ML20154N225

Rev 1 to Main Steam Tunnel Flooding Analysis

ML20154N225
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	02/28/1986
From:	BECHTEL GROUP, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20154N219	List: ML20154N215 ML20154N225
References
NUDOCS 8603170238
Download: ML20154N225 (8)

Text

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MAR 4 *86 0 2 9 '/ 7 7 7

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MAIN STEAM TUNNEL FLOODING ANALYSIS REVISION 1 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO.

FEBRUARY 1986 PREPARED BY BECHTEL POWER CORP.

8603170239 B60312 PDR ADOCK 05000354 E PDR ,

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. MAR 4 *86 C 2 9 7 7 7 7 PURPOSE The Hope Creek Safety Evaluation Report (SER) requires submittal for NRC staff review a hazards analysis for effect of a feedwater line break in the main steam tunnel (MST) on the plant's ability to sately shut down. (SER Section 8.3.3.1.4 - Confirmatory Item No. 28) h METHODOLOGY The analysis was conducted in the following manner:

1. Identify all Class lE equipment and components in the main steam tunnel, Room 4316, that will be subject to the worst case submergence which results from a break in a main teed-water line. (Flood level is Elevation 126' of this room).

2. Identify the safety channel and safety function / system of each equipment or component identified.

3. Determine if the equipment or component is qualified for submergence. If not, determine if the equipment or compo-nent circuit has a primary and backup protective device located in a hazard-free area.

4. Determine if the plant can be safely shut down af ter both the primary and backup protective device open as a result of the failure of the unprotected equipment or component together with the worst case single tailure.

ANALYSIS The Class lE equipment and components which will be subjected to flooding are identified on the attached table. This table also provides information on safety channel, safety function / system, submergence qualification and location of the primary and backup protective devices. The evaluation of safe shutdown after loss of the equipment / components not qualified for submergence is as follows:

A. Motor Operated Valves (MOVs)

1. LAB-HV-F071 - Main Steam drain line isolation downstream of the outboard MSIVs. This valve is not required to mitigate the consequences of a feedwater line break or any other pipe break which could cause flooding of the main steam tunnel, nor is it required for safe shutdown.

2. 1KP-HV-5829A&B, -5834A&B, -5835A&B, -5836A&B, and 5837A&B -

MSIV sealing system gas supply valves. Thase valves are only required to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA.

Should any valve (s) spuriously open, upstream piping is protected from overpressurization by check valves (See FSAR Figure 6.7-1). These valves have no safe shutdown function.

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MAR 4 *86 0 2 9 7 7 7 7 -

A. Mot'or Operated Valves (MOVs) - Cont'd

3. lAE-HV-F039 - RhCU return to feedwater.

This valve is powered from AC motor control center 10B242, Channel D. The supply line to the RbCU system

,i has a containment inboard isolation valve IBd@HV-F001 powered from the Channel A source and'an outboard isola-tion valve 1BG-HV-F004 powered from 10B242. Neither these valves nor their power supplies are located in the MST. There is no single failure which can prevent both supply isolation valves from closing. They will close automatically on low level in the RPV.

4. lAE-HV-4144 - FW crosstie isolation valve. -

This valve is required to mitigate the consequences [jg of a LOCA only. This valve has no safe shutdown function following a F.W. Line break in the steam tunnel. ,

B.. Solenoid Operated Valves 1KL-PDV-5825A&B - MSIV sealing system supply valves. See discussion of item A.2 above.

C. Thermocouples The thermocouples provide input to the MSIV isolation logic which closes the MSIVs on high temperature in the MST. Closure of the MSIVs is not required to mitigate the consequences of a feedwater line break or to safely shut down the reactor.

Closure of the MSIVs will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

CONCLUSION As discussed above, none of the components which are flooded and are not qualified for submergence are required for safe shutdown of the plant, nor will their failure prevent safe shutdown.

Because the equipment / systems that are required to safely shut-down the plant are single-tailure proof, no single failure can prevent safe shutdown.

K68/15-3

4 MAIN STEAM 'IUtNEL FICODING ANALYSIS -

CIASS lE EQUIPMEMr AND OUMPONENIS ANALY2ED EQUIPMENT / SAFETY OUALIFIED FOR , IOCATION OF PRIMARY / BACKUP COMPONENT No. CHANNEL SAFET. Y FUNCTION /SAFL'IY SYS'ITN SUBMERGENCE PI(frECTIVE DEVICE ISK-TE-N010A RPS W Main Steam 'Ibanel high temp. No 10C609 - Primary (Thermocouple) trip input to NSSSS/ Steam 10C410 - Backup (1) l Leak Detection 1

ISK-TE-N012A RPS W Main Steam Tunnel high temp. No (Thermocouple) trip input to NSSSS/ Steam 10C609 10C410 -- Backup Primary (1)

Ieak Detection ISK-TE-N016 RPS W None (alarm and indication)/ No 10C609 (Thermocouple) Steam Isak Detection 10C410 -- Backup Primary (1) 1 i

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TC to M

K6d/15-4 . M M

1 t *.

MAIN STEAM 'IUteiEL FLOODING ANALYSIS 9

CLASS lE EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENIS ANALY2ED EQUIPMENT / SAFETY SAFETY FLNCTION/ QUALIFIED FOR IOCATION OF PRIMARY / BACKUP COMPONENT No. CHANNEL SAFETY SYSTEM i SUBME%ENCE PRUIECTIVE DEVICE l

ISK-TE-N010B RPS X Main Steam ibnriel high tmp. No (Thennocouple) trip input to NSSSS/ Steam 10C611 10C411 -- Backup Primary (1)

Leak Detection l

ISK-TE-N0123 RPS X Main Steam ibnnel high temp. No (Thennocouple) trip input to NSSSS/ Steam 10C611 10C411 -- Backup Primary (1) teak Detection ISK-TE-N010C RPS Y Main Steam Tunnel high tmp. No (Thennoccuple) trip input to NSSSS/ Steam 10C609 - Primary (1) 10C410 - Backup Leak Detection l l

ISK-TE-N012C RPS Y Main Steam ibnnel high temp. No (Thermocouple) trip input to NSSSS/ Steam 10C609 10C410 -- Backup Primary (1)

Isak Detection j l

ISK-TE-N010D RPS 2 Main Steam Ib. riel high tesup.

No (Thermocouple) trip input to NSSSS/ Steam 10C611 10C411 -- Backup Primary (1) g Leak Detection "'

l n-ei ISK-TE-N012D RPS 2 Main Steam 'Ibnnel high temp. No 10C611 - Primary

• trip input to NSSSS/ Steam U 10C411 ,ylackup 11)

Isak Detection l g l l 4

1AB-HV-F071 C Main Steam lines downstream "

108232 (2) y (Motor operated drain isolation y valve)

K68 /15-5

1-e ..

MAIN STEAM 'I1JNNEL FIDODING ANALYSIS CIASS lE EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENIS ANALY2ED

..s EQUIPMENr/ SAFETY SAFErY FLNCTION/ CUALIFIED FOR IOCATION OF PRIMARY / BACKUP OOMPONENT No. CliMedEL SAFETY SYSTEM SUBMERGENCE PICIECTIVE DEVICE 1

IKL-PDV-5825B C MSIV Outboard Seal Gas No lYF403 (2)

(Solenoid valve) Supply l l

IKP-lW-5829B C MSIV Outboard Seal Gas No 10B232 (2)

(Petor operated Supply valve) 1KP-IN-5834B C MSIV Outboard Seal Gas No 10B232 (2)

(Motor operated Supply valve)

I IKP-lW-5835B C MSIV Outboard Seal Gas No 10B232 (2)

(Motor operated S w ly valve) 1 liGMW-5836B C MSIV Outboard Seal Gas No 10B232 (2) g (Motor operated Supply "

valve) >

N 1KP-IN-5837B C MSIV Outboard Seal Gas No 10B232 (2)

(Motor operated {

valve)

Supply . , . *y{

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e, MAIN STEAM 'IUtNEL FLOODING ANALYSIS CLASS lE EQUIPMENT A:4D COMPONENIS ANALYZED **

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EOUIPMENT/ SAFETY SAFETY FUNCTICN/ QUALIFIED FOR IDCATION OF PRIMARY / BACKUP COMPONENT No. CHANNEL SAFETY SYb"n:M SUBMERGENCE PRCTTECTIVE DEVICE IKL-PDV-5825A D MSIV Inboard Seal Gas Supply No lYF404 (2)

(Solenoid Valve) 1KP-IN-5829A D MSIV Inboard Seal Gas Supply No 10B242 (2)

(Motor operated valve) l IKIMN-5834A D MSIV Inboard Seal Gas Supply No 108242 (2)

(Motor operated valve) 1KP-fW-5835A D MSIV Inboard Seal Gas Supply No 10B242 (2)

(Motor operated valve) ,

1KP-fN-5836A D MSIV Inboard Seal Gas Supply No 10B242 (2)

(Motor operated 9 valve) g c

1KP-fN-5837A D MSIV Intoard Seal Gas Supply No 10B242 (2) pc (Motor operated l CC valve <

q lAE-fN-F039 D RWCU Discharge to Feedwater No 10B242 (2) i w

(Motor operated Isolation i M valve) ,.

l lAE-IN-4144 C EW Crosstie Isolation No 10B232 (2) -

(Motor operated valve b

K68 /15-7

o.

MAIN STEAM 'IU@lEL FIOODING ANALYSIS CIASS lE EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENIS ANALYZED ,,

EQUIPMENT / SAFETY SAFETY FLNCTION/ OUALIFIED FOR IOCATION OF PRIMARY / BACKUP COMPONENT No. CHAPNEL SAFETY SYSIEM SUHMEICENCE PRCTrBCTIVE DEVICE LAB-W-F019 D Steam Lines Drain Outboard Yes 10B242 (3)

(Motor operated Isolation valve) 1AB-W-F067A D Main Stean Line A Outboard Yes 10B242 (3)

(Motor operated Drain valve l

1AB-W-F067B D Main Steam Line B Outboard Yes 10B242 (3)

(Motor operated Drain valve)

LAB-W-F067C D Main Steam Line C Outboard Yes 10B242 (3)

(Motor operated Drain valve) 1AB-W-F067D D Main Steam Line D Outboard Yes 10B242 (3)

(Motor operated Drain E valve "

l

• cd (1) Opening the backup protective device dWnergizes the associated RPS channel which ..,

may result in a reaction trip. This is a safe condition. c y

(2) Opening the primary and backup protective device does not atfect any cmponent other (c y

than the identified ccznponent. g N

(3) For qualified operators, only primary protection device location is provided. w K68 /15-8