ML20214P210

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Special Rept 2-SR-86-033:on 861011,while Unit in Mode 1,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys High Range Monitor Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Failure of Channel 2 Detector Due to Normal Component Aging of Integral Tubing.Detector Replaced
ML20214P210
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 11/06/1986
From: Haynes J
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To: Martin J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
2-SR-86-033, 2-SR-86-33, ANPP-00113-JGH, ANPP-113-JGH, NUDOCS 8612040114
Download: ML20214P210 (3)


Text

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'If, k Arizona Nuclear Power Project Q P O. BOX 52034

  • PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034 (f s c, m.

A O ANPP-00113-JGH/TDS/

November 6, 1986 ESP-96.0$'/,5 Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 (License NPF-51)

Special Report 2-SR-86-033 File: 86-020-404

Dear Mr. Martin:

Attached please find a Special Report 2-SR-86-033 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3-6 and 6.9.2. This report discusses a radiation monitoring unit not restored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

If you have any questions, please contact Tom Bradish, Compliance Supervisor at (602) 932-5300 Ext. 6936.

Very trul yours, J. G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/ ESP /cid Attachment cc: 0. M. DeMichele (all w/a)

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

R. C. Sorenson R. P. Zimmerman E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr INPO Records Center gk O I14 861106 S OCK 05000529 PDR

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, A Mr. John B. Martin Special Report 2-SR-86-033 ANPP-00113/JGH/TDS/ ESP-96.03 Page 2 bcc: J. R. Bynum (all w/a)

O. J. Zeringue J. M. Allen R. E. Younger R. J. Adney R. E. Gouge M. L. Clyde W. E. Ide D. N. Stover (NSG)

J. R. LoCicero (ISEG)

M. K. Hartsig D. R. Canady LCTS Coordinator B. F. Asher (Training)

PRO File 2-86-0152 Responsible Departments (required review):

Operations Engineering (T. Phillips)

Operations Engineering (G. Voboril)

Operations Engineering (L. Henson)

Radiation Protection Chemistry Manager (L. Brown)

Radiological Services Manager (G. Perkins)

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,, 9 s-1 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Special Report 2-SR-86-033 RADIATION MONITORING UNIT NOT RESTORED WITHIN 72 HOURS Docket'No. STN 50-529 License No. NPF-51 This special report is required by Palo Verde Unit 2 Technical Specification Table 3.3-13, Action 42-B.

At 0818 on October 11, 1986, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent reactor power, when the-Fuel Building Ventilation System High Range Monitor ' (RU-146) had been inoperable for more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The monitor, which samples radioactive gaseous effluents in the fuel building ventilation system, was initially declared inoperable on October 8, 1986.

The Pre-Planned Alternate Sampling Program was initiated as an interim compensatory measure as required by Technical Specification Table 3.3-13, Action 42-A. The redundant monitor.(Fuel Pool Area Monitor RU-31) was in operation during RU-146's inoperability. Since this monitor showed no high level radiation during this time, no-threat.to the health and safety of the public existed.

During the functional Quarterly Test (36ST-9SQ04) on RU-146, the channel 2 detector failed. 'The detector was replaced. The new detector check source failed to respond.

The check source was reworked and the detector was satisfactorily tested and returned to service on October 12, 1986.

The root cause ~ of the failure has been attributed to normal component aging of the integral Geiger-Mueller (GM) tube. Ongoing analysis of this type of failure will determine an expected replacement schedule for detectors used in this type of environment.-

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