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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARNOC-AE-000661, Rev 4 to Severe Weather Plan, Including Summary of Changes.With1999-10-0404 October 1999 Rev 4 to Severe Weather Plan, Including Summary of Changes.With ML20217A2421999-09-30030 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Parameters No Longer Applicable & Adding Tdf Value for Model 94 SGs in Place of Reactor Coolant Sys Flow ML20211Q8071999-09-0808 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs & Associated Bases for Specification 3/4.8.1, AC Sources, to Eliminate Requirement for Accelerated Testing of Standby DGs & Associated NRC Reporting Requirements ML20211Q2361999-09-0808 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.8.1,revised by Relocating 18-month Surveillance to Subject Sdg to Insps IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction with Mfg Recommendations to Section 3.8.1.1.4.8 of UFSAR ML20211G2281999-08-24024 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Relocating Cycle Specific Operating Parameters from TSs to Colr,Including Moving Location of Insert 6 from Page 6-21 to Page 6-22 of Administrative Control Section & Renumbering Methods List ML20211C0371999-08-18018 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.9.3 Re Cold Overpressure Mitigation Curve Associated with Replacement SGs ML20210J0481999-07-28028 July 1999 STP Unit 1,Cycle 9 Startup Testing Summary Rept ML20209G9351999-07-15015 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.7.1.6 Re Atmospheric Steam Relief Valves ML20209H2131999-07-13013 July 1999 Rev 4,revised Pages 29 & 30 of 102 to Procedure 0ERP01-ZV-IN01, Emergency Classification ML20209H3371999-07-13013 July 1999 Rev 0 to 0PGP02-ZA-0004, Station Performance Data Collection,Categorization & Reporting ML20209G4461999-07-13013 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying 3.6.3 Action B,Clarifyin Use of Check Valve with Flow Through Valve Secured as Means to Isolated Affected Containment Penetrations ML20209C1511999-07-0101 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amend to License NPF-80, Changing TSs 3.3.2 & 3.7.8 Allowing All Fuel Handling Bldg Exhaust Air Sys Components to Be Inoperable for Period of 8 Hours to Facilitate Repair of Train B Exhaust Booster Fan ML20209B5341999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.9.1.6.a,adding Min Measured RCS Flow,Which Lists Parameters Included in COLR ML20209H3151999-06-23023 June 1999 Rev 4 to 0PGP02-ZA-0003, Comprehensive Risk Management ML20195E4211999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating cycle-specific RCS-related TS Parameter Limits to COLR ML20195E4701999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Proposed Amend to Licenses NPF-76 & NPF-80,deleting Total Allowance,Sensor Error & Z Terms from ESFAS & RTS Instrumentation Trip Setpoint Tables of TS 2.2.1 & 3.3.2 ML20209H3081999-06-0101 June 1999 Rev 3 to 0PGP04-ZA-0604, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program ML20205S3511999-04-19019 April 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases Page 3/4 8-3 Removing Reference to Fast Transfer Capability That Is Inconsistent with STP Design Bases as Described in UFSAR Chapters 8.2 & 8.3 ML20205G8081999-03-30030 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating Section 3/4.3.3.4, Meteorological Instrumentation & Associated Bases Description to STP Trm,Per NUREG-1431 ML20204J9681999-03-22022 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating New TS for Atmospheric Steam Relief Valve Instrumentation & Revising TS 3.7.1.6 Re Atmospheric Steam Relief Valves ML20204D1581999-03-15015 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.7.9 for Snubbers to TRM ML20207D9651999-03-0202 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Change Clarifies Use of Check Valve with Flow Through Valve Secured as Means to Isolate Containment Penetration in TS 3.6.3 Action B ML20207C4721999-02-24024 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases 3/4.2.5,clarifying That Averaging of Only Three Channels Is Min Expected When Verifying DNB Parameter Compliance ML20202G6871999-01-26026 January 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Page 3/4 4-39,revising TS 4.4.10 for Alternate ISI of RCP Flywheels ML20199K5681999-01-20020 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.1.a Re AFW Pump Performance Testing ML20198A2181998-12-10010 December 1998 Revised TS Pages,Adding Ref to TS Figure 2.1-2 to Bases Section 2.1.1 as Figure Provides DNBR Curves Appropriate to Alternate DNB Operating Criteria ML20198A1951998-12-0909 December 1998 Corrected TS Bases Pages B 3/4 8-15,-16 & -17,as Discussed During 981103 Telcon ML20196B8121998-11-23023 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Proposed Amends to Licenses NPF-76 & NPF-80,relocating Descriptive Design Info from TS 3/4.7.1.1 (Table 3.7-2) Re Orifice Sizes for Main Steam Line Code Safety Valves,To Bases Section ML20155J9031998-11-0303 November 1998 Proposed Corrected Tech Specs Bases 3/4 9-3 Re Water level- Refueling Cavity & Storage Pools ML20155D5441998-10-29029 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Proposed Amend to Relocate Turbine Overspeed Protection TS 3/4.3.4 to TRM ML20155D5561998-10-29029 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Proposed Amends to Relocate Snubber TS 3/4.7.9 to TRM ML20155D5801998-10-29029 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amends to Relocate Portion of TS Surveillance Requirement for DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank to TRM ML20154M1621998-10-12012 October 1998 Revised Tech Specs Bases Pages B3/4 8-14 Through -17 ML20154C0051998-09-30030 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Reflecting Replacement SG Tube Insp Surveillance Differences & Deleting Provision Allowing Use of F* Alternate Repair Criteria ML20154C5071998-09-30030 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Bases Page B 3/4 9-2,removing Wording Re 10% Value for Clad Gap Iodine Isotopics ML20154A4281998-09-28028 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Requirements Associated with Control Room & Fuel Handling Bldg Ventilation Sys ML20151T1621998-08-31031 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.9.3 Re Cold Overpressure Mitigation Curve Associated W/Replacement SGs ML20238F0841998-08-28028 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 4.0.5,excluding Specified Containment Isolation Valves from ISI & Testing Requirements as Stated in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code ML20236T5141998-07-22022 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Replacement SG Water Level Setpoint Differences ML20236R1461998-07-15015 July 1998 Proposed Changes to Current Tech Specs Bases ML20236L6311998-07-0707 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Rev of Criticality Analyses & Rack Utilization Schemes for Regions 1 & 2 of Spent Fuel Racks as Described in STP UFSAR & TSs ML20236K3481998-07-0606 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating 3/4.7.13 Requirements for Area Temp Monitoring Sys to Technical Requirements Manual ML20236M6381998-07-0606 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating 3/4.3.3.3 Requirements for Seismic Instrumentation to Technical Requirements Manual ML20236N0001998-07-0606 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating RCS Design Features from TS Section 5.4 to UFSAR ML20247F3321998-05-0707 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Reflecting Replacement SG Reactor Coolant Flow Differences ML20217P1441998-04-0202 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.5 Re voltage-based Repair Criteria ML20202H9771998-02-16016 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Implementing 1-volt voltage-based Repair Criteria for SG Tube Support plate-to-tube Intersections ML20198C3741997-12-31031 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1,2.2 & 3/4.2.5 for Alternate Operation W/Reduced Measured RCS Flow ML20197A7211997-12-17017 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising TS 4.6.2.1 to Extend Surveillance Interval of Containment Spray Sys Nozzle Air Flow Test from Five Years to Ten Years ML20199H2081997-11-20020 November 1997 Revised TS Bases Page B 3/4 4-15 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:TEST/INSPECTION/OPERATING PROCEDURES
MONTHYEARNOC-AE-000661, Rev 4 to Severe Weather Plan, Including Summary of Changes.With1999-10-0404 October 1999 Rev 4 to Severe Weather Plan, Including Summary of Changes.With ML20209H3371999-07-13013 July 1999 Rev 0 to 0PGP02-ZA-0004, Station Performance Data Collection,Categorization & Reporting ML20209H2131999-07-13013 July 1999 Rev 4,revised Pages 29 & 30 of 102 to Procedure 0ERP01-ZV-IN01, Emergency Classification ML20209H3151999-06-23023 June 1999 Rev 4 to 0PGP02-ZA-0003, Comprehensive Risk Management ML20209H3081999-06-0101 June 1999 Rev 3 to 0PGP04-ZA-0604, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program ML20212G0031997-10-21021 October 1997 Rev 2 to OPGP-04-ZA-0002, Condition Rept Engineering Evaluation Program ML20209H3321997-07-31031 July 1997 Rev 2 to 0PGP01-ZA-0304, Probabilistic Safety Assessment Risk Ranking ML20198E8411997-05-22022 May 1997 Rev 4 to 0PGP05-ZA-0002, 10CFR50.59 Evaluations ML20217G8191997-02-15015 February 1997 Rev 16 to 0POP03-ZG-0009, Mid Loop Operation ML20198E8511996-10-28028 October 1996 Rev 5 to 0PGP05-ZA-0002, 10CFR50.59 Evaluations ML20134J9951996-09-11011 September 1996 South Tx 1 Fuel Assembly Insp Program ML20148C9531996-07-15015 July 1996 Rev 0 to 0PGP04-ZA-0604, Probabilistic Safety Assessment Program ML20217F0001996-04-0101 April 1996 Rev 0 to Usqe 96-0101, Control Room Envelope HVAC Emergency Makeup Flow Control Damper B2HEFCV9585 Temporary Mod ML20097D4021996-02-0202 February 1996 Rev 0 to 0PGP02-ZA-0004, Station Performance Data Collection,Categorization & Reporting ML20097D3751996-02-0202 February 1996 Rev 0 to 0PGP02-ZA-003, Comprehensive Risk Mgt ML20097D3821996-01-0202 January 1996 Rev 0 to 0PGP02-ZA-XXXX, Probabilistic Safety Assessment Program ML20097D3881995-10-30030 October 1995 Rev 0 to 0AAA00-AA-0000, Configuration Control of Probabilistic Safety Assessment ML20149E0061995-10-20020 October 1995 Rev 1 to Procedure Usqe 92-0022, Proposed Change Evaluates Doses from Leakage of Sump Water Into Rwst ML20149E0561995-10-20020 October 1995 Rev 2 to OPGP05-ZA-0002, 10CFR50.59 Evaluations, Form 2 ML20093E7361995-10-0202 October 1995 Rev 0,Suppl 1 to ISI Plan for First Insp Interval of South Tx Project Electric Generating Station Unit 1 ML20149E0321995-06-0404 June 1995 Rev 2 to Procedure OPGP05-ZA-0002, 10CFR50.59 Evaluations, Form 1 ML20080G9091994-12-31031 December 1994 1999 Business Plan ML20217G8141994-11-22022 November 1994 Rev 2 to 0PGP03-ZA-0101, Shutdown Risk Assessment ML20078Q2561994-11-0707 November 1994 Rev 6 to OPMP04-JC-0002, Polar Crane Insp ML20078C5971994-10-26026 October 1994 Rev 4,Suppl 2 to STP Electric Generating Station Unit 2 Pump & Valve IST Plan ML20078C5961994-10-26026 October 1994 Rev 6,Suppl 2 to STP Electric Generating Station Unit 1 Pump & Valve IST Plan ML20078Q5651994-10-17017 October 1994 Rev 6 to OPGP03-ZX-0002, Condition Reporting Process ML20078Q7291994-10-17017 October 1994 Rev 10 to OPGP03-ZA-0090, Work Process Program ML20078Q8051994-10-17017 October 1994 Rev 2 to OPGP04-ZE-0310, Plant Mods ML20078Q5081994-08-29029 August 1994 Rev 7 to OPMP02-ZG-0011, Alternative Valve Packing & Live- Load Valve Packing ML20078Q5581994-06-24024 June 1994 Rev 5 to OPGP03-ZX-0002, Corrective Action Program ML20078Q7801994-06-0101 June 1994 Rev 2 to OPEP07-ZE-0007, MOV Tracking & Trending Program ML20078Q4021994-05-24024 May 1994 Rev 7 to OPOP01-ZA-0001, Plant Operations Dept Administrative Guidelines ML20064N4561994-03-21021 March 1994 South Tx Project Electric Generating Station Operational Readiness Plan Unit 2 ML20078Q5521994-03-0808 March 1994 Rev 2 to OPOP02-AF-0001, Auxiliary Feedwater ML20078Q2581994-02-14014 February 1994 Rev 5 to OPGP03-ZM-0021, Control of Configuration Changes ML20078Q5671994-01-25025 January 1994 Rev 8 to OPGP03-ZA-0090, Work Process Program ML20063K3251993-12-23023 December 1993 300 Ton Essential Chiller Bypass Mod Verification Test ML20058C4771993-10-25025 October 1993 Rev 0 to STP Restart Action Plan ML20083P6821993-10-19019 October 1993 Rev 1 to Dept Procedure 0POP05-EO-EC00, Loss of All AC Power ML20078Q7851993-10-15015 October 1993 Rev 0 to, Equipment History Program ML20058N7821993-10-14014 October 1993 STP 1994-98 Business Plan ML20083P6831993-09-15015 September 1993 Rev 2 to Dept Procedure 0POP04-AE-0001, Loss of Any 13.8 Kv or 4.16 Kv Bus ML20046A2161993-07-15015 July 1993 Field Change 93-1163 to Rev 0 to Procedure 0PGP05-ZV-0008, Siren Sys Activation,Testing & Documentation, Adding Caution to Conducting Manual Growl Test ML20062L1461993-07-0606 July 1993 Rev 3 to Speakout Program Instruction SPI-02, Classification of Concerns ML20045E9781993-06-29029 June 1993 Rev 4 to Pump & Valve IST Plan, for Stp,Unit 2 ML20045E9901993-06-29029 June 1993 Rev 6 to Pump & Valve IST Plan, for Stp,Unit 1 ML20078Q2751993-06-28028 June 1993 Rev 5 to ISEG-01, Independent Safety Engineering Group Organization & Responsibilities ML20062L2301993-03-0202 March 1993 Rev 2 to Speakout Program Instruction SPI-08, Speakout Review Committee ML20062L2101993-03-0202 March 1993 Rev 2 to Speakout Program Instruction SPI-07, Speakout Repts 1999-07-13
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SOUTil TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION D0527
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L";r a '! L ., OPGP01-ZA-0304 Rev.2 Page 1 of 7 Probabilistic Safety Assessinent Risk Ranking Quality Non Safety-Related Usage: Available Effective Date: 07/31/97 m
A. C. Moldenhauer D. W. stillwell *A Risk Mgmt & Industry Relations PREPARER TECIINICAL USER COGNIZANT ORGANIZATION Table of Contents Pace
1.0 Purpose and Scope
.. ....... ...... ..................... .... ..................................................2 2.0 Definitions.....................................................................................................................2 3.0 References............................................................................................. ......................3 4.0 Re sp o n s ib il it i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5.0 Procedure............................................................................................................3 Addendum 1 - Maintenance Rule... .... ............... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........................4 Addendum 2 - Graded Quality Assurance ... .............. . . .... ....... ... ...... ..... ... . .... ... . .... ..... .. .... . 5 1
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OPGP01-ZA-0304 Rev.2 Page 2 of 7 -
Probabilistic Safety Assessment Risk Ranking
1.0 Purpose and Scope
This procedure describes the methods and criteria used to rank according to risk significance the systems, structures, and components (SSCs), and operator actiops within the scope of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). This procedure is applicable to those items contained in the STP risk models. It applies to Maintenance Rule, Graded QA and other administrative programs that use risk ranking as part of the process as specified in references 3.1 and 3.2.
l 2.0 Definitions 2.1 Risk Ranking: the process by which SSCs and operator actions within the scope of the PSA analysis are grouped based on their significance to the risk of nuclear accidents.
2.2 Importance Measures: standard calculations which quantify the risk significance of elements of the PSA relative to a figure of merit (FOM) such as core damage frequency (CDF) or large early release frequency (LERF).
1 2.3 Basic Event: a component of a system fault tree which represents a failure mode of a single SSC, although to reduce the number of cut sets, SSCs are sometimes combined.
2.4 PSA System: a related group of components that together perform a particular function within the scope of the PSA. PSA systems are similar to but not the same as plant _
engineered systems. PSA systems are based more on logical rather than physical 4 component relationships, and can contain more or fewer components than the corresponding plant systems.
2.5 Fussell-Vesely (FV): an importance measure defined a ~ ratio of the difference between the FOM with the component failed and the FOM with the component successful, to the value of the average FOM multiplied by the component's importance. ,
2.6 Risk Achievement Worth (RAW): an importance measure which is defined as the ratio of the FOM given the component is guaranteed failed to the average FOM.
2.7 Risk Reduction Worth (RRW .f.m importance measure which is defined as the ratio of the FOM given the component is 100% reliable to the average FOM.
2.8 Common Cause Failure: a single, shared event that adversely affects two or more components at the same time.
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0PGP01-ZA-0304 Rev.2 Page 3 of 7 Probabilistic Safety Assessment Risk Ranking I
3.0 References !
3.1 OPGP02-ZA-0003," Comprehensive Risk Management" ;
3.2 OPGP04-ZA-0604,"Probabilistic Safety Assessment Program" 3.3 OPGP04-ZE-0313," Maintenance Rule Program" 3.4 STP Maintenance Rule Basis Document 3.5 EPRI TR-105396,"PSA Applications Guide", August 1995 3.6 ST-HS-HS-034969," Basis and Validation for using the STP PSA for Ranking of the Safety Significance for SSCs", August 1996.
3.7 OPGP05-ZE-0001,"PSA Analysis / Assessments." l 4.0 Responsibilities 4.1 The Administrator, Risk and Reliability Analysis ensures that the requirements of this procedure are implemented. !
1 5.0 Procedure 5.1 The basis and validation for ranking the safety significance of SSCs for each application of the PSA is described in Reference 3.6.
5.2 This procedure will be performed after every major PSA model, update.
5.3 The at power PSA model will be quantified for the nominal average operation case for both Level 1 and Level 2.
5.4 Maintenance Rule: The impact on the Maintenance Rule Basis Documem shall be performed as described in Addendum 1.
5.5 Graded QA The sensitivity studies and risk ranking for the Graded QA program shall be performed as outlined in Addendum 2..
5.6 The results for the risk ranking study shall be documented in accordance with the PSA Analysis / Assessments procedure, Reference 3.7.
5.7 The results of the risk ranking process and supporting documentation shall be sent to the appropriate Expert Panel or Working Group according to the relevant program procedure.
OPGP01-ZA-0304 Rev.2 Page 4 of 7 Probabilistic Safety Assessment Risk Ranking Addendum 1 Maintenance Rule Page1of I 1.0 Requirements The RRA requirement for providing input to the Maintenance Rule Program is contained in section 3.6.3 of OPGP04-ZE-0313 (Ref 3.3): " Provide a Maintenance Rule Basis Docum impact review for any changes to PSA processes or procedures that could affect Maintenance Rule functions, performance criteria, or goals."
2.0 Maintenance Rule Basis Document Ranking systems is required for the Maintenance Rule,10CFR50.65, and is described in Section 5 of the Maintenance Rule Basis Document,(Ref 3.4). PSA modelinformation and ranking results are presented in the tabs entitled:
Tab 7, "PSA Modeled Functions and Systems List" Tab 9, "RRW and RAW Ranking."
3.0 Procedure
3.1 Review Section 5, and Tab 7 of the Maintenance Rule Basis Document, and note any changes resulting from the PSA model update.
3.2 From the quantified RISKMAN model acquire a system importance report for both CDF and LERF.
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3.3 Send the documented review to the Maintenance Rule Working Group Chairman.
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OPGP01-ZA-0304 Rev.2 Page 5 of 7 Probabilistic Safety Assessment Risk Ranking m_
Addendum 2 Graded Quality Assurance Page 1 of 3 m
1.0 Requirements 3 The requirements for PSA inputs to the Graded QA Program are referred to in OPGP02-ZA-0003 (Ref 3.1). Figure 1 of Addendum I and Figure 1 of Addendum 3 describe processes that start with a PSA risk ranking of High, Medium, and Low.
2.0 Risk Ranking From the base case at-power model for nominal average operation, generate the RAW and FV basic event importances relative to CDF and LERF. Categorize the basic events according to the criteria in Table 2-1 below. The rank given to a basic event will be the highest between that determined on the basis of CDF and that determined on the basis of LERF. Cross reference basic events with the components they represent to determine component risk ranking.
Use Table 2-1 to determine component risk ranking. Components in the " Medium (Further Evaluation Required)" risk rank category will require additional evaluation and final classification based on deterministic considerations by the Program (e.g., Graded QA) Working Group and approval by the Comprehensive Risk Management Expert Panel to provide reasonable assurance that the controls established for SSCs ensure they will perform their intended critical function (s).
3.0 Sensitivity Studies For each of the sensitivity studies determine the risk ranking described in the previous paragraph.
List all components that were ranked Low in the base case, but that fall in the High category in a sensitivity study. Such components whose classification changes under various sensitivity studies are to be identified, and relevant comments are to be prepared for consideration by the Graded QA Working Group or Comprehensive Risk Management Expert Panel.
3.1 Scheduled Maintenance
Description:
Quantify the at-power nominal average operation PSA separately for each one of the scheduled-maintenance state types modeled under top event GENST in event tree PMET.
Purpose:
Considers the effect of unavailability due to the 12 week rolling maintenance schedule on nisk ranking.
7 OPGP01-ZA-0304 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 7 Probabilistic Safety Assessment Risk Ranking Addendum 2 Graded Quality Assurance , Page 2 or 3 3.2 Recovery Descrip jon: Quantify available and appropriate risk models based on the removal of all operator recovery actions.
Purpose:
Provides risk ranking with primary emphasis on equipment availability, reliability, and removes credit for human intervention.
3.3 Common Cause Failures
Description:
Quantify available and appropriate risk models based on the removal of all common cause failure contributions.
Purpose:
Provides focus of risk ranking based equipment combinations outside the scope of common cause failures.
3.4 Multi-System Effects of a Component Type
Description:
For selected component types common to more than one system that are low risk and candidates for changes in QA requirements, vary the failure rates and requantify the models. Selection should based on active components that appear in a majority of system level analyses such as relays, check valves, motor operated valves, etc.
Purpose:
To determine the impact of changes that affect more.than one system.
3.5 LERF De.:cription: Set split fraction ISS to one halfit's normal value and reevaluate LERF.
Purpose:
LERF is dominated by induced steam FC"erator tube rupture, which is a highly uncertain phenomenon. This change considers the effect of reducing the assumed failure rate on risk ranking.
4.0 Define Equipment Groups - classify equipment based on the above results and document for the Comprehensive Risk Management Expen Panel.
OPGP01-ZA-0304 Rev.2 Page 7 of 7 Probabilistic Safety Assessment Risk Ranking Addendum 2 Graded Quality Assurance Page 3 of 3 Table 2-1 Rank Ranking Criteria High RAW 2100.0, or FV 2 0.005 and RAW 2 2.0 or FV 2 0.1 l i Medium (Further Evaluation FV < 0.005 and 100.0 > RAW 2 10.0 l Required) !
Medium FV 2 0.005 and RAW < 2.0, or FV < 0.005 and 10.0 2 RAW 2 2.0 Low FV < 0.005 and RAW < 2.0 I
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