldbebasedonarealisticappraisalofthesituationsinceadelayinanupgradedecisionbasedononlyachanceofmitigatingtheeventcouldresultinahssofvaluabletimeinpreparingandimplementingpublicprotectiveactions.Inaddition,undertheseconditions,fissionproductbarriermonitoringcapabilitymaybedegraded.Althoughitmaybedifficulttopredictwhenpowercanberestored,itisnecessarytogivetheEmergencyDirectorareasonableideaofhowquickly(s)hemayneedtodeclareaGeneralEmergencybasedontwomajorconsiderations:1.ArethereanypresentindicationsthatcorecoolingisalreadydegradedtothepointthatLossorPotentialLossoffissionproductbarriersisimminent'?(RefertoTables3and4formoreinformation.)2.Iftherearenopresentindicationsofsuchcorecoolingdegradation,howlikelyisitthatpowercanberestoredintimetoassurethatalossoftwobarrierswithapotentiallossofthethirdbarriercanbeprevented?Thus,indicationofcontinuingcoracoolingdegradationmustbebasedonfissionproductbarriermonitoringwithparticularemphasisonEmergencyDirectorjudgementasitrelatestoimminentlossorpotentiallossoffissionproductbarriersanddegradedabilitytomonitorfissionproductbarriers.84

ICe:SG2Op.ModeAppllcablllty3G2.1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle..itUnit2FailureoftheReactorProtectionsystemtocompleteanautomaticscramandmanualscramwasnotsuccessfulandtherelsIndlcatlottanextremechallengetotheabllltytocoolthecore.g1(PwrOps)52(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)QAIIAND>Eitherofthefollowing:a.(Sb.(s'RBases85

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile~..itUnit2Automaticandmanualscramarenotconsideredsuccessfulifactionawayfromthereactorcontrolconsoleisrequiredtoscramthereactor.UndertheconditionsofthisICanditsassociatedEALs,theeffortstobringthereactorsubcriticalhavebeenunsuccessfuland,asaresult,thereactorisproducingmoreheatthanthemaximumdecayheathadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.Althoughtherearecapabilitiesawayfromthereactorcontrolconsole,suchas'tandbyliquidcontrolinBWRs,thecontinuingtemperateriseindicatesthatthesecapabilitiesarenoteffective.Thissituationcouldbeprecursorforacoremeltsequence.reactorvesselwaterlevelisbelow2/3coverageofactivefuelForBWRs,theextremechallengetotheabilitytocoolthecoreisintendedtomeanthattheAnotherconsiderationistheinabilitytoinitiallyremoveheatduringtheearlystagesofthissequence.BWRs,~~peelsconsiderationsincludeinabilitytoremoveheatviathemaincondenser,orviathesuppressionpooloc4oruc(e.g.,duetohighpoolwatertemperature).Intheeventeitherofthesechallengesexistatatimethatthereactorhasnotbeenbroughtbelowthepowerassociatedwiththesafetysystemdesign(typically3to5%power)acoremeltsequenceexists.Inthissituation,coredegradationcanoccurrapidlyForthisreason,theGeneralEmergencydeclarationisintendedtobeanticipatoryofthefissionproductbarriermatrixdeclarationtopermitmaximumoffsiteinterventiontime.86

PlantSpecificEAlsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBtC¹'C1Barrier:FuelCladdinDescription:PrimaryCoolantActivityLevelType:LossFC1.1CoolantactivitygreaterthanBases:AssessmentbytheNUMARGEALTaskForceindicatesthatthisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorrespondstoabout2%to5%fuelcladdamage.Thisamountofcladdamageindicatessignificantcladheatingandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsideredhst.Thereisnoequivalent'PotentialLoss"EALforthisitem.87

PlantSpecificEAIjideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹'C2Barrier:FuelCladdinDescripttoll:ReactorVesselWaterLevelType:Loss/Pot.LossFC2.1Levellessthan-bioJEBBBases:The"Loss"EA+si~poci~valuecorrespondstothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallengeofcorecooling.o~tiuo-fuel.Thisistheminimumvaluetoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradationofthedad.The"PotentialLoss"EAListhesameastehRCSbarrier"Loss"EAL4belowandcorrespondstothe~~pecifgwaterlevelatthetopoftheactivefuel.Thus,thisEALindicatesa"Loss"ofRCSbarrieranda"PotentialLoss"oftheFuel.CladBarrier.ThisEALappropriatelyescalatestheemergencyclasstoaSiteAreaEmergency.88

PlantSpecificEAlsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:FC3Barrier:FuelCladdinDescrfptloit:DrywellRadiationMonitoringType:LossDrywellradiationmonitorreadinggreatertha+sitaepecific)+R/hr.Bases:~isavaluewhichindicatesthereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicativeoffueldamage,intothedrywelLThereadingshouldbecalculatedassumingtheinstantaneousreleaseanddispersalofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventoryassociatedwithaconcentrationof300pCi/gmdoseequivalent1-131intothedrywallatmosphere.Reactorcoolantconcentrationsofthismagnitudeareseveraltimeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrations(includingiodinespRing)allowedwithintechnicalspecificationsandarethereforeindicativeoffueldamage(approximately2'/a-5%dadfailuredependingoncoreinventoryandRCSvolume).ThisvalueishigherthanthatspecifiedforRCSbarrierlossEAL¹3.Thus,thisEALindicatesalossofbothfueldadbarrierandRCSbarrier.Caution:itisimportanttorecognizethatintheeventtheradiationmonitorissensitivetoshinefromthereactorvesselorpipingspuriousreadingswillbepresentandanotherindicatoroffuelcladdamageisnecessary.Thereisno"PotentialLossEALassociatedwiththisitem.89

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:FC4BaggiestFuelCladdinDescrlptlotl:Other(Site-Specific)IndicationsType:LossBases:ThisEAListocoverother~Wpec~indicationsthatmayindicatelossorpotentialhssofthefuelcladbarrier,IncludingindicationsfromcontainmentairmonitorsoranyotherQ~ocif+instrumentation.~I90

PlantSpecificEAIlideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBICN:FCSBarrier:FuelCladdinDescription:EmergencyDirectorJudgementType:LossIPot.LossFC5.1AnyconditioninthejudgementoftheEmergencyDirectorthatindicateslossorpotentiallossofthefuelcladdingbarrier.Bases:ThisEALaddressesanyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheEmergencyDirectorindeterminingwhetherthefuelcladbarrierislostorpotentiallylost.Inaddition,theinabilitytomonitorthebarriershouldalsobeincorporatedinthisEALasafactorinEmergencyDirectorjudgementthatthebarriermaybeconsideredlostorpotentiallylost.(SeealsoICSG1,"ProlongedLossofAllOifsitePowerandProlongedLossofAllOnsiteACPower",foradditionalinformation.)91

PlantSpecificEAsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS1Description:RCSLeakRateBarrfer:RCSType:LossRCS1.1Q~pec~Indicationgofmainsteamlinebreak:Bases:The'Loss"EALisbasedondesignbasisaccidentanalyseswhichshowthatevenifMSIVclosureoccurswithindesignlimits,doseconsequencesoffsitefroma"puffreleasewouldbeinexcessof10millirem.Thus,thisEALisincludedforconsistencywiththeAlertemergencyclasslcation.92

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS1Description:RCSLeakRateBarrier:RCSType:PotentialLossRCS1.2RCSleakagegreaterthan50gpminsidethedrywellRCS1.3Bases:ThepotentiallossofRCSbasedonleakageissetatalevelindicativeofasmallbreachoftheRCSbutwhichiswellwithinthemakeupcapabilityofnormalandemergencyhighpressuresystems.Coreuncoveryisnotasignificantconcernfora50gpmleak,however,breakpropagationleadingtosignificantlylargerlossofinventoryispossible.ManyBWRsmaybeunabletomeasureanRCSleakofthissizebecausetheleakwouldlikelyincreasedrywellpressureabovethedrywellisolationsetpoint.'Thesystemnormallyusedtomonitorleakageistypicallyisolatedaspartofthedrywellisolationandisthereforeunavailable.Ifprimarysystemleakrateinformationisunavailable,otherindicatorsofRCSleakageshouldbeused.PotentiallossofRCSbasedonprimarysystemleakageoutsidethedrywallisdeterminedfromsite-specifichfgzimllm3ghQptttatittgLgygh4acaaintheareasofthemainsteamlinetunnel,rnaia4urbiao-etc.,whichindicateadirectpathfromtheRCStoareasoutsideprimarycontainment.93

PlantSpecificEAIjideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS2Description:DrywellPressureBarrier:RCSType:LossRCS2.1EQIBREKQiginlmlttpressure~psigBases:The+~ciTQdrywallpressureisbasedonthedrywellhighpressurealarmsetpoint'highervaluemaybeusedifsupportingdocumentationisprovidedwhichindicatesthechosenvalueislessthanthepressurewhichwouldbereachedfora50gpmreactorcoolantsystemleak.Thereisno'PotentialLoss"EALcorrespondingtothisitem.94

PlantSpecificEALideline(FPB)NineMllePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS3Barrier:RCSDescriptlotl:DrywellRadiationMonitoringType:LossRCS3.1Drywellradiationmonitorreadinggreatertha+sft~ocific)39@R/hrBases:Ihlaal<<-'--dispersalofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventoryassociatedwithnormaloperatingconcentrations(I.e.,withinT/S)intothedrywellatmosphere.Thisreadingwillbelessthan-thatspecifiedforfuelcladbarrierEAL¹3.Thus,thisEALwouldbeindicativeofaRCSleakonly.IftheradiationmonitorreadingincreasedtothatvaluespecifiedbythefuelcladbarrierEAL¹3,fueldamagewouldalsobeindicated.However,ifthesite-specificphysicallocationofthedrywallradiationmonitorissuchthatradiationfromacloudofreleasedRCSgasescouldnotbedistinguishedfromradiationfromadjacentpipingandcomponentscontainingelevatedreactorcoolantactivity,thisEALshouldbeomittedandothersite-specificindicationsofRCSleakagesubstituted.Thereisno"PotentialLoss"EALassociatedwiththisitem.95

PlantSpecificEAlideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS4Barrier:RCSDescription:ReactorVesselWaterLevelType:LossRCS4.1Levellessthan'BfDBases:This"Loss"EAListhesameas"PotentialLoss"fuelcladbarrierEAL¹2.Th+sit~cif+waterlevelcorrespondstothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallengeofcorecooling.Dependingontheplantthismaybetopofactivefuelor2/3coverageofactivefuel.ThisEALappropriatelyescalatestheemergencydasstoaSiteAreaEmergency.Thus,thisEALindicatesalossoftheRCSbarrierandapotentialtossofthefuelcladbarrier.96

PlantSpecificEAI'sideline(FPB)HineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS5Barrier:RCSDescrlptloll:Other(site-specific)indicationsType:LossRCS5.1Bases:ThisEAListocoverother~~cif+indicationsthatmayindicatelossorpotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier.97

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS5Barrier:RCSDescription:Other(site-specific)indicationsType:PotentialLossRCS5.2Bases:ThisEAListocoverother~~pecTilc)indicationsthatmayindicatehssorpotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier.98

PlantSpecificEAI>ideline(FPEI)NjneMllepojntUnit2BWRFPBICC:RCSSBarrier:RC8Description:EmergencyDirectorJudgmentType:Loss/Pot.LossRCS6.1AnyconditioninthejudgmentoftheEmergencyDirectorthatindicateslossorpotentiallossoftheRCSbarrierBases:ThisEALaddressesanyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheEmergencyDirectorindeterminingwhethertheRCSbarrierislostorpotentiallytost.Inaddition,theinabilitytomonitorthebarriershouldalsobeincorporatedintheEALasafactorinEmergencyDirectorjudgementthatthebarriermaybeconsideredhstorpotentiallylost.(SeealsoICSG1,"ProlongedLossofOffsitePowerandProlongedLossofAllOnsiteACPower,,foradditionalinformation.)99

PlantSpecificEAIideline(FPB)NineMllePointUnit2BWRFPBICO:PC1Oescrlptlon:DrywellPressureBarrier:PrimaContainmentType:LossPC1.1PC1.2Bases:100

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:PC1Description:DrywallPressureBarrier:PrimaContainmentType:PotentialLossPC1.3PC1.4Exphsivemixtureof'xists.Bases:ofanexplosivemixturemeansahydrogenandoxygenconcentrationofatleastthelowerdeflagrationlimitcuacoexists.Existence101

PlantSpecificEAlsideline(FPB)NineMilePoIntUnit2BWRFPB1C¹:PC2Barffat';PrimaContainmentType:LossDescriptloll:ContainmentIsolationValveStatusafterContainmentIsolationSignalPC2.1bhin2aamlinaBQIQ2thtmiimPC2.2IntentionalventingperEOPs:PC2.3~~~hfttm~g~~g~ittiiTtgrtot~Jggggtt~uatfttr~ggrttfitj~,Inaddition,thepresenceofarearadiationortemperaturealarmsindicatingunisolableprimarysystemleakageoutsidethedrywellarecovered.Also,anintentionalventingofprimarycontainmentperEOPstothesecondarycontainmentand/ortheenvironmenttoconsideredalossofcontainment.Thereisno'PotentialLoss"EALassociatedwiththisitem.hurimarymhunhdht;htrrtittututhhharimarxmafaiuamrttmirtithttr;BmtgrBuildIrtahrmImnuttraturmabmthtirmazimum~fmttmtirtglmhQBHugerBuiirhrtahumBafiatignlmhahmthttirmaximum~urtttmtintlychBases:ThisEALisintendedtocovercontainmentisolationfailuresallowingadirectflowpathtotheenvironmentsuchasfailureofbothMSIVstoclosewithopenvalvesdownstreamtotheturbineortothecondenser.102

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPB1C¹:PC3Barrier:PrimaContainmentDescription:SignificantRadioactivityInventoryinContainmentType:PotentialLossPC3.1ContainmentradiationmonitorreadinggreaterthBases:RIKEt""""'""'"'"'""'"""""i""'"'"""'"ofradioactivityrequiringoffsiteprotectiveactionsfromcoredamageisnotpossibleunlessamajorfailureintothereactorcoolant.Regardlessofwhethercontainmentischallenged,thisamountofactivityincontainment,ifreleased,couldhavesuchseverconsequencesthatitisprudenttotreatthisasapotentiallossofcontainment,suchthataGeneralEmergencydeclarationiswarranted..NUREG-1228,"SourceEstimationsDuringIncidentResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents,indicatesthatsuchconditionsdonotexistwhentheamountofcladdamageislessthan20%.aradiationmonitorreadingcorrespondingto20%fuelcladdamagshe~specifiedhere.Thereisno'LossEALassociatedwiththisitem.103

PlantSpecificEAI'sideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPB)C¹:PC4Barrier:PrimaContainmentDescription:ReactorVesselWaterLevelType:PotentialLossPC4.1Bases:TheconditionsinthispotentialhssEALrepresentimminentmeltsequenceswhich,ifnotcorrected,couldleadtovesselfailureandincreasedpotentialforcontainmentfailure.InconjunctionwiththelevelEALsinthefuelandRCSbarriercolumns,thisEALwillresultlnthedeclarationofaGeneralEmergency-lossoftwobarriersandthepotentiallossofathird.IftheemergencyoperatingprocedureshavebeenineffectiveinrestoringreactorvessellevelfggJthereisnota"success"path.~'nSevereaccidentanalysis(e.g.,NUREG-1150)haveconcludedthatfunctionrestorationprocedurescanarrestcoredegradationwiththereactorvesselinasignificantfractionofthecoredamagescenarios,andthelikelihoodofcontainmentfailureisverysmallintheseevents.Giventhis,itisappropriatetoprovideareasonableperiodtoallowemergencyoperationprocedurestoarrestthecoremeltsequence.Whetherornottheprocedureswillbeeffectiveshouldbeapparentwithinthetimeprovided.TheEmergencyDirectorshouldmakethedeclarationassoonasitisdeterminedthattheprocedureshavebeen,orwillbeineffective.Thereisno"loss"EALassociatedwiththisitem.104

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:PC5Barrier:PrimaContainmentDescrlptlort:Other(site-specific)indicathnsType:LossPC5.1Bases:ThisEAListocoverother~~ocific)indicationsthatmayindicatetossorpotentialhssofthecontainmentbarrier.105

PlantSpecificEAIiideline(FPB)NineMilePointVnlt2BWRFPBIC¹:PC5Bayriey:PrimaContainmentDescription:Other(site-specific)indicationsType:PotentialLossPC5.2Bases:ThisEAListocoverother~~pec~indicationsthatmayindicatelossorpotentialhssofthecontainmentbarrier.106

PlantSpecificEAIjideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:PC6Barrier:PrimaContainmentDescription:EmergencyDirectorJudgmentType:Loss/Pot.LossPC6.1AnyconditioninthejudgmentoftheEmergencyDirectorthatindicateslossorpotentiallossofthecontainmentbarrierLmaafamtaiamftatindiaatnramaxiadttdL'aamhtttatgt:unttltnftgtmfLQQhmmumHaahfuafatglaimddamaaahljtattinajaitialirzreminmataiamttaturmumBases:ThisEALaddressesanyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheEmergencyDirectorindeterminingwhetherthecontainmentbarrierislostorpotentiallylost.Inaddition,theinabilitytomonitorthebarriershouldalsobeincorporatedinthisEALasafactorinEmergencyDirectorjudgementthatthebarriermaybeconsideredlostorpotentiallylost.(SeealsoIGSG1,'ProhngedLossofAllOffsitePowerandProlongedLossofAllOnsiteAGPower",foradditionalinformation.)107

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0FissionProductBarrierEvaluationRevision0N'raMohawkPowerCoNineMilePointUnit2OperationsSupportServices,Inc.233waterStreet2ndFloorPlymouth,MA02360

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0EvaluationofNMP-2FissionProductBarrierEmerencActionLevelsTheFissionProductBarrier(FPB)degradationcategoryforaBWRplantisillustratedinthefollowingtablewhichisdesignated"Table3"inNESP-007,Revision2.TheInitiatingCondition(IC)foreachofthefouremergencyclassifications(UnusualEvent,Alert,SiteAreaEmergency,andGeneralEmergency)aredesignatedFUl,FAl,FSl,andFGl,respectively.EachICisdefinedbyoneormoreEALsorcombinationofEALswhichareindicativeofalossorpotentiallossofoneormoreofthethreefissionproductbarriers.Thethreefissionproductbarriersare:~FuelClad(FC)~ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)~PrimaryContainment(PC)NESP-007,Revision2,prescribesexampleEALsforeachofthethreefissionproductbarriers.AnEALisdefinedbyoneormoreplantconditions.Formcaznple,therearefiveFCbarrierexample$W,Ls,sixRCSbarrieracampleEALs,andsixPCacampleEALs.EachEALmayconsistofoneormoreconditionsrepresentingalossofthebarrierandapotentiallossofthebarrier.SomeEALsmayhaveonlylossconditions,othersonlypotentiallossconditions,somehavebothlossandpotentiallossconditions.EachEALisgivenasequentialnumberinTable3.InthefoQowinglistunderthecolumnlabeled"NESP-007",NUMARCKALawithadefinedcondition(i.e.,labeledasneeding"site-specific"inputinTable3)areidentifiedwitha"yes",andthosewithoutadefinedcondition(i.e.labeled"notapplicable"inTable3)areidentifiedwitha"no".Similarly,EALconditionsapplicabletoNMP-2areidentifiedwithayes/nounderthecolumnlabeled"NMP-2".

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0~BrrfrEAL¹NUMARCLoss~PNMP-2mPiLumFCRCSPClalb23456lalb2a2b2c356YesNoYesYesYesNoYesYesYesYesYesYesNoYesYesNoYesNoYesNoYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesNoYesNoYesNoNoYesNoYesYesYesYesYesYes(FC1.1)Yes(FC2.1)Yes(FC3.1)Yes(FC4.1)Yes(FC5.1)Yes(RCS1,1)NoYes(RCS2.1)Yes(RCS3.1)Yes(RCS4.1)NoYes(RCS6.1)NoNoYes(PC2.1)Yes(PC2.2)Yes(PC2.3)NoNoNoYes(PC6.1)NoYes(FC2.1)NoNoYes(FC5.1)Yes(RCS1.2)Yes(RCS1.3)NoNoNoNoYes(RCS6.1)Yes(PC1.3)Yes(PC1.4)NoNoNoYes(PC3.1)Yes(PC4.1)NoYes(PC6.1)BasedontheclassiQcationkeygivenatthebeginningofTable3,thenumberofexampleEALs,andthenumberoflossandpotentiallossconditions,thesetofconditionsthatcanyieldagivenemergencyclassiQcationcanbecomputed.Themaximum,theoreticallypossiblesetofconditionsthatcanyieldanUnusualEventclassificationisgivenincolumn1ofTableA.TheseconsistofthePClossandPCpotentiallossconditions.Themaximum,theoreticallypossiblesetofconditionsthatcanyieldanAlertclassificationisgivenincolumn1ofTableB.TheseconsistofFClossandpotentiallossconditions,andRCSlossandpotentiallossconditions.Themaximum,theoreticallypossiblesetofconditionsthatcanyieldaSiteAreaEmergencyclassificationisgivenincolumn1ofTableC.Theseconsistofanyofthefollowingconditions:~LossofFCandRCS,or~PotentiallossofFCandRCS,or~PotentiallossofFCorRCS

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0BIldLossofanotherbarrierThethirdsetofconditionslistedabovecanberepresentedbythefollowingconditionstoeliminatereferenceto"lossofanotherbarrier":~PotentiallossofFCandlossofRCS,or~PotentiallossofFCandlossofPC,or~PotentiallossofRCSandlossofFC,or~PotentiallossofRCSandlossofPCThemaximum,theoreticallypossiblesetofconditionsthatcanyieldaGeneralEmergencyclassificationisgivenincolumn1ofTableD.Theseconsistofthefollowingconditions:~Lossofanytwobarriers,and~PotentiallossofathirdTheseconditionscanberepresentedbythefollowingconditionstocorrelatebarrierlossandpotentiallosstothethreespecificbarriers:~LossofFCandlossofRCSandpotentiallossofPC,or~LossofRCSandlossofPCandpotentiallossofFC,or~LossofPCandlossofFCandpotentiallossofRCSSincetheEALconditionsarelistednumericallyinTable3,TablesAthroughDutilizeasimilarnumberingsystemwhichismodifledbyletterabbreviationstodefineeachsetofconditions.Forexample,condition"FCl-loss"correspondstoalossoftheFuelCladbarrierduetoprimarycoolantactivitylevelgreaterthanthesite-specificvalue.Similarly,"RCSlb-pot.loss"correspondstoapotentiallossoftheReactorCoolantSystembarrierduetounisolableprimarysystemleakageoutsidethedrywell,andsoon.AnevaluationofeachconditionorsetofconditionslistedinTablesAthroughDismadetodetermineifitproperlydefinestheappropriatethresholdfortheclassification.Ifaconditionorsetofconditionsisappropriate,acommentreflectingthisconclusionisrecordedinthe"Remarks"column.Ifaconditionorsetofconditionsisdeterminedtobeinappropriate,itislinedoutandthereasonforthisconclusionissimilarlyrecordedinthe"Remarks"column.Whereadditionalspaceisrequiredtocompletecomments,thecommentsarerecordedby

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0numberinAppendix1ofthisdocument.Thenumbersofthecommentsarerecordedinthe"Remarks"columnwiththeassociatedconditionorsetofconditionstowhichtheyapply.AsummaryoftheresultsoftheQssionproductbarrierevaluationispresentedinAppendix2.

RECOGNITIONCATEGORYFFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERDEGRADATIONINITIATINGCONDITIONMATRIXTABLESBWRUNUSUALEVENTSITEAREAEMERGENCYGENERALEMERGENCYFU1AnylossoranypotentiallossofcontainmentOp.Modes:PoweroperaUonHotStandby/Startup(BWR)HotShutdownAnylossoranytentfallossofeitherelcladorRCS.Op.Modes:PoweroperationHotStandby/Startup(BWR)HotShutdownLossofbothfuelcladandRCSORPotentfallossofbothfuelcladandRCSORPotentfallossofeitherfuelcladorRCS,andlossofanyadditionalbarrfer.Op.Modes:PoweroperationHotStandby/Startup(BWR)HotShutdownFG1LossofanytwobarriersANDPotentiallossofthirdbarrfer.Op.Modes:PoweroperationHotStandby/Startup(BWR)HotShutdownNOTES:l.AlthoughthelogicusedforthesefnfUatfngcondfUonsappearsoverlycomplex,ftlsnecessarytoreflectthefollowingconsfderations:~ThefuelcladbarrferandtheRCSbarrierareweightedmoreheavilythanthecontainmentbarrier(seeSections3.4and3.8formorefnformaUononthispoint).UnusualEventICsassociatedwithRCSandFuelCladbarriersareaddressedunderSystemMalfuncUonICs.~AttheSiteAreaEmergencylevel.theremustbesomeabilitytodynamicallyassesshowfarpresentcondfUonsareforGeneralEmergency.Forexample.ifFuelCladbarrferandRCS~er"Loss"EALsexisted,thiswouldindicatetotheEmergencyDfrectorthat,inadditionaltooffsltedoseassessments.conUnualassessmentsofradioactiveinventoryandcontainmentintegritymustbefocusedon.If,ontheotherhand.bothFuelCladbarrierandRCSbarrier"PotenUalLoss"EALsexisted,theEmergencyDirectorwouldhavemoreassurancethattherewasnofmmedfateneedtoescalatetoaGeneralEmergency.~'Iheabilitytoescalatetohigheremergencyclassesasaneventgetsworsemustbemaintained.Forexample,RCSleakagesteadilyincreasingwouldrepresentanincreasingrisktopublichealthandsafety.2.FfssfonProductBarrierICsmustbecapableofaddressingeventdynamfcs.'Ihus,theEALReferenceTables3and4statethatIMMINENT(Le.,withinIto2hours)lossorpotenUallossshouldresultfnaclassfflcaUonasfftheaffectedthreshold(s)arealreadyexceeded,partfcularlyforthehfgheremergencyclasses.O

1.PrimlantAtivlRECOGNITIONCATEGORYFINITIATINGCONDITIONMATRIXTABLE8BWRFuelCladBarrierEzampleEALs'otentialLoss0(8(0OzCoolantactivitygreaterthan(site-specfAc)valueNotApplicable2.RtVWaLevLevellessthan(site-speciAc)valuedatoonitorlnDrywellradiationmonitorreadinggreaterthan(site-speciAc)RfhrLevellessthan(site-spcciAc)valueNotApplicable4.tAd(site-specfAc)asapplfcable(site-specfAc)asapplicabletJdAnyconditionlnthe]udgmentoftheEmergencyDirectorthatfndfcateslossorpotentiallossofthefuelcladbarrierDeterminewhichcombfnatlonofthethreebarriersarelostorhaveapotentiallossandusethefollowingkeytoclassifytheevent.Also.aneventformultipleeventscouldoccurwhichresultintheconclusionthatexceedingthelossorpotentiallossthresholdsfsimminent(l.e.,withinIto3hours).Inthisimminentlosssituation,use]udgmentandclassffyasffthethresholdsareexceeded.

RECOGNITIONCATEGORYFINITIATINGCONDITIONMATRIXTABLE3BWRRCSBarrierExampleEAL8'CO0)O1.Lt~~~kRag(site-speciQc)fndfcatfonofmainsteamlinebreakPotentialLossRCSleakagegreaterthan50gpmfnsfdethedrywellORunisolatbleprfmarysystemleakageoutsidedrywellasindfcatedbyareatemperatureorarearadiationalarmPressuregreaterthan(site-speclQc)psfgNotapplicable1dafoloDvgarellradiationmonitorreadinggreaterthan(site-specfQc)RfhrNotapplicable4.toVesselWater1Levellessthan(site-speciQc)valueNotapplicable(site-speciQc)asapplicable(site-speciQc)asapplicabletorJudenAnyconditionfnthe]udgmentoftheEmergencyDirectorthatindicateslossorpotentiallossoftheRCSbarrierKOp

RECOGNITIONCATEGORYFINITIATINGCONDITIONMATRIXTABLESBWRPrimaryContainmentBarrierExampleEALs'Co0)(0ORapidunexplaineddecreasefollowingfnftfalincreaseORDrywellpressureresponsenotconsistentwithLOCAconditions(site-specfffc)psfgandincreasingORexplosivemixtureexists2.tasolatfoValvataetoFailureofbothvaluesfnanyonelfnetodoseanddownstreampathwaytotheenvironmentexistsORIntentionalventingperEOPsORUnfsolableprfmarysystemleakageoutsfdechywellasindicatedbyareatemperatureorarearadiationalarmNotapplicable4.aVesselWateNotapplfcableNotapplfcableNotapplicableNotapplfcableContainmentradiationmonitorreadinggreaterthan(site-specific)R/hrReactorvesselwaterlevellessthan(site-specific)valueandthemaxtmumcoreuncovertimelimitfsfntheunsaferegionROfO9(sfte-specific)asapplfcabletorJudAnycondftfonfnthejudgmentoftheEmergencyDirectorthatindicateslossorpotentiallossofthecontainmentbarrier(site-specfffc)asapplicableKQpO

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableA-BWRFissionProductBarrierUnusualEventsNESP-007RemarksLossorpot.1ossofPCQua-lessPC4b-1essPea-lessDCRb-lessPCQe-1essPCS-1essQCG-1essConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.212ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.33,254,265,27ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.10

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableB-BWRFissionProductBarrierAlertsNESP-007RemarksLossorpot.lossofPCgsstu>>eeeSueSs8%4oss">>s'>>~"sp~'$"'"'::""'"'4'.@r+44l"~'3".CoolQnt'.8ctivitv"@~"~>@4:+r"'+'s~~"""~'p~>>".'CQ-less8FCS-lessSubsumedtn"Judgment"EAL.8ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Lossorpot.lossofRCSRCS~ess6RC34-less8RCSS-lessConditionnotsupportedinPEG.RCSGMssSubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.1523ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableC-BWRFissionProductBarrierSiteAreaEmergenciesNESP-007LossofFCandRCSRemarks16I":-i!i::::-.:ii'"':::::::!xiii::,i:::::::::::::,:-::---::--'-o--:::ii"':188ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.,'-.":ii"':-:iii,:--!iiii~iii":ii('!.',:::,.ll""'i"":l"""I~i889ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judent"EAL.FW%"-'-'-'.:i':"t*,:,::i:::'::::.."-::":"--"-'-":::iii"':lid'""""1i-:::""'di'll"""iii::-;:-:"1910llConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.2424248ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.12121212ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Pot.lossofPCandRCS8ess812

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableC-HWRFissionProductBarrierSiteAreaEmergenciesMESP-007RemarksConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedln"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Pot.lossofFCandlossofRCS888ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedln"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Pot.lossofFCandlossofPCConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.813

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableC-HWRFissionProductBarrierSiteAreaEmergenciesNESP-007Remarks88ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedfn"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Pot.lossofRCSandlossofFC198192012238192412ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-HWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesMESP-007RemarksLossofFC+lossofRCS+pot.lossofPC"":""'""'-kpCti-:pesoreititossIfrtp'rES"icountsiisniienitpnrsepsdsnsre>bWpl"':::gIj'""::i'l::@I'-""'-"'-"".'.O'CIS-:yet.ConditionnotsupportedInPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627essConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL,25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EALSubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.16

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL17

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksSubsumedin"Judgment"EALConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.18

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-HWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksSubsumedin"Judgment"EALSubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.-ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.19

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksSubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.12121212ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.12121212ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.12252627ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25121212ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.20

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksSubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.LossofRCS+lossofPC+pot.lossofPCCondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.28CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.28ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG,ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.21

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007Remarks28ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL28ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EALConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.28ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.28ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.22

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksSubsumed'in"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondfUonnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.28CondlUonnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.28ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.25ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondlUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.Subsumedfn"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.CondfUonnotsupportedlnPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondlUonnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-SWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondftfonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.CondftfonnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedfn"Judgment"EAL,Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.LossofPC+lossofFC+pot.lossofRCSConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.24

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluaUon,Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksCondlUonnotsupportedlnPEG.CondlUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.'onditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondlUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.CondlUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondlUonnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.25

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksConditionnotsupportedinPEG.""*"""*'PC'-"-l"""'"-'-*-"~i""'!iliaSi'llI!i!ii@tiki"""'0ii&Alhi""'dpi"'"29ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.PCS:3688:,>$+%FC2-."Toss"""i'"""'""i28'"'-'f8ilto~fsol':eamWc'An'FAF'N'0ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.i".'1ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.24,2824,28ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL1212ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL2222ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.22,22ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.2222ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.222226

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-SWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.1212CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.I,::-'"""":llilia'i'Fi'3CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.'si'eii"e'4"::""'8*,:.'":""':::w:;:.*"i!i:.'-i'i!i):::32ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedtn"Judent"EAL.34ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.2424CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.assSubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.1212ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EALConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.essCondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.27

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-HWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksConditionriotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG,Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EALSubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.LossofPC+lossofFC+lossofRCSConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-HWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies-NESP-007RemarksConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondfUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondfUonnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.CondfUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondftfonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedfnPEG.29 I

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-HWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG,ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.CondiUonnotsupportedinPEG.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.

0 OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007Remarks35353535353524,2824,2824,2824,2824,28Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.2525252525Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.2525252525Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.252525252531

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-SWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksSubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.2525252525Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.2525252525Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.24,2824,2824,2824,2832

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-SWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007Remarks24,28Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.CondlUonnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedlnPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.

i.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergenciesNESP-007RemarksConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.ConditionnotsupportedinPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EALSubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EALSubsumedin"Judgment"EAISubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.'ubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EALSubsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment"EAL.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0AppencHx1-FissionProductBarrierRemarks2.AlthoughintentionalventingpertheEOPsinEAL¹PC2.2isavoluntarylossoftheprimarycontainmentboundary,declarationofanUnusualEventattheDrywellPressureLimit{DWPL)orcombustiblegasconcentrationsrequiresanemergencyresponsebeyondtheUnusualEventrequirements.DrywellpressureabovethescramsetpointisanindicationofalossoftheRCSbarrier(EAL¹RCS2.1).LossoftheRCSbarrierisalwaysanAlertdeclaration.ItisreasonabletoassumethattheDWPLandcombustiblegasconcentrationswillalwaysbereachedwithdrywellpressureabove3.5psig.SincetheRCS2.1willalwaysbereachedbeforePC2.2,EAL¹PC2.2isunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.AlthoughunisolableprimarysystemleakageoutsidethedrywellasindicatedbysecondarycontainmentradiationlevelsatthemaximumsafeoperatinglevelinEAL¹PC2.3isalossoftheprimarycontainment,EAL¹RCS1.3requiresanAlertdeclarationatthemaximumnormaloperatingradiationlevel.SinceRCS1.3willalwaysbereachedbeforePC2.3,EAL¹PC2.3isunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.3.4.5.AlthoughdrywellpressureabovetheDWPLandthepresenceofcombustiblegasconcentrationsisanindicationofapotentiallossoftheprimarycontainmentboundary,emergencyclassiQcationattheselimitsrequiresanemergencyresponsebeyondtheUnusualEvent.DrywellpressureabovethescramsetpointisanindicationofalossoftheRCSbarrier(EAL¹RCS2.1).LossoftheRCSbarrierisalwaysanAlertdeclaration.ItisreasonabletoassumethatthedrywellpressureattheDWPLandcombustiblegasconcentrationswillalwaysbereachedwithdrywellpressureabovethescramsetpoint.SincetheRCS2.1willalwaysbereachedbeforePC1.3andPC1.4,EAL¹sPC1.3andPC1.4areunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.EAL¹PC3.1wouldrequireanUnusualEventdeclarationatacontainmentradiationlevelwhichiswellinexcessofthatrequiredforthelossofRCS.SincelossofRCSisanAlertclassiQcation,EAL¹PC3.1isunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.EntrytotheDrywellFloodingEOPisidentifiedinEAL¹PC4.1asaconditionrepresentinganimminentmeltsequencewhereRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredabovethetopofactivefuel.ThispotentiallossEALrequiresanUnusualEventdeclaration.However,EAL¹FC2.1requiresanAlertdeclarationwhenRPVwaterlevelislessthanthetopofactivefuel.SinceFC2.1willalwaysbereachedbeforePC4.1,MHtPC4.1isunnecessaryandcanbedeleted,

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0Appendix1-FissionProductBarrierRemarks6.7.8.AmainsteamlinebreakinsidetheprimarycontainmentwouldresultindrywellpressureabovethescramsetpointandisaddressedbyEAL¹RCS2.1.AmainsteamlinebreakoutsideprimarycontainmentwouldresultinalossoftwoQssionproductbarriersandisaddressedbythecombinationofconditionsrequiringaSiteAreaEmergency.Therefore,thisEALisunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.EAL¹FC3.1andEAL¹RCS3.1identifydrywellradiationmonitorreadingsrequiringanAlertclassification.SincethemonitorreadinginEAL¹FC3.1isalwaysgreaterthanthatusedinEAL¹RCS3.1,EAL¹FC3.1isunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.RPVwaterlevellessthanTAPisaSiteAreaEmergencybasedonEAL¹SS5.1.Therefore,thisportionoftheEALisunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.910.EAL¹FC2.1andEAL¹RCS4.1identifyRPVwaterlevellessthanTAFasaconditionrequiringanemergencyclassiQcation.Sincetheyarethesamecondition,theappropriateclassiQcationisprovidedattheAlertlevelunderEAL¹FC2.1.Therefore,thiscombinationofconditionsasaSiteAreaEmergencyclassificationisunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.EAL¹FC3.1andEAL¹RCS3.1identifydrywellradiationasaconditionrequiringanemergencyclassification.sincetheyarethesamecondition,theappropriateclassificationisprovidedattheAlertlevelunderRCS3.1.Therefore,thiscombinationofconditionsasaSiteAreaEmergencyclassificationisunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.FC3-loss+RCS4-lossisidenticaltoFC2-loss+RCS3-loss.SincetheseSiteAreaEmergencyconditionsareredundant,FC3-loss+RCS4-losscanbedeleted.12.Theemergencydirectorhasthelatitudetodeclareanemergencyclassificationatanylevelbasedonhisassessmentofcombinationsofplantconditions.Therefore,anyjudgementdecisioninvolvingFC5-lossandanotherconditionisthesameasthejudgementmadeforFC5-lossaloneandcanbedeleted.13.EAL¹PC2.3andEAL¹RCS1.3(whichaddressesareatemperaturesandradiationlevelsatthemaximumsafeoperatinglevel)areredundant.SinceeitherconditionwarrantsdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergencybythemselves,thisEALcombinationcanbedeleted.1-2

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductHarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0Appendix1-FissionProductBarrierRemarks14.N/A15.RCSleakageintothedrywellmustalsoresultinahighdrywellpressureabovethescramsetpoint.Thisconditionisaddressedunder$MLNRCS2.1.Therefore,thisconditionisunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.16.17.ForleaksinsidethedrywellthiscombinationofconditionsisadequatelyaddressedunderEAL¹FC3.1.ForleaksoutsidethedrywellwithsuccessfulcontainmentisolationthiscombinationwouldbeadequatelycoveredunderASl.l.Forconditionsinwhichthecontainmentdoesnotsucessfullyisolate,aGeneralEmergencywouldberequired.N/A18.19.ThedrywellradiationlevelgiveninEAL¹RCS3.1islessthanthedrywellradiationlevelassociatedwiththecoolantactivityofEAL¹FCl.l.Eh'C1.1coolantactivitycombinedwithEAL¹RCS3.1isadequatelyaddressedbyEAL¹FC3.1.EAL¹FC3.1isbasedonallofthecoolantactivityofEAL¹FCI.1depositedintotheprimarycontainment.SuchaconditionmustresultfromthelossofthefuelcladandRCSbarriers.Therefore,EAL¹RCS1.1isunnecessaryfortheSiteAreaEmergencyconditionandcanbedeleted.20.21.RCSla.pot.lossis>50gpmdrywellleakage.FC4lossisveryhighoffgasactivity.Highoffgasactivityunderconditionswheresteamflowtothemaincondenserisongoing(i.e.offgasreadingsvalid)aloneisindicativeofaMSLfaQuretoisolatewithdownstreampathwaytotheenvironment.ThisconditionrequiresdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyunderEALPC2.1.Therefore,thiscombinationofconditionsisunnecessaryandcanbedeleted.FaQureofasteamlinetoisolatewithadirectpathtotheenvironmentcanonlyoccurwiththelossofthePrimaryContainmentboundaryandthelossoftheRCSboundary.Bydeflnition,thiscombinationofconditionsbyitselfrequiresdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.Therefore,declarationoftheUnusualEventisunnecessaryandanySiteAreaEmergencycombinationofthisconditioncanbedeleted.1-3

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEAIEvaluation,Rev.0Appendix1-FissionProductBarrierRemarks22.23.TointentionallyventtheprimarycontainmentinaccordancewiththeEOPs,twoQssionproductbarriersmusthavebeenlostandathirdbarrierisabouttobelostduetoventing.BydeQnition,thiscombinationoflosseswarrantsdeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.Thecombinationofaprimarysystemdischargingintosecondarycontainmentandsecondarycontainmentparametersatthemaximumsafeoperatinglevelsisalossoftwobarriers.Bydeflnition,thisrequiresaSiteAreaEmergencydeclaration.EAL¹PC2.1isequivalenttothiscombinationofconditions.24.25.26.27.28.Offgasmonitorsarenotareliableindicatoroffuelfailureunderseverelydegradedconditionsinthatthesystemwouldbeisolatedandprocessmonitorswouldnotbemonitoringanunisolatedprocessstream.Highoffgasactivityunderconditionswheresteamflowtothemaincondenserisongoing(i.e.offgasreadingsvalid)aloneisindicativeofaMSLfailuretoisolatewithdownstreampathwaytotheenvironment.ThereforethisconditionrequiresdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyunderEALPC2.1.PrimarycontainmentpressureatorabovedesignorthepresenceofcombustiblegasconcentrationseachrequiresventingoftheprimarycontainmentinaccordancewiththeEOPs.Lossoftwofissionproductbarriersmusthaveoccurredanditmustbeassumedthatthefuelcladbarrierislostorabouttobelost.Therefore,EAGANPC1.3,EAL¹PC1.4orEAL¹PC2.2alonewarrantsdeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.AccordingtotheNUMARCguidancegiveninthebasisforIC¹PC3,thelevelofactivitydepositedintheprimarycontainmentasaresultoftheconditionofEAL¹PC3.1warrantsdeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.DrywellFloodingisrequiredwhenmeansofrestoringandmaintainingadequatecorecoolingcannotbeestablished.ThisconditionisadirectprecursortocoremeltwhichwarrantsdeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.EAL¹PC2.1orEALPC2.3isalossoftheRCSandprimarycontainment.EAL¹FC1.1,FC2.1andFC3.1areeachlossesofthefuelclad.TheseconditionsalonemeetthedefinitionofaGeneralEmergency.Therefore,anycombinationsoftheseEALsareredundantandcanbedeleted.1-4

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0Appendix1-FissionProductBarrierRemarks29.Thiscombinationofconditionsisasubsetofthepreviouslylistedcombination(EAL¹PC2.1andEAL¹FCl.l)andcan,therefore,bedeleted.30.Thiscombinationofconditionsisasubsetofthepreviouslylistedcombination(EAL¹PC2.1andEAL¹FC2.1)andcan,therefore,bedeleted.31.Thiscombinationofconditionsisasubsetofthepreviouslylistedcombination(EAL¹PC2.1andEAL¹FC3.1)andcan,therefore,bedeleted.32.Thecombinationofaprimarysystemdischargingintosecondarycontainmentandsecondarycontainmentparametersatthemaximumsafeoperatinglevelsisalossoftwobarriers.RPVwaterlevellessthanthetopofactivefuelisapotentiallossofathirdbarrier.Bydefinition,thisrequiresaGeneralEmergencydeclaration.33.Thecombinationofaprimarysystemdischargingintosecondarycontainmentandsecondarycontainmentparametersatthemaximumsafeoperatinglevelsisalossoftwobarriers.Elevatedcoolantactivityisapotentiallossofathirdbarrier.BydeAnition,thisrequiresaGeneralEmergencydeclaration.34.Thecombinationofaprimarysystemdischargingintosecondarycontainmentandsecondarycontainmentparametersatthemaximumsafeoperatinglevelsisalossoftwobarriers.Elevatedprimarycontainmentradiationisapotentiallossofathirdbarrier.Bydefinition,thisrequiresaGeneralEmergencydeclaration.35.EAL¹PC2.1orEAL¹PC2.3incombinationwithanyofEM@FCl.l,FC2.1orFC3.1haspreviouslybeenevaluatedasjustiQcationofGeneralEmergency.Thereforethiscombinationofconditionsisredundantandcanbedeleted.1-5

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP1NMP1FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation,Rev.0Appendix2-SuaunaryofFissionProductBarrierEvaluationThefollowingsummarizestheEALswhichresultedfromtheanalysisperformedofthefissionproductbarriermethodologyofNVMARC-007forNMP-2:~EmergencyDirectorJudgementFC1.1-lossFC4.1-lossRCS2.1-lossRCS3.1-lossEmergencyDirectorJudgement~FC2.1-loss~FC3.1-loss~RCS2.1-loss~PC2.1-loss~PC2.3-loss~EmergencyDirectorJudgement

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP1NMP1FissionProductBarrierEAI.Evaluation,Rev.0Appendix2-SuamaaxyofFissionProductBarrierEvaluation~PC1.3-pot.loss~PC1.4-pot.loss~PC3.1-pot.loss~PC4.1-pot,loss~PC2.1-loss+FC1.1-loss,FC2.1-lossorFC3.1-loss~PC2.3-loss+FC1.1-loss,FC2.1-lossorFC3.1-lossEmergencyDirectorJudgement1-2

OSSI92<02A-3-BWRBWREALBinningDocument,Rev.0EALBinninDocumentKQY>~>R2NewYorkPowerAuthoriJ;A.EErpatrtckNuclearPowerPlantIndianPointNuclearPowerPlantUnit3NiaraMohawkPowerCoorationNineMilePointUnit1NineMilePointUnit2ConsolidatedEdisonComanIndianPointStationUnit2RochesterGasandElectricComanR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerStationOperationsSupportServices,Inc.233WaterStreet2ndfloorPlymouth,MA02360

OSSI92<02A-3-BWRBWREALBinningDocument,Rev.01.0ReactorFuelCoolantActivitySU4.2FC1.1(Alert)Off-gasActivitySU4.1FC4.1(Alert)ContaixunentRadiationRCS3.1(Alert)FC3.1(SAE)PC3.1(General)OtherRadiationMonitorsAU2.4AA2.1AA3.1AA3.2RefuelingAccidentsAU2.1AA2.22.0ReactorPressureVessel2.12.2RPVWaterLevelSU5.1SS5.1FC2.1(SAE)PC4.1(General)ReactorPower/ReactivityControlSA2.1SS2.1SG2.1

OSSI92<02A-3-BWRBWREALBinningDocument,Rev.03.0Contaixxment8.13.28.8PrimaryContaixxmentPressureRCS2.1(Alert)FC1.1+RCS2.1(SAE)PC1.3(General)PC2.2(General)SuppressionPoolTemperatureSS4.1(SAE)ICombustibleGasConcentrationSS5.2(SAE)PC1.4/PC2.2(General)ContaixxmentIsolationStatusPC2.1(SAE)PC2.1+FC1.1(General)PC2.1+FC2.1(General)PC2.1+FC3.1(General)4.0SecondaryContainmentReactorBuildingTemperaturesPC2.3(Temp)/RCS1.3(SAE)PC2.3+FC1.1(Temp)(General).PC2.3+FC2.1(Temp)(General)PC2.3+FC3;1(Temp)(General)4.2ReactorBuildingRadiationLevelsPC2.3(Rad)/RCS1.3(SAE)PC2.3+FC1.1(Rad)(General)PC2.3+FC2.1(Rad)(General)PC2.3+FC3.1(Rad)(General)

OSSI92-402A-3-BWRBWREALBinningDocument,Rev.05.0RadioactivityRelease5.15.2EffluentMonitorsAU1.1AA1.1AS1.1AG1.1DoseProjections/EnvironmentalMeasurementsAU1.2IAA1.2AS1.3AS1.4AG1.3AG1.46.0ElectricalFailures6.16.2'LossofACPowerSourcesSU1.1SA1.1SA5.1SS1.1SG1.1LossofDCPowerSourcesSU7.1SS3.17.0EquipmentFailures7.17.27.3TechnicalSpeci6cationRequirementsSU2.1SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuationHU1.6HA5.1SA3.1HS2.1LossofIndications/Alarm/CommunicationCapabilitySU3.1SU6.1SA4.1SS6.1

OSSI92-402A-3-BWRBWREALBinningDocument,Rev.08.0Hazards8.18.28.88.4SecurityThreatsHU4.1HU4.2HA4.1HA4.2HS1.1HS1.2HG1.1HG1,2FireorExplosionHU2.1HA2.1Man-MadeEventsHU1.4HU1.5=HU3.1HU3.2HA1.5HA3.1HA3.2'aturalEventsHU1.1.HU1.2HU1.3HU1.7HA1.1HA1.2HA1.3HA1.79.0OtherHU5.1PC6.1HA6.1FC5.1RCS6.1HS3.1PC1.1PC1.2HG2.1

NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATIONNINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATIONEMERGENCYPLANNINGMAINTENANCEPROCEDUREEPMP-EPP-0102REVISION00UNIT2EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTECHNICALBASISTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONREQUIREDApprovedby:J.H.MuellerPlantnager-Ui2DateEffectiveDate:NOTTOBEUSEDAFTERSUBJECTTOPERIODICREVIEW

~PN.JCCNCoversheet.1o~o~2.345.'6~~~~7.8~~~~9.=10.~-~.~~12~~~~13o~~~14~~~~15.16.17~~~~18.19.20.21LISTOFEFFECTIVEPAGES~PN.~CIN22~~~~2324.25~~~~26o~~~27~~~~28.29~~'~30~~~~31~~~~32~~~~33.34.35.36~~~~37~~~~38~o~~39~~~~40.4142.43~~~~44.45.46.~PN.~ChN.47.48.49.50.51oo~~52.5354.55.5657~~o~58.59.60.6162.6364~~o~65.66.6768.69.70.71Hay1994PageiEPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

LISTOFEFFECTIVEPAGES(Cont)~PN.~CNN72.73.74.75~~~~76~~~~77~~~~78o~~~79~~~~80.8182.83.84.85.86.87.88~~'~89.90.9192.93~o~94.95.96.~PN.~CNN97~~0~98~o~~99100.101102.103104.105.106.107.108.109.~PN.~CNNNay1994PageiiEPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

SECTION1.0PURPOSE.2.0PRIMARYRESPONSIBILITY3.0PROCEDURE.TABLEOFCONTENTS3.1EmergencyPreparednessGroup......PAGE11113.2ResponsibleProcedureOwnerforTechnicalBasisReferences.14.0DEFINITIONS.

5.0REFERENCES

ANDCOMMITMENTS6.0RECORDREVIEWANDDISPOSITION.~~~22ATTACHMENT1:UNIT2EMERGENCYACTIONLEVELTECHNICALBasis.......3INTODUCTIONPURPOSE.DISCUSSION~~~3~~~3NAIINIALBAI1.0REACTORFUEL2.0REACTORPRESSUREVESSEL(RPV)3.0PRIMARYCONTAINMENT(PC)4.0SECONDARYCONTAINMENT(SC)5.0RADIOACTIVITYRELEASE.6.0ELECTRICALFAILURES.7.0E(UIPMENTFAILURES8.0HAZARDS.8~~~~23293844~~~~5663~~~~749.0OTHER.94ATTACHMENT2:WORDLIST/DEFINITIONS.101May1994PageiiiEPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.0PURPOSETodescribetheTechnicalBasisfortheEmergencyActionLevelsatUnit2.2.0PRIMARYRESPONSIBILITY2.1EmerencPrearednessGrouMonitor/solicitanychangestotheTechnicalBasisofeachEmergencyActionLevelAssessthesechangesforpotentialimpactontheEmergencyActionLevelMaintaintheEmergencyActionLevel(EAL)TechnicalBasis,EPIP-EPP-02,andtheEmergencyActionLevelMatrix/Unit2.3.0PROCEDURE3.1EmerencPrearednessGrou3.1.'13.1.2'3.1.3MaintainamatrixofTechnicalBasisreferencesforeachEmergencyActionLevel.EvaluateeachTechnicalBasisReferenceChangeforimpactontheAffectedEmergencyActionLevel.Modify'EPIP-EPP-02,EmergencyActionLevelMatrix/Unit,andAttachment1ofthisprocedure,asneeded.4.0DEFINITIONSSeeAttachment2.May1994Page1EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.05.15.25.35.

45.5REFERENCES

ANDCOMMITMENTSLicenseeDocumentationNoneStandardsReulationsandCodesNUHARCNESP-007,MethodologyforDevelopmentofEmergencyActionLevelsPoliciesProramsandProceduresEPIP-EPP-02,ClassificationofEmergencyConditionatUnit2.SulementalReferencesNineNilePointUnit2Plant-SpecificEALGuidelineCommitmentsNone6.0ECODREVIEWANDDISPOSITIONNoneNay1994Page2EPNP-EPP-0102Rev00

URPOSEATTACHMENT1UNIT2EMERGENCYACTIONLEVELTECHNICALBASISThepurposeofthisdocumentistoprovideanexplanationandrationaleforeachoftheemergencyactionlevels(EALs)includedintheEALUpgradeProgramforNineMilePoint2(NHP-2).ItisalsointendedtofacilitatethereviewprocessoftheNMP-2EALsandprovidehistoricaldocumentationforfuturereference.ThisdocumentisalsointendedtobeutilizedbythoseindividualsresponsibleforimplementationofEPIP-EPP-02"ClassificationofEmergencyConditionsUnit2"asatechnicalreferenceandaidinEALinterpretation.DISCUSSIOEALsaretheplant-specificindications,conditionsorinstrumentreadingswhichareutilizedtoclassifyemergencyconditionsdefinedintheNHP-2EmergencyPlan.WhiletheupgradedEALsaresitespecific,anobjectiveoftheupgradeprojectwastoensureconformityandconsistencybetweenthesitestotheextentpossible.,TherevisedEALswerederivedfromtheInitiatingConditionsandexampleEALsgivenintheNMP-2Plant-SpecificEALGuideline(PEG).ThePEGistheNHP-2plantinterpretationoftheNUHARCmethodologyfordevelopingEALs.Hay'1994Page3EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

DISCUSSIO(Cont)STTACHMtNT1(Ct)ManyoftheEALsderivedfromtheNUMARCmethodologyarefissionproductbarrierbased.Thatis,theconditionswhichdefinetheEALsarebaseduponlossorpotentiallossofoneormoreofthethreefissionproductbarriers.Theprimaryfissionproductbarriersare:A.B.C.ReactorFuelCladdinFC:Thefuelcladdingiscomprisedofthezirconiumtubeswhichhousetheceramicuraniumoxidepelletsalongwiththeendplugswhichareweldedintoeachendofthefuelrods.ReactorCoolantSstemRCS:TheRCSiscomprisedofthereactorvesselshell,vesselhead,CRDhousings,vesselnozzlesandpenetrationsandallprimarysystemsdirectlyconnectedtotheRPVuptotheoutermostprimarycontainmentisolationvalve.imarContainmentPC:Theprimarycontainmentiscomprisedofthedrywell,suppressionchamber,theinterconnectionsbetweenthetwo,andallisolationvalvesrequiredtomaintainprimarycontainmentintegrityunderaccidentconditions.Althoughthesecondarycontainment(reactorbuilding)servesasaneffectivefissionproductbarrierbyminimizinggroundlevelreleases,itisnotconsideredasafissionproductbarrierforthepurposeofemergencyclassification.Thefollowingcriteriaservesasthebasisforeventclassificationrelatedtofissionproductbarrierloss:UnusualEvent:AnylossorpotentiallossofcontainmentAlert:AnylossoranypotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSSiteAreaEmerenc:AnylossofbothfuelcladandRCSorAnypotentiallossofbothfuelcladandRCSorAnypotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSwithalossofanyadditionalbarrierMay1994Page4EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

DISCUSSION(Cont)ATTACHHENTI(Cont).GeneralEmerenc:LossofanytwobarrierswithlossorpotentiallossofathirdThoseEALswhichreferenceoneormoreofthefissionproductbarrierInitiatingCondition(IC)designators(FC,RCSandPC)inthePEGReferencesectionofthetechnicalbasisarederivedfromtheFissionProductBarrierAnalysis.Theanalysisentailedanevaluationofeverycombinationoftheplantspecificbarrierloss/potentiallossindicatorsappliedtotheabovecriteria.Wherepossible,theEALshavebeenmadeconsistentwithandutilizetheconditionsdefinedintheNHP-2symptombasedEmergencyOperatingProcedures(EOPs).WhilethesymptomsthatdriveoperatoractionsspecifiedintheEOPsarenotindicativeofallpossibleconditionswhichwarrantemergencyclassification,theydodefinethesymptoms,independentofinitiatingevents,forwhichreactorplantsafetyand/orfissionproductbarrierintegrityarethreatened.WherethesesymptomsareclearlyrepresentativeofoneofthePEGInitiatingConditions,theyhavebeenutilizedasanEAL.Thisallowsforrapidclassificationofemergencysituationsbasedonplantconditionswithouttheneedforadditionalevaluationoreventdiagnosis.AlthoughsomeoftheEALspresentedherearebasedonconditionsdefinedintheEOPs,classificationofemergenciesusingtheseEALsisnotdependentuponEOPentryorexecution.TheEALscanbeutilizedindependentlyorinconjunctionwiththeEOPs.Totheextentpossible,theEALsaresymptombased.Thatis,theactionlevelisdefinedbyvaluesofkeyplantoperatingparameterswhichidentifyemergencyorpotentialemergencyconditions.Thisapproachisappropriatebecauseitallowsthefullscopeofvariationsinthetypesofeventstobeclassifiedasemergencies.But,apurelysymptombasedapproachisnotsufficienttoaddressalleventsforwhichemergencyclassificationisappropriate.ParticulareventstowhichnopredeterminedsymptomscanbeascribedhavealsobeenutilizedasEALssincetheymaybeindicativeofpotentiallymoreseriousconditionsnotyetfullyrealized.TheEALsaregroupedintoninecategoriestosimplifytheirpresentationandtopromotearapidunderstandingbytheirusers.Thesecategoriesare:1.ReactorFuel2.ReactorPressureVessel3.PrimaryContainment4.SecondaryContainment5.RadioactivityRelease6.ElectricalFailuresHay1994Page5EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

DISCUSSION(Cont)7.EquipmentFailures8.Hazards9.OtherATTACHMENTI(Ct)Categories1through5areprimarilysymptombased.Thesymptomsareindicativeofactualorpotentialdegradationofeitherfissionproductbarriersorpersonnelsafety.Categories6,7and8areeventbased.ElectricalFailuresarethoseeventsassociatedwithlossesofeitherACorvitalDCelectricalpower.EquipmentFailuresareabnormalandemergencyeventsassociatedwithvitalplantsystemfailures,whileHazardsarethosenon-plantsystemrelatedeventswhichhaveaffectedormayaffectplantsafety.Category9providestheEmergencyDirectorthelatitudetoclassifyanddeclareemergenciesbasedonplantsymptomsoreventswhichinhisjudgmentwarrantclassification.ThisjudgmentincludesevaluationoflossorpotentialofoneormorefissionproductbarrierswarrantingemergencyclassificationconsistentwiththeNUMARCbarrierlosscriteria.Categoriesarefurtherdividedintooneormoresubcategoriesdependingonthetypesandnumberofplantconditionsthatdictateemergencyclassifications.Forexample,theReactorFuelcategoryhasfivesubcategorieswhosevaluescan,beindicativeoffueldamage:coolantactivity,off-gasactivity,containmentradiation,otherradiationmonitorsandrefuelingaccidents.AnEALmayormaynotexistforeachsubcategoryatallfourclassificationlevels.Similarly,morethanoneEALmayexistforasubcategoryinagivenemergencyclassificationwhenappropriate(i.e.,noEALattheGeneralEmergencylevelbutthreeEALsattheUnusualEventlevel).ForeachEAL,thefollowinginformationisprovided:Classification:UnusualEvent,Alert,SiteAreaEmergency,orGeneralEmergencyOperatingNodeApplicability:Oneormoreofthefollowingplantoperatingconditionsarelisted:PowerOperation,Startup/HotStandby,HotShutdown,ColdShutdown,RefuelandDefueledEAL:DescriptionoftheconditionorsetofconditionswhichcomprisetheEALBasis:DescriptionoftherationalefortheEALPEGReference(s):PEGIC(s)andexampleEAL(s)fromwhichtheEALisderived~BasisReference(s):SourcedocumentationfromwhichtheEALisderivedNay1994Page6EPNP-EPP-0102Rev00

dtdtddtltdtttlATTACHMENT1(Cont)Theidentifiedoperatingmodesaredefinedasfollows:Power0eratiosReactoriscriticalandthemodeswitchisinRUN.StartuHotStandbReactoriscriticalandthemodeswitchisinSTARTUP/HOTSTANDBY.~tdttdNodeswitchisusuallyinSHUTDOWNandreactorcoolanttemperatureis>200'F.ColdShutdownModeswitchusuallyinSHUTDOWNandreactorcoolanttemperatureis<200'F.RefuelModeswitchinREFUEL(withvesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensionedorwithheadremoved)ORModeswitchinSHUTDOWNandreactorcoolanttemperatureis8140'F.~efcledRPVcontainsnoirradiatedfuel.May1994Page7EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.0REACTORFUELATTACHMENT1(Cont)Thereactorfuelcladdingservesastheprimaryfissionproductbarrier.Overtheusefullifeofafuelbundle,theintegrityofthisbarriershouldremainintactaslongasfuelcladdingintegritylimitsarenotexceeded.Shouldfueldamageoccur(breachofthefuelcladdingintegrity)radioactivefissionproductsarereleasedtothereactorcoolant.Themagnitudeofsuchareleaseisdependentupontheextentofthedamageaswellasthemechanismbywhichthedamageoccurred.Oncereleasedintothereactorcoolant,thehighlyradioactivefissionproductscanposesignificantradiologicalhazardsinplantfromreactorcoolantprocessstreams.Ifotherfissionproductbarriersweretofail,theseradioactivefissionproductscanposesignificantoffsiteradiologicalconsequences.Thefollowingparameters/indicatorsareindicativeofpossiblefuelfailures:CoolantActivit:Duringnormaloperation,reactorcoolantfissionproductactivityisverylow.Smallconcentrationsoffissionproductsinthecoolantareprimarilyfromeitherthefissionoftrampuraniuminthefuelcladdingorminorperforationsinthecladdingitself.Anysignificantincreasefromthesebase-linelevelsisindicativeoffuelfailures.~pf-AIt:A~ith1ttitty,yf1fi1willreleasefissionproductstothereactorcoolant.Thoseproductswhicharegaseousorvolatileinnaturewillbecarriedoverwiththesteamandeventuallybedetectedbytheairejectoroff-gasradiationmonitors.ContainmentRadiationMonitors:Althoughnotadirectindicationormeasurementoffueldamage,exceedingpredeterminedlimitsoncontainmenthighrangeradiationmonitorsunderLOCAconditionsisindicativepossiblefuelfailures.Inaddition,thisindicatorisutilizedasanindicatorofRCSlossandpotentialcontainmentloss.OtherRadiationMonitors:OtherprocessandarearadiationmonitoringsystemsarespecificallydesignedtoprovideindicationofpossiblefueldamagesuchasAreaRadiationMonitoringSystems.RefuelinAccidets:Bothareaandprocessradiationmonitoringsystemsdesignedtodetectfissionproductsduringrefuelingconditionsaswellasvisualobservationcanbeutilizedtoindicatelossorpotentiallossofspentfuelcladdingintegrity.May1994Page8EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

CoolantActivitl.l.lE~EATTACHMENT1(Cont)Coolantactivity>0.2pCi/gmI-131equivalentor>100/EbarpCi/gmNodeApplicability:AllBasis:Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.ThisEALaddressesreactorcoolantsamplesexceedingcoolanttechnicalspecificationsforiodinespiking.PEGReference(s):SU4.2BasisReference(s):1.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo..2,DocketNo.50-410,Article3.4.5.aandbMay1994Page9EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.1.2~1ertATTACHMENT1(Cont)Coolantactivity>300pCi/gm1-131equivalentNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.Thisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorrespondstoabout2Xto5Xfuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significantcladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsideredlost.Therefore,declarationofanAlertiswarranted.PEGReference(s):FC1.1BasisReference(s):1.GeneralElectricNED0-22215,ProceduresfortheDeterminationoftheExtentofCoreDamageUnderAccidentConditionsMay1994Page10EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.2Off-asActivitSTTAIINENT1(Ct)1.2.1UnusualEventValidoffgasradiationhighalarm(atDRMSred).NodeApplicability:AllBasis:Elevatedoffgasradiationactivityrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.TheTechnicalSpecificationallowablelimitisanoffgaslevelnottoexceed350,000pCi/sec.TheORMSalarmsetpointhasbeenconservativelyselectedbecauseitisoperationallysignificantandisreadilyrecognizablebyControlRoomoperatingstaff.15minutesisallottedforoperatoractiontoreducedtheoffgasradiationlevelsandexcludetransientconditions.ThehioffgasradiationalarmissetusingmethodologyoutlinedintheODCM.PEGReference(s):SU4.1BasisReference(s):1.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Article3.11.2.72.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-13.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Article3.4.5.aandb4.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Article3.4.5c.2and35.N2-0P-42,annunciator851253,pg.115May1994PagellEPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.3ContainmentRadiationETTAIIIIENT1(C1.3.1alertDrywellarearadiation~41R/hrNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:Thedrywellradiationreadingisavaluewhichindicatesthereleaseofreactorcoolanttothedrywell.Thereadingiscalculatedassumingtheinstantaneousreleaseanddispersalofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventoryassociatedwithnormaloperatingconcentrations(i.e.,withinTechnicalSpecifications)intothedrywellatmosphere.ThereadingislessthanthatspecifiedforEAL1.3.2becausenodamagetothefuelcladisassumed.OnlyleakagefromtheRCSisassumedinthisEAL.ItisimportanttorecognizethattheradiationmonitormaybesensitivetoshinefromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiationMonitorsareinstalledinthefollowinglocations:2CEC*Pnl880D:DRHS2RHS*RElB/DRHS*RUZ1BRHS*RUZ1D2CEC*Pnl880B:DRMS2RMS*REIA/CRMS*RUZIARMS*RUZlCPEGReference(s):RCS3.1BasisReference(s):1.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-12.CalculationPR-C-24-0Hay1994Page12EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.3.2SiteAreaEmerencATTACHMENT1(Cont)Drywellarearadiation>3100R/hrNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:Thedrywellradiationreadingisavaluewhichindicatesthereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicativeoffueldamage,intothedrywell.Thereadingiscalculatedassumingtheinstantaneousreleaseanddispersalofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventoryassociatedwithaconcentrationof300pCi/gmdoseequivalentI-131intothedrywellatmosphere.ReactorcoolantconcentrationsofthismagnitudeareseveraltimeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrationsallowedwithinTechnicalSpecifications(includingiodinespiking)andarethereforeindicativeoffueldamage(approximately2X-5XcladfailuredependingoncoreinventoryandRCSvolume).ThereadingishigherthanthatspecifiedforEAL1.3.1and,thus,thisEALindicatesalossofboththefuelcladbarrierandtheRCSbarrier.ItisimportanttorecognizethattheradiationmonitormaybesensitivetoshinefromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiationMonitorsareinstalledinthefollowinglocations:2CEC*Pnl880D:DRHS2RHS*RE1B/DRMS*RUZ1BRMS*RUZ1D2CEC*Pnl880B:DRMS2RMS*RElA/CRMS*RUZ1ARMS*RUZlCPEGReference(s):FC3.1BasisReference(s):1.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-12.CalculationPR-C-24-0May1994Page13EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.3.3GeneralEmerencATTACHMENT1(Cont)Drywellarearadiation>5.2E6R/hrNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:ThedrywellradiationreadingisavaluewhichindicatessignificantfueldamagewellinexcessofthatrequiredforlossoftheRCSbarrierandthefuelcladbarrier.NUREG-1228"SourceEstimationsDuringIncidentResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents"statesthatsuchreadingsdonotexistwhentheamountofcladdamageislessthan20X.Amajorreleaseofradioactivityrequiringoffsiteprotectiveactionsfromcoredamageisnotpossibleunlessamajorfailureintothereactorcoolanthasoccurred.Regardlessofwhethertheprimarycontainmentbarrieritselfischallenged,'hisamountofactivityincontainmentcouldhavesevereconsequencesifreleased.Itis,therefore,prudenttotreatthisasapotentiallossofthecontainmentbarrierandupgradetheemergencyclassificationtoaGeneralEmergency.ItisimportanttorecognizethattheradiationmonitormaybesensitivetoshinefromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiationMonitorsareinstalledinthefollowinglocations:2CEC*Pnl880D:DRHS2RHS*RE1B/DRHS*RUZ1BRHS*RUZ1D2CEC*Pnl880B:ORMS2RMS*RE1A/CRMS*RUZ1ARHS*RUZlCPEGReference(s):PC3.1BasisReference(s):1.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-12.CalculationPR-C-24-0,Rev.4Hay1994Page14EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.4OtherRadiationMonitorsCTTNCIINENTIECtt1.4.1UnusualEventAnysustainedARHreading>100xDRMShighradiationalarm(red)oroffscalehigh(DETECTORSATURATION)resultingfromanuncontrolledprocessModeApplicabi1ity:AllBasis:Validelevatedarearadiationlevelsusuallyhavelongleadtimesrelativetothepotentialforradiologicalreleasebeyondthesiteboundary,thusimpacttopublichealthandsafetyisverylow.'ThisEALaddressesunplannedincreasesinradiationlevelsinsidetheplant.Theseradiationlevelsrepresentadegradationinthecontrolofradioactivematerialandapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Arearadiationlevelsabove100timesthehighradiationalarmsetpointhavebeenselectedbecausetheyarereadilyidentifiableonARHinstrumentation.TheARHalarmsetpointisconsideredtobeaboundingvalueabovethemaximumnormalradiationlevelinanarea.SinceARHsetpointsarenominallysetonedecadeovernormallevels,100timesthealarmsetpointprovidesanappropriatethresholdforemergencyclassification.ForthoseARMSwhoseupperrangelimitsarelessthan100timesthehighradiationalarmsetpoint,avalueofoffscalehighisused.ThisEALescalatestoanAlert,iftheincreasesimpairthelevelofsafeplantoperation.PEGReference(s):AU2.4BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-79,RadiationMonitoringSystem2.EPIP-EPP-13,pg.843.CalculationPR-C-25-1Hay1994Page15EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.4.2A1ertATTACHMENT1(Cont)ValidRxBldg.aboveRefuelingFloorRadiationMonitor2HVR*RE14AorB,GaseousRadiationMonitors(channel1)isolationORAnysustainedrefuelfloorradmonitor>8.0R/hrTable1.1Table1.1Reeoordon'torsARMRMSlll,RB354'estofSpentFuelPoolARMRHS112,RB354'astofSpentFuelPoolNodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALisdefinedbythespecificareaswhereirradiatedfuelislocatedsuchasreactorcavity,reactorvessel,,orspentfuelpool.Sufficienttimeexiststotakecorrectiveactionsfortheseconditionsandthereislittlepotentialforsubstantialfueldamage.NUREG/CR-4982"SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafety;Issue82"indicatesthatevenifcorrectiveactionsarenottaken,no-promptfatalitiesarepredictedandtheriskofinjuryislow.Inaddition,NRCInformationNoticeNo.90-08,"KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"presentsthefollowinginitsdiscussion:"Intheeventofaseriousaccidentinvolvingdecayedspentfuel,protectiveactionswouldbeneededforpersonnelonsite,whileoffsitedoses(assuminganexclusionarearadiusofonemilefromtheplantsite)wouldbewellbelowtheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency'sProtectiveActionGuides.Accordingly,itisimportanttobeabletoproperlysurveyandmonitorforKr-85intheeventofanaccidentwithdecayedspentfuel."Thus,anAlertClassificationforthiseventisappropriate.Escalation,ifappropriate;wouldoccurviaEmergencyDirectorjudgmentinEALCategory9.0.Thebasisforthereactorbuildingventilationmonitorsetpointisaspentfuelhandlingaccident(isolationsetpoint)andis,therefore,appropriateforthisEAL.TechnicalSpecificationrequiresisolationat<2.36E-3pCi/cc).Hay1994Page16EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.4.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)ArearadiationlevelsontherefuelflooratorabovetheMaximumSafeOperatingvalue(8.0R/hr)areindicativeofradiationfieldswhichmaylimitpersonnelaccess.Accesstotherefuelfloorisrequiredinordertovisuallyobservewaterlevelinthespentfuelpool.Withoutaccesstotherefuelfloor,itwouldnotbepossibletodeterminetheapplicabilityofEAL1.5.2.ArearadiationlevelsontherefuelflooratorabovetheMaximumSafeOperatingvaluecouldalsoadverselyaffectequipmentwhoseoperationmaybeneededtoassureadequatecorecoolingorshutdownthereactor.PEGReference(s):AA2.1BasisReference(s):.1.'NUREG-0818,EmergencyActionLevelsforLightWaterReactors2.NUREG/CR-4982,SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82,July19873.NRCInformationNoticeNo.90-08,KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel4.N2-0P-79,RadiationMonitoringSystem=5.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.2-26.N2-0P-61B,StandbyGasTreatmentHay1994Page17EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.4.3AlertNTTACIIIIENTIECt)Sustainedarearadiationlevels>15mR/hrineither:ControlRoomORCentralAlarmStation(CAS)andSecondaryAlarmStation(SAS)NodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALaddressesincreasedradiationlevelsthatimpedenecessaryaccesstooperatingstationsrequiringcontinuousoccupancytomaintainsafeplantoperationorperformasafeplantshutdown.AreasrequiringcontinuousoccupancyincludetheControlRoom,thecentralalarmstation(CAS)andthesecondarysecurityalarmstation(SAS).Thesecurityalarmstations-areincludedinthisEALbecauseoftheirimportancetopermittingaccesstoareasrequiredtoassuresafeplantoperations.Thevalueof15mR/hrisderivedfromtheGDC19valueof5remin30dayswithadjustmentforexpectedoccupancytimes.AlthoughSectionIII.D.3ofNUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTHIActionPlanRequirements",providesthatthe15mR/hrvaluecanbeaveragedoverthe30days,thevalueisusedherewithoutaveraging.A30daydurationimpliesaneventpotentiallymoresignificantthananAlelt.Itistheimpairedabilitytooperatetheplantthatresultsintheactualorpotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.ThecauseormagnitudeoftheincreaseinradiationlevelsisnotaconcernofthisEAL.TheEmergencyDirectormustconsiderthesourceorcauseoftheincreasedradiationlevelsanddetermineifanyotherEALsmaybeinvolved.Forexample,adoserateof15mR/hrintheControlRoommaybeaprobleminitself.However,theincreasemayalsobeindicativeofhighdoseratesinthecontainmentduetoaLOCA.Inthislattercase,aSiteAreaEmergencyoraGeneralEmergencymaybeindicatedbyotherEALcategories.ThisEALcouldresultindeclarationofanAlertatNHP-2duetoaradioactivityreleaseorradiationshineresultingfromamajoraccidentattheNHP-1orJAFNPP.Suchadeclarationwouldbeappropriateiftheincreaseimpairssafeplantoperation.ThisEALisnotintendedtoapplytoanticipatedtemporaryradiationincreasesduetoplannedevents(e.g.,radwastecontainermovement,depletedresintransfers,etc.).Hay1994Page18EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.4.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):AA3.1ATTACHMENT1(Cont)~BasisReference(s):1.GDC191.4.42.NUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTHIActionPlanRequirements",SectionIII.D.3AlertSustainedarearadiationlevels>8R/hrinanyareas,Table1.2ANDAccessisrequiredforsafeoperationorshutdownTable1.2PlantSaetFuctionAreasControlBuildingNormalSwitchgearBuildingSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGeneratorBuildingScreenwellBuilding/ServiceWaterPumpBaysCondensateStorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatmentBuildingNodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALaddressesincreasedradiationlevelsinareasrequiringinfrequentaccessinordertomaintainsafeplantoperationorperformasafeplantshutdown.Arearadiationlevelsatorabove8R/hrareindicativeofradiationfieldswhichmaylimitpersonnelaccessoradverselyaffectequipmentwhoseoperationmaybeneededtoassureadequatecorecoolingorshutdownthereactor.ThisbasisofthevalueisdescribedinNMPCmemoFileCodeNHP31027"ExposureGuidelinesForUnusual/AccidentConditions".TheareasselectedareconsistentwiththoselistedinotherEALsandrepresentthosestructureswhichhousesystemsandequipmentnecessaryforthesafeoperationandshutdownoftheplant.Hay1994Page19EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.4.4(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)IItistheimpairedabilitytooperatetheplantthatresultsintheactualorpotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.ThecauseormagnitudeoftheincreaseinradiationlevelsisnotaconcernofthisEAL.TheEmergencyDirectormustconsiderthesourceorcauseoftheincreasedradiationlevelsanddetermineifanyotherEALmaybeinvolved.Forexample,adoserateof8R/hrmaybeaprobleminitself.However,theincreasemayalsobeindicativeofhighdoseratesinthecontainmentduetoaLOCA.Inthislattercase,aSiteAreaEmergencyoraGeneralEmergencymaybeindicatedbyotherEALcategories.ThisEALcouldresultindeclarationofanAlertatNHP-2duetoaradioactivityreleaseorradiationshineresultingfromamajoraccidentattheNHP-1orJAFNPP.Suchadeclarationwouldbeappropriateiftheincreaseimpairssafeplantoperation.ThisEALisnotmeanttoapplytoincreasesinthecontainmentradiationmonitorsastheseareeventswhichareaddressedinotherEALs.Norisitintendedtoapplytoanticipatedtemporaryradiationincreasesduetoplannedevents(e.g.,radwastecontainermovement,depleteresintransfers,etc.).PEGReference(s):AA3.21.5BasisReference(s):1.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationmemo'ileCodeNHP31027"ExposureGuidelinesForUnusual/AccidentConditions",Revision1,3/18/93RefueinAccidents1.5.1UnusualEventSpentfuelpool/reactorcavitywaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintainedabovethespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelalarmNodeApplicability:AllHay1994Page20EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

1.5.1(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT1(Cont)Theaboveeventhasalongleadtimerelativetothepotentialforradiologicalreleaseoutsidethesiteboundary,thusimpacttopublichealthandsafetyisverylow.However,inlightofrecentindustryevents,'classificationasanUnusualEventiswarrantedasaprecursortoamoreseriousevent.Thespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelisindicatedbyannunciators873317and875117whichalarmatEl352'".Thedefinitionof"...cannotberestoredandmaintainedabove..."allowstheoperatortovisuallyobservethelowwaterlevelcondition,ifpossible,andtoattemptwaterlevelrestorationinstructionsaslongaswaterlevelremainsabovethetopofirradiatedfuel.WaterlevelrestorationinstructionsareperformedinaccordancewithN2-0P-38.Whenthefueltransfercanalisdirectlyconnectedtothespentfuelpoolandreactorcavity,therecouldexistthepossibilityofuncoveringirradiatedfuelinthefueltransfercanal.Therefore,thisEALisapplicableforconditionsinwhichirradiatedfuelisbeingtransferredtoandfromtheRPVandspentfuelpool.PEGReference(s):AU2.1BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-38,SpentFuelPoolCoolingandCleanupSystem1.5.2AlertImminentorreportofactualobservationoftheuncoveringofirradiatedfuel.NodeApplicability:AllMay1994Page21EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

ATTACHMENTt(Ct)1.5.2(Cont)Basis:ThisEALisdefinedbythespecificareaswhereirradiatedfuelislocatedsuchasreactorcavity,reactorvessel,orspentfuelpool.Sufficienttimeexiststotakecorrectiveactionsfortheseconditionsandthereislittlepotentialforsubstantialfueldamage.NUREG/CR-4982"SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82"indicatesthatevenifcorrectiveactionsarenottaken,nopromptfatalitiesarepredictedandtheriskofinjuryislow.Inaddition,NRCInformationNoticeNo.90-08,KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"presentsthefollowingititsdiscussion:"Intheeventofaseriousaccidentinvolvingdecayedspentfuel,protectiveactionswouldbeneededforpersonnelonsite,whileoffsitedoses(assuminganexclusionarearadiusofonemilefromtheplantsite)wouldbewellbelowtheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency'sProtectiveAction.Guides.Accordingly,itisimportanttobeabletoproperlysurveyandmonitorforKr-85intheeventofanaccidentwithdecayedspentfuel."Thus,anAlertClassificationforthiseventisappropriate.Escalation,ifappropriate,wouldoccurbyEmergencyDirectorjudgmentinEALCategory9.0.Thereisnoindicationthatwaterlevelinthespentfuelpoolhasdroppedtothelevelofthefuelotherthanbyvisualobservationby.personnelontherefuelingfloor.Whenthefueltransfercanalisdirectlyconnectedtothespentfuelpoolandreactorcavity,therecouldexistthe-possibilityofuncoveringirradiatedfuelinthefueltransfercanal.Therefore,thisEALisapplicableforconditionsinwhichirradiatedfuelisbeingtransferredtoandfromtheRPVandspentfuelpool.ThisEALappliestospentfuelrequiringwatercoverageandisnotintendedtoaddressspentfuelwhichislicensedfordrystorage.PEGReference(s):AA2.2BasisReference(s):1.NUREG-0818,EmergencyActionLevelsforLightWaterReactors2.NUREG/CR-4982,SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82,July19873.NRCInformationNoticeNo.90-08,KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuelMay1994Page22EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

2.0NTTANNTNTIICttREACTORPRESSUREVESSELRPV2.1N.l.lThereactorpressurevesselprovidesavolumeforthecoolantwhichcoversthereactorcore.TheRPVandassociatedpressurepiping(reactorcoolantsystem)togetherprovideabarriertolimitthereleaseofradioactivematerialshouldthereactorfuelcladdingintegrityfail.TherearetwoRPVparameterswhichareindicativeofconditionswhichmayposeathreattoRPVorfuelcladdingintegrity:APPWII:NPIII11dttlyItdtttstatusofadequatecorecooling,andthereforefuelcladdingintegrity.Excessive(>Tech.Spec.)reactorcoolanttodrywellleakageindicationsareutilizedtoindicatepotentialpipecrackswhichmaypropagatetoanextentthreateningfuelclad,RPVandprimarycontainmentintegrity.Conditionsunderwhichallattemptsatestablishingadequatecorecoolinghavefailedrequireprimarycontainmentflooding.eactorPowerReact'vitContro:Theinabilitytocontrolreactorpowerbelowcertainlevelscanposeadirectthreattoreactorfuel,RPVandprimarycontainmentintegrity.PVWaterLevelUnidentifieddrywellleakage>10gpmORReactorcoolanttodrywellidentifiedleakage>25gpmNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:TheconditionsofthisEALmaybeaprecursorofmoreseriousconditionsand,asaresult,isconsideredtobeapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.The10gpmvaluefortheunidentifieddrywellleakagewasselectedbecauseitisobservablewithnormalControlRoomindications.Smallervaluesmustbedeterminedthroughtime-consumingsurveillancetests(e.g.,massbalances).The25gpmvalueforidentifiedreactorcoolanttodrywellleakageissetatahighervaluebecauseofthesignificanceofidentifiedleakageincomparisontounidentifiedorpressureboundaryleakage.Hay1994Page23EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

STTACHNENT1lCtl2.1.1(Cont)Onlyoperatingmodesinwhichthereisfuelinthereactorcoolantsystemandthesystemispressurizedarespecified.PEGReference(s):SU5.1BasisReference(s):None2.1.2SiteAreaEmerencRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained>-14in.(TAF)NodeApplicability:PowerOperation,Startup/HotStandby,HotShutdown,ColdShutdown,RefuelBasis:TheRPVwaterlevelused,in"thisEAListhetopofactivefuel(TAF).ThisvaluecorrespondstothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallengetocorecoolingandlossofthefuelcladbarrier.Thisistheminimumwater'leveltoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradationoftheclad.SeverecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegritymaynotbeassuredifRPVwaterlevelisnotmaintained>TAF.UncoveryofthefuelirrespectiveoftheeventthatcausesfueluncoveryisjustificationalonefordeclaringaSiteAreaEmergency.Thisincludese'ventsthatcouldleadtofueluncoveryinanyplantoperatingmodeincludingcoldshutdownandrefuel.EscalationtoaGeneralEmergencyoccursthroughradiologicaleffluenceaddressedinEAL1.3.3fordrywellradiationandintheEALsdefinedforCategory5.0,RadioactivityRelease.PEGReference(s):SS5.1FC2.1Nay1994Page24EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

2.1.2(Cont)STTACIINEIIT1(Ct)BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-RPV,RPVControl2.1.3GeneralEmerencPrimaryContainmentFloodingrequiredNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:TheconditioninthisEALrepresentsimminentmeltsequenceswhich,ifnotcorrected,couldleadtoRPVfailureandincreasedpotentialforprimarycontainmentfailure.IftheEOPsareineffectiveinrestoring-RPVwaterlevelabovethetopofactivefuel,lossofthefuelcladbarrierisimminent.Therefore,declarationofaGeneralEmergencyisappropriatewhenentrytothePrimaryContainmentFloodingEOPisrequired.PEGReference(s):PC4.12.2BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-RPV,RPVControlReactorPowerReactivitControl2.2.1AlertAllimmediatemanualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandbyMay1994Page25EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

2.2.1(Cont)Basis:A~TTACAAIAITCttThisconditionindicatesfailureoftheautomaticand/ormanualprotectionsystemtoscramthereactortotheextentwhichprecludesthereactorbeingmadesub-critical.ItisthecontinuedcriticalityunderconditionsrequiringareactorscramwhichposesthepotentialthreattoRCSorfuelcladintegrity.Thisconditionismorethanapotentialdegradationofasafetysystem.Afrontlineautomaticprotectionsystemdidnotfunctioninresponsetoaplanttransient,andthusplantsafetyhasbeencompromisedanddesignlimitsofthefuelmaybeexceeded.AnAlertisindicatedbecauseconditionsexistthatleadtoapotentiallossofthefuelcladbarrierortheRCSbarrier.Animmediatemanualscramisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperatorsatthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcriticalincludingmanualscrampushbuttons,ARIandmodeswitch.PEGReference(s):SA2.12.2.2BasisReference(s):,1.N2-EOP-RPV,RPVControl,SectionRLSiteAreaEmerencAllimmediatemanualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDBoroninjectionisrequiredNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandbyBasis:Thisconditionindicatesfailureoftheautomaticand/ormanualprotectionsystemtoscramthereactortotheextentwhichprecludes,thereactorbeingmadesubcritical.Undertheseconditions,thereactorisproducingmoreheatthanthemaximumdecayheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsaredesigned.ASiteAreaEmergencyisindicatedbecauseconditionsexistthatleadtoimminentlossorpotentiallossofbothfuelcladandprimarycontainment.Nay1994Page26EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

2.2.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)Thefailureofautomaticinitiationofareactorscramfollowedbyunsuccessfulmanualinitiationactionswhichcanberapidlytakenatthereactorcontrolconsoledoesnot,byitself,leadtoimminentlossofeitherfuelcladorprimarycontainmentbarriers.Itisthecontinuedcriticalityunderconditionsrequiringareactorscramalongwiththecontinuedadditionofheattocontainmentwhichposestheimminentthreattoprimarycontainmentorfuelcladbarriers.InaccordancewiththeEOPs,SLCisinitiatedbasedonheatadditiontocontainmentinexcessofsafetysystemcapabilityunderfailuretoscramconditions.Animmediatemanualscramisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperatoratthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcriticalincludingmanualscrampushbuttons,ARIandmodeswitch.PEGReference(s):SS2.1BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-RPV,RPVControl,SectionRL2.2.3GeneralEmerencAllimmediatemanualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained>-39in.NodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandbyBasis:UndertheconditionsofthisEAL,theeffortstobringthereactorsubcriticalhavebeenunsuccessfuland,asaresult,thereactorisproducingmoreheatthanthemaximumdecayheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.Hay1994Page27EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

2.2.3(Cont)ATTACHMENTI(Cont)AnextremechallengetotheabilitytocoolthecoreisindicatedwhenRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintainedabovetheMinimumSteamCoolingRPVWaterLevel(-39in.).ThisRPVwaterlevelisusedintheEOPstodefinethelowestRPVwaterlevelinafailure-to-scrameventabovewhichadequatecorecoolingcanbemaintained.Thissituationcouldbeprecursorforacoremeltsequence.Inthissituation,coredegradationcanoccurrapidlyForthisreason,theGeneralEmergencydeclarationisintendedtobeanticipatoryofthelossoftwofissionproductbarriersandapotentiallossofathirdthuspermittingthemaximumoffsiteinterventiontime.Animmediatemanualscramisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperatoratthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcriticalincludingmanualscrampushbuttons,ARIandmodeswitch.PEGReference(s):SG2.12.2.4BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-C5,Level/PowerControlGeneaEmerencAllimmediatemanualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDSuppressionpooltemperatureandRPVpressurecannotbemaintained<HCTLNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandbyBasis:UndertheconditionsofthisEAL,theeffortstobringthereactorsubcriticalhavebeenunsuccessfuland,asaresult,thereactorisproducingmoreheatthanthemaximumdecayheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.May1994Page28EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

2.2.4(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)Anextremechallengetotheprimarycontainmentisindicatedwhentheinabilitytoremoveheatduringtheearlystagesofthissequenceresultsinheatupofthecontainment.TheHeatCapacityTemperatureLimit(HCTL)isameasureofthemaximumheatloadwhichtheprimarycontainmentcanwithstand.Thissituationcouldbeprecursorforacoremeltsequence.Inthissituation,coredegradationcanoccurrapidlyForthisreason,theGeneralEmergencydeclarationisintendedtobeanticipatoryofthelossoftwofissionproductbarriersandapotentiallossofathirdthuspermittingthemaximumoffsiteinterventiontime.Animmediatemanualscramisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperatoratthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcriticalincludingmanualscrampushbuttons,ARIandmodeswitch.PEGReference(s):SG2.1BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-C5,Level/PowerControl.2.N2-EOP-PC,PrimaryContainmentControl3.0PRINARYCONTAINMENTPCTheprimarycontainmentstructureisapressuresuppressionsystem.Itformsafissionproductbarrierdesignedtolimitthereleaseofradioactivefissionproductsgeneratedfromanypostulatedaccidentsoastoprecludeexceedingoffsiteexposurelimits.Theprimarycontainmentstructureisalowleakagepressuresuppressionsystemhousingthereactorpressurevessel(RPV),thereactorcoolantrecirculationpipingandotherbranchconnectionsofthereactorprimarysystem.Theprimarycontainmentisequippedwithisolationvalvesformostsystemswhichpenetratethecontainmentboundary.Thesevalvesautomaticallyactuatetoisolatesystemsunderemergencyconditions.May1994Page29EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

3.0(Cont)ATTACHNENT1(Cont)TherearefourprimarycontainmentparameterswhichareindicativeofconditionswhichmayposeathreattoprimarycontainmentintegrityorindicatedegradationofRPVorreactorfuelintegrity.~rimarContainmentPressure:Excessiveprimarycontainmentpressureisalsoindicativeofeitherprimarysystemleaksintocontainmentorlossofcontainmentcoolingfunction.Primarycontainmentpressuresatorabovespecifiedlimitsposeadirectthreattoprimarycontainmentintegrityandthepressuresuppressionfunction.~SuressionPoolTemerature:ExcessivesuppressionpoolwatertemperaturescanresultinalossofthepressuresuppressioncapabilityofcontainmentandthusbeindicativeofseverelydegradedRPVandcontainmentconditions.~CombustibleGasConcentrations:Theexistenceofcombustiblegasconcentrationsincontainmentposeaseverethreattocontainmentintegrityandareindicativeofseverelydegradedreactorcoreand/orRPVconditions.CotinmetIsolatoStatus:TheexistenceofanunisolablesteamlinebreakoutsidecontainmentconstitutesalossofcontainmentintegrityaswellasalossofRCSboundary.Shouldalossoffuelcladdingintegrityoccur,thepotentialforreleaseoflargeamountsofradioactivematerialstotheenvironmentexists.3.1ContainmentPressure3.1.1AlertPrimarycontainmentpressure'cannotbemaintained<1.68psigduetocoolantleakageNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:ThedrywellpressurevalueisthedrywellhighpressurescramsetpointandisindicativeofaLOCAevent.Theterm"cannotbemaintainedbelow"isintendedtobeconsistentwiththeconditionsspecifiedinthePrimaryContainmentControlEOPindicativeofahighenergyreleaseintocontainmentfor.whichnormalcontainmentcoolingsystemsareinsufficient.Nay1994Page30EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

3.1.1(Cont)PEGReference(s):RCS2.1ATTACHMENT1(Cont)3.1.2BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-97,annunciator603401SiteAreaEmerencPrimarycontainmentpressurecannotbemaintained<1.68psigANDCoolantactivity>300pCi/gmNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:ThedrywellpressurevalueisthedrywellhighpressurescramsetpointandisindicativeofaLOCAevent.Thetermcannotbemaintainedbelow"isintendedtobeconsistentwiththeconditionsspecifiedinthePrimaryContainmentControlEOPindicativeofahighenergyreleaseintocontainmentforwhichnormalcontainmentcoolingsystemsareinsufficient.Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.Thisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorrespondstoabout2Xto5Xfuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significantcladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsideredlost.Thecombinationoftheseconditionsrepresentsalossoftwofissionproductbarriersand,therefore,declarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyiswarranted.PEGReference(s):FC1.1RCS2.1May1994Page31EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

3.1.2(Cont)BasisReference(s):ATTACHMENT1(Cont)1.N2-0P-97,annunciator6034012.GeneralElectricNED0-22215,ProceduresfortheDeterminationoftheExtentofCoreDamageUnderAccidentConditions3.1.3GeeralEmerencPrimarycontainmentventingisrequiredduetoPCPLNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:LossofprimarycontainmentisindicatedwhenproximitytothePrimaryContainmentPressureLimit(PCPL)requiresventingirrespectiveoftheoffsiteradioactivityreleaserate.ToreachthePCPL,primarycontainmentpressuremustexceedthatpredictedinanyplantdesignbasisaccidentanalysis.AlossoftheRCSbarriermusthaveoccurredwithapotentiallossofthefuelcladbarrier.PEGReference(s):PC1.3PC2.23.2BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-PC,PrimaryContainmentControlSuressionPoolTemerature3.2.1StereaEmerencRPVpressureandsuppressionpooltemperaturecannotbemaintained(HCTL(non-ATWS)NodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownNay1994Page32EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

3.2.1(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT1(Cont).ThisEALaddressescompletelossoffunctions,includingultimateheatsink,requiredforhotshutdownwiththereactoratpressureandtemperature.Undertheseconditions,thereisanactualmajorfailureofasystemintendedforprotectionofthepublic.Thus,declarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyiswarranted.Functionsrequiredforhotshutdownconsistoftheabilitytoachievereactorshutdownandtodischargedecayheatenergyfromthereactortotheultimateheatsink.Inabilitytoremovedecayheatenergyisreflectedinanincrease.insuppressionpooltemperature.ElevatedsuppressionpooltemperatureisaddressedbytheHeatCapacityTemperatureLimit(HCTL).TheHCTLisafunctionofRPVpressureandsuppressionpooltemperature.IfRPVpressureandsuppressionpooltemperaturecannotbemaintainedbelowtheHCTL,theultimateheatsinkisthreatenedanddeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyiswarranted.PEGReference(s):SS4.13.3BasisReference(s):'-.l.USAR,Revision2,Section9B.22.'SAR,Revision2,Section9B.4.33.N2-EOP-PC,PrimaryContainmentControlCombustibleGasConcentration3.3.1SiteAreaEmerenc>4AHzexistsinDMorsuppressionchamberNodeApplicability:AllMay1994Page33EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

3.3.1(Cont)Basis:ATTACHHENT1(Cont)4Xhydrogenconcentrationisthelowesthydrogenconcentrationwhich,inthepresenceofsufficientoxygen,cansupportupwardflamepropagation.Thishydrogenconcentrationisgenerallyconsideredthelowerboundaryoftherangeinwhichlocalizeddeflagrationsmayoccur.Togeneratesuchaconcentrationofcombustiblegas,lossofboththefuelcladandRCSbarriersmusthaveoccurred.Therefore,declarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyiswarranted.Ifhydrogenconcentrationsincreaseinconjunctionwiththepresenceofoxygentoglobaldeflagrationlevels(i.e.~6Xhydrogenandh5Xoxygen),ventingofthecontainmentirrespectiveoftheoffsiteradioactivereleaseratewouldberequiredbyEOPsanddeclarationofaGeneralEmergencyrequired.PEGReference(s):SS5.23.3."2BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-PC,PrimaryContainmentControl,Revision5GeneraEmerencPrimarycontainmentventingisrequiredduetocombustiblegasconcentrationsNodeApplicability:AllBasis:6Xhydrogenconcentrationinthepresenceof5Xoxygenconcentrationisthelowestconcentrationatwhichadeflagrationinsideoftheprimarycontainmentcouldoccur.Whenhydrogenandoxygenconcentrationsreachorexceedcombustiblelimits,imminentlossofthecontainmentbarrierexists.Togeneratesuchlevelsofcombustiblegas,lossofthefuelcladandRCSbarriersmusthaveoccurred.VentingofthecontainmentirrespectiveoftheoffsiteradioactivereleaserateisrequiredbyEOPsforthiscondition.Hay1994Page34EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

3.3.2(Cont)PEGReference(s):PC1.4PC2.2ATTACHMENT1(Cont)3.4BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-PC,PrimaryContainmentControlContainmentIsolatioStatus3.4.1SiteAreaEmerencMainSteamLine,RCICsteamlineorReactorWaterClean-upisolationfailureresultinginareleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainment.NodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:TheconditionsofthisEALincluderequiredcontainmentisolationfailuresallowingaflowpathtotheenvironment.Areleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainmentexistswhensteamflowisnotpreventedbydownstreamisolations.Inthecaseofafailureofbothisolationvalvestoclosebutinwhichnodownstreamflowpathexists,declarationunderthisEALwouldnotberequired.TheconditionsofthisEALrepresentthelossofboththeRCSbarrierandtheprimarycontainmentbarrierandthusjustifiesdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.PEGReference(s):PC2.1BasisReference(s):NoneMay1994Page35EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

3.4.2ATTACHMENT1(Cont)GenealEmerencHainSteamLine,RCICsteamlineorReactorMaterClean-upisolationfailureresultinginareleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainmentANDany:~Coolantactivity>300pCi/gmI-131equivalent~RPVwaterlevel<-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation>3100R/hrNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:TheconditionsofthisEALincluderequiredcontainmentisolationfailuresallowingaflowpathtotheenvironment.Areleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainmentexistswhensteamflowisnotpreventedbydownstreamisolations.Inthecaseofafailureofbothisolationvalvestoclosebutinwhichnodownstreamflowpathexists,declarationunderthisEALwouldnotberequired.ContainmentisolationfailureswhichresultinareleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainmentarethebasisfordeclarationofSiteAreaEmergencyinEAL3.4.1.Whenisolationfailuresareaccompaniedbyelevatedcoolantactivity,RPVwaterlevelbelowTAF,orhighdrywellradiation,declarationofaGeneralEmergencyisappropriateduetolossoftheprimarycontainmentbarrier,RCSbarrier,andlossorpotentiallossofthefuelcladbarrier.Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.Thisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorrespondstoabout2XtoSXfuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significantcladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsideredlost.TheRPVwaterlevelusedinthisEAListhetopofactivefuel(TAF).ThisvaluecorrespondstothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallengetocorecoolingandlossofthefuelcladbarrier.Thisistheminimumwaterleveltoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradationoftheclad.SeverecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegritymaynotbeassuredifRPVwaterlevelisnotmaintainedaboveTAF.Hay1994Page36EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

3.4.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)Thedrywellradiationreadingisavaluewhichindicatesthereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicativeoffueldamage,intothedrywell.Thereadingiscalculatedassumingtheinstantaneousreleaseanddispersalofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventoryassociatedwithaconcentrationof300pCi/gmdoseequivalentI-131intothedrywellatmosphere.Reactorcoolantconcentrationsofthismagnitudeareseveral.timeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrationsallowedwithinTechnicalSpecifications(includingiodinespiking)andarethereforeindicativeoffueldamage(approximately2X-5XcladfailuredependingoncoreinventoryandRCSvolume).ItisimportanttorecognizethattheradiationmonitormaybesensitivetoshinefromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiationMonito}sareinstalledinthefollowinglocations:2CEC*Pnl880D:DRHS2RHS*RE1B/DRHS*RUZ1BRHS*RUZ1D2CEC*pnl880B:ORMS2RHS*RElA/CRHS*RUZlARHS*RUZ1CPEGReference(s):PC2.1andFCl.lPC2.1andFC2.1PC2.1andFC3.1BasisReference(s):1.GeneralElectricNED0-22215,ProceduresfortheDeterminationoftheExtentofCoreDamageUnderAccidentConditions2.N2-EOP-RPV,RPVControl3.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-14.CalculationPR-C-24-0,Rev.4May1994Page37EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

4.0NTIACNIIENTI(CI)SECONDRYCONTAINNENTSCThesecondarycontainmentiscomprisedofthereactorbuildingandassociatedventilation,isolationandeffluentsystems.Thesecondarycontainmentservesasaneffectivefissionproductbarrierandisdesignedtominimizeanygroundlevelreleaseofradioactivematerialswhichmightresultfromaseriousaccident.Thereactorbuildingprovidessecondarycontainmentduringreactoroperationandservesasprimarycontainmentwhenthereactorisshutdownandthedrywellisopen,asduringrefueling.Becausethesecondarycontainmentisanintegralpartofthecompletecontainmentsystem,conditionswhichposeathreattovitalequipmentlocatedinthesecondarycontainmentareclassifiableasemergencies.Therearetwosecondarycontainmentparameterswhichareindicativeofconditionswhichmayposeathreattosecondarycontainmentintegrityorequipmentlocatedinsecondarycontainmentorareindicativeofadirectreleasebyaprimarysystemintosecondarycontainment:SecondarContanmentTemeratures:AbnormallyhighsecondarycontainmentareatemperaturescanalsoposeathreattotheoperabilityofvitalequipmentlocatedinsidesecondarycontainmentincludingRPVwaterlevelinstrumentation.Highareatemperaturesmaylimitpersonnelaccessibilitytovitalareas.Highareatemperaturesmayalsobeindicativeofeitherprimarysystemdischargesintosecondarycontainmentorfires.~SecondarContainmentAreaRadiatioLevels:Abnormallyhigharearadiationlevelsinsecondarycontainment,althoughnotnecessarilyposingathreattoequipmentoperability,mayposeathreattopersonnelsafetyandtheabilitytooperatevitalequipmentduetoalackofaccessibility.Abnormallyhigharearadiationlevelsmayalsobetheresultofaprimarysystemdischargingintothesecondarycontainmentandbeindicativeofprecursorstosignificantradioactivityreleasetotheenvironment.4.1ReactorBuildinTemerature4.1.1SiteAreaEmerencPrimarysystemisdischargingoutsidePCANDRBareatemperaturesare>maximumsafeoperatinglevelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SCNodeApplicability:.Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownMay1994Page38EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

4.1.1(Cont)Basis:CTTACIIMIMTITCttThepresenceofelevatedareatemperaturesinthesecondarycontainmentmaybeindicativeofanunisolableprimarysystemleakageoutsidetheprimarycontainment.TheseconditionsrepresentalossofthecontainmentbarrierandapotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier.PEGReference(s):PC2.3RCS1.3BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-SC,SecondaryContainmentControl2.N2-EOP-SC4.1.2GeneralEmerencPrimarysystemisdischargingoutsidePCANDRBareatemperaturesare>maximumsafeoperatinglevelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SCANDany:~Coolantactivity>300pCi/gmI-131equivalent~RPVwaterlevel<-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation>3100R/hrNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:Thepresenceofelevatedareatemperaturesinthesecondarycontainmentmaybeindicativeofanunisolableprimarysystemleakageoutsidetheprimarycontainment.TheseconditionsrepresentalossofthecontainmentbarrierandapotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier.Whensecondarycontainmentareatemperaturesareaccompaniedbyelevatedcoolantactivity,RPVwaterlevelbelowTAF,orhighdrywellradiation,declarationofaGeneralEmergencyisappropriateduetolossoftheprimarycontainmentbarrier,RCSbarrier,andlossorpotentiallossofthefuelcladbarrier.May1994Page39EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

4.1.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.Thisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorrespondstoabout2Xto5Xfuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significantcladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsideredlost.TheRPVwaterlevelusedinthisEAListhetopofactivefuel(TAF).ThisvaluecorrespondstothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallengetocorecoolingandlossofthefuelcladbarrier.Thisistheminimumwaterleveltoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradationoftheclad.SeverecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegritymaynotbeassuredifRPVwaterlevelisnotmaintainedaboveTAF.Thedrywellradiationreadingisavaluewhichindicatesthereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicativeoffueldamage,-intothedrywell.Thereadingiscalculatedassumingtheinstantaneousreleaseanddispersalofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventoryassociatedwithaconcentrationof300pCi/gmdoseequivalentI-131intothedrywellatmosphere.ReactorcoolantconcentrationsofthismagnitudeareseveraltimeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrationsallowedwithinTechnicalSpecifications(includingiodinespiking)andarethereforeindicativeoffueldamage(approximately2X-5XcladfailuredependingoncoreinventoryandRCSvolume).Itisimportanttorecognizethattheradiationmonitormaybesensitivetoshine-fromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiationMonitorsareinstalledinthefollowinglocations:2CEC*Pnl880D:DRHS2RMS*RE1B/DRHS*RUZ1BRHS*RUZ1D2CEC*Pnl880B:DRMS2RMS*RElA/CRHS*RUZlARHS*RUZ1CPEGReference(s):PC2.3andFCl.lPC2.3andFC2.1PC2.3andFC3.1May1994Page40EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

4.1.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-SC,SecondaryContainmentControl2.N2-EOP-RPV,RPVControl3.GeneralElectricNED0-22215,ProceduresfortheDeterminationoftheExtentofCoreDamageUnderAccidentConditions4.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-15.CalculationPR-C-24-0,Rev.44.2ReactoBuidinadationLeve4.2.1SitereaEmerencPrimarysystemisdischargingoutsidePCANDRBarearadiationlevelsare>maximumsafeoperatinglevelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SCNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:Thepresenceofelevatedarearadiationlevelsinthesecondarycontainmentmaybeindicativeofanunisolableprimarysystemleakageoutsidetheprimarycontainment.TheseconditionsrepresentalossofthecontainmentbarrierandapotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier.PEGReference(s):PC2.3RCS1.3May1994Page41EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

4.2.1(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):N2-EOP-SC,SecondaryContainmentControl4.2.2GeeaerecPrimarysystemisdischargingoutsidePCANDRBarearadiationlevelsare>maximumsafeoperatinglevelsintwoor'oreareas,N2-EOP-SCANDany:~Coolantactivity>300pCi/gmI-131equivalent~RPVwaterlevel<-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation>3100R/hrNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:Thepresenceofelevatedarearadiationlevelsinthesecondarycontainmentmaybeindicativeofanunisolableprimarysystemleakageoutsidetheprimarycontainment.TheseconditionsrepresentalossofthecontainmentbarrierandapotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier.Whensecondarycontainmentradiationlevelsareaccompaniedbyelevatedcoolantactivity,RPVwaterlevelbelowTAF,orhighdrywellradiation,declarationofaGeneralEmergencyisappropriateduetolossoftheprimarycontainmentbarrier,RCSbarrier,andlossorpotentiallossofthefuelcladbarrier.Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.Thisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorrespondstoabout2Xto5Xfuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significantcladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsideredlost.May1994Page42EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

4.2.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)TheRPVwaterlevelusedinthisEAListhetopofactivefuel(TAF).ThisvaluecorrespondstothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallengetocorecoolingandlossofthefuelcladbarrier.Thisistheminimumwaterleveltoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradationoftheclad.SeverecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegritymaynotbeassuredifRPVwaterlevelisnotmaintainedaboveTAF.Thedrywellradiationreadingisavaluewhichindicatesthereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicativeoffueldamage,intothedrywell.Thereadingiscalculatedassumingtheinstantaneousreleaseanddispersalofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventoryassociatedwithaconcentrationof300pCi/gmdoseequivalentI-131intothedrywellatmosphere.Reactorcoolant.concentrationsofthismagnitudeareseveraltimeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrationsallowedwithinTechnicalSpecifications(includingiodinespiking)andarethereforeindicativeoffueldamage(approximately2X-5XcladfailuredependingoncoreinventoryandRCSvolume).ItisimportanttorecognizethattheradiationmonitormaybesensitivetoshinefromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiationMonitorsareinstalledinthefollowinglocations:2CEC*Pnl880D:DRMS2RMS*RElB/DRHS*RUZlBRHS*RUZ1D2CEC*Pnl880B:DRHS2RHS*RE1A/CRHS*RUZIARMS*RUZ1CPEGReference(s):PC2.3andFC1.1PC2.3andFC2.1PC2.3andFC3.1May1994Page43EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

4.2.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-SC,SecondaryContainmentControl2.N2-EOP-RPV,RPVControl3.GeneralElectricNED0-22215,ProceduresfortheDeterminationoftheExtentofCoreDamageUnderAccidentConditions4.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-15.CalculationPR-C-24-0,Rev.46.N2-EOP-SC5.0RADIOACTIVITYRELEASEManyEALsarebasedonactualorpotentialdegradationoffissionproductbarriersbecauseoftheincreasedpotentialforoffsiteradioactivityrelease.Degradationoffissionproductbarriersthough,isnotalwaysapparentvianon-radiologicalsymptoms.Therefore,directindicationofincreasedradiologicaleffluentsareappropriatesymptomsforemergencyclassification..Atlowerlevels,abnormalradioactivityreleasesmaybeindicativeofafailureofcontainmentsystemsorprecursorstomoresignificantreleases.Athigherreleaserates,offsiteradiologicalconditionsmayresultwhichrequireoffsiteprotectiveactions.Therearetwobasicindicationsofradioactivityreleaserateswhichwarrantemergencyclassifications.EfluentMonitors:Directindicationofeffluentradiationmonitoringsystemsprovidesarapidassessmentmechanismtodeterminereleasesinexcessofclassifiablelimits.DosePro'ectionandorEnvironmentalMeasurements:Projectedoffsitedoses(basedoneffluentmonitorreadings)oractualoffsitefieldmeasurementsindicatingdosesordoseratesaboveclassifiablelimits.May1994Page44EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.1EffluentMonitorsE.l.l~EEETTCMMEETITCttAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"UE"for>60min.Table5.1EffluentMonitorClassificationThresholdsMonitorUEAlertSAEGERadwaste/ReactorBldg.VentEffluentMainStackEffluentServiceWaterEffluentLiquidRadWasteEffluentCoolingTowerBlowdown2xGEMSalarm2xGEMSalarm2xDRMSHigh(red)2xDRMSHigh(red)2xDRMSHigh(red)200xGEMSalarm200xGEMSalarm200xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)~5.5E6pCi/sN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/ANodeApplicability:AllBasis:Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.Unplannedreleasesinexcessoftwotimesthesitetechnicalspecificationsthatcontinuefor60minutesorlongerrepresentanuncontrolledsituationandhence,apotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafety.Thefinalintegrateddose(whichisverylowintheUnusualEventemergencyclass)isnottheprimaryconcern;itisthedegradationinplantcontrolimpliedbythefactthatthereleasewasnotisolatedwithin60minutes.Therefore,itisnotintendedthatthereleasebeaveragedover60minutes.Forexample,areleaseof4timesT/Sfor30minutesdoesnotexceedthisinitiatingcondition.Further,theEmergencyDirectorshouldnotwaituntil60minuteshaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdeterminedthatthereleasedurationhasorwilllikelyexceed60minutes.May1994Page45EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.1.1(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)ThealarmsetpointsforthelistedmonitorsareconservativelysettoensureTechnicalSpecificationradioactivityreleaselimitsarenotexceeded.ThevalueshownforeachmonitoristwotimesthehighalarmsetpointfortheDigitalRadiationMonitoringSystem(DRHS).InstrumentationthatmaybeusedtoassessthisEALislistedbelow:Radwaste/ReactorBuildingVentEffluentMonitoringSystemmonitor:2RMS-CAB180recorder:2RHS-RR170/180annunciator:851248MainStackEffluentMonitoringSystemmonitor:2RHS-CAB170recorder:2RHS-RR170/180annunciator:851256ServiceWaterEffluentLoopA/BRadiationmonitor:2SWP*RE146A/Brecorder:2SWP*RR146A/Bannunciator:851258LiquidEffluentLinemonitor:LWS-RE206annunciator:851258CoolingTowerBlowdownLinemonitor:CWS-RE157annunciator:851258PEGReference(s):AU1.1BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-79,RadiationMonitoringSystem2.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-13.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-1May1994Page46EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.1.2alertCTTACIIIITIITICCtlAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"Alert"for>15min.Table5.1EffluentMonitorClassificationThresholdsMonitorUEAlertSAEGERadwaste/ReactorBldg.VentEffluent2xGEMSalarmHainStackEffluent2xGENSalarmServiceWaterEffluent2xDRHSHigh(red)LiquidRadWasteEffluent2xDRHSHigh(red)CoolingTowerBlowdown2xORMSHigh(red)200xGEMSalarm200xGEMSalarm200xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRHSHigh(red)200xDRHSHigh(red)~5.5E6pCi/sN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AModeApplicability:AllBasis:Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.ThiseventescalatesfromtheUnusualEventbyincreasingthemagnitudeofthereleasebyafactorof100overtheUnusualEventlevel(i.e.,200timesTechnicalSpecifications)..Proratingthe500mR/yrbasisofthe10CFR20non-occupationalDAClimitsforbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier,theassociatedsiteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Therequiredreleasedurationwasreducedto15minutesinrecognitionoftheincreasedseverity.Thevaluesforthegaseouseffluentradiationmonitorsarebaseduponnotexceeding10mR/hratthesiteboundaryasaresultoftherelease.InstrumentationthatmaybeusedtoassessthisEALislistedbelow:Radwaste/ReactorBuildingVentEffluentMonitoringSystemmonitor:2RMS-CAB180recorder:2RHS-RR170/180annunciator:851248Hay1994Page47EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.1.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)MainStackEffluentMonitoringSystemmonitor:2RMS-CAB170recorder:2RMS-RR170/180annunciator:851256ServiceWaterEffluentLoopA/BRadiationmonitor:2SWP*RE146A/Brecorder:2SWP*RR146A/Bannunciator:851258LiquidRadWasteEffluentLinemonitor:LWS-RE206annunciator:851258CoolingTowerBlowdownLinemonitor:CWS-RE157annunciator:851258PEGReference(s):AA1.1BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-79,RadiationMonitoringSystem2.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-13.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-1May1994Page48EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.1.3SiteAreaEmerencATTACHMENT1(Cont)AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"SAE"for>15min.Table5.1EffluentMonitorClassificationThresholdsMonitorUEAlertSAEGERadwaste/ReactorBldg.VentEffluent2xGEMSalarmMainStackEffluent2xGEMSalarmServiceWaterEffluent2xDRMSHigh(red)LiquidRadWasteEffluent2xDRMSHigh(red)CoolingTowerBlowdown2xORMSHigh(red)200xGEMSalarm200xGEMSalarm200xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)200xORMSHigh(red)~5.5E6pCi/sN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/ANodeApplicability:AllBasis:Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.TheSAEvaluesofTable5.1arebasedontheboundarydoseresultingfromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivitythatexceeds100mRwholebodyor500mRchildthyroidfortheactualorprojecteddurationoftherelease.The100mRintegrateddoseisbasedontheproposed10CFR20annualaveragepopulationexposure.The500mRintegratedchildthyroiddosewasestablishedinconsiderationofthe1:5ratiooftheEPAProtectiveActionGuidelinesforwholebodythyroid.Thesevaluesprovideadesirablegradient(oneorderofmagnitude)betweentheAlert,SiteAreaEmergency,andGeneralEmergencyclassifications.ItisdeemedthatexposureslessthanthislimitarenotconsistentwiththeSiteAreaEmergencyclassdescription.Integrateddosesaregenerallynotmonitoredinreal-time.Inestablishingthisemergencyactionlevel,adurationofonehourisassumedbasedonsiteboundarydosesforeitherwholebodyorchildthyroid,whicheverismorelimiting(dependsonsourcetermassumptions).TheFSARsourcetermsapplicabletoeachmonitoredpathwayareusedindeterminingindicationsforthemonitorsonthatpathway.ThevaluesarederivedfromCalculationPR-C-24-X,Rev.2.May1994Page49EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.1.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):AS1.1ATTACHMENT1(Cont)5.2'asisReference(s):1.N2-0P-79,RadiationMonitoringSystem2.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-13.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-14.CalculationPR-C-24-X,Rev.2DosePoectionsEnvironmentaeasuremets5:2:1~UlEConfirmedsampleanalyses'forgaseousorliquidreleaserates>2xtechnicalspecificationslimitsfor>60min.NodeApplicability:AllBasis:Confirmedsampleanalysesinexcessoftwotimesthesitetechnicalspecificationsthatcontinuefor60minutesorlongerrepresentanuncontrolledsituationandhence,apotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafety.Thefinalintegrateddose(whichisverylowintheUnusualEventemergencyclass)isnottheprimaryconcern;itisthedegradationinplantcontrolimpliedbythefactthatthereleasewasnotisolatedwithin60minutes.Therefore,itisnotintendedthatthereleasebeaveragedover60minutes.Forexample,areleaseof4timesT/Sfor30minutesdoesnotexceedthisinitiatingcondition.Further,theEmergencyDirectorshouldnotwaituntil60minuteshaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdeterminedthatthereleasedurationhasorwilllikelyexceed60minutes.May1994Page50EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.2.1(Cont)PEGReference(s):AU1.2ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-79,RadiationMonitoringSystem2.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-13.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-15.2.2AlertConfirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>200xtechnicalspecificationslimitsfor>15min.NodeApplicability:All'Basis:Confirmedsampleanalysesinexcessoftwohundredtimesthesitetechnicalspecificationsthatcontinuefor15minutesorlongerrepresentanuncontrolledsituationandhence,apotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafety.'This'eventescalatesfromtheUnusualEventbyincreasingthemagnitudeofthereleasebyafactorof100overtheUnusualEventlevel(i.e.,200timesTechnicalSpecifications).Proratingthe500mR/yrbasisofthe10CFR20non-occupationalHPClimitsforbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier,theassociatedsiteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Therequiredreleasedurationwasreducedto15minutesinrecognitionoftheincreasedseverity.PEGReference(s):AA1.2Hay1994Page51EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.2.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-79,RadiationMonitoringSystem2.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-13.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-15.2.3AlertDoseprojectionsorfieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"Alert"atthesiteboundaryorbeyondTable5.2DosePro'ectionEnv.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsAlertSAEGETEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mR100mRN/A500mR10mR/hr100mR/hrN/A500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hrNodeApplicability:AllBasis:Offsiteintegrateddosesinexcessof10mRTEDEordoseratesinexcessof10mR/hrTEDErepresentanuncontrolledsituationandhence,apotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafety.ThiseventescalatesfromtheUnusualEventbyincreasingthemagnitudeofthereleasebyafactorof100overtheUnusualEventlevel(i.e.,200timesTechnicalSpecifications).Proratingthe500mR/yrbasisof10CFR20forbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier,theassociatedsiteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.hAspreviouslystated,the10mR/hrvalueisbasedonaprorationof200timesthe500mR/yrbasisof10CFR20,roundeddownto10mR/hr.May1994Page52EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.2.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):AA1.2BITACHIIENTI(Ct)BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-79,RadiationMonitoringSystem2.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-13.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-15.2.4SiteAreaEmerencDoseprojectionsor-fieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2columnSAE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyondTable5.2DosePro'ectionEnv.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsAlertSAEGE'TEDECDEThyroidTEDErate10mR100mRN/A500mR10mR/hr100mR/hrCDEThyroidrateN/A500mR/hrNodeApplicability:All1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hrMay1994Page53EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.'2.4(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT1(Cont)The100mRintegratedTEDEdoseinthisEALisbasedontheproposed10CFR20annualaveragepopulationexposure.Thisvaluealsoprovidesadesirablegradient(oneorderofmagnitude)betweentheAlert,SiteAreaEmergency,andGeneralEmergencyclasses.ItisdeemedthatexposureslessthanthislimitarenotconsistentwiththeSiteAreaEmergencyclassdescription.The500mRintegratedCDEthyroiddosewasestablishedinconsiderationofthe1:5ratiooftheEPAProtectiveActionGuidelinesforwholebodythyroid.Inestablishingthedoserateemergencyactionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed.Therefore,thedoserateEALsarebasedonasiteboundarydoserateof100mR/hrTEDEor500mR/hrCDEthyroid,whicheverismorelimiting.PEGReference(s):AS1.3AS1.4BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-79,RadiationMonitoringSystem2.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-13.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-15.2.5GeneralEmerencDoseprojectionsorfieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doseratesinexcessofTable5.2column"GE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyondTable5.2Dosero'ectionEnv.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsTEDECDEThyroidTEDErateAlert10mRN/A10mR/hrCDEThyroidrateN/ASAE100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hrGE1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hrHay1994NodeApplicability:AllPage54EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

5.2.5(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT1(Cont)TheGeneralEmergencyvaluesofTable5.2arebasedontheboundarydoseresultingfromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivitythatexceeds1000mRTEDEor5000mRCDEthyroidfortheactualorprojecteddurationoftherelease.The1000mRTEDEandthe5000mRCDEthyroidintegrateddosearebasedontheEPAprotectiveactionguidancewhichindicatesthatpublicprotectiveactionsareindicatedifthedoseexceeds1remTEDEor5remCDEthyroid.ThisisconsistentwiththeemergencyclassdescriptionforaGeneralEmergency.ThislevelconstitutestheupperlevelofthedesirablegradientfortheSiteAreaEmergency.Actualmeteorologyisspecificallyidentifiedsinceitgivesthemostaccuratedoseassessment.Actualmeteorology(includingforecasts)shouldbeusedwheneverpossible.Inestablishingthedoserateemergencyactionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed.Therefore,thedoserateEALsarebasedonasiteboundarydoserateof1000mR/hrTEDEor5000mR/hrCDEthyroid,whicheverismorelimiting.PEGReference(s):AG1.3AG1.4BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-79,RadiationMonitoringSystem2.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-13.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-1May1994Page55EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

6.0ELECTRICLFAILURESATTACHMENTItCtjLossofvitalplantelectricalpowercancompromiseplantsafetysystemoperabilityincludingdecayheatremovalandemergencycorecoolingsystemswhichmaybenecessarytoensurefissionproductbarrierintegrity.Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowingtwolossofelectricalpowertypes:~LossofACPowerSources:Thiscategoryincludeslossesofonsiteand/oroffsiteACpowersourcesincludingstationblackoutevents.6.1~LossofDCPowerSources:Thiscategoryinvolvestotallossesofvitalplant125vdcpowersources.LossofACPowerSources6.1.1UnusualEventLossofpowerfor>15min.toall:~ReserveTransformerA~ReserveTransformerB~AuxBoilerTransformerNodeApplicability:AllBasis:ProlongedlossofalloffsiteACpowerreducesrequiredredundancyandpotentiallydegradesthelevelofsafetyoftheplantbyrenderingtheplantmorevulnerabletoacompletelossofACpower(stationblackout).Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses.Nay1994Page56EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

6.1.1(Cont)PEGReference(s):SU1.1ATTACHHENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-70,StationElectricalFeedand115kvSwitchyard2.N2-0P-100A,StandbyDieselGenerators3.N2-0P-100B,HPCSDieselGenerator6.1.2AlertLossofallemergencybusACpowerfor>15min.NodeApplicability:Coldshutdown,refuel,defuelBasis:LossofallACpowercompromisesallplantsafetysystemsrequiringelectricpower.ThisEALisindicatedby:Lossofpowerfor>15min.toall:~ReserveTransformerA~ReserveTransformerB~AuxBoilerTransformerWhenincoldshutdown,refueling,ordefueledmodethiseventisclassifiedasanAlert.Thisisbecauseofthesignificantlyreduceddecayheat,lowertemperatureandpressure,thusincreasingthetimetorestoreoneoftheemergencybusses,relativetothatspecifiedfortheSiteAreaEmergencyEAL.EscalatingtotheSiteAreaEmergency,ifappropriate,isbyAbnormalRadLevels/RadiologicalEffluent,orEmergencyDirectorJudgmentICs.Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses.Hay1994Page57EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

6.1.2(Cont)PEGReference(s):SA1.1STIAIINENT1(Ct)BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-70,StationElectricalFeedand115kvSwitchyard2.N2-0P-100A,StandbyDieselGenerators3.N2-0P-100B,HPCSDieselGenerator6.1.3AlertAvailableemergencybusACpowerreducedtoonlyoneofthefollowingsourcesfor>15min.:ReserveTransformerAReserve'TransformerBAuxBoilerTransformer2EGS*EG12EGS*EG22EGS*EG3NodeApplicability:'Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:TheconditionindicatedbythisEAListhedegradationoftheoffsitepowerwithaconcurrentfailureofoneemergencygeneratortosupplypowertoitsemergencybusses.Anotherrelatedconditioncouldbethelossofonsiteemergencydieselswithonlyonetrainofemergencybussesbeingfedfromoffsitepower.ThesubsequentlossofthissinglepowersourcewouldescalatetheeventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.Hay1994Page58EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

6.1.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):SA5.1ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-70,StationElectricalFeedand115kvSwitchyard2.N2-0P-100A,StandbyDieselGenerators3.N2-0P-100B,HPCSDieselGenerator6.1.4SiteAreaEmerencLossofallemergencybusACpowerfor>15min..NodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:LossofallACpowercompromisesallplantsafetysystemsrequiringelectricpower.ThisEALisindicatedby:LossofpowertoReserveTransformerA,ReserveTransformerB,andAuxBoilerTransformerANDfailureofallDGstopoweranyemergencybusANDfailuretorestorepowerto2ENS*SWG101,2ENS*SWG102or2ENS*SWG103in~15min.ProlongedlossofallACpowercancausecoreuncoveryandlossofcontainmentintegrity,thusthiseventcanescalatetoaGeneralEmergency.Thetimedurationselected,15minutes,excludestransientormomentarypowerlosses.PEGReference(s):SS1.1May1994Page59EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

6.1.4(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-100A,StandbyDieselGenerators2.N2-0P-100B,HPCSDieselGenerator3.N2-0P-70,StationElectricalFeedand115kvSwitchyard4.N2-0P-72,StandbyandEmergencyACDistributionSystem6.1.5GenealEmereLossofallemergencybusACpowerANDeither:Powercannotberestoredtoanyemergencybusin<2hrsORRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained)-14in.(TAF)NodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:LossofallACpowercompromisesallplantsafetysystemsrequiringelectricpower.ProlongedlossofallACpowerwillleadtolossoffuelclad,RCS,andcontainment.AlthoughthisEALmaybeviewedasredundanttotheRPVWaterLevelEALs,itsinclusionisnecessarytobetterassuretimelyrecognitionandemergencyresponse.ThisEALisspecifiedtoassurethatintheunlikelyeventofprolongedstationblackout,timelyrecognitionoftheseriousnessoftheeventoccursandthatdeclarationofaGeneralEmergencyoccursasearlyasisappropriate,basedonareasonableassessmentoftheeventtrajectory.Thelikelihoodofrestoringatleastoneemergencybusshouldbebasedonarealisticappraisalofthesituationsinceadelayinanupgradedecisionbasedononlyachanceofmitigatingtheeventcouldresultinalossofvaluabletimeinpreparingandimplementingpublicprotectiveactions.Inaddition,undertheseconditions,fissionproductbarriermonitoringcapabilitymaybedegraded.Althoughitmaybedifficulttopredictwhenpowercanberestored,theEmergencyDirectorshoulddeclareaGeneralEmergencybasedontwomajorconsiderations:May1994Page60EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

6.1.5(Cont)ATTACHHENT1(Cont)1.ArethereanypresentindicationsthatcorecoolingisalreadydegradedtothepointthatLossorPotentialLossoffissionproductbarriersisimminent72.Iftherearenopresentindicationsofsuchcorecoolingdegradation,howlikelyisitthatpowercanberestoredintime.toassurethatalossoftwobarrierswithapotentiallossofthethirdbarriercanbeprevented?Thus,indicationofcontinuingcorecoolingdegradationmustbebasedonfissionproductbarriermonitoringwithparticularemphasisonEmergencyDirectorjudgmentasitrelatestoimminentlossorpotentiallossoffissionproductbarriersanddegradedabilitytomonitorfissionproductbarriers.ThetimetorestoreACpowerisbasedonsiteblackoutcopinganalysisperformedinconformancewith10CFR50.63andRegulatoryGuide1.155,StationBlackout",withappropriateallowanceforoffsiteemergencyresponse.PEGReference(s):SG1.16.2BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-74A,EmergencyDCDistribution2.N2-0P-74B,HPCS125vdcSystem3.N2-0P-70,StationElectricalFeedand115kvSwitchyard4.N2-EOP-RPV,RPVControlLossofDCPowerSources6.2.1UnusualEvent<105vdcon2BYS*BAT2AandBfor>15min.NodeApplicability:Coldshutdown,RefuelHay1994Page61EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

6.2.1(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT1(Cont)ThepurposeofthisEAListorecognizealossofDCpowercompromisingtheabilitytomonitorandcontroltheremovalofdecayheatduringcoldshutdownorrefuelingoperations.ThisEALisintendedtobeanticipatoryinasmuchastheoperatingcrewmaynothavenecessaryindicationandcontrolofequipmentneededtorespondtotheloss.Thebusvoltageisbasedontheminimumbusvoltagenecessaryfortheoperationofsafetyrelatedequipment.Thisvoltagevalueincorporatesamarginofatleast15minutesofoperationbeforetheonsetofinabilitytooperateloads.PEGReference(s):SU7.1BasisReference(s):1.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,Amendment5,Article4.8.2.1.d.22.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,Basis3/4.8.1-3,pg.B3/48-23.OperationsTechnologyBYS/BWS,PlantDCElectricalDistributionSystem6.2.2SiteAreaEmerenc<105vdcon2BYS*BAT2AandBfor>15min.NodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownMay1994Page62EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

6.2.2(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT1(Cont)LossofallDCpowercompromisesabilitytomonitorandcontrolplantsafetyfunctions.ProlongedlossofallDC.powerwillcausecoreuncoveringandlossofcontainmentintegritywhenthereissignificantdecayheatandsensibleheatinthereactorsystem.EscalationtoaGeneralEmergencywouldoccurbyotherEALcategories.Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses.Thebusvoltageisbasedontheminimumbusvoltagenecessaryfortheoperationofsafetyrelatedequipment.Thisvoltagevalueincorporatesamarginofatleast15minutesofoperationbeforetheonsetofinabilitytooperateloads.PEGReference(s):SS3.'1BasisReference(s):1.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,Amendment5,Article4.8.2.l.d.22.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Basis3/4.8.1-3,pg.B3/48-23.OperationsTechnologyBYS/BWS,PlantDCElectricalDistributionSystem7.0EUIPMENTFAILURESNumerousplantsystemrelatedequipmentfailureeventswhichwarrantemergencyclassification,basedupontheirpotentialtoposeactualorpotentialthreatstoplantsafety,havebeenidentifiedinthiscategory.Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowingeventtypes:~TechnicalSecifications:OnlyoneEALfallsunderthiseventtyperelatedtothefailureoftheplanttobebroughttotherequiredplantoperatingconditionrequiredbytechnicalspecifications.May1994Page63EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

7.0(Cont)ATTACHMENTI(Cont)7.1~SstemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation:ThiscategoryincludeseventswhichareindicativeoflossesofoperabilityofsafetysystemssuchasECCS,isolationfunctions,ControlRoomhabitabilityorcoldandhotshutdowncapabilities.~LossofIndicationAlarmorCommunicationCaabilit:Certaineventswhichdegradetheplantoperatorsabilitytoeffectivelyassessplantconditionsorcommunicatewithessentialpersonnelwithinorexternaltotheplantwarrantemergencyclassification.Underthiseventtypearelossesofannunciatorsand/orcommunicationequipment.TecncaSecifications7.1.1UnusualEventPlantisnotbroughttorequiredoperatingmodewithinTechnicalSpecificationsLCOActionStatementTimeNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:'-LimitingConditionsofOperation(LCOs)requiretheplanttobebroughttoarequiredshutdownmodewhentheTechnicalSpecificationrequiredconfigurationcannotberestored.Dependingonthecircumstances,thismayormaynotbeanemergencyorprecursortoamoreseverecondition.Inanycase,theinitiationofplantshutdownrequiredbythesiteTechnicalSpecificationrequiresaonehourreportunder10CFR50.72(b)non-emergencyevents.TheplantiswithinitssafetyenvelopewhenbeingshutdownwithintheallowableactionstatementtimeintheTechnicalSpecifications.AnimmediateNotificationofanUnusualEventisrequiredwhentheplantisnotbroughttotherequiredoperatingmodewithintheallowableactionstatementtimeintheTechnicalSpecifications.DeclarationofanUnusualEventisbasedonthetimeatwhichtheLCO-specifiedactionstatementtimeperiodelapsesunderthesiteTechnicalSpecificationsandisnotrelatedtohowlongaconditionmayhaveexisted.OtherrequiredTechnicalSpecificationshutdownsthatinvolveprecursorstomoreseriouseventsareaddressedbyotherEALs.PEGReference(s):SU2.1May1994Page64EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

'.1.1(Cont)~~BasisReference(s):ATTACHMENT1(Cont)7.21.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,article3.0.3SstemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation7.2.1UnusualEventReportofmainturbinefailureresultingincasingpenetrationordamagetoturbinesealsorgeneratorsealsNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisintendedtoaddressmainturbinerotatingcomponentfailuresofsufficientmagnitudetocauseobservabledamagetotheturbinecasingortothesealsoftheturbinegenerator.Ofmajorconcernisthepotentialforleakageofcombustiblefluids(lubricatingoils)andgases(hydrogencooling)totheplantenvirons.ActualfiresandflammablegasbuildupareappropriatelyclassifiedthroughotherEALs.ThisEALisconsistentwiththedefinitionofanUnusualEventwhilemaintainingtheanticipatorynaturedesiredandrecognizingtherisktonon-safetyrelatedequipment.PEGReference(s):HU1.6BasisReference(s):None7.2.2alertControlRoomevacuationNodeApplicability:AllMay1994Page65EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

7.2.2(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT1(Cont)WiththeControlRoomevacuated,additionalsupport,monitoringanddirectionthroughtheTechnicalSupportCenterand/orotherEmergencyOperationsCenterisnecessary.InabilitytoestablishplantcontrolfromoutsidetheControlRoomwillescalatethiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.PEGReference(s):HAS.1BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-78,RemoteShutdownSystem,SectionH.2.07.2.3AlertReactorcoolanttemperaturecannotbemaintained<200'FNodeApplicability:Coldshutdown,refuelBasis:ThisEALaddressescompletelossoffunctionsrequiredforcorecoolingduringrefuelingandcoldshutdownmodes.EscalationtoSiteAreaEmergencyorGeneralEmergencywouldbethroughotherEALs.AreactorcoolanttemperatureincreasethatapproachesorexceedsthecoldshutdowntechnicalspecificationlimitwarrantsdeclarationofanAlertirrespectiveoftheavailabilityoftechnicalspecificationrequiredfunctionstomaintaincoldshutdown.TheconcernofthisEAListhelossofabilitytomaintaintheplantincoldshutdownwhichisdefinedbyreactorcoolanttemperatureandnottheoperabilityofequipmentwhichsupportsremovalofheatfromthereactor.ThisEALdoesnotapplyduringhydrostatictesting.PEGReference(s):SA3.1May1994Page66EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

7.2.3(Cont)BasisReference(s):ATTACHMENT1(Cont).1.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Amendment26,Article3.4.9.22.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table1.27.2.4SiteAreaEmerencControlRoomevacuationANDControlofcorecoolingsystemscannotbeestablisheding15min.NodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALindicatesthatexpeditioustransferofcontrolofsafetysystemshasnotoccurred.Thetimeintervalfortransferisbasedonanalysisorassessmentsastohowquicklycontrolmustbereestablishedwithoutcoreuncoveringand/orcoredamage.Incoldshutdownandrefuelingmodes,operatorconcernisdirectedtowardmaintainingcorecoolingsuchasisdiscussedinGenericLetter88-17,"LossofDecayHeatRemoval."Inpoweroperation,hotstandby,andhotshutdownmodes,operatorconcernisprimarilydirectedtowardmonitoringandcontrollingplantparametersdictatedbytheEOPsandtherebyassuringfissionproductbarrierintegrity.PEGReference(s):HS2.1BasisReference(s):1.GenericLette}88-17,"LossofDecayHeatRemoval"2.N2-0P-78,RemoteShutdownSystem,SectionH.2.03.NMP-2FSARSection9B.8.2.2,SafeShutdownScenario,pg.9B.8-5a,May1994Page67EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

7.3ATTACHMENT1(Cont)LossofIndicationsAlarmCommunicationCaabilit7.3.1~UEUnplannedlossofannunciatorsorindicatorsonanyofthefollowingpanelsfor>15min.:2CEC*PNL6012CEC*PNL6022CEC*PNL6032CEC*PNL8522CEC*PNL851ANDIncreasedsurveillanceisrequiredforsafeplantoperationNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizesthedifficultyassociatedwithmonitoringchangingplantconditionswithouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciationorindicationequipment.Recognitionoftheavailabilityofcomputerbasedindicationequipmentisconsidered(SPDS,plantcomputer,etc.)."Unplanned"lossofannunciatorsorindicatorsexcludesscheduledmaintenanceandtestingactivities.Itis,notintendedthatplantpersonnelperformadetailedcountofinstrumentationlostbuttheuseofjudgmentbytheShiftSupervisorasthethresholdfordeterminingtheseverityoftheplantconditions.ThisjudgmentissupportedbythespecificopinionoftheShiftSupervisorthatadditionaloperatingpersonnelwillberequiredtoprovideincreasedmonitoringofsystemoperationtosafelyoperatetheplant.May1994Page68EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

7.3.1(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)Itisfurtherrecognizedthatmostplantdesignsprovideredundantsafetysystemindicationpoweredfromseparateuninterruptablepowersupplies.Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciatorsismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications,theconcernisincludedinthisEALduetodifficultyassociatedwithassessmentofplantconditions.Thelossofspecific,orseveral,safetysystemindicatorsshouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponentoperabilitystatus.ThiswillbeaddressedbytheirspecificTechnicalSpecification.TheinitiationofaTechnicalSpecificationimposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrumentlosswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.IftheshutdownisnotincompliancewiththeTechnicalSpecificationaction,theUnusualEventisbasedonEAL7.1.1,InabilitytoReachRequiredShutdownWithinTechnicalSpecificationLimits.AnnunciatorsorindicatorsforthisEALmustincludethoseidentifiedintheAbnormalOperatingprocedures,intheEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors,etc.).Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses.Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperationduringcoldshutdown,refueling,anddefueledmodes,thisEALisnotapplicableduringthesemodesofoperation.ThisUnusualEventwillbeescalatedtoanAlertifatransientisinprogressduringthelossofannunciationorindication.PEGReference(s):SU3.1BasisReference(s):1.USARFigure1.2-15,ControlRoomlayout2.N2-0P-91A,ProcessComputer3.N2-0P-91B,SafetyParameterDisplaySystem(SPDS)May1994Page69EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

7.3.2U~1ATTACHHENT1(Cont)Lossofallcommunicationscapabilityaffectingtheabilitytoeither:PerformroutineonsiteoperationsORNotifyoffsiteagenciesorpersonnelNodeApplicability:Al1Basis:ThepurposeofthisEAListorecognizealossofcommunicationscapabilitythateitherdefeatstheplantoperationsstaffabilitytoperformroutinetasksnecessaryforplantoperationsortheabilitytocommunicateproblemswithoffsiteauthorities.Thelossofoffsitecommunicationsabilityisexpectedtobesignificantlymorecomprehensivethantheconditionaddressedby10CFR50.72.Theonsitecommunicationslossmustencompassthelossofallmeansofroutinecommunications,Table7.1.Table7.1CommunicationsSstems~SstemOnsiteOffsiteDialtelephonesSPCsystemM/CCsystemPP/PAsystemHand-HeldPortableradioRedphonetoUSNRC-BethesdaBlackphonetoUSNRC-KingofPrussiaBlackphonedirecttoJAFNPPPBXREGSHealthphysicsnetworkandFTS2000UHFradiosTheoffsitecommunicationslossmustencompassthelossofallmeansofcommunicationswithoffsiteauthorities,Table7.1.ThisEALisintendedtobeusedonlywhenextraordinarymeansarebeingutilizedtomakecommunicationspossible(relayingofinformationfromradiotransmissions,individualsbeingsenttooffsitelocations,etc.).Hay1994Page70EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

7.3.2(Cont)PEGReference(s):SU6.1ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-76,PlantCommunications7.3.3AlertUnplannedlossofannunciatorsorindicatorsonanyofthefollowingpanelsfor>15min.:~2CEC*PNL601~2CEC*PNL602~2CEC*PNL603~2CEC*PNL852-~2CEC*PNL851ANDincreasedsurveillanceisrequiredforsafeplantoperationANDeither:PlanttransientinprogressORplantcomputerandSPDSareunavailableModeApplicability:Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizesthedifficultyassociatedwithmonitoringchangingplantconditionswithouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciationorindicationequipmentduringatransient.Recognitionoftheavailabilityofcomputerbasedindicationequipmentisconsidered(SPDS,plantcomputer,etc.)."Unplanned"lossofannunciatorsorindicatorsdoesnotincludescheduledmaintenanceandtestingactivities.Itisnotintendedthatplantpersonnelperformadetailedcountoftheinstrumentationlostbuttheuseofthevalueasajudgmentbytheshiftsupervisorasthethresholdfordeterminingtheseverityoftheplantconditions.ThisjudgmentissupportedbythespecificopinionoftheShiftSupervisorthatadditionaloperatingpersonnelwillberequiredtoprovideincreasedmonitoringofsystemoperationtosafelyoperatetheplant.Hay1994Page71EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

7.3.3(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)Itisfurtherrecognizedthatmostplantdesignsprovideredundantsafetysystemindicationpoweredfromseparateuninterruptablepowersupplies.Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciatorsismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications,theconcernisincludedinthisEALduetodifficultyassociatedwithassessmentofplantconditions.Thelossofspecific,orseveral,safetysystemindicatorsshouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponentoperabilitystatus.ThiswillbeaddressedbythespecificTechnicalSpecification.TheinitiationofaTechnicalSpecificationimposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrumentlosswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.AnnunciatorsorindicatorsforthisEALincludesthoseidentifiedintheAbnormalOperatingProcedures,intheEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors,etc.)."Significanttransient"includesresponsetoautomaticormanuallyinitiatedfunctionssuchasscrams,runbacksinvolvinggreaterthan25Xthermalpowerchange,ECCSinjections,orthermalpoweroscillationsof10Xorgreater.Ifbothamajorportionoftheannunciationsystemandallcomputermonitoringareunavailabletotheextentthattheadditionaloperatingpersonnelarerequiredtomonitorindications,theAlertisrequired.Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperationduringcoldshutdown,refuelinganddefueledmodes,noEALisindicatedduringthesemodesofoperation.ThisAlertwillbeescalatedtoaSiteAreaEmergencyiftheoperatingcrewcannotmonitorthetransientinprogress.PEGReference(s):SA4.1BasisReference(s):1.USARFigure1.2-15,ControlRoomlayout2.N2-0P-91A,ProcessComputer3.N2-0P-91B,SafetyParameterDisplaySystem(SPDS)May1994Page72EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

7.3.4SiteAreaEmerencATTACHMENT1(Cont)Lossofannunciatorsorindicatorsonanyofthefollowingpanels:~2CEC*PNL601~2CEC*PNL602~2CEC*PNL603~2CEC*PNL852~2CEC*PNL851ANDplantcomputerandSPDSareunavailableANDindicationstomonitorallRPVandprimarycontainmentEOPparametersarelostANDplanttransientisinprogressNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,-startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizestheinabilityoftheControlRoomstafftomonitortheplantresponsetoatransient.ASiteAreaEmergencyisconsideredtoexistiftheControlRoomstaffcannotmonitorsafety.functionsneededforprotectionofthepublic.AnnunciatorsforthisEALshouldbelimitedtoincludethoseidentifiedintheAbnormalOperatingProcedures,intheEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andinotherEALs(e.g.,radmonitors,etc.)."Significanttransient"includesresponsetoautomaticormanuallyinitiatedfunctionssuchasscrams,runbacksinvolvinggreaterthan25Xthermalpowerchange,ECCSinjections,orthermalpoweroscillationsof10Xorgreater.IndicationsneededtomonitorsafetyfunctionsnecessaryforprotectionofthepublicmustincludeControlRoomindications,computergeneratedindicationsanddedicatedannunciationcapability.Thespecificindicationsshouldbethoseusedtodeterminesuchfunctionsastheabilitytoshutdownthereactor,maintainthecorecooledandinaeoolablegeometry,toremoveheatfromthecore,tomaintainthereactorcoolantsystemintact,andtomaintaincontainmentintact."Planned"actionsareexcludedfromtheisEALsincethelossofinstrumentationofthismagnitudeisofsuchsignificanceduringatransientthatthecauseofthelossisnotanamelioratingfactor.May1994Page73EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

7.3.4(Cont)PEGReference(s):SS6.1ATTACHMENT1(Cont).IBasisReference(s):1.N2-EOP-PC,PrimaryContainmentControl2.N2-EOP-RPV,RPVControl3.N2-0P-91A,ProcessComputer4.N2-0P-91B,SafetyParameterDisplaySystem(SPDS)5.USARFigure1.2-15,ControlRoomlayout8.0HAZARDSPHazardsarethosenon-plantsystemrelatedeventswhichcandirectlyorindirectlyimpactplantoperationorreactorplantandpersonnelsafety.Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowingtypes:SecuritThreats:ThiscategoryincludesunauthorizedentryattemptsintotheProtectedAreaaswellasbombthreatsandsabotageattempts.Alsoaddressedareactualsecuritycompromisesthreateninglossofphysicalcontroloftheplant.FireorExlosion:Firescanposesignificanthazardstopersonnelandreactorsafety.AppropriateforclassificationarefireswithinthesiteProtectedAreaorwhichmayaffectoperabilityofvitalequipment.Man-madeEvents:Han-madeeventsarethosenon-naturallyoccurringeventswhichcancausedamagetoplantfacilitiessuchasaircraftcrashes,missileimpacts,toxicorflammablegasleaksorexplosionsfromwhateversource.NaturalEvents:Eventssuchashurricanes,earthquakesortornadoeswhichhavepotentialtocausedamagetoplantstructuresorequipmentsignificantenoughtothreatenpersonnelorplantsafety.Hay1994Page74EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.1SecuritThreatsETIACAIIENTIECI)8.1.1UnusualEventBombdeviceorotherindicationofattemptedsabotagediscoveredwithinplantProtectedAreaNodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALisbasedontheNineMilePointNuclearStationPhysicalSecurityandSafeguardsContingencyPlans.Securityeventswhichdonotrepresentatleastapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplant,arereportedunder10CFR73.71orinsomecasesunder10CFR50.72.TheplantProtectedAreaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolationzoneandisdefinedinthesecurityplan.PEGReference(s):HU4.1HU4.2BasisReference(s):1.NineMilePointNuclearStationPhysicalSecurityandSafeguardsContingencyPlans.8.1.2AlertIntrusionintoplantProtectedAreabyanadversaryNodeApplicability:AllMay1994Page75EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.1.2(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT1(Cont)ThisclassofsecurityeventsrepresentsanescalatedthreattoplantsafetyabovethatcontainedintheUnusualEvent.ForthepurposesofthisEAL,theintrusionbyanadversaryinsidetheProtectedAreaboundarycanbeconsideredasignificantsecuritythreat.IntrusionintoavitalareabyanadversarywillescalatethiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.NMP-1andNMP-2ProtectedAreaboundariesareillustratedinUSARFigure1.2-1.AlsoseeSEWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/89.PEGReference(s):HA4.1HA4.2BasisReference(s):1.NineMilePointNuclearStationPhysicalSecurityandSafeguardsContingencyPlans2.SNDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/898.1.3SiteAreaEmerencIntrusionintoaplantsecurityvitalareabyanadversaryNodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisclassofsecurityeventsrepresentsanescalatedthreattoplantsafetyabovethatcontainedintheAlertinthatanadversaryhasprogressedfromtheProtectedAreatothevitalarea.May1994Page76EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.1.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):HS1.1HS1.2ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.NineMilePointNuclearStationPhysicalSecurityandSafeguardsContingencyPlans8.1.4GeneralEmerencSecurityeventwhichresultsin:LossofplantcontrolfromtheControlRoomANDLossofremoteshutdowncapabilityNodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALencompassesconditionsunderwhichunauthorizedpersonnelhavetakenphysicalcontrolofvitalareasrequiredtoreachandmaintainsafeshutdown.PEGReference(s):HGl.1HG1.2BasisReference(s):NoneMay1994Page77EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.2FireorExlosionATTACHHENT1(Cont)8.2.1UnusualEventConfirmedfireinanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3,notextinguisheding15min.ofControlRoomnotificationTable8.2PlantAreasServiceBuilding115KVSwitchyard345KVSwitchyardNodeApplicability:AllTable8.3PlantVitaAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAug.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuilding'DieselGeneratorBuildingScreenwellBuilding/ServiceWaterPumpBaysCondensateStorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatmentBuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingBasis:ThepurposeofthisEAListoaddressthemagnitudeandextentoffiresthatmaybepotentiallysignificantprecursorstodamagetosafetysystems.Thisexcludessuchitemsasfireswithinadministrationbuildings,waste-basketfires,andothersmallfiresofnosafetyconsequence.PEGReference(s):HU2.1Hay1994Page78EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.2.1(Cont)BasisReference(s):ATTACHMENT1(Cont)1.NineMilePointNuclearStationPhysicalSecurityandSafeguardsContingencyPlans2.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-28.2.2alertFireorexplosioninanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3,whichresultsindamagetoplantequipmentorstructuresneededforsafeplantoperationTable8.2PlantAreasServiceBuilding115KVSwitchyard345KVSwitchyardNodeApplicability:AllTable8.3lantVitalAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGeneratorBuildingScreenwellBuilding/ServiceWaterPumpBaysCondensateStorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatmentBuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingBasis:Thelistedareascontainfunctionsandsystemsrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplant.TheNMP-2safeshutdownanalysiswasconsultedforequipmentandplantareasrequiredfortheapplicablemode.May1994Page79EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.2.2(Cont)ATTACHHENT1(Cont)Withregardtoexplosions,onlythoseexplosionsofsufficientforcetodamagepermanentstructuresorequipmentrequiredforsafeoperationwithintheidentifiedplantareasshouldbeconsidered.Asusedhere,anexplosionisarapid,violent;unconfined'combustion,oracatastrophicfailureofpressurizedequipment,thatpotentiallyimpartssignificantenergytonearbystructuresandmaterials.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.ThedeclarationofanAlertandtheactivationoftheTSCwillprovidetheEmergencyDirectorwiththeresourcesneededtoperformdamageassessments.TheEmergencyDirectoralsoneedstoconsideranysecurityaspectsoftheexplosions.PEGReference(s):HA2.18.38.3.1.BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-47,FireDetection2.USAR,Figure9B.6-13.USAR,Section9B4.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-2-lidEUnusualEventVehiclecrashintoorprojectilewhichimpactsplantstructuresorsystemswithinProtectedAreaboundaryNodeApplicability:AllBasis:TheProtectedAreaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolationzoneandisdefinedinthesitesecurityplan.NHP-1andNHP-2ProtectedAreaboundariesareillustratedinUSARFigure1.2-1.Also,refertoS8WDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25;IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/89.Hay1994Page80EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.3.1(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)ThisEALaddressessuchitemsasplane,helicopter,train,car,truck,orbargecrash,orimpactofotherprojectilesthatmaypotentiallydamageplantstructurescontainingfunctionsandsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifthecrashisconfirmedtoaffectaplantvitalarea,theeventmaybeescalatedtoAlert.ForthepurposeofthisEAL,aplantstructureisanypermanentbuildingorstructurewhichhousesplantprocess/supportsystemsandequipment.Administrativebuildings,supportbuildings/trailersorothernonplantoperationsrelatedstructuresarenotintendedtobeincludedhere.PEGReference(s):HU1.4S.3.2BasisReference(s):l.USARFigure1.2-2StationArrangement2.SEWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/89.ReportbyplantpersonnelofanexplosionwithinProtectedAreaboundaryresultinginvisibledamagetopermanentstructuresorequipmentNodeApplicability:AllBasis:TheProtectedAreaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolationzoneandisdefinedinthesitesecurityplan.NMP-1andNMP-2ProtectedAreaboundariesareillustratedinUSARFigure1.2-1.Also,refertoSEWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/89.May1994Page81EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.3.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)ForthisEAL,onlythoseexplosionsofsufficientforcetodamagepermanentstructuresorequipmentwithintheProtectedAreashouldbeconsidered.Asusedhere,anexplosionisarapid,violent,unconfinedcombustion,oracatastrophicfailureofpressurizedequipment,thatpotentiallyimpartssignificantenergytonearbystructuresandmaterials.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.Theoccurrenceoftheexplosionwithreportsofevidenceofdamage(e.g.,deformation,scorching)issufficientfordeclaration.TheEmergencyDirectoralsoneedstoconsideranysecurit'yaspectsoftheexplosion.PEGReference(s):HU1.58.3.3BasisReference(s):l.USARFigure1.2-2StationArrangement2.SLWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/89UnusualEventReportordetectionofareleaseoftoxicorflammablegasesthatcouldenterorhaveenteredwithintheProtectedAreaboundaryinamountsthatcouldaffectthehealthofplantpersonnelorsafeplantoperationORreportbylocal,countyorstateofficialsforpotentialevacuationofsitepersonnelbasedonoffsiteeventModeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALisbasedonreleasesinconcentrationswithinthesiteboundarythatwillaffectthehealthofplantpersonneloraffectingthesafeoperationoftheplantwiththeplantbeingwithintheevacuationareaofanoffsiteevent(i.e.,tankertruckaccidentreleasingtoxicgases,etc.).TheevacuationareaisasdeterminedfromtheDOTEvacuationTablesforSelectedHazardousMaterials,intheDOTEmergencyResponseGuideforHazardousMaterials.May1994Page82EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.3.3(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)NMP-1andNMP-2sharenocommonsafetysystems,buttheirrespectiveProtectedAreaboundariessharecommonbordersinsomeplaces.Thereforeitispossiblethatatoxicorflammablegasincidenthappeningononesitecouldaffecttheothersite.Shouldanexplosionoccurwithinaspecifiedplantarea,anAlertwouldbedeclaredbasedonEAL8.2.2PEGReference(s):HU3.1HU3.2BasisReference(s):None8.3.4alertVehiclecrashorprojectileimpactwhichprecludespersonnelaccesstoordamagesequipmentinplantvitalareas,Table8.3Table8.3PlantVitalAreasNodeApplicability:AllSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGeneratorBuildingScreenwellBuilding/ServiceWaterPumpBaysCondensateStorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatmentBuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingMay1994Page83EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.3.4(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT1(Cont)ThisEALaddresseseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtoforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortoclassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.NMP-1andNMP-2ProtectedAreaboundariesareillustratedinUSARFigure1.2-1.AlsoseeSSWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/89.ThisEALaddressessuchitemsasplane,helicopter,train,car,truck,orbargecrash,orimpactofotherprojectilesintoaplantvitalarea.PEGReference(s):HA1.5BasisReference(s):1.USARFigure1.2-2StationArrangement2.SKWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/893.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-28.3.5AlertConfirmedreportordetectionoftoxicorflammablegaseswithinaplantvitalarea,Table8.3,inconcentrationsthatwillbelifethreateningtoplantpersonnelorprecludeaccesstoequipmentneededforsafeplantoperationTable8.3PlantVitalAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGeneratorBuildingScreenwellBuilding/ServiceWaterPumpBaysCondensateStorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatmentBuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingMay1994Page84EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.3.5(Cont)ATTACHNENT1(Cont)RodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALisbasedongasesthathaveenteredaplantstructureprecludingaccesstoequipmentnecessaryforthesafeoperationoftheplant.ThisEALappliestobuildingsandareascontiguoustoplantvitalareasorothersignificantbuildingsorareas.TheintentofthisEALisnottoincludebuildings(i.e.,warehouses)orotherareasthatarenotcontiguousorimmediatelyadjacenttoplantvitalareas.Itisappropriatethatincreasedmonitoringbedonetoascertainwhetherconsequentialdamagehasoccurred.8.4PEGReference(s):HA3.1HA3.2BasisReference(s):1.USARFigure1.2-2StationArrangement2.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-2NaturalEvents8.4.1UnusualEventEarthquakefeltinplantbyanyoperatorANDeither:NNP-2seismicinstrumentationactuatedORconfirmationofearthquakereceivedonNHP-IorJAFNPPseismicinstrumentationHay1994Page85EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

ATTACNIIENTIECtt8.4.1(Cont)NodeApplicability:AllBasis:NHP-2seismicinstrumentationactuatesat0.01gcausing:PowertoremoteaccelerationsensorunitsActivationofMRSlrecordersEVENTalarmlightonPWRSltolightAnnunciator842121onpanel2CEC-PNL842tobereceivedEVENTINDICATORonPWRSltoturnfromblacktowhiteDamagetosomeportionsofthesitemayoccurbutitshouldnotaffectabilityofsafetyfunctionstooperate.Methodsofdetectioncanbebasedoninstrumentationvalidatedbyareliablesource,operatorassessment,orindicationreceivedfromNMP-1orJAFNPPinstrumentation.AsdefinedintheEPRI-sponsored"GuidelinesforNuclearPlantResponsetoanEarthquake",datedOctober1989,a"feltearthquake"is:"Anearthquakeofsufficientintensitysuchthat:(a)theinventorygroundmotionisfeltatthenuclearplantsiteandrecognizedasanearthquakebasedonaconsensusofControlRoomoperatorsondutyatthetime,and(b)-forplantswithoperableseismicinstrumentation,theseismicswitchesoftheplantareactivated.Formostplantswithseismicinstrumentation,theseismicswitchesaresetatanaccelerationofabout0.01g."PEGReference(s):HU1.1BasisReference(s):1.N2-0P-90,SeismicMonitoring2.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpeci-ficationsNineMilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,article3.3.7.23.EPRIdocument,"GuidelinesforNuclearPlantResponsetoanEarthquake",datedOctober1989Hay1994Page86EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.4.2UnusualEventATTACHHENT1(Cont)ReportbyplantpersonneloftornadostrikingwithinplantProtectedAreaboundaryNodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALisbasedontheassumptionthatatornadostriking(touchingdown)withintheProtectedAreaboundarymayhavepotentiallydamagedplantstructurescontainingfunctionsorsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifsuchdamageisconfirmedvisuallyorbyotherin-plantindications,theeventmaybeescalatedtoAlert.NHP-1andNHP-2ProtectedAreaboundariesareillustratedinUSARFigure1.2-1.AlsoseeSEWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/89.PEGReference(s):HU1.2BasisReference(s):1.USARFigure1.2-12.S&WDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/89Hay1994Page87EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.4.3UnusualEventATTACHHENT1(Cont)AssessmentbyControlRoompersonnelthatanaturaleventhasoccurredprecludingaccesstoaplant.vitalarea,Table8.4Table8.4PlantVitalAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGeneratorBuildingScreenwellBuilding/ServiceWaterPumpBaysCondensateStorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatmentBuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingNodeApplicabi1ity:AllBasis:ThisEALallowsfortheControlRoomtodeterminethataneventhasoccurredandtakeappropriateactionbasedonpersonalassessmentasopposedtoverification(i.e.,anearthquakeisfeltbutdoesnotregisteronanyplant-specificinstrumentation,etc.).NHP-1andNHP-2ProtectedAreaboundariesareillustratedinUSARFigure1.2-1.AlsoseeS&WDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/89.PEGReference(s):HU1.3Hay1994Page88EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.4.3(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.USARFigure1.2-1ATTACHMENT1(Cont)2.SKWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/893.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-28.4.4UnusualEventLakewaterlevel>248ftORintakewaterlevel<237ftNodeApplicability:AllBasis:Thiscovershighandlowlakewaterlevelconditionsthatcouldbeprecursorsofmoreseriousevents.ThehighlakelevelisbaseduponthemaximumattainableuncontrolledlakewaterlevelasspecifiedintheFSAR.Thelowlevelisbasedonintakewaterlevelandcorrespondstothedesignminimumlakelevel.PEGReference(s):HU1.7BasisReference(s):1.FSARSection2.4.1.2and2.4.11.28.4.8AlertEarthquakefeltinplantbyanyoperatorANDNMP-2seismicinstrumentationindicates>0.075gNodeApplicability:AllMay1994Page89EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.4.5(Cont)Basis:ATTACHHENT1(Cont)ThisEALaddresseseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtoforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortoclassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.ThisEALisbasedontheFSARdesignoperatingbasisearthquakeof0.075g.Seismiceventsofthismagnitudecancausedamagetoplantsafetyfunctions.PEGReference(s):HAl.1BasisReference(s):1.'2-0P-90,SeismicHonitoring2.NUREG-1253TechnicalSpecificationsNineHilePointNuclearStations,UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,article3.3.7.2Hay1994Page90EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.4.6Alert)TTACHNENT))Ct)Sustainedwinds>90mphORTornadostrikesaplantvitalarea,Table8.4Table8.4PlantVitalAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGeneratorBuildingScreenwellBuilding/ServiceWaterPumpBaysCondensateStorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatmentBuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingNodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALaddresseseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtoforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortoclassification..NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.ThisEALisbasedontheFSARdesignbasisof90mph.Windloadsofthismagnitudecancausedamagetosafetyfunctions.NHP-1andNHP-2ProtectedAreaboundariesareillustratedinUSARFigure1.2-1.AlsoseeSEWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25,IssueNo.1,SiteFacilitiesLayoutStatusasof8/1/89.PEGReference(s):HA1.2Hay1994Page91EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.4.6(Cont)ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.FSAR3.3,WindandTornadoLoadings,Amendment262.FSARTable1.3-7,Amendment43.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-28.4.7AlertAssessmentbytheControlRoompersonnelthatanaturaleventhasresultedindamagetoequipmentneededforsafeplantoperation,Table8.4Table8.4PlantVitalAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAux.Bay'RadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGeneratorBuildingScreenwellBuilding/ServiceWaterPumpBaysCondensateStorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatmentBuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingNodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALaddresseseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtoforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurred'toplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortoclassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.ThisEALspecifiesareasinwhichstructurescontainingsystemsandfunctionsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplantarelocated.May1994Page92EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

8.4.7(Cont)PEGReference(s):HA1.3ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):1.USARFigure1.2-2StationArrangement2.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-28.4.8AlertLakewaterlevel>254ftORIntakewaterlevel<233ftNodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALaddresseseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtolevelsbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessment,priortoclassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.ThisEALcovershighandlowlakewaterlevelconditionsthatexceedlevelswhichthreatenvitalequipment.Thehighlakelevelisbaseduponthemaximumprobablefloodlevel.Thelowforebaywaterlevelcorrespondstotheminimumintakebaywaterlevelwhichprovidesadequatesubmergencetotheservicewaterpumps.PEGReference(s):HA1.7BasisReference(s):1.FSARSection2.4.5.22.FSARSection2.4.1.13.FSARSection9.2.5.3.1May1994Page93EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

9.0OTHERATTACHMENT1(Cont)TheEALsdefinedincategories1.0through8.0specifythepredeterminedsymptomsoreventswhichareindicativeofemergencyorpotentialemergencyconditions,andwhichwarrantclassification.WhiletheseEALshavebeendevelopedtoaddressthefullspectrumofpossibleemergencyconditionswhichmaywarrantclassificationandsubsequentimplementationoftheEmergencyPlan,aprovisionforclassificationofemergenciesbasedonoperator/managementexperienceandjudgmentisstillnecessary.TheEALsofthiscategoryprovidetheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirectorthelatitudetoclassifyemergencyconditionsconsistentwiththeestablishedclassificationcriteria,basedupontheirjudgment.E.l.l~ll11Anyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.NodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEAL.addressesunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergencyDirectortofallundertheUnusualEventemergencyclass.Fromabroadperspective,oneareathatmaywarrantSiteEmergencyDirectorjudgmentisrelatedtolikelyoractualbreakdownofsitespecificeventmitigatingactions.Examplestoconsiderincludeinadequateemergencyresponseprocedures,transientresponseeitherunexpectedornotunderstood,failureorunavailabilityofemergencysystemsduringanaccidentinexcessofthatassumedinaccidentanalysis,orinsufficientavailabilityofequipmentand/orsupportpersonnel.AnotherexampletoconsiderwouldbeexceedingaplantsafetylimitasdefinedinTechnicalSpecifications.PEGReference(s):HU5.1BasisReference(s):NoneMay1994Page94EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

9.1.2VusualEventATTACHMENT1(Cont)~Anyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoalossorpotentiallossofcontainment.NodeApplicability:Poweroperations,Startup/Hotstandby,HotShutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesanyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheSiteEmergencyDirectorindeterminingwhetherthecontainmentbarrierislostorpotentiallylost.Inaddition,theinabilitytomonitorthebarriershouldalsobeincorporatedinthisEALasafactorinEmergencyDirectorjudgmentthatthebarriermaybeconsideredlostorpotentiallylost.PEGReference(s):PC6.1BasisReference(s):None9.1.3AlertAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldcauseorhascausedactualsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.NodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergencyDirectortofallundertheAlertemergencyclass.May1994Page95EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

9.1.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):HA6.1ATTACHMENT1(Cont)BasisReference(s):None9.1.4AlertAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossorpotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrier.NodeApplicability:Poweroperations,Startup/Hotstandby,HotShutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesanyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheSiteEmergencyDirectorindeterminingwhetherthefuelcladorRCSbarriersarelostorpotentiallylost.Inaddition,theinabilitytomonitorthebarriersshouldalsobeconsideredinthisEALasafactorinEmergencyDirectorjudgmentthat'thebarriersmaybeconsideredlostorpotentiallylost.PEGReference(s):FC5,1RCS6.1BasisReference(s):NoneHay1994Page96EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

9.1.5SiteAreaEmerencATTACHMENT1(Cont)AsdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposureswhichexceedEPAPAGs.RodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergencyDirectortofallundertheemergencyclassdescriptionforSiteAreaEmergency.PEGReference(s):HS3.1BasisReference(s):None9.1.6SitereaEmerencAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldleadorhasledtoeither:LossorpotentiallossofbothfuelcladandRCSbarrierORLossorpotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierinconjunctionwithalossofcontainmentLossofcontainmentindicatorsmayinclude:~InconsistentorunexpectedLOCAresponse~RapidunexplaineddecreasefollowinginitialincreaseincontainmentpressureNodeApplicability:Poweroperations,Startup/Hotstandby,HotShutdownHay1994Page97EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

9.1.6(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT1(Cont)ThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsaffectingfissionproductbarrierswhicharenotaddressedexplicitly.elsewhere.DeclarationofanemergencyiswarrantedbecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergencyDirectortofallundertheemergencyclassdescriptionforSiteAreaEmergency.Rapidunexplainedlossofpressure(i.e.,notattributabletodrywellsprayorcondensationeffects)followinganinitialpressureincreaseindicatesalossofcontainmentintegrity.DrywellpressureshouldincreaseasaresultofmassandenergyreleaseintocontainmentfromaLOCA.Thus,drywellpressurenotincreasingundertheseconditionsindicatesalossofcontainmentintegrity.PEGReference(s):FC5.1RCS6.1PC6.1PC1.1PC1.29.1.7BasisReference(s):NoneGeneralEmerencAsdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorimminentcoredamageandthepotentialforalargereleaseofradioactivematerialinexcessofEPAPAGsoutsidethesiteboundary.NodeApplicability:AllBasis:ThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergencyDirectortobeconsistentwiththeGeneralEmergencyclassificationdescription.ReleasescanreasonablybeexpectedtoexceedEPAPAGplumeexposurelevelsoutsidethesiteboundary.May1994Page98EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

9.1.7(Cont)PEGReference(s):HG2.1STIACIINENT1(Ct)BasisReference(s):None9.1.8GeneralEmerencAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossofanytwofissionproductbarriersandlossorpotentiallossofthethird.Lossofcontainmentindicatorsmayinclude:~InconsistentorunexpectedLOCAresponseRapidunexplaineddecreasefollowinginitialincreaseincontainmentpressureNodeApplicability:Poweroperations,Startup/Hotstandby,HotShutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsaffectingfissionproductbarrierswhicharenotaddressedexplicitlyelsewhere.DeclarationofanemergencyiswarrantedbecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergencyDirectortofallundertheemergencyclassdescriptionfortheGeneralEmergencyclass.Rapidunexplainedlossofpressure(i.e.,notattributabletodrywellsprayorcondensationeffects)followinganinitialpressureincreaseindicatesalossofcontainmentintegrity.DrywellpressureshouldincreaseasaresultofmassandenergyreleaseintocontainmentfromaLOCA.Thus,drywellpressurenotincreasingundertheseconditionsindicatesalossofcontainmentintegrity.PEGReference(s):FC5.1RCS6.1PC6.1PC1.1PC1.2May1994Page99EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

9.1.8(Cont)BasisReference(s):NoneATTACHMENT1(Cont)May1994Page100EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

TTACHMENT2WORDLIST/DEFINITIONSMay1994Page101EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

ctuateATTACHMENT2(Cont)~Toputintooperation;tomovetoaction;commonlyusedtorefertoautomated,multi-facetedoperations."ActuateECCS".~dversarAsappliedtosecurityEALs,anindividualwhoseintentistocommitsabotage,disruptStationoperationsorotherwisecommitacrimeonstationproperty.deuateCoreCoolinHeatremovalfromthereactorsufficienttopreventrupturingthefuelclad.alertEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveanactualorpotentialsubstantialdegradationofthe'levelofsafetyoftheplant.AnyreleasesareexpectedtobelimitedtosmallfractionsoftheEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevels.~vailabieThestateorconditionofbeingreadyandabletobeused(placedintooperation)toaccomplishthestated(orimplied)actionorfunction.Asappliedtoasystem,thisrequirestheoperabilityofnecessarysupportsystems(electricalpowersupplies,coolingwater,lubrication,etc.).CanCannotbedeterminedThecurrentvalueorstatusofanidentifiedparameterrelativetothatspecifiedcan/cannotbeascertainedusingallavailableindications(directandindirect,singlyorincombination).CanCannotbemaintainedabovebelowThevalueoftheidentifiedparameter(s)is/isnotabletobekeptabove/belowspecifiedlimits.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturesystemperformanceinrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).Neitherimpliesthattheparametermustactuallyexceedthelimitbeforetheactionistakennorthattheactionmustbetakenbeforethelimitisreached.May1994Page102EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

ATTACHNENT2(Cont)CanCannotberestoredabovebelowThevalueoftheidentifiedparameter(s)is/isnotabletobereturnedtoabove/belowspecifiedlimitsafterhavingpassedthoselimits.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturesystemsperformancesinrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).Doesnotimplyanyspecifictimeintervalbutdoesnotpermitprolongedoperationbeyondalimitwithouttakingthespecifiedaction.Asappliedtolossofelectricalpowersources(ex.:Powercannotberestoredtoanyvitalbusin~4hrs)thespecifiedpowersourcecannotbereturnedtoservicewithinthespecifiedtime.Thisdeterminationincludesmaki,nganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturerestorationcapabilities.Impliesthatthedeclarationshouldbemadeassoonasthedeterminationismadethatthepowersourcecannotberestoredwithinthespecifiedtime.CloseTopositionavalveordampersoastopreventflowoftheprocessfluid.Tomakeanelectricalconnectiontosupplypower.ConfirmConfirmatioTovalidate,throughvisualobservationorphysicalinspection,thatanassumedconditionisasexpectedorrequired,withouttakingactiontoalterthe"asfound"configuration.ControlTakeaction,asnecessary,tomaintainthevalueofaspecifiedparameterwithinapplicablelimits;tofixoradjustthetime,amount,orrateof;toregulateorrestrict.DecreaseTobecomeprogressivelylessinsize,amount,number,orintensity.~0fschareRemovalofafluid/gasfromavolumeorsystem.May1994Page103EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

~0rel1STTACHNENT(Ct)ThatcomponentoftheBWRprimarycontainmentwhichhousestheRPVandassociatedpiping.EnterTogointo.EstablishToperformactionsnecessarytomeetastatedcondition.EstablishcommunicationwiththeControlRoom."EvacuateToremovethecontentsof;toremovepersonnelfromanarea.ExceedsTogoorbebeyondastatedorimpliedlimit,measure,ordegree.EstTo"havebeingwithrespecttounderstoodlimitationsorconditions.FailureAstateofinabilitytoperformanormalfunction.GeneralEmerencEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorimminentsubstantialcoredegradationormeltingwithpotentialforlossofcontainmentintegrity.ReleasescanbereasonablyexpectedtoexceedEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevelsoffsiteformorethantheimmediatesitearea.Hay1994Page104EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

STTACIIMENT2(Ct)Logictermwhichindicatesthattakingtheactionprescribediscontingentuponthecurrentexistenceofthestatedcondition(s).Iftheidentifiedconditionsdonotexist,theprescribedactionisnottobetakenandexecutionofoperatoractionsmustproceedpromptlyinaccordancewithsubsequentinstructions.IncreaseTobecomeprogressivelygreaterinsize,amount,numberorintensity.IndicateTopointoutorpointto;todisplaythevalueofaprocessvariable;tobeasignorsymbol.~IitiateTheactofplacingequipmentorasystemintoservice,eithermanuallyorautomatically.Activationofafunctionorprotectivefeature(i.e.initiateamanualscram).InectionTheactofforcingaTluidintoavolumeorvessel.IntrusionTheactofenteringwithoutauthorizationLossFailureofoperabilityorlackofaccessto.NaintainTakeaction,asnecessary,tokeepthevalueofthespecifiedparameterwithintheapplicablelimits.Nay1994Page105EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

STTACIIMfNT2(CtiNaximumSafe0eratinarameterThehighestvalueoftheidentifiedoperatingparameterbeyondwhich,requiredpersonnelaccessorcontinuedoperationofequipmentimportanttosafetycannotbeassured.NonitorObserveandevaluateatafrequencysufficienttoremainapprisedofthevalue,trend,andrateofchangeofthespecifiedparameter.got~ifTogivenoticeoforreporttheoccurrenceof;tomakeknownto;toinformspecifiedpersonnel;toadvise;tocommunicate;tocontact;torelay.~0enTopositionavalveordampersoastoallowflowoftheprocessfluid.Tobreakanelectricalconnectionwhichremovesapowersupplyfromanelectricaldevice.Tomakeavailableforentryorpassagebyturningback,removing,orclearingaway.~eeeableAbletoperformit'sintendedfunctionPerformTocarryoutanaction;toaccomplish;toaffect;toreachanobjective.PrimarContainmentTheairtightvolumeimmediatelyadjacenttoandsurroundingtheRPV,consistingofthedrywellandwetwellinaBWRplant.PrimarSsteThepipes,valves,andotherequipmentwhichconnectdirectlytotheRPVorreactorcoolantsystemsuchthatareductioninRPVpressurewilleffectadecreaseinthesteamorwaterbeingdischargedthroughanunisolatedbreakinthesystem.Nay1994Page106EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

RemoveATTACHMENT2(Cont)Tochangethelocationorpositionof.eortTodescribeasbeinginaspecificstate.lLeeufreTodemandasnecessaryoressential.RestoreTaketheappropriateactionrequirestoreturnthevalueofanidentifiedparametertowithinapplicablelimits.RiseDescribesanincreaseinaparameterastheresultofanoperatororautomaticaction.~SamleToperformananalysisonaspecifiedmediatodetermineitsproperties.ScramTotakeactiontocauseshutdownofthereactorbyrapidlyinsertingacontrolrodorcontrolrods(BWR).SecondarContainmentTheairtightvolumeimmediatelyadjacenttoorsurroundingtheprimarycontainmentinaBWRplant.ShutdownToperformoperationsnecessarytocauseequipmenttoceaseorsuspendoperation;tostop."Shutdownunnecessaryequipment."May1994Page107EPMP-EPP-0102Rev00

ShutdownATTACHHENT2(Cont)AsappliedtotheBWRreactor,subcriticalwithreactorpowerbelowtheheatingrange.SiteAreaEmerencEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorlikelymajorfailuresofplantfunctionsneededforprotectionofthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposurelevelswhichexceedEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevelsexceptnearthesiteboundary.SuressonoolThevolumeofwaterinaBWRplantintendedtocondensesteamdischargedfromaprimarysystembreakinsidethedrywell.SustainedProlonged.NotintermittentoroftransitorynatureTode-energizeapumporfanmotor;topositionabreakersoastointerruptorpreventtheflowofcurrentintheassociatedcircuit;tomanuallyactivateasemi-automaticfeature.UnavailableNotabletoperformit'sintendedfunctionUcontrolledAnevolutionlackingcontrolbutisnottheresultofoperatoraction.~U1anedNotasanexpectedresultofdeliberateaction.UntilIndicatesthattheassociatedprescribedactionistoproceedonlysolongastheidentifiedconditiondoesnotexist.Hay1994Page108EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

UnusualEvetATTACHHENT2(Cont).Eventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichindicateapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Noreleasesofradioactivematerialrequiringoffsiteresponseormonitoringareexpectedunlessfurtherdegradationofsafetysystemsoccurs.ValidSupportedorcorroboratedonasoundbasis.entToopenaneffluent(exhaust)flowpathfromanenclosedvolume;toreducepressureinanenclosedvolume.~VerifToconfirmaconditionand-takeactiontoestablishthatconditionifrequired.Verifyreactortrip."Iti11Anyplantareawhichcontainsvitalequipment.Hay1994Page109EPHP-EPP-0102Rev00

IL~'I0-,NIKP-2EmergencyActionLevelsCategory1.0ReactorFuelCategory2.0ReactorPressureVesselCategory3.0PrimaryContainmentCategory4.0SecondaryContainmentCategory5.0RadioactivityReleaseCategory6.0ElecrticalFailuresCategory7.0EquipmentFailuresCategory8.0HazardsCategory9.0Other6/20/94

1.0ReactorFuel1.1CoolantActivity1.1.1UnusualEventCategory1.0ReactorFuel1.0ReactorFuel12Off-gasActivity1.2.1UnusualEventCoolantactivity>0.2pCi/gmI-131equivalentor>100EbarpCi/gmValidofFgasradiationhighalarm(at>DRMSred)for>15min.1.1.2AlertCoolantactivity>800pCi/gmI-131equivalentPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown1-2 e

Category1.0ReactorFuel1.0ReactorFuel18ContaimnentRadiation1.3.1AlertDrywellarearadiation>41R/hrPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown1.8.2SiteAreaEmergencyDrywellarearadiation28100R/hrPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown1.8.8GeneralEmergencyDrywellarearadiationt5.2E6R/hrPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown1.0ReactorFuel1.4OtherRadiationMonitors1.4.1UnusualEventAnysustainedARMreading>100xDRMShighradiationalarm(red)oroffscalehigh(DETECTORSATURATION)resultingfromanuncontrolledprocessALL1.4.2AlertValidreadingonRxBldg.aboveRefuelingFloorRadiationMonitor2HVR*HE14AorB,GaseousRadiationMonitors(Channel1)isolationORAnysustainedrefuelQoorradmonitor>8.0R/hr,Table1.11.4.8AlertSustainedarearadiationlevels)15mR/hrineither:ControlRoomORCentralAlarmStationandSecondaryAlarmStation1-3

Category1.0ReactorFuel1.0ReactorFuel1.4OtherRadiationMonitors1.4.4Alert1.0ReactorFuel1.6RefuelingAccidents1.6.1UnusualEventSustainedarearadiationlevels>8R/hrinanyareas,Table1.2ANDAccessisrequiredforsafeoperationorshutdownSpentfuelpooVreactorcavitywaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintainedabovethespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelalarmTable1.1RefuelFloorRadMonitorsARMRMS111,RB354'estSpentFuelPoolARMRMS112,RB354'astofSpentFuelPool1.6.2AlertImminentorreportofactualobservationofirradiatedfueluncoveredTable1.2PlantSafetFunctionAreasControlBuildingNormalSwitchgearBuildingSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGeneratorBuildingScreenwellBuilding/ServiceWaterPumpBayCondensateStorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatmentBuilding

Category2.0ReactorPressureVessel2.0ReactorPressureVessel2.1RPVWaterLevel2.1.1UnusualEvent2.0ReactorPressureVessel2.2ReactorPower/ReactivityControl2%1AlertUnidentifieddrywellleakage>10gpmORReactorcoolanttodrywellidentifiedleakage>25gpmPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown2.1.2SiteAreaEmergencyRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained>-14in.(TAF)PowerOperation,Startup/HotStandby,HotShutdown,ColdShutdown,RefuelAllimmediatemanualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby2.2.2SiteAreaEmergencyAllimmediatemanualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDBoroninjectionisrequiredPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby2.1.8GeneralEmergencyPrimaryContainmentFloodingrequiredPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown2.2.8GeneralEmergencyAllimmediatemanualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained>-89in.Poweroperat'ion,startup/hotstandby

Category2.0ReactorPressureVessel2.0ReactorPressureVessel2.2ReactorPower/ReactivityControl2.2.4GeneralEmergencyAllimmediatemanualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDSuppressionpooltemperatureandRPVpressurecannotbemaintainedcHCTLPoujeroperation,startup)hotstandby

Category8.0PrimaryContainment3.0PrimaryContainment3.1ContainmentPressure3.1.1AlertPrimarycontainmentpressurecannotbemaintained<1.68psigduetocoolantleakagePoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown8.0PrimaryContainment3.2SuppressionPoolTemperature3.2.1SiteAreaEmergencyRPVpressureandsuppressionpooltemperaturecannotbemaintained<HCTL(non-ASS)Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown8.1.2SiteAreaEmergencyPrimarycontainmentpressurecannotbemaintained<1.68psigANDCoolantactivity>800pCi/gmPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown8.1.8GeneralEmergencyPrimarycontainmentventingisrequiredduetoPCPLPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown3-1

Category8.0PrimaryContainment8.0PrimaryContainment3.8CombustibleGasConcentration3.8.1SiteAreaEmergency>4%H2existsinDWorsuppressionchamber8.0PrimaryContainment8.4ContainmentIsolationStatus8.4.1SiteAreaEmergencyMainSteamLine,RCICsteamlineorRWCUisolationfailureresultinginareleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainment.8.8.2GeneralEmergencyPrimarycontainmentventingisrequiredduetocombustiblegasconcentrationsPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown3.4.2GeneralEmergencyMainSteamLine,RCICsteamlineorRWCUisolationfailureresultinginareleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainmentANDany:~Coolantactivity>800p,Ci/gmI-131equivalent~RPVwaterlevel<-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation)8100R/hrPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown3-2

Category4.0SecondaryContainment4.0SecondaryContainment4.1ReactorBuildingTemperature4.1.1SiteAreaEmergency4.0SecondaryContainment4.2ReactorBuildingRadiationLevel4.2.1SiteAreaEmergencyPrimarysystemisdischargingoutsidePCANDRBareatemperaturesare>maximumsafeoperatinglevelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC,RRPoweroperation,startuplhotstandby,hotshutdownPrimarysystemisdischargingoutsidePCANDRBarearadiationlevelsare>maximumsafeoperatinglevelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC,RRPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown4.12GeneralEmergencyPrimarysystemisdischargingoutsidePCANDRBareatemperaturesare>maximumsafeoperatinglevelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC,RRANDany:~Coolantactivity>800pCi/gmI-131equivalent~RPVwaterlevel(-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation>8100R/hr4.2.2GeneralEmergencyPrimarysystemisdischargingoutsidePCANDRBarearadiationlevelsare>maximumsafeoperatinglevelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC,RRANDany:~Coolantactivity>800pCi/gmI-131equivalent~RPVwaterlevel(-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation>8100R/hrPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdownPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown

Category6.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation6.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.1EQluentMonitors6.1.1UnusualEventAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"UE"for>60min.6.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation6.2DoseProjections/EnvironmentalMeasurements/ReleaseRates6.2.1UnusualEventConfirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>2xtechnicalspecificationslimitsfor>60min.6.1.2AlertAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"Alert"for>15min.5.2.2AlertConfirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>200xtechnicalspecificationslimitsfor>15min.5.1.3SiteAreaEmergencyAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"SAE"for>15min.6.2.3AlertDoseprojectionsorfieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"Alert"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.5-1

Category6.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation6.2DoseProjections/EnvironmentalMeasurements/ReleaseRates6.2.4SiteAreaEmergencyDoseprojectionsorfieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"SAE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.6.2.6GeneralEmergencyDoseprojectionsorfieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"GE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.

e Category6.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiationMonitorTable5.1EffluentMonitorClassificationThresholdsRadWaste/ReactorBldg.VentEffluent2xGEMSalarmMainStackEffluent2xGEMSalarm200xGEMSalarm200xGEMSalarm%.5E6p,Ci/sN/AN/AN/AServiceWaterEffluentLiquidRadWasteEffluentCoolingTowerBlowdown2xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)N/A2xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)N/A2xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)N/AN/AN/AN/ATable5.2DoseProection/Env.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsGETEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThoidrate10mRN/A10mR/hrN/A100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hr5-3

ElectricalFailures6.0ElectricalFailures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.1UnusualEventLossofpowerfor>15min.toall:~ReserveTransformerA~ReserveTransformerB~AuxiliaryBoilerTransformer6.0ElectricalFailures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.4SiteAreaEmergencyLossofallemergencybusACpowerfor>15min.Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown6.1.5GeneralEmergency6.1.2AlertLossofallemergencybusACpowerfor>15min.Coldshutdown,refuel6.1.8AlertAvailableemergencybusACpowerreducedtoonly'neofthefollowingsourcesfor>15min.:~ReserveTransformerA~ReserveTransformerB~AuxiliaryBoilerTransformer~2EGS*EG1~2EGS*EG2~2EGS*EG3LossofallemergencybusACpowerANDeither:Powercannotberestoredtoanyemergencybusin<2hrsORRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained>-14in.(TAF)Poweroperation,startupIhotstandby,hotshutdownPoweroperation,st'artup(hotstandby,hotshutdown

Category6.0ElectricalFailures6.0ElectricalFailures6.2LossofDCPowerSources6.2.1UnusualEvent<105vdcon2BYS*BAT2AandBfor>15min.Coldshutdown,Refuel6.2,2SiteAreaEmergency<105vdcon2BYS*BAT2AandBfor>15min.Poweroperation,startuplhotstandby,hotshutdown

EquipmentFailures7.0EquipmentFailuresV.1TechnicalSpeci6cationXRequirements7.1.1UnusualEventPlantisnotbroughttorequiredoperatingmodewithinTechnicalSpecificationsLCOActionStatementTime.Poweroperation,startup(hotstandby,hotshutdown7.0EquipmentFailuresV.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuationV.2.1UnusualEventReportofmainturbinefailureresultingincasingpenetrationordamagetoturbinesealsorgeneratorseals.Poweroperation,startup)hotstandby,hotshutdown7.2.2AlertControlRoomevacuation7.2.3AlertReactorcoolanttemperaturecannotbemaintained(200'FColdshutdown,refuel7-1

7.0EquipmentFailures7.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation7.2.4SiteAreaEmergencyCategoryV.OEquipmentFailuresV.OEquipmentFailures7.8LossofIndications/Alarm/CommunicationCapabilityV.8.1UnusualEventControlRoomevacuationANDControlofcorecoolingsystemscannotbeestablishedin515min.Unplannedlossofannunciatorsorindicatorsonanyofthefollowingpanelsfor>15min.:~2CEC*PNL601~2CEC*PNL602~2CEC*PNL603~2CEC*PNL852~2CEC*PNL851Poweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown7.8.2UnusualEventLossofallcommunicationscapabilityaffectingtheabilitytoeither:PerformroutineonsiteoperationsORNotifyoQsiteagenciesorpersonnel7-2

Category7.0EquipmentFailures7.0EquipmentFailuresV.8LossofIndications/Alarm/CommunicationCapabilityV.8.8AlertUnplannedlossofannunciatorsorindicatorsonanyofthefollowingpanelsfor>15min.:~2CEC*PNL601~2CEC*PNL602~2CEC*PNL603~2CEC*PNL852~2CEC*PNL851ANDIncreasedsurveillanceisrequiredforsafeplantoperationANDeither:PlanttransientinprogressORPlantcomputerandSPDSareunavailablePoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown7.0EquipmentFailures7.8LossofIndications/Alarm/CommunicationCapability7.8.4SiteAreaEmergencyLossofannunciatorsorindicatorsonanyofthefollowingpanels:~2CEC*PNL601~2CEC*PNL6022CEC*PNL603~2CEC*PNL852~2CEC*PNL851ANDPlantcomputerandSPDSareunavailableANDIndicationstomonitorallRPVandprimarycontainmentEOPparametersarelostANDPlanttransientisinprogressPoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown7-3

Category8.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.1SecurityThreats8.1.1UnusualEvent8.0Hazards8.2FireorExylosion8.2.1UnusualEventBombdeviceorotherindicationofattemptedsabotagediscoveredwithinplantProtectedAreaConfirmedfireinanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3,notextinguishedin<15min.ofControlRoomnotification8.12AlertIntrusionintoplantProtectedAreabyanadversary8.2.2AlertFireorexplosioninanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3,whichresultsindamagetoplantequipmentorstructuresneededforsafeplantoperation8.1.3SiteAreaEmergencyIntrusionintoaplantsecurityvitalareabyanadversary8.1.4GeneralEmergencySecurityeventwhichresultsin:LossofplantcontrolfromtheControlRoomANDLossofremoteshutdowncapability8-1

Category8.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.8Man-MadeEvents8.3.1UnusualEvent8.0Hazards8.3Man-MadeEvents8.8.4AlertVehiclecrashintoorprojectilewhichimpactsplantstructuresorsystemswithinProtectedAreaboundaryVehiclecrashorprojectileimpactwhichprecludespersonnelaccesstoordamagesequipmentinplantvitalareas,Table8.38.3.2UnusualEventReportbyplantpersonnelofanexplosionwithinProtectedAreaboundaryresultinginvisibledamagetopermanentstructuresorequipment8.3.5AlertReportordetectionoftoxicorflammablegaseswithinaplantvitalarea,Table8.3,inconcentrationsthatwillbelifethreateningtoplantpersonnelorprecludeaccesstoequipmentneededforsafeplantoperation8.3.3UnusualEventReportordetectionofareleaseoftoxicorflammablegasesthatcouldenterorhaveenteredwithintheProtectedAreaboundaryinamountsthatcouldaffectthehealthofplantpersonnelorsafeplantoperationORReportbylocal,countyorstateofBcialsforpotentialevacuationofsitepersonnelbasedonoffsiteevent8-2

Category8.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.1UnusualEvent8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.4UnusualEventEarthquakefeltinplantbyanyoperatorANDeither:NMP-2seismicinstrumentationactuatedORConarmationofearthquakereceivedonNMP-1orJAFNPPseismicinstrumentationLakewaterlevel>248ftORIntakewaterlevel<237ft8.4.5Alert8.4.2UnusualEventReportbyplantpersonneloftornadostrikingwithinplantProtectedAreaboundaryEarthquakefeltinplantbyanyoperatorANDNMP-2seismicinstrumentationindicates)0.075gAll8.4.6Alert8.4.3UnusualEventAssessmentbyControlRoompersonnelthatanaturaleventhasoccurredprecludingaccesstoaplantvitalarea,Table8.3Sustainedwinds)90mphORTornadostrikesaplantvitalarea,Table8.38-3

Category8.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.7AlertAssessmentbytheControlRoompersonnelthatanaturaleventhasresultedindamagetoequipmentneededforsafeplantoperation,Table8.38.4.8AlertLakewaterlevel)264ftORIntakewaterlevelc288ft8-4

HazardsTable8.2PlantAreas~ServiceBuilding~115KVSwitchyard~345KVSwitchyardTable8.3PlantVitalAreas~SouthAux.Bay~NorthAux.Bay~RadWasteBuilding~ReactorBuilding~TurbineBuilding~DieselGeneratorBuilding~ScreenwellBuilding/ServiceWaterPumpBays~CondensateStorageTanksBuilding~StandbyGasTreatmentBuilding~ControlBuilding~Unit2SecurityBuilding8-5

Category9.0Other9.0Other9.1.1UnusualEvent9.0Other9.1.4AlertAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Anyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossorpotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrier.Poweroperation,startuplhotstandby,hotshutdown9.1dUnusualEvent9.1.6SiteAreaEmergencyAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoalossorpotentiallossofcontainment.Poweroperation,startupIhotstandby,hotshutdownAsdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposureswhichexceedEPAPAGs.9.1.3AlertAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiRSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldcauseorhascausedactualsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.

Category9.0Other9.0Other9.1.6SiteAreaEmergencyAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiRSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldleadorhasledtoeither:LossorpotentiallossofbothfuelcladandRCSbarrierORLossorpotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierinconjunctionwithalossofcontainmentLossofcontainmentindicatorsmayinclude:~InconsistentorunexpectedLOCAresponse~RapidunexplaineddecreasefollowinginitialincreaseincontainmentpressurePoweroperation,startup/hotstandby,hotshutdown9.0Other9.1.8GeheralEmergencyAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossofanytwofissionproductbarriersandlossorpotentiallossofthethird.Lossofcontaizunentindicatorsmayinclude:InconsistentorunexpectedLOCAresponse~RapidunexplaineddecreasefollowinginitialincreaseincontainmentpressurePoweroperation,startupfhotstandby,hotshutdown9.1.VGeneralEmergencyAsdeterminedbytheShiRSupervisororSiteEmergencyDirector,eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorimminentcoredamageandthepotentialforalargereleaseofradioactivematerialinexcessofEPAPAGsoutsidethesiteboundary.

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2NMP-2EALVeriQcatton&ValidationReport,Rev.0ErnerencActionLevelV==-'cationRValidationReortRevision0NewYorkPowerAuthoriJ.A,FitzpatrickNuclearPowerPlantIndianPointNuclearPowerPlantUnit3NiaraMohawkPowerCoorationNineMilePointUnit1NineMilePointUnit2ConsolidatedEdisonComanIndianPointStationUnit2RochesterGasandElectricComanR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerStationOperationsSupportServices,Inc.233WaterStreet2r.dFloorPlymouth,MA02360 eI OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2NMP-2EALVeriQcatfon&ValidationReport,Rev.0TableofContentsSection~Pae1Introduction...................,....,......,.....~~~t~~otto~~otooooeootoesososooooo~o~o~oooottotoottoto12.Preparations~~o~oo~~~~~~~~~o~~s~o~~~~eoo~~~~~eoo~~~oooo~~~~etto~~et~e~e~~s~oooto~~ettoo~otoo~e~ootoooottooteoo~13.Process~oooeoooosoooooooooooooooeoooooo43.1VerificationActivities,.......,........,.................................,.........,............,...43~2ValidationActivities~.....~..~..,....,........,...~.,.......,..................,.............54CommentResolution....,......,......,........,...................................................................95References...~~~~o~ooooeotooo~eeoooooeo~ooooosoooooo9Attachment1EALVerlfjcat;osChecklists11Attachment2EALVerificationCommentDatabase..~~~~~~~o~~~o~o~~o~o~~~~~o~o~~~o~o~~o~~~to~Attachment3Ef.in~~<n~-curiosALValidaiio~n>arios31Attachment4EALpQ.~own~ni~rC4csi-c.VamationS,pia~rSh4-Attachment5EALValidationL.-.c:ciseChecklists...........................................................................5-1Attachment6EALnA1s1131AValidatict..0:...",:cntDatabase.................................,.........................................6-1

OSSI93-402A-'.*-'",!."NMP-2EALVerificatio&ValidationReport,Rev.01.Introduc'nTheverificat'~:".processwasperformedtoensuretheNMP-2EmergencyActionLevel."-'L';)andclassificationproceduresarewrittencorrectlyandaretechnica!i,.:.:...'cct.TheNMP-2EALverificationwasconductedpriortotheEALvalic';:-;"..'onexercises.VerificationactivitieswerecompletedaccordingtoRc"c:.encel.ThevalidationpiocesswasperformedtoensurethattheNMP-2EALsandclassificationproceduresareusableandoperationallycorrect,andtoensurethatresponse!,'ien.ei.gencyresponseorganizationpersonnelareabletoarriveatco:-.'.-.=!,ctt.'LerpretationsofEALsundervaryingconditions.TheNMP-2EAL...:..;...;;,.;exerciseswereconductedonOctober7,1993attheNineMilePoi'".:..;.'.iningCenterNMP-2controlroomsimulator.Validationactivitieswcioi..:piet.edaccordingtoReference2.TheNMP-2E!4.vc..ification/validationwasoneofsixverification/validationsconductedbyCSS!ateachofthesixparticipatingplantsintheNYPAEALUpgradePre)".".~.2.P~reareal"",.sMr.C,K,W.".",":("SR?)wasassignedEALverificationandvalidationteamleader.For..'.'.,~-;,;;.ication,hewasresponsiblefor:~Det.'"-'.:-".;-;.gtheextenttowhichtheEALdocumentationisverii::*...~Scl".,".:.:..:g'.=.".,mmemberstoconductEALverificationreviews.

OSSI93-402A-"':NMP-2EALVerification&ValidationReport,Rev.0~Providingappropriatesourcedocumentssoteammemberscancon;!::ctvciificationreviews.~Coo:.;..'.-.nt;.-:<resolutionstoanyverificationreviewcomments.~Coor".:--",.!:.:gupdateofEALprogramdocumentationconsistentwith!.i.::r=solutionofverificationreviewcomments.~Deter:~iiningtheextenttowhicheachselectedEALisvalidated.ForEALvalid.:o>>,Mr'.Walkerwasresponsiblefor:~Selec"..~,<<'c:-.mmemberstoparticipateasvalidationexerciseob"-e.",.:.s;handasemergencyresponseorganizationpersonnelduin;",EA!.validationexercises.~Prepar::;<..validationexercisetestplanandschedule.(EALsselectdI;:rvalidationaredocumentedontheValidationSummarySheetwhichservedasthevalidationtestplan.)~Ob'..":,;...'.gappropriatescenariostotestemergencyresponseorg:;r.=:;t.i.",classificationactivitieswhileusingtheEALs.~Coor;i::-~at.:;igresolutionstovalidationexercisecomments.~Coorlnat,ingupdateofEALprogramdocumentationconsistentwi'..'..!,".crsoIiitionofvalidationexercisecomments.Mr.J.P.St.-"...:,2=::.-"i)wasassignedtotheverificationteamandwasresponsible.~;~Beco:>,."g'anliliarwithappropriateverificationsourcedocumentsandthcNMP-2EALstobeverified.~Pe:.'"..r....::."assignedEALverificationreviews.

OSSI93-402P.-:NMP-2EALVer1Qcatton&ValfdationReport,Rev.0~Complcf.ingverificationchecklistsfortechnicalaccuracyandwr!.'.".:".c,.rrcctnessreviews.~As.".'<nthcpreparationofresolutionstoverificationreviewcori!ie!!ts.Mr.M.C.D,.:.;(<<.";:S.')andMr.J.Toothaker(NMPC)wereassignedEALvalidationexe!ciseobservers,Theywereresponsiblefor:~Beco'..ingfamiliarwithappropriateNMP-2EALdevelopmentdo.,:..-..;..'.sandtheEALstobevalidated.~OL.-..:emergencyresponseorganizationparticipantsusingthe.EAl.."..v.'ii.crespondingtosimulatedemergencyevents.Comp.'.i:".gthevalidationexercisechecklists~Ass.',',r!ginthepreparationofresolutionstovalidationexercisecoaa~isSeveralme:"...'.::".l.h"NMP-2operationstrainingstaffwerealsoassignedtothevalid...:!;.t.oplaytheroleofemergencyresponseorganizationpositions.Th:".':n,.mcsandtitlesarelistedontheEALValidationSummarysheets(Atta"..l.:.'.c:.t4).Theywereresponsiblefor:~Bcc".:..',:pfa!:..iliarwiththeEALstobevalidated.~Us.:'.'.'"<<PLswhilerespondingtosimulatedemergencyevents.~Con':.'.e~ingthevalidationexercisechecklists.

OSSI93-402h-!"-"':i.-?NMP-2EAI.VeriQcation&ValidationReport,Rev.03.Proces~3.1Verificaf1onActivitiesThetechnic",1:.;.""...:..","..yandwrittencorrectnessoftheupgradedEALswereverifiedthrc;-.'.f.'..-i-'opreviewswhichaddressedthefollowingEALattributes:WritenCorrectnessHum"ncn<inccringfactorsoftheEALWriter'sGuideFo.-..'...,..:.":::.anceandterminologyconsistent,totheextentpos..ihlc.a...on<BWRandPWRplantsinvolvedintheNYPAEALUp~-..-;cfc.:ojectEALc:f:-ii'ALterminologyisclearandwelldefinedTechnicalAccuracTc.".!.:;:::;.".,o:".-l',;letenessandappropriatenessforeachclassificationlcv".'o'...'"":.'.:"';nssificationupgradeonlywhenthereisanincreasedth1'::::;-...!-.:.chealthandsafetyLog",al=.r)<:essioninclassificationforcombinationsofmultipleeventsCon".~tcncyof'ALs,totheextentpossible,amongBWRandPWR1nyp1le(~iI~iabTheEALsv;.'.:.",."::.".*.cdintermsoftheevaluationcriteriaembodiedinthechecklistsf:.'c"h:::calaccuracyandwrittencorrectness(Attachments1and2ofRc"..-..:"..'1.KALverificationreviewsfortechnicalaccuracyandwrittencorr:;:!.."."..a~ereaccomplishedbyacomparativeTable-Topevaluationc:';,h('";:Giving:

OSSI93-402A-'MP-2EALVeriAcation&ValidationReport,Rev.0~Wri!'cn,'.cctnessoftheEALsincludinghumanfactorsguidanceof'.;.'...>>.rater'sguide.~Tec!~nicalaccuracyoftheEALscomparedtotheEALTechnicalBas..1'.=,:-isionProductBarrierEvaluation,Plant-SpecificEALGu-i'..;:.F.h.LBinningDocument,andNUMARCNESP-007,Rev.'.'"='..'.".c!udingNUMARC/NRCQuestionsandAnswers).~Co...pat.i!..!yoftheEALswiththeplant.~Nu:.;"ri:,".':v'.1pcs,quantitativeandcalculatedinformation.TheWalk-th.'"n.c'.!'.odofverificationwasperformedduringEALvalidationwherenece."":",::.'.fcrencestoequipment,indicationsandinstrument"'-.nw";"checkedagainstcontrolroomhardwareasrepresented;t'.;;..':>...i1atorcontrolroom.Verificationrvic>>,"swereperformedusingtheapplicablesectionsoftheEALverifical.:.".nc1"..".cklists(Attachment1).Alldiscrepanciesweredocumented'n':".',Co::amentFormsintheEALVerificationCommentDatabase.A'i~.'o.:to!thisdatabaseisprovidedinAttachment2.3.2Valid~".D'.;.'.'i:i."sTheusabilit~andc-"rationalcorrectnessoftheupgradedEALswerevalidatedt!."u~>'...:".,c;.>>ationofemergencyresponseorganizationpersonnelrespondin<:,=..'....;',=":..emergencyeventsusingthe$UiLs.ThegroupofEALsselect:..'.'......:;".:".ionweresufficientlyrepresentativetotestthattheEALsposse'.;"~h~,;",.:n<attributes:Usabili'~aif'ii"'1'iqpqsEca'-"oi.)~"e'deriding

OSSI93-402P-':-.'iNMP-2EALVeriAcation&ValidationReport,Rev.0~Easeofplace-keeping~Ea.";;of;:".,:.:!-:nganddeclassifying~Oerati",-'...',-.:-,c"~,.sessPol..':"..;=classificationupgradeonlywhenthereisanincreasedthre.".i:t.o".::blichealthandsafetyTeel:;;i"::."o:...pletenessandappropriatenessforeachclassificationieqpnlP.i':"."';'-~,:".ssioninclassificationforcombinationsofmultipleev...EALsnotsei'.".;;.".::.;.;-.!idationwerecomparedtothevalidationchecklistcriteriaatL>;.eco..".lisionofthevalidationexercises.TheEALsw..:."~;~.:..'.!atedintermsoftheevaluationcriteriaembodiedinthechecklistfor".,A!.;.'.,Iuation.EALvalidationexerciseswereconductedusingtheTable-T-"".!..".'.!~adandtheSimulatormethod.Scenariosweredeveloped"....:.:.".t:".cperformanceoftheTable-TopandSimulatormethodsof'-.::...;.::(h.t.tachment3).Thescenariosprovidedthemeansforvalidatic"':...:-.observerstoviewemergencyresponseorganizationpersonnelc"...'.8'.i.".gtheEALsforproperemergencyclassification.Intheclas.;.;".>>"..::.":..hersoftheEALvalidationteamwereintroducedtotheupgrac!,,*I.eteamleader.Classificationcategoriesandsubcatego..:',:.scussedaswerethetechnicalbasisforindividualEALconditions.'..-..I'.ofamiliarizeallvalidationteamparticipantswiththeconten'.'...;:..".Lsandtheirrelationshiptotheexistingclassificai.i;".::.".s.Membersofthevalidationteamwerealsobriefedonthevali;i'.;.:..:cessdescribedinReference2.CopiesoftheupgradedEALsweren:.;!ci.!l.bletoteammembersduringthevalidationexercises.TheEALv"-."inAttach:.wereperf.':lanisgivenontheEALValidationSummarySheets...hEALvalidationscenario,thefollowingactivities

OSSI93402sNMP-2EALVerillcation&ValidationReport,Rev.01.Tl..vali.!..'.Ionteammembersassumedtheemergencyresponseo:.,."..'.;lestheywereexpectedtofulfillduringanactual2.Tl'".'.'":.,'crdescribedtheinitialplantconditions.3.Wl~:-.;i'..c:.gcncyresponseorganizationpersonnelwerefamiliarw".r::-..::!.i.;.!~"lentconditions,theteamleaderannouncedthestartoft1-."..:..a:.;c:;crciseanddescribedchangesinkeyplantp",."-:-':-!!'".rtheTable-Topmethod)orheinstructedthes'...,.'.."..iinstructortoplacethesimulatorinRUN(fortheS"."!".:.cri're'.bod).4.Th~".c'<.-.'.cyresponseorganizationpersonneldescribedtheac'...;..sLheywouldperform(fortheTable-Topmethod)ortheyn.=--.-'.'"..'-.".>>roprlateplantcontrolsinthesimulatorasneededto.:<..'""...".angingplantconditions(fortheSimulator5,Tl"...,.;.,;,"."responseorganizationpersonnelconsultedtheup:.:.'.!'...~'.I'.saccordingtoEmergencyPlanproceduresandmadea;"...';..siiications.6.T.'--".".:.""-rversoccasionalyaskedquestionsoftheemergencyrc,.'.-..'::stionpersonnelduringtheexercise.7P7~"..".tconditionswerereached,thevalidationteam:theexerciseandheldapostscenariobriefing~~~"".:;i.-...":.ibersjointlydiscussedproblemsandcomments!:"...<theexercise.

OSSI93-402"-'MP-2EALVeriilcation&ValidationReport,Rev.0~".'".".:nn~c>>bcrsjointlycompletedtheEALValidationExercise~"""..1.'-'-t~(h.ttachment5)..:.sonsfornotedproblemsandcommentswere')i;."cases,portionsoralloftheexercisewere..."...:"=!togainabetterperspectiveofnotedproblemsc~n'.CC':lnlellts.Thevalidatic"'."">>>",".dciensuredthefollowinginformationwasrecordedoneachV,",.':....:".eChecldist:tVa"."..n".ammembernamesandtitlesEA'.!:.-".!ionnumberofEALsvalidatedSce:"":sc'...-~ripe,ionVai-',.'.,:n,.'.hadFollowinge"'....-'",.::::;.riobriefing,teammemberscomparedobservatio.",';..'..cdifanyproblemsandcommentsnotedthusfarrequiredn"".:"!'.~etestplantoachievevalidationobjectives.Whenallv-"'".'.,"r".scswerecompleted,theteamleader,withtheassistance~'t..;nicnbers,consolidatedallexerciseproblemsandcomments'p~.yproblemandcommentrecordedontheEAL-'hecklists.~R-.'!"msandcommentsintheEALValidationComment"';-.!:outofthisdatabaseisprovidedinAttachment6.~R-C1~...;.;mmentnumbersontheEALValidationExercise

OSSI93-402A-l~-.'P2NMP-2EALVeriQcation&ValidationReport,Rev.04.Commen',T'...~~DitionMr.WalkerandMr.DausevaluatedeachverificationandvalidationcommentrecordedintheEALcommentdatabases.Theyreviewedthecommentdiscrepanciesanddeterminedtheaccuracyofthediscrepancy.ReferencematerialsinEP.'c~e1opnientwereusedtoidentifythescopeofthediscrepancyandtoprepareappropriatesolutions.Theypreparedreso!utionstothediscrepancies,determinedtheimpactthefinalresolutio..".i:"ieonEALProgramdocumentation,determinedtheimpactthefinalicsolutionshaveontheplant,andidentifiedanyrequiredfollow-upact.'."...,.Resultsofthever.*icationandvalidationcommentresolutionprocessweredocumentedinUie!.ALVerificationCommentDatabase(Attachment2)andtheEALValida'.ionC'om:..entDatabase(Attachment6),respectively.5.Refere~'..""l.OSSI92-~,-,".",-".,".:;;ergencyActionLevelVerifcation,Revision02.OSSI92-4"".-..H:..ergencyActionLevelValidation,Revision0

OSSI93-402A-10-NYP2NMP-2EALVerification&ValidationReport,Rev.0Attachment1T';.KLVeri6cationChechlists

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EAI,VerificationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment1-TechnicalAccuracyPlant:NineMlePoint2Date:92093Verifier:J.P.StalnameEALUadeProectEn'nertitleYesNoNA1.Plant-specificEALGuideline(PEG)comparisontoNESP-007,Revision2,includingNRCreviewedquestionsandanswers:1.1DoeseachNESP-007initiatingconditionhaveacorrespondingPEGinitiatingconditionthatreflectsthemeaningoftheNESP-007IC'?~QQ1.2DoestheoperatingmodeapplicabilityofeachPEGinitiatingconditionagreewiththeNESP-007operatingmodeapplicabilityVQ~Q1.3IseachPEGEALderivedfromacorrespondingNESP-007exampleEALapplicabletoplantspeciflcdesign'~QQ1.4DoPEGEALsreflecttheintentoftheNESP-007exampleEALs'?Q~Q1.5DoesthePEGEALbasesreflecttheintentoftheNESP-007EALbaseswhichareapplicabletoplantspecificdesign'Q~Q

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EAI.VerificationProcedure,Rev.0AttachmentI-TechnicalAccuracyYesNoNA1.6ArethePEGEALscompleteandappropriate(i.e.,isadditionalinformationneeded,shouldanyinformationbedeleted)'Q~Q1.7IseachapplicablePEGfissionproductbarrierEALproperlyconsideredintheQssionproductbarrierevaluationforthisplant'~QQ1-2

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EALVerificatioProcedure,Rev.0Attachment1-TechnicalAccuracyYesNoNA2.EALTechnicalBasis(TB)comparisontothePlant-SpecificEALGuideline(PEG),FissionProductBarrierEvaluation(FPBE)andEALBinningDocument:2.1DoesthesetofTBcategoriesandsubcategoriessatisfactorilyreflectthesetofPEGinitiatingconditionsasdefinedintheEALBinningDocument'~002.2IseachTBEALderivedfromoneormorecorrespondingPEGEALsasdefinedbytheFPBEandEALBinningDocument'0r02.3DoTBEALsreflecttheintentofthePEGEALsfromwhichtheyarederived'0~02.4DoestheoperatingmodeapplicabilityofeachTBEALagreewiththecorrespondingPEGEALoperatingmodeapplicabilityV0~02.5DoestheTBEALbasesreflecttheintentofthePEGEALbasesandFPBE'?~002.6ArethereferenceslistedforeachTBEALappropriateandconsistentwiththePEG:~PEGReference(s)'?~BasisReference(s)'?0r0~001-3

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EALVeriQcationProcedure.Rev.0Attachment1-TechnicalAccuracyYesNoNA2.7AretheTBEALscompleteandappropriate(i.e.,isadditionalinformationneeded,shouldanyinformationbedeleted)V2.7Doeseach"Remark"inTablesAthroughDofthefissionproductbarrierevaluationforthisplantsatisfactorilyexplainthereasonaPEGEALorcombinationofPEGEALsisnotneededforeventclassification'?~002.8AretheresultantfissionproductbarrierevaluationEALsforthisplantproperlyaddressedintheTBattheappropriateclassificationlevel:~UnusualEvent'~Alert'~SiteAreaEmergency'~GeneralEmergency'?~00~00~000~02.9Doesthepotentialexistforclassificationupgradeonlywhenthereisanincreasedthreattopublichealthandsafety'002.10IstherealogicalprogressioninclassiQcationforcombinationsofmultipleeventswithinacategory'~001-4 0

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EALVerificationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment1-TechnicalAccuracyYesNoNA3.EALcomparisontotheEALTechnicalBasis(TB):3.1DoesthesetofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesagreewiththeTBcategoriesandsubcategories,respectivelyV~QQ3.2IseachEALconditionderivedfromacorrespondingTBEALcondition'~QQ3.3DoestheoperatingmodeapplicabilityofeachEALagreewiththecorrespondingTBEALoperatingmodeapplicabilityVSQQ4.EALcomparisontotheplantControlRoom(Simulator):4.1Areas-labeleddesignationsusedtoidentifyspecificcomponents,alarms,controls,andinstrumentstotheextentpracticable'~QQ4.2IseachEALadequatelysupportedbyplantinstruments,approvedinstructions,orotherappropriatesourcesofinformation'~QQ1-5

OSSIS2-402A-6-NMP2EAI.VerificationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment1-TechnicalAccuracyYesNoNA4.3WhereEALconditionsspecifynumericalvalues,aretheunitsofmeasurementthesameasthosepresentedontherespectiveplantpanelinstruments,approvedinstructions,orothersourcesofinformation'50Q4.4WhereEALconditionsspecifynumericalvalues,arethevaluesexpressedtoaprecisionconsistentwiththeaccuracyandprecisionoftherespectiveinstrumentation'a~aAlldiscrepancieshavebeenrecordedonEALCommentFormsandforwardedtotheVerificationTeamLeader.Signature:Date:920931-6

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EALVeriQcationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment2-WrittenCorrectnessPlant:NineMilePoint2Date:92093VeriQer:J.P.StalnameEALUradeProectEnineertitleYesNoNAl.EALOrganization:1.1IseachEALassignedtooneofninecategories'?~aa1.2Iseachsubcategoryclearlyassociatedwithitscategory'SCIC32.EALIdentification:2.1IseachEALidentifiedwithauniquethreedigitnumberwhosefirstdigitcorrespondstothecategorynumber,seconddigitthesubcategorynumber,andthirddigittheEALsequencenumbers~ao2.2DoEALsequencenumbersincreaseinmagnitudeasclassificationschangefromUnusualEvent,toAlert,toSiteAreaEmergency,andtoGeneralEmergency'~0Cl2-1

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EAI.VerificationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment2-WrittenCorrectnessYesNoNA2.3WhereanEALconditiondoesnotexistinacategory/subcategoryforagivenemergencyclassification,has"NA"beenenteredinplaceoftheEALidentificationnumber'~QQ3.EALLengthandContent:3.1IseachEALclearandconcise'Q~Q3.2HaveverbsandarticlesbeendeletedfromEALswheretechnicalaccuracyandreadingclaritypermit'3.3AreEALsconsistingofmultipleconditionsformattedsuchthateachconditionanditsrelationshiptootherconditionsareeasilyunderstood'5QQ3.4Iswordingandabbreviations/acronymsusedintheEALsconsistentwiththedeQnitionsprovidedinAttachments1and2oftheEALWriter'sGuide'~QQ3.5AreEALconditionsexpressedquantifiablywherepossible?~QQ3.6Whereused,dolimitmodiQers(<,>,s,>)simplifypresentationofEALconditions'SQQ2-2

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EALVerificationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment2-WrittenCorrectnessYesNoNA3.7AreannunciatorsetpointsnotgiveninEALswhenthesetpointiscommonoperatorknowledgeorthesetpointissubjecttofrequentadjustment(e.g.,arearadiationmonitoralarmsetpoints,offgasradiationmonitoralarms,etc.)'?5QQ4.UseofLogicTerms:4.1WhenanEALmustexpressacombinationoftwoconditions,aretheconditionsjoinedbythelogictermAND'?5QQ4.2WhenanEALmustexpressanalternatecombinationoftwoconditions,aretheconditionsjoinedbythelogictermOR'~QQ4.3IstheuseofANDandORwithinthesameEALavoidedwherepossible'?4.4IseachEALconditionclearandconcise'~QQ~QQ2-3

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EALVerificationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment2-WrittenCorrectnessYes~NNA5.Presentationofinformationintables:5.1Iseachtablepresentedinarectangularenclosurewithatablenumberandtitleprintedabovethetableentries'8005.2Arecolumnheadingswithapplicableengineeringunitsprovidedfortableswithmultiplecolumnsofinformation'S005.3Whereverticallinesseparatecolumnsofinformation,isreadabilityimproved'5.4Ifanentryisnotrequiredinatablecell,istheabbreviation"N/A"used'~006.Mechanicsofstyle:6.1Istheuseofhyphensminimized,and~nousedtobreakwordsbetweenlines'~006.2IspunctuationusedonlyasnecessarytoaidreadingandpreventmisunderstandingV~006.3AreparenthesesusedtoencloselocationinformationinEALsandtovisuallyseparatesupplemental/qualifyinginformationfromtheprimaryinformationbeingstated'~002-4

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EALVerificationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment2-WrittenCorrectnessYesNoNA6.4IswordusageconsistentamongtheEALs'?~QQ6.5ArenumbersintheEALsprintedinArabicnumerals'~QQ6.6.AreEALlimitsspecifiedinsuchawaythatadditionandsubtractionbytheuseris.avoided'8QQ6.7AreEALlimitsexpressedtoaprecisionconsistentwiththeintentoftheEALasspecifiedintheTBandPEG'?aQQ7.EALformat:7.lArethreeormoremultipleitems(systems,plantconditions,etc.)forwhichthereisnopreferenceorpriorityarrangedinalistformatwitheachitemprefacedbyabullets~QQ7.2AreEALlimitvalues,valuemodiQersandvalueengineeringunitsprintedinboldprint'Q~QAlldiscrepancieshavebeenrecordedonEALCommentFormsandforwardedtotheVerificationTeamLeader.SignatureDt:9//20932-5

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EALVerificationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-Inter-PlantEALComparisonPlants:J.A.FitzPatrlckNineMile1Date:92093NineMile2VeriQer:J.P.StalenameEALProectEnineertitleYesNoNA1.WithintheconstraintsofBWRandPWRplantdesign,iseachplanttypeEALscomposedofthesamecategories'~QQ2.WithintheconstraintsofBWRandPWRplantdesign,iseachplanttypeEALscategorycomposedofthesamesubcategories'?~QQ3.WithintheconstraintsofBWRandPWRplantdesign,doestheoperatingmodeapplicabilityofeachEALthesameforeachplant'SQQ4,Whereindividualplantdesignpermits,arethecondition(s)ofeachEALthesameforeachplant?Q~Q3-1

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2EALVerificationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-Inter-PlantEALComparisonYesNoNA5.Whereindividualplantdesignpermits,arethelimitvalue(s)ofeachEALconditionthesameforeachplant'0~06.WithintheconstraintsofBWRandPWRplantdesign,isEALwordusagethesameforeachplant'S00AlldiscrepancieshavebeenrecordedonEALCommentFormsandforwardedtotheVeriQcationTeamLeader.Signature:Date:~920933-2 0

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2NMP-2EALVerIAcatlon&ValidationReport,Rev.0Attachment2EA."V"HficationCommentDatabase2-1

a~~a~~.~~~~RecordNo.5OrlglnatlngSiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllltyOJAFOIP-3ONMP-2OGenericBWR8GeneralOIP-2ONMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactONUMARC-007OProcedureOVerificationOTrainingOHardwaregEALElTechnicalBasesOValidationODeviationONoneCat.PCIc¹2No.2Emer.Class.LOSSComment(verificationquestion2.3):EAL3.4.2isdeclaredwhenH2/02exceedcombustiblelimits.PEGEALPC2.2requiresdeclarationwhentheycannotbedeterminedtobebelowcomubustiblelimits.ItisnotclearifEAL3.4.2addressesthelattercondition.Consider"PrimarycontainmentventingisrequiredduetoH2and02concentrationstcombustiblelimits".C!nncirforovnlanatinninthohacicthatinrlinatocthatthoovictinnuinrdinnonrnmnaccociashonResolutionExplaininTBwhatismeantbycombustiblegasconcentrations.PEGsareok.ChangedEALtostate"Primarycontainmentventingisrequiredduetocombustiblegasconcentrations".status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionQeClosedRecordNo.7OrlglnatlngSiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllltyOJAFOIP-3ONMP-2OGenericBWR8GeneralOIP-2ONMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactONUMARC-007OProcedureOVerificationOTrainingOHardwareIHIEALOTechnicalBasesOValidationODeviationONonecat.SystemMalf.No.1Emer.Class.UnuSualEVentComment(verificationquestion3.2):EALmatrixandTB7.3.1ismissingconditionthatEPICisavailable..ResolutionAddedjustificationinPEGforthereasonthisconditionisnotrequired.SeePWRverificationcommentsforspecificresolution.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosed

RecordNo.8OriginatingSiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityClJAFC3IP-3QNMP-2PGenericBWR8GeneralCIIP-20NMP-1CIGinnaC3GenericPWRImpactCINUMARC-0070Procedure0VerificationClTraining0HardwaregEALrHITechnicalBasesCIValidationQDeviation0NoneNo.1Emer.Class.UnuSualEventIc¹3cat.HazardsComment(verificationquestion2.3):PEGHU3.1referstoprotectingsafeoperationoftheplant.EAL8.3.3onlyaddressespersonnelprotection.ResolutionTheconcernforsafeplantoperationhasbeenaddedtotheEALs.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.10rlglnatlngSiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityPJAFQIP-3PNMP-2ClGenericBWR8GeneralQIP-2PNMP-1ClGinnaPGenericPWRC3ProcedureC3VerificationClTrainingPHardwareHTechnicalBasesQValidation0Deviation0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verificationquestion1):9.0categoryreferstolossandpotentiallossofbarriers.NESP-007providescleardefinitionoftheseconditionsintheFPBtables,buttheEALmatrixnevermakesadistinctionbetweenalossorpotentialloss.Thiscouldpresentaproblemregardinginterpretationoflossandpotentialbarrierlosses.ResolutionCheckforthisinvalidation.10/22/93Thiswascheckedduringvalidationandwasnotobservedtobeaproblemstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.11orlglnatlngSitelJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllltyPJAFQIP-3QNMP-2QGenericBWREGeneral0IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070Procedure0Verification0TrainingCJHardwaregEALC3TechnicalBases0Validation0DeviationQNonecat~N/Alc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verificationquestion7.2):EALmatrix5.2.3,6.1.4,6.2.2,theEALnumbersshouldbeinboldprint.ResolutionEALnumbershavebeenproperlyembolded.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosedRecordNo.13orlglnatlngSiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteAppllcabllltyQJAFQIP-3PNMP-28GenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRImpactClNUMARC-0070Procedure0VerificationPTraining0HardwaregEALQTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNonecat~HazardsIc¹1No.**Emer.Class.UnuSualEVentComment(verificationquestion2.4):PEGICHU1,HA3operatingmodeisunchecked.Itshouldbe"All".ResolutionChecked"All"forHU1,HA3operatingmodeapplicabilityinthePEG.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosed

RecordNo.15OriginatingSiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAFPIP-3QNMP-2mjGenericBWRPGeneral0IP-20NMP-1QGinnaC]GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007CIProcedure0Verification0TrainingCIHardwareIHIEAL0TechnicalBases0Validation0Deviation0NoneNo.**Emer.Class.UnusualEventIcg2cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verificationquestion2.4):PEGICHU2operatingmodeincludeshotshutdownbuttheTBEAL7.1.1onlyincludespoweroperationsandhotstandby.IsthisintentionalorshouldtheTBincludehotshutdown?ResolutionEAL7.1.1shouldincludehotshutdown.ChangedTBstoincludehotshutdown.10/9needtochangematrices.MntothatthicicalenaRWRFAIualirlatinnnnmmontstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0+ClosedRecordNo.16rlglnatlngSiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteAppllcablllty0JAFQIP-3C]NMP-2[3GenericBWREGeneralClIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaCJGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007DProcedureDVerification0TrainingQHardwareglEALQTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationC3NoneNo.**Emer.Class.AlertIct1cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verificationquestion2.4):PEGICSA1operatingmodeincludesdefuelbuttheTBEAL6.1.2onlyincludescoldshutdownandrefuel.IsthisintentionalorshouldtheTBincludedefuel?ResolutionTheICspecificallystatesthatthelossofpowerisapplicabletocoldshutdownandrefuelingmodes.Therefore,NESP-007operatingmodeapplicabilityshouldnotlistdefueled.ChangedPEGSA1toexcludedefueledmode.AddedstatementtoPEGbasis:"NotethatDefuelmnrfoicnntannlinahlotnthicIt.honaiicothoIC'.iccnonifiralluwrittonfnrnnlAchi>trlnwnanrlrohiolstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOiClosed

RecordNo.17OrlglnatlngSiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityOJAFOIP-3ONMP-2EGenericBWROGeneralOIP-2ONMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-QQ70Procedure0Verification0Training0HardwareHEALOTechnicalBasesOValidationODeviationONoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAl'eaIc¹2cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verificationquestion2.4):PEGICSS2operatingmodeispoweroperationsonly,buttheTBEAL2.2.2includesstartup/hotstandby.Isthisintentional?ResolutionThisEALisconcernedwithATWSconditionsinaBWR.PoweroperationmodedoesnotencompassalloftheplantconditionswhereanATWSwouldbeofconcerninaBWR,therefore,itisappropriatetoexpandthisEALtoincludestartup/hotstandbymode.C'.honnorlRWRPFAIC'.c'c'9tninningcarloctort>>n/hntctonrlhvmnrtoonrlorlrlorlohnvoovnbntotinntnstatusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDisposition0+ClosedRecordNo.18rlglnatlngSiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabIlltyOJAFOIP-3ONMP-2ILGenericBWROGeneral0IP-20NMP-1OGinna0GenericPWRImpactONUMARC-QQ70ProcedureOVerificationOTraining0HardwareHEAL0TechnicalBases0Validation0Deviation0NoneNo.**Emer.Class.Generallc¹2cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verificationquestion2.4):PEGICSG2operatingmodeispoweroperationsonly,buttheTBEAL2.2.3includesstartup/hotstandby.Isthisintentional?ResolutionThisEALisconcernedwithATWSconditionsinaBWR.PoweroperationmodedoesnotencompassalloftheplantconditionswhereanATWSwouldbeofconcerninaBWR,therefore,itisappropriatetoexpandthisEALtoincludestartup/hotstandbymode.l.honnorlRWRPC(~IC'.c'C~Ptninningcarloctorti>n/hntctonrlhvmnrloonrlorlrtorlohnvoovnbntotinntnstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

RecordNo.22OrlglnatlngSiteNMP-2NMP-1Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityQJAF0IP-30NMP-20GenericBWR8GeneralHIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaCIGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007QProcedure0VerificationQTraining0HardwaregEAL8TechnicalBasesI]Validation0Deviation0Nonecat.Abnorm.Rad.Ic¹**No.**Emer.Glass.**Comment(verification)NMP-1,AU-1bases:WhynoreferencelistedtoNMP-1TechSpecs?SameforAA-1,AS-1,AG-1,andmanyothers.ResolutionFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-63,AppendixA,RadiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsisreferencedineachoftheabovePEGEALbasisdiscussions.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.23riginatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityOJAFOIP-3ENMP-2PGenericBWRPGeneral0IP-2gNMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingC3HardwarelaIEALIHITechnicalBasesOValidationODeviationONonecat.Abnorm.Rad.Ic¹1No.**Emer.Class.SiteAreaComment(verification)AS1:Note"laters"here,bothunits.ResolutionStillwaitingfornumbersfromNMP.sta~usOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOClosed

RecordNo.27OriginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityOJAFOIP-38NMP-2OGenericBWROGeneralOIP-2HNMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactONUMARC-007OProcedureOVerificationC3TrainingOHardwaregEALHTechnicalBasesOValidationODeviationONoneNo.1Emer.Glass.UnuSualEventIc¹7cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2SU-7.1(alsoappliestoSS3):Itwouldseemthatthesetwoplantsmightagreeonwhich-105voltsor106volts-constituteslossofDCpoweriResolutionAgree,butthat'swhatwehavefromtheirdatasources.statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.28rlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityC3JAFC3IP-3gNMP-2C3GenericBWROGeneralC3IP-28NMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007C3ProcedureC3VerificationC3TrainingOHardwaregEALHTechnicalBasesC3ValidationODeviationC3Nonelc¹2cat.SystemMalf.No.**Emer.Class.AlertComment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2SA2bases:"Existence"ismisspelledinsecondparagraph.ResolutionCorrectedtypoinNMP1,2.JAFok.senatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0+Closed

RecordNo.29OriginatingSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityOJAFHIP-3ENMP-2QGenencBWROGeneralHIP-2ONMP-1CIGinnaOGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-0070ProcedureQVerification0TrainingClHardwaregEALISLTechnicalBases0ValidationCIDeviationC3Nonecat.SystemMalf.Ic¹4No.**Emer.Glass.AlertComment(verification)NMP-2,SA4:"COLDSHUTDOWN"ischeckedasapplicable,butshouldn'tbe.ResolutionCorrectedNMP2;NMP1andJAFareok.statusOOpen0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0>ClosedRecordNo.31OriginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAFQIP-38NMP-2QIP-2isiNMP-1PGinnaImpact0NUMARC-0070Procedure0VerificationgEALHTechnicalBases0ValidationQGenericBWRQGeneral0GenericPWR0TrainingC3Hardware0Deviation0NoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAreaIc¹2cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2SS2:NUMARCsaysthisEALisapplicableinPowerOperation,butPEGsaysPowerOperationandHotStandby.ResolutionDeselectedhotstandbyinNMP1,2.JAFok.statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.32orlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityQJAFQIP-3QNMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardwaregEAL8TechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAf'eaIc¹2cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2SS2bases:Thestatementthat"thegenericguidancewouldrequireclassificationofaSAEforconditionsinwhichthereactorisinfactshutdownasaresultofthescramsignal..."iswrong.ApparentlythissentencewascopiedoverfromthecorrespondingAlert.ResolutionDeletedsentencecontainingtheabovestatementfromNMP1,2andJAF.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.33rlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityQJAFQIP-3QNMP-28GenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardwaregEALHTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAl'ealc¹5cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2SS5:WouldprimarycontainmentHydrogenconcentrationabove4%bebettertreatedasacontainmentbarrierpotentialbreach?Also,lossofwaterlevelinthepoweroperation,HSBandHSDconditionsistreatedasafuelcladbarrierealformodes1,2,3,4&5.SoisitappropriateornecessarytoexpandSS2fromcolds/dandrefuelingtoallmodes?ResolutionItcouldbetreatedasapotentialcontainmentbreach,buthydrogengenerationismostdirectlyanindicationofprolongedinadequatecorecooling.ExpandingSS2modeapplicabilityisnotnecessary.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0+Closed

RecordNo.35OrlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteAppllcabllltyC3JAFPIP-3PNMP-2PGenericBWREGeneralCIIP-2QNMP-10GinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070ProcedureCIVerificationETraining0HardwaregEALHTechnicalBasesC]Validation0DeviationC1NoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAreaIc¹5cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2SS6:ShouldtheEALstatethatALLoftheindicationsneededtomonitorplantparametershavetobeunavailable?Whynothalf,ormost?ResolutionNESP-007specifies"mostorall"indicationswhere"most"isstatedtobeapproximately75'/o.But,NESP-007alsostatesthattheydonotexpecttheoperatortallyupthenumberoflostindicators.ThisEALispoorlywordedinNESP-007.Theemphasisneedstobeontheneedforincreasedsurveillanceresultingfromwhatevernumberislost.ThisisatrainingissueuntilNUMARCchoosestnhottorrlofinothinI=AIstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.36rlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty0JAF0IP-30NMP-2C3GenericBWR8GeneralC3IP-2C]NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-0070ProcedureC3VerificationgTrainingQHardwaregEAL8TechnicalBases0ValidationQDeviationQNoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAI'eaIC¹5cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2SG1:Shouldastatementbeaddedtothebasesjustifyinguseofonlyoneparameter,i.e.RPVwatercan'tbemaintainedaboveTAF,insteadofbroaderfissionproductbarriermonitoring?ResolutionIfthecoreiscovered,adequatecorecoolingexistsnomatterwhatthestatusofotherfissionproductbarriers.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.37OriginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityOJAFOIP-3ONMP-2EGenericBWRDGeneral0IP-20NMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007CIProcedure0VerificationElTrainingCIHardwareILEALETechnicalBasesQValidationDDeviationCINonecat.SystemMalf.Ic¹5No.**Emer.Glass.SiteAreaComment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2FC2.1:PartofbasisfromNUMARCismissing.ResolutionAddedtoNMP1,2andJAFFC2.1basis:The"PotentialLoss"EAListhesameastheRCSbarrier"Loss"EAL4belowandcorrespondstothe(site-specific)waterlevelatthetopoftheactivefuel.Thus,thisEALindicatesa"Loss"ofRCSbarrieranda"PotentialLoss"oftheFuelCladBarrier.ThisEALappropriatelyescalatestheemergencyclasstoaSiteAreaEmergency.statusOOpen0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.38'originatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityOJAFOIP-3HNMP-2I)GenericBWRC3GeneralOIP-2gNMP-1OGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007PProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardwarelaLEALEITechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationClNonecat.BarrierIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2FC3.1,RC3,PC3.1:Note"later"¹sstillneeded.ResolutionStillwaitingfornumbersfromNMP.statusOIOpen0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

RecordNo.39OriginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007gEAL9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityOJAFCIIP-3DNMP-2HGenericBWROGeneral0IP-2CINMP-1PGinnaCIGenericPWR0ProcedureClVerificationClTrainingClHardwareETechnicalBasesC3ValidationCjDeviationClNonecat.Barrierlc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2PC1.1,1.2basisstatement:IwonderiftheNRCwillquestionthisadditiontothebases...ResolutionThiscommentreferstothelineoutoftheprimarycontainmentpressuredecreasefollowingrapidincrease.PerhapstheNRCwillquestionthis,buttheyshouldbemoreconcernedwiththeBWREOPsthantheEALsbecausethestatementinthebasisisthereasontheoperatorisnotkeyedtorespondbasedonthetypesofconditionssuggestedbyNUMARC.ChangedthePEGtoincludethorornnriitinncIlnriorthoiitrtnomontFAIPC'.R1status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0+ClosedRecordNo.40OriginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityC3JAFCIIP-3ONMP-2HGenericBWRCJGeneralHIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaQGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007I3ProcedureQVerification0TrainingQHardwareggEALHTechnicalBasesC3ValidationCIDeviationONoneNo.**Emer.Class.**Ic¹**cat~BarrierComment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2PC4.1:IwouldsuggestmoreexplanationshouldbeaddedtothebasesastowhyweareusingprimarycontainmentfloodingasthecriterioninsteadoftheNUMARCcriteria.ResolutionAddedthefollowingtotheendofthesecondparagraphofNMP1,2,JAFPEGPC4.1:Therequirementforprimarycontainmnentfloodingaddressesallplantconditionsforwhichadequatecorecoolingisorisabouttobelost.ThisincludesRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintainedaboveTAFandRPVfloodingconditionscannotbeestablishedandmaintained.Thus,thoPI=ArnnrlitinnonnnmnoccocthoNlIMAAC'.nnnrtitinnrnnnorninnI=IPVwotorlovolonrIthos~a~us00pen0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed 0

RecordNo.41OriginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityClJAFOIP-3C3NMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralHIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaCIGenericPWRImpactCJNUMARC-0070ProcedureC3VerificationQTraining0HardwaregEAL8TechnicalBases0Validation0DeviationCINonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-1,NMP-2:Generalcomment:Thebarrierloss/potentiallosstableonpage3oftheevaluationisconfusinglylaidout;itwouldbebettertoassignauniqueidentifiertoeachlossorpotentiallosscondition.ResolutionAgree,shouldidentifyinparenthesesaftereach"Yes"thespecificPEGEALnumber.statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDisposition0+ClosedRecordNo.42rlglnatlngSiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityOJAFHIP-3ONMP-2HGenericBWRCIGeneralC3IP-20NMP-1QGinnaC3GenericPWRC3ProcedureQVerification0TrainingQHardwaregTechnicalBasesOValidationODeviation0NoneNo.**IC¹**Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP-2,remarkf21:Whyisn'tfailureofasteamlinetoisolatewithadirectpathtotheenvironmentalossofRCSratherthanapotentiallossasstatedintheremark?ResolutionAfterreviewoftheremark,Idon'tknowwhyitisnotalossofRCSasopposedtoapotentialloss.ChangedremarktostatelossofRCS.sta~usOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOClosed

RecordNo.43orlglnatlngSiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllltyC3JAF0IP-3QNMP-2IIGenericBWRQGeneral0IP-2C7NMP-10GinnaC3GenericPWR0ProcedureC3VerificationClTraining0HardwarelalTechnicalBasesPValidationCJDeviationCJNonecat~BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-2UnusualEventtable:PC1aPot.lossshouldn'treferenceremark¹24,andPC1bPot.lossshouldreference¹25.ResolutionAgree,changedtoremark25.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionClosedRecordNo.44rlglnatlngSiteNMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007IHIEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllity0JAF0IP-30NMP-28GenericBWRQGeneralCIIP-2C3NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRC3Procedure0VerificationC3Training0HardwareIHITechnicalBasesC3ValidationQDeviation0Nonecat.Barrierlc¹*No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-2UnusualEventtable:Remark¹25doesn'tapplytoPC3-pot.loss.Shouldref.26.ResolutionAgree,changedtoremark26.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.45OriginatingSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteAppllcabllltyOJAFOIP-3ONMP-28GenericBWROGeneralOIP-20NMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactONUMARC-007OProcedureOVerificationOTrainingOHardwaregEAL8TechnicalBasesOValidationODeviationONonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-2UnusualEventtable:PC-4potentiallossshouldreferenceremark¹27vs.26.ResolutionAgree,changedtoremark27.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.46rlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllltyOJAFOIP-3ONMP-28GenericBWROGeneralOIP-2ONMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactONUMARC-007OProcedureOVerificationOTrainingOHardwaregEALHTechnicalBasesOValidationODeviationONonecat~BarrierIc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)Remark¹15:InmostofthecontainmentsI'mfamiliarwith,50GPMofRCSleakageisnotverymuchandwouldtakeaverylongtimetoresultinapressureincreaseto1.68psig,ifever.Suggestthisremarkbereexamined.ResolutionRemark¹15appliestoRCS1a-potloss(RCS1.2leakageintothedlywell>50gpm).TheNESP-007basisforthisEALstatesinpart"ManyBWRsmaybeunabletomeasureanRCSleakofthissizebecausetheleakwouldlikelyincreasedrywellpressureabovethedrywellisolationsetpoint".MeasurementofleakageintothedrywellforNMP1isverylimited.ItjustdoesnotseemwnrthittnirlontifuonFAIhocorlnnouoruorhitrorunnmhorSnnnmlwhononuciihctontiolomnnntstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.47OriginatingSiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007ILEAL9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAFQIP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWR0General0IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWR0Procedure0VerificationCJTrainingQHardware8TechnicalBases0Validation0Deviation0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.'*Comment(verification)NMP2SAEtable:Firstline(FC1loss+RCS1aloss):Idon'tunderstandhowremark16appliestothis.IfyouhavehighcoolantactivityandasteamlinebreakinsideORoutsidethedrywell,itdoesn'tmeanthatyouwillhaveadoseatthesiteboundaryof100mr/hr(AS1.1).Ifthiswasactuallysupposedtoberemark17,itstilldoesn'tseemtowork.FC3.1ishighdrywellradiationindicatingaLOCAwithfueldamage.RCS1acouldbeamainsteamlinebreakinsideORoutsidennntolnrnnntResolutionIftheleakisoutsidetheprimarycontainment,thiscombinationwouldrequiredeclarationofaGeneralEmergencyiftheleakwasnotisolated.Iftheleakwereisolated,theresultingpuffreleasewouldrequireescalationtotheSAEonlyiftheexposureatthesiteboundaryreachedthelevelgiveninAS1.1.Otherwise,thereleaseonlyjustifiesanAlertcondition.Remark¹16hasbeennhonnoritnroflontthoohnuoctotornontcstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0>>ClosedRecordNo.48rlglnatlngSiteNMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007gEAL9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityQJAF0IP-30NMP-28GenericBWRClGeneralClIP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWR0Procedure0VerificationC3TrainingC3HardwaregTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationC3NoneEmer.Class.**No.*Ic¹**cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP2SAEtable:Secondline(FC1loss+RCS2loss):Remark¹17statesthatthisconditionisadequatelycoveredbyFC3.1.FC3.1isbasedonallofthecoolantactivityofFC1.1beingdumpedintoprimarycontainment.CanwereallybesurethatALLthecoolantactivityisinthedrywellifdrywellpressureis>3.5psig?ResolutionRevisedFPBEstomakeRemark¹17N/AmakingFC1loss+RCS2lossanEAL.AddednewEALtoBinningdocumentandEALTB.AddedEALtomatrices.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0>>Closed

RecordNo.49OrlglnatlngSiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAF0IP-3DNMP-28GenericBWRQGeneralGIP-20NMP-10GinnaQGenericPWR0Procedure0Verification0Training0HardwareIHLTechnicalBases0ValidationDDeviationI3None**Emer.Class.**IC¹**cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP2SAEtable:FC2loss+RCS1alossisshownasaSAE,whilereferencingremark¹8.Butremark¹8saysthisEALisunnecessarybecauseit'scoveredbySS5.1.SowhyisthiscombinationshownasaSAE?ResolutionRemark¹8shouldstatethat"...thisportionoftheEALisunnecessaryandcanbedeleted"."thisportion"referstoRCS1aloss.ChangedJAF,NMP1,2FPBEstostate"...theRCS1alossportionoftheEALisunnecessaryandcanbedeleted".status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosedRecordNo.50riglnatlngSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty0JAF0IP-3QNMP-2gGenericBWRClGeneral0IP-2PNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070ProcedureC3VerificationQTrainingPHardwaregEALlalTechnicalBases0ValidationClDeviationC]NoneEmer.Class.****IC¹*cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP2SAEtable:FC4loss+RCS1aloss:Withrespecttoremark¹24,Idon'understandwhythesystemandprocessmonitorswouldnotbeinoperationjustbecausethereisamainsteamlinebreak,especiallyifthebreakisoutsidetheD/W.Iwouldsuggestmorejustificationisneededhere.ResolutionRemark¹24presumesthatavalidgp1isolationsignalinRCS1alosswouldresultinisolationofthesteamlines.Withnoflowthroughoffgas,theoffgasmonitorsarenotagoodindicationoffuelfailure.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosed

RecordNo.51originatingSiteNMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityPJAFClIP-3PNMP-2IHIGenencBWRPGeneralC]IP-20NMP-10GinnaClGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070Procedure0Verification0Training0HardwaregEAL8TechnicalBases0ValidationQDeviation0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹**N**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2SAEpage13:TheconditionFC4-pot.loss+RCS1apot.lossisrepeatedfivetimesinarow.ResolutionCorrectedBWRFPBEsbylistingcorrectRCSpotentiallosseswithFC4-pot.loss.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOoClosedRecordNo.52rlginatlngSiteNMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityCIJAFClIP-3QNMP-28GenericBWR0GeneralCIIP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007CIProcedure0Verification0TrainingQHardwaregEALHTechnicalBasesQValidation0DeviationI7Nonecat.Bal'I'lel'C¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2SAEpage14:ForRCS1apot.loss+FC4loss:See¹27above.ResolutionThissetofconditionsisdeletedbecauseofRemark¹20.Remark¹20hasbeenclarifiedasfollows:"RCS1apot.lossis>50gpminthedrywell.FC4lossisveryhighoffgasactivity.Highoffgasactivityunderconditionsinwhichsteamflowtothemaincondenserisongoing(i.e.,highoffgasreadingsvalid)aloneisindicativeofaMSLfailuretoisolatewithdownstreampathwaytotheonvirnnmontThicrnnditinnroniiirocrlorhrotinnnfoRitoArool=mornonrv>>nidorI=AIc<<cinnstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosed

RecordNo.53OriginatingSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAF0IP-3PNMP-2IIGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-20NMP-1[3Ginna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070ProcedureCJVerificationC3TrainingC3HardwareIjEAL8TechnicalBases0Validation0DeviationC3Nonecat.BarrierIc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2SAEpage14:ForRCS1b-pot.loss+FC4-loss:See¹31above.ResolutionExpandeddiscussioninRemark¹24whichjustifiesthedeletionoftheseconditions."Offgasmonitorsarenotareliableindicatoroffuelfailureunderseverelydegradedconditionsinthatthesystemwouldbeisolatedandtheprocessmonitorswouldnotbemonitoringanunisolatedprocessstream.HighoffgasactivityunderconditionsinwhichsteamflowtothemaincondenserisongoingliohinhnHnocrooriinncMoliribolnnoicinriirotiuonfomoinctoomlinofoil>>rotnicnlotowithstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.54OriginatingSiteNMP-2DateimpactQNUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityC3JAFQIP-3ClNMP-2HGenericBWR0GeneralPIP-20NMP-1CIGinnaPGenencPWR0Procedure0VerificationC3TrainingQHardwareIITechnicalBasesCIValidationQDeviation0Nonecat.BarrierIc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2SAEpage15:RCS6-pot.loss+FC1lossshouldsay:"Subsumedin'JudgementEAL.'"ResolutionChangedJAFFPBERemarksonpage15forthiscombinationofEALsto"Subsumedin'Judgement'AL".status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.55OriginatingSiteNMP-2Date9/2p/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAFC3IP-3QNMP-2HGenencBWR0General0IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070Procedure0VerificationClTraining0Hardware8EAL8TechnicalBases0Validation0DeviationPNonecat.BarrierIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2SAEpage15:ThecombinationofRCS1a-pot.loss+PC2b-lossreferencesremark¹22.Whynotsimplystate"NotsupportedinPEG?"Resolution"ConditionnotsupportedinPEG"isnotappropriatebecausetheseconditionsaresupportedinthePEGs...statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.56OriginatingSiteNMP-2Date9/2P/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityCjJAFQIP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWRC]GeneralClIP-20NMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007QProcedureQVerification0Training0HardwaregEAL8TechnicalBases0ValidationClDeviation0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2GEpage17:ForFC2-Loss+RCS4-Loss+PC1b-loss,remark¹25wouldbemoreappropriatethan14,sinceitstatesthatPC1b-lossbyitselfconstitutesaGE.Similarly,remarks26and27wouldbebetterforthetwocombinationsthatfollowthisone.ResolutionPage17onlyreferstoPC1b-potloss,notPC1b-loss.ChangedJAFFPBEfromRemark¹14to¹25;Remark¹26and¹27areappliedtothetwocombinationsthatfollowthisone.SinceRemark¹14isnolongerinuse,N/AhasbeenenteredforthisremarkintheFPBE.statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.57OriginatingSiteNMP-2DateImpactC3NUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability0JAFC3IP-3PNMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralHIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRClProcedure0Verification0TrainingC3Hardware8TechnicalBases0ValidationQDeviation0Nonecat.BarrierIc¹No.'*Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2GEtable:ThroughouttheGEtable,onlyonecombinationofRCS3-lossisshowninconjunctionwithlossofFCandPC,thatwhereitiscombinedwithPC-1apotentialloss.Idon'tunderstandwhy.WhathappenedtoPC-1b,PC-3,4,5,6pot.loss?ResolutionDon'tknowwhathappenedappeartoalsobemissingFC1-loss+RCS4-loss+PC1a-pot.losseachplacetheRCS4-lossfollowstheRCS2-loss.AddedmissinggeneralemergencyconditionsincludinglossofallthreebarrierstotheBWRFPBEs.EvaluationoftheaddedconditionsindicatedthatallwerepreviouslyidentifiedasaGeneralEmergency,subsumedintheJudgementEALs,orthonnnriitinnwocnntc<<nnnrtoriinthoPI=(cstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.58rlginatlngSiteNMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007IHIEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityOJAFCIIP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWRQGeneraiC3IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRCIProcedureQVerification0Training0HardwareHTechnicalBases0ValidationQDeviationQNoneEmer.Class.**N**Ic¹**cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP2GEtable:ForcombinationsofLOSSOFRCS,LOSSOFPC,POT.LOSSOFFConlyFC2,4and5arelistedinthecombinations.WhynotFC1andFC3,bothofwhichareadmittedlynotsupportedinthePEG?ResolutionFC1andFC3potentiallossesarenotincludedintheTablebecausetheyarenotsupportedinNESP-007.ThisfactisidentifiedintheTableonpage3oftheFPBEs.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.59OriginatingSiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAF0IP-30NMP-2IJGenericBWRCJGeneral0IP-2QNMP-1CJGinna0GenericPWR0Procedure0Verification0TrainingQHardware8TechnicalBasesQValidationDDeviationQNonecat.BarrierIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2GE:Remark¹28hasatypo,shouldbeEAL¹FC1.1,notEAL1.1.ResolutionChangedtoEAL¹FC1.1inFPBE.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.60riginatlngSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAF0IP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWR0GeneralC3IP-2C3NMP-10GinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070ProcedureC]VerificationQTrainingQHardwaregEALgTechnicalBasesClValidationQDeviation0Nonecat.BarrierIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2GEtable,page25:Remark¹28doesnotapplytothecombinationofPC2alossandFC2loss.AnewremarkshouldmakereferencetoRPVWL<TAFasalossoffuelclad.AsimilarcommentsappliesforthecombinationofPC2alossandFC3loss.ResolutionRevisedRemark¹28tostatethatFC2-lossandFC3-lossareeachlossesofthefuelclad.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.61OriginatingSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAFC3IP-30NMP-2HGenericBWRQGeneralPIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaQGenencPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070ProcedureCIVerification0TrainingQHardware8EALIHLTechnicalBasesC3Validation0DeviationC3None**IC¹**Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP2GEtable,page25:Remark28doesnotappeartoapplytothecombinationsofPC2aloss+FC4loss+RCS1a/bpot.loss.ResolutionRevisedRemarks¹24and¹28toexplaintheconditionsinwhichuseoftheoffgasairejectorsetpointwouldnotbevalidforemergencydeclaration.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.62OriginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabilltyQJAFQIP-3QNMP-2mjGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaQGenericPWRQProcedureCIVerificationQTraining0HardwareElTechnicalBases0ValidationQDeviation0NoneIc¹****Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)ThroughoutthetableofLOSSOFPC+LOSSOFFC+POT.LOSSOFRCS,RCS2,3,and4conditionsarenotlisted.AdmittedlytheyarenotsupportedinthePEG.ResolutionThesepotentiallossesarenotincludedintheTablebecausetheyarenotsupportedinNESP-007.ThisfactisidentifiedintheTableonpage3oftheFPBEs.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

RecordNo.63OrlglnatlngSiteNMP-2cat.BarrierDateImpactQNUMARC-007ILEALIc¹**9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteAppllcabllltyQJAFQIP-3QNMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRQProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardwaregTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNoneNo.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2GEtable,page20andlater:Remark¹8appliestoSAEsanditwouldseemshouldnotbereferencedintheGEtable.Theseshouldbereevaluated.ResolutionAgree.WherePC2a-lossorPC2c-lossisusedintheGEtable,Remark¹28isapplied.WherePC2c-lossisusedintheGEtable,Remark¹25isapplied.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.64rlglnatingSiteNMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007gEAL9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabilltyQJAFQIP-3QNMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRQProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardwaregTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNoneIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP2GEtable,page25:Remark¹22statesthatPC2b-lossshouldbeaGEallbyitself.Sowhyisn'titlistedasone.ResolutionPC2b-lossappearsintheEALsunderventingforPCPLandH2/02atorabovecombustiblelimits.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.65OriginatingSiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007SEAL9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityQJAFtlIP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWRQGeneralC]IP-2ONMP-1OGinnaDGenericPWRC3Procedure0VerificationCITrainingCJHardware8TechnicalBases0Validation0Deviation0Nonecat.Barrierlc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2GEtable,page25and26:Remarks¹25,26and27arereferencedinalotofcombinationstheydon'tapplyto.ResolutionDeletedRemarks¹25,¹26,and¹27fromcombinationswithEALPC2b-lossbecauseintentionalventingaloneisreasontodeclareaGeneralEmergency.statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOiClosed**Emer.Class.**lc¹**cat~BarrierComment(verification)WithrespecttoAU2.4,listedinthe"ReactorFuel"category,otherthingsthanfueldegradationcouldcauseahundredfoldincreaseinarearadiationmonitors.SameforAA3.1andAA3.2.SuggestthesethreeEALsbelonginthe"EquipmentFailures"category...?RecordNo.66Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSOriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-1QJAFHIP-3PNMP-2EGenericBWRQGeneralNMP-20IP-2QNMP-1PGinnaC3GenericPWRImpact,C3NUMARC-007C3ProcedureQVerification0Training0HardwaregEAL8TechnicalBasesClValidation0Deviation0NoneResolutionAlmostallEALscouldbegroupedunder"EquipmentFailures"sinceequipmentfailuresgenerallycontributetotheseriousnessofaneventandleadtoemergencyclassifications..ValidationevaluationofEALsshouldindicateifthesePEGEALsareproperlycategorized.senatusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionO>Closed

RecordNo.67OriginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityPJAFC3IP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWRPGeneral0IP-2CINMP-1C3GinnaOGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007CJProcedureCIVerificationC3TrainingC3Hardware8EALHTechnicalBases0ValidationPDeviationI]Nonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)AA2.1isduplicated,in1.4and1.5.ResolutionDeletedAA2.1fromsubcategory1.5.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0+ClosedRecordNo.68Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausOriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-20JAF0IP-3GNMP-2gGenericBWRC3GeneralHIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaPGenericPWRImpact:0NUMARC-007QProcedure0Verification0TrainingPHardwaregEAL8TechnicalBasesOValidation0DeviationONonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-2PEG,EALAS1.3:Says1000mr/hr,shouldsay100mr/hr.NMP1PEGisOK.ResolutionChangedNMP-2PEGEALAS1.3to100mr/hr.senatusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOClosed

RecordNo.69OrlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityCIJAFOIP-3ONMP-28GenericBWROGeneral0IP-2QNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070Procedure0VerificationCITrainingpHardwareIIIEALIHITechnicalBases0ValidationQDeviation0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.*'omment(verification)ConsideringthatsometimestheemergencyCoordinatormaynotbeabletodistinguishbetweenfireandexplosion,andconsideringthecloseassociationofHU1.5andHU2.1,considercombiningthe"fire"and"Man-madeevents"intoonecategory.ResolutionFirecategorywillbeexpandedtobefire/explosionsandnotcombinedwithman-madeevents.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.70OriginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityQJAFOIP-3ONMP-2SGenericBWRClGeneral0IP-2C3NMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007PProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardware5gEALgTechnicalBasesQValidationC]Deviation0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.*Comment(verification)Insection2.0,ReactorVessel,SS5.1andFC2.1areredundantEALs(bothareRPVWL(TAF)..ResolutionItispossibleforFissionProductBarrierEALstoberedundantwitheventbasedEALs.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

RecordNo.71OrlglnatlngSIteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllltyQJAFPIP-3PNMP-28GenericBWRQGeneralCJIP-2CINMP-1CIGinna0GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007CJProcedure0Verification0TrainingC3HardwareSEAL8TechnicalBasesC]ValidationCIDeviation0Nonecat.BarrierIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)RCS3.1isindicativeofanRCSleakonly,i.e.nofueldamage.SoIsuggestthattheReactorFuelbinisnottheappropriateplaceforthisEAL.Maybethe"ReactorPressureVessel"categoryshouldbemadeinto"ReactorPressureVesselandSteamSystems."ResolutionDespitethefactthatNUMARCsaysthisradlevelisindicativeofreactorcoolantinthedrywellwithtechspeclevelofactivity,thesourceofactivityisduetoexposuretoirradiatedfuelintheRPV.Assuch,thisEALisindicativeofthestatusofReactorFuel.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0+ClosedRecordNo.rlglnatlngNMP-1NMP-272SiteDateImpact0NUMARC-007ggEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabillty0JAF0IP-30NMP-28GenericBWR0GeneralQIP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWR0Procedure0VerificationQTrainingQHardwaregTechnicalBasesC]ValidationQDeviationQNonecat.BarrierIC¹**No.*Emer.Class.*'omment(verification)NMP-1,2,NUE1.1~1:Thestatedbasisforthisdoesn'treadmuchlikethePEG,althoughitseemsOK...ResoluttonAgree.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

RecordNo.73OrlglnatlngSiteNMP-2cat.BarrierDateImpact0NUMARC-007HEALIc¹**9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAFQIP-3HNMP-2QGenericBWRC3GeneralI7IP-2HNMP-10Ginna[3GenericPWROProcedureOVerificationC3TrainingCIHardwareHTechnicalBasesC3Validation0DeviationQNoneNo.*Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-2,NUE1.2.1:TheEALstates15minutes,butthere'snomentionof15minutesinthePEG.ResolutionNMP-2PEGEALisbasedontheoffgasradiationalarmsetpoint.ThesetpointforNMP-2,unlikeNMP-1,includesa15minutetimedelay.statusQOpenQResolved/AwaitingDispositionQeClosedRecordNo.74riglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAFPIP-3HNMP-2PGenericBWRC3General0IP-2HNMP-1CJGinna0GenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingC3HardwareHEALHTechnicalBases0ValidationC3DeviationQNonelc¹****Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP-1,2,NUE1.2.2:Idon'tseewhereitsaysinthePEGthat10timestheDRMSalarmsetpointisequivalentto300pCi/CCl-131.ResolutionAddeddiscussioninEALTBbasistoPEGEALbasisforNMP1,2.JAFisok.statusQOpenQResolved/AwaitingDispositionQeClosed

RecordNo.75OriglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityQJAFQIP-3QNMP-2gGenencBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardwareSEALHTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNonecat.BarrierIc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-1,2,ALERT1.4.4:Thesecondparagraphofthebasisisredundantwiththefirst.Asuggestion:SincethereferencedNMPCmemomaynotbeimmediatelyavailabletoanyonereadingtheTechBasis,abriefexplanationmightbeappropriate.ResolutionDeletedsecondparagraphofEALTBbasisforNMP1,2andJAF.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0+ClosedRecordNo.76rlginatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllltyQJAFQIP-38NMP-2QGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-28NMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardware8EALgTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNonecat.BarrierIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-1,2,ALERT1.5.2:PEGreferenceofAU2.2iscited.ShouldbeAA2.2.ResolutionChangedNMP1,2EALTB1.5.2referencetoAA2.2,JAFok.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.77OrlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllity0JAF0IP-30NMP-2gGenericBWR0General0IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070Procedure0Verification0Training0HardwaregEAL8TechnicalBases0Validation0Deviation0Nonecat.BarrierIc¹'*No.'*Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-1,2,EALs2.2.1,2.2.2,2.2.3,2.2.4:TheseEALsstate,"anymanualscramwhichfailstoshutdownthereactor."ButthePEGstates,"Anymanualscramorautomaticscramfollowedbyamanualscramwhichfails.~."ResolutionTheseareoneinthesamesinceoperatingproceduresrequirethatanyautomaticscrambefollowedbyoneormoremanualscramattempts.statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.78OrlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-0075gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty0JAF0IP-30NMP-28GenericBWR0General0IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWR0Procedure0Verification0Training0Hardware8TechnicalBases0Validation0Deviation0Nonecat.Barrierlc¹**No.**Emer.Class.Comment(verification)NMP-1,2:NotedthatPC2.2isreferencedforGEs3.2.2and3.4.2.ResolutionItshouldbebecausetheseareconditionsrequiringintentionalventingperEOPs.statusOOpen0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

RecordNo.79OrlginatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllltyQJAFQIP-3QNMP-28GenencBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRQProcedureQVerificationQTrainingOHardwareHTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNonecat.BarrierIC¹***Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-1,2:PEGsectionRCS1.3isnotreferencedforEAL4.1.1inthebinningdocument,butisreferencedintheTechBasisfor4.1.1.ResolutionChangedbinningdocument4.1fromPC2.3(SAE)to"PC2.3orRCS1.3(Temp)(SAE)".Changedbinningdocument4.2fromPC2.3(SAE)to"PC2.3orRCS1.3(Rad)(SAE)".status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.80rlginatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllltyQJAFQIP-38NMP-2QGenericBWRQGeneralImpactQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRQNUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardware5gEALgTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNonecat.BarrierIC¹**N**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP-2,EAL4.1.2:Theword"temperature"ismisspelledinthedescriptionoftheEAL.ResolutionCorrectedspellinginNMP2.NMP1andJAFok.status0OpenCIResolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.81OriginatingSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityCIJAFOIP-3HNMP-2QGenericBWROGeneralOIP-2ONMP-1QGinnaOGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-0070Procedure0VerificationQTrainingC1HardwaregEALIHITechnicalBases0ValidationC3DeviationQNonecat.BarrierIc¹**N**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP2:FortheEffluentMonitorClassificationThresholdTableofEAL5.1.1:AttheAlertlevel,thePEGcallsfor200xDRMSsetpointforRW/RxBldgVentEffl.Mon.andthemainstackeffluentmonitor.ButEAL5.1.1says"lateV'orboth.ResolutionStillwaitingfornumbersfromNMP.statusOeOpen0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.82rlginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpactC3NUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityClJAFHIP-3PNMP-2PGenericBWRgGeneralQIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaQGenericPWR0Procedure0VerificationC3TrainingQHardwareHTechnicalBases0ValidationQDeviationClNonecat~BarrierIC¹**N**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP1,2:ForEAL6.1.1,thereisnomentionofthePEGstatementthatatleasttwoemergencygeneratorsaresupplyingpowertoemergencybuses.ResolutionAvailabilityofDGsisunnecessaryinthisEALbecause,iftheyareunavailable,ahigheremergencyclassificationwouldbedeclaredduetoEAL6.1.2.senatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.83OriginatingSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicabilityC3JAFCJIP-3HNMP-2OGenericBWRC3General0IP-2DNMP-1C3GinnaOGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070ProcedureClVerificationCITrainingC3HardwaregEAL8TechnicalBasesC3Validation0DeviationC3NoneIc¹**Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP2:ForEAL6.2.1,theEALspecifies<112.5VDCon2BYS*BAT2C.Thereisnomentionof112.5VDCinthePEG.ResolutionNMP-2PEGEALSU7.1states"<105vdcbusvoltageindicationson125vdcbatteries2BYS*BAT2AandB,and<112.5vdcon125vdcbattery2BYS*BAT2C"..statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosedRecordNo.84rlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpactC3NUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityOJAFCJIP-3ONMP-2OGenericBWRHGeneralC3IP-2PNMP-1QGinnaOGenericPWR0Procedure0Verification0TrainingCIHardwareIHITechnicalBasesC3ValidationClDeviationC3Nonecat.BarrierIc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP1,2:ForEAL7.3.4,seecomment¹13above.ResolutionNESP-007specifies"mostorall"indicationswhere"most"isstatedtobeapproximately75%.But,NESP-007alsostatesthattheydonotexpecttheoperatortallyupthenumberoflostindicators.ThisEALispoorlywordedinNESP-007.Theemphasisneedstobeontheneedforincreasedsurveillanceresultingfromwhatevernumberislost.ThisisatrainingissueuntilNUMARCchoosestnhottorrlofinothicFAIstatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosed

RecordNo.85OrlglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty0JAFC3IP-3C3NMP-2QGenericBWRgGeneral0IP-2CINMP-1CJGinnaQGenericPWR0Procedure0Verification0TrainingClHardwareIHLTechnicalBases0ValidationQDeviationC1Nonecat.BarrierIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)NMP1,2:EAL8.1.2referencesPEGHA4.2,butthereisnomentionintheEALof"other"securityevents.SimilarcommentforEAL8.1.3.ResolutionSincethereisnodefined"other"securityeventforthisexampleEAL,thisconditionisaddressedundertheJudgementEALs.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.86rlglnatlngSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty0JAFQIP-3QNMP-2QGenericBWR8GeneralImpactPIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaPGenericPWRPNUMARC-007QProcedureC3Verification0TrainingQHardware5gEALIHITechnicalBasesC]ValidationClDeviation0NoneEmer.Class.**No.**Ic¹**cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP2:InEAL8.2.2,thelistofaffectedareasdoesnotmatchthatinthePEG.ResolutionUpdatedPEGtouselistofareasinHUinHA2.1.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOiClosed

RecordNo.87OriginatingSiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpactC3NUMARC-007gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabilityClJAF0IP-3C]NMP-.20GenericBWR8GeneralC3IP-20NMP-1PGinnaCIGenericPWR0ProcedureCIVerification0TrainingClHardware8TechnicalBasesQValidation0DeviationClNoneic¹**Emer.Class.**No.cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP1,2:EAL8.3.5referencesPEGHA3.2,butmakesnoreferencetoflammablegas.ResolutionAddedreferencetoflammablegasesinwordingofEAL.status.0Open,OResolved/AwaitingDispositionOiClosedRecordNo.88riginatlngSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability0JAF0IP-3C3NMP-2C3GenericBWRIIIGeneralC3IP-20NMP-1ClGinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007C3ProcedureC3VerificationQTrainingCJHardwaregEALIHLTechnicalBasesC1ValidationCIDeviationQNoneIC¹*No.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)NMP2:ForEAL8.4.3,theReactorBuildingisnotincludedinthelistofPlantVitalAreas.Samefor8.4.6,8.4.7.ResolutionReactorBuildingisincludedinTable8.4.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2NMP-2EALVerlQcatlon&ValldatlonReport,Rev.0Attachment3L<'ALVaMationScenarios3-1

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2EAIValidationScenarios,Rev.0Attachment2-VaHdationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:NMP-2Simulator:~Table-Top:ClScenario¹1ScenarioDescription(s):InitialConditions:Reactorpower100%;HPCSDGOOSinsevendayLCO.Withtheplantat100%power,mainturbinepressurecontrollersfaillowinitiatingaturbinetripandreactorscramsignal.Allrodsfullyinsert.Reserveandauxboilerstationtransformersfailtoenergizewhenthegeneratortrips(UE6.1.1).DGsstartandenergizeemergencybusses.RCICsteamlinerupturesduetopressurespikeandRCICisolationvalvesfaQtoisolate.EmergencyRPVdepressurizationduetosecondarycontainmentmaximumsafeoperatingtemp"=.aturevalues(SAE4.1.1).BombexplosionsintheswitchyardandthetwoDGs(UE8.1.1,Alert8.2.2)causelossofRPVinjectionsources,(105vdconallbatteries(SAE6.2.2),andlossofoffsit~~~ve:(UE6.1.1);lossofannunciatorsandindicatorsandincreasedsurvei!!",:-::..withtransientinprogress(Alert7.3.3).[ifexplosionweretohaveoccu'..-~v:hileincoldshutdown/refuel,batterylossperUE6.2.1andlossof'":!'.~'.=per6.1.2.]RPVwaterdecreases<TAI(SAE2,1.1);withprimarysystemdischargingoutsideprimaryco;".'.".'.;".-;.cntandRBtemperaturesaboveMSOlevelsintwoormoreareas(GK4.'.",'.Somefueldamagecc"'..swithcoreuncovery.RBARMsincreaseaboveMSOvaluesinmoretK-;;..'oareas;withprimarysystemdischargingoutsideprimarycontain:.......("-,~.T:4.2.1,SAE7.3.4,GE4.2.2).2-1

OSSI92-402A-7A-N.""~2EALValidationScenarios,Rev.0A;."-.:.=.c"..t2-VaIMationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant.NMP-'?Simulator:~Table-Top:0Scenario¹2ScenarioDescri".".'.-'".,'.:InitialConditions:Reactorpower100%forpast3months,smallsteamleakfromoneturbi","'.!".rottlevalve,planttoshutdowntomorrowWiththeplantatI"0%powerandasmallsteamleakonturbinethrottlevalve,adroppedco.-.":o.'-.-odresultsinfuelcladfailure.Reactorscrams;~~.'.IsnarHCUsexceed100timesalarmsetpoint(UE1.4.1).Offgasactivityi~.";-e,".(UE1.2.1).OneMSLfailstoc(3Z3.5.1).Offsiteradioactivi',;r"1caseincreasestotheGeneralEmergencylevel(UE5.1.1,Alert1.2.2"';;:=.l.2,SAE5.1.3,GE5.1.4).Drywellradiation="..-!i.gsincrease(Alert1.3.1).Coolantsampler..:..'.',-300pCi/gm)supporthighoffsiteradiactivityreadings(UEl.l.......'<-i.1.2,GE3.5.2).EmergencyRPV'..;"-..":..i;.ationisrequired.2-2

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2EAI.ValidatfonScenarios,Rev.0A:".::='.="."-t2-VaHdationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:PlantNMP->>,Simulator:~Table-Top:ClScenario03ScenarioDescris..".:.=-.'.-,,'nitialCondition.::;.":."torpower60%,returntopowerdelayedwithfeedwaterheate"~.";..s.HPCSoutofservicewithbearingreplacement;duebackin4hc.."Earthquakecause".;.'s";.icactivityalarmsatJAFNPPandNMP-1/2(UE8.4.1).Smalllocaintodg~>>~'!,unidentiQedleakage>10gpm(UE3.1.1).Drywellpressure>"".r'.setpoint(Alert3.2.1).Multiplefailuresc"'..-~.~lectionsystemsRPVwaterleveld"."...:-;.:-."s<TAF(SAE2.1.1)2-3

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP'-?EALValfdaUonScenarios,Rev.0P..t."-.-..h=;."..".t2-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:NMP--.Simulator:STable-Top:ClScenario¹4ScenarioDescrip':;..","):InitialCondition..:..""..!orpower100%,noequipmentOOS.Condensatehead"=';.-..sresultinginalossoffeed.Whenthereactors".:".-,n;sonlowRPVwaterlevel,severalcontrolrodsfailtoinsert(Alert2.2.1).'reactorpowerremainsabove5%.RCICandHPCSdo:"..".-trmainoperable.Variousotherfail~r";s!~a.iconelowpressureECCSpumpforRPVmakeup.Boroninjectioni,::..=::"-.,(.".-.AE2.2.2).SRVoperationh='=.";;:-".:cssionpoolandleakfromsuppressionpoolcauseswaterlev..!'".-:..e~.".e.RPVpressureandsuppressionpooltemperaturecan.".'..=."..;:aintainedbelowtheHCTL(SAE3.3.1,GE2.2.3);RPVwaterlevelc":".;.':>emaintainedbelowMSCRWL(GE2.2.4).Hydrogenconcen:Ž"...'"..int'esuppressionchamberreaches4%(SAE3.4.1).2-4

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2EALValfdationScenarios,Rev.0J'tt".':....e.t2-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:NMP-2Simulator:STable-Top:ClScenario85ScenarioDescript'"..".!~):InitialConditions:'."..ctorpower75%,ashutdownisinprogressforadrywellentrytoicc:;";.:;"-.c!"-ritifiedleakage,wetwellisdeinerted,drywelldeinertioninpr<;,;..."!'.;!g~elloxygenconcentration10%.NoequipmentOOS.Lossofoffsitepow..-..o.."u-s(UE6.1.1).Reactorfailstoscr".-'..."-0rodsout(Alert2.2.1).WhenRPSfusesp~"':!.allrodsfullyinsert.AllbutoneDG<a!.":-.::I-."',-"Jert6.1.3).RemainingDGtxil;.".',.=~"r'.1.4).MajorLOCAoccurs,"'.>VwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintainedaboveTAF-(GE6.1.",'.After20minutes,c:".eŽ-returnedtooperation;availableinjectioncannotrestoreRPVwaterl"=-.;.',~eveTAF.Drywellhydrol::-.~r'.'"..".K3.4.1).PrimaryConta.'."..;.*...'..."..'isrequired(GE3.1.2).Hydrogenindrywell>6%(GE3.4.2).Primarycontain';:c:-:.t.'svent"..dduetoPCPL(GE3.2.2).2-5

OSSI92-402A-7A-N.'.~P2EALValidationScenarios,Rev.0Att".:".~:.=nt2-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:Simulator:ClTable-Top:~Scenario86ScenarioDescrip'...-.-',-',:Afterelevatedof:"p-.-,."'.,'sanoted,reactorcoolantsamplesindicatecoolantactivity>,":,<,',-g,'-131eq.(UE1.1.1)Followingreact","."'".,'..:.-.:-,..ddepressurization,coolantsamplesaretakenindicating390pCiy-:mi-131cq.(Alert1.1.2)2-6

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2EAT.ValidationScenarios,Rev.0At*"=-.'.;cnt2-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:M<P-2Simulator:0Table-Top:~Scenario¹7ScenarioDescr'r"..-'."):Reactorscramson!.'.xd:g~vellpressure.Drywellradiationlevelsindicate[Later]R/hr.(PJer..".).Followingemerge";."..."..".'Vc!@pressurization,drywellradiationlevelsof[Later]R/hrareindicated(ShE1.3.2).Atwhatlevelwou!d;oudcc!areaGeneralEmergencybasedondrywellradiationlevels?(GT1.3.3)2-7

OSSI92-402A-7A-i"'~.".~"EALValidationScenarios.Rev.0Attachxnent2-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:renp-."Simulator:QTable-Top:~Scenario88ScenarioDescrip".o".f"-):AHPTechnicianpc.farmingroutinesurveysmeasuresControlRoomarearadiationlevelsoi".:..":.2j!'r(Alert1.4.3).Itisreportedthat.".n".~shieldedradiographysourceisintheRelayRoom.Generalareared~.tion'eve!sintherelayroomareapproximately20R/hr(Alert1.4.4)2-8

OSSI92-402A-7A-Nl<>2EAI.ValidationScenarios,Rev.0At".".".'....."".t2-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:Simulator:ClTable-Top:~Scenario89ScenarioDescria"."."!"'efuelingoperationsareinprogressandamainsteamlineplugbeginstoleakcausingther"f':"!"..<ca.".tyandspentfuelpoolleveltodrop.TheSFPlowlevelalarmisr".."ic;cd(UE1.5.1).Afuelbund!.i.=.c'.'"e<r~pp'eandinthecattleshutewhentherefuelfloorisevacuated',.'.:;.;'..:Therefuelfloorradiationmonitorsgooffscalehigh(Alert1.4.2)2-9

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2EALValfdatfonScenarios,Rev.08t..-..l..-...."..".t"-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant.NMP-2Simulator;ClTable-Top:~Scenario¹10ScenarioDescrii."io"<"'.Chemistryreportsstackeffluentanalysisindicatesthateffluentshavebeenapproximately3'.i::.".s;"ech.S~ec.allowedlimitsforthelast2hours(UE5.2.1).300timesTec.'s.Spec.forthelast20minutes(Alert5.2.2)2-10

OSSI92-402A-74-F>.",".P2EALValidationScenarios.Rev.0Att,.b...cnt2-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:NynP2Simulator:ClTable-Top:~'cenario¹11ScenarioDescr'-:c.-',".):Fieldsurveyteamsrcportivholebodydoseratesatthesiteboundaryof20mR/hr(Alert5.";,.3,'.200mR/h(8,':.'..;"""Doseprojection".':".".jcatechildthyroiddosesof7200mR(GE5.2.5)2-11

OSSI92-402A-7A-."I;"..?EAI.ValidationScenarios,Rev.0"'.:"."-,"-.,"..".t".-VA~'dationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:Ni'IP-2Simulator:QTable-Top:0Scenario812ScenarioDescTheplanthasentere..la24LCOactionstatementat0700duetoEGoperability.At1800ap!",ntshutdownisinitiated.At0700thefollowingday,coolanttemple:.ate,'eisstill220'Fwhileattemptingtoinitiateshutdowncooling{:.'=..'.'=)Shutdowncoo':::<cannotbcestablishedduetoafailureofSDCsuctionvalve.Reactortemper:-..".;:"cannotvc'educedto212F(Alert7.2.3)2-12

OSSI92-402A-7A-i9l;~?EALValidationScenarios,Rev.0..-VMdationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:Nvi.p-)Simulator:QTable-Top:~Scenario813ScenarioDescr'".i"..Ž.'"-"Atankercarry.'.~<~,:.=>>.,i~.iagasoverturnsontheaccessroadreleasingammoniagas.Th".lu;.~ecaressesontothesite,incapacitatingnumeroussitepersonnel(UI;8....!Thegasthene:"!.,".rsthecontrolroomrequiringthecontrolroomtobeevacuated(Ale't".3.38:7.2.2).ControlofRPViniectionisnotacheivedafter30minutes(SAR7.2.4).2-13

OSSI92-402A-7A-Ni~!P2EALValidationScenarios,Rev.0~"".-'".-.""..'-VMdationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:NA".P-,'?Simulator:ClTable-Top:~Scenario814ScenarioDescr':":.'"-':Aseverestormcau,".""alossofalltelephonesystemsoffsite.Noradiosrespondtoatt.e::pL'stoc.,!1cffsite(UE7.3.2).Meteorologic"I,t"""Ž".;ipchartindicatesustainedwindspeedsof95mph(Alert8.4.O.Theroofisrir.a."~o.'foithesecuritybuilding(Alert8.4.7).2-14

OSSI92-402A-7h-I'i".-2EALValfdatfonScenarloS,Rev.0."-.-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:NynP2Simulator:QTable-Top:8Scenario¹15ScenarioDescr'vt'.on(s):Abombthreatisr""".".d.Asearchrevealsabombinthereactorbuildingataremoteshu!.-..'."...~~'..-."!(!.'.-.8.1.1).Anunauthor"ec':".cvi:!ualisrcco<nizedtohavescaledtheProtectedAreafence(Alert8.!..'.Theindividu.".!i~'..";.".'.;..dintothereactorbuilding(SAE8.1.3).Thebombexp!odsdestroyingtheremoteshutdownpanel(GE8.1.4orAlert8.2.2).Insteadoft!-.:"."-'-.;'-..'Id'ng,abombexplodesintheAdministativeBuilding(U2-15

OSSI92-402A-7A-NVP2EALValidationScenarios,Rev.0f.';"."-.-..".;.=+:?-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:Simulator:C3Table-Top:SScenario816ScenarioDesc'""."!~!.):Asecuritytru"':":",".ti",ed;sc!fuelstoragetank(UE8.3.1).Thecollisinn'n~'".~'",".'"intheoiltank(Alert8.3.4).Thespilledci!c"-"."..hes~:.reandburnsoutofcontrolfor30minutes(UE8.2.1).2-16

OSSI92-402A-7,'.EALValtdatfonScenarios,Rev.0..-=."-.:."-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:Simulator:QTable-Top:~Scenario817ScenarioDesc'hecontrolroomoperatorsnoticegroundmotionandthattheseismicactivityala".i~.'.";."".",'",'.J."..i!PPcallsandconfirmstheearthquake(UE8.4.1).JAFNPPlaterce'.!~andsaystheearthquakewasofmagnitudeO.lg(Alert8.4.5).Asaresultoftheearthquakethescreenwellbuildingisdestroyed(Alert8.4.7).2-17 0

OSSI92-402h.-7A-~2EALValidationScenarios,Rev.0Attachment-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:N)"t~-2Simulator:0Table-Top:0Gcenario¹18ScenarioDescry".:",;=',):Areporttotheccntrclroomstatesthatatornadohasbeensightedinsidethesecur'tyf'e:..ce',i'+.4.2).Anoperate'".-."."'"-'="-.'";.c,".:".notgettothescreenwellbecauseofwindanddebris',"..:.',"=..:.2-18

OSSI92-402~='?.~-"'~~?EALValidationScenarios,Rev.0Attach'nt2-ValidationExerciseScenarioChecklistNo.:Plant:Simulator;C3Table-Top:~Scenario¹19ScenarioDescry:,".lo.;.(..':Lakefloodinghas:e,.u'-'..cdinmeasuredlakelevelsof248ft.(UE8.4.4).Frizzleicef".."..:.".'~n!."-scausedt.heintakewaterleveltodropto[Later]ft.(Alert8.4.B;.2-19

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2NMP-2EALVerIAcatfon&ValidationReport,Rev.0Attachment4EALValidationSSheets4-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidaUonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment1-VaHdationSunlmaxySheetiiI4,,').!~Plant+~2-IIRIIlCValidationTeamMembers:ICa(6tA.W5Jck~WrstPIecch(.('1~~~ChecklistNo.:~EALRev.No.:~EALNscrimnrlN8Ql~g.IBgiValid.performedandcommentsrecorded;Q.(ot>(ZXValidatiTeamLeaderDateEALRev.No.:~jChecklistNo.:~1I~lliII1tii~~NJim~TiFi,s~~'tiiiIliValidationamLeaderDate~IIiI.oet~l.~,zg.Q82-QRQValida.performedandcommentsrecorded:~&I.~~CheckhstNo.:tEALRev.No.:IsIzIUass'7~BQS.IIQQValid.performedandcommentsrecorded:e.-ValidatioTeamLeaderDateChcklistNo.:~e(EALRev.No.:~~@QgQQQQValida.performedandcommentsrecorded:ValidationearnLeaderDateI~*l~~IContinuationSheetsAttached:~'Il~~I

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment1-VaHdationSuxnmsrySheetPlant:XLGI1KValidationTeamMembers:5~~e~4~)t'Il3tI'IChecldtstNo.:~EALRev.No.:ILtegl,'?r<3lEValid.performedandcommentsrecorded:LobJaZValidatioearn.LeaderDateChecklistNo.:~EALRev.No.:tValida.performedandcommentsrecorded:~sf(VValtdationearnLeaderDate'l;3li'Il3RItChecklistNo.:~EALRev.No.:M~lAL~N~i~TCheckhstNo.:MBa.Rm.XZEALRev.No.:Q5gaIi9.asoValid.performedandcommentsrecorded:gofv(qValidationearnLeaderDatestII~3'106Valida.performedandcommentsrecorded:Lb()(tedValidationearnLeaderDate.3iContinuationSheetsAttached:1-2

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2EALValidationScenarios,Rev.0,Attachment1-VaHdationSummaxySheetPlant:ValidationTeamMembers:ChecklistNo.:v(tI!tEALRev.No.:CChecklistNo.:~II'ALRev.No.:s-.QQ.'.cQQ7-I~7.~.39.>.5QRl/CIXI~IQlipQKIValid.performedandcommentsrecorded:i,t>i~~ValidationearnLeaderDateValida.performedandcommentsrecorded:r.L,itsVaBdationTeamLeaderDateChecklistNo.:IEALRev.No.:~SS=I!ChecklistNo.:AREALRev.No.:/ALLANJimT-TL)QQtoQN/0ocloQQ/7-rL.I!~QQQQrQQQQValid.performedandcommentsrecorded:C..dtit'((g~Valida.performedandcommentsrecorded:lo!(/ygValidationearnLeaderDateValidationTmLeaderDateContinuationSheetsAttached:1-3

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2EALValidationScenarios,Rev.0Attachment1-VaHdationSmnmaxySheettc)o)<<t>Plant:ValidationTeamMembers:ChecklistNo.:~/6EALRev.No.:IL=eChecklistNo.:~EALRev.No.:~~M;I'\IL=e.(~oelQQQCIff!/QQcetClliPQQQtlII)Valid.performedandcommentsrecorded:JokL'c2.ValidationearnLeaderDateIValidaUonearnLeaderDateValida.performedandcommentsrecorded:(l.c'~3ChecklistNo.:EALRev.No.:~I""sChecldistNo.:EALRev.No.:~L~NQmT-T8'39f.z..I.9sQglQg3elQ8ContinuationSheetsAttached:Valid.performedandcommentsrecorded:I~~~f'tZValidationearnLeaderDateQQQQQQQQValida.performedandcommentsrecorded:UaBdationTeamLeaderDateI!lfi$~tj)ifjII~I1-4

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2NMP-2EALVerification&ValidationReport,Rev.0Attachment5F.~.TValidationExerciseChecklists5-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValMationExerciseChechlistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:1YesNo~NA1.WhentheneedforclassiQcationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'~QQComments:None.2.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'Q~QComments:ItwouldbeheifultolaminateEALmatrixanduseerasablemarkerssoEDcanmarkEALsreachandthoseabouttbdelared.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'~QQComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'~QComments:EAL3.1.1leakratesmabebetterlocatedunderRPV.That'swherethe'relocatedinTechnicalSecifications.ConsidermovinEAL3.1.2tounderRPValso.3-1

OSSIS2-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechlistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:1YesNo~NA5.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized?aooComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'Cl0~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEM@whenappropriate?~0CIComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'~ooComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValidatIonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecMistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:19Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergency'response,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?YesNo~NA5QQComments:None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'~QQComments:None.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures.etc,necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?~QQComments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'Q~QComments:EAL1.4.2:secichannel1with1413.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'?~QQComments:EAL6.1.1:aredesinatorsfortransformersreadilunderstandable'?Iscommonterminoloused'?3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:1YesNo~NA14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'P~0CIComments:None..15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7EALValfdatfonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecRHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:2Yes~N~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'~aoComments:None.2.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'?50C3Comments:None.,3.WasclassiQcationofanyconditions~norequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'~0ClComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'~00Comments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:25.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'YesNo~NASQ0Comments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'a~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'~0C3Comments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'~ooComments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheF~?500Comments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecMistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:2YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'~ooComments:None.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEMs'?oruComments:EAL13.11.3.21.3.3:whenvaluesarereceivedfromNMPshouldlisttheminTablesas2decimallacesscientiocnotatione.1.76E5.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'0~0Comments:EAL3.5.1:PathwatotheenvironmentisnsideredtoexistonceasoutbdPCisolaionbecausedownstreamvalvsarenotleaktested.WouldwanttoconsiderotherindicationsintheturbinebuildinsuchasvisualobservationofsteamleakARMsCAMstc.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValfdatIonProcedure,Rer.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:213.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetailVYesNo~NA0~CIComments:EAL1.2.1shouldreadreaterthanoreualtoDRMSred.14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'P~aoComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecMistDate;10793ChecklistNo.:~YesNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'Comments:None.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'rooComments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'o~oComments:EAL3.2.1:If1.68siisreacheduetolossofdellcoolinisAlertdeclared'AearssobutNESP-007clearlfocusesonlossofRCSandleakintoPC.Considerusinwordinforrestoreandmaintaininsteadofustmaintain.Restoreandmaintainwouldallowtheoeratortotoreduceressure.Butouhttodeclareifreductionisduetodellsraoeration.annotbemaintained<1.68siduetocoolan~leakse.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValidationProcedure.Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecldistNo.:~YesNo~NA4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassiAcationefforts'~QQComments:None.5.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized?rQQComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'QQ~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'~QQComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate?~QQComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure.Rev.0Attachment3-ValMationExerciseChechHstDate:10793'hecklistNo.:3YesNo~NA9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?~QQComments:None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'~QQComments:None.11.Didthe$MLsadequatelyspecifycontrols.instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc,necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?~QQComments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'~QQComments:None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'~QQComments:None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecMistDate10793ChecklistNo.:314.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'PYesNo~NA50ClComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate10793CheckBstNo.:4Y~s~N~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'?~00Comments:None.2.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'?r00Comments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditions~nrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'500Comments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'?~00Comments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChechHstDate:10793CimcldistNo.:45.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiAcation,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'YesNo~NA5QQComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'QQ~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'0QQComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'?~QQComments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?~QQComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValfdationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChechlistDate10793ChecklistNo.:4YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'rQQComments:None.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?rQQComments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'8QQComments:None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'~QQComments:None.14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'~QQComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:~YesNo~NAl.WhentheneedforclassiQcationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheusers~QQComments:None.2.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,didtheformatandlayoutofthe'EALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'?~QQComments:None.3.WasclassiAcationofanyconditions~norequiringemergencyclassificationavoidedV8QQComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'aQQComments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:5Yes~N~NA5.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognizedV~ooComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'?aorComments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassiQcationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'~ClClComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'~00Comments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?W00Comments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure.Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecRHstDate:10793CheckBstNo.:~YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'?rooComments:None.ll.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc..necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?~00Comments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'roaComments:~Non.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'0~0Comments:EAL6.1.3shouldnotinclude2XTS-XSNlbecauseitcannotbeoweredfromanoA'siteowersources.14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'~C30Comments:None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure.Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:515.AdditionalComments:None.YesNo~NA3-4

OSSIS2-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValMationExerciseChechlistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:~Yes~N~NA1.WhentheneedforclassiQcationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser?~Q0Comments:None.2.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassiQcationrecognition'~00Comments:None.3.'-Wasclassificationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'roaComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts?0~0Comments:Cateo6title"Sstem"doesnotreallAttheEALscontainedintheCateoe.turbinefailurecontrolroomevacuation.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecMist10793ChecklistNo.:65.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'Y~sNo~NAS00Comments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'oo~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate?~0QComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'E00Comments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?~Cl03-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaIMationExerciseChecRIistDate10793CheekBstNo.:6YesNo~NAComments:Modealicabili:isitnecessatodownradewhenthemodeshiftsfromowerostocoldshutdown'?No.Thisisaolicissue.Thechaneinmodeisnotamehanismtoescalateordescalate.NRCwillromlateinasoontobeissuedNUREGthataformaldeclarationneednotbemadeifoneAndsthatintheastaconditionreuirinescalationxistedbutsubseuentlassed.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformationVrooComments:None.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALsVrooComments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'oroComments:DefinitionsofclassiAcationsareneededonEALmatrixatleasttoheiinteretationofCateo9.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'~oo3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:6YesNo~NAComments:None.14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'~oaComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:SuestchaneEbarto-E.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChechlist10793ChecMtetNo.:7Y~eNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'?aoaComments:None.2.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergency,.classification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'~Cl0Comments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditions~norequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'0~CIComments:IfsraandressurecomedownandcanthereforemaintainlessthanscramseointdoesAlerthaveobedeclared'?BelieveshouldhavedeclaredAlertassoonasEOPsteasedthatermitteduseofsrasontrolerr,~ur..4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'?~00Comments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValtdationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecklistDate;10793ChecklistNo.:7YesNo~NA5.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'~QQComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'QQ~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'rQQComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'~QQComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecMistDatir10793ChecklistNo.:7YesNo~NA9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?~QQComments:None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'~QQComments;None.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?Q~QComments:EALsasdellressurebutEOPsasrimacontainmentressure.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated?Q~QComments:PerhasusedellarearadiationandutRMScomonentnumbersinEAL1.1.11.1.21.1.3.Doesradmonitornumberneedobesecified'?Possibl.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValtdatfonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate1079ChecklistNo.:713.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'YesNo~NAraComments:Takesstemdesinator43outofTable1.1.14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'~0ClComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.34

OSSI92-402A-7EALValfdatfonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate10793ChecldistNo.:~YesNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser?rooComments:None.2.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition?rQQComments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided?rooComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts?rQQrComments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:85.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized?YesNo~NA5QQComments;None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly?QQ~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate?Comments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate?5QQComments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs?~QQComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecMistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:8YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'~QQComments:None.ll.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALsVQSQComments:EAL1.4.4:Wouldnothavearriveddeclarationof>8Rhrunlessaccesstoareawasreuired.That'scorrect.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated?~QQComments:None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'SQQComments:None.14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationpro'cedure'?~QQComments:None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecklistDate10793ChecklistNo.:815.AdditionalComments:None.YesNo~NA'-4

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecklistDate:10793ChecldistNo.:9YesNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'?SQQComments:None.2.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition?5QQComments:None.3.Wasclassilicationofanyconditions~norequiringemergencyclassificationavoided?rQQComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts?~QQComments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValldatfonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecMistDate:10793ChecldistNo.:~YesNo~NA5.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'rQQComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly?Commcnts:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificai.ionescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'SQQComments:None.8.DidtheE.'ii.ssupportescalationofemergencyclassificai.ionwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescal:~t.ionwasappropriate'SQQCommcnt,s:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEAI.sY~QQCommcnts:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecklistDM:~laIC!ChecklistNo.:9YesNo~NA10.AretheEAI.sdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation?rQoComments:EAL1.5.2:oneSROwouldhavecalledAlertwovisualreortotherwouldhavewaitedforvisual.11.Did-theEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs?rooCommcnis:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated?oroCommcnIs:ARMs>100timessetointwhich~setointnlcrtalarm,orhialarm'PShouldbe"hi".ThisisalsoaroblemwithotherEALse..5.0~etc..J!.:stcut"red"or"ellow"noteveningarenUic,"-~'~,13.AretheI.:KLsdevoidofexcessivedetail?rooComments:None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecMistDate:~107(93ChecklistNo.:914.DidtheI;Al.identificationschemeadequatelysupportloc;!.ionoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificaL:onproceduresYes~N~NA~0ClCommcn!.s:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValidatfonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:10Y~sNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'?~ouComments:None.2.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'rooComments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'~aoComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'~00Comments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValldaUonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecklistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:10YesNo~NA5.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognizedVrQQComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperl+QQ~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'rQQComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'rQaComments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?~QQComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:10YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'~QQComments:None.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?QSQComments:StackandRBRWyeneffluentmonitordoesnototoDRMS.Table5.1.1thefirstinstrumentswillrobablnotreadlownuhoindiateUEandshouldrobablbelistedNAintheUEcolumn.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'QQComments:None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'~QQComments:None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecMistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:11YesNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'?~QQComments:None.2.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheFRLssupporteasyandrapidclassiQcationrecognition'QQComments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditions~nrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'Comments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'~QQComments:None,3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValfdatlonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate10793ChecklistNo.:115.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'YesNo~NA~QQComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'~QQComments:None.8,DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'QSQComments:Table5.1.1use2xand200xalarmsetointforUEandAlertresectivel.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidatfonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:119.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?YesNo~NA~ooComments:None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'Comments:EAL1.4.2is10RhrEAL1.4.4is8Rhr.Shoulduseonevalueandbasisforit.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?~ooComments:~Nne.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'rooComments:None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'oroComments:EAL1.4.4relaceoneormorewithan.Checktheuseofoneormorethrouhoutthematrix.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechlistDate;10793ChecklistNo.:11Y~No~NA14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'~ooComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecMistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:12YesNo~NA1.WhentheneedforclassiAcationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'?~QQComments:None.2.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'?~QQComments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided?rQQComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts?~QQComments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecRHstDate:10793ChecklistNo,:125.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'Y~sNo~NAo~oComments:EAL7.1.1:Mode3isblockedoutandthisEALisnotreuiredinthismode.Becauseofanevent'thatevolvesintimeleftmode1mode2andwhentheLCOtimerunsoutourinmode3wherEALdoesnoal.PrNESP-007shoulincludemode3.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'oo~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'rooComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate?~ooComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:129.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?Yes~N~NAroQComments:None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformationQrQComments:EAL7.2.3:Issueofbeininhothutdownandan'ttobelow212'F.ShouldonlbeaUE.Ifincoldshutdownbutcan'tstatherethenit'sanAlert.ShouldincludthisreasonininTrainin.EAL7.2.3:Shouldbeusin200'Finsteadof212'F.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?~QQComments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'~QQComments:None.3-3 0

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechlistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:1213.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail?YesNo~NA~aoComments:None.14.DidtheEALidentiQcationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'~aaComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

,

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValfdationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecRHstDate;10793ChecklistNo.:13YesNo~NA1.WhentheneedforclassiAcationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser?~aoComments:None.2.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassiAcationrecognition'ooComments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'~aoComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'?~aaComments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:1079ChecklistNo.:135.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'YesNo~NA~aaComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperl+Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'~0ClComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriateVrooComments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?~ooComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValfdationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:13Y~sNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation?Q~QComments:Table8.2and8.3shouldinclude"ControlBuildin".Table8.2shouldnotinclude"CoolinTower"and"OilStorae",TakeTable8.3areasoutofTable8.2tavoidconfusionoveriffrninlitdareas.NthnhaneEALsreferencinTable8.2sothatitnowreferencesbothTable8.2andTable8.3.EAL7.2.4shouldstatecannotbemaintainedinaofstablished."Within15minuteaftercontrolroomevacuationadeuatecorecoolincannotbemaintained".No.UsewordinfromexistinEAL.ll.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs?~QQComments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated?Q~QComments:EAL8.3.5shouldreference"vital"table.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValfdatlonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate10793ChecklistNo.:13Y~~N~NA13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'~0ClComments:None.14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure?800Comments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:14YesNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser?~QQComments:None.2.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,didtheformatandlayoutofthelessupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'?~QQComments:None.3.WasclassiQcationofanyconditions~norequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'~QQComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts?0QQComments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValfdatfonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechlistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:14YesNo~NA5.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'SCl0Comments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'C30~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'SC30Comments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'?~ooComments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?raoComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValMationExerciseChecMistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:14YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'Q8QComments:EAL8.4.6shouldincludeword"sustained"toavoidtransientsike.Don'includeatimelimit.Metcomuterrvides1minuteaveraerins.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?~QQComments:~Nne.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'Q~QComments:Table8.3needstohave"SecuriBuildin".13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'rQQComments:None.3-3

,

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecklistDate:107ChecklistNo.:14YesNo~NA14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'SQQComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecRHstDate10793ChecklistNo.:~lY~sNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'rQQComments:~Non.2.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'Comments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'0QQComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'SQQComments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecMistDate10793ChecklistNo.:155.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'Y~eNo~NA~ooComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassiQcationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'Comments:~Nne.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'rooComments:None.9Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?~ooComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValfdationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecklistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:15Yes~N~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'a~oComments:EAL8.1.3needstostatethattheareasofconcernarethosedefinedbSecuriSeemsthattheseareaswouldallreuirkecardtoaccess.NeedtomakeitclearatSAElevelthatitisSecuri'scall.IsSecuriersonnelknowledcableenouhtoknowthatitertainstoanintrusion.NMP2willcontactSecuritoensuretheirwordsaresamemeaninasEALs.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?Comments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'?0~0Comments:EAL8.1.4:ShouldbeanANDnoOR.Chanet"LossoflantcontrIfromthecontrolroom"becauseanRSPtakeovercouldtransferthecontrolroomcaabilitocontrolthelant.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:1513.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'Yes~N~NA80ClComments:~Non.14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'~00Comments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate;10793ChecklistNo.:16YesNo~NA1.WhentheneedforclassiQcationwasinitiallyrecognized,werethe&MLseasilyaccessibletotheuser'5QQComments:None.2.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassiQcationrecognition'~QQComments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditions~norequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'SQQComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'~QQComments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechlistDate;10793ChecklistNo.:16Y~~N~NA5.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'~QQComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'QQ~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'~QQComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'~QQComments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?~QQComments:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidatfonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecklistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:16~YeNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'~oaComments:~Nne.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?~aoComments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'~oaComments:None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'~oaComments:None.14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'aoaComments:ToAdesksidebsidewuldbebased.Makethemortable.shouldbeoneboard.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-3

(

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.VaBdationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:17Yes~N~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'?~ooComments:None.2.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'SClC3Comments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'50ClComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'~aaComments:None.5.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'500Comments:None.3-1

(

OSSI92-402A-7EALValfdationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:17YesNo~NA6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly?Comments:~Non.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassiQcationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate?~CI0Comments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate?SCI0Comments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs?roaComments:None.10,AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation?50ClComments:None.3-2

,

OSSI92-402A-7EALValldatlonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecldistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:1711.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?Yes~N~NASCI0Comments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'~00Comments:None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail'?S00Comments:None.14.DidtheEALidentiQcationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'~oaComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidatfonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-Va1MationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:~lYes~N~NA1.Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'?Comments:None.2.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'?~QQComments:None.3.Wasclassificationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided?~QQComments:~Non.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'?~QQComments:None.5.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized?rQQComments:None.3-1 L

OSSI92-402A-7EALValldatfonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:18YesNo~NA6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'Q5Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassificationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriateVrQQComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'~QQComments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?rQQComments:None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation?~QQComments:None.3-2

,

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:1811.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?YesNo~NA~QQComments:None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated?~QQComments:None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail?~QQComments:None.14.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'~QQComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EALValidationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecRHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:19YesNo~NA1~Whentheneedforclassificationwasinitiallyrecognized,weretheEALseasilyaccessibletotheuser'rooComments:None.2.WhereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassiQcation,didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassificationrecognition'rooComments:None.3.WasclassiQcationofanyconditionsnotrequiringemergencyclassificationavoided'rooComments:None.4.DidtypeandarrangementofEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesadequatelysupportemergencyclassificationefforts'~ooComments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValfdationProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:195.Whereplantconditionsrequiredemergencyclassification,wastheoperatingmodeapplicabilityoftheEALsclearlyrecognized'Y~sNo~NA~aaComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergencyPlanproceduresinterfaceproperly'00~Comments:None.7.Afterinitialclassification,didsubsequentclassiQcationescalationfollowalogicalprogressionintheEALswhenappropriate'~ooComments:None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalationofemergencyclassificationwhenplantconditionsindicatedthatescalationwasappropriate'Comments:None.9.Whereplantconditionspermittedreductioninthelevelofemergencyresponse,wasdowngradingofclassificationseasilyrecognizedusingtheEALs'?rooComments:None.3-2

,

OSSI92-402A-7EALValfdatlonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChechHstDate:10793ChecklistNo.:'19YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleadingorincorrectinformation'?Q~0Comments:Lowlakelevelis233.1ftforservicewaterumoerabilitbasedonUSARlevelforintake.USARminimumlakelevelreventseverreachinminimumintakelevel.Thereforecouldotolaklevelinsteadoflowintakelevel'?No.couldhaveanintakeroblemcausinlowlevelwhenlakelevelsareok.Canitbemeasured'Checkinsimulator.ItisoninstrumentLI-502on~I6D1.11.DidtheEALsadequatelyspecifycontrols,instrumentation,operatoraides,procedures,etc.necessarytoeffectivelyevaluatetheEALs'?~oaComments:None12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectivelyevaluated'~00Comments:None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessivedetail?~00Comments:None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7EAI.ValldatlonProcedure,Rev.0Attachment3-ValidationExerciseChecldistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:1914.DidtheEALidentificationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure?YesNo~NAroaComments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2NMP-2EALVeriAcatlon&ValidationReport,Rev.0Attachment6FAT.ValidationCommentDatabase6-1

,

~~a~~a~~re~~~RecordNo.18Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausOriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2QJAF0IP-30NMP-2C3GenericBWRHGeneral0IP-2CINMP-1CjGinna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070ProcedureI]VerificationQTrainingCjHardwareCJEALC]TechnicalBasesCIValidationClDeviationC3NoneCat.N/ACommentGeneraldiscussion:IC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**modebar-whatisit?whatdoeswhitevsgreymean?TryincreasingcolorintensityfromUEtoGEasmeansofhighlightingchangesinclassification.ResolutionModebardefinitionisgiveninthelegendatthebottomoftheEALchart.Increasingcolorintensitywouldoverusecolorsanddetractfromtheireffectivenessforseparating--=~EALcategories.tatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOoClosedRecordNo.19Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausOriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2CIJAFQIP-30NMP-2C3GenericBWR8GeneralClIP-20NMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007C3Procedure0VerificationClTrainingClHardware0EAL0TechnicalBasesQValidationClDeviation0NoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.'*"CommentScenario1,question2:ItwouldbehelpfultolaminateEALmatrixanduseerasablemarkerssoEDcanmarkEALsreachedandthoseabouttobedeclared.ResolutionAgree.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed 0,

RecordNo.20Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausOriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2CJJAFOIP-38NMP-2OGenericBWRQGeneralPIP-2PNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007CIProcedure0VerificationCJTrainingClHardwareC3EALC3TechnicalBasesC3ValidationQDeviationQNoneCat.N/AIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario1,question12:EAL1.4.2:specifychannel1with14A/B.ResolutionAddedchannel1assuggested.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosedRecordNo.21Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSOriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2CIJAFQIP-3CINMP-2HGenericBWRQGeneralImpactPIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaQGenericPWR0NUMARC-007C3Procedure0Verification0TrainingDHardwareQEALQTechnicalBasesClValidationQDeviationQNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario1,question4:EAL3.1.1leakratesmaybebetterlocatedunderRPV.That'swherethey'elocatedinTechnicalSpecifications.ConsidermovingEAL3.1.2tounderRPValso.ResolutionMovedEALsassuggested.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

NameM.C.DauSRecordNo.22Date9/20/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyNMP-2QJAFQIP-3HNMP-2QGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardwareQEALQTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.*'mer.Class.**CommentScenario1,question13:EAL6.1.1:aredesignatorsfortransformersreadilyunderstandable?Iscommonterminologyused?ResolutionYes.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.23Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausrlginatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyNMP-2QJAFQIP-3gNMP-2QGenericBWRQGeneralImpactQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRQNUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardwareQEALQTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario2,question11:EAL1.3.1,1.3.2,1.3.3:whenvaluesarereceivedfromNMP,shouldlisttheminTablesas2decimalplaces,scientificnotation(e.g.,1.76E5).ResolutionAgree.statusOeOpen0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

NameM.C.DauSRecordNo.24Date9/2Q/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyNMP-2QJAFQIP-3C3NMP-2QGenericBWRHGeneral0IP-2QNMP-1C]GinnaQGenericPWRmpactClNUMARC-007ClProcedure0VerificationClTrainingClHardwareQEALQTechnicalBasesCJValidationC]DeviationQNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario2,question12:EAL3.5.1:PathwaytotheenvironmentisconsideredtoexistoncepastoutbdPCisolationbecausedownstreamvalvesarenotleaktested.Wouldwanttoconsiderotherindicationsintheturbinebuildingsuchasvisualobservationofsteamleak,ARMs,CAMs,etc.ResolutionCKWAgree.Pathwaytoenvironmentshouldnotbeassumedbecausedownstreamvalvesarenotleaktested.Otherindicationsshouldbeusedtosupportdecisionthatapathwaytoenvironmentexists.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.25Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausrlginatlngSiteSiteApplicabilityMP-20JAFC]IP-3IRINMP-2QGenericBWRC3GeneralImpactC3IP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWR0NUMARC-007QProcedure0VerificationCITrainingQHardware0EALClTechnicalBasesQValidation0Deviation0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.*'mer.Class.**CommentScenario2,question13:EAL1.2.1shouldreadgreaterthanorequaltoDRMS(red).ResolutionAgree.ChangedEALto">DRMSred".status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

NameM.C.DauSRecordNo.26Date9/2Q/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabilltyNMP-2QJAFQIP-38NMP-2C3GenericBWR0GeneralCIIP-2C]NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRmpact0NUMARC-0070ProcedureClVerificationClTraining0HardwareQEALQTechnicalBases0ValidationC3DeviationC3Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario5,question13:EAL6.1.3shouldnotinclude2XTS-XSN1becauseitcannotbepoweredfromanyoffsitepowersources.ResolutionDeleted2XTS-XSN1.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosedRecordNo.27Date9/2Q/93riglnatlngSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-20JAFQIP-30NMP-2QGenericBWRHGeneral0IP-2QNMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpactClNUMARC-007C3ProcedureC1VerificationClTraining0Hardware0EAL0TechnicalBases0ValidationC]DeviationClNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario6,question4:Category7.2title"System"doesnotreallyfittheEALscontainedintheCategory(e.g.,turbinefailure,controlroomevacuation).Resolution4CKW(needtodothisforNMP.doneforJAF.)Changedtitleto"SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation".status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

NameM.C.DauSRecordNo.28oate9/20/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyNMP-20JAFI7IP-30NMP-2C3GenericBWRgGeneralPIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRmpact0NUMARC-0070Procedure0VerificationCITraining0Hardware0EALQTechnicalBasesCIValidationQDeviation0NoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario6,question12:DefinitionsofclassificationsareneededonEALmatrixatleasttohelpinterpretationofCategory9.ResolutionCategory9embodiesthedefinitionsforeachclassification.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionQIClosedRecordNo.29Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausrlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyMP-2PJAFQIP-3PNMP-2QGenericBWR8GeneralImpact0IP-20NMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRClNUMARC-007ClProcedureClVerificationOTrainingCIHardwareQEAL0TechnicalBasesCIValidationDDeviationClNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.'mer.Class.**CommentScenario6,question9:Modeapplicability:isitnecessarytodowngradewhenthemodeshiftsfrompoweropstocoldshutdown?ResolutionNo.Thisisapolicyissue.Thechangeinmodeisnotamechanismtoescalateordescalate.NRCwillpromolgateinasoontobeissuedNUREGthataformaldeclarationneednotbemadeifonefindsthatinthepastaconditionrequiringescalationexistedbutsubsequentlypassed.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.30Date9/20/93OriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2PJAFPIP-3PNMP-2PGenericBWRHGeneralPIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRImpactpNUMARC-007pProcedurepVerificationpTrainingpHardwarePEALpTechnicalBasespValidationpDeviationpNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario6,question15:SuggestchangeEbarto-E.ResolutionEbarisusedbyIP2/3andwillbecontinuedhereforconsistencyamongEALs.statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosed..RecordNo.31Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausriglnatlngSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2PJAFPIP-38NMP-2PGenericBWRPGeneralImpactPIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRpNUMARC-007pProcedurepVerificationpTrainingpHardwarePEALpTechnicalBasespValidationpDeviationpNoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.*Emer.Class.'*CommentScenario7,question13:Takesystemdesignator43outofTable1.1.ResolutionChangedassuggested.sta~usOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.32Date9/20/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyNMP-20JAFQIP-30NMP-2HGenericBWRC3GeneralC3IP-2QNMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRmpactCINUMARC-007CIProcedureC3Verification0TrainingClHardware0EALClTechnicalBasesQValidationC]Deviation0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario7,question3:Ifsprayandpressurecomesdownandcanthereforemaintainlessthanscramsetpoint,doesAlerthavetobedeclared?BelieveshouldhavedeclaredAlertassoonasEOPsteppassedthatpermitteduseofspraystocontrolpressure.ResolutionSeedefinitionof"cannotbemaintained".Aslongaspressureisbelowthescramsetpointandpressurecanbemaintainedbelowthescramsetpoint.ThisEALdoesnothavetobedeclared.Notethat"...duetocoolantleakage"hasbeenaddedtothisEAL.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.33Date9/20/93rlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyMP-2j3JAFQIP-3IHINMP-2QGenericBWRC]GeneralQIP-2PNMP-1PGinna0GenericPWRImpactCINUMARC-007QProcedureClVerificationCITrainingC3Hardware0EALC3TechnicalBases0ValidationCJDeviation0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario7,question12:PerhapsusedrywellarearadiationandputRMScomponentnumbersinEAL1.3.1,1.3.2,1.3.3.Doesradmonitornumberneedtobespecified?Possibly.ResolutionAddedword"area".RMS/radmonitornumbersarenotneeded.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.34Date9/20/93OriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2QJAFOIP-38NMP-2OGenericBWRClGeneralC]IP-2CjNMP-1QGinnaC]GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007QProcedure0Verification0TrainingDHardwareDEALC1TechnicalBasesC7ValidationC3DeviationCjNonecat.N/AIC¹*No.Emer.Class.**CommentScenario7,question11:EALsaysdrywellpressure,butEOPsaysprimarycontainmentpressure.ResolutionChangedto"primarycontainmentpressure"toagreewithEOP.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedRecordNo.35Date9/20/93rlglnatlngSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-20JAFC3IP-3ONMP-2OGenericBWRHGeneralHIP-2C7NMP-1C]GinnaC3GenericPWRImpactCINUMARC-0070ProcedureC3VerificationClTraining0HardwareCjEALC3TechnicalBases0Validation0DeviationC3NoneCat.N/AIC¹*No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario8,question11:EAL1.4.4:Wouldnothavearrivedatdeclarationof>8R/hrunlessaccesstoareawasrequired.ResolutionThat'scorrect.statusOOpen0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

RecordNo.36Date9/20/93OriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-20JAFQIP-38NMP-2QGenericBWRC]General0IP-2ClNMP-1ClGinnaQGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007CIProcedureQVerificationC1TrainingCIHardwareC3EALClTechnicalBasesQValidationDDeviation0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario9,question12:ARMs>100timessetpoint,whichsetpointalertalarmorhialarm?Shouldbe"hi".ThisisalsoaproblemwithotherEALs(e.g.,5.0,etc.).Justput"red"or"yellow"noteveninparentheses.ResolutionChangedtouse"DRMSred".status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0+ClosedRecordNo.37Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausrlglnatlngSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2'QJAFQIP-3C]NMP-2C3GenericBWRgGeneralImpactQIP-2PNMP-1C3GinnaDGenericPWRC3NUMARC-007C3ProcedureQVerificationIITrainingQHardware0EALQTechnicalBases0ValidationC3Deviation0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario9,question10:EAL1.5.2:oneSROwouldhavecalledAlertwo/visualreport,otherwouldhavewaitedforvisual.ResolutionDeclarationisrequiredifbundlewasnotspecificallyseenuncovered.Thiswillbecoveredintraining.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.38Date9/20/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyNMP-2ClJAFQIP-38NMP-20GenericBWR0GeneralPIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070Procedure0Verification0TrainingC3Hardware0EAL0TechnicalBasesC3Validation0DeviationCINonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.*CommentScenario10,question11:StackandRB/RWventeffluentmonitordoesnotgotoDRMS.Table5.1.1thefirsttwoinstrumentswillprobablynotreadlowenoughtoindicateUEandshouldprobablybelistedasN/AintheUEcolumn.ResolutionChangedfirsttwoentriesinTable5.1.1toread:Radwaste/ReactorBldgVentEffluent2xalarmMainStackEffluent2xalarm'tatus0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOIClosedNameM.C.DauSRecordNo.39Date9/20/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2C3JAF[3IP-3ClNMP-28GenericBWR0General0IP-20NMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007QProcedure0VerificationQTrainingQHardware0EALCITechnicalBasesClValidationQDeviationClNoneIC¹**No.*"Emer.Class.**cat.N/ACommentScenario11,question10:EAL1.4.2is10R/hr,EAL1.4.4is8R/hr.Shoulduseonevalueandbasisforit.MaybeshouldchangetechbasisdescriptiontotalkaboutgettingstaffeduptobeabletodoactionsrequiredwiththeMSOradvalue.ResolutionAgree,butthebasisfor8R/hrhasbeenestablishedbyNMPCcalculation.DifferencefromEOPMSOvalueshouldberesolvedinEOPprogram.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

RecordNo.40Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausOriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-20JAFClIP-3QNMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-0070Procedure0VerificationC]TrainingQHardwareQEALClTechnicalBases0Validation0DeviationC]Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario11,question8:Table5.1.1use2xand200xalarmsetpointforUEandAlert,respectively.ResolutionChangedassuggested.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedNameM.C.DausRecordNo.41Date9/20/93OriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-20JAF0IP-30NMP-20GenericBWR8GeneralDIP-2QNMP-1C3Ginna0GenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-0070ProcedureC3VerificationQTrainingQHardware0EALQTechnicalBasesC3Validation0Deviation0NoneCat.N/AIC¹'*No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario11,question13:EAL1.4.4replaceoneormorewithany.Checktheuseofoneormorethroughoutthematrix.ResolutionChangedassuggested.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.42Date9/20/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcablllty.NMP-2C3JAFQIP-3HNMP-2OGenericBWRgGeneral0IP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactCINUMARC-007C]Procedure0VerificationHTraining0Hardware0EALOTechnicalBasesC3ValidationClDeviationQNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.*Emer.Class.**CommentScenario12,question10:EAL7.2.3:Issueofbeinginhotshutdownandcan'tgettobelow212'F.ShouldonlybeaUE.Ifincoldshutdownbutcan'tstaythere,thenit'sanAlert.ShouldincludethisreasoninginTraining.EAL7.2.3:Shouldbeusing200'Finsteadof212'F.ResolutionChanged212to200'F.statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionO>>ClosedRecordNo.43Date9/20/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyNMP-2OJAFCIIP-3DNMP-2OGenericBWR8GeneralOIP-2QNMP-1C3GinnaC3GenericPWRImpactCJNUMARC-007ClProcedureQVerification0TrainingQHardwareQEALC3TechnicalBases0ValidationPDeviation0NoneIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**cat.N/ACommentScenario12,question5:EAL7.1.1:Mode3isblockedoutandthisEALisnotrequiredinthismode.Becauseofaneventthatevolvesintime,leftmode1,mode2andwhentheLCOtimerunsoutyourinmode3whereEALdoesnotapply.PerNESP-007shouldincludemode3.ResolutionIncludedmode3.senatusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOiClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.44Date9/20/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyNMP-2C3JAFC]IP-3QNMP-2C]GenericBWRIHLGeneraleQIP-2QNMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRimpact0NUMARC-007CIProcedureC3Verification0Training0Hardware0EALQTechnicalBasesQValidationCIDeviationQNoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario13,question12:EAL8.3.5shouldreference"vital"table.ResolutionAdded"vital"totable.AddedtoEAL"...neededforsafeplantoperation".status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosedRecordNo.45Date9/20/93rlglnatingSiteSiteAppllcabllltyNMP-2QJAFC1IP-30NMP-2CJGenericBWRgGeneral0IP-2ClNMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRimpactC3NUMARC-007C3ProcedureC3VerificationQTrainingQHardware[7EALQTechnicalBasesCIValidationQDeviationQNonelC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**cat.N/ACommentScenario13,question10:Table8.2and8.3shouldinclude"ControlBuilding".Table8.2shouldnotinclude"CoolingTower"and"OilStorage".TakeTable8.3areasoutofTable8.2toavoidconfusionoverdifferencesinlistedareas.NeedtothenchangeEALsreferencingTable8.2sothatitnowreferencesbothTable8.2andTable8.3.ResolutfonChangedassuggested.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionQeClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.46Date9/2Q/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2QJAFQIP-3QNMP-2QGenericBWRHGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardwareQEALQTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario13,question10:EAL7.2.4shouldstatecannotbemaintainedinsteadofestablished."Within15minutesaftercontrolroomevacuation,adequatecorecoolingcannotbemaintained".ResolutionNo.UsedwordingfromexistingEAL.statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDisposition0ClosedNameM.C.DausRecordNo.47Date9/2Q/93rlglnatlngSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2QJAFQIP-3QNMP-2QGenericBWRHGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007QProcedureQVerificationQTrainingQHardwareQEALQTechnicalBasesQValidationQDeviationQNoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.*'mer.Class.**CommentScenario14,question10:EAL8.4.6shouldincludeword"sustained"toavoidtransientspike.Don'tincludeatimelimit.Metcomputerprovides15minuteaveragereadings.ResolutionAddedword"sustained".sta~usOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDispositionOeClosed

NameM.C.DauSRecordNo.48Date9/20/93OriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-20JAFC3lP-3IINMP-2C3GenericBWRpGeneralDIP-2QNMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRmpactCJNUMARC-007CIProcedure0VerificationCITraining0HardwareQEALQTechnicalBasesPValidationC3DeviationPNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario14,question12:Table8.3needstohave"SecurityBuilding".ResolutionAddedsecuritybuildingtotable.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDispositionClosedRecordNo.49Date9/20/93rlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllltyNMP-20JAF0IP-3CINMP-20GenericBWRIGeneralpIP-2pNMP-1pGinnapGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007C3ProcedureC]VerificationPTrainingQHardware0EAL0TechnicalBases0Validation0Deviation0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario15,question10:EAL8.1.3needstostatethattheareasofconcernarethosedefinedbySecurity.Seemsthattheseareaswouldallrequirekeycardtoaccess.NeedtomakeitclearatSAElevelthatitisSecurity'scall.lsSecuritypersonnelknowledgeableenoughtoknowthatitpertainstoanintrusion.NMP2willcontactSecuritytoensuretheirwordsaresamemeaningasEALs.Resolution11/9EALclearlystatesthattheconcerniswithaplantsecurityvitalarea.AwaitingNMPconfirmationthatsecuritywordsmeansameasEALintent.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed

NameM.C.Daus~RecordNo.50Date9/20/93OrlglnatlngSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2C3JAFC3IP-3C3NMP-2C3GenericBWRHGeneralC3IP-2C3NMP-1C]GinnaC3GenericPWRmpactC3NUMARC-007C3ProcedureC3VerificationC3TrainingC3HardwareC3EALC3TechnicalBasesC3ValidationC3DeviationC3NoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario15,question12:EAL8.1.4:ShouldbeanANDnoOR.Changeto"Lossofplantcontrolfromthecontrolroom"becauseanRSPtakeovercouldtransferthecontrolroomcapabilitytocontroltheplant.ResolutionChangedassuggested.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0IClosedNameM.C.DauSRecordNo.5IDate9/20/93rlglnatlngSiteSiteAppllcabllityNMP-2C3JAFC3IP-3QNMP-2CIGenericBWRgGeneralC3IP-2C3NMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007C3ProcedureC3VerificationC3TrainingC3HardwareC3EALC3TechnicalBasesC3ValidationC3DeviationC3NoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario16,question14:Tofitdesk,sidebysidewouldbebest.Makethemportable.Shouldbeoneboard.ResolutionAgree.status0Open0Resolved/AwaitingDisposition0Closed YE'

.,RecordNo.52Date9/20/93NameM.C.DauSOriginatingSiteSiteApplicabilityNMP-2CIJAF0IP-38NMP-2C3GenericBWRQGeneralDIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007CIProcedureClVerificationQTraining0HardwareQEALQTechnicalBasesCIValidation0Deviation0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario19,question19:Lowlakelevelis233.1ftforservicewaterpumpoperabilitybasedonUSARlevelforintake.USARminimumlakelevelpreventseverreachingminimumintakelevel.Therefore,couldgotolakelevelinsteadoflowintakelevel?Canitbemeasured?Checkinsimulator.ItisoninstrumentLI-502onpanel601.ResolutionNo.Couldhaveanintakeproblemcausinglowlevelwhenlakelevelsareok.Canbemeasuredincontrolroom.statusOOpenOResolved/AwaitingDisposition0+Closed l~AVffIC OSSI92-402A-7EALValldatlonProcedure.Rev.0Attachment3-VaHdationExerciseChecMistDate:10793ChecklistNo.:1014.DidtheEALidentiQcationschemeadequatelysupportlocationoftheEALconditionwithintheclassificationprocedure'YesNo~NASCl0Comments:None.15.AdditionalComments:None.3-4

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