ML20138R015

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Responds to Request Re Author Conversations W/Judge Cotter Concerning Appointment of New Facility Licensing Board.Draft Notice of Appointment Received on 840329.GPU 830223 Interofc Memo Re Polar Crane Safety Evaluation Encl
ML20138R015
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Shoreham
Issue date: 05/03/1984
From: Malsch M
NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To: Palladino
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20136E247 List:
References
FOIA-85-437 NUDOCS 8511180380
Download: ML20138R015 (4)


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May 3, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman Palladino FROM:

Martin G. Malsch Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT:

CONVERSATIONS WITH JUDGE COTTER REGARDING APPOINTMENT OF NEW SHOREHAM LICENSING BOARD This is in response to your request that I advise you of my, conversations with Judge Cotter regarding the appointment of the Shoreham Licensing Board chaired by Judge Miller.

On March 29, 1984, I received what appeared to be a draft notice of appointment of a licensing board chaired by Judge Miller to preside over any proceedings on the Shoreham e

supplemental low power motion.

I called Judge Cotter and raised the following two issues for his consideration in connection with the reappointment.

First, I raised the issue whether the premise for the unavailablility of the current board was the fact that expedited hearings on LILCO's low power motion would be held.

I pointed out that if this was the case then he had no authority to appoint a new Licensing Board because the appointment was premised upon an invalid assumption.

The motion was still pending and Judge Cotter had no authority to grant or deny it.

I inquired whether the more prudent course might be to let the current Board act on the need for an expedited proceeding and then, if it determined that an expedited proceeding was warranted and feasible, advise him of any resulting schedule conflicts.

Judge Cotter assured me that he had been informed by the current Board that they were unable to even rule within a reasonable time on the need for an expedited hearing for Shoreham, and therefore there was a problem of availability regardless of whether the motion was later granted or denied.

I stated that if indeed that was the case, then there was an availability problem with the current Board.

I further raised the issue whether the appointment of a new Licensing Board would create an appearance problem at this time.

I explained to Judge Cotter that there might be an appearance problem because it could appear that the current

/76 8511180300 851017 PDR FOIA GILINSK85-437 PDR

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2 May 3, 1984 Board, which had denied LILCO's previous low power motion, was being replaced by another Board which would be more favorably inclined.

Judge Cotter agreed to think about the appearance problem and get back in touch with me.

He did so the next day, informing me that he had decided to go ahead and appoint a new Licensing Board.

I told him that was his decision to make.

cc:

Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal SECY 1

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2 ATTACHMENT 2 Inter-Offico Momerandum f

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' Da:e February 23, 1983 S'uopct Polar Crane Safety Evaluation Location TMI Trailer 175 To B. K. Kanga cirector, Unit 2 Quality Assurance has reviewed the safety Evaluation for the Polar Crane L:ad Test and the concerns that have been raised per your request.

Bechtel The calculaticas to back up the safety Evaluatien were reviewed.

Quality Assurance was requestad and has reviewed the calculations in Gaithersburg and.GPCN CA has reviewed the cale-11ations available on site.

The only calculations availaJie at the site were B&W analysis of decay heat removal, which were originally ~ performed to support quick lock, but are also In the Safety Evaluation, applicable to the loss of ecmponents due to load drep.seme events w made. One exa=ple is the drep of a missile shield directly en the Reacter Head.

The extent of damage is postulated and not backed up by calculations.

Our review also identifieE two iteEs that were not specifically addressed in the safety Evaluatien:

The lead test should qualify the sa=e length of cable that will be 1) required for head' lift.

Lead testing of the fabricated load test frane prior to Polar Crane 2) load test has not been addressed, 'although all other rigging ecmpenents have.

-here % e bee additional. concerns raised that are not directly related to the We plan te i.et:ti pt-safety Evaluati=n but which could be a potential problem.

the following areas in = ore detail and will inform you if cur current program is inadequa:e:

Trai.ing f er :psri.:::s and parsc...el directing the Icaf tast.

1) 2)

Calibration of the lead cell.

all Mcdifications to the Polar Crane--cencerns have been raised that 3) modificattens to the Polar Crane vere not appropriately doc =ented.

Program - verify that the progra-: at.ic controls f or testing were 4)

Test followed (i.e., AP-1043 and AP-1047 have been c. plied with).

Reverify inspectic. and refurbish =ent dcct=tentatien.

5) acc:een L

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3. K. Eanga Memorandum 6110-83-039.

February 23, 1983 Page 2

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I would recommend Engineering hasure themselves that they have adequately

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covered the two items noted concerning the safety Evaluation. Though these items may not r<gd.re any modification to the safety Evaluation, they may j

require change or review for applicability to the actual load test implementing j procedures.

In stannary, we in QA have found no significant programmatic problems with the safety Evaluation or the Polar Crane refurbishment process but we will continue to assess this program a,pd keep you. appraised of any problems discovered. It should be noted that there appears to be a number of technical cencarns being raised and these should be addressed fully by Engineering.

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An interesting ite= to note which we did discuss within QA was the approach Bechtel has taken on this specific safety Evaluation. Though it is acceptable from a programmatic and engineering standpoint to perform the evaluatation based on a worst case scenario, in our recoverf mode, there may be sczne operational considerations that may make th'is approach not always prudent. An analogy is, in our industry for years we considered the 'large ' break ICCA the worst case limiting accident bef8k e the 'dI accident, where as 'now we have learned that '

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a small break ICCA deserves equal n'htention. senior Engineering management should perhaps review this issue.

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COMo

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B. E. Ballard, Sr.

Manager - TMI QA Modifications /Cperations BEB:JFM: cam

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cc:

N. C. Karanas R. I. Iong CATCES 6

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