ML20206G524

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SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 30111, Valve Closure
ML20206G524
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 11/04/1988
From:
NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20206G037 List: ... further results
References
NUDOCS 8811220304
Download: ML20206G524 (2)


Text

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() E NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION W/,$HINGTON D. C. 00555 WeV./

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SAFETY EVALUAT:CN REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS ,

Ef';LOYEE C0fiCERN ELEl4ENT REPORT OP Mill. "VALVE CLOSURE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SECUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 P

4 COCKET fl05. 50-327 Af4D 50-328 P

k I. 5.bfe:t Cate;;ry: C:e atiens (30000)

Sv:: ate;: y: ve:aanical E:ui:-ent Reliability /Cesign (30100)

Ele er.t: Vahe C1:svre Erc lem (30111)

E pleyee Concerr.: Ih-55-400-01 r Tne tap s fer E!e e t Re:rt CP 30111, cated October 30, 1936, is the

fcile sag e eleyce v
e.n:

Cer:e-n IN-s!.-4C0'01: Ceneric Cen:orn - Flow C:r.tiel Valves and '

I est: ati: esen/close valves in Units 1 and 2 '

(RhR. 515. CVC5. and RCE) do not completely close '

to prevert ficw of water, Average closure wt.s expressed as 96'i. C1 is concerned that tnis i

could be detrimntal to plant operation and

cesonnel safety, particularly after nuclear ,

ocerations begin, for exatole: instances where i ray routine /e+ergency maintenance activities i require t:tal or partial system isolation. t C:ncern is generic in nature, with no furtnea 4

specifics aveilable. l l

3 II. Su- ary of Issue i This is a geferic c rcern fr** 'n'atts $3r with C0ssible aaplicabi'ity at f  !

i $e*uayaF. Alt"Ou*h t*e 00*:e'n "eations :o'.h fl:W Control valves a*0 Aut *a*1: C e"./cl se (is0iatic*,) valves, chly 'ne isolati0n valves are Cesiga4: t: ;"eveat fl0d of water, i.e.. routine :P e-ergency Eaint.enan:e l ,

l a:ttvitie. at re:uire t:tal er cartial system isolatten.

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Evaluat4:n e'e:t s:a1'y :-

.c.t> ':4-t e +: :, t e C: ::,': te eit e

+ .:45

4. 4:':4' ,  ::e ate:. 5 :e tne .a',es a e ces'; e: a-: f4:* : ate: -

a::: :3 :e t- ,'.5 : 5;6 5, vis-53-66, ae: ASvi Ser.tien II-;if5 e:4ti: , ,

l  ::ssitte :s car gn.

'esta
e is -t M :e: t: tre ente 0811220304 8911d4 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P PDC

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e The Se:voyah plant has an extensive valve leakage testing program in a::ordance with both ASME Section IX IWV and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, which a;; ears to be reasonably effective.

ine ex:-essed c:n:ern of 95'. closure leads one to believe that the CI was tr :atly referrirg to tre 93'. limit switch setting on POVs. For slow a:tua i ; C.'s the pc-er ef f limit switch is typically set at 9E-99', to prevert the r: e n t e. of tre valve operator from damaging ths valve internals, for fast a:tuating MOVs, this power of f 's i mi t switch is typically set at 90-95*. for the same reason. Althougn the limit switch is used to ceecergize the valve ector on the opening stroke, the torque s ,. i t c h is used to deenergi:e the valve on the closing stroke.

The S e:;ucya h raintena. ace training for both electrical and mechanical raintea.ance workers covers not only the setting of limit switches in a::crda ce witn Secuoyah raintenance instructions (MI 11.2A, B, C, and 0),

but also Oc.ers the theory on why the limit switches are set at 98-99'. for s10 a:tuating MOVs and 90-95'. for f ast actuatirg MOVs.

IV. C:*:lusien THe ' 0. 0 staff telieves tnat the TVA investigation of this concern was 1:e;us.e an: treir resolution cf the con:ern as describcd in Ele ent

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,e::rt C? 30;;l is acceptsb'e #0- restart, t

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