ML20107H937

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Final Deficiency Rept,Item 145 Re Tubing Configuration & Connection Hook Up Discrepancy.Initially Reported on 850115. Solenoid Valves on Nitrogen Inerting/Purge Makeup Sys Reinstalled.Operation Will Be Verified
ML20107H937
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/14/1985
From: Jens W
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
145, EF2-70387, NUDOCS 8502270326
Download: ML20107H937 (3)


Text

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Coyne H.Jens h Al hb '

- Vice President Nuclest Operstions Fermb2 i 6400 North Dxie Hghway le n Newpn, Mdqu 481M February 14, 1985 iI pia s8541so EF2-70387 Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator Region III

< U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i 799. Roosevelt Road l Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 l I i

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Reference:

Fermi 2 .

NRC Docket No. 50-341

Subject:

Final Report of 10CFR50.55 (e) Item 145 " Tubing Configuration and Connection Hook-Up Discrepancy".

On January 15, 1985, Detroit Edison's Mr. L. P. Bregni, Engineer - Licensing telephoned Mr. E. Greenman of NRC Region III to report the incorrect installation of 16 solenoid valves used to actuate air operated containment isolation valves for the Nitrogen-Inert ' Purge / Makeup Systems. .This deficiency is reportable u 3r 10CFR50.55 (e) and is being tracked as Item 145.

Description of Deficiency Sixteen ASCO solenoid valves were installed improperly when the valves that had been installed previously were replaced with valves having a different porting arrangement. These solenoid valves are used to actuate air operated primary containment isolation valves for the Nitrogen Inerting/

Purge / Makeup Systems. These solenoid valves, as they were installed, could have prevented the closure of the associated containment isolation valve when-an isolation signal is generated and would prevent the remote manual operation of the isolation valves while an isolation signal is present.

The incorrect installation of these solenoid valves was discovered when the design engineer examined the solenoid val"es after the work was completed. The improper installa-tion had not been discovered during quality control 0502270326 850214 PDR ADOCK 05000341 S PDR FEB 19 285 1 10

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'! ~ o-Mr. James G. Keppler EF2-70387 February 14, 1985 Page 2 inspections or by the post-installation checkout.

However, this discrepancy would have been detected during preoperational testing when the response of the isolation valves to an isolation signal was to be verified.

Cause: This discrepancy occurred when the ASCO-8321 solenoid valves were being replaced with ASCO-8320 solenoid valves which have different porting arrangements and markings. The ASCO-8321 solenoid valves had been installed under earlier revisions of the same Design Change Request (DCR I-2291) and Field Modification Request (FMR-6989) used to install the ASCO-8320 valves. The personnel doing the installation and the QC inspectors overlooked the fact that replacing the valve without reconfiguring the tubing would not connect the air supply and the discharge line as required by the design documents.

L Analysis of Safety Implications The Nitrogen Inerting/ Purge / Makeup system primary con-tainment isolation valves are normally closed during plant operation. However, if these valves were open for purging or inerting they would not close on a containment isolation signal if the solenoid valves in the air supply line were installed improperly.

Corrective Action

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The solenoid valves are being.re-installed. Following the re-installation, proper operation of the solenoid valves will be verified by checking the response of the associated isolation valves to an . isolation signal and remote manual operation.

Detroit Edison's actions to prevent the recurrence will be described in Detroit Edison's response to Inspection Report

'50-341/84-65.

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Mr. James G. Keppler EF2-70387 February 14, 1985 Page 3 - ,

This is Detroit Edison's final report on.this item. If you have questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Lewis Bregni, (313) 586-5083.

Sincerely, l

f cc: P. M. Byron R. C. DeYoung h

R. C. Knop .

USNRC, Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 1-e

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