ML20207D283

Rev 0 to Crdr Emergency Operating Procedures Validation Rept

ML20207D283
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	12/22/1986
From:	HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20207D201	List: ML20207D250 ML20207D283 ST-HL-AE-1860, Forwards 861222 Rev to Crdr Criteria Rept & Rev 0 to Crdr Emergency Operating Procedures Validation Rept, Updating Status of Facility Crdr Programs in Response to SER Confirmatory Item
References
NUDOCS 8612300367
Download: ML20207D283 (93)

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT REVISION LOG Date Description Af ected 0 12/22/86 Initial Issue I

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS I Section Title Page REVISION LOG i TABLE OF CONTENTS I

11 LIST OF TABLES fil LET OF FIGURES iii APPENDICES iv ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS v SUMM ARY vill PREFACE xii I

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1-1 2.0 METHODOLOGY 2-1 2.1 SCENARIO SELECTION 2-1 2.2 ORGANIZATION AND ORIENTATION 2-2 2.3 SCENARIO EXECUTION 2-4 2.4 SLOW W ALK-THROUGH/ TALK-THROUGH 2-5 2.5 ADDENDUM TESTS 2-5 3.0 OBSERVATIONS 3-1 3.1 CONTROL PANEIE 3-2 3.2 EMERGENCY OPER ATING PROCEDURES 3-10 3.3 TRAINING 3-14 I

4.0 CONCLUSION

S 4-1 4.1 GENERAL 4-1 4.2 PERSONNEL 4-1 4.3

SUMMARY

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__ POWER CO. W EOP VALIDATION REPORT LIST OF TABLES Table Number Title Page 2-1 EOP SELECTED SCENARIOS 2-6 2-2 STP EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES 2-7 3-1 EOPs USED IN SCENARIOS 3-16 LET OF FIGURES Figure g Number Title B P-1 STP CRDR M AJOR REPORTS 2-1 COMPOSITE OF EOP TRANSITIONS 2-2 BRIEFING BEFORE THE SCENARIO 2-3 PASSING OUT OPERATOR ADDENDA DURING A TRANSIENT 2-4 TEAM I-SCENARIO EXECUTION 2-5 TEAM II- SCENARIO EXECUTION 2-6 DISCUSSIONS AFTER THE SCENARIO 2-7 CRITIQUE AFTER THE WALK-THROUGH/ TALK-THROUGH 3-1 SAFETY INJECTION EXPERIMENTAL MIMIC 3-2 DEM ARCATION FOR ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION I 1 I

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DESIGN REVIEW APPENDICES I A SUMM ARY OF HUM AN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES B EOP CHECKLET EVALUATION C EOP VALIDATION TEST CHECKLIST AND DEFICIENCY FORM D CONTROL PANEIS - EOP VALID ATION CHECKLIST QUESTIONS I

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1 EOP VALIDATION REPORT ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AC Alternating current Auxillery Feedwater AFW ATWS Anticipated 'IYansient Without Scram g

CCW Component Cooling Water a CRDM Control rod drive mechanism CRDR Control Room Design Review CRS Control Room Survey CRT Cathode ray tube CSF Critical Safety Function DG Diesel generator ECW Essential Cooling Water EOP Emergency Operating Procedure ERFDADS Emergency Response Facilities Data Acquisition and Display System ESF Engineered Safety Features ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GPM Gallons per minute HED Human Engineering Discrepancy HEO Human Engineering Observation g

HHSI High Head Safety Injection E

! HL&P Houston Lighting & Power Company kV Kilovolts LHSI Low Head Snfety Injection LOCA Loss of Coc' int Accident I

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS MG Motor generator MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve NPOD Nuclear Plant Operations Department NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OER Operating Experience Review PORV Power operated relief valve PPRO Primary Plant Reactor Operator PRT Project Review Team QDPS Qualified Display Processing System RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal RO Reactor Operator RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SFTA System Function and Task Analysis S/G, SG Steam Generator SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture SI Safety Injection SPRO Secondary Plant Reactor Operator SRO Senior Reactor Operator I  !

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS STA Shift Technical Advisor STP South Texas Project V Volts VCT Volume Control Tank I

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT

SUMMARY

This report describes the validation process used for the South Texas Project Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and summarizes the results of that validation as they involte the control panels. This validation process was performed as part of the Procedures I Generation Package requirements and as part of the Control Room Design Review.

Complete descriptions and results of the EOP preparation process, including EOP verification, EOP validation control panel results, EOP validation training results and EOP validation procedure results, will be available as part of the Procedures Generation Package.

I Specific features in the validation process were included to address the needs of the CRDR, including a slow walk-through/ talk-through of two procedures and participation of human factors specialists throughout the entire EOP validation process.

Twenty-two definitive scenarios were run on the simulator to test the EOPs. We EOPs direct operators to perform the actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of transients or other conditions caused by various accidents. De scenarios were chosen I specifically to test the principal safety actions and the branching into the steps of as many procedures as possible. %ey also tested the technical content and usefulness of the operator addenda and the crew organization.

I %e operating crew's ability to respond to a transient depends on the quality of:

o Control Room Equipment (Control Panels).

I o Emergency Operating Procedures.

I o Operator Training.

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Observations have been made in eacn of these categories, as summarized below:

A. Control Panels

1. CCW flow indication for RCP thermal barriers is not provided; valve alignment is lengthy to check.

2. Mimics, demarcation and labeling need improvement in some areas E

of the panels. E

3. Load center switches for removing power to control rod drive MG sets are not distinctively marked.

4. Inadequate indication is provided for status of ESF bus power-available and RCS makeup.

5. 'Ihe "first out" annunciator windows are not readable when lit.

6. Pushbutton for annunciator test function was inadvertently pressed rather than acknowledge and reset buttons.

7. Capability for emergency stop of standby (ESF) diesel generators is not provided.

8. Recorder inputs mix linear and logarithmic units.

9. Feedback for ESFAS signal reset could be more visible.

10. Recorder pens are not readable / visible on three-pen recorders.

11. Various meter problems were seen, which are resolvable by the meter zone coding (an effort already planned).

12. Parameters shown both on indicators and recorders in close proximity to each other should be presented in the same sequence left to right.

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1. Binders are marked with procedure numbers which need to be larger and color coded to the different EOP groups. Addendum labeling should also be larger.

2. Double negatives, imprecise words and subjective words in the EOPs are confusing.

I 3. Setpoints and values given in the EOPs should be correct, indicative of the plant capabilities and consistent with the instrument values displayed.

4. Means for quickly accessing the starting point or the point of exit of a procedure are not provided. )

5. Readability would be improved using a different type style.

The procedures make extensive use of indentures.

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7. Durability of pages and covers should be better.

8. Discrepancies between the EOP terms and the control panel labeling were noted.

9. Use of well known symbols and abbreviations would help clarity and length of procedures.

10. Procedures do not take advantage of the planned meter zone coding effort.

I 11. Backup indications and actions are not always given in the procedures.

12. The Status Tree binder should have a Conditional Information page.

13. Certain reset actions necessary should be added to the procedures.

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1. Background information for development of the EOPs is not known by operators.

2. Standard responses to immediate action steps must be better learned, since response must be quick and accurate.

3. ESFAS reset sequences required for various situations are not yet established in operators' minds.

Human engineering observations (HEOs) identified against the control panels during the EOP validation process have been submitted to the Project Review Team (PRT) for evaluation, identification of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) and recommended resolution. The HED9 and the resolutions are summarized in Appendix A. (Observations against the EOPs themselves or training are handled separately, as part of the Procedures Generation Package.)

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PREPACE The control rocm design review (CRDR) of the South Texas Project (STP) Nuclear Generating Station was started in September 1982. Bis review is being performed by Torrey Pines Technology for Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) with Bechtel Energy Co@ oration (Bechtel) acting as agent.

I De program plan was presented to the NRC at the STP mock-up in October 1982. The basic review work for operator experience review, system function and task analysis and control room survey was completed in October 1982. In November 1982 the management team put a hold on CRDR activities, and authorized a design study to correct mounting evolutionary engineering changes and discrepancies with the NUREG-0700 guidelines.

In November 1982, a decision was made by HL&P to completely relayout six panels and upgrade the four remaining main control room panels based on the design study. This redesign effort was required to accomodate design changes resulting from plant design evolution and Regulatory Guide 1.97 requirements and to correct discrepancies with NUREG-0700. In December 1982 the management team selected one of five alternatives studied for design implementation.

The mock-up was revised considering the 441 identified HEDs and evolutionary engineering changes. As the Bechtellayout engineers advanced the layouts of the 10 panels, Torrey Pines Technology engineers reviewed the rework for correction of known discrepancies and compliance with good human factors principles. He redesign effort on the main control panels was completed in April 1983. He NRC performed an in-progress audit in May 1983, after which the panel vendor was provided with firm layout drawings.

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The NRC audit comments required the addition of several special studies to those already in progress, i.e., demarcation and hierarchicallabeling. %e most significant addition was the evaluation of specified parameters which resulted in a net reduction of 51 panel meters. De extensive relayout required a repeat of the System Function and Task Analysis with verification and walk-through/ talk-through validation. Likewise a specially structured control room review and human factors review of the corrective measures for all Category "A" and representative Category "B" discrepancies were performed. The demarcation and hierarchical labeling studies resulted in continued upgrading of the mock-up. We completion of the panel relayout allowed the design of the annunciator system consistent with the relocations of many systems and subsystems, and a reduction of active windows from 1055 to 642.

We documentation for this program was necessarily extensive in view of its design development nature. Documentation describing the work performed during the CRDR is summarized below and in Figure P-1:

1. Program Plan - Defines the plan for performing the CRDR.

2. Criteria Report - Provides the detailed guidelines and basis for the CRDR and describes the interface between the control room and plant systems.

%is report also includes review procedures, plant conventions and Human Factors data developed during the CRDR that will facilitate future control room modifications.

3. Operating Experience Review (OER) Report - Describes the operations I

personnel review process results, conclusions and recommendations of this task defined in the Program Plan.

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4. System Function and Task Analysis (SFTA) Report - Describes the methodology, results, conclusions and recommendations for this SFTA effort defined in the Program Plan.

5. Control Room Survey (CRS) Report - Describes the review process, results, conclusions and recommendations of this task defined in the Program Plan. This report also includes the final results and dispositions for the human factors observations obtained from the OER and the SFTA.

6. Annunciator Report - Describes the review process, results, conclusions and recommendations of the annunciator review task defined in the Program Plan, and the annunciator study guide.

7. Special Studies Report - Describes details of miscellaneous studies performed as part of the CRDR. This includes the anthropometric study, the hierarchical labeling study, the demarcation study, evaluation of specified parameters and many minor studies to resolve NRC audit comments.

I 8. Implementation Plan Report -Summarizes the control panel design I changes resulting from the implementation of Reg. Guide 1.97 requirements, engineering design requirements and preliminary observations of the CRDR design review team. It describes the reasons for major changes to the control panel layouts.

9. SFTA Validation Report -Summarizes the second review required because of the extensive revisions made to the control panellayouts and also includes walk-through/ talk-through exercises performed in the mock-up area.

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10. OER Validation Report -Summarizes the review made by operators to determine if the redesigned panels corrected reported operator concerns ano evaluate if any new problems were created as a result of the corrective measures taken.

11. CRS Validation Report -Summarizes the review made to determine if the Category A and representative samples of the Category B HEDs were satisfactorily corrected and if any new problems were created. ,

12. Executive Summary -Summarizes the CRDR results, conclusions and recommendations. Technical details are in the Operating Experience Review Report, the System Function and Task Analysis Report, the Annuncietor Report, the Control Room Survey Report, the Special Studies Report, the Implementation Plan Report and various validation reports.

13. Humcn Engineering Discrepancy Resolution Report -Summarizes all Category A, B, C and D HED resolutions.

14. Executive Summary Addenda -Summarize the results of the CRDR program following the submittal of the Executive Summary Report.

Addendum I showed progress as of April 15,1985. Addendum 2 showed g progress as of December 22,1986. 5

15. Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Validation Report -Summarizes the validation process used for the Emergency Operating Procedures and the results as they involve the control panels. 'Ihis validation was conducted on the STP simulator during May 1986 using the draft EOPs.

16. Human Engineering Discrepancy Resolution Report Addendum -

Sunnarizes all Category A, B, C and D HED resolutions for HEDs identified after January 1,1986. m l

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

'Ihis report describes the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) validation conducted at the South Texas Project simulator in the STP training center and the results of the validation, mainly as they involve the control panels. The EOP validation ptocess is I defined in Section 6.0 of HLkP STP Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0027, titled " Emergency Operating Procedures, Preparation, Approval and Implementation." This procedure was prepared to meet NRC requirements.

The validation process included:

1. Scenario selectiori.

2. Organization and orientation of operating and support personnel to exercise the transient scenarios in the STP simulator.

3. Scenario execution.

4. Debriefing after each scenario and identification of problem areas as related to the control panels, the written EOPs and training.

I 5. Preparation of Validation Test Deficiency Forms.

l The scenario execution for the validation process was performed during the weeks of May 12,1986 and May 19,1986. Twenty-four scenarios were prepared. Two scenarios (Numbers 22 and 23) were not run due to simulator modeling limitations. However, the procedure for response to one scenario was walked through, as discussed below.

At the conclusion of all the scenarios, a slow walk-through examining two procedures in l

detail on the simulator was performed to provide additional data for the Control Room Design Review (CRDR) effort. One procedure was the procedure for a scenario ( ATWS) which the simulator was unable to model at that time; the other was the procedure for I response to reactor trip or safety injection. Additional runs were made to evaluate the usefulness of the procedure addenda used by the operators.

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%e simulator is in an advanced stage of modeling. It was able to simulate the transients to permit the validation teams to complete 22 of 24 planned scenarios. During the exercise, minor erratic simulated responses were observed; the operating crews were able to rationalize the simulator anoinalies.

The simulator control panels were also in the process of being updated. They did not have the QDPS plasma displays or the computer CRTs (SPDS/ERFDADS, plant computer, radiation monitoring, fire protection). Paper copies of the QDPS displays were taped in ,

place of the actual plasma displays and identified as the source of information when required. The SPDS/ERFDADS was assumed to be unavailable. Certain other hardware changes already installed in the plant control room had not been installed, e.g. ESF actuation switches, AFW flow control valve reset switches, etc. The control panels, however, were of sufficient fidelity to permit the validation evaluation.

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2.0 METHODOLOGY I 2.1 Scenario Selection Twenty-four transient scenarios were selected by a committee composed of personnel from: the EOP Writers Group, Reactor Operations, Nuclear 'lYaining Department and Technical Support Group. 'Ihe scenarios selected are listed in Table 2-1 and were developed to meet the following criteria:

1. Include a wide variety of transients that lead to branching into other EO Ps.

2. Include transients in both the primary and secondary systems in the same scenario.

I 3. Add loss of offsite power to the system fault, t 4. Test the major procedure transitions and insure adequate procedural coverage for the FSAR accident analyses.

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5. Verify adequate procedural coverage in the event of equipment failures. l I 6. Maximize the instrumentation usage in the control room.

I 'Ihe STP Emergency Operating Procedures are listed in Table 2-2. Figure 2-1 shows a composite chart of the anticipated procedure usage and the branching paths. Branches to i other procedures give step numbers on Figure 2-1 when the transition point was predictable.

The chart shows clearly that those selected scenarios meet or exceed the selection criteria given above.

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2.2 Organization and Orientation l

'Ihe validation process included two teams. Each team consisted of a Team Leader, an g

Operations Group composed of a control room shift complement, and an Observation E Group composed of several observers, organized as follows: -

TEAM LEADER I

OPER ATIONS GROUP OBSERVATION GROUP Shift Supervisor (SRO) STA (observing the SRO) .

Prim. Plant Reactor Oper. (PPRO) STA (observing the PPRO)

Sec. Plant Reactor Oper. (SPRO) STA (observing the SPRO)

Shift Technical Advisor (STA/SRO) STA (observing the STA of the operations crew)

RO (recording procedural path used) .

Human factors specialist 3

'Ihe personnel forming each team and their positions at STP are as follows:

Team I T. L. Templeman - Operations Supervisor D. W. McCallum -Shift Supervisor K. J. Christian - Unit Supervisor B. J. Mankey - Reactor Operator l J. R. Page III- Reactor Operator W. J. Aimone - Reactor Operator D. A. Leazar -Shift Technical Advisor C. T. Bowman - Shift Technical Advisor M. A. Friedman -Shift Technical Advisor S. F. Luna - Human Factors Specialist 2-2 12/22/86 8625c/0327c

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Team II S. J. Eldridge - Operations Supervisor W. L. Giles - Shift Supervisor W. F. Smith Jr. - Unit Supervisor I B. F. Neurohr - Reactor Operator E. E. Dugger - Reactor Operator J. H. Hodges - Reactor Operator K. P. Mulligan -Shift Technical Advisor C. B. Thiele - Shift Technical Advisor T. A. Godsey -Shift Technical Advisor E. L. Considine - Human Factors Specialist i

Each team was supported by a simulator operator and an audio-video operator.

The Reactor Operations Supervisor (Team H leader) conducted.the orientation for the participants of the EOP validation exercise. 'Ihe orientation covered the EOPs, the facilities, the objectives of the test, duties of operators and observers, and the validation I process. The Operations Supervisor reviewed the purpose and scope of the validation test and provided updates on procedural changes to the EOPs. The version used during the test was in final format and bindings.

The EOPs incorporate addenda which separate procedure steps into areas of responsibility. One addendum is provided for the primary plant RO and one for the secondary plant RO; the unit supervisor passes them out at an appropriate time for use.

The operator addenda contain the procedure steps for each operator. The addendum for each operator shows his procedural steps on the left-hand page, while the other operator's I steps are shown on the right-hand page.

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2.3 Scenario Execution Before each scenario was run, a briefing on the objectives of the test was conducted for all who would participate. %e responsibilities of each position and how the test was to be conducted were reviewed. After briefing the complete group, a continued briefing was conducted for the observers only. His briefing was for the purpose of explaining what -

they should be specifically looking for and how they should physically observe the operators. Each was directed to observe only one operator and note any problems observed associated with procedural usage or control board / man-machine interface problems.

The scenario was then executed using the simulator, once for each team. Each team was exposed to the same scenario without prior knowledge of the specific scenario and without information from the other team. De Operations Group reacted to the simulated event, while the Observation Group was responsible for noting questions and problem areas seen during the simulation.

Appendix B shows the checklist used by the human factors specialists during the EOP validation. Appendix C shows the checklist developed by the HL&P Nuclear Plant Operations Department (NPOD) and used by the operations observers during the validation.

Following the performance of each scenario, the Operations Group and the Observation Group discussed the scenario response in a debriefing for better identification of problem areas. Use of the video tape was made as required to verify responses and impressions recalled during the debriefing.

The various steps in the scenario execution are depicted in Figures 2-2 through 2-6.

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2.4 Slow Walk-Through/ Talk 'Ihrough In order to address specific CRDR needs and to address one of the remaining scenarios, a slow walk-through/ talk-through was proposed. A list of questions was developed for use I at appropriate times as each step of the procedure was performed on the simulator. See Appendix D for the question list.

An operating crew performed a slow walk-through/ talk-through of IPOP05-EO-E000,

" Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and, for one of the remaining scenarios, IPOP05-EO-FRS1, " Response to Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS." Two human factors specialists participated and asked appropriate questions as the ROs responded in slow time to the direction of the SRO. This operation was also monitored by the audio-video operator. The Appendix D questionnaire was used by the human factors specialists throughout this operation.

I After the walk-through/ talk-through of each procedure was completed, a critique of the procedure, the actions required and the probl6ms noted was conducted. 'Ihis step is depicted in Figure 2-7.

I 2. 5 Addendum Tests I Other special tests were performed to evaluate the usefulness of the operator addenda.

Two scenario's were repeated, with the addenda not available during the first scenario and with the supervisor out of the control room for a short period of time during the second scenario. Advantages and disadvantages of the operator addenda were identified with these tests. Responses to the disadvantages have been identified, i.e. encouraging more communication during the transient and providing portable book holders for the addenda.

Considering the advantages versus the disadvantages, the decision was made to maintain the use of the addenda.

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1. Loss of offsite Power: No SI Required; Natural Wl Circulation Cooldown

2. Spurious Safety Injection

3. LOCA - 500 to 1000 GPM

4. LOCA - Maximum

5. LOCA (Approx. 500 GPM) plus %TR (Approx. 200 GPM) m

6. LOCA (Approx. 500 GPM) plus Loss of Auxiliary Feedwater (Staggered AFW Recovery)

7. LOCA (Approx. 500 GPM) plus Loss of HHSI

8. Steamline Break - On Equalization Header

9. Steam 11ne Break - Outside Containment, Upstream of a MSIV; Failed MSIV on Faulted S/G

10. Steamline Break - Downstream of MSIVs plus Subsequent E Failed Open S/G PORV g

11. Steamline Break - Failed Open S/G PORY plus 500 GPM LOCA

12. Steamline Break - Failed Open S/G PORY plus STR in Non-faulted S/G h

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13. Steamline Break - Inside Cbntainment plus LQ'A (Approx.1000 G,M)P

14. Steamline Break - Inside Containment plus STR in Faulted S/G

15. Steamline Break - Outside Containment - Failed Open MSIV in Faulted S/G plus SGTR in Faulted S/G

16. Repeat #15 - Cooldown on E0P ES32 (Post-SGTR Cooldown using Blowdown)

17. Two SGTRs, One Subsequent to Other

18. SGTR plus Failed Open PORV in ibn-ruptured Steam Generator

19. STR 'plus Loss of Auxiliary Feedwater

20. S/G Tube Leak: Less than Tech Spec limits plus a g Spurious Safety Injection E

21. Main Steamline Break - Outside Containment; All MSIVs l

Failed to Close

22. Loss of Offsite Power plus Failed Open Pressurizer PORV "

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23. ATWS from 100% Power

24. SGTR with Loss of Offsite Power E0P SELECTED SCENARIUS TABLE 2-1 8620c/0331c 2-6

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mx POP 05-EO E000 Reactor Trip or Safety inlection POP 05 EGE500 Rediagnosis POPOSEO-F001 Sutxriticality Safety Function POPOSEO-FRC1 Desponse to inadequate Core POP 05 EGE010 Lossof ReactororSecondary POPOSEGE501 Reactor Trip Response Status Tru Wing Coolant "O "

POP 05-EGE502 Natural Circulation Cooldown g ', I'""

POPOSEGE020 Faulted 5 team Generator ,MSEGE503 featuralCirculation Cooldown Isolation POP 05EGF003 Heat Senk Safety Function POP 05-EO-FRC3 Response toSaturated Core with 5 team Void in Vessel Status Tree Cooling M POP 05EO-E030 Steam Generator Tube Rupture

-.( POPOSEGE511 Safety injection Termination POPOSEO-F004 integnty Safety Fuxtion Status POP 05-EO-FRH1 Response to Loss of Secondary POP 05-EGE512 Post LOCA Cooldown and Tree Heat Sank m POPOSEO-EC00 Lossof All ACPoww Depressuntation POPOSEGFRH2 Response to 5 team Generator POP 05EGF005 Containment 5afety function E POP 05 EO-EC01 Lossof All ACPower Recovery POP 05EGE513 Transfer to Cold Leg Status Tree Ovwpressure Without 51 Required Recerculation POPOSEGFRH3 Response to steam Generator POP 05 EO-ECO2 Lossof All ACPower-Recovery POPOSEGFW Wet %fe Funcm High Level g POPOSEGE514 Transfer to Hot Leg Status free m "'th588'9""'d Reorculation POPOSEO-FRH4 Response to Loss of Normal 2 POP 05EO-EC11 Loss of f mergency Coolant * " '

POPOSEO E531 Post-5GTR Cooldown Using O Recarculation sackfill POPOSEGF2HS Response to 5 team Generator q N POPOSEGEC12 LOCA Outside Containment POP 05-E0'E532 Post-5GTR Cooldown Using

> O POPOSEO EC2 t uncontralied Depressi.rizat.o4 slowdown POPOSEO-FR11 Response to Hegh Pressunser

Q of All Steam Generators POPOSEGE533 Post-5GTR Cooldown using POP 0FEGFRl2 Response to Low Pressunser N ilh 3 POPOS EO EC31 5GTR withless of Reactor Steam Dump PJ

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POPOSEGEC32 SGTR weth Lossof Reactor Coolant Saturated Recovery POP 05EO FRP1 Responsa to imminent Deured Pressunzed Thamei Shock 7 Condition y POP 05 EO EC33 $GTR without Pressunrer POP 05EO-FRP2 Response to Anticipated 1 O Pressure Control Pressurized Thermal Shock i Condition l g POP 05-EO-FR$1 Response to Nuclear Power C G'""i*"'AT*5 3 POPOSEO-FRS2 Response to Loss of Core g m Shutdown M POPOSEO-FRZ1 Response to High Containment Pressure k POP 05-EGFRZ2 Response to Containment N Flooding QD w ma g3 POPOSEO-FR23 Pesponse to High Contaenment gO Radiation tevel  % P*

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3. 0 OBSERVATIONS

'Ihe EOPs direct the operators to take the actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of transients or other conditions caused by various accidents. Here are 48 EOPs, which were posittor.3d on a shelf in the simulator facility by the operators in their preferred I order. Of notable interest was the order they used; E000 and E010 with supporting procedures were prominent. he STA had a special binder containing the status trees to monitor the critical safety functions.

'Ihe EOPs present material consistent with the control panellayouts. The verbiage used considered the hierarchicallabeling used on the control panels. He addenda were easy to locate in the main EOP binder, to pass out and to restore.

Twenty-two prescribed scenarios were executed and observed during a week and a half I using two independent crews. Table 3-1 shows the procedures used by each team for each scenario. A review of this table shows the following results:

1. Each team used essentially the same procedures and branching paths.

%ere were some differences which were a result of different stages of the simulator transient at which action was taken. %is in part was due to the difference in the speed of response to each plant disturbance. %e I quicker reacting crew usually exited the procedure at an earlier step.

2. The major procedural steps and branch paths were used.

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Appendix B is a checklist evaluation of the EOPs that was performed by the human factors specialists. %e checklist evaluation considers only observations made during the scenario executions and during the critique afterwards. (Further evaluation was also made during control room design reviews the week of December 8,1986. Changes to the Appendir B checklist entries are shown by Revision 1 triangles.) %e EOP validation checklists and deficiency forms used by the operations observers also reflect various EOP problems. (Checklists and deficiency forms are shown in Appendix C.)

De following sections give the observations noted during the scenario executions, the I

debriefings, the slow walk-through/ talk-through of two procedures (one being the procedure for ATWS, a scenario the simulator could not model) and the critique afterwards. %e observations for the control panels are followed by the identified resolution. Observations for the EOPs (format, paper, wording, etc.) and training are given here; resolutions will be addressed as part of the Procedures Generation Package.

3.1 Control Panels The control panels are the tools used by the operators when executing their duties. An I

evaluation of operator response to a transient using the control panels in the simulator and the EOPs highlights areas in the panel design that are likely to lead to operator errors. g gi During the scenario simulations, problem areas were observed when the operators were responding to direction from the Unit Supervisor. Rese problem areas were discussed by the Operations and Observation Groups during the debriefing immediately af ter the simulation. Problem areas were also noted during the procedure slow walk-through/ talk-through. %ese observations ar.d the resolutions are discussed in the sections below and summarized in Appendix A.

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3.1.1 Instrumentation

1. %ere is no direct feedback for component cooling water flow to the reactor coolant pump thermal barriers. Component cooling water flow to I the reactor coolant pump seals is checked in E000, " Reactor Trio or Safety Injection", step 19.00. Reestablishing component cooling water flow to the reactor coolant pump thermal barriers after a loss of all AC power (step 1.2 of IPOP05-EO-EC01) also requires checking flow.

Verifying flow requires:

I o Checking the status of 10 valves on two non-adjacent control panels.

o Checking that one of three CCW pumps is running.

I De existing flow switch, which alarms only on high flow, is being replaced with a flow switch which will alarm in the control room on dither high or low flow.

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2. The reactor coolant pump seal flow recorders on CP-004 measure RCP sealinjection, RCP high range sealleakoff and RCPlow range seal I leakoff flows. Two of these flows are logarithmic and one is linear.

%e logarithmic flows are being revised to linear. All inputs are thus linear.

I 3. There is no indication that the pressurizer spray valve controller has I repositioned the valve. His is inadequate once the valve has been cracked off its seat. %e controllers show " demand". No final device position or spray flow is provided.

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A spray valve "not closed" light is provided in the control room, but was not in the simulator. his light provides adequate indication. Pressurizer pressure and RCS pressure provide backup indication of spray operation.

4. %e pressurizer program / cold calibrate meter is easily confused with the pressurizer level meters. It was pointed out during the slow walk-through that this has been a problem for several of the operators. This concern is g

also present with the SG level program meters. 5 The meter zone coding resolves the issue of differentiating the program meter from the other meters. De program meter is half of a dual meter and is not zone coded. We other half is a level meter and is zone coded, thus providing the differentiation.

5. Many dual meters look exactly like single meters. During two scenarios, the left side feedwater flow meter had a stuck pointer that was not discovered. During discussions the operators pointed out that this has been a source of confusion.

The meter zone coding for dual meters includes two coding bands; these l coding bands willidentify the instrument as a dual meter.

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6. Procedures require a check to see if the reactor coolant makeup system is on, to provide automatic makeup to the volume control tank. There is no provision for feedback of status.

A red light is being added to indicate that the system start signal has been I

scaled in.

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7. On three-pen recorders, the third pen is not visible.

De recorder scales are being removed; the pen visibility is being verified by this resolution on the simulator.

I 3.1.2* Control Panet Arrangements

1. %e CCW system mimic is confusing in the following areas:

o Where the three trains merge with the common header.

o %e representation of the CCW heat exchanger and bypass.

o Labeling for components and flow paths.

'The labeling is being changed to provide more complete descriptions of each component. De mimic is being revised to reduce confusion, provide differentiation between trains and provide more fidelity to the physical system arrangement.

2. The SI system layout is confusing. %e confusion is brought out by a need I. to differentiate the following:

o Trains A, B and C o liigh Head Safety injection Subsystem o Low Ilead Safety Injection Subsystem o RilR System and Components Used for Si o Accumulators l

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Mimics are being revised to provide differentiation between trains and more fidelity to the physical system arrangement. Figure 3-1 is a photograph of the simulator with an experimental mimic installed. This mimic was installed to determine its effectiveness; the reactor operators were more accurate and faster in performing the EOP steps associated with the SI system with the experimental mimic. This experimental mimic is being used to revise the ecntrol room rr'mic. Demarcation and labeling changes are also being made to differentiate the various components.

3. Labeling of the CCW and ECW pump switches is too similar, resulting in operation of the wrong pump. ('Ihe switches are close to each other on the panel)

The nameplates are being revised to spell out the full names of the pumps. Additionally, demarcation is being used to differentiate the CCW and ECW systems.

4. The mimic for the charging pump discharge valves shows the valves correctly for one pump, but the normal discharge valve as the bypass valve and vice versa for the other pump.

Where shown incorrectly, the two valve switches are being interchanged.

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'Ihe check valves on the discharge header are also being shown.

i S. Recorders are provided for each SG, recording stcom flow, feedwater flow and water level. The indicators above the recorder give these parameters in reverse sequence left to right.

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%e recorder pen inputs are being revised so that recorder pens are in the same order as the indicators.

6. Labeling of power lockout switches in the SIsystem is inadequate; power lockout of an incorrect valve can occur.

%e labels for the SI power lockout valves (accumulator discharge and hot leg isolation valves) are being revised to identify the specific service.

7. RCS temperature recorders have inconsistent panel labels and pen labels.

The labels are being corrected such that recorder labels and pen labels are appropriate for the pen inputs.

8. Function of AFW pump turbine trip pushbutton is not indicated.

Label with engraving of "TRP" is being added to pushbutton.

3.1.3 Engineered Safety Features

1. There is inadequate feedback to show that depression of an ESFAS signal reset pushbutton has reset the signal. The reset pushbuttons and the l status lights are on well-sepsrated panels.

lI Revisions are being made to use the ESF Status Monitoring l system-actuate red lights to provide the feedback. Reset of an ESFAS signal will result in the red light being extinguished.

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2. Block / reset pushbuttons IS139, IS297 and IS298 have confusing labeling.

These are the train A, B and C Si reset pushbuttons; the escutcheon reads

" Block / Reset."

he escutcheons are being changed to read " Reset".

3. The train R and S pressurizer pressure Si block / reset switch labeling on CP-005 is confusing. %e escutcheon currently reads " Reset-blank-Block" (three position switch).

%e switch escutcheons are being changed to read " Unblock-blank-Block" i to better indicate that the left position removes the Si block.

3.1.4 Electrical Distribution

1. %e demarcation for the power feeds on CP-010 to the ESF buses on CP-003 does not adequately identify that two breakers are required to feed the Class IE buses. During scenario I when AC power was regained, two Class IE buses were not energized from offsite power because the second breaker was not closed.

%e panel demarcation is being revised to include the second breaker switch, as shown in Figure 3-2.

2. We load center switches on CP-010, used in the ATWS procedure to I

deenergize the rod drive MG sets, are not coded.

De switch handles are being color coded to provide a contrast to other switches, as shown in Figure 3-2.

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3. %e blue power-available lights on CP-003 indicate breaker position and not actual bus voltage. During scenario I this gave false indication that offsite power was available and energizing the ESF buses.

Power available can be determined by using the voltmeter between the I 13.8kV/4160V transformer mimic and the 4160V supply breaker switch.

%e purpose of the lights has been clarified to be to indicate to the operator whether and which feed from the 13.8kV bus is lined up. %e light color is being revised to red. %e light input is being revised and will indicate that the supply breaker and the disconnect switch from that 13.8kV bus are both closed.

I 4. Emergency stop capability for shutting down the standby diesel generators is not provided if the DG cooling water system fails, the DG would I overheat before it could be shut down.

An " emergency stop" switch is being provided in the control room for each standby DG, to override the start signals and stop the diesel.

5. De mimic for the 13.8kV bus is confusing because of the number of horizontal parallel paths shown. Figure 3-2 shows the mimic.

I %e mimic is being revised to lessen the confusion by differentiating the parallel paths.

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3.1. 5 Annunciator

1. De "first out" windows are unreadable when lit. %e letters are washed out, being red on white.

The windows arc being changed to white with black lettering. (The red border around the "first out" group of windows is being retained.)

2. The annunciator test pushbutton was inadvertently depressed several I

times while actually trying to silence or reset the annunciator.

A guard is being installed over the test pushbutton to prevent inadvertent actuation.

3.2 Emergency Operating Procedures The following items summarize apparent problems in the EOPs as observed during the validation process. Resolution of these observations is addressed in the Procedures Generation Package.

1. %e individual procedure binder does not have an easily identifiable number. Color coding should also be considered for the different EOP groups.

2. The EOP does not provide a tab for quickly accessing step 1.0 or the first caution and/or note prior to step l.0.

3. There is no system for marking where a procedure has been exited. Many times procedures require returning to the same step, return could be facilitated using a movable pnge mark.

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4. Various verbiage problems were identified in the procedures, as follows:

A) %e procedures contain words that create communication problems, such as normal, e.g. " check if VCT level is normal." Specific values, with tolerances where applicable, should be provided.

B) he procedures use adverbs that are difficult to define in a precise manner, e.g. frequently, slowly, etc. When necessary to use these adverbs, additional information should be provided to help define the action needed.

C) The procedures define actions that are subjective and not definitive, e.g. decrease, increase, etc. More definitive words, such as raise, lower, etc., should be used.

D) The procedures use double negatives and certain terms (such as

" faulted") that may lead to confusion. Double negatives and vague terms should be climinated if at all possible.

I 5. The procedures use Prestige Elite 12 type style. The readability would be significantly improved by the use of 10 pitch lielvetica style print.

6. The procedures make extensive use of indentures, which is contrary to NitC guidelines. EOlb should be reviewed for use of indentures and revised.

I 7. The procedures do not take advantage of the planned meter zone coding effort. Considering the meter zone coding would result in references such as "all indicators in the green band."

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8. During the validation it was observed that the SRO sometimes passed out the addendum for the primary plant RO to the secondary plant RO ard vice versa. De labeling for the addenda should be large and obvious.

9. It was observed after several days use of the EOPs, that pages were tearing loose from the binders. Likewise the jackets that house the addenda were showing signs of wear. Pages and jackets should be made of more durable materials.

10. In several debriefing sessions, it was suggested that placing the primary plant RO and secondary plant RO addenda in the front of the EOP binder would be better.

11. In monitoring the EOP walk-through, several discrepancies were noted between the EOP terms and the panellabeling. %e disertpancies should be resolved.

12. It was noted during the validation exercises that the procedures call for reading parameter values to a precision beyond the scale markings of the panel instruments. For example, a particular step is to check that RCS pressure >466 psig. %is can probably be changed to >465 psig which is easily read on the meter.

13. A reduction in printed matter and greater clarity can be effected by better usage of well known symbols or abbreviations, e.g. >instead of greater than, CNTMT inster.d of containment.

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14. Backup indications and actions are not always given in the procedures.

For example, one EOP relles on valve position lights to verify letdown isolation. During a loss of all AC power, letdown flow Indication must be used as a backup. Similarly the non-class IE main steam line drain valve could be used as a backup in case of failure of the Class IE valve. %is I backup valve is not mentioned in the procedure.

15. De Status Wee binder needs a Conditional Information page to remind the user of transitions to adverse containment values.

16. An action to reset auto-switchover(from the RWST to the containment sump) must be added to the SI reset procedural sequence. The SI signal is sealed in for the auto-switchover action.

17. Questions arose in some steps about the intent of the EOPs. The intent should be identified and the procedure clarified.

18. Procedure IPOP05-EO-Frill does not adequately provide guidance.

Consideration must be given for the operator to use the startup feedwater l pump, the main feedwater bypass control valves and the SG preheater bypass valves to inject water into a SG.

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19. Incorrect values in procedures must be corrected. Capabilities of the plant must be considered when providing values for procedures.

l l 20. Reenergizing 480V motor control centers EIAS, ElB5 and ElC5 has to be included in the SI reset sequence in order to regain the CRDM vent fans.

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3.3 Training The correct execution of the EOPs is a direct result of the reactor operator's previous experience and training. De speed and precision of execution will vary with training.

De following problem areas were noted:

1. During the scenarios, the Operations Group executed the EOPs in a very straightforward manner. %is did, however, leave them with a feeling that they were operating as robots and possibly not analyzing the transients, thus missing the big picture. %e EOPs have been designed and written to protect the Critical Safety Functions (CSF). A training

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program should be considered that will explain how the EOPs protect the CSFs and why this new method is being used. It should also explain the linking and branching and stress the need for analyzing "what's happening in the plant."

2. There are a total of twenty-two procedural steps in three procedures that are immediate action steps, i.e. steps that must be memorized and executed from memory. A standard response to each of these steps should be developed and included in the training courses. %is will ensure that durirg the critical period of the EOPs, the reactor operators all react and communicate in the same way.

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3. During the scenarios, the unit supervisor read the steps to the primary and secondary plant reactor operators. 'The training program should consider development of standard responses to these steps. For example:

Supervisor: Reads out " Verify CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers."

PPRO: (1) Checks absence of alarms for flow to thermal barriers.

(2) Reports back "CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers verified."

4. During the scenarios and the slow walk-through/ talk-through, the requirements for reset of the ESPAS signals and the actions needed to assume manual control of components were not known by the operators.

Training is required so that operators know what is required before reset can be accomplished (i.e., controllogic conditions for reset) and what actions are needed after ESFAS signal reset to reopen or reclose valves, start or stop pumps, etc.

5. Operation of reactor coolant pumps during LOCAs versus SGTRs was confusing. Procedure steps were sometimes overlooked, but largest contributor was lack of background information. Training to provide this background is required.

6. In SI reduction / termination procedure steps, use of SI pump termination table was confusing to the operator. Training should address background I and understanding on SI reduction / termination to eliminate confusion.

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SCENARIO #

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4.0 CONCLUSION

S 4.1 General The concept used to develop the FOPS, their content, clarity and other techniques used l show a good understanding of the requirements. He technique of having an addendum for each operator is particularly good. His inherently promotes a check and balance between the supervisor and operator. It will significantly reduce the potential for errors.

4.2 Personnel The EOP validation was performed by a staff of motivated people that demonstrated a 1 high degree of training and professionalism. As the week progressed, the pace became more deliberate with the actions more decisive and calm.

%e supervisors, operators and shift technical advisers demonstrated an excellent understanding of the physics and fluid dynamics of the plant. This was obvious from the manner in which they would pick out the difference between a simulator anomaly and the response to be expected from the plant. It was also brought out during the discussions in I the debriefing periods.

4.3 Summarv The panel, procedure and training improvements noted in Section 3 should result in an enhancement of the ability of the operating crew to respond to a transient. %is step in the overall Control Room Design Review process at STP has proven to be a valuable step.

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I APPENDIX A SUMM ARY OF HUM AN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES I

I NOTE: 1hese HED's are also presented in the I HED Resolution Report Addendum.

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT l

HED CATEGORY A I HED NUMBER OBSERVATION DISPOSITION HED-1004 CCW Flow to RCPs Direct feedback for CCW flow to Change existing high flow the RCP thermal barriers is not switch to a high/ low flow provided. Procedure for switch, alarming low flow as confirmation of flow is lengthy. well.

HED-1005 g Demarcation / Labeling The SI system demarcation and Revise mimic to differentiate labeling are confusing. he between the trains and three trains and various subsystems.

l subsystems need to be differentiated.

I CCW/ECW Pump Labeling i

HED-1006 Labeling of the CCW and ECW Revise the nameplates to spell pump switches is too similar. out the full names of the he CCW/ECW switches are close pumps. Additionally, I to each other and operators have used wrong s5yitch.

demarcate the ECW and CCW systems with different shades of paint.

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NUMBER OBSERVATION DISPOSITION HED-1007 CCW Labeling / Mimics Control panel labeling and Change the labeling to provide mimic are inadequate in the CCW more complete descriptions of system. each component. Change mimic to reduce confusion; provide differentiation between trains and more fidelity to the physical a

E arrangement.

HED-1008 Load Center Switches M Rod I

Drive MG Sets The load center switches to Color code the switch handles deenergize the rod drive MG sets to provide a contrast to the ,

after an ATWS are not coded. other handles.  !

HED-1009 _ESF Power Available Lights Ii !

The blue power-available lights Power available can be for the ESF buses on ZCP-003 determined using voltmeter indicate disconnect switch between the 13.8kV/4160V )

position and not actual ESF transformer mimic and the E

4160V bus voltage. 4160V supply brer.ker switch. E A-2 12/22/86 8629c/0327c

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT HED CATEGORY A I HED NUMBER OBSERVATION DISPOSITION Re pumose of the lights was clarified to be: indicate to the operator that a feed from the 13.8kV buses is properly lined up.

He proper light color is red. 'The electricalinput to the light will indicate that the supply breaker I and the disconnect switch are both closed from that 13.8kV bus.

I HED-1010 Annunciator "First Out" Windows i

I Annunciator "first out" windows Change the windows to white l are unreadable when lit. with black lettering. Retain l the red border around the "first

, out" group of windows.

HED-1011 Annunciator Test Button I The annunciator " test" Install a guard over the pushbutton was depressed test pushbuttons.

several times when actually trying to silence or reset the I annunciato r.

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT HED CATEGORY B HED NUMBER OBSERVATION DISPOSITION HED-1003 DG Emergency Stop Emergency stop capability for Provide an " emergency stop" the standby DGs is not provided switch in the control room to in the control room. If the DG override the start signals cooling water system failed, and stop the standby DG.

the DG would overheat before it could be shut down.

HED-1012' ESF Power Feed Switch Demarcation The demarcation for the Revise the panel demarcation power feeds on ZCP-010 to to include the second breaker g the ESF buses on ZCP-003 does switch. "

not identify that two breakers g

are needed to feed the Class IE g buses.

HED-1013 RCP Flow Recorders On the RCP seal flow recorders, Revise signal conditioning so the three scales mix both that all three inputs are j linear and logarithmic units. linear. 4 A-4 12/22/86 8629e/0327c

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT HED CATEGORY B I HED NUMBER OBSERVATION DISPOSITION HED-1014 SG, Parameter Recorders The recorder pens for steam Make the recorder pens the flow, feedwater flow and SG same order as the indicators.

level are reversed relative to the arrangement of the indicators. (Inputs to pens I agree with labels, but pen sequence is opposite to sequence of panelindicators displaying the same parameters f above the recorder.)

HED-1016 13.8kV Bus Mimic The mimic for the 13.8kV bus is Revise the mimic'for greater confusing because of the number clarity.

of parallel horizontal paths shown.

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT HED CATEGORY C HED NUMBER OBSERVATION DISPOSITION HED-1015 Reactor Coolant Makeup System The procedures require a check Add a red light to indicate to see if the reactor coolant that the system start has been makeup system is on. Feedback sealed in.

for this system being on is not provided in the control room.

HED-1017 Chaming Pump Dischame Mimic The panel mimic shows the Where shown incorrectly, swap normal discharge valves of the the two valve switches.

charging pumps as the normal Also, on the mimic, show the discharge valve for one pump check valves.

and as the bypass valve for the u other pump. The bypass for one pump is shown as the normal I discharge valve.

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EOP VALID ATION REPORT HED CATEGORY C i

HED NUMBER OBSERVATION DISPOSITION HED-1018 SI Recet Feedback

'The SI reset does not have Use the ESF Status Monitoring adequate feedback. system-actuate red lights to provide reset feedback. (When the ESFAS signal is reset, the ESF Status Monitoring system-actuate I light will be extinguished.)

IIED-1019 Pressurizer Pressure M Block / Reset I The pressurizer pressure SI Change the escutcheon to read block / reset labeling is " unblock - blank - block."

I confusing. This also applies to the excessive cocidown block switches.

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT HED CATEGORY C HED NUMBER OBSERVATION DISPOSITION HED-1020 SI Power Lockout Labeling Labeling of power lockout Revise the labeling to switches for the SIsystem identify the specific needs additional information on service.

the nameplates to differentiate between the accumulator E

discharge valves and the hot W 1eg isolation valves.

HED-1072 SI Reset Label I

The train A/B/C SI reset Change the block / reset switch switches have confusing escutcheon label to " reset."

labeling (" block / reset").

HED '148 AFW Turbine Trip Pushbutton I

Function of AFW pump turbine Label with engraving of "TRP" I

trip pushbutton is not is being added to the indicated. pushbutton.

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT HED CATEGORY C I HED NUMBER OBSERVATION DISPOSITION HED-1049 Recorder Labels RCS temperature recorders 'Ihe labels are being corrected have inconsistent pane 11abels such that recorder labels and and pen labels. pen labels are appropriate for the pen inputs.

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EOP VALIDATION REPORT HED CATEGORY D HED NUMBER OBSERVATION DISPOSITION HED-1029 'Ihlrd Pen Not Visible on Recorders On three-pen recorders, the Remove the scales. The third third pen is not visible. pen should now be visible; the simulator is being used to verify that this resolution works as desired.

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I I APPENDIX B EOP CHECKLIST EVALUATION I

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g Ckd Y N Recommendations 1.0 GENERAL GUIDANCE 1.1 EOPs should direct operator to those actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of transients or other conditions that can cause plant parameters to exceed set points for:

1.1.1 Reactor Protection System x 1.1.2 Engineered Safety Features x 1.1.3 Tech Spec Limits x 1.2 EOPs should be consistent in 1.2.1 Organization x 1.2.2 Format x 1.2.3 Style x I 1.2.4 Content x 1.3 Is there a method for identifying x Shape and Binder EOPs Color 1.4 Is the binder holding EOPs easily x I distinguished from binders containing other plant procedures I 1.5 Are individual EOPs easily dis-tinguished from other EOPs within a binder x One binder per EOP 1.6 There should be an administrative x OPG P03-ZA-0013 1 procedure to insure operators have aceess to the most current EOP revision I

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Ckd Y N Recom mendations 2.0 CROSS REFERENCING AND BRANCHING 2.1 Information in EOPs should be x 1 compatible with other plant procedures 2.2 Is reference to other plant pro- x cedures used to avoid cumbersome procedures 2.3 When references are used, a method should be used that:

! 2.3.1 Is quick x 2.3.2 Describes why the operator i x I

leaving one part of a pro-cedure and going to another procedure 2.3.3 Indicates if return to the x 5 original procedure is nec- E essary 2.4 Referencing and branching should be j used consistently snd only when

! required, considering:

2.4.1 Avoiding referencing other x Not applicable sections, pages or steps because of the within another procedure. (It way the proce- E is preferable to repeat dures are g referenced instructions if not written too lengthy.)

2.4.2 Preference for " branching", x l

1.e. eziit the procedure being used and enter into an entire new procedure 2.4.3 A means should be provided to x insure returning to the correct step in the original procedure being used 2.5 Reference to other oarts of EOPs x should be minimized 1 s l

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Ckd Y N Recommendations 3.0 OPERATOR AIDS 3.1 Printed operator aids should be Addendums compatible with the EOPs:

3.1.1 Instrument values should be x consistent I 3.1.2 Information present in aids should be clear x

3.1.3 Titles, terms and nomenclature x should be consistent 3.1.4 Cross-referencing should be x accurate 3.2 Computer Driven Operator Aids _1 There should be consideration for the x 1 use of computer driven operator aids I that are compatible with the EOPs, considering the ability of the operator to execute the EOPs with the computer 4.0 PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION FOR READABILITY Procedures should have the following characteristics:

I 4.1 They can be easily read x I 4.2 They can be read rapidly without interruption x There were only minor concerns among the oper-ators.

I 4.3 They can be precisely understood x There were minor exceptions.

4.4 They can be understood without the x aid of additional material I

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I N/A Not EOP Comments / E Ckd Y N Recommendations 3 4.5 The reader should accept the infor- x The operators mation presented followed the procedure steps because they were logical.

4.6 They can be easily learned x 4.7 They can be retained x 4.8 They can be used easily for x l instruction 5 4.9 They should be simple, ordered and x pertinent 4.10 There should be a consistent use of x grammar 5.0 WRITTEN OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS 5.1 Should use short, concise, identi- x Minor errors were fiable and correct instructions noted for 5.2 Ordinarily use a step for a single x action or functionally related actions (not to exceed three 3 actions) g

! 5.3 Should avoid use of footnotes x 5.4 Should avoid writing instructions in x complex paragraphs 5.5 Choice of writing instructions is not x limited to sentences but encourages writing in fragments for best use of a space l 5.6 Should minimize the number of verbs x and objects per step I

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Ckd Y N Recommendations 5.7 Should provide the annunciator alarm x Setpoints are setpoint if the alarm is stated in provided when the procedure analog indication is available.

Otherwise y presence or absence of alarms on annunciator is sufficient.

5.8 Should use nomenclature that will x EOPs were assist the operator to accurately and written using the quickly identify panel devices hierarchical I labeling on the control panels.

6.0 ORGANIZATION OF EOPs EOPs should be organized to include:

6.1 Cover Page x The cover page should include:

I 6.1.1 A short and descriptive pro-cedure title that easily identifies the emergency x

6.1.2 A revision number and date x 6.1.3 Number of pages x 6.1.4 Space for review and approval x signatures 6.1.5 Identification of applicability x to unit and facility 6.2 Table of Contents x The operator should be able to locate specific sections of EOP via:

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Ckd Y N Recommendations 6.3 Scope If not contained inherently in the x Inherent procedure title, a scope or purpose should be provided 6.4 Entry Conditions or Symptoms Entry conditions or symptoms should x be provided under which execution of the procedure is required and provide g confirmation for proper procedure . m choice to handle emergency 6.4.1 Major entry conditions or x symptoms shall be listed in a separate section at the start of the procedure with a heading

" ENTRY CONDITIONS" or

" SYMPTOMS" 6.4.2 Major entry conditions should x be lbted and not their subsets 6.4.3 Logic words should be used to x present conditional information 6.5 Automatic Actions Should provide the operator with an x Contained within indication of which systems, important the procedure to safety, should be activated automa- steps. The tically without operator action automatic actions, while implied, are clear.

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! 6.6 Immediate Operator Actions 6.6.2 Immediate operator actions x They are distin-(usually memorized) should be guished by a included in the EOPs for note. Could use verification (checkoff) different type.

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Ckd Y N Recommendations 6.7 Subsequent Operator Actions The EOP should contain those actions x necessary to return the plant to a safe steady-state condition 6.8 Supporting Materials (Attachments)

Supporting materials needed to carry x out EOP actions, but which can not be included in the body of the EOP, should be attached to the EOP 7.0 FORMAT OF EOPs 7.1 The format should be designed to x minimize reading time and response to instructions 7.2 Formats should be consistent x 7.3 Format approach should include:

7.3.1 Physical layout of information x 7.3.2 Narrative style x 7.3.3 Levels of information presented x presentation 8.0 IDENTIFYING INFORM ATION All pages of the EOP should contain (in a consistent location where the operator can readily locate it):

8.1 EOP identity (title and number) x 8.2 Currentness (revision and date) x 8.3 Page numbering system for ensy x recognition of missing page(s)(page number and total number of pages) 8.4 Unit to which it applies x 8604c/0332c Rev.1 B-7

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Ckd Y N Recommendations 9.0 PAGE LAYOUT Information displayed should:

9.1 Minimize clutter x 9.2 Use adequate line spacing and type x Type size is size consistent with room lighting 12 pitch,10 pitch would be easier to read in actual CR with less lighting.

9.3 Use margins for bindings which do not x obscure text 9.4 Facilitate uninterrupted flow of x information 9.5 Start each beginning of a procedure x or sub-procedure on a new page 9.6 Present each action step within a x single page 9.7 Provide for easy recognition of the x Changes tracked changes made on the latest revision using other methods - see 1 Writer's Guide (OPOP01-ZA-0006) ,

10.0 WARNING AND CAUTION STATEMENTS Warning and caution statements should:

10.1 Be used only to alert an operator to x 1 I

conditions that could result in health hazards or equipment or plant g damage g 10.2 Describe the hazardous condition and x consequences if corrective action is not taken 10.3 Appear in the sequence in which they x are required

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Ckd Y N Recommendations 10.4 Be emphasized to attract the x Experience shows attention of the operator that the operator will not read the warning and Ii caution if it is not written as a 10.5 Immediately precede the steps) to x which they refer 10.6 Be written to preclude confusion as x to which step or evaluation they refer 10.7 Be written so that they can be read x completely without interruption by intervening step or page turning 10.8 Be used consistently x 10.9 Not be overused x 10.10Not include any operator actions x 11.0 PLACE KEEPING AIDS 11.1 To help the operator keep track x I of his place in the execution of a procedure 11.2 For keeping track of completed steps x The use of two (e.g., initial or checkoff blocks) people precludes the need for this. The third person will also I; be following each steps 12.0 DIVISIONS, HEADINGS AND NU'.8ERING 12.1 Headings and an alpia numeric x numbering system should be used I 12.2 Each instructional step should be x readily identifiable 12.3 Instruction steps should be numbered x l l

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Ckd Y N Recommendations 12.4 A step numbering system with sub- x Indentions are ordinate numbers to minimize indenta- used.

tions should be used 12.5 There should be a reasonable use x There is a lot of of indenting to avoid loss of writing indention.

• space 13.0 EMPHASIS 13.1 A consistent method should be used for highlighting key words or phrases.

(Emphasis should be used sparingly.)

Suggested are:

13.1.1 Quotation marks - to emphasize x Other methods of switch positions, indicator emphasis are light names or annunciation used.

tile messages 13.1.2 Indentation - to emphasize x bodies of text 13.1.3 Framing - to emphasize text x for warnings or cautions

- 13.2 Provide a methodology for distinctive emphasis such as:

13.2.1 Verbation of equipment x nameplate information for quick and accurate recogmtion 13.2.2 A standard list of nomen- x STP Abbreviations clature and abbreviations List is a "living" list and 'sl will be used in 1

- EOP revisions, g per Writer's E Guide.

l 14.0 IDENTIFICATION OF SECTIONS WITHIN A PROCEDURE OR SUBPROCEDURE Provide a technique to locate a x E l[ specific section within a procedure E l or subprocedure I

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I Ckd Y N Recommendations 15.0 FIGURES AND TABLES 15.1 Should be used to assist in decision x making and locating information:

15.2 Should be explicitly and uniquely x identified so that they are easy to 1 find when referenced in the text 15.3 Should contain only the relevant x The HHSI pump I information needed to clarify or accomplish the purpose referenced in the text shutdown chart is confusing.

l 15.4 Should be prepared according to standard technical graphics x Graphics prac-tices will be 1 l

J practices included in I Writer's Guide.

15.5 Should be located to facilitate x l access and usability 16.0 USE OF FLOWCHARTS j Flowcharts or logic diagrams should x Overall writing l be considered: technique doesn't  ;

require flow-charts.

16.1 As job performance aids x l 16.2 For diagnostics x 16.3 For initial steps in procedure x I 16.4 As training cids x i 17.0 STYLE OF EXPRESSION AND PRESENTATION )

EOPs should be written in a style x The use of that presents information in a double nega-I simple, familiar, specific and unambiguous manner tives does provide some confusion.

i I Several terms are not familiar.

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Ckd Y N Reco.nmendations 18.0 VOCABULARY EOPs should:

18.1 Use short words and words that are x common in ordinary conversation 18.2 Use nomenclature and idioms that the x

=

operator is trained to use and which are standard in the nuclear power industry 18.3 Use concrete and specific words that x describe precisely what the operator is to do or observe 18.4 Use words and meanings consistently x throughout the procedures 18.5 Avoid using adverbs that are x There is little difficult to define in a precise use of defining g manner (e.g., frequently, slowly) acceptable zones E or values.

19.0 USE OF ACTION VERBS 19.1 Use commonly used and understood x action verbs that are used in normal r oral conversations 19.2 There should be a consistent use of x verbs, i.e., select one verb to express a particular action I .

19.3 Avoid use of verbs that sound alike x g but have different meanings 3, 19.4 A list of selected verbs should be x in Writer's Guide 1.

provided and used (OPOP01-ZA-0006) ,

19.5 Adverbs that may change the meaning x of a verb should be avoided 19.6 Avoid use of verbs that create x communication problems, like:

decrease, increase i

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Ckd Y N Recommendations 20.0 ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLE i 20.1 The abbreviations, acronyms and x I symbols used in the EOPs should be those familiar to the operators so that there is no need to consult a I glossary of abbreviations, acronyms or symbols 20.2 When these abbreviations, acronyms x I ,

or symbols are used, the operator should immediately recognize them 21.0 NUMBER OF OBJECTS OF ACTION VERBS 21.1 Avoid imbedding three or more x l1 objects of an action verb by listing I them following a colon 21.2 Avoid use of very long lists by x subgrouping in lists of four or use of tabular format 22.0 SENTENCE STRUCTURE 22.1 Sentences, clauses and phrases x should be short, and use common American English verbiage 22.2 Directives should be in the x imperative mode 23.0 PUNCTUATION l

23.1 Should be consistent and follow x In conformance l standard American English rules with Writer's 1 l Guide 24.0 CAPITALIZATION 24.1 Should conform to standard American x l1 English rules I

24.2 May be used for emphasis x I

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Ckd Y N Recommendations 25.0 UNITS 25.1 Should be familiar to operators and x should not require conversion, translation or mental manipulation 26.0 NUMERALS 26.1 Should be written in a style familiar x to the operators 26.2 Should correspond to numerals on x panels and panel devices 26.3 When referencing instrument x AFW total flow li readings, numerals should not require needed to be conversion, translation or manipulaton added up from the individuals flows.

NOTE: Total AFW flow is provided y on ODPS and l ERFDADS displays . 3 27.0 TOLER ANCES 27.1 Should be used to bound the numer- x ical values to avoid approximations 28.0 FORMULAS AND CALCULATIONS 28.1 Should be minimized and when x required, simplified 28.2 When calculations are necessary, x adequate space should be provided l g

and infermation formatted (conversion factors and attached graphs with < '

properly marked ordinates) 28.3 Calculations should be performed x accurately in record form 29.0 CONDITIONAL STATEMENTS Should be constructed using formal x 5 logic techniques, considering: E E

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K Ckd Y N Recommendations 29.1 Correctness x 29.2 Completeness x 29.3 Clarity x The use of double negatives is 29.4 Consistency x I 29.5 Emphasis is on logical terms and sequences x

30.0 SEQUENCING 30.1 Tasks and action steps should be x There are minor sequenced according to technical improvements that necessity can be made.

30.2 Tasks and action steps should:

30.2.1 Consider the physical layout x i and organization of the control room I 30.2.2 Advise operator of the objective of a sequence of x 1, actions and results expected 30.2.3 Be presented in proper x sequence considering the I importance of each action 30.2.4 Distinguish fixed sequence

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x Not required I steps from non-fixed sequence steps based on EOP and training methodology.

30.2.5 Clearly identify sequential x Not required and non-sequential steps based on EOP and training methodology.

31.0 VERIFICATION STEPS It should be possible to determine whether the task objective or sequence of actions has been achieved by:

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Recommendations l

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31.1 Checking that an action has resulted x in a command signal to a piece of l equipment. (The operator should not i rely on this type of check, but i should use a more positive indication) .

31.2 Checking that an action has resulted x , E in a positive indication that the  ! E equipment has responded to a command j 31.3 Checking that an operator has x ,

correctly performed an action or has -

carried out a series of steps i g

31.4 Alternate indications should be x 5 identified when additional confirm-ation is needed for a system response 32.0 NONSEQUENTIAL STEPS Should be written to identify:

32.1 Where and when the steps apply x l 32.2 Conditions when they apply x 1 -

i 32.3 Time sequence required for their x  !

performance

{

33.0 EQUALLY ACCEPTABLE STEPS 33.1 Should provide direction to carry x  ;

out alternate steps or sequences

{

33.2 Should provide alternates fer cases x of equipment unavailability {

34.0 RECURRENT STEPS 34.1 Should inform when and how often the x step should be performed 34.2 Should advise when the step should x no longer be carried out l l I

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I Ckd Y N Recommendations 35.0 TIME-DEPENDENT STEPS 35.1 Should specify the time interval and x I when the ste (conditions) p is to take place 35.2 Should provide assistance,if x Writer's Guide I necessary, to allow operator to meet the required time frame avoids this situation; there is only one st ch 1

I irstance and it is clearly defined.

36.0 CONCURRENT STEPS 36.1 Should provide explicit instructions x The EOP overall I on which steps are concurrent technique elimi-nates the need fct this.

36.2 Should be within the capability of x the assigned control room shift staff 37.0 DIAGNOSTIC STEPS 37.1 Should assist the operator in x diagnosis 37.2 Provide clear and unambiguous x instructions leading to accurate I deelsions 37.3 Provide clear referencin to x appropriate EOP section )

37.4 Consider use of flow diagrams, graphs x and other aids 38.0 NOTE STATEMENTS 38.1 Should provide descriptive or x. Not applicable I explanatory information that will with the overall aid in the execution of a procedure technique used.

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38.2 Should be presented in the order x needed _,

38.3 Should be easily differentiated from x l um "W ARNINGS" or "CAUTIO NS" 38.4 Should not contain operator actions x 39.0 LEVEL OF DETAIL 39.1 Should provide sufficient, detailed x instructions to support the users' =

training and intelligence level

'39.2 Should provide a degree of detail that considers:

39.2.1 Importance of task x 39.2.2 Operators' knowledge and x skill (suited to the lowest E levellikely to be given B responsibility for EOP execution) 39.2.3 Complexity of task x 39.2.4 Operator's experience x 39.3 Lists upper level task before lower x level or sub task 39.4 Avoids use of confusing superficial x or redundant information except where redundancy is judged necessary to insure completion of a critical step 39.5 States limits of actions quantita- x With minor tively, if possible exceptions.

40.0 PLANT INSTRUMENTATION VALUES 40.1 Instrument values should be pre- x sented wi.th a band (tolerance or I limit) 3 I

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Ckd Y N Recommendations 40.2 Values presented should be in the x same units as the panel instrument 40.3 Values should be consistent with the x precision and readability of the man / machine system 41.0 LOCATION INFORM ATION Should be provided for devices:

41.1 Infrequently used x Not required 41.2 In "out-of-the-way" places x Not required 41.3 Difficult to find x Not required I

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l APPENDIX C EOP VALIDATION TEST l CHECKLIST AND DEFICIENCY FORM I

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I I Emergency Operating Procedures Preparation, Approval, and Implementation OPGP03-ZA-0027 Rev. 1 I

Page 13 of 17 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES VALID ATION TEST CHECKLIST I OPGP03-ZA-0027-2 (Page 1 of 3)

Reviewed Procedure Number Scenaric Number l Review Points Discrepancy (Yes/No)

(if No - Sheet number)

Usability Yes No

) A. Level of Detail l

1. Is there sufficient information to perform the specified actions at each step? ,

2. Are the Alternates adequately described at each decision point?

3. Labeling, abbreviations and location as written sufficient and clear to the operator enabling him to find equipment.

l l 3 4. Is the E0P information adequate to manage the emergency condition?

5. Are symptoms sufficiently abbreviated by actions prescribed?

6. Are titles and numbers clearly defined I for referencing and branching?

7. Are points clearly identified for entry into the Emergency Plan?

I B. Understandability

1. Is the E0P easy to read?

2. Are the' figures and tables easy to read with accuracr?

3. Can the values on figures and charts be easily determined?

4. Are caution and note statements readily understandable?

5. Are the E0P Steps readily understandable? _

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Emergency Operating Procedures _ OPGP03-ZA-0027 Preparation, Approval, and Implementation Rev. 1 Page 14 of 17 I

EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES f

I V ALIDATION TEST CHECKLIST OPGP03-ZA-0027-2 (Page 2 of 3)

Review Poic Discrepancy (Yes/No)

(if No - Sheet number)

Yes No C. Plant Compatibility

1. Can the actions specified in the E0P be performed in the specified sequence?

2. If there are choices of success paths, is the most preferred choice listed first g and all others listed in descending g preferential order?

3. Can the information required by the E0P l E

be obtained by the operator or supervisor?

4. Is the E0P selection, based upon the g symptoms, easily determined? g

5. Are the E0P entry conditions appropriate for the symptoms displayed to the operator?

6. Are all information and equipment needs identified to accomplish the specified task?

7. Do plant responses agree with the E0P basis?

8. Are the instrdment readings and tolerances stated in the E0P consistent with the instrument values displayed?

9. Is the E0P physically compatible with the I work situation (too bulky to hold, cannot be laid flat, places where 1. can be laid down in an open condition)?

D. Operator Compatibility

1. If time intervals are specified, can the procedure action steps be performed on the plant within or at the designated time intervals?

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I I OPGP03-ZA-0027 l

Emergency Operating Procedures '

Preparation, Approval, and Implementation Rev. 1 I EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES Page 15 of 17 I VALIDATION TEST CHECKLIST OPGP03-ZA-0027-2 (Page 3 of 3)

Review Points Discrepancy (Yes/No) l I (If No - Sheet number)

Yes No l 2. Can the proceduce steps be performed by the operating shift?

If specific actions are assigned to individual I 3.

shift personnel, does the E0P adequately aid in the coordination of actions.among shift personnel where necessary?

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4. Can the operating shift follow the designated action step sequences?

5. Can the particular steps or sets of steps be readily located when required?

6. Can procedure exit point be returned to without omitting steps when required?

7. Can procedure branches be entered at the correct point?

8. Are E0P exit points specified adequately?

Total number of discrepancy sheets Validation Test Method l

Validation Observation Croup members Leader I

I I This form when completed, shall be retained for the lif e of the plant.

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1 Emergency Operating Procedures OPGP03-ZA-0027 Preparation, Approval, and Implementation Rev. I l

-Page 16 of 17 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES VALIDATION TEST DEFICIENCY FORM gl

'J PG P03-ZA-0027-3 gl (Page 1 of 1)

Deficiency Sheet of Procedure Number IPOP05-EO- Rev.

Deficiency At (Step Number)

Deficiency I

Observer Name Date Resolution I

I Resolution By Date Approved YES NO (Circle One) ,

Reactor Operations Manager i

! Resolution Incorporated by Date This form when completed, shall be retained for the life of the plant.

Color paper requirements do not apply to this form.

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HousioN c0NTROL ROOM lGHTING DESIGN REVIEW I

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I l APPENDIX D CONTROL PANELS - EOP VALIDATION CHECKLIST QUESTIONS 1

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D-i I I2/22/86 8629e/0327c

I CONTROL PANELS - EOP VALIDATION Note (1) Ask before the procedure is started, answer after the procedure is complete.

O-1 If control action is required is the associated feedback display located close enough to minimize the probability of misoperation of the control? For example, if the control is located among other similar controls and viewing of the feedback display I requires significant movanent away,fran the control and mental adjustment to the control position?

O-2 Is the information required presented in the most direct form?

Q-3 Is the labeling of all associated controls and displays consistent with the operating procedure contents?

Q-4 Are the controls and associated displays located in the optimum position?

Q-5 Are they easy to associate?

I Q-6 Are associated annunciators located such that they can be read within the time constraints of the required action?

Q-7 Does the control device have the required characteristics?

Q-8.1 Are control switch positions clearly labeled? (1) 0-8.2 Do controls have adjustment positions (precision) to effect the degree of control required within limits of dexterity, coordination, and reaction time? (1)

I O-8.3 Do controls have positive detent positions and feedback to effect the required control action? (1)

I O-9.1 Are the indicators and scales marked to permit reading the parameter to the degree of accuracy required?

and 0-9.2 Do not require converting readings? and (1)

Q-9.3 Cover the required range needed? and Q-9.4 Do not have dif ficult multipliers for determining the parameter values? and (1)

Q-9.5 Provfde for easy comparisons when relating associated parameters for a step? (1)

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I' O-10.1 Does the display provide the correct type of information relative to:

0-10.2 Need for trend information? (1) 0-10.3 Clarification of exact parameter if display is a multipoint recorder?

o-10.4 Are the panel devices located to permit timely recognition of the g process arrangement (i.e., is the need for mimics or demarcation 3 obvious)? (1)

Q-ll Does the required action call for access to information not in the control roan? If so, is it necessary to make this information available in the control roan? Nhere should it be located? (1) 0-12 Does the step progression, in relation to shift manning, put the operator under undue stress or overload? NA Q-13 Are there any significaat design improvements you think should be incorporated? (1)

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i CONTROL PANELS - E0P VERIFICATION I PROCEDURE NUMBER DATE

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