ML20196L516

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Safeguards Evaluation Supporting Amends 73 & 65 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively
ML20196L516
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/24/1988
From:
NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20196L511 List:
References
NUDOCS 8807070556
Download: ML20196L516 (4)


Text

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, o UNITED STATES

! 'Is NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$ WASHINGTON, D. C 20666

$ l June 24, 1988 l

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SAFEGUARDS EVALUATION REPORT MISCELLANEDUS AMENDMENTS AND SEARCH REQUIREMENTS TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

'COUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 l DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 1.0 INTRODUCTIOj!  ;

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has ri kd with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission revisions to their Physical Security Plan for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.

This Safeguards Evaluation Report (SGER) sumarizes how the licensee proposes to meet the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions of 10 CFR Part 73.55.

Based on a review of the Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that?

the proposed changes satisf revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (y Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements record reporting requirements. Accordingly, ne protection provided will ensure that the public health and safety will not be endangered.

2.0 PERSONNEL SEARCH The licensee has provided commitments in the Physical Security Plan to provide a search of all individuals entering the protected area except bona fide Federal, State and local law enforcement personnel on official duty, through the use of equipment designed for the detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. In addition, the licensee has provided comitments to conduct a physical pat-down search of an individual whenever the licensee has cause to suspect that the individual is attempting to introduce firearms, I explosives, or incendiary devices into the protected areas; or whenever firearms or explosives detection equipment is out of service or not operating satisfactorily.

l 3.0 VITAL AREA ACCESS TVA has modified their Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Physical l Security Plan to limit unescorted access to vital areas during non-emergency conditions to individuals who may require access in order to perform their duties.

They have established current authorization access lists for each vital area l

8807070556 880624 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P PNU

which are updated and approved by the cognizant manager or supervisor at least once every 31 days. TVA has' assured that only individuals whose specific duties require access to vital areas during nonemergency conditions are included on their site access list. TVA has provided further assurance by revoking access and retrieving badges and other entry devices prior to, or simultaneously with, notification of termination of an individual's unescorted facility access.

Based upon comitments made by the licensee in revisions to their Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that TVA meets the vital area access requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(1)(A), (B) and (C).

4.0 LOCKS AND XEYS The licensee has comitted to providing methods to reduce the probability of compromise of keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices used to control access to their protected areas and vital areas. These methods include the rotatica of keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices every 12 months or the changing of these devices whenever there is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination or related access 3 control device may have been compromised or when an individual who has had access to any of these devices has had their access tenninated due to a lack of trustworthiness, reliability or inadequate work perfonnance. Only persons granted unescorted facility access are issued such entry devices.

Based upon comitments made by the licensee in revisions to their Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that TVA meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (d)(9) to reduce the probability of compromise of keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices.

1 5.0 EMERGENCY ACCESS

! The licensee has provided comitments to provide for the rapid ingress and i egress of individuals during emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency conditions by assuring prompt access to vital equipment.

An annual review of their physical security plans and contingency plans and procedures will be conducted to evaluate thoir potential impact on plant and personnel safety. Emergency access is granted by a licensed senior operator.

Based upon cemitments made by the licensee in revisions to their Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that TVA meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (d)(7)(11) to assure access to vital equipment during emergencies or to situations that may lead to'an emergency.

6.0 PROTECTION OF SECONDARY POWER SUPPLIES The licensee has provided comitments to protect the on-site secondary power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable comunications equipment by including such equipment within a vital area boundary.

l

r Based upon commitments made by the licensee in revision to their Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that TVA meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(e) in protecting the secondary power supplies of an alarm annunciator equipment and nonportable communications equipment.

7.0 VITAL AREA ENTRY / EXIT LOGGING The licensee has committed to maintaining a log indicating name, badge number, time of entry, and time of exit of all individuals granted access to a vital area except those individuals entering or exiting the reactor control room.

Based upon commitments made by the licensee in revisions to their Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that TVA meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.70(d) by maintaining entry / exit log of individuals accessing vital areas (except the reactor control room).

8.0 CONCLUSION

o ased upon the above evaluation, we find that the licensee has met the requirements of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revision<i, to 10 CFR 73.55 and the record reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 73.70.

Principal Contributor: G. McPaek, NRR Dated: June 24, 1988 e

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Mr. S. A. White N Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant cc.

General Counsel Regional Administrator, Region II Tdanessee Valley Authority U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 400-West Sumit Hill Drive 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Eli B33 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 . .

Resident Inspector /Sequoyah NP Mr. R. L. Gridley c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Tennessee Valley Authority 2600 Igou Ferry Road SN 157B Lookout Place Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Mr. Richard King Mr. H. L. Abercrombie c/o U.S. GAO -

. Tennessee Valley Authority 1111 North Shore Drive Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Suite 225, Box 194 P.O. Box.2000 Knoxville, Tennessee 37919 Sodiy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Mr. M. R. Harding Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Ofrcctor ?

Tennessee Valley Authority Division of Radiological Health Sequoyah Nuclear Plant T.E.R.R.A. Building 6th Floor P.O. Box 2000 150 9th Avenue North Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Nashville, Tennessee 37219-5404 Mr. D. L. Williams Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor Tennessee Valley Authority Comittee on Interior 400 West Sumit Hill Drive and Insular Affairs W10 B85 U.S. House of Representatives Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Washington, D.C. 20515 County Judge Hamilton County Courthouse Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 l

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