ML20206G457

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SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept Co 15105-SQN, Flex Hose Connections
ML20206G457
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 11/04/1988
From:
NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20206G037 List: ... further results
References
NUDOCS 8811220287
Download: ML20206G457 (2)


Text

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4 pa a ug'c, UNITED STATES i* NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 k,:. [* iI pyj J. wasmNGTON. D. C. 20555 SAFET) EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS EMPLOYEE C0l4CERid ELEMENT REPCRT C015105-SQN, "FLEX HOSE CONNECTI0l45" TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SE0VOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1. Subject Category: Construction (10000)

Subca tegory: Damage (15100)

Elerent: Flex Hose Connections (15105)

Concern: IN-85-449-001 - The basis for Elen.ent Report C015105-SQN, i Rev. 2, cated October 10, 1966 is Watts Bar Employee Concern IN-85-449-001 which states:

"All crafts and engineering personnel should be l

trained en the protection of flex hose connections.

' After instrumentation filter installation and inspection by-off, other personnel can walk, climb and disfigure the assembly. This affects the ability of the flex hose to operate as required per design.

Example: System No. 63 at elevation 717, four feet east and ten feet south of the wall. It is possible i

that repairs have been made, but not verified." .

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This concern was and potentially evaluate applicable by TVA as to Sequoyah potentially)

(generic . nuclear safety-related

!!. Sumary Of issue A ceneric cercern about the status of employee training in the area of electrical flex hose protection was identified as a r2sult of a review conducted on Watts Bar specific item lh-85-449-001 by TVA. This issue was reviewed by the licensee specific to the Sequoyah t;uclear Plant, ,

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2-Ill. Evalcation The licensee reviewcd maintenance history documents and interviewed knowledgeable plant personnel. The licensee determine that no pattern of flex 'hcse damage existed at the Sequoyah fluclear Plant. The licensee also conducteo a walkdown of approximately 150 flex hose connections and discoveied no currently damaged hoses. Finally, the licensee determined that no formal training was conducted on flex hose damage.

IV. Conclusion The licensee substantiated that no formal trainino existed at the

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Sequoyah tiuclear Flant on prevention of flex hose damage. However, the need for such training was disputed by the licensee L.' sed on the absence of any identifiable trend of current or past flex hose damage. Flex hose daraage had been identified by the NRC in isolated cases but, there does i.ot appear to be a pervasive flex hose damage issue at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. This evaluatirn is consistent with the results on an NRC inspection conducted in December 1986 and January 1989 (IR 50-327/86-68 ar.d 50-328/86-68) which toentified isolated cases of flex hose damage.

Therefore, the need for flex hose damage training does not appear to exist. ho actions by the licensee are required prior to the startup of either unit. The hFC staff believes the TVA investigation of the concern was acequate. This issue is closed.

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