ML20137Z160

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PNS-I-85-013A:on 850928,insp Team Conducted Review on Licensee Investigative/Followup Actions & Independent Evaluation to Determine Probable Cause of Damaged Spent Fuel Handling Equipment.No Evidence of Attempted Sabotage
ML20137Z160
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 10/03/1985
From: Keimig R, Lester Tripp
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
References
PNS-I-85-013A, PNS-I-85-13A, NUDOCS 8510080183
Download: ML20137Z160 (2)


Text

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OCS No: 50293850927 Date: October 3, 1985 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF SAFEGUARDS EVENT --PNS-I-85-13A 1

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE national security or public interest significance. The information is as f initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region I staff on this date.

Facility: Boston Edison Company Licensee Emergency Classification:

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Notification of Unusual Event Plymouth, Massachusetts Alert ON 50-293 Site Area Emergency General Emergency X Not Applicable

Subject:

DISCOVERY OF DAMAGED SPENT FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT (UPDATE)

Subsequent to the discovery on September 27, 1985, of the bent refuel bridge main mast attached to a spent fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool, a three man NRC inspection team was dispatched to the site on September 28 to review licen~ee s investigative / followup actions as well as conduct an independent evaluation as to the possible cause(s) of this event. Region I management at the Division Director level held daily conference calls with the on-site team and licensee management thru October 3 to discuss followup activities, l

Per agreement with Region I management, while their investigation was on going, the licensee did additional testing and walkdowns of important safety systems and electrical equipment. In addition, they implemented additional security measures such as a two man rule for access to the reactor building and other

, areas with critical safety equipment as well as withholding of contractor access to process buildings. The FBI was inforned of this event, but did not inves-tigate as they concluded that no federal statute was involved.

The licensee's investigation effectively ended on October 2. (Massachusetts state police assistance has been requested to administer polygraph tests).

Both the licensee and Region I have concluded that: (1) there was no evidence l of attempted sabotage or other damage, (2) this event had minimal safety signi-ficance in that there was no radioactive release nor evidence of damage to the i

spent fuel, and (3) circumstantial evidence indicates that the most probable cause was operator error.

CONTACT: L. Tripp R. Keimig 488-1227 488-1255 DISTRIBUTION:

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RI Resident Office Licensee:

8510000183 851003 (Reactor Licensees)

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. 4 DCS No: 50293850927 Date: October 3, 1985 2

After consultation with Region I the additional security measures were lifted today. The NRC team has returned to Region I. There are no additional onsite actions planned beyond normal routine Resident Inspection followup. The licensee will be describing his corrective actions taken and commitments made to upgrade equipment and procedures in a future submittal to the regional office.

Media interest has occurred; there have been several newspaper articles in the Boston area.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has been informed.

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