IR 05000369/1998001

Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-369/98-01 & 50-370/98-01 on 980114-15 (Ref 10CFR2.790).No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Support,Including Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Plant & Vehicle Barrier Sys

ML20203C384
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	02/17/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203C358	List: IR 05000369/1998001 ML20203C353
References
50-369-98-01, 50-369-98-1, 50-370-98-01, 50-370-98-1, NUDOCS 9802250172
Download: ML20203C384 (2)

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9 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-369 and 50-370 '

License Nos: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Report No: 98-01 Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 Location: 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: January 14-15, 1998 Inspector: D. Thompson, Safeguards Inspector Accompanying G. Belisle, Chief Personnel: Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety Barry Manili, Licensing Reviewer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved by: George A. Belisle, Chief Special Inspections Branch Division of Reactor Safety SAFEGUARDS INFORMAT! ~ ---

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY McGuire Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-369/98-01 and 50-370/98-01 This routine announced inspection was conducted in the area of plant support by a regional safeguards specialist. The specific area evaluated was the Malevolent Use of vehicles at Nuclear Power Plant * The inspector concluded that the vehicle barrior system, using a combination of gates, jersey barriers, cable rod system, cable, buildings, and terrain, was an acceptable barrier capable of stopping a design basis vehicle traveling at_the established speed prior to the vehicle penetrating the protected area perimeter and causing damage to vital equipment. The inspector concluded that the engineering staff had performed an appropriate analysis of the vehicle threat and had installed an acceptable vehicle barrier to counter the threat. (S2.5.1)

• The inspector determined that the licensee had installed the vehicle barrier at a distance that would preclude an explosion from a bomb-laden vehicle from causing damage to vital targets required for the safe shutdown of the reacto (S2.5.2)

• Based on the inspector's review of the vehicle barrier system procedures and in discussion with the licensee, the inspector concluded that the plans and procedures were acceptable for implenenting the vehicle barrier syste (S2.5.3)

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