ML20236C280
| ML20236C280 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1989 |
| From: | HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236C171 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8903220053 | |
| Download: ML20236C280 (18) | |
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j South Texas Project, Unit 2 Readiness to Begin Ascent to Full Power:
.l A Self-Assessment Report q
prepared by i
Houston Lighting & Power Company "l
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March 16, 1989 8903220053 890317 PDR-ADOCK 05000499 i::-
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' INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
i This'self-assessment'by' Houston Lighting-& Power Company (HL&P) is intended to outline the-bases upon which thec company.
i hasiconcluded that operations beyond five percent of rated, power l
can be_ safely, conducted at Unit 2 of the South Texas Project-g (STP).
l In Summary:
- 1. The-facility meets licensing requirements affecting design, construction and testing. Where problems have:
'been' identified during pre-critical testing, they have i
been corrected and. steps taken to-reduce the likelihood ~
ofLtheir recarrence.. There are no significant j
outstanding tescing deficiencies.
(See Section II.)
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- 2. Requirements affecting~the staffing'and' training of personnel have been met, and an-effective fitness for l
duty program is in place.
Operational experience gained from operation of Unit l_and during pre-critical testing of-Unit 2-has. identified opportunities for improvement in procedures and organization.
Training programs have been expanded, procedural changes have been accomplished and organizational changes have been identified.all as'part of the lessons learned from these experiences.
(See Section III.)
3.
Other indicators also consistently point to readiness, including:
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- a. Improved security measures;
- b. Results of other objective assessments including l
assecaments by HL&P and outside consultants; H
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- c. Appropriate maintenance programs are in place and the maintenance backlog is acceptable; and,
- d. Demonstration of effective management of resources by safely conducting the Unit 2 startup program concurrent with an extended outage on Unit 1.
These and other readiness indicators are discussed in l
Section IV.
1 Conclusions drawn from the foregoing regarding the general readiness to proceed with operations at STP at power levels above r
'five percent are summarized in Section V.
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II 1
DEMONSTRATING THE ADEQUACY OF ENGD:EERING AND CONSTRUCTION -
1 A.
PRIOR TO. RECEIPT OF OPERATING LICENSE As the Commission is aware, most safety-related construction at STP was held in abeyance in the period 1980-81.
A Commission order to Show Cause was issued in 1980.
The engineer / constructor I
was replaced in 1981.
During this transitional period,.there was a thorough examination of all completed and in-process engineering, and construction work by HLAP and contractor personnel.
These reviews verified the status and quality of engineering and construction and determined its acceptability.
In addition, HL&P employed an Engineering Assurance Program (EAP) in which a special, off-project. group of engineers performed real-time, independent third-party substantive reviews of the architect-engineer's work with the assistance of another architect-engineer.
The EAP concept has continued into the sperations phase.
Additional assurance regarding design and construction is derived from the SAFETEAM program which provides a means:for STP l
employees to. identify any concerns that they may have in regard to nuclear safety or quality.
The NRC Staff is thoroughly familiar with the program.
The SAFETEAM program has, in effect, provided thousands of " additional pairs of eyes" to help assure that work was done properly.
The concept of the SAFETEAM program will remain in effect during the operations phase.
Unit'l performance revealed several deficiencies in design that were resolved prior to issuance of the initial license for Unit 2.
These included:
Flow induced vibration in the CCW heat exchangers; o
Hydraulic transients in the Auxiliary Feedwater System; o
Dealuminization of small bore Essential Cooling Water o
System aluminum bronze fittings and valves; o
Abnormal wear and leakage in the reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) tubing; and, o
Main feed pump overspeed failure.
In the case of the BMI tubing, a long term solution to the vibration problem has been provided by installing in Unit 2 a stiffer, heavier walled thimble than that used on Unit 1.
As in Unit 1, automatically closing check valves and manual isolation valves have been installed on each thimble tube.
Flow limiters, L2/JNB06/B - _ _ -.
Houston tthting 4 PQur Company used on Unit 1, are not used on Unit 2.
HL&P will inspect the Unit 2 BMI thimbles for wear to verify design adequacy after an
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initial period of operation.
In the case of flow induced vibration in the CCW heat exchangers, hydraulic transients in the Auxiliary Feedwater system and main feedpump overspeed failure, the corrective actions for Unit 1 were also taken on Unit 2.
The small bore fittings and valves in the ECW system have been replaced on Unit 2 with material which is not susceptible to dealuminization.
This is also being done on Unit 1 during available outages and will be completed prior to the return to service of Unit 1 from its first refueling outage.
In November, 1988, HL&P discovered that vortex breakers used to prevent flow induced vortexing and subsequent air-ingestion in the three containment sumps in each unit, were not installed.
Unit 1, which was operating at 100% power was immediately shut down and cooled down in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
Unit 2 had not yet received its operating license at the time of the discovery.
Vortex breakers were fabricated and installed promptly in both units.
Unit 1 subsequently was restarted.
A thorough investigation was conducted, headed by the General Manager, Nuclear Assurance and his report was reviewed and accepted by the Nuclear Safety Review Board.
Other components, with the same potential for omission were found to be installed; therefore, the investigation concluded that the omission was an isolated occurrence.
HL&P initiated 1ts own investigation of the safety significance of having operated Unit 1 without vortex breakers.
HL&P's investigation resulted in a conclusion that the ECCS system would have operated acceptably without the vortex breakers.
A more intensive analysis has been completed by independent consultants hired by HL&P.
Results from the consultants indicate that the vortex breakers were not necessary.
The complete analysis is being submitted.
The NRC has identified the failure to install the vortex breakers as a significant quality breakdown, taken escalated enforcement action and issued a Level III Violation.
In any event, HL&P took proper and decisive action upon discovering that the components were missing.
In summary, problems identified in testing and operation of Unit 1 have been resolved and should improve Unit 2's performance. L2/JNB06/B
B..
POST RECEIPT OF OPERATING LICENSE.
PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTE' RED DURING LOW POWER TESTING-Since receipt of its license in December, 1988, the South!
Texas Project Unit 2 has carried out pre-critical and low power testing.in accordance with FSAR and OL requirements.
As in the case of the pre-operational program, post-OL testing has confirmed the' adequacy of systems, structures and components.
Only minor deficiencies have been identified.
There was some leakage in bolted connections in the refueling cavity and some cables, damaged during installation, in the control rod position indication system, required repair, but resulting delay was minimal.
A'significant event occurred on. Unit 1 which had engineering and operational significance for Unit 2.
On January 20, 1989 the Unit 1 generator had a fire outside the seal area of the bearing closest to the turbine.
Subsequent evaluations determined that a loose lead in the hydrogen temperature controller caused it to switch to manual control.
Inadequate cooling was then supplied to the hydrogen, which in turn caused the pressure inside the generator to rise.
Failure of the. hydrogen gas high pressure and high temperature alarm, allowed the pressure to build, without operator action, until the gas escaped through the seal and ignited in the atmosphere outside the seal.
HL&P has aggressively pursued the effort to determine root cause of the generator fire and to apply corrective action.
Those engineering improvements identified as necessary for Unit 1 restart will be incorporated into Unit 2 prior to generator synchronization.
In addition, personnel have been given supplemental training to heighten their sensitivity to the importance of secondary side reliability.
In early March, a hydraulic transient was observed on the Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown System and inspections determined that snubbers had been damaged.
The hydraulic transient occurred when the system was placed into operation after it had been out of service for a~short period.
The damaged snubbers were repaired.
Procedural changes to warm up and pressurize the lines, prior to full restoration of the system, have prevented recurrence of the event.
In summary, the low power testing of Unit 2 has demonstrated that the Unit is free of significant engineering or construction problems.
This performance is attributable to the quality of the initial design and construction, as well as a strong program to apply lessons learned on Unit 1 to Unit 2.
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JCPERATIONAL' EXPERIENCE As in the. case of_ requirements applicableLto engineering and o
! construction,fSTP also meetsiregulatory requirements associated I
with staffing, procedures'and training.
A. STAFFING & ORGANIZATION
- 1. NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL &' TRAINING The Operations Department is responsible fcr the operation-of the Nuclear Steam Surply System and the turbine. generator and its auxiliaries.
STP has a total of 49.SROs and 27 Ros.
The
' Operations staff is on five chift rotation:with 5: licensed-operators typically _ scheduled on each shift per unit,.of which at least two are SROs.. Eleven of the SROs and one of'the Ros have-been previously licensed on other nuclear _ units. 'Each shift also
'has a Shift Technical Advisor'whose duties-include both Unit 1 and Unit _2.
Four1of the nine qualified STAS have SRO. licenses.
Personnel'have had training on a plant-specific' simulator at' STP._ The training program has achieved:an overall success rate of 85 percent-on the NRC license examinations.
The latest exam
-results were not as. successful as previous ones'(9 of 14 passing)-
but overall the program has been quite successful.. Significant comments concerning simulator performance during testing were made by'the NRC.
Corrective action'is planned prior to HL&P's request for NRC certification of the simulator.
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HL&P. believes, based on operator performances in Unit 1 that the training program has been successful in. meeting its training
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Unit 2 shift crews have.at least one SRO on each shift'who has operated STP Unit 1 at power.
All licensed operators are dual unit qualified.
HL&P has a policy of maintaining Unit 1 and Unit 2 similarity insofar.as possible, to free the operators from having to learn unique requirements.
The Maintenance Department is responsible for preventive and corrective maintenance programs.
The Department consists of Electrical, Mechanical, Instrument and Control (I&C), and Support.
Maintenance personnel are trained in a dedicated facility on site.
Hiring practices have emphasized the importance of experience.
Each of the maintenance groups includes several journeymen who have worked at other operating nuclear stations.
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The Plant Engineering Department is responsible for system performance engineering.
The Department has responsibility for the performance of programs such as Appendix R compliance, ASME i
Section XI Pump and Valve Testing, Appendix J testing and system
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leakage testing.
Predictive taaintenance in the form of equipment diagnostics is performed by this Department.
Shift Technical Livisors are also drawn from this Department.
The Technical Services Department is responsible for the station chemistry program, for operation of the radwaste systems and radiological controls and services.
The Integrated Planning & Scheduling Department reports directly to the Plant Manager.
The Department is responsible for scheduling and coordinating work activities during operations and outages.
Work activities are assigned daily through a work control center where representatives of the Operations Staff, Maintenance and Schcduling Departments ensure that work activities are prioritized e.nd coordinated, taking into account plant conditions.
2.
FITNESS FOR DUTY Plant personnel, including all HL&P Nuclear Group employees and employees of contractors and subcontractors, are subject to a stringent fitness for duty program which meets or exceeds the NUMARC guidelines ar.d the proposed rule.
One important element in the program is aggressive alcohol and drug testing.
Prospective employees are subject to baseline testing for alcohol and drugs.
Random testing is.also utilized.
If an employee comes forward voluntarily to acknowledge a problem, he is l
eligible for rehabilitation and may return to work at STP under certain conditions.
However, if testing idetitifies a substance abuser, the employee is discharged.
HL&P believes that this is an important step in ensuring a drug and alcohol free environment on the job, as well as a significant deterrent to off-site use of l
illegal substances.
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- 3. REORGANIZATION i
A recent reorganization was made to provide additional management emphasis on support organizations.
Now reporting to l
the Group Vice President, Nuclear are two Vice Presidents, one for Nuclear Operations and a seccnd for Nuclear Engina.ering and Construction.
This change reduces to 5 the number of persons reporting directly to the Group Vice President, Nuclear (Figure 1), allowing him to better focus on overall performance of the Nuclear Group.
E.
PROCEDURES Procedures necessary for the safe and efficient operation, maintenance and testing of Unit 2 are in place and ready for use.
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~In_most' cases procedures were developed from their Unit 1 counterparts and:therefore have been field tested and proven to be adequate. However, there are areas where improvements can be made; they have been identified by HL&P, NRC and NES, an independent consultant whose results are summarized in IV H below.
HL&P will initiate.a program to enhance the overall quality of the operations procedures used at STP.
This program, as previously. described to the NRC in letters dated August 22, 1988, September 2, 1988, November 23, 1988, and February 14, 1989 will encompass: Emergency Operating, Off-Normal,-Annunciator Response, System Operating and General Operation procedures.
The principal elements of the program are:
o Upgrading of the administrative procedures which control the procedure development (content and format) process; o
Upgrading of the administrative procedures which control the procedure review and approval process.
This will include specific guidance on conduct of appropriate walkdowns, interdisciplinary reviews, and verification / validation; and, The revisi',n of individual implementing procedures to o
meet the upgraded administrative procedures.
HL&P's initial focus is the Emergency Operating Procedures.
The revisions are scheduled to be written, covered in training and put into effect by August 31, 1990.
This effort will:
o Ensure consistency between plant labeling and procedures; o
Incorporate Revision lA of the WOG Emergency Response Guidelines; and, o.
Lead to development of a Step Deviation / Justification Document for the STP EOPs.
l The schedule for review of the remaining procedures is based upon their relative importance and frequency of use.
The less frequently used procedures require more immediate attention because they have not been field tested to the' extent that System or General Operating Procedures have.
The overall program is scheduled for completion by December 31, 1993.
The upgrade program for these procedures will incorporate applicable lessons learned from the EOP enhancement process.
Preventive maintenance procedures cover both safety and non-safety components in the plant.
These procedures are based on manufacturers recommendations and experience in the field.
The procedures and program appear to be sound, although l
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additional manpower is necessary to fully support this work.
In the interim, some of the PMs have been deferred in accordance l
with procedures.
An evaluation of the scope of the PM program is underway at this time.
Surveillance procedures, required by Technical Specifications for the first year of operation of Unit 2, are written and are in place.
Because of the experience with Unit 1, no problems have been identified in this area.
C.
BUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCES Unit 2 has successfully completed the pre-critical test program with no major operational occurrences.
Five LERs have been generated since issuance of the low power operating license and are discussed in Section IV F below.
A review of the experience with Unit 1 during the comparable startup period I
demonstrates the improvements made in the intervening period:
(1)
On November 2, 1987 on Unit 1 an event occurred while changing from mode 5 to mode 4, which left the High Head Safety Injection Valves in the wrong position for mode 4 operation.
Corrective actions included revision of procedures; additional operator training, both classroom and simulator; and management counseling.
No events of a similar nature have occurred on Unit 1 nor have any occurred in the initial startup of Unit 2; (2)
On Unit 1 in January, 1988 the reactor coolant pumps wege started while the steam generators were more than 50 F above each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loop temperature.
As a result the pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) lifted as part of the automatic actions of the Cold overpressure Mitigation System.
Corrective actions included modifying procedures and providing the operators additional training on bulk water thermodynamics.
No further events of this type have occurred on Unit 1 or 2; and, (3)
On January 11, 1988 with Unit 1 in mode 5, a cold steam generator was being filled with hotter main feedwater when condensation induced waterhammer occurred. Procedures were modified, operators were given additional training and the plant was tested 3
using the revised procedures.
There has been no 1
recurrence on Unit 1 or 2.
The experience gained in starting up Unit 1 has been important to the success of the pre-critical operations of Unit 2.
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IV OTHER INDICATORS OF READINESS A.
SECURITY Problems in certain areas of the security program delayed initial issuance of the OL for STP Unit 1.
As a result of increased management attention, improved physical design and revised training plans, Unit 2 performance has been good and therefore, did not affect the issuance of the Unit 2 license.
HL&P has confidence that the physical security program is functioning effectively.
B. NUCLEAR ASSURANCE The following Nuclear Assurance (NA) activities have been conducted during the period since issuance of the Unit 2 Operating License (OL) through March 1, 1989:
o Eight (8) surveillance of Technical Specification surveillance testing; o
Eight (8) surveillance of Preoperational, Initial Startup and Plant Testing activities; i
o Eleven (11) surveillance of Maintenance / Modification activities; o
Four (4) surveillance of Security activities; o
Eight (8) surveillance of Plant Operation activities; o
Three (3) surveilldnces of Health Physics / Radiation Protection activities; o
Two (2) surveillance of Material Management activities; o
Two (2) surveillance of Special Nuclear Material Accountability; o
Three (3) surveillance of Plant Housekeeping activities; o
One (1) surveillance of Engineering Support activities; o
Two (2) surveillance of an Emergency Preparedness exorcise; and, o
Three (3) surveillance of Fire Protection activities.
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e There has been a total of 79 surveillance performed since the receipt of the Unit 2 operating license.
Of these, 55 1
involved Unit 2 activities.
l The results of surveillance performed to date indicate that initial implementation of Unit 2 Startup activities reflect experience gained from Unit 1.
There have been no significant deficiency reports issued on Unit 2 to date.
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A Level Ci violation concerning a failure of audits and surveillance to identify generic issues regarding the content of Emergency Operation Procedures was identified in NRC Inspection i
Report 498/88-68.
As a result, HL&P Nuclear Assurance initiated immediate corrective action and recurrence control which provides for additional emphasis on process effectiveness as well as compliance with requirements.
The Nuclear Assurance audit program for STPEGS operational activities during the time period of December 16, 1988 to March 1,
1989 included:
o One (1) audit of Chemistry / Radiochemistry; o
One (1) audit of Instructions and Procedures; o
One (1) audit of Nonconformance Control / Corrective Action; o
One (1) audit of Special Nuclear Material; o
One (1) site audit of Westinghouse Electric Corporation; and, o
One (1) audit in progress of ODCM/ Radiological Effluent / Monitoring.
None of these audits or surveillance identified matters of significant safety concern.
NSRB The South Texas Project has established a Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB) whose function is to provide an independent t
oversight and review of designated activities in various plant areas (e.g.,
operations, engineering, training, etc.).
The board began functioning prior to issuance of the Unit 1 Operating License.
l The NSRB consists of experienced senior managers, including an outside industry representative.
The Board's role includes oversight and review of safety evaluations, reportable events and significant operating abnormalities.
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s The~NSRB reviews in these areas have been thorough and complete.
When follow up action is indicated, open items are assigned and tracked to closure..
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ISEG An Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) has been established to examine plant operating events and industry 4
operating experience as it applies to the STP.
As with the NSRB, 1
ISEG began functioning prior to issuance of the operating license on Unit 1.
The ISEG independently reviews reports of plant activities including observation of day-to-day operations and investigations of specific technical problems.
A aummary of the tasks / evaluations performed by the ISEG appears in Appendix A.-
The results of the ISEG evaluations are distributed to.the appropriate departments / divisions for their action and implementation..
50% ASSESSMENT HL&P has committed to perform an evaluation of the *eadiness of the plant staff to operate Unit 2 at power levels in :xcess of 50% of rated power.
This evaluation will include a review of the performance of the staff and reviews of past-findings to assure l
that safe and reliable plant operation can be maintained with two l
units in operation.
HL&P will assess its performance utilizing a combination of performance indicators (e.g., number of reactor trips, ESF actuations, etc.), management observations and evaluations drawn from objective third-party reviews.
i The reviews will be conducted during the startup of Unit 2 and will comprise the basis for HL&P's decision to proceed above 50% power.
C.
EMERGENCY PLANNING HL&P has previously submitted (with Revisions) an emergency plan for the South Texas Project.
The-NRC has reviewed this plan and has concluded that the emergency plan provides an adequate planreing basis for onsite emergencies and that it meets the i
requirements of 10CFR50 and Appendix E thereto (See STP SSER l
No.3).
l The NRC-Region IV and Federal Emergency Management Agency l
(FEMA) final report from the April 8, 1987 exercise stated that there wore no deficiencies identified as a result of that exercise. A second full-participation exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plan for STP will be conducted on April 26, 1989.
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The NRC ntaff performed an inspection of emergency planning i
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activities in November, 1988.
The issues identified were generally associated with inclusion of Unit 2 emergency l
facilities and equipment into the Emergency Plan and its' implementing procedures.
Those activities have been completed and reviewed on site by the NRC residents.
No deficiencies have been identified.
D.
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS HL&P believes that performance indicators are a very important management tool, particularly insofar as they may provide an early warning of a potentially deteriorating situation.
Thirty-seven (37) indicators, including those
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monitored by NRC and INPO, are included in the STP program.
E. MAINTENANCE Because good maintenance is one of the principal keys to safe and reliable operation, a comprehensive maintenance program has been developed for STP..The program consists of preventive, predictive and corrective maintenance.
The preventive program currently consists of thousands of maintenance activities for Unit 2.
This program is fully implemented, however, the required frequency of performance of many activities is under review.
The predictive program consists of a group in the Plant Engineering Department devoted to monitoring equipment vibration, pump and heat exchanger performance and other equipment parameters to facilitate early diagnosis of problems.
The corrective maintenance program, which provides service j
to both Unit 1 and 2, has been in use since before Unit 1 received it operating license.
The number of outstanding ccrrective maintenance work requests is currently at 962 on Unit 2 and 1614 on Unit 1 and common facilities.
None of these requirements for corrective action impairs the required performance of safety systems.
A maintenance self-assessment has recently been performed using the INPO criteria, with the conclusion that the program is adequate for continued safe operation of the ur.its.
This is further discussed in Section H below.
F.
LICENSE EVENT REPORTG UNIT 2 The low power licence for STP Unit 2 was issued December 16, i
1988.
Since that time, five (5) LERs have been initiated on that unit.
The LERs are as follows:
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DESCRIPTION ROOT CAUSE j
89001 Loss of power to "B" and "C"
Procedural error trains of ESF buses due to lock out on standby transformer caused by inadvertent actuation of the fire protection system.
t 89002 Plastic cover found taped to Procedural error control room envelope "C"
train makeup fan inlet placing i'
it inoperable for more than seven days.
89003 Loss of Power on ESF Train "C".
- Design, Installation, 6
Fabrication error 89004 Fuel handling building HVAC Unknown actuation on high radiation.
89005 Failure of "A" Train RHR Investigation in temperature control valve progress while ECCS Train "C" was out of service.-
On Unit 1, during the 7 months from fuel load through initial criticality, thirty-two (32) LERs were initiated.
In comparison during the 3 months of precritical operation of STP Unit 2, there were five.
The lessons learned from Unit 1 have been effectively applied to STP Unit 2.
G.
FRAUDULENT MATERIAL Prior to the issuance of the low power licence, the NRC issued two Bulletins,88-005 and 88-010 dealing with supply of fraudulent safety related ASME flanges and molded case circuit breakers.
HL&P letter ST-HL-AE-2898 dated December 6, 1988 summarized the testing and analytical program that responded to Bulletin 88-005. All installed flanges in Unit 2 were found to be 3
acceptable; no replacement was required.
On February 20, 1989 a letter to the NRC (ST-HL-AE-2995)
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detailed the status of reviews in response to Bulletin 88-010.
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At that time HL&P had received certification from the equipment suppliers that all molded case circuit breakers in the STP warehouse were traceable back to the circuit breaker manufacturer.
On March 10, 1989, the NRC requested that HL&P parforn additional verification to assure that each circuit breaker is traceable to a circuit breaker manufacturer.
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4 HL&P is aggressively acting to perform these additional verifications.
j H.
ASSESSMENTS AND REVIEWS HL&P has performed th*ee assessments recently which provide additional information concerning readiness to proceed with operations in excess of five percent power on Unit 2.
The areas evaluated include maintenance, procedures and organization, and station manning.
Each eva]uation has concluded that the added tasks of operation of Unit 2 can be performed in a manner consistent with safe operation of both units.
1.
SELF ASSESSMENT OF MAINTENANCE As mentioned in Section E, above, HL&P has conducted, in accordance with INPO criteria, a self assessment of its maintenance program.
A committee, consisting of representatives of the Operations, Maintenance and Nuclear Assurance organizations, among others, performed oversight of the assessment.
Independent contractors were also used to review the assessment process.
The overall conclusion was that maintenance was being performed in a manner which provided for safe operation of the plant.
Areas requiring attention to reduce inefficiencies in the process ware:
o The work control process; o
Procedures for control of maintenance; and, Availability of information for maintenance planners.
o An action plan to implement recommendations for improvement is being developed and will be available in May, 1989.
2.
NUCLEAR ENERGY SERVICES (NES) REVIEW NES has conducted a review to assess the effectiveness of the existing STP procedures and organization.
The assessment identified a number of areas where performance and officiency could be improved.
The recommendations are under management review to determine follow-up actions.
3.
T.D. MARTIN & ASSOCIATES STAFFING REVIEW T. D. Martin & Associates has performed a review which i
included all departments assigned to the station.
The review was conducted to provide additional insight into the staffing needs for two unit operation.
The preliminary results indicate that i
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s HL&P staffing' generally compares favorably witn that of other 4
nuclear utilities..The final report will be available.in late March, 1989.
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CONCLUSION STP, Unit-2, is ready to proceed to operations 11nfexcess of i
Ifive percent of rated power.
The facility. meets licensing requirementsfaffecting design, construction and testing.
STP-Unit.2 personnel have.the requisite qualifications.to conduct operations and have demonstrated their ability to operate the
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plant and conduct related activities safely.-
i Presently, HL&P has demonstrated the ability to manage' resources during'an outage on Unit 1 concurrent with the startup cf Unit 2.
HL&P has learned a' great deal about.the strengths and weaknessen of its operations and personnel during cperation of Unit 1 at power and low power testing on Unit 2.
As a result,-
the Project _is stronger today than it was when the Unit'l OL was-issued.
.The company intends to proceed.in a deliberate manner.
i beyond five percent power, taking advantage of lessons learned, so as to improve the overall' performance of the operation.
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s APPENDIX A~
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INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP-
SUMMARY
OF TA8KS 1988-1989 A8 OF 03/16/89 i
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l tTASK-SUBJECT l
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'88-10 Obs.oof the. Natural Circulation Verification l
88-14 Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank Alarm Review L
88-16 Obs. ofnInitial Radiation Shield Verification Survey l
88-17 Work' Control Center Observation 88-19 Review of ODCC Procedures Update 88-20 Observation of the Turbine Overspeed Trip 88-21 Unit 1 50% Power Assessment 88-22 Investigation of Loss of Offsite Power /RX Trip.
88-23 Operability Tracking Log. Review l
88-24 Fire Prevention Survey Observation 88-25
'SPR 880159 - Excess NH40H in Condensate System
'88-26 SPR 880154 - Improper Gasket Material j
88-27 Review of Technical Specifications 1
88-28 Observation of the Loss of Offsite Power Test l
88-29 Missed Surveillance Tests Review on ASME Section XI i
58-30
- 11 SGFP Destructive-Overspeed Event on 5/28/88 88-31 Inadvertent Release of 3,000 Gal. Radioactive Waste 88-32 Review of. Westinghouse Tech. Bulletin - Valve Operations 88-33 Surveillance Task Force Formed Due to Missed Surveillance 88 Observation of the June 23, 1988 Shutdown 88-36 Reactor Trip Following QDPS Troubleshooting on July 19, 1988 88-37 Obs. of Electrical / Mechanical /I&C Maintenance Activity 88-38 Observation of Chemical Operations Functions j
88-39 ISEG Review of the Caution Tag Program 88-40 Review of Estimated Critical Condition 88-41 Obs.' of Corrective Actions for' Fire Watch Requirements
'I 88-42 ISEG Observation of the August 7, 1988 Reactor Startup 88-44 The ISEG Unit 2 Operational Readiness Review 88-45 The ISEG Unit 2 Operational Readiness Review 88-46 The ISEG Unit 2 Operational Readiness Review 88-47 Review of ODCC Dccument Cross-Reference Database 88-48 The ISEG Unit 2 Operational Readiness Review 88-49 Observation of Area Radiation Surveys j
88-50 Observation of Hot Tool Crib Transactions 88-51 Investigation of #11 SDG Fuel Oil Storage j
88-52 Post-Trip Review Task Force 88-53 1988 Week #42 CR Activities Observation 88-54 ISEG Observation Reactor Plant Operator Rounds 88-55 Review of 10-8-88 Reactor Startup RCS Boron Analysis 88-56 Assessment of PMT Program Surveillance 88-57 Assessment of Preparation for Mid-Locp Operations 88-58 Annual NPOD Operational Effectiveness 88-59 Observation of Shift Technical Advisor Duties 88-60 Review NPOD Electrical Safety Plan L2/JNB06/B -
TASK SUBJECT l
88-61 Assess Reliability of On-Line Boron Concentration Indicator 88-62 Observation of Air Sampling for Rad. Monitoring System 88 Control of-Procedure Revisions for OPGP03-ZA-0002 88-64 Adequacy of AFW Flow Verification Procedure l
88-66 Observation of HP Technician Routine Tasks l
88-67 AFW Tank Overflow Investigation 88-68 Observation of Chemical Operations i
88-69 Review of Delta-Flux Difference Control 88-70 Investigation of PR 880476, Trip of ESF DG.#22 88-71 Review of Generic Implications from Tank. Overflow Events 88-72 Observation of Electrical and I&C Maintenance 88-73 ISEG Observation of Unit 2 Initial Core Load
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88-74 Containment Integrity Degradation 89-01 1989 Annual Assessment of OER Program 1
89-02 ISEG Observation of Reactor Plant Operators Rounds 89-03 ISEG Observation of Rapid Refueling Demonstration 89-04 Assessment of ESF Filter Trains i
89-05 Investigation of Fire Protection Deluge System Activation 89-06 Investigation of Root Causes of Unit 1 Fire on 01-20-89 89-07 Assess Need for a Human Performance Evaluation System 89-10 Assessment of Effectiveness of Corrective Action Process l
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