IR 05000413/1998004

Insp Repts 50-413/98-04 & 50-414/98-04 on 980302-06.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observation & Evaluation of Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Plant

ML20217Q546
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	04/20/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217Q539	List: IR 05000413/1998004 ML20217Q537
References
50-413-98-04, 50-413-98-4, 50-414-98-04, 50-414-98-4, NUDOCS 9805080181
Download: ML20217Q546 (19)

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i U.'S,, NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION

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, REGION II~

Docket Nos: 50-413. 50-41'4

,, License Nos: NPF-35. NPF-52 Report No: 50-413/98-04, 50-414/98-04

Licensee: Duke l Energy Corporation (DEC)

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Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units.1 and 2

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Location: .4830 Concord Rd York; SC 29745

. Dates:

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March 2-6,-~1998-Inspectors

W. Sartor, Exercis Team Leader'-

' Forbes. Senior Radiation Specialist

'J..Kreh, Radiation Specialist '

G. Salyers, Emergency Preparedness' Specialist Approved by: Barr. Chief. Plant Support. Branch Division of Reactor Safety-

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pon Apocn o pga Enclosure G "

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l

CATAWBA NUCLEAR PLANTJ ..  !

e ~NRC Inspection Report.Nos. 50-413/98 01 and 50-414/98-01 This.~ routine,' announced inspection was the observation-and' evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise for the Catawba Nuclear Plant. This NRC/ FEMA-evaluated exercise was a plume exposure. pathway exercise with offsite participation by the States of North Carolina and South Carolina, and. Yor .Gaston..and Mecklinburg. Counties. The exercise was conducted on March 3,

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'l 1998 from-7:45~a'.m. to 1:37 p.m.- This report summarizes-the observations of the four-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the licensee's emergency 3rocedures:in preparedness program response to the simulatedasacciden it implemented its emergency A separate FEMA reportplan wi and . . ll l Je issued that-evaluates-the performance of the State and countie ,

The NRC team observed the licensee's response.in the Control Room Simulator )

(CRS), the Technical Support Center (TSC), the 0]erational Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility'(E02). Based on.the performance

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observed, the. team concluded that.the licensee successfully demonstrated its-l ability to-implement the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure .

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l 'Proaram Areas Evaluated and Results

>. Scenario--The scenario de'veloped for this exercise was effective .for testing the integrated emergency response capability, and exercise- I ( Jpreparations were organize (P4.1)

> Control' Room Simulator --The Operations Shift Manager / Emergency Coordinator. and his CRS staff were effective in performing initial emergency responsibilities. (P4.2.b.1)

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• . Technical- Support Center--The Emergency Coordinator and staff accomplished assigned tasks. Areas for improvement included better management of information provided during update conferences and better presentation of degrading plant conditions to the TSC staff from the l Systems Support Grou (P4.2.b.2)  !

> Operational Support Center--Good command and control were demonstrated by the OSC Communicator and repair team development and deployment wa well planned and. implemented. (P4.2.b.3)

> Emergency Operations Facility--The EOF functioned efficiently and .

l . professionally. Command and control of operations by the E0F Director  !

L were low-key.but. effective. The Generar Emergency declaration and

associated protective action recommendations were-timely and correc ' ( P4.- 2. b. 4 )

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Reoort Details IV. Plant Suooort P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)

P4.1 Exercise Scenario j a. Insoection Scoce (82302)

The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether 4 provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements of the licensee's pla b. Observations and Findinas The licensee submitted two co)ies of the annual exercise scenario to the NRC with a letter dated Decem)er 16, 199 A review of the package indicated that the scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the offsite agencies for their participation in the exercise. The inspector noted that the control of the exercise was also well organize c. Conclusion The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency capability, and exercise preparations were well organized.

P4.2 Emeraency Resoonse Facility (ERF) Observations and Criticue a. Exercise Evaluation Scooe I During this inspection, the inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's biennial full-participation, emergency preparedness exercise in the Control Room Simulator (CRS) Technical Support Center (TSC),

Operational Support Center (OSC). and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations (PARS), command and control, communications, and the overall implementation of the Emergency Plan. In addition the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of the exercise. Acceptance criteria are contained in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, site Emergency Plan, Emergency Plan implementing procedures, and industry guidance in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. " Criteria for Preparations and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."

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.b; ERF Observations. Findinas. and Facility Critiaues

' b.1 Control Room Simulator- l Observation and Findinas >

The CRS shift was briefed on'.the initial conditions and assumed shift

. responsibilities at 8:00 a.m.- The Operations Shift Manager / Emergency-

' Coordinator L(EC) correctly classified the Alert conditions at 8:12 ;

'He then promptly. directed the callout of the emergency response (

organization (ER0).. Within 10 minutes of the declared simulated- '

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emergency, the EC also _ reviewed and approved the emergency notification-message for;the offsite-governmental agencies. The EC was effective in-implementing the Emergency Plan until relieved of.the EC duties by the EC in the TSC at 8:59 ConclusiQD-The Operations Shift Manager / Emergency Coordinator. and his staff were effective in performing initial emergency responsibilities I

b.2 Technical Sucoort Center l

Observations and'Findinas- l An Alert emergency was declared at 8:12_ a.m.. based on a primary - I coolant leak greater than 50 g.p.m. 11n response to the Alert =. the j

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licensee's pagers were activated at 8:16 a.m. instructing '

emergency response 3ersonnel to report to their assigned Emergenc J

Response Facility ( ERF). A plant ann'uncement at 8:24 instructed ~ licensee personnel to-activate the ERFs. The scenario' ;

progressed to a Site Area Emergency (SAE) at 9:18 a.m. due to a i

~ loss of subcooling. A General Emergency.(GE) was declared at '

-10:28 a.m.-based on a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)_with a failure of' Emergency Core Cooling System recirculation capability, consistent with the Emergency' Action Level on inability to

. maintain subcooling, Offsite notifications made from the TSC were timely and. correct. Notification. responsibilities were-transferred to the EOF at 9:47 During this day. shift exercise, the TSC was activated at

> 18:59 a.m., 47-minutes after the Alert emergency declaration and

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sooner than the maximum of 75 minutes-permitted in the licensee's emergency. plan. -The inspector-observed that:

h -(1) TLDs were issued to the incoming TSC staff, -i

! .(2)-facility radiological habitability surveys were frequently (3) performed, and the_TSC ventilation system maintained, as designed, a positive

pressure of 0.15. inch water gaug ? The TSC staff effectively used their procedures in performing their i duties. Frequent facility briefings were conducted by the Emergency L Coordinator. The briefings were scheduled in advance, and were of

[ sufficient detail to keep the staff. informe ;' '

l l3L Upon arrivingsin the TSC, the dose assessment staff promptly

performed.an initial offsite dose assessment. The staff continued -

to monitor-changing radiological conditions within.the plant and' !

performed dose assessments-in response to those change The TSC Emergency Coordinator:(EC):and the Assistant' Emergenc > Coordinator made. extensive-use of video conferencing with the

' Emergency ~ Director. (ED) .in the EOF and Emergency-Manager in the 50SC. .The inspectors observed two instances in which the EC learned of a= change in vital plant' conditions from the ED in the

. EOF during video conferences rather than receiving lthe information from his engineering staf In the first case, at 9:50 a.m.. the ]

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EC was-informed by the ED in the EOF;that the core had been .

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uncovered at 9:32 a.m. In the~second case, the EC was prompted by '

the ED to question annulus pressure change The inspector observed two specific instances in which the Engineering Manager and the System Support Group-(SSG) failed to advise the !

Emergency Coordinator on systems' status and provide. accident mitigation 1 strategies as reruired in' procedure'RP/0/A/5000/020. Revision 1 l Technical Support Center Activation Procedure, Enclosures 4.8 and 4.1 Those instances were:

a (1) The core was approaching' core uncovery, and . finally uncovered at 9:32 a.m. The SSG member monitoring the Reactor Vessel-Level Indication System did not' inform the Engineering Manager of core- '

uncovery until after the' EC.was made aware of the condition by the ED in the E0 ,

'(2) 'For approximately an hour, during degrading' plant conditions one-SSG; member continuously monitored the increase'in annulus pressure and. ventilation. flow but, never informed the Engineering Manager of the~ increase. This information was important since this area-was a-leakage 3ath from containment. ; Based on subsecuent

" discussions, t1e inspector concluded that the indivicual was not i familiar with the annulus ventilation system.' '

.The inspector observed that overhead electronic display #1 remained on a power operation screen for a majority of the exercise. Many key Sarameters essential to diagnosing system and plant performance during a

_0CA, such as incore thermocouple measurements, were not displayed on the screen. Also, reactor pressure..T-hot. T-cold and T-ave instruments were at their lower limits and were. displaying erroneous values. In one instance, an incorrect value for reactor coolant pressure was obtained

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from the display screen. .The incorrect value was corrected within about l ,five minutes.

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Conclusions

-The Technical Support Center was staffed and activated in a timely manne Classifications and notifications originating from the p

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-TSC were timely and accurate. Facility habitability for a radiation dose was properly evaluated by licensee personne Facility personnel effectively used their response procedure TSC dose assessment staff functioned-effectively to assess l

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radiation dose consequences of the postulated accident. The E

Engineering Manager and the System Support Group failed to advise the. Emergency. Coordinator on systems status and provide accident

mitigation strategies. Overhead electronic display #1 was not

effectively use b.3 Ooerational Suocort Center Observations and Findinas Following the Alert declaration at 8:12 a.m.. personnel started arriving in the-OSC at 8:25 a.m. - The personnel worked together efficiently as they declared the OSC operati_onal at 8:29 a.m. and activated at 8:59 a.m.

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H The' inspectors observed the_OSC Coordinator exercise effective command 1 and: control. The Coordinator conducted OSC briefings that were ;

consistently clear, thorough. and _sufficiently frequent. Briefings were 1 announced prior to beginning-the briefings.and personnel in the OSC were attentive. Key personnel in the OSC were asked to participate in the briefings. Also the OSC monitored TSC briefings. The OSC'and TSC

.would compare Repair Mission (Team) status for priority, mission scope, i and status. The OSC Communicator often discussed plant conditions and j

' anticipated conditions with'the appropriate OSC manager I x

The-0SC-staff (Radiation Protection. Chemistry. Operations Maintenanc Safety, and Mission Coordinators) worked well together in efficiently

' dispatching repair missions. An emergency Radiation Work Permit.(RWP) 4 l was written for the emergency. As ~ repair missions were needed, tracking sheets were used to assemble ~ brief, track,cand debrief _ repair team !

Repair missions were effectively tracked onca mission status board that i

was continuously updated as:to mission, status, priority, and team composition; The OSC' missions were re-prioritized as plant emergency ;

conditions changed. The repair mission personnel.were briefed regarding safety relating to plant conditions and radiation levels. The OSC ;

effectively dispensed 27 repair missions-in a timely manner. Each miss' ion team member was monitored with the appropriate. dosimetry and a

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. radiation protection technician was assigned to escort teams as lyg- appropriate,

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L . The OSC equi ament staged for use, including communications equipment, e appeared'to )e in good condition and the OSC was large.enough to accommodate the assigned staff and mission teams.

i, , The' inspectors reviewed the emergency plan implementing procedures used

in the OSC and determined that the~ licensee was complying with the

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guidance in the procedure .0SC control points were established and personnel accountability within the OSC was maintained by logging personnel in and out of the OSC. The inspectors observed that radiological surveys were periodically taken in the OSC~to monit The

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llicensee had theor potential equipment a)propriate changes intoradiological establish a condition contamination

. control point at t1e OSC entrance: however, the contamination control L Lpoint;was not needed during the exercise scenario.

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good perationa Good planningSupport Center'sin emergency was displayed response' performance repair team development and was deploymen Effective ~ command and contral wera demonstrated by the'0SC

. Communicato b.4 Emeraency:00erations Facilit'v

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E Observation and Findinas o The ERO pagers were actuated at 8:16 a.m with the message. " Alert declared 0812: ER0 activate TSC/OSC/ EOF" (as observed on an E0F

, controller's pager). Required. minimum staffing for-the E0 '

-(6 positions) was achieved at 9:15 a.m. and the EOF Director announced at.9:17.a.m. that the facility was operational .-(i.e. ready to

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activate). Thus the EOF reached operational status 65 minutes after the Alert declaration, meeting-the established goal of 75 minute Because the SAE declaration occurred at 9:18 a.m., one minute after the EOF became o)erational, the turnover of management responsibilities from the TSC to tie EOF'was justifiably delayed until 9:47 a.m. At 9:55 a.m.. the EOF Director declared (and announced to the EOF staff) a

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..GE based on having met'the criteria of two separate emergency action levels: (1) no.subcooling available or achievable, and (2) a loss-of--

coolant accident with both trains of emergency core cooling unavailabl However, because of constraints related to the progress of ongoing-L exercise participation by the State and local agencies, the EOF lead controller informed the EOF Director that the GE. declaration could not

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be made yet. and that a SAE status would be maintained until a specific-H release by the controller. (The controllers at the TSC had obstructed a

!' GE declaration by the EC at 9i36 a.m. for the same reason, so the subsequent declaration at the EOF should have been anticipated by the o controllers there.)- Althouch this impediment-to exercise play was not a concern in terms of the licensee's demonstration of emergency response capabilities it appeared to have been avoidable had the controllers injected a contingency message when the EOF was activate ' When the' GE declaration was finally allowed by the controllers, the licensee notified offsite authorities within 15 minutes as required.

l including a protective action recommendation (PAR) developed in

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accordance with its-Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).

Radiological assessment personnel performed appropriate dose projections L and regularly communicated this information to State and local agencie '

! although notification message number 10 contained a numerical

[ transcription error which was promptly corrected in a follow-up messag The EOF functioned efficiently and professionally. Personnel continuously monitored )lant conditions using information from large-screen video monitors w11ch displayed (simulated) plant data in real time. One of the monitors was used to display the consolidated ERF log, which was very useful for keeping the Director's staff updated. A minor problem with this computerized log was that the licensee *s current (> software-did.not provide for time-stamping of entries so that they would L -appear in correct chronological order. An audiovisual link with the TSC

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facilitated the flow and exchange of alant status informatio Command and control of operations by the EOF Jirector were low-key but i effective. Personnel regularly devoted effort to anticipatory

, evaluation so as to be better prepared for possible changes in plant condition ;

' Conclusion i

The EOF functioned efficiently and professionally. Command and control of operations by the EOF Director were low-key but effective. The GE 3 declaration and associated PARS were timely and correc j b.5 Licensee Facility Criticues Following the exercise, the licensee conducted facility critiques where the players provided their own assest. ment of their performance and identified areas that needed im)rovement. The post-exercise critiques in the TSC. OSC, and EOF were o) served by the inspectors and were observed to be thorough. open, and self-critical . Deficiencies as well as strengths were self-identified by the exercise participants:.

V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting The-Team Leader presented the inspection summary to licensee management on March 5. 1998. The summary indicated the exercise was fully !

, satisfactory with the exception of a delayed notification to the NRC following the Alert declaration. This issue was later determined to be satisfactory since the notification had been made within an hour.

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i . PARTIAL LIST'0F PERSONS CONTACTED j

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, : Licensee - .

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" , Baysinger.iRadiation Protection Staff Scientist?

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.M. Birch." Manager.. Safety Assuranc f.D.' Cameron.;CatawbaNuclearStation:0wnersGroup- '

S2 Cristopher,jSupervisor.: Emergency Planning -

' ' C.'Jennings. Public Affairs a Rc James. Station Manager - .

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Rc:Katalinich. Station Instructor i M. Kitlan~Jr. Manager;~. Regulatory Complianc 'T. Kuhr,' Nuclear Emergency. Planning Consultant'

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'S. Ledford. Training Instructor

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i' ' !G.'Mitchell. Senior Analyst.-Emergency Planning l

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-T.'0'Donohue.' Ra'diation Protection Analyst  !

T. Pasour, Emergency Planning: Administrative' Assistant

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=G.:Peterson. Site Vice President 1

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+-M.' Purser 1 Senior _ Engineer

.R. SmithJEmergency Planning 3 Analyst; i 1T. Worley.' Public Affairs -

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

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. .. l m ilP 82301f -Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors'

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IP 82302: Review of Exercise 0bjectives and Scenarios'for Power Reactors ;

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l ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED.AND DISCUSSED n m

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fAttachmentf(10 pages):

. Scope and Objective : Exercise-Narrative and Sequence

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION ANNUAL EXERCISE l MARCH 3,1998 I.- SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES A.- Scope The 1998 Catawba Nuclear Station annual exercise is designed to meet the exercise j requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. The exercise will be conducted l March 3,1998, from 0800 to 1230.

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This exercise will involve participation of Catawba Nuclear Station emergency response .

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l personnel and will include the activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the i j Joint Information Center (JIC).

York, Gaston, and Mecklenburg Counties will be fully participating in the March 3,1998, Exercise. The States of North and South Carolina will also be fully participatin The Annual Fire Drill will be part of the Annual Exercis i i

l The MERT team will also be needed during this Exercise for a NON-CONTAMINATED Medical Dril The Annual Exercise will include participation in a Recovery and Reentry objective for the

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CNS only, from 1230 -1400 to include TSC, OSC, EOF, and JI !

A formal critique including Duke Power and NRC will be held on March 5,1998, at 4:00 i p.m. at Catawba Nuclear Station. This critique will be closed to the publi I l Exercise Obiectives (Duke Power Company Emergency Organization)

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Egersency Management Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency classification in accordance with procedure l

, Demonstrate the ability to notify the States and Counties within fifteen minutes after I declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classificatio !

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l Demonstrate proper use of the message format and authentication methodology for I l messages transmitted to States and Countie ;

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l Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the TSC, OSC, EOF, and JIC after i d:claring an Alert or higher emergency class, and maintain staffm' g around the cloc I

! Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Operations Shift Q

U Manager in the Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TS >

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Catawba Nuclear Station Page Two l Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC not later than one hour after declaring one of

- the emergency classe ~ Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30 minutes in a simulated -

emergency and provide accountability for any not present at the assembly location , Demonstrate access control measures to the plant site, EOF, JIC and Media Center,

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' Test communications equipment among on-site emergency facilities including plant -

- extensions and intercom l 1 Test off-site communications equipment to the County and State warning points, i County and State emergency operations centers and to NRC including the Selective i

- Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification Syste I Test the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment / supplie . Evaluate the adequacy of the following assessment' tools, as applicable:

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' Drawings ' Data N play L : Maps y{- 1 Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Emergency -

Coordinator in the TSC to the Emergency Operations Facility Directo . Demonstrate the ability'to provide accurate information to the news media in a timely manner and to provide effective rumor control according to procedure . Demonstrate the ability to coordinate information with State and County Public j Information Officers prior to its releas Accident Assessment 1 Demonstrate the ability to transmit data in accordance with procedures and to display l this data throughout the EO . Demonstrate the ability to provide and display data to the TSC and OSC in i

accordance with site procedure . Demonstrate the ability to locate a simulated, radioactive plume and to measure the off-site radiation lev'el . Demonstrate adequate radio communications between the off-site monitoring teams and the TSC/ EO O v

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Catawba Nuclear Station Page Thre !

2 Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose projections in accordance~ with-O erecedures.

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l Demonstrate the ability to collect soil, water and vegetation samples in accordance l with procedure . 2 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposur )

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'l 2 . Demonstrate the ability to determine on-site radiation levels and airbome radiciodine concentration . Demonstrate the ability to make the decision whether to issue KI to emergency worker ' 2 Demonstrate the ability to take post-accident liquid samples under accident conditions

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(simulated).

Protective Action Recommendations 2 Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective action !

recommendations to off-site officials in accordance with site procedure '

Plant Operations 2 Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and provide mitigation strategie Medical Drill <

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2 Demonstrate proper site response to a simulated medical emergency in accordance with site procedure ' Fire Drill l

2 Demonstrate proper response by the on-site fire brigade.to a simulated fire in accordance with site procedure .- Demonstrate the ability to request and obtain firefighting support from the off-site j volunteer fire departmen '

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Recovery and Reentry -

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3 Demonstrate the ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for ;

controlled recovery and reentr ., ,, -3 Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposur Other

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! 3 Demonstrate resolution of previous exercise findings'(weaknesses,' deficiencies) {

identified by evaluators, QA, or NRC, as applicabl {

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f la CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION i

ANNUAL EXERCISE SCENARIO MARCH 3,1998 NARRATIVE

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N./ This Annual Exercise will be a full station drill with the Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center ;

(TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) manned with

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participants, Controllers, and Evaluators. The Media Center and Joint Information Center will be manned !

also. The States (North Carolina and South Carolina) and Counties (York, Gaston, Mecklenburg) will participate in this exercise too The exercise begins with a 0.5" break in one of the drain lines on the B train hot leg between INDlB and i IND2A. This results in a >50 gpm leak (~400 gpm) to containment. (See diagram on the time line). This results in an Alert being declared. Initiate safety injection and Rx trips at 0810. ETB (Essential bus)is lost due to ground fault (86 B,D lockouts). D/G "IB' trips and stops 0815 Declare an ALERT and Implement RP/0/A/5000/03 Based on EAL 4.1.l(1) NC leakage >50 gpm and NC Subcooling >0 A failure of the second ND valve (IND2A) causes a pipe break in the annulus. Due to the arrangement of the penetration, most of the water goes back into containment and some coes into the

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annulus and is released to the environment. (See diagram below in the time line). The leak is greater than !

ECCS (emergency core cooling system) capacity and causes a loss of subcooling. Emergency Procedure i requirements will shut down l A ND pump if not needed - pump will fail if attempted to star I 0930 Declare Site Area Emergency and Implement RP/0/A/5000/04 based on EAL 4.1.l(1) NC leakage > l O _ available ECCS capacity and SI activated or required and Existing NV<NI<ND cannot maintain i V subcooling . > 0 F Actual Sounding of the Sirens and activation of EAS will take plac At 1040 A small plane crashes on site (pilot and co-pilot only) and causes the FWST (refueling water storage tank) to collapse and drain over a period of 5 minutes. Fire Brigade and MERT are needed. The j Bethel VFD, our offsite vfd backup will be called and this will be our " Annual Fire Drill".When MERT is l called to the plane crash they find both pilots dead. The bodies will not be contaminated as they are burned up. However, the FWST water is slightly contaminated and flowing on the ground and into drains that go !

to hold up ponds. We now have no ECCS suction from anywhere to cool the Reactor core and no way to recirculate the containment sump wate I100 Declare a General Emergency and implement RP/0/A/5000/05 based on EAL 4.1.l(a) Loca with failure of both trains of ECCS recirculation and NC system subcooling cannot be maintained >0"F Simulate sirens and EBS at the GE. The FMT dose readings indicate fuel damage thus the plume contains E

iodine. Although the release is'not large enough to recommend it, an evacuation recommendation of two miles around and five miles downwind will be given automatically based on entering a General Emergenc Some slight core damage occurs and a small amount of iodine i: measured at two mile. Thus the PAG's are upgraded to recommend - Evacuation to five miles based on plam conditions and wind speed is < 5 mp j When ETB is returned to service allowing use of ND Pump "B" from Cont. Sump which is 2 3.5 ft the !

O cere ie recovered and cere coeidewn besin . The Exerci e end for 18e state, eed Ceentie, aed ihe '

RECOVERY AND REENTRY Objective for the CNS Site TSC, OSC, EOF and JIC begin ?

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CATAWBA - ANNUAL EXERCISE. SEQUENCE l'

l MARCH 3,1998 Initial Conditions

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. Unit' I is at 100% power and 280 effective full power days with a continuous run of 125 day (simulator core cycle 9) -

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' Valve INDIB (containment suction valve) has a seat leakage which has not been detected.'

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Unit 2 is at 100% power and 50 EFPD with a continuous run of 50 day Failures'

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Containment spray pressure transmitte .5" break in A Train ND suction line resulting in 400 gpm NC leak. (ALERT) 1

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ETB ' 4160 Essential bus lost due to ground fault on Normal Incoming Breaker (86B, D lockouts)

which causes subsequent loss of IB D A second failure of 1 A ND suction line resulting in NC leak > capacity of ECCS system and loss of

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subcooling. (SAE)

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' An off-site release through annulus and unit vent as result of second ? A' ND suction line brea FWST is destroyed by the crash of a small plane which causes the loss of all ECCS recirculation (General Emergency) Both persons on Board the plane are DEA Mockuos

- Plane at FWST, Unit 1.... A truck will be used to simulate the plane (fire simulated)

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Fire Brigade and MERT

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Catawba Drill Sequence MARCH 3,1998 Page Two

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Simulator Walk Control Boards and get Turnover 0800 -

Simulator out of freeze and operators on statio A 0.5" break occurs in one of the drain lines on the B train hot leg i

between 1NDIB and IND2A. This results in a >50 gpm leak (~400 gpm) to containment. (See diagram below).

ND1 B

ND2 A

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LEG B 1 :6_

l DC DG

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>50 gpm  :::::

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Initiate safety injection (Rx trips).

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ETB is lost due ;a ground fault (86 B,D lockouts). D/G "IB' trips and stops Expected Response 0815 -

Implement EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Rx Trip and SI)

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Implement RP/0/A/5000/01 (Classification of Event)

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Conduct a Site Assembl Activate TSC, OSC, EOF, and JIC i.

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Catawba Drill Sequence MARCH 3,1998 Page Three

_U (] 0815 -

Declare an ALERT and '..nplement RP/0/A/5000/03 Based on EAL i

4.1.1(1) NC leakage >50 gpm and NC Subcooling >0 ;

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Operators and/or ERO should implement the following procedures:

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RP/0/A/5000/06 Notification to States and Counties

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RP/0/A/5000/10 Conducting a Site Assembly or Evacuation

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RP/0/A/5000/13 NRC Notification Requirements

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RP/0/A/5000/20 Technical Support Center Procedure

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RP/0/A/5000/21 Emergency Operations Facility Procedure j 0915 -

A failure of the second ND valve (IND2A) causes a pipe break in the annulus. Due to the arrangement of the penetration, most of the water goes back into containment and some goes into the annulus. (See diagram below).

ND1 B

ND2 5 A :I: l HOT p l.l.;

NO 1 A LEG 8  :.;;; SUCTION

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DQ DC s I h

SOME FLOW TO ANNUt.US O q. .

m

.

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The leak is greater than ECCS (emergency core cooling system)

capacity and causes a loss of subcooling. Emergency Procedure will shut down I A ND pump if not needed - pump will fail if attempted to start. (A NS system running).

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High VE (annual ventilation) delta pressure.

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Low tiow (4000 cfm) across V High annulus pressur All VE goes to the unit ven A V

Catawba Drill Sequence MARCH 3,1998 -

l Page Four L

^

f 0930 -

Declare Site Area Emergency and Implement RP/0/A/5000/04 based lJ

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on EAL 4.1.l(!) NC leakage > available ECCS capacity and SI activated or required and Existing NV<NI<ND cannot maintain subcooling . > 0 F

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TSC/OSC Activation complete Site Assembly complet EOF Activated (oroperational)

Expected Response ERO should implement the following procedures: i

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RP/0/A/5000/12 Control of Assessment of Repair Teams

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Sound sirens and activate EBS 1000 -

VE Filters saturated , iodine being released 1030 -

Iodine at two miles

_

1040 -

A small plane crash (pilot and co-pilot only) causes the FWST O (refueling water storage tank) to collapse and drain over a period of 5 minutes. Fire Brigade and MERT NEEDE FWST puncture alarm  !

Fire Brigade Response (from CR and plant)

MERT Response

Security Response

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NS, NV and NI (safety injection) pumps will fail if they are not taken off within 5 minutes. Otherwise, they are available for recirculation Expected Response i

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Attempt to return ETB to service as per Abnormal Procedure AP/1/A/5500/07, " Loss of Normal Power Case 11 Loss of All Power to '

an Essential Bus." ETB will not be available until about !!3 '

Catawba Drill Sequence MARCH 3,1998 Page Five p)

(- ' i100 -

Declare a General Emergency and Implement RP/0/A/5000/05 based on EAL 4.1.l(a) Loca with failure of both trains of ECCS recirculation and NC system subcooling cannot be maintained >0"F

-

. Evacuate two miles around and five miles downwin Expected Response ERO should implement the following procedures:

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RP/0/A/5000/15 Core Damage Assessment

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HP/0/B/1009/19 Off-Site Dose Projections Simulate sirens and EBS FMT dose readings indicate fuel damage (plume contains iodine).

PAO - Evacuate to five miles based on plant conditions and wind speed is < 5 mph O

k .

Plant cooldown in progress - Equalize NC System

<

with steam pressure ,

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l 1101' -

Core begins to uncove Ii15 -

- Core damage begins

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PALS sample requested i145 -

ETB returned to service allowing use of I

ND Pump "B" from Cont. Sump ;> 3.5 f Core covere Exercise Ends. For states and Counties 1230 -

BEGIN RECOVERY AND REENTRY Objective (CNS Site TSC, OSC EOF and JIC only)

i 1400 -

Critique in TSC. EOF, and JIC -  !

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