IR 05000482/1999008

Insp Rept 50-482/99-08 on 990613-0724.Noncited Violation Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Plant Support

ML20211A877
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	08/18/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211A864	List: IR 05000482/1999008 ML20211A858
References
50-482-99-08, NUDOCS 9908240161
Download: ML20211A877 (11)

Text

r l ..

.

ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-482 License No.: NPF-42

- Report No.: 50-482/99-08 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -

Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: 1550 Oxen Lane, NE Burlington, Kansas Dates: June 13 through July 24,1999 Inspector: F. L. Brush, Senior Resident inspector Approved By: D. N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENT: SupplementalInformation

)

' '

9908240161 990818 i I

PDR ADOCK 05000482 G PDR l

l 1 ,

.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Wolf Creek Generating Station NRC Inspection Report No. 50-482/99-08 Operations

• The communications and coordination during shift briefings and between operations and other site organizations improved. Control room shift turnover and prejob briefings improved (Section O4.1).

Maintenance

= The plant material condition'and housekeeping had declined. This was evidenced by a small increase in the number of boric acid and water leaks in various systems and the presence of trash in numerous plant locations. The licensee previously identified the material condition concerns and took corrective actions for the housekeeping items (Section M2.1).

. The failure to place the 4 kV undervoltage circuitry in a tripped condition when the associated 15/48 Vdc power supply module was deenergized for more than an hour was a violation of Action Statement 19 for Technical Specification 3.3.2 (LER 50-482/99-007-00). Although the trip logic was altered from 2 of 4 signals required to actuate to 2 of 3, r o loss of undervoltage trip function occurred. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-1968 (Section M8.1).

Plant Suooort

= The licensee responded appropriately to a contamination event when removing a reactor coolant system letdown filter vault radiation detector. Four licensee personnel received internal and external contamination. The licensee identified the proper ,

corrective actions. The licensee changed out a filter to support plant operations ]

following the contamination event but prior to completing the corrective actions. There was no contamination problem during the filter change out. The licensee planned to

'

complete the corrective actions in the near future (Section R4.1).

,

L...

r

.

.

Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant began the report period on June 13,1999, at 100 percent power. The plant op'erated

'at essentially 100 percent power the entire report perio I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspector conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and plan-of the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room coordination were properly controlled. The inspector observed several shift turnovers and noted no problem Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Review of Eauioment Taaouts (71707)

The inspector walked down the following tagouts:

• Clearance Order 99-0606-GL " Component Cooling Water Room Cooler, SGL11B"; and

- Clearance Order 99-0611-GK " Class 1E Electrical Equipment A/C Unit 58, SGK05B."

The inspector did not identify any discrepancies. The tagouts were properly prepared and authorized. All tags were on the correct devices and the devices were in the position prescribed by the tag O2.2 Enaineered Safetv Feature System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspector walked down accessible portions of the following engineered safety features and vital systems:

• Emergency Diesel Generators A and B;

.- Essential Service Water Train A; and

. Auxiliary Feedwater Trains A and B and the turbine-driven trai Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptabl .

"

o, ,

. .

I '

04) Operator Knowledge and Performance

'0 Control Room Staff Communications Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspector evaluated the .scensee's efforts to improve the communications and I coordination within and between the operations department and other site organization Observations and Findings The inspector observed a number of control room shift tumover briefings and operations f led plan-of-the-day meetings. The inspector also attended several control room prejob briefings for maintenance and surveillance activitie , The inspector observed that, in the past, some personnel were not prepared for the plan-of-the-day meeting. When questioned by the operations shift supervisor, the attendees were unsure of the status of issues within their scope of responsibility. The inspector observed that personnel were better prepared during recent plan-of-the-day

- meeting ' The inspector noted an improvement in recent shift tumover briefings. Shift personnel partopated in discussions to a greater extent and in more detail. Projob briefings for maintenance and surveillance activities have also improved. Operations and maintenance personnel held detailed discussions on not only the scope of the evolution but also possible problems that could arise.' The licensee continued the effort to improve communications, Conclusions The communications and coordination during shift briefings and between operations and'

other site organizations improved. Control room shift turnover and prejob briefings improve '08 - Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

e

' 08.1 - (Closed) LER 50-482/99-005-00. engineered safety feature actuation due to the loss of

. Transformer 7. On May 12,1999, an animal accessed the transformer and caused a lockout which resulted in an undervoltage condition on vital Bus NB01. All systems responded, as required. The licensee determined that there was no damage to the transformer.- The licensee restored the plant's electrical lineup to the normal

]

configuration. No concems were identified by the inspecto *

,

I LL

-

.

.

3-II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance y M1.1 General Comments - Maintenance Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspector observed or reviewed portions of the following work activities:

• Work Order 99-210132-002," Component Cooling Water Pump Room Cooler, SGL11B;"

• Work Order 99-207105-001," Class 1E Electrical Equipment A/C Unit SB Condenser Outlet isolation Valve, GK-V758;" and

. Work Order 99-207105-001," Troubleshoot Emergency Diesel Generator A Voltage Regulator Circuit." Observations and Findinos All work observed was performed with the work packages present and in active us The inspector frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present, when require M1.2. General Comments - Surveillatie Insoection Scope (61726)

The inspector observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:

• Test Procedure f,TS BN-207A, " Borated Refueling Water Storage System Inservice Valve Test" and

• Test Procedure STS KJ-005A, " Manual / Auto Start, Synchronization & Loading of Emergency D/G ?!E01."

l Observations and Findinas I The surveillance testing was conducted satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the Technical Specification l J

.

'

-4-

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Material Condition and Housekeeoino Durino Plant Tours Insoection Scooe (62707).

_

The inspector performed routine plant tours to evaluate the plant material condition and housekeepin Observations and Findinas The inspector observed a decline in plant material condition and housekeeping. This was evidenced by an increase in the number of boric acid and water leaks in various systems. The licensee had previously identified the leaks and installed catch basins for each of them. The licensee planned on repairing the leaks as part of the normal maintenance schedul The housekeeping decline was evidenced by a large quantity of trash, tools, rolls of duct tape, unused hoses, and other items in many parts of the power block. The licensee concurred with the inspector's observations and cleaned up the items, Conclusions The inspector concluded that the plant material condition and housekeeping had declined. This was evidenced by an increase in the number of boric acid and water leaks in various systems and the presence of trash in numerous plant locaticv c. Ne licensee had previously identified the material condition concerns and took cp actions for the housekeeping item .M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-482/99-007-00: licensee did not meet the requirements of Actio :

Statement 19 for Technical Specification 3.3.2 due to inadequate work practices. On May 19,1999, the licensee replaced the 15/48 Vdc power supply module for NB01 Channel 1 degraded and under voltage circuitry in the load shed and emergency load sequencing undervoltage compartment. Action Statement 19 requires that the inoperable channel be placed in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> when the power supply was deenergized. The maintenance technicians believed that deenergizing the power supply placed the circuit in the tripped conditio t Following completion of the work, the licensee determined that deenergizing the circuit did not place the undervoltage channel in a tripped condition. The power supply was deenergized for approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, which exceeded the 1-hour time limit of Action Statement 19 for Technical Specification 3.3.2. With one channel unavailable, this placed the undervoltage trip logic in a 2 out of 3 coincidence as opposed to the initial 2 out of 4. No loss of undervoltage trip function occurred.

'

L

i

.

.

'

5-The licensee's corrective actions included:

. Documenting the location of the jumper installations or lifted leads required to place the channels in a tripped condition,

. Revising the appropriate procedures to provide instructions for lifted lead and jumper installation,

. Reviewing reactor trip system and engineered safety features actuation system functional units to determine the failure modes,

. Maintenance management planning to discuss using the verification and validation process before starting a job, and

. Operations management planning to develop a briefing paper for distribution to and discussion with operations department personne The failure to place the undervoltage circuitry in a tripped condition when the 15/48 Vdc power supply module was deenergized for more than an hour was a violation of Action Statement 19 for Technical Specification 3.3.2. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-1968 (50-482/9908-01).

IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)

The inspector observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practice Contaminated and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspector checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and found no problem R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance R Personnel Contamination Event Inspection Scope (71750)

The inspector r sviewed the licensee's response to a personnel contamination even ,

..

..

-6- Observations and Findinas Four licensee personnel were contaminated while removing a radiation detector from the reactor coolant system letdown filter vault. In addition to skin contamination, the

' workers also inhaled a small amount of radioactive material. The detector was used during the recent refueling outage to determine the best time to replace the letdown

~

filter. The licensee decided to replace the filter based on dose rather than differential pressure. If the licensee waited for the filter to reach the maximum design differential pressure, the filter's dose would be extremely high. The detector was attached to a portable sanction and both were in a plastic ba The licensee's work package to remove the detector required the following:

.

Installation of a temporary exhaust fan with a HEPA filter taking suction on the vault,

. Wetting down the vault prior to removing the detector, and

. Installing an air sampler in the work ce The workers followed the requirements of the work package when removing the vault plug and the detector and stanchion. However, when the health physics technician surveyed the bag that was around the detector and stanchion, the contact dose was 2 rem per hour. The dose rate was above what was expected. The licensee immediately halted the job and performed additional surveys. The licensee determined that an airborne contamination release occurred and that the workers were contaminated. The licensee stopped all work and reviewed the even The licensee concluded that the release occurred because the auxiliary building ventilation system was lined up to support fuel movement. The auxiliary / fuel building filtered exhaust system was in service and the auxiliary building normal supply was in slow speed. Therefore, when the vault plug was removed, the loose surface contamination was stirred by air currents. Also, the loose contamination could have been stirred when the temporary oxhaust fan trunk was placed in the vault. The ventilation exhaust from the vault was not enough to prevent the contamination from exiting through the just opened plug openin The licensee performed whole body counts on the four workers. The workers had l breathed in a very small amount of radioactive material. The licensee calculated the l committed effective dose equivalent for each worker at less than 50 mrem. The committed effective dose equivalent is the amount of dose the worker would receive )

over a 50 year period as a result of an uptake of radioactive material. This dose, that the workers received, was well below the regulatory limit of 5 rem per yea The licensee's corrective actions included the following: I

.- Performing a smoke test with the ventilation in the normal lineup, t-

.

.

7-

. Performing an engineering review of the ventilation system for the filter vaults, and

. Developing a plan to remove as much contamination from the filter vaults as possibl The licensee replaced a letdown filter prior to completing the corrective actions in order to support plant operations. There was no significant contamination to either personnel or the surrounding area. The auxiliary building ventilation was in the normal lineup and the technicians used a small vacuum with a HEPA filter to control the air flow from the vault. The licensee planned to complete the corrective actions in the near future, c. Conclusions Four licensee personnel received internal and external contamination when removing a reactor coolant system letdown filter vault radiation detector. The licensee responded appropriately and identified proper corrective actions V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The exit meeting was conducted on July 23,1999. The licensee did not express a position on any of the findings in the report. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie .o S '

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

- PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. J.' Angus, Manager, Licensing and Corrective Action G. D. Boyer,!lhief Administrative Officer

_

J. W. Johnson, Manager, Resource Protection O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer B. T. McKinney, Plant Manager R. Muench, Vice President Engineering

- S. R. Koenig, Manager, Performance improvement and Assessment C. C. Warren, Chief Operating Officer

' INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 Onsite Engineering IP 61726 ' Surveillance Observations IP 62707 Maintenance Observations IP 71707 - Plant Operations IP 71750 Plant Support Activities IP 92700 . Onsite LER Review IP 92901 Followup - Operations IP 92902 Followup - Maintenance

- IP 92903 - Followup - Engineering IP 92304 - Followup - Plant Support

IP 93702 - Prompt Onsite Response to Events ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened-50-482/9908-01 NCV Licensee did not meet the requirements of Action Statement 19 for Technical Specification 3.3.2 due to inadequate work practices (Section M8.1)

Closed 50-482/99-005-00 LER Engineered safety feature actuation due to the loss of Transformer 7 (Section 08.1) -

50-482/99-007-00 LER Licensee did not meet the requirements of Action Statement 19 for Technical Specification 3.3.2 due to inadequate work practices (Section M8.1)

L-

,*

.

t

-...

. 2-50-482/9908-0 NCV Licensee did not meet the requirements of Action Statement 19 for Technical Specification 3.3.2 due to -

inadequate work practices (Section M8.1)

-2

$

_