IR 05000010/1997012
| ML20217Q079 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217Q034 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-97-12, 50-10-97-12, 50-237-97-12, 50-249-97-12, NUDOCS 9708290140 | |
| Download: ML20217Q079 (16) | |
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. U.S. NULLEAR.HEGULATORY COMMISSION
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- Docket Nos: 50 10; 50 237; 50 249 l i
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Lic6nse Nos: DPR 2; DPR 19; DPR 25
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Report No: 50 010/97012; 50 237/97012; 50 249/97012 i Licenses: Cominonwealth Edison Company- ,
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Facility: Dresden Nuclear Station Units 1,2 and 3 L9 cation: G500 North Dresden Road Morris, IL 60450 Dates: May 31 throu0h July 14,1997 Inspectors: K. Riemer, Senior Resident inspector i D. Roth, Resident inspector C, Brown, Resident inspector I C. Settles, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
' Resident inspector B. Dickson, Resident inspector in Training
Approved By: W. L. Kropp, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY !
Dresden Nuclear Station Units 1,2 and 3 NRC Inspection Report 50 10/97012; 50 237/970121 50 249/97012 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and i plant support, The report covers the period from May 31 to July 14,1997, of resident Inspsction augmented by staff from other sites and from the Regio l
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Overall, the startup was well controlled and conducted in a slow, conservative, and ,
deliberate manner, The inspectors concluded that entry into the high pressure coolant ;
injection testing Technical Specifications limiting condition for operations (LC0; ,
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the operators. However, the inspectors concluded that this issue was of minor safety i significance, The inspectors also concluded that the drywell was not ready for closeout '
when the licenses first attempted to perform thu drywell closeout inspectio L The licensoo's continued startup when the high pressure Injoction systorn (HPLI) failed a surveillance was not a conservativo operating decision. During the time that the HPCI system was technically inoperablo, the licensoo continued with the startup and increased i pressure and power lovels to support other testing activitie Mainton0DGA ,
The maintenance and survoillanco activities observed by the inspectors woro performed in accordanco with proceduros. However, self revealing events were the result of inattention to doisil during the performance of maintenance with thn incomplete performance of sorne work resulting in plant transients or work delays. The material t condition of Unit 3 following the outage created challengos to operators and twicu caused the main turbino to be trippe '
' Engincoring The inspectors found that the licensoo had adequately documented changes to the Unit 1 facility as required in 10 CFR 50.59. Furthermoro, Dresden Decommissioning Proceduto
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DDP 10 appropriately addresses the requirements of 10 CFR 50.82(a)(6) regarding decommissioning activities. The inspectors concluded that the licensoo'o 10 CFR 50.59 program at Unit 1 was thorough and wellimplomonte PJant suonort No deficienclos in the area of radiation control were identifie ,
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BspoILQatalls Summary of Plant Status Unit 2 began this inspection patiod near 375 MWo following installation of lino 2311 in the 345 kV switchyard. Power was increased on June 1. The unit remained at or near full power for tho tornainder of the inspection period, except for brief planned decreases to support maintenanco and testing, and to attempt to comply with limits on river dischargo temperatur Unit 3 was in a refueling outago (D3R14) at the beginning of the inspection period. On !
Juno 10, Unit 3 was started and (nado critical. On Juno 17, the generator was placed on-lino, but subsequently manually tilpped duo to moisturo separator high lovel alarms. On ~
June 21, the turbino automatically tripped during troubleshooting of the overspood trip circuitry. Power ascension was completed on July 2. Full power on Unit 3 was not achlovod due to two limits: control valvo (CV) positions woro limited to an average of 85% opon or 90% of any ono CV open, and foodwater flow was limited to 9.73 Mlbm/h (instead of approximately 9.8 Mlbm/h at full power) as a result of an ongineering foVioW of tho fuel cyclo analysis. Those two limlis romained in offect until tho end of the inspection period, l. Operatloas 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Commtala_12.110ll Using Inspection Proceduro 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant cporations. Overall, the conduct of operations was safe and in accordanco with proceduro During the inspection period, events occurrod or woro discovered for which the licensoo was required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73 to notify the NRC. Some of the ovonts and the notification datos are listed below:
Juno 6 (Unit 2) High Pressuro Coolant injection (HPCI) system declared inoperable during a surveillanco test deo to excessivo cycling of the gland seat loakoff pum June 11 (Unit 3) The HPCI system received an invalid engineered safety feature (ESF) signal during lifting of loads to support surveillance testin Juno 12 (Units 2 & 3) Loss of process computer that impacted operation of the safoty paramotor display bystem, calculation of thermallimits, and equipment monitoring. This emergency notification system (ENS)
call was retracted on July 8,199 ~ . - - - - . -- _ . . _ . .- ..
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. June 13 (Units 2 & 3) Unauthorized non malevolent entry into the protected ,
are i June 19 (Unit 3) The HPCI system declared inoperable during surveillance test
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due to steam leakage through the HPCI turbine above seat drain ;
valve July 3 (Units 2 & 3). Loss of process computer and safety parameter display
- ~ system displays due to high computer room temperature. This ENS call was retracted on July 8,199 Prelirninary assessment of the licensee's responses to these events determined the i
responses to be adequate. Final review of some of these events is documented in this report. Final review of the others will be done after receipt of the associated licensee event reports LER Operator Knowledge and Performance t 04.1 (UniL2,31 Operations Performanca Insocction Scong.R11021 The inspoctors conducted iroquent reviews of communications by onorations personnel, proceduto adherenco, and awaroness of plant conditions during tho
, routino oporations of Unit 2 and the startup operations of Unit 3. Procedures and documents reviewed included DGP 0101, " Unit Startup" and " Unit 3 Startup Plan (D3R14 June 1997)."
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p Qhatyallons and Findinns
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Routine and Startup Activities t
, in general, the activities observed by the inspectors woro performed well. The operators in the control room and in the field were observed to enforce throo way communications, strictly follow plant procedutos, and conduct informative turnovers.
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The inspectors determined that routino evolutions during startup were performed in accordance with procedures. The response by operations personnel to equipment problems, such as preparations for repair of failed levelinstrumentation on
- June 18, was good. Also, the inspectors did not identify any errors in the
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. licensee's response to equipment problems with the feodwater heater system (See Section M1.1.) and with the HPCI syste Reactivity and Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Time Management
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The inspectors identified a concern with the operators' reactivity and LCO time ,
clock management during the Unit 3 startup, Technical Specification 4.5. :
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. required that appropriate HPCI system flow be verified within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of reaching 150 psig steam pressure. On June 16, just prior to reaching the 150 psig mark, operators discussed holding Unit 3 at a lower pressure to ensure that all personnel and required equipment were ready before starting the 12-hour LCO timo cloc .
The operators stopped rsulling control rods and reinserted control rod 10 24 from position 48 to posi' ion 24 in an attempt to provent pressure from reaching 150 psig. The control room staff then concluded that lowering and maintaining pressure at a desired point below 150 psig would requiro many rod movements because the last rode moved were of low reactivity worth Due to the multiple control rod manipulations required to reach the lower pressuro, and the subsequent potential risk of personnol error during the extra control rod manipulations, the operating crow decided to proceed with the original plan and enter the 150 psig
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HPCI LCO time clock. The operator re pulled controi rod 10 24 from position 24 back to position 48. Tho operators then ontored the HPCl LCO timoclock por the Technical Specifications and the startup pla Drywell Closcout The inspectors assessed tho'housokooping of the Unit 3 drywell as the final operations closoout inspecdon was performed. This inspecticn was performed af ter the licenson informed tho ins?octors that the drywell was ready for closure. The inspectors identified various housekooping concerns ranging from torn insulation pad duct topo to a discarded 10' 'ong rope. The inspectors concluded that the drywell was not ready to be closed. Also, the person selected to perform the drywell closoout becamo exhausted by the heat and chooto to leave the drywell beforo completio Cpnclusions Overall, tho startup was well controlled and conducted in a slow, conservativo, and deliberato manner. The inspectors concluded that entry into the HPCI testing LCO represented poor planning, and weak reactivity and LCO timo management on the part of the operators. However, the inspectors concluded that this issue was of minor saloty significance. Tho inspectors also concluded that the drywell was not ready for closoc'Jt when the licensoo first attempted to perform the drywell closoout inspectio .2 Concerns With HPCI TechnicaLSnecification LCO ActioQg GSDEliDD_SCORD On Juno 19,1997,liconsoo personnel performod HPCI testing in accordance with the Unit 3 Startup Plan and Technical Specification 4.5.A.2.c. The inspectors observed the testing ard identified a concern with the licenseo' a power ascension plan and operational philosoph .. . .-
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, Qhtetyations and Findinat Technical Specification 4.5.A.2.c required that the licensoo perform a surveillance to verify appropriate HPCI system flow within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of reaching a steam pressure of 920 psig. At 0204 on June 19,1997, the licensoo reached 920 psig reactor pressure and entered the 11-hour LCO to complete HPCI testing. The licensoo was unable to successfully complete the surveillanco due to loaking isolation valvos for the HPCI room sump. The licensoo declared the HPCI system inoperable and went from a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to a 14 day HPCI LCO. The licensoo then continued with power asconsion and testing activities. The licensoo successfully completed the HPCI system surveillance and subsequently declared the system operable at 0345 on June 21,199 The inspectors woro concomoJ with the licensoo's approach sinco the foodwater system had boon modified during the refueling outage and was untestod at the time the HPCI system was technically inoperablo. inspectors' discussions with the control room operators indicated that the Unit 2 foodwater system had boon similarly modified during its refueling outage and post outage foodwater testing resulted in a plant trip. Tho inspectors woro concerned with the potential for a similar transient on Unit 3 prior to successfully completing foedwater system testin Tho licensoo's position was that the Technical Specification requirements woro mot for HPCI testing; the surveillance was performed within the required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, alboit unsuccessfully. The prior Technical Specifications (the licensoo implemented the now updated Technical Specifications in January 1997) required that the HPCI survoillanco bo successfully performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, or pressure be reduced to t 50 psig within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> C.gactusions
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The inspectors concluded that the HPCI testing issue represented a non-conservative operating philosophy. During the timo that the HPCI system was technically inoperable, the licensoo continued with the startup and increased pressure and power lovels to support testing activities. During the timo that the HPCI system was technically inoperablo, the foodwater system was untestod following modifications mado during the refueling outago. Pending further NRC review of the matter, and pending further discussion of the issue (both intomally within the NRC and with the licensee), this is considered an Inspection Follow up item (IFI 50-237:249/97012-01).
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 issues related to 1995 Escalated Enforcement E&Q3D
- Closed) VIO 50 237:249/95004 01: Failure to verif y temperature diff arential t-etwoon the steam space and the bottom head drain lino coolant was less than 145 degroes fahrenhoit before starting the B reactor recirculation pump (01023).
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{Closod) VIO 50 237:249/95004-02a: Drosjon Operating Proceduto 0202 01 did not properly implomont the TS requirements for verification of differential temperature (01033).
(Closed) VIO 50 237:249/95004-02b: Failure to secure soal purgo flow to the B recirculation pump as required by Dresdon Operations Abnormal (DOA) proceduto 0202 01 (01043).
IClosed) VIO 50 2311249/95004-02c: Failure to implomont an adequate proceduro to perform Dresdon Operating Surveillance 1600 13(01053).
(Closed) VIO 50 237:549/95003 03: Type B and C primary containment leakage excooding 60 porcon'. of La was contrary to TS (01013).
IC1920dl LER 237/95 003-00: Typo B and C tost leakago limit excooded due to inadoquato survoillance procedur The issues listed above were the subject of escalated enforcer.1ont and extensivo correctivo actions in 1995. The licensoo's correctivo actions addressed the specific procedural problems and the staff practicos regarding procedural adherenco. Based on an of fectiveness review performed by the licensco in 1995, and subsequent licensoo performanco observed by the inspectors, the actions taken were offectivo in reducing procedural adhorenco problems by operations department personne Also, the plugged reactor vessel bottom head drains have sinco been unplugge The problem with containment isolation has not boon repeated. These items are thereforo closed, ll. Ma!ntenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M 1.1 GoncaLCpmments JnEngstion Scong (61726. 62707)
The inspectors observed various maintenance activities and assessed the workers'
performanco and compliance with plant requirements and management expectations. Activities observed or reviewed includod:
WR 970066257 01 Switch Limit HPCI MSC High Speed Stop; Set / Adjust MSC Limits During HPCI Coupled Run WR 97006895101 U3 Reactor Lovel ATWS RPT/ARI: Calibrate LT and/or MTU/STU. Alarm for Lo-Lo Lovel WR 970068952-01 D3 Turb Overspood Trip Test
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The inspectors observed all or portions of various surveillance tests and assessed the workers' performanae and compliance with plant requirements and management expoa'at.'ns. Tests observed or reviewed included: ,
DJS 020102 Unit 3 RPV ASME B & PV Code 000 psi System Leakage Test / Hydrostatic Test DOS 0250 04 Relief Valve Testing at Low and High Pressure DOS 0500 04 Determination of Core Thermal Power DOS 0500-05 Calculation of Core Thermal Power ,
DOS 2300-03 High Pressure Coolant injection System Operability Verification i DOS 2300 08 HPCI Pump Discharge Line Temperature Monitoring DOS 1600 09 Pressure Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Full Stroke Exercise Test Qbattvations and Findinag The work observed was performed in accordance with procedures. The workers were observed to self-check, exerciso good communications, and follow ,
proceduros, However, some self tovoating errors were mado on work not directly observed by tho inspectors, and thoso errors rt,sultod in challengos to plant operations. Also, somo work was dolayod because the work instructions did not contain sulficient detail or the stops could not be accomplished for the given plant conditions. Specific comments follo Unit 3) Recirculation Svitem Startuo On June 0, the licensco attempted to startup the recirculation motor-generator (MG)
sets. Ono MG set field breaker would not close becauso a differential pressure cell was set incorrectly, thereby preventing the correct completion of the system startup logic. Both trains tripped the field breakers after startup because of swapped polarity on relays in the startup logic. The polarity had been swapped during the outago because the licensoo had not performed a thorough review of the impact of a modificatio (Unit 3) Hinh Pressuro CQQ10nt Inioction System Survei4pnco Tests On June 16, the inspectors witnessed the HPCI system low pressure test. The test revealed that the cooling water pressure was above acceptance criteria. The licensee determined the design bases documents had not specified an upper ban The licensee reviewed and approved a change to the criteria to add an upper ban Also, the cooling water pressure conMol valve was edjusted to assure it would function properly at all pressures. On June 17 the licensee re ran the test and the HPCI system passed us low pressure tes On Juno .19, the Unit 3 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to turbine stop valve above seat drain valvos leaking steam during performance of HPCl testin Preliminary review by the licensee indicated that one valve was binding and not
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. sosting properly, and another valve had improper loading. The licensoo planned to writo a licensoo event report to document this event, and final NRC review will be conducted after receipt of the LE i On June 19, the inspectors observed the high pressure (920 psig) HPCI system run and post outage adjustmonts to the motor gear unit and the motor spood chango Those adjustments woro proviously modo during uncoupled runs, but the licensoo had decided to perform the adjustments during a coupled run atter discussions with tho vendor. The turbino frequency did not moet the critoria specified in the work request. The licensoo and the vendor subsequently dotorrnined that the required frequency could not be attained due to plant conditions (Ref. DOC ID
- 0005442092). Following engineering rovlow, the HPCI system survoillance was re run satisfactoril Additional problems were encountered and documented by the licensoo during HPCI system testing. For example, Nuclear Operations Notification (NON) DR 12 97 31
[BJ) documented that on July 2, af ter the HPCI system was out-of service for overspood testing, the system could not be returned to service. The cause was the as-left position of the overspeed test block lower nut. The nut was too tight by approximately a quarter tu (Un!.t 3) Self RovnDjino Maintenance P_rohlpms with the Feedwater Heauna System During startup of the turbine generator system on June 20, the 3B Moisture Soparator Lovel Hi Hi alarm sounded and operators tripped the turbino. The licensoo found that on May 21, work was performed on the 3B Moistuto Soparator Drain Tank Lovel Transmitter by the Instiumont Maintenanco Department (IMD),
and, upon completion of the work, the air supply lino to the omorgency lovel cont,ol transmitter for the drain tank was left disconnected. The WR (#950065525) for tho work directed IMD personnel to " verify all systems have been returned to normal." On June 20, alllovel control equipment related to Unit 3 moister separator drain tanks was walked down by the IMD Gonoral Supervisor, and no other discropancies .<oro foun On June 26, Unit 3 operators were again unable to make the feodwater system respond correctly, investigation revealed that the valvo actuator to valvo stem coupling was loose, allowing the coupling to totato, and *his allowed the 3B MSDT normal drain valvo positioners foodback arms to becomo disconnected. The licensoo had replaced those valves as a subassembly during the outago and had not manipulated the coupling. At the end of the inspection period, the licensoo was in the process of dotormining a root caus (Unit 3) Foodwater Reculatina Valves (FRV) Lonic Problems On June 16 at 9:00 p.m., while aligning the feodwater level control system por Dresdon Operating Proceduro, DOP 0600 06, the A FRV opened when the master controller was placed in automatic (A was in auto and the low flow FRV was in auto). The unexpected valve transfer occurred becauso a stop in DOP 0600-06
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that would have reset the transfer logic was inadvertently deleted during a procedure revision.
The inspectors reviewed the training provided to the crew in "D3R14 Startup
, Training, Course Code 120STR3" and noted that the specifics of the logic in auto
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and manual were not discusse (Unit 3) Trin Unit for Lo Lo ( 59")
On June 20 and 21, a trip unit card associated with level transmitter LT 3 263 23D (Anticipated Transient without a Scram (ATWS)) failed. The inspectors watched testing of the new board in accordance with WR 97006895101, "U3 Reactor t.ovel ATWG RPT/ARl: Calibrate LT and/or MTU/STU. Alarm for Lo Lo Level." The -
IMD personnel followed the WR and found that a resistor on the replacement card was out of tolerance.. Af ter discussions with the work analysts and supervisor, the IMD staff used an instrument with a lower uncertainty and determined that the resistor was actually within toleran (Unit 31 Turbino oversnood trio
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On June 21, as the licenson was troubleshooting a problem encountorod whilo l performing turbino overspood testing, the turbino tripped unexpectodly. Tho
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licensoo datormined that the causo was an improporly seated car Conclusions
The maintenance and surveillance activities observed by the inspectors were performnd in accordance with procedure. However, self revealing events were the result of inattention to-dotail during the performance of maintenance, in addition,
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the incomplete performance of some work resulted in plant transients or work
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dolays. The matorial condition of Unit 3 following tho outago created challongos to operators and twico caused tho main turbino to be tripped.
- M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 IncorrocLtoads liftg.d Durina Surveillance Proceduto Insocction Scone (62703)
t On June 10,1997, an unexpected automatic HPCI suction transfer from the condensate storage (CST) tank to the torus occurred. The inspecton independently reviewed this event in parallel with the licensee's investigation, wa!' 'own the surveillance procedure, and " recreated" the event based on the work instruction ' Observations and Findinag Daring the performance of DOS 0040 07, " Verification of Remote Position Indication for Valvos included in Inservice Testing (IST) Program." electrical 10 l J
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. maintenance porsennel lifted loads at the correct terminal point, as specified in the proceduro, but on the wrong side of the terminal strip. As a result, a logic circuit opened for CST Low Lovel and an automatic HPCI suction transfer to the torus occurto The proceduro lacked specific details on the exact location to lif t the lead Additional potential contributors to the event included the fact that the electrician was working to an operations (vice electrical) surveillanco proceduro and the involved individual did not review the electrical prints prior to performing the tas Station personnel re-landed the loads and restored the HPCI system to its previous lineup. The licensos documented the occurronce in PlF 97 4825, Prompt Investigation Ropert " Unit Throo HPCI Transfor Causod by Lif ting Wrong Leadt, por
. DOS 0040-07," ar'd Nuclear TrackinD System (NTS) 249 200 97 01000, C.0nchtslona This avont was self revealing in that tho error was not identified until the ESF actuation occurrod. The inspectors reviewod the event and the licensso's immediato corrective actions and concluded that there woro no significant safety consequences as a result. This event will be further reviewed when the LER is issue M8 Miscellaneous Maintenanco issuos (92902)
M8.1 (C10scillLEJLh0337/97 013 00: HPCI System Dociated Inoperablo duo to Excessivo Cycling of the Gland Seal Condonsor Hotwell Drain Pump duo to Pump Stop Level Switch Malfunction. The LER reported the Juno G,1997, failure of the Unit 2 HPCI system gland seat leak off condensor hotwell drain pump. The inspectors concluded this event was the result of a random failure of the level switc Ill. Enninoerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E [ Unit 1) 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Procram Review IDSDEtion Scono t3700U The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrativo procedures and other documents associated with the 10 CFR 50.59 safety review process. In addition, the inspoctors reviewod sovon 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations conducted from August 28,1996, to May 2,1997. The inspectors also reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 trainin0 and qualification records for Unit 1 personne ._ - . - . _ .. __. --
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. ObservationLand Findinag i
The inspectors found that during the inspection period, the licensoo changed tho l procedure by which 10 CFR 50.59 ovaluations woro documented. Evaluations l conducted prior to March 5,1997, woro prepared in accordance with Dresdon Administrativo Proceduro (DAP), DAP 10 02. On March 5,1997, Commonwealth I Edison implomonted a now corporato 10 CFR 50.59 proceduro, Nuclear Station Work Procedura (NSWP) NSWP-A-04, "10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Process."
Paing the inspection period, the licensoo performed eight plant modifications for which 10 CFR 50.59 ovaluations woro prepared, six in accordance with DAP 10 2 and M1 following the implomontution of NSWP A 0 Since August 28,1996,10 CFR 50.82(a)(6) required that licensees assess activities on permanently shut down plants to deterrnino if decommissioning activitios could: (1) foreclose roloaso of the site for possible unrestricted uso, (.'.) result in significant environmental impacts not previously reviewed, and, (3) result in there no longer being reasonable assurance that adequate funds will be available for docommissioning. To comply with the regulations, the licenseo has implomonted Dresdon Docommissioning Proceduro 10 (CDP 10), "10 CFR 50.82 Decommissioning impact Evaluations," which providos guidelines to ensuro that the requiroments of 10 CFR 50.82(a)(0) are mot. The proceduto states that the 10 CFR 50.82 review is in addition to the 10 CFR 50,59 Safety Evaluation proces The inspectors datormined that each of the proceduros by which the licensco conducts 10 CFR 50.59 ovaluations, DAP 10 2 prior to March 5,1997, and NSWP-A 04 af ter March 5, provided acceptable guidance for performing ovaluations as required by 10 CFR 50.59. The inspectors also concluded that DDP 10 was acceptable as a means of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.82(a)(6).
The inspectore reviewed the following Safety Evaluations (SEs) prepared by the licensoo:
SE 96-04 221 - Radwaste Facility ContaminMod Vaults SE 96 04 302 - Decommissioning Program han SE 96 04 303 - Isolato Unit 1 Radwasto Facility SE 96 04-319 - Dresden Unit 1 Organization SE 97 01044 - Portablo Service Air Compressor SE 97 02 093 Core Spray System Jismantlement SE 97 02 097 Offgas Filter Building isolation The inspectors used the three most recent quarterly 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation summary reports submitted by the licensoo on October 14,1996, January 17,1997, and April 9,1997, to ascertain which plant modifications woro planned or performed by the licensoo during the inspection period, The inspectors reviewed the narrativos contained in the specific SEs with the quartedy reports in general, the corresponding narrativo in the quarterly reports accurately summarized the chango, test, or experiment described in the SEs. One exception was the description for the proposed chango in SE 96 04 221, Radwasto Facility
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Cor.taminated Vaults, which was unclear as to the change being evaluated;
' however,' the evaluation was acceptabl The safety evaluations reviewed were determined to be complete, accurate, and in compliance w:th DAP 10 2 and NSWP-A 04 and 10 CFR 50.5 '
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7.a inspectors reviewed a licensee qualification matrix for Dresden stetion persont.el and determined that all the preparers and reviewers who conducted the ,
13 CFR 50.59 evaluations at Dresden Unit 1 for the period inspected were qualified to perform those functions. The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 qualification records for two workers and noted that the records were satk s otory
) and up to-date, Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee had adequately documented changes to the facility as required by 10 CFR 50.59. Furthermore, Dresden Decommissioning Proct, dure DDP 10 appropriately addresses the requirements of 10 CFR 50.82(a)(6)
regarding decornmissioning activities. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's
{ 10 CFR 50.59 program at Unit 1 was thorough and wellimplemented.
. IV. ElanLSjjonort i R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls '
R1.1 Ganeral__ Comments (71750)
During routine inspections in radiologically controlled areas, the inspectors assessed licensee performance. Overall, the licensee's radiation protection staff enforced the plant's sadiological contiol standards. The licensee continued to use personnel functioning as " greeters" to assure that workers entering the radiologically controlled area were aware of dose rates and administrative protection requirements. No deficiencies in the area of radiation control were identifie V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of license management on July 14,1997, followin0 the conclusion of the inspection period _ The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. .The inspectors asked the licensee whether any matorials esamined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie .
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L PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Liceact K. Ainger; Decomrnissioning Services Licensing Manager '
'J. Almon, PTV Lead
' 'S. Benett, Operations Manager
' 'K.- Bowman, Ops Staff
'E. Carroll, NRC Coordinator-
'R. Freeman, Site Engineering Manager
'*R. Gideon, Ops Staff ,
'J. Heffley, Station Manager -
P. Holland, Decommissioning Regulatory Manager .
C. Howland, Ra:tiation Protection Mana.ger
. J. Limes, Unit 1 Engineer / Licensing
'W.' Lipscomb, SVP Staff L'T. Nauman, Unit 1 Plant Manager
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- R. Peak, Engineering Supervisor
'S, Perry, Sl'.e Vice President -
"P. Planing, Plant Engineering Superintendent
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'C Richards, QSA Audit Supervisor
- J. Richardson, H.R. Supervisor
'M. Runion, Ops Staff
'F, Spangenberg, Regulatory Assurance Manager
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'P. Swafford, Maintenance Manager
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'C. Tzomes, SVP Staff
'D. Winchester, OSA Mana0er
- Denotes present at July 14th exit meeting
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, INSPECTION *ROCEDURES USED i
- lP 37001: 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program IP 37551: Onsite Engineering .
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- iP 40500
- Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
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IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support Activities ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50 237;249/97012 01 IFl Not entering TS 3.0.C during HPCI planned maintenanc C10Md
,
50 237:249/95004 01 VIO Failure to verify temperature differential between the
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steam space and the bottom head drain line (01023).
50 237:249/95004-02a VIO Dresden Operating Procedure 0202-01 did not properly implement the TS requirements for verification of dif ferential temperature (01033).
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50 237:249/95004-02b VIO Failure to secure seal purge flow to the 20 recirculation
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pump as required by Dresden Operations Abnormal (DOA) procedure 0202-01 (01043).
.
50 237:249/95004-02c VIO Failure to implement en adequate procedure to perform
- Dresden Operating Surveillance 1600-13 (01053).
50-237:249/95004-03 VIO Type B and C primary containment leakage exceeding 60 percent of La was contrary to TS (01013).
249/95-003 00 LER Type B and C test leakage limit exceeded due to inadequate surveillance procedure.
.
237/97-013-01 LER HPCI System Declared inoperable due to Excessive
, Cycling of Gland Seal Condenser Hotwell Drain Pump due to Pump Stop Level Switch Malfunctio Discussed None I
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. LIST OF ACRONYMS USED.-
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CST } Condensate Storage Tank - S
- CCSW Containmant Cooling Service Water-CFR- Code of Federal Regulations CR Control Room - -
~DAP Dresden Administrative Procedure
- DATR Dresden Administrative Technical Requirements ,
DEOP Dresden Emergency Operating Procedure _'
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DES- Dresden Engineering Surveillance :
< DGP Dresden General Procedure
. DlS . Dresden Instrument Surveillance DOA . - Dresden Operating Abnormel DOE- Department of Energy--
DOP Dresden Operations Procedure
- DOS Dresden Operations Surveillance DTS- Dresden Technical Surveillance
. ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
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- EDG ' Emergency Diesel Generator EMD_ Electrical Maintenance Department EOF - Eme*gency Operations Facility EP Emergency Preparedness
- _ ERO Emergency Response Organization o - FHA Fire. Hazard Analysis FME Foreign Material Exclusion ,
gpm Gallons Per Minute '
GSEP Generating Station Emergency Plan
, HPCI High Pressure Coolant injection
[ HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning IFl inspector Follow up item
. lMD instrument Maintenance Department IRB Issues Review Board
- kW- Kilowatt k. V: Kilovolt L'ER Licensee Event Report
LCO- Limiting Condition for Operation g
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- LOCA - Loss Of Coolant Accident -
MG Merlin Gerin - ,
- MMD Mechanical Maintenance Department
- MW- Megawatt
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NCAD Nitrogen Containment Atmosphere Dilution-NTS- - Nuclear Tracking System PlF - Problem identification Form psig - Pounds Square Inch Gage R PT -' - Radiation Protection Technician -
- SE Safety Evaluation -
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