ML20214P274

Special Rept 1-SR-86-093:on 860830 & 1015,containment Bldg Area Radiation Monitor RU-149 Declared Inoperable.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Errors.Appropriate Personnel Counseled on Proper Preparation of Tech Spec Condition Records

ML20214P274
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/13/1986
From:	Haynes J ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
1-SR-86-093, 1-SR-86-93, ANPP-00116-JGH, ANPP-116-JGH, NUDOCS 8612040140
Download: ML20214P274 (4)

Text

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Arizona Nuclear Power Project ' ' 0;. 'k P o. Box 52034

• PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034 7s ANPP-00116-JGH/TDS/JHT-96.03 0?f ,

November 13, 1986 C J,;,.. r,

.g. r Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-528 (License NPF-41)

Special Report 1-SR-86-093 File: 86-020-404

Dear Mr. Fbrtin:

Attached please find a Special Report 1-SR-86-093 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 and 6.9.2. This report discusses the inoperability of a Containment building area radiation monitor.

If you have any questions, please contact Tom Bradish, Compliance Supervisor at (602) 932-5300, Ext. 6936.

Very truly yours,

/W J. G. Ilaynes Vice President Nucleer Production JCII/TDS/JIIT/c1d Attachment cc: O. M. DeMichele (all w/a)

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

R. P. Zimmerman R. C. Sorenson E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr INPO Reccrds Center

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-Document Control Desk Licensee Event Report ANPP-00116-JGH/TDS/JHT/96.03-

-Page 2 bcc: J. R. Bynum '(all w/a)

O. J. Zeringue J.-M. Allen R..J. Adney R. E. Younger R. E. Gouge M. L. Clyde W. E. Ide D. N. Stover (NSG)

J. R. LoCicero (ISEG)

D. R. Canady M. K. Hartsig B. F. Asher (Training)

LCTS Coordinator PRO File 1-86-0298 Responsible Departments (required review):

Ops Engineering,(F. T.-Semper)

Ops Engineering'(G. K. Voboril).

Radiation Protection-(G. D. Perkins)

, - +

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Containment Building Area Radiation Monitor Inoperable for Greater than 72 Hours License No. NPF-41 Docket No. 50-528 Special Report 1-SR-86-093 At approximately 0637 on August 30, 1986,~ Palo Verde Unit I was in Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY) when. the containment building area radiation monitor (RU-149) was declared inoperable because it was generating detector failure alarms. In order to comply with ACTION 27 of Table 3.3-6 a preplanned alternate program to monitor the appropriate parameters was placed in service.

- RU-149 was declared inoperable because it was periodically generating detector failure alarms. The monitor generates a failure alarm whenever the count rate drops below a predetermined setpoint, which is set near the background levels normally present at the detector.

RU-149 was administratively declared inoperable. The alarms that were being generated were short in duration and would clear themselves, so the radiation monitor was left in an operational mode in an effort to identify the root cause of the alarm generation.

Troubleshooting was conducted in accordance with a work order which was controlled by an approved procedure. The troubleshooting did not reveal the root cause of the alarms. The alarms were being generated very infrequently and for only short periods of time which made it difficult to determine the cause. The containment building area radiation monitor was declared operable at approximately 1315 on November 3, 1986 after successful completion of the applicable surveillance test.

At 1620 on October 15, 1986, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) operating at 100 percent reactor power when it was discovered that a containment building area radiation monitor (RU-149) had been inoperable for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> without having a special report submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) within 30 days. Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 Table 3.3-6 ACTION 27 requires that a special report be submitted to the NRC pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days af ter RU-149 has been inoperable for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

This event was discovered by a Shift Technical Advisor (STA) (non-licensed utility) performing a daily review of.open Technical Specification Component Condition Records (TSCCRs). TSCCRs are used to track the inoperability of Technical .

Specification required equipment and the associated Technical Specification ACTION l requirements.

The onshift STA (non-licensed utility) was notified of the inoperable monitor on August 30, 1986, and issued a TSCCR to track the inoperability of the monitor. The STA recorded the ACTION requirement for alternate sampling on the TSCCR, but did not record the ACTION requirement for submittal of a special report. The Shift Supervisor (Licensed-utility) approved the TSCCR and the ACTION requirements that were implemented, but did not realize that the requirement for submittal of a special report was-not recorded.

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The root cause of this event was cognitive personnel errors by the STA and Shif t Supervisor.

To prevent recurrence the STA was counseled on the proper preparation of TSCiRs.

The STA was reminded to record the complete ACTION statements including reporting requirements and to use the Technical Specification ACTION tracking computer. The computer 8enerates an alarm in the control room to notify the control room operators of Technical Specification ACTION requirements that are due. The STA was told to ensure that all TSCCRs are thoroughly reviewed during shift turnover. Also a staff meeting was held to brief the STAS on this event and the actions implemented to prevent recurrence. The responsible Shift Supervisor has been counseled on ensuring that TSCCRs are completed satisfactorily and that the appropriate ACTION requirements are met. This is believed to be an isolated occurrence and no further corrective action is deemed necessary.

This event was an administrative error that had no impact on the operation of the plant other than the late submittal of a special report. Therefore, this event had no impact on the health and safety of the public.