IR 05000302/1992029
| ML20127K049 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1993 |
| From: | Freudenberger, Holmesray P, Landis K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127K034 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-92-29, NUDOCS 9301260027 | |
| Download: ML20127K049 (14) | |
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5 d 9 d . .', p-Report No.: 50-302/92-29 Licensee; florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St.-Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No.: 50-302 License No._ _DRP-72 Facility Name: Crystal River 3
- i Inspection conducted: Novemter 15 - December 19, 1992 Inspector: 1H M /!/ .3 Dat'e Signed-P.00p-RaGSeniorResidentinspector Inspector: p fU M / 5 Date S gn li, reiidenberger,, Resident Inspector c- (/ /f e' ~
-Approved by:K. Landis, Section Chief Date $igne Division of Reactor Projects 1 Accompanying personnel: A. Long, Project Engineer, RII SUMMARY Scope:
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This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas' '
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of piant operations ~, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports, and licensee action on previous inspection. items. Numerous facility tour were conducted and facility-operations observed. Backshift inspections were conducted on December- 9, 18, 22,-29, and 3 Results:
The licensee voluntarily entered TS 3.0.3 during the performance of a:
maintenance evolution to replace a failed RCS flow instrument. This action improved the margin of safety and was appropriately controlled. (paragraph '
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The status of the long term corrective actions 'in response to the reactor trip
. events of December 1991 were also reviewed and updated.- '(paragraph 7)
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.. I REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted ,
Licensee Employees
- Boldt, Vice President Nuc' ear Production
- E. Froats, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
- G. Halnon, Manager, Nuclear System Engineering
- B. Hickle, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- J. Kraiker, Nuclear Shift Manager
- D. Kurtz, Manager, Nuclear Operations Quality Assurance-
- G. Longhouser, Nuclear Security Superintendent P. McKee, Director, Quality Programs
- R. McLaughlin, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist
- B. Moore, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Scheduling '
- S. Robinson, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assessments V. Roppel. Nuclear Engineering Services Supervisor R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support -
- D. Wilder, Radiation Protection Manager Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, .
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engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation, and corporate personne NRC Resident Inspectors .
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P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector
- R. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
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last paragrap . Plant Status and Activities The plant continued in power operation (Mode 1)' for the duration of this inspection period.-
On November 20, 1992, the Regional Administrator, RII; the Director, Division of Reactor Projects, DRP, RII; the Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RII; the Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 28, DRP, RII; the Director, Projects Directorate II-2, NRR; the' Senior Project-Manager, Projects Directorate 11-2-2, NRR; and a' Reactor Engineer,.
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Operator Licensing Section 2, RII were on. site for a public meeting and discussion of the recent SALP rerert'. - The Initial SALP Report-was issued on November 9, 1992 (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-302/92-21).
During the week of December-1, a specialist: inspection'of ISI~ activities and_recent piping' support discrepancies was conducted. .The results of this inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/92-28.-
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3. Plant Operations (71707, & 40500)
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. The tours included entries into the protected areas and the radiologically controlled areas of the plan During these inspections, discussions were held with operators, health physics and instrument and controls technicians, mechanics, security personnel, engineers, supervisors, and plant management. Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts. Licensee meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management activities. The inspections confirmed FPC's compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, License Conditions, and Administrative Procedures, Reactor Coolant Flow Transmitter Failure On December 8, at 12:02 a.m., an RCS flow annunciator alarm was received in the control room. Reactor Coolant Pump amps remained steady and were consistent with earlier reading Operators monitored the RCS flow indications and determined that the RPS channel "B" instrumentation had faile The channel was declared inoperable and placed in the tripped condition at 12:50 a.m. as required by T Troubleshooting indicated that transmitter RC-14B-DPT2 had faile The transmitter was manufactured by Rosemount Inc., model ll53HD6PA. While planning the replacement of the transmitter, the licensee recognized that a similarly designed plant had recently tripped inadvertently during a similar maintenance evolution, in order to minimize the potential for an inadvertent reactor trip, the licensee planned to isolate a redundant transmitter associated with RPS channel "C" while the Channel "B" transmitter was valved out, replaced, and returned to servic This required bypassing Channel "C" of the RPS during the evolution, an action not allowed by TS for the performance of surveillance but not maintenance. The licensee reasoned that this course of action was in the best interest of safety, by reducing the probability of an inadvertent reactor trip. Revised Standard TS for crystal River Unit 3 are in development and will allow unlimited bypass of RPS channels for maintenance with one channel already failed. Following licensee discussion of their assessment, the NRC concurred with their planned actions. The licensee voluntarily entered TS 3.0.3 while Channel "C" was bypassed from 9:05 p.m. to 9:08 p.m. and 11:10 p.m. to 11:17 p.m.,
during the maintenance evolution. The inspectors noted that the licensee expended significant effort to ensure the maintenance evolution was performed in a manner which minimized the risk of an inadvertent reactor trip and to minimize the time in TS 3.0.3 (total time of approximately 10 minutes). This issue will be permanently resolved when Revised Standard TS are implemented. Implementation is currently scheduled for the Fall of 199 Radiological Protection Program Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and
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procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements. These u observations included: I
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Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;
- Area postings and controls;
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Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and <
contaminated areas;
- RCA exiting practices; and
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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective clothing, and respiratory equipmen The implementation of radiological controls observed during this inspection period were proper and conservativ Security Control in the course of the_ monthly activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force _was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and-retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; -and compensatory posts. In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and. maintenanc No performance discrepancies were identified by the inspector . Maintenance and Surveillance Activities (62703 & 61726)
Surveillance tests were observed to. verify that approved procedures were
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being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipmont operability;- calibrated equi utilized; and TS requirements appropriately implemented. pment~was-The:following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
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SP-3400, RWP-38, DCP-1B and Valve' Surveillance; and
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SP-344A,_RWP-2A, SWP-1A and Valve Surveillance.
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In addition, the inspector observed maintenance activities-to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire-prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;.
quality control personnel performed inspection activities as required; and TS requirements were being followed.
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Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:
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WR 303750, RPS Channel "B" Loop Flow Indication Erratic;
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WR 290604, Prefabrication of replacement' suction header piping for SW system;
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WR 303331, Fabrication of vibration damper for use in DHP-1A testing;
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WR 303337, installation of damper for vibration testing of DHP-1A; and
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WR 289054, UT examination of SW Heat Exchanger nipples to monitor corrosio !
One item involving Decay Heat Pump vibration testing was considered noteworthy. As previously reported in NRC Inspection Report.50-302/92-18, detail 4,c., the licensee has performed vibration testing in an attempt to determine the cause of higher than desired vibration.of.the .
"A" Decay Heat Pump. The analysis of the data collected during the July'
testing indicated a potential resonant frequency vibration in the pump discharge piping. During this inspection period,-the licensee performed additional testing. A vibration dampening device was temporarily installed on the discharge piping to identify the impact-of the vibration of the piping on pump vibration. A reduction in pump- ,
vibration of up to twenty percent was measured with.the damper installed. Due to difficulties handling the-dampening device, further testing may be required prior to development of the design change to permanently reduce-pump vibratio Inspector observation of the testing activities indicated that they were performed in a well controlled manne Overall, surveillance and maintenance. activities observed and discussed above were performed in a satisfactory manner in accordance_with procedural-requirements and met the requirements of the T . Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
LERs were reviewed for potential-generic impact, to detect trends, and?
to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events that were. reported-immediately were reviewed as.they occurred to determine if the TS were-satisfied. LERs were also reviewed.in; accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy, (Closed) LER 91-14: Gasket Failures Cause Feedwater Booster Pump and Main Feedwater Pump Trip
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On November 25, 1991, with a plant startup in progress, the operators had completed realignment-of.the condensate system and-closed the output breakers. The reactor was slightly above 20%
power. Due to failed gaskets in the deaerator level switch, the-level indicating instruments were not functioning properly. The-result was a reactor trip caused by . loss of main feedwater pumps wher the feed booster pumps tripped on- a false low deaerator-
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'5 level. A contributing factor was that the deaerator dump valve
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did not function when level was high. -The breaker for the dump valve was found ope This event and the trips that occurred on December 3, and December 8,1991, were the subject of special operator training for the-lessons learned. The asbestos gaskets which failed were replace with flexitallic gaskets under WR 0281983 and WR 0280098. The operation of the deaerator dump valve was checked and found to be satisfactory. This item is closed, (hen) LER 90-02: Fire Dampers May Not Close Under Ventilation Flow Conditions Due to Failure to Consider Flow Conditions in -
Original Design Criteria Per NRC IN 89-5 '
There have been three revisions of this LER issued; the original-on March 19, 1990; Revision 1 on January 9, 1991; and Revision 2-on May 17, 199 The status of this LER was last discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50 302/92-16. At that time several Control Complex fire dampers were scheduled for modification during the Mid-Cycle 9 outage in the spring of 1993. Since the last review the licensee has initiated actions to perform an engineering study of all the fire dampers in the facility, their design basis, and recommendations-for appropriate actions to resolve all aspects of the issu nis LER remains open, (0 pen) LER 90-03: Present Plant Design Leads to Instrument Fluctuation Exceeding Required Range and Subsequent Technical Specification Violatio A design change (MAR 91-05-25-01) to install upgraded flow instrumentation on the Chilled Water System is scheduled for implementation prior to the Mid-Cycle 9 Outage-in the spring of-1993. This LER remains open pending installation of the design change, (0 pen) LER_90-05: Calculation of RB Flood Level Shows Level Exceeds that of Safe Shutdown Equipment Due to Design Error Causing Operation Outside the Design Basi Approximately half of the affected equipment was relocated by_ MARS 90-06-10-01 and 90-06-10-02 during the Cycle 8 Refueling Outage.in 1992. The remainder of the affected equipment is scheduled _to be relocated above the R8 flood level during the'Mid-Cycle 9 Outage for the Spring of 1993. This LER remains open pending completion of the modification Violations or deviations were not identifie . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ . _ . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ____ _ _
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6 6.- Meeting with Local Officials (94600)
On November 20, the Region 11 Regional Administrator, NRR management, Region 11 management, and resident inspector personnel met with local officials at the Crystal River Site Administrative Building. The s e --
officials included:
Harlan Keaton, Manager, Environmental Radiation Control Program, State of Florida Office of Radiation Control Bill Kicklighter, Assistant Emergency Operations Director, Citrus County Sheriff's Department Jim Soukup, Emergency Operations Director, Citrus County Sheriff's Department William' Hunt, Radiological Emergency Planning Coordinator, Citrus County Sheriff's Department i
During the meeting, the NRC staff was introduced, the purpose of the NRC was explained and a discussion of the SALP presentation was held. As a result, the staff answered some general questions about the operation of
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Crystal River Unit 3, and received generally positive comments regarding-Florida Power Corporation's interface with local agencies. None of th discussions necessitated followup correspondenc . Generic Implications of Reactor Trip Events in December 1991 On December 8, 1992, the licensee issued a revised. status of the.long term-corrective actions delineated in the FPC Final Report of-January -
10, 1992, entitled " Florida Power Corporation Generic' Implications of-Reactor Trip Events in December 1991." This revision included the most
- _1 current updates as well as corrections to minor deficiencies identified by QPER 92-19, Corrective Action Program Review: Followup-up to December 1991-Reactor Trips. The inspector reviewed the status of all items not previously closed in an NRC Inspection Report, and determined the status of these items to be as follows: (Closed) Operations item A1: Training for-Shift Which will
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Restart the Plant-A training program was put in place to-provide startup training to-selected crews prior to plant restart. This training was-conducted-
-for the-startup crew for the restart from the April:1992 reactor trip recovery outage, and for operating crews prior to restart-from the 8R refueling outage. . Training was conducted through the Licensed Operator Requalification program using-Lesson Plan ROT-9-26, and included all available operators and SOTAs. The inspector reviewed the lesson plan and training attendance records, and no-deficiencies were identified. This item is close ;
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b. (Closed) Operations item A2: OSB Entries for All Three Trips Operations Study Book entries 9112.01, 9112.02, and 9112.03 addressed the reactor trips on November 25, 1991,-December 3, 1991, and December 8, 1991, respectivel The inspector reviewed the three Study Book entries, issued on--
December 16, 1991, and found them to include appropriate-detail-and information on cause and lessons learned. This item is closed, s
c. (Closed) Operations Item A3: Refresher Startup Training for All Available Operators See paragraph 7 a abov d. (Closed) Operations Item Bl: Reinforce Man-On-Call Concurrence for Required Actions (Especially Work in Systems that Can Trip the Plant)
The policy of utilizing the Man-On-Call as a resource during any unusual or off-normal occurrence or plant evolution is_being reinforced during simulator training. A plant management commitment has been made to make the Man-On-Call available for training purposes, and Shift Managers'have been participating in operations training as related to their function as Emergency Coordinator. Additionally, a dedicated telephone line has been installed at the simulator site so that simulator crews can practice communication with the Man-On-Call during selected practice sessions. This telephone line was used during the-annual Emergency Preparedness exercise on November 5, 199 AI-500, Conduct of Operations, Revision 173, effective September 30, 1992, specified the systems. requiring prior approval before performing maintenance. The-systems specified were-those which could trip the unit, actuate engineered safeguards,-or interrupt decay heat removal. Approval for work on these systems can be-granted by the Operations Superintendent, the Manager-0n-Call, or the Nuclear Shift Manager. The pre-approval requirement does not'
apply to the performance of routine surveillances using approved procedures. This item is close e. (Closed) Operations Item B2: Reinforce SR0 Concurrence for-Required Actions (Especially bypassing "ES")
The licensee took the following actions to clarify requirements for bypassing automatic ES actuations:
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As an immediate corrective action, Operations Study Book entry 9112.04 was issued on December 16, 1991, and stated that S500 concurrence should be obtained prior to bypass of any ES Actuation. The document further stated that ES may
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only be placed in bypass when directed by appropriate procedures. Specific guidance was provided as to the.-
circumstances in which ES may and may not be bypassed.-
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Procedure Al-500, Conduct of Operations, was revised _
(Revision 70) to state that bypassing of Automatic Safety System Actuation is only allowed provided NSS/ANSS concurrence is obtained prior to bypassing, and the placement into bypass is directed by an approved plant procedure where the consequences have_been evaluated and
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approve Training on the new guidance on bypassing any safeguards; <
system was conducted during the first requalification cycle of 1992, using ROT 5-49, Special Trainin The inspector reviewed the Study Book entry, the Revision to AI-500, and ROT 5-49, and found tham to adequately specify and reinforce requirements for bypassing automatic ES:actuations. This item is closed, f. (Closed) Operations Item B4: Balance Shift Staffing Following appropriate evaluations, the operating crew that was--on1 shift during the third reactor trip was restructured. The inspector reviewed the Operations Shift Realignment and found it-to be acceptable. The Shift Supervisor and Assistant Shift Supervisor were placed on different crews, and the licensed operators were reassigned-to take advantage of varied' experience level s .
Procedure Al-500, Conduct of Operations, Revision 73, includes a requirement for the Nuclear Operations Superintendent to ensure shift compositions capable of performing harmoniously as regards.-
overall experience ' levels,: personnel behavioral compatibility and-overall management styles. This item is closed.
- (Closed) Operations Item B5
- Review Shift Manager Concept t
Recommendations for replacing the " Man-On'-Call" with a- Shift Manager were documented in a memorandum from Paul F. McKee to L. Boldt, dated April 20, 1991 (PM92-0021). The Shift Manager is an additional person on shift, and-will- hold (or have held in'the_
past) an active SR0 licens Partial implementation of the_ Shift Manager position.was successfully accomplished in October.1992. Shift Managers were on duty during the day shift and during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00_ shift Monday through Friday. Full staffing is expected following L completion of- the 1993 SR0 license class, pending successful
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results. When fully staffed, there will be five Shift _ Managers working a 12-hour shift rotation. This item is closed.
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h. (Closed) Maintenance Item A1: Review Other 8M Work-A review of work completed during the~Midcycle 8 outage was performed to identify potential maintenance items that'could cause plant transients. This review was completed prior te plant startup, and was documented in an interoffice _ correspondence _from P. Ezell to J. Frijouf, dated May 7,1992. It included a review of the AHF-2A/2B work, work performed by Contractors, M0 VATS work,-
and equipment critical to Plant operations, (i.e. pressure, temperature, and reactivity control). A list of actions to be accomplished prior to Plant Startup was developed,-and the actions complete There were no identified examples of equipment returned to service =
in a degraded condition following the 1992 refueling outage. This item is closed, (Closed) Maintenance Item Bl: Evaluate Methods for Review of PMT When WR Scope Expands A revision to CP-ll3B, Work Request Evaluation, was issued on October 28, 1992, to provide more explicit guidance for the_re-evaluation and post-maintenance test review for changes in work
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scope -from the original evaluation. The inspector reviewed the procedural requirements for work request re-evaluations and'found them adequate. Work request re-evaluations are to ensure that post maintenance testing addresses the maintenance activities as originally evaluated as well as the additional;re-evaluated maintenance activitie Prior to the issuance of CP-ll3B, as an interim corrective action,-
training was provided to the First-Line supervisors and Senior
. Shop Supervisors during the Monthly Maintenance Staff meeting -in April 1992. This item is close (0 pen) Maintenance Item C1: Improve Documentation of Work Performed A licensee review revealed documentation problems in work-packages-and in shop logs. Development of written standards-for work package documentation and shop log-keeping was initiated. This-item remains open pending completion of these written. standards, training of personnel on the new guidance, and NRC review of the completed actions.
, (0 pen) Maintenance Item C2: Monitor _ Quality of Work Package-Completion An audit of work packages.and shop logs will be performed after the_ written standards for this documentation have-been implemented (see paragraph-10.j above). Additionally, Quality Programs' has committed to the inclusion of work packages as a standard part of-
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the audit program where audit results indicate a need for continued independent assessment. This item remains open pending licensee completion of these activities, and NRC revie ' (Closed) Training Item Bl: Remedial Training for Shift on Duty During Trip #3-The crew manning the control room during the reactor t' rip of-December 8,1991, was given remedial classroom and' simulator training under lesson plans ROT 3-20, Mitigating Core Damage, Symptom Oriented Procedure Philosophy; ROT 9-9, Variable Sized LOCAs; ROT 8-24, Instrument Failures; ROT.9-100, a demonstration ,
of the December 8, 1991 reactor trip;.and ROT 5-49,_LER, TAP, SER,.
SOER and Other Operating Experience Training, which constituted a case study of all three reactor trips. The inspector-reviewed _ the lesson plans and training attendance records, and no deficiencies were identified. The lesson plans included appropriate detail and information on event causes and lessons learned. This item is close (Closed) Training Item Cl: Develop Guideline for Bypassing Safety Functions See Operations Item B2, paragraph 7.e abov (Closed) Training Item C2: Train Operators on Guideline
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See Operations Item 82, paragraph 7.e abov (Closed) Training Item El: Restructure Composition of Crew on Duty During Trip #3 See Operations Item B4, paragraph 7 f above, (Closed) Training Item G2: Improve. Training on-SOTA--diagnostic skills To improve S0TA diagnostic skills, the licensee began requiring S0TAs to attend Licensed Operator- classroom and simulator -
requalification trainin SOTA-specific simulator training, concentrating on the improvement of diagnostic skills, has also been completed. In addition, the purchase of an operational "see-through" reactor model in 1993 will provide another tool for training and reinforcement of thermodynamic theory. This item is close (Closed) Training Item G3: Enhance Operational Experience and Teamwork Opportunities for SOTAs The SOTAs were placed on shift effective October 19, 199?. In addition, SOTAs attended an INP0 Team Training course. This item-is close __ -
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11 (0 pen) Training item G4: Ensure Verification Procedures Do Not Ollute OTA Ability to "Get the Big Picture" This item remains open pending issuance and NRC review of VP-580, Plant Safety Verification Procedure, and additional new verification procedures, (0 pan) Training Item G5: Develop Diagnostic Aids for OTAs A revision to VP-580, Plant Safety Verification Procedure, was being prepared. In addition, a temporary recall system was i installed on the simulator to improve diagnostic aids available during training. The temporary recall system will eventually be replaced by a Plant Integrated Computer System (PICS), which, in combination with the safety parameter display system, will provide the desired SOTA diagnostic aids. This item remains ope (Closed) Engineering Item A1: Define Root Cause for RCV-14 Failure Analysis 91-RCV-14-01 addressed the root auses of the depressurization of the RCS on December 8, 1991, one failure of RCV-14 to close, and the false RCV-14 position indication. As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/92-18, the inspector reviewed f ailure Analysis 91-RCV-14-01 and found it to be thorough and comprehensive. This item is closed, (Closed) Engineering item B1: Time Study System Engineering Activities A time study of the daily activities of System Engineers wa completed in October 1992, and covered the period of January through September 1992. The objective was to determine whether the time allocations of the engineers were consistent with the real priorities of the plant. The study included pre-outage, outage, and post-outage periods, and resulted in several recommendations for better implementation of the System Engineering concept. This item is close (0 pen) Engineering Item B2: Take Corrective Action on The Recommendations of the Time Study This item remains open pending completion of the recommendations of the System Engineer-time stud (Closed) Engineering Item B3: Establish Performance Indicators for Vital Functions Revision 4 of the Systems Engineering Manual established performance indicators for tracking vital engineering function Monthly reports have been prepared on thirteen key items, with L reporting of system walkdown tracking to begin in January-199 .
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12 [ (Closed) Engineering Item Cl: Establish Root Cause- Criteria N00 40, Root Cause/ Failure Analysis, in concert with CP-144, Root Cause Analysis, establish consistent methodology and a minimumiset of criteria for root cause analyses. This item is closed, (Closed) Engineering Item C3: Establish Single Point of Accountability AI-255, System Outage Scheduling and Implementation, was issued May 22, 1992, and established single point accountability for troubleshooting and corrective maintenance practices.-The System Manager (usually-the System Engineer) maintains overall project lead and is' responsible and accountable for technical direction, root cause determination, and coordination of activities. The outage implementor'and lead planner are accountable to the System
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Manage (0 pen) Engineering Item C4: Establish Method to Issue Troubleshooting / Correction Action Plans This item remains open pending revision of MP-531, Troubleshooting Plant Equipment, to more effectively control troubleshooting activities, particularly those involving vital equipment-and multiple crews or disciplines.
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' 9. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 21, 1992, with those persons indicated in paragraph Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license Item Number Status Description-and Reference LER 50-302/91-14 Closed Gasket Failures Cause:Feedwater-Booster.' Pump and Main Feedwater Pump-Trip (paragraph 5.a) -
LER 50-302/90-02 Open- Fire Dampers May Not Close Under Ventilation Flow Conditions Due to Failure to Consider Flow Conditions in Original Design Criteria Per NRC IN 89-52 (paragraph 5.b)
LER 50-302/90-03 Open Present Plant Design ~ Leads to Instrument Fluctuation Exceeding Required Range-and Subsequent Technical Specification Violation-l (paragraph 5.c)
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' LER S0-302/90-05- Open- Calculation of RB Flood Level' Shows-Level Exce9ds that'of Safe Shutdown Equipment Due to Design Error Causing Operation Outside-the Design Basis (paragraph-S.d)
1 Acronyms and Abbreviations AI -
Administrative Instruction ante meridiem ANSS - Assistant Nuclear Shift Supervisor CFR - -Code of Federal Regulations CP - Compliance Procedure DRP - Division of Reactor Projects ES - Engineered Safeguards
- FPC - Florida Power Corporation IN - Information~ Notice ISI - Inservice Inspection LER - Licensee Event Report MAR - Modification Approval Record M0 VATS- Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NSS - Nuclear Shift Supervisor OTA - Operating-Technical Advisor post meridiem PMT - Post Maintenance Testing RB - Reactor Building RCA - Radiation Control Area
. RCS - Reactor Coolant System ROT - Replacement Operator' Training RPS - Reactor Protection System SALP - Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance S0TA - Shift Operating Technical Advisor-SP - Surveillance Procedure SR0 -
Senior Reactor Operator SS00 - Senior Reactor Operator Shift Supervisor on Duty
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- SW - Nuclear Services. Closed Cycle Cooling-System TS - Technical Specification UT - Ultrasonic Testing
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WR --Work-Request
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