ML20197J593
| ML20197J593 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1998 |
| From: | Chris Miller NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Quinn V Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9812150154 | |
| Download: ML20197J593 (3) | |
Text
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Septeraber 16, 1998 l
i Vanessa Quinn, Acting Chief State and I.ocal Regulatory Evaluation and Assessment Branch ,
Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W. )
Washington D.C. 20472
SUBJECT:
EXEMPTION OF MAINE YANKEE FROM OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS 1
l
Dear Ms. Quinn:
This is to notify you that on September 3,1998, the NRC granted an exemption to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (the licensee) from certain sections of 10 CFR 50 conceming emergency response planning, thereby allowing the licensee to discontinue offsite emergency planning activities and reduce the scope of its onsite planning at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (Maine Yankee). A copy of the exemption is enclosed.
The facility, which is located at the licensee's site in Lincoln County, Maine, is a permanently shut down pressurized-water reactor. By letter dated August 7,1997, the licensee t,ubmitted ;
written certification that the licensee's Board of Directors had decided to permanently cease I operation of Maine Yankee and that fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor.
In light of the exemption granted to the licensee, the NRC no longer requires FEMA to monitor, review, or report on offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities at Maine Yankee. Emergency planning and preparedness can be limited to onsite activities, simple notification to offsite authorities, and training for offsite personnel who may need to respond onsite (e.g., fire, ambulance, and law enforcement personnel). [j Please notify the State and local govemments that the offsite emergency plans and l preparedness will no longer be required for Maine Yankee. Should you need more information on this matter please contact Mr. Daniel M. Barss of my staff at 301-415-2922. 4)
Sincerely, M@harles
'C L. Miller, Chiefdd6nedbyCharlosLth Emergency Preparedness and 9812150154 900916 Radiation Protection Branch PDR ADOCK 05000309 Division of Reactor Program Management F PDR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-309
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Enclosures:
As stated l DISTRIBUTION PERB R/F DBarss BZaleman CMiller RBoces, RI JRoe EP Staff i
i Up^ b FKantor MModes, RI MWebb G:\DMB1\MYEPEXFM.LTR To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE PERB lD E SC/PERB M lC BC/PERB l( l
_NAME DMBarss By% BZalctitadh CLMillerfA_
DATE 9/ Ff /98 9/ H /98" 9// f /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
September 16, 1998
, Vensssa Quinn, Acting Chief i State and Local Regulatory Evaluation l and Assessment Branch ,
I
, Federal Emergency Management Agency j 500 C Street, S.W.
- Washington D.C. 20472 i
l
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SUBJECT:
EXEMPTION OF MAINE YANKEE FROM OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS i
j
Dear Ms. Quinn:
l This is to notify you that on September 3,1998, the NRC granted an exemption to Maine i Yankee Atomic Power Company (the licensee) from certain sections of 10 CFR 50 conceming i i
emergency response planning, thereby allowing the licensee to discontinue offsite emergency i j planning activities and reduce the scope of its onsite planning at the Maine Yankee Atomic '
l Power Station (Maine Yankee). A copy of the exemption is enclosed.
l The facility, which is located at the licensee's site in Lincoln County, Maine, is a permanently -
l shut down pressurized-water reactor. By letter dated August 7,1997, the licensee submitted I
- written certification that the licensee's Board of Directors had decided to permanently cease
- operation of Maine Yankee and that fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor.
- in light of the exemption granted to the licensee, the NRC no longer requires FEMA to monitor, j . review, or report on offsite radiological emergency planning and preparerfass activities at i j Maine Yankee. Emergency planning and preparedness can be limited to onsite activities, t simple notification to offsite authorities, and training for offsite personnel who may need to l respond onsite (e.g., fire, ambulance, and law enforcement personnel). j 1
j Please notify the State end local govemments that the offsite emergency plans and I l preparedness will no longer be required for Maine Yankee. Should you need more information ;
j on this matter please contact Mr. Daniel M. Barss of my staff at 301-415-2922. )
i Sincerely,
- N&id$6fedbyChattesLMf l Taarles C. Miller, Chief
! Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Protection Branch j Division of Reactor Program Management
- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i Docket No. 50-309
Enclosures:
As stated DISTRIBUTION DBarss CMiller JRoe PERB R/F BZaleman RBores, Rl EP Staff FKantor MModes, RI MWebb G:\DMB1\MYEPEXFM.LTR To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE PERB l2,y E SC/PERB)(( lC BC/PERB lff l NAME DMBaros M BZalet4htfLQ CLMiller, A ,
DATE 9/14 /98 9/ M /90' 9//f /98' 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
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y UNITED STATES NUCLEAR RE2ULATORY COMMISSION
$ e WASHINGTON, D.C. 20066-0001
([ # Septen ber 16, 1998 Vanessa Quinn, Acting Chief State and Local Regulatory Evaluation and Assessment Branch Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W.
Washington D.C. 20472
SUBJECT:
EXEMPTION OF MAINE YANKEE FROM OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS
Dear Ms. Quinn:
i This is to notify you that on September 3,1998, the NRC granted an exemption to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (the licensee) from certain sections of 10 CFR 50 concerning emergency response planning, thereby allowing the licensee to discontinue offsite emergency planning activities and reduce the scope of its onsite planning at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (Maine Yankee). A copy of the exemption is enclosed. ;
The facility, which is located at the licensee's site in Lincoln County, Maine, is a permanently shut down pressurized-water reactor. By letter dated August 7,1997, the licensee submittd written certification that the licensee's Beard of Directors had decided to permanently cease ;
operation of Maine Yankee and that fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor, j l
In light of the exemption granted to the licensee, the NRC no longer requires FEMA to monitor, ;
review, or report on offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities at Maine Yankee. Emergency planning and preparedness can be limited to onsite activities, simple notification to offsite authorities, and training for offsite personnel who may need to respond onsite (e.g., fire, ambulance, and law enforcement personnel). !
Please notify the State and local govemments that the offsite emergency plans and preparedness will no longer be required for Maine Yankee. Should you need more information ;
on this matter please contact Mr. Daniel M. Barss of my staff at 301-415-2922. l Sincerely, Charles L. Miller, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Protection Branch
, Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-309
Enclosures:
As stated 4
2 rro ug
[ *, UNITED STATES 3 E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 30HM001 -
.....[ September 3, 1998 Mr. Michael J. Meisner, President Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company P.0, Box 408 Wiscasset, Maine 04578
SUBJECT:
EXEMPTION FROM CERTA!N REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50.54(q),10 CFR 50.47(b) and (c), AND APPENDIX E TO 10 CFR PART 50 AT MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION (TAC NO. MAOO69)
Dear Mr. Meisner:
The Commission has issued the enclosed exemption for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (Maine Yankee) in response to your application dated November 6,1997, as supplemented or modified by letters dated January 20, March 25, May 15, June 18, June 29, July 9, and August 5,1998, in which you requested exemption from certain portions of 10 CFR 50.54(q),10 CFR 50.47 (b) and (c), and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 to c!!ow Maine Yankee to discontinue offsite emergency planning activities and to reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning as a result of the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility. A list of the specific requirements from which exemption is granted is contained in Attachment ll of your letter dated June 29,1998.
Also enclosed is a copy of the Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significar.:
Impact related to your application.
Sincerely,
. , .Au fy Michael K. Webb, Project Manager Non7 Power Reactors and Decommissioning Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50 309
Enclosures:
- 1. ExempHon
- 2. Environmental Assessment
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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station Docket No. 50-309 cc:
Mr. Charles B. Brinkman Friends of the Coast Manager - Washington Nuclear P.O. Box 98 Operations . Edgecomb, ME 04556 ABB Combustion Engineering 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Mr. William O' Dell Rockville, MD 20852 Operations Director Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esquire P.O. Box 408 Ropes & Gray Wiscossat, ME 04578 One International Place Boston, MA 02110 2624 Mr. George Zinke, Director Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs Mr. Uldis Vanags Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company State Nuclear Safety Advisor P.O. Box 408 State Planning Office Wiscasset, ME 04578 State House Station #38 Augusta, ME 04333 Mr. Jonathan M. Block Attorney at Law Mr. P. L. Anderson, Project Manager P.O. Box 566 Yankee Atomic Electric Company Putney, VT 05346-0566 580 Main Street Bolton, MA 01740 1398 Mr. Michael J. Meisner, President Main Yankee Atomic Power Company Regional Administrator, Region i P.O. Box 408 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wiscasset, ME 04578 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. Robert Fraser, Director Engineering First Selectman of Wiscasset Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
. Municipal Building P.O. Box 408 -
U.S. Route 1 Wiscasset, ME 04578 Wiscasset, ME 04578 Mr. Patrick J. Dostie Mr. Richard Rasmussen State of Maine Nuclear Safety Senior Resident inspector inspector Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 408 P.O. Box E Wiseasset, ME 04578 Wiscasset, ME 04578 Mr. Mark Ferri Mary Ann Lynch, Esquire Decommissioning Director Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company P.O. Box 408 P.O. Box 408 Wiscasset, ME 04578 Wiscasset, ME 04578 l
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J 7590 01-P I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the Matter of ) l
) I MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC ) Docket No. 50 309 )
POWER COMPANY )
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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station )
EXEMPTION 1.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPCo or the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-36, which authorizes possession of Maine Yankee l
Atomic Power Station (Maine Yankee). The license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear . Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commissien) now or hereafter in effect. The f acility is a pressurized-water reactor (PWR) located on the licensee's site in Lincoln County, Maine.
On August 7,1997, the licensee submitted written certifications to the Commission that it had decided to permanently cease operations at Maine Yankee and that all fuel had been ,
permanently removed from the reactor. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), upon docketing of the certifications contained in the letter of August 7,1997, the facility operating license no longer authorizes MYAPCo to operate the reactor or to place fuel in the reactor vessel.
11.
Section 50.54(q) of Title 10 of the Code of federa/ Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(q))
l requires power reactor licensees to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans that meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR ggog/h9 &F1- _
2 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of the l I
regulations that are (1) authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security and (2) present ;
i special circumstances. Special circumstances exist when application of the regulation in 1 I
the particular circumstance would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not i l
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule (10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii)). The underlying purpose of Section 50.54(g) is to ensure licensees follow and maintain in effect j l'
emergency plans that provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency at a nuclear reactor. Sections 50.47(b) and (c) outline the planning standards and size of Emergency Planning Zones, respectively, that are to be considered in emergency plans and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 identifies the information that must be included in emergency plans.
Ill.
By letter dated November 6,1997, t..a licensee requested exemptions from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q),10 CFR 50.47(b) and (c), and Appendix E to Part 50; the licensee also made available a draft copy of the Maine Yankee Defueled Emergency Plan l
(DEP) to assist the staff in its review of the exemption request. The exemptions would allow Maine Yankee to discontinue certain aspects of offsite planning and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning. The licensee stated that the remaining requirements of 1
10 CFR 50.54(q),10 CFR 50.47(b) and (c), and Appendix E to Part 50 will be addressed in the DEP. The licensee plans to implement the DEP without NRC review and approval.
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3 Under the provisions of 150.54(q), when a change to an emergency plan is made, the staff 1
evalue'es that change against the bases for commitments made in the plan to determine whether there is a decrease in effectiveness. It is not a decrease in effectiveness if the i
reduction in the commitment is commensurate with a reduction in the bases for that l commitment. In this instance, the staff has determined that there has been a reduction in
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the bases that require offsite emergency planning. The revised DEP will be reviewed by the l NRC after implementation. By letter dated March 25,1998, the licensee submitted the Emergency Action Levels that it proposes to use with the Defueled Emergency Plan. By letter dated June 29,1998, the licensee submitted additionalinformation that revised the exemption request. By letters dated January 20, May 15, and June 18,1998, MYAPCo submitted the results of an assessment of the Maine Yankee spent fuel heatup in the absence of water in the spent fuel pool. By letters dated July 9 and August 5,1998, the
! licensee provided the results of radiological analyses applicable to Maine Yankee in the l permanently shutdown condition.
The licensee stated that special circurnstances are present at Maine Yankee because (1) application of the regulation in the padicular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the j rule, (2) compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in i
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted, or are significantly in excess of those incurred by others in similar circumstances, and (3) there is a material
) circumstance present, that was not considered when the regulation was adopted, for which it would be in the public interest to grant an exemption.
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With the plant in a permanently shutdown and defueled condition, the applicable design basis accidents are limited to a fuel handling incident, spent fuel cask drop, and radioactive liquid waste system leak and failure. The calculated maximum offsite dose from these postulated releases is less than the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Protective Action Guides (PAGs). The licensee also estimated that, by March 1998, a beyond-design-basis event, involving fuel damage (caused by 6 loss of spent fuel pcol water and a subsequent overheating of the stored fuel) and the release of radioactive materials sufficient to exceed EPA PAGs at the site boundary is not credible.
Revision 14 to the Maine Yankee Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) includes revised analyses of postulated accidents at Maine Yankee in its permanently shutdown status. Chapter 5 of the DSAR describes the radiological consequences of accidents that could release radioactive materials and the consequences of a spent fuel pool draindown event. The staff reviewed the licensee's analyses, as modified in licensee submittals dated July 9 and August 5,1998, to determine whether the radiologicalimpact of these events would reovire an offsite emergency plan.
Decontamination of systems during decommissioning and dismantlement operations will generate significant quantities of radioactive waste in the form of contaminated domineralizer resins. The licensee has postulated a bounding accident for the release of radioactivity: the dropping of a highly loaded spent resin liner within the low-level waste i
storage building (Lt.WSB), resulting in the liner failure and a release of a fraction of its radioactive materials in an airborne cloud. The analysis indicates that an individual at the exclusion area boundary (EAB) could receive up to 0.11 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) from this event.
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The licensee stated that this event was considered to have higher offsite consequences than the mishandling of resin during resin liner filling and dewatering I operations since these activities are performed in containment. Hold-up and confinement i of radioactive materials in a containment that is isolated would significantly decrease the potential for offsite release. In addition, the licensee committed in the DSAR to establish 1
administrative controls to ensure that calculated offsite doses from potential !
decommissioning accidents do not exceed those calculated for a spent resin cask drop accident.
The licensee did not postulate a fire concurrent with the resin mishandling event owing to the low flammability.of the resin itself and the absence of flammable material in the LLWSB. However, the analysis did assume that 1.0 percent of the radioactivity in the liner became airborne during the event. This assumption is the same fraction of material expected to be released by a fire, and is consistent with the release fractions listed in !
l Schedu's C to 10 CFR 30.72 for mixed fission and corrosion products. The calculational methods and assumptions used in this analysis are acceptable to the staff.
. Wet storage of spent fuel possesses inherently large safety margins because of the simplicity and robustness of the spent fuel pool design. The design basis includes the ability to withstand an earthquake and to retain sufficient water to adequately cool and shield the stored spent fuel. Specifically, in the DSAR, the licensee states that the spent i fuel pool structure is designed to Seismic Class I requirements and is capable of performing
! its intended safety function under the licensee's design basis hypothetical earthquake with a 0.1 g peak ground acceleration. The pool has 6 foot reinforced-concrete walls and floor with a 1/4 inch' steel liner. To add to the robustness of the design, the poolis founded on
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6 1 bedrock and is embedded 12.5 feet below grade level, which is at the 20 foot,1 inch I elevation. Since the analyses used in designing the capability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to perform their safety function under a hypothetical earthquake have significant margin in them, it is expected that an SSC built to withstand the hypothetical design-basis earthquake actually will be able to withstand a larger earthquake. Thus, the i
loss of coolant from the Maine Yankee spent fuel pool, which partially or completely uncovers the fuel, is a beyond-design-basis event with a very low probability of occurrence. !
In a letter dated May 15,1998, the licensee submitted analyses for a complete loss of l
- inventory and several partialloss of inventory events within the spent fuel pool. That analysis showed that a partial draindown was more severe than a complete draindown for the licensee's plant. For this case, only 5.5 feet of the active fuelis covered by water.
The licensee calculated that it would take 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> for the cladding to heat up to 827 *C.
However, the staff reviewed the calculations and determined that the bounding scenar!o would be one with the active fuel totally uncovered and water blocking the assembly lower inlet so that no natural circulation flowpath exists. The staff calculated that, for this case, as of August 1,1998, it would take approdmately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> for the hottest location in the highest power assembly to reach 900 'C. The heatup time was calculated assuming an adiabatic bratup of a fuel rod and using conservative decay heat assumptions. An ,
i adiabatic heatup is defined as one in which all heat generated is retained in the system, l
with no heat loss to the surroundings. This definition corresponds to a physical situation in which the spent fuel pool water is lost, no cooling mechanism is available, and the fuelis surrounded by a perfect insulator. The staff considers that this scenario would be bounding for any loss of-inventory scenario since any other scenario would have some heat removal
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7 from the assembly and a longer heatup time. Consequently, the staff determined that, in view of the low likehhood of the bounding scenario, and the time elapsed since the shutdown of the facility, there would be sufficient time for mitigative actions and, if necessary, offsite protective measures to be initiated after a postulated loss of water and before a postulated release of radioactivity resulting from spent fuel overheating.
In the event that spent fuel pool water inventory is lost more gradually through the
- method discussed above or through some other means, such as a siphon or liner leak, plant personnel have various methods for detecting the loss of inventory. The staff reviewed ,
1 these methods, which include indicators to alert and assist in identifying any loss of coolant inventory. The design includes a low coolant levelindicator and an area radiation monitor, both of which alarm in the control room. Although not credited for accident mitigation, these alarms provide methods to alert the operators to a loss-of-inventory event. In the DSAR, the licensee also states that there are several sources of makeup water to the spent fuel pool. Among these sources are the normal sources of makeup water from the refueling water storage tank, domineralizer water from the primary water storage tank, emergency sources from th fire water system, and potable water from the ,
l town of Wiscasset water supply system. On the basis of indicators and alarms available ;
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to plant personnel and the availability of makeup sources to restore a gradual loss of ;
coolant, the staff finds it reasonable to expect that fuel uncovery as a result of a gradual ;
loss of coolant scenario is highly unlikely.
Although the event is unlikely, the licensee evaluated the dose consequences of both j partial and complete spent fuel pool draindown. Water and the concrete pool structure provide radiation shiel' ding on the sides of the pool. However, water alone accounts for l
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! 8 most of the shielding above the spent fuel. A loss of shielding above the fuel could 1 ,
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l increase the radiation levels at the exclusion area boundary (EAB) due to the scattering of '
t gamma rays streaming up out of the pool. The licensee postulated a partial pool draindown event resulting from a break in the pool cooling system piping, concurrent with a failure of the associated anti-syphon device. The licensee assumed that additional pool water was lost through pool boiling for the following four days before effective corrective actions !
i could be taken to reestablish adequate pool water level. The licensee calculated that the ]
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dose rate was 0.00076 rem per hour at the EAB. In addition the licensee calculated the i postulated offsite dose rates in the event of a complete draindown of the spent fuel pool (a beyond-design-basis event). Assuming only one year of radioactive decay and a site boundary distance of 610 meters, the complete draindown resulted in a postulated dose rate of 0.01 rem per hour. The licensee's calculated dose rate indicates it would take 4.1 days for this event to exceed the EPA early phase PAG of 1 rem.
The staff concludes that the licensee's request for an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q).10 CFR 50.47(b) and (c), and Appendix E to Part 50 is acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radiological consequences associated with the current plant status. The staff finds that the postulated dose to the general public from any reasonably conceivable accident would not exceed EPA PAGs and, for the bounding accident, the length of time available gives confidence that offsite measures for the public could be taken without preplanning. The staff finds acceptable the licensee's commitment in the DSAR to establish administrative controls to ensure that calculated offsite doses l from potential decommissioning accidents do not exceed those determined for a spent resin
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cask drop accident. Therefore, the staff concludes that the requirement that emergency
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i plans meet all of the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and all of the requirements of
- Appendix E to Part 50 is not now warranted at Maine Yankee and an exemption from the
. requirements for offsite emergency planning is acceptable.
i IV.
] The NRC staff has completed its review of the licensee's request for an exemption i
from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) and from the requirements of 10 CFR j 50.54(q), that emergency plans must meet all of the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and all the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 that remain in effect are listed in Attachment 11 to the licensee's letter dated June 29,1998. On the basis of its review, the NRC staff finds that the postulated dose to the general public from any reasonably conceivable accident would not exceed EPA PAGs and, for the bounding accident, the length of time available provides confidence that offsite measures for the public could be taken without preplanning. The analyses submitted by the licensee are consistent with the commitmc.nt made in its DSAR, which stated that any decommissioning activities will be analyzed and administrative controls will be established to ensure that the calculated offsite doses do not exceed those determined for the spent resin cask drop accident. The staff finds the exemption from two requirements,10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.IV.A.4, acceptable on the basis of the licensee's commitment to continue to maintain capabilities for dose assessment and personnel equivalent to those described in Section 7.0 of the draft Defueled Emergency Plan provided in Attachment lit to the licensee's letter dated November 6,1997. The information developed from the capability
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would be used to determine whether offsite measures for the general public would be l appropriate. Maine Yankee will continue to maintain an onsite emergency preparedness organization capable of responding to the consequences of radiological events still possible
- at the site. Thus, the underlying purpose of the regulations will not be adversely affected by eliminating offsite emergency planning activities or reducing the scope of easite emergency planning.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, elimination of offsite emergency planning activities will not present an undue risk to public health and safety and is consistent with common defense and security.
I Further, special circumstances are present as stated in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(ii). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that this exemption will not have a significant i
effect on the quality of the human environment (63 FR 43968, August 17,1998).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
J FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4
1 uel . dhns, irec or
- ffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day of September 1998.
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,y g* 18%g#', UNITED STATES j" j 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. " "1
.....l SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 1
OF A REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM CERTAIN 10 CFR PART 50 REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THE MAINE YANKEE PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-309 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated November 6,1997, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPCo or the licensee) requested an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) and the requirement of 10 CFR 50.54(q) that emergency plans must meet all of the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and all of the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and ,
submitted a draft copy of the Defueled Emergency Plan (DEP) for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (Maine Yankee), Docket No. 50-309. In a letter dated August 7,1997, MYAPCo submitted written certifications to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) that the Board of Directors of MYAPCo had decided to permanently cease operation at Maine Yankee and that fuel had been permanently removed from th=
reactor. In consideration of the shutdown and defueled status of the plant, the requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(q) would allow the licensee to discontinue offsite emergency planning activities and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning. On March 25,1998, the licensee submitted the Emergency Action Levels it proposed to use with the DEP. In a letter dated June 29,1998, subsequent to conference calls held on June 16 and June 24,1998, the licensee made changes to its exemption request. By letters dated July 9 and August 5,1998, the licensee provided the results of radiological analyses applicable to Maine Yankee in the permanently shutdown condition.
2.0 BACKGROUND
The NRC may grant exemptions from the requirements of its regulations, which, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), (1) are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security and (2) present special circumstances. Section 50.12(a)(2) of 10 CFR Part 50 identifies some of these special circumstances to be where application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule, compliance would result in undue hardship or cost that are significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated, and circumstances er.ist that were not considered when the regulation was adopted for which it would be in the public interest to grant an exemption.
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in the licensee's submittals, the following special circumstances were presented. Maine Yankee was shut down on December 6,1996, and is now in a permanently shutdown and defueled condition. With the plant in a ptrmanently shutdown and defueled condition, the applicable design basis accidents are limited to a fuel handling incident, spent fuel cask drop, and radioactive liquid waste system leak and failure. The calculated maximum offsite dose from these postulated releases is less than the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs). The licensee also estimated that, by March 1998, a beyond design basis event, involving fuel damage (caused by a loss of spent fuel pool water and a subsequent overheating of the stored fuel) and the release of radioactive i materials sufficient to exceed EPA PAGs at the site boundary is not credible. Once a !
radiological release warranting prompt offsite response is no longer possible, offsite j response capability, including offsite emergency plans, would no longer be necessary. The licensee stated that requiring Maine Yankee to comply with the requirements for offsite emergency planning when it is no longer warranted would result in undue financial and administrative hardship to Maine Yankee, its owners, and their ratepayers.
Notwithstanding the licensee's position stated above, the staff, as discussed in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2, identified a very low likeiihood bounding accident that could result in an offsite consequence, but that the length of time available provides confidence that offsite protective measures for the public could be taken without the need for preplanning.
Therefore, the requirement that emergency plans meet all of the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and all of the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 is not now warranted at Maine Yankee.
3.0 DISCUSSION AND STAFF EVALUATION 3.1 Radioloaical Consecuences Revision 14 to the Maine Yankee Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) includes revised analyses of postulated accidents at Maine Yankee in its permanently shutdown status.
Chapter 5 of the DSAR describes the radiological consequences of accidents that could release radioactive materials, as well as the consequences of a spent fuel pool draindown
- event. The staff reviewed the licensee's analysec, as modified in licensee submittals dated July 9 and August 5,1998, to determine whether the radiologicalimpact of these events would require an offsite emergency plan.
3.1.1 Resin Handlina Event Decontamination of systems during decommissioning and dismantlement operations will generate significant quantities of radioactive waste in the form of contsminated demineralizer resins. The licensee has postult.ted a bounding accident for the release of radioactivity: the dropping of a highly loaded spent resin liner within the low-level-waste storage building (LLWSB), resulting in the liner f ailure and a release of a fraction of its radioactive materials in an airborne cloud. The analysis indicates that an individaal at the exclusion area boundary (EAB) could receive up to 0.11 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) from this event.
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! 3 i The licensee stated that this event was considered to have higher offsite consequences than the mishandling of resin during resin liner filling and dewatering operations since these
! activities are performed in containment. Holdup and confinement of radioactive materials in a containment that is isolated would significantly decrease the potential for offsite l
release in addition, the licensee committed in the DSAR to establish administrative l
controls to ensure that calculated offsite doses from potential decommissioning accidents
! do not exceed those calculated for a spent resin cask drop accident.
l- The licensee did not postulate a fire concurrent with the resin mishandling event due to the low flammability of the resin itself and the absence of flammable materialin the LLWSB.
! However, the analysis did assume that 1.0 percent of the radioactivity in the liner became l airborne during the event. This assumption is the same fraction of material expected to be I released by a fire, and is consistent witn the release fractions listed in Schedule C to I 10 CFR 30.72 for mixed fission and corrosion products. The calculational methods and assumptions used in this analysis are acceptable to the staff.
! 3.1.2 Fuel Pool Draindown l
j Although the fuel on site has decayed for a minimum of a year, a significant quantity of j radioactive material remains in the spent fuel pool in the form of spent fuel assemblies.
Water and the concrete pool structure provide radiation shielding on the sides of the pool.
l However, water alone provides most of the shielding above the spent fuel. A loss of i shielding above the fuel could increase the radiation levels at the EAB from the scattering
! of gamma rays streaming up out of the pool. The licensee postulated a pool draindown 4 event resulting from a break in the pool cooling system piping, concurrent with a failure of
- the associated anti syphon device. The licensee assumed that additional pool water was l
lost through pool boiling for the following 4 days before effective corrective actions could be taken to reestablish adequate pool water level. The licensee calculated that the dose
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rate would be 0.00076 rem per hour at the EAB. In addition the licensee calculated the
- postulated offsite dose rates in the event of a complete draindown of the spent fuel pool j (a beyond design-basis event). Assuming only 1 year of radioactive ciecay and a site l boundary distance of 610 meters, the complete draindown resulted in a postulated dose rate of 0.01 rem per hour. The licensee's calculated dose rate indicates it would take l
{ 4.1 days for this event to exceed the EPA early-phase PAG of one tem.
4 By letter dated May 15,1998, the licensee submitted analyses for a complete loss of inventory and several partialloss of-inventory events within the spent fuel pool. That analysis showed that a partial draindown was more severe than a complete draindown for the licensee's plant. For this case, only 5.5 feet of the active fuelis covered by water, j
The licensee calculated that it would take 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> for the cladding to heat up to 827 *C.
However, the staff reviewed the calculations and determined that the bounding scenario 4 would be with the active fuel totally uncovered and water blocking the assembly inlet so i that no natural circulation flowpath exists. The staff calculated that, for this case, as of August 1,1998, it would take approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> for the hottest location in the i highest power assembly to reach 900 'C. The heatup time was calculated assuming an adiabatic heatup of a fuel rod and using conservative decay heat assumptions. An
' adiabatic heatup is defined as one in which all heat generated is retained in the system, with no heat loss to the surroundings. This definition corresponds to a physical situation in
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l which the spent fuel pool water is lost, no cooling mechanism is available, and the fuel is !
surrounded by a perfect insulator. The staff considers this scenario bounding for any l loss-of inventory scenario, since any other scenario would have some heat removal from the assembly and a longer heatup time. Consequently, the staff determined that, in view of the low likelihood of the bounding scenario, and the time elapsed since the shutdown of the facility, there would be sufficient time for mitigative action:; and, if necessary, offsite protective measures to be initiated after a postulated loss of water and before a postulated release of radioactivity resulting from spent fuel overheating.
3.2 Emergency Plan Exemptions Request in accordance with 550.54(q), a licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power reactor must follow and maintain in effect both onsite and offsite emergency plans that meet the standards in 550.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part
- 50. A licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan and the plan, as changed, continues to meet the standards of 550.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
Proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plans may not be implemented without application to and approval by the Commission.
The licensee requested exemption from the following specific recnirements:
l As required in 550.54{q), the licensee requested NRC approval to eliminate the requirement that the Maine Yankee emergersey response plans meet all of the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and all of the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50. The licensee stated that the onsite plans would remain subject to the standards as modified by this requested ;
exemption. In accordance with the provisions of 550.54(q), when a change to an l emergency plan is made, the staff evaluates that change against the bases for commitments made in the plan to determine whether there is a decrease in effectiveness. 1 It is not a decrease in effectiveness if the reduction in the commitment is commensurats j with a reduction in the bases for that commitment. In this instance, the staff has j determined that there has been a reduction in the bases that require offsite emergency planning. For a counding accident scenario at Maine Yankee, as discussed in Section 3.1.2 above, the staff determined that the length of time available provides confidence that mitigative actions and additional offsite measures could be taken without preplanning, if )
required.
As discussed in Section 3.1.1 above, the licensee committed to establish administrative controls to ensure that calculated offsite doses from potential decommissioning accidents do not exceed those determined for a spent resin cask accident, which are a small fraction of the EPA early phase PAG (1 rem) to any individuallocated off site.
Given that the postulated dose to the general public from any reasonably conceivable accident would not exceed the EPA PAG and, for the bounding accident, the length of time available provides confidence that offsite measures for the public could be taken without preplanning, the emergency plan commitment for offsite emergency planning may be
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reduced. Therefore, the staff concludes that the requirement that emergency plans meet all of the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and all of the requirements of Appendix E to
! 10 CFR Part 50 is not now warranted at Maine Yankee. The emergency plans would remain subject to the standards as modified by requested exemption.
i The staff found this change acceptable.
The licensee requested an exemption in order to eliminate reference to the term
" Emergency Planning Zones" (EPZs) in defining which organizations would be included in the emergency plan. The emergency plan would continue to address appropriate onsite and offsite response organizations.
l The staff found this change acceptable.
- 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) l No exemption was requested.
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! The licensee requested an exemption in order to eliminate from the standard the i arrangement to accommodate State and local staff at a near site emergency operations
! facility. The emergency plan would continue to maintain arrangements for requesting and l using assistance resources from other organizations.
The staff found this change acceptable.
. The licensee requested an exemption from the need for State and local plans to rely on information provided by the licensee for offsite response measures.
! The staff found this change acceptable.
The licensee requested an exemption from the need for establishing procedures and means for notification of the public within the EPZ.
The staff found this change acceptable.
The licensee requested an exemption from the need for the provision of prompt communications with the public.
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- 6 E The staff found this change acceptable.
The licensee requested an exemption from the need for providing information to the public on a periodic basis concerning initial actions in an emergency, and a physicai L: cation for the dissemination of information to the news media.
The staff found this change acceptable.
No exemption was requested.
- 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) 1 The licenses requested an exsmption from the requirement to have the capability to assess and monitor specifically "offsite" consequences of radiological emergency conditions.
2 The licensee's exemption request is based on its conclusion that no design basis accident or credible beyond-design-basis accident can result in radioactive releases that exceed EPA
- PAGs at the site boundary. The bounding act,ident essessed by the staff was a low likelihood event that postulated doses in excess of EPA PAGs. However, the length of time available provides confidence that offsite measures for the public could be taken
! without preplanning. In Section 7.0, " Assessment of Releases," of the licensee's draft DEP, the licanuee commits to the following:
"Using the instrumentation available, as described in Section 5.0, the initial response j to an event will be to ascertain the cause, mitigate further progression and determine the patential impact to station personnel and the general public.
" Initial assessments will consist of verifying the parameters that indicate a release may be in proCress and initiating a dose assessment based on that information.
"As soon as practicable, facility staff should initiate general ares radiation surveys and airborne sampling to determine the actual extent of a radiological release. Results of the surveys will be analyzed by facility staff to formulate an action plan to mitigate the event and restore the f acility to a safe condition. Survey rinta will also be used, as appropriate, in any dose assessment techniques.
"Once the TSC is staffed, the Radiological / Hazard Assessment Coordinator assumes responsibility for dose assessment activities. The methooology to be used may consist of computerized dose assessment models, nomographs or hand calcu'ations, depending on the severity of the event and the point of release to the atmosphere.
The primary objective of any of these methods is to determine the maximum dose rate and the distance from the point of release where that dose will be realized. From this information, protective actions can be formulated and implemented to minimize the risk to facility staff.
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"Following the termination of the event, environmental surveys (including, but not I limited to water, soil, vegetation, etc.) may be required to determine the long-term
. impact of the event."
l The information developed from the capability described above would be used to determine whether offsite measures for the general public would be appropriate. The stafi found this change ac.:0ptable, on the basis of the licensee's commitmern J maintain capabilities equivalent to those described in Section 7.0 of the draft DEP submitted in Attachment 111 l to the licensee's letter dated November 6,1997 (Docket No. 50 309, Accession No. 9711130334).
The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement to develop protective actions for the plume exposure and ingestion pathway EPZs.
The staff found this change acceptable.
No exemption was requested.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(12) l No exemption was requested. '
10 CFR 50.47(b)(13) l No exemption was requested, i 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14)
No exemption was requested.
No exemption was requested.
No exemption was requested.
The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement to establish plume and ingestion t pathway EPZs.
l The staff found this change acceptable.
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The licensee requested an exemption ttom the requirement to follow and maintain in effect i
emergency plans that meet all of the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and all of the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 with regard to offsite emcrgency planning.
The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E 111 The licensee requested an exemption in order to eliminate reference to the term
! "Emergercy Planning Zones" (EPZs).
- ! The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement to provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and take other protective actions off site.
The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Apoendix E IV A.1.
The licensee requested an exemption in order to eliminate reference to the term " operating" and refer instead to the " normal plant organization."
The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV A.3.
The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement to describe licensee headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant site in an emergency.
The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV A.4.
The licensee requested an exemption in order to eliminate the term "offsite" in relation to dose projections that will be performed. -
The licensee's exemption request is based on its conclusion that no design-basis accident or credible beyond-design-basis accident can result in radioactive releases that exceed EPA PAGs at the sito boundary. The bounding accident assessed by the staff is a low-likelihood event that found postulated doses in excess of EPA PAGs. However, the length of time available provides confidence that offsite measures for the public could be taken without preplanning.
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9 The staff found this change acceptable, on the basis of the licensee's commitment to maintain personnel with responsibilities equivalent to those described in Section 7.0 of the draft DEP submitted in Attachment lll to the licensee's letter dated November 6,1997.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV A.S.
The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement to identify individuals with special qualifications.
- ihe staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV A.6.
No exemption was requested.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV A.7.
No exemption was requested.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV A.8.
The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement to identify State and local !
officials responsible for protective actions. j i
I The staff found this change acceptable. l I
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV B.
The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement to base emergency action levels on offsite monitoring results and considerr' ion of protective measures outside the site '
boundary. 1 The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV C.
i The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement to base ernergency action levels on offsite radiological monitoring information and information from other sensors, such as containment pressure, that are no longer appropriate. The licensee requested to eliminate emergency classification above the Alert level. ;
The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV D.1 The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement for administrative and physical means for the prompt notification of the public of protective measures, c --
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The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV D.2. !
The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement for yearly dissemination of emergency planning information to the public. l l
The staff found this change acceptable. t 10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV D.3. ;
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' The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement to demonstrate that Stacc/ local j officials have the capability to make public notification promptly, and changed the time for notification of State and local agencies to within 60 minutes after declaring an emergency. !
The staff found this change acceptable.
l 10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV E.8. i i
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The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement to provide for a near site emergency operations facility. ,
The staff found this change acceptable. .
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV E.9.a.
The licensee requested an exemption in order eliminate the phrase "within the plume exposure pathway EPZ" from the description of communication systems with State and !
local governments and to change the frequency of test of these communications to !
quarterly. J l
The staff found this change acceptable. I 1
l 10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV E.9.b. j No exemption was requested. .
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV E.9.c.
l The licensee requested an es.emption from the requirements to provide communications among the near site emergency operations f acility, the nuclear facility, State and local emergency operations centers, and field asr9ssment teams.
l The staff found this change acceptable.
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11 10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV E.9.d The licensee requested an exemption from the requirements for provision of communications by the licensee from the onsite technical support center and near site emergency operations facility to the NRC Headquarters and Re-tonal Operations Center.
The ficansee will maintain these communications from the contivl room and will change the frequency of test of such communications to quarterly.
The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV F.1. viii.
The licansee requested an exemption in order to delete Headquarters suppon personnel and local news media persons from the list of categories of emergency personnel who will be provided periodic training.
The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV F.2.
The licensee requested an exemption in order to elim.nate the requirement to test the public notification system as part of emergency preparedness exercises.
The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV F.2.b.
The licensee requested an exemption in order to eliminate the reference to spe.cific emergency response facilities, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility.
The stafi found this change c::ceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV F.2.c.
The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement for a biennial exercise with full participation of offsite authorities.
The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV F.2.d.
The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement for an ingestion pathway exercise.
The staff found this change acceptable.
12 10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV F.2.e.
. The licensee requested an exemption in order to modify the language of this section by replacing the phrase " located within the plume e sure pathway EPZ" with " support services" to modify and clarify the governmental entities who would be permitted to participate in emergency preparedness drills.
The staff found this change acceptable.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV F 2.f.
l The licensee requested an exemption in order to eliminate reference to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and State and local participation in remedial
- exercises.
f Tne staff found this change acceptable.
i 10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV F.2.g.
No exemption was requested.
I 10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV F.2.h.
No exemption was requested.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV G.
No exemption was requested.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E IV H.
No exemption was requested.
No exemption was requestad.
4.0 CONCLUSION
S The staff concludes that the licensee's request for an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(qh 10 CFR 50.47(b) and (c), and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 is acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radictogical consequences associated with the current plant status. The staff finds that the postulated dose to the general public from any reasonably conceivable accident would not exceed EPA PAGs and, for the bounding accident, the length of time available provides confidence that offsite protective measures for the public could be taken without preplanning. The staff finds acceptable the licensee's commitment in the DSAR to establish administrative coa.1ls to ensure that calculated offsite doses from potential decommissioning accidents c's not exceed those determined for
13 a spent resin cask drop accident. Therefore, the staff concludes that the requirement that emergency plans meet all of the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and all of the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 is not now warranted at Maine Yankee and an exemption from the requirements for offsite emergency planning is acceptable.
The licensee's onsite emergency plan would remain subject to the standards as modified by the requested exemption. The staff has determined that, with the approval of the exemptions from the requimments of 10 CFR 50.54(q),10 CFR 50.4/(b) and (c), and Appendix E to Part 50 for emergency planning. as detailed above, the licensee may revise its emergency plan consistent with the remaining iequirements.
Principal Contributors: Daniel M. Barss Roger L. Pedersen Diane T. Jackson Joseph L. Staudenmeier Date: September 3, 1998 i
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i 7590-01 P l
L UNITED STATES NUCLEAR FEGULATORY COMMISSION l MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION DOCKET NO. 50-3C9 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its regulations to Facility Operating License ;
No. DPR-36, a license held by the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPCo or the licensee). The exemption would apply to the Maine Yrr,' nee Atomic Power Station, a permanently shutdown plant located at the MYAPCo site in Lincoln County, Maine.
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT ldentificatici, of the Proposed Action: ,
The proposed exemption would modify emergency response plan requirements due to the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the Maine Yankee facility.
The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated November 6,1997, as supplemented by letter dated June 29,1998. The requested action would grant an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) to discontinue ;
offsite planning activities and reduce the scope of onsitt emergency planning. )
l The Need for the Proposed Action:
l Maine Yankee was shut down in December 1996. By letter dated August 7,1997, l
the license informed the Commission that it had decided to permanently cease operations 1
at Maine Yan<.ee Atomic Power Station and that all fuel had been permanently removed
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l from the reactor. In.accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), upon docketing of the certifications in the letter of August 7,1997, the facility operating license no longer
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authorizes MYAPCo to operate the reactor and to load fuelin the reactor vessel. In this l l permanently shutdown condition, the facility poses e reduced risk to public health and l 9Wffl0~h96
. . . . . _ . . . . - . - . . . ~ - . - - - _ - . . . - . - . . - - . - . .- .
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2 safety. Because of this reduced risk, certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) are no longer required. An exemption is required from portions of 10 CFR 50.54(q) to allow the licensee to implement a revised Defueled Emergency Plan that is appropriate for the l
permanently shutdown and defueled reactor facility.
l Environmentalimpact of the Proposed Action:
i The Commission has concluded that the granting of the exemption will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the allowable l individual or cumulative occupational exposure. Accordirqly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmentalimpacts associated with the proposed action.
With regard to potential non radiological impacts, the proposed action does not afN non radiological p! ant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there are no significant non-radiological impacts associated with the proposed action.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action:
Since the Commission has concluded that there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternative with equal or greater environmentalimpact neea .ivt be evaluated. The principal alternative to the action would be to deny the request (no action alternative). Denial of the exemption request would result in no change in current environmentalimpacts. The environmentalimpacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.
2 Alternative Use of Resources:
This action does not involve the use of resources not previoutly considered it; the Final Environmental Statement related to Operation of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station l 1
(July 1972).
.. 3 Agencies and Persons Consulted:
In accordance with its stated policy, on July 31,1998, the NRC staff consulted with l 1
Mr. Patrick Dostie of the State of Maine, Department of Human Services, regarding the environmentalimpact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.
FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT l
Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmentalimpact statsment for the proposed action.
i For further details with respect to this action, see the licensee's letters, dated November 6,1997, and June 29,1998, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, Gelman Building,2120 L Street, NW.,
Washington, D.C., and at the Local Public Document Room at the Wiscasset Public Library, High Street, Post Office Box 367, Wiseasset, Maine 04578.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this lith day of August 1998.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/ Sey our H. eiss, Director Non Power Reactors and Decommissioning Project Directorate ;
Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
.-r.,