ML20082G285
| ML20082G285 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1991 |
| From: | Fleming J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20081J504 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9108160287 | |
| Download: ML20082G285 (10) | |
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June 26, 1991 W n m i n is,
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gf5 h%Q Samuel Chilk j- l 7 l'I H
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Secretary -
USNRC Washington,D.C.20555 ,, g rLM D
Dear Secretary Chilk,
k Through your of fice I am petitioning the Commission to consider and make a determination regarding Emergency Preparedness for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
I have enclosed the reasons that it is important for the Commission to make a determination, together with pertinent documen+.ation that su1 ports my views. Testimony that given at the public hearing ;n Plymouth on June 12, 1991, attached to the Task Force's firal " report", also supports my views.
The initial fact finding work the Task Force did was excellent; but it failed properly to assess the significance of issues, and this coupled with the lack of a final recommendation to the Commission has left the major question officially unanswered. Is there Reasonable Assurance?
In the past week I have sent additional information to the-Commission as well as the Inspector General's office.
.This information casts a cloud over the work that the Task Force accepted, and also over FEMA's recent finding of adequacy and integrity.
The I.G's office is currently reviewing the concerns, situation and reports, but has not yet mede a determination.
Therefore, there is no ongoing investigation to hinder the Commission's decision making process.
I am aware of the time crunch facing the current Commission. Although I would prefer to have Chairman Carr be
, involved in this determination, I am aware that a determination could be made after his term expires.
I have arranged the major issues in six categories:
I. Task Force acceptance of the " Quick Fix.
- 11. The " GIFT" III.The Task Force exceeding its Charter 9108160287 910808 PDR ADOCK 05000293 ,
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,o IV. Legal Precedents V. The 1988 Commission Decision VI. Violations of Federal Regulations and Guidelines.
I trust that something here might convince each Commissioner that a determination must be made, and that the clock must be set. In my opening statements at the June ,
12, 1991 Public Meeting I addressed the new attitudes we have here in Massachusetts. Although there are still some obvious flaws in our new players, I do believe we can now, finally, achieve planning that will provide " reasonable assurance."
The Task Force, even with its shortcomings, has identified the vast majority of issues. With this as a framework, combined with the State's new attitude, I believe planning can be achieved. But the utility, BCCO, must have the o
incentive to do the job correctly. The Commission has the power to achieve that.
Thus, I request that the Commission consider planning at Pilgrim and make a determination regarding a findi.ng of
" reasonable assurance" Sincerely, Jane A. Fleming cc: Chairman Carr Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Curtiss Commissioner Remick David Williams I.G.
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy Sen. John Kerry -
Rep. Gerry Studds Rep. Peter Kostmayer Gov. William Weld Att'y. Gen. Scott Harshbarger k
,I 6
Request'for a Commission Decision l Recarding Emeroency EJanning at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station The recent events surrounding Emergency Planning for i
. Pilgrim unfortunately clouded the end results of the task '
force. FEMA's finding of-adequacy did not resolve the situation; rather it resulted in doubting not only the ,
adequacy of _ planning, but also the integrity of TEMA as an agency. Fortunately, for those of us who truly want As the Courts planning, FEMA is not the ultimate authority.
have found, "the responsibility for making the final ,
j determination on the adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness plans rests with the NRC." Ohio ex rel.
Celebreeze v. NRC, 868 F.2d 816.
Accordingly, I am requesting that the NRC Commission consider and make the final determination regarding Emergency Planning for the Pilgrim EPZ. The need for the Commissionall to make this final determination can be seen on many levels, of which lead to tt.e same conclusions - If we are, on any it will only honest basis, to have " reasonable assurance",
be because the Commission made the determination based not only on the facts presented by the task force, butpresenting also the other pertinent facts I have recently, or am now, to the Commission for its consideration.
The Task Force performed the fact finding phase of its However, it falls short of charter in a excellent manner.
its assigned charter in assessing the significance of these facts and did not make a' final recommendation to the Commission. Indeed, it is my understanding that the task force didn't even attempt to assess the substantive issues raised at the f-inal public meeting, but in presenting its final recommendation to the Commission, merely attached the testimony and evidence presented at the public meeting as an attachment to its already printed preliminary findings.
As part of its' fact-finding function, the Task Force clearly identified the fundamental flaws that existed in 1988, and equally clearly identified fundamental flaws that exist today. In both cases, these fundamental flaws did and do preclude " reasonable assurance". Consistent the '88 flaws were with FEMA's 1987 withdrawl of " reasonable-assurance", However, the Task clearly identified and assessed as such.
Force's assessment of the current flaws are often ambiguous; and in some cases the Task Force blatantly accepted resolutions which do not comport withCollectively, neither 10CFR 50.47 nor these the Federal Guidelines NUREG 0654.
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7 the final policy decision based on the factual background, and in doing so it must be aware that the Task Force's
-" policy making" displayed significent shortcomings.
The Task Force identified many fundamental flaws and lesser flaws. Many of the fundamental flaws identified in 1991 are essentially the same as those that precluded a finding of " reasonable assurance" in 1987. The NRC's present policy states that a fundamental flaw can be ascertained from a review of a plan itself, and should be corrected when found. The Task Force seems to have ignored this policy, and instead decided that whether the " fundamental flaw" really existed should be determined in the planned December 1991 exercised. This comports with the FEMA philosophy that deficiencies are identified solely through an exercise; but it also plainly illustrates why the applicable federal regulations require that in making the fi.ml decision of
" reasonable assurance" the NRC exercise ics own judgment and not be bound by FEMA's findings.
In addition, and as pointed out above, the factual basis on which the Task Force made its " policy" decision, was incomplete; it did not even attempt to address the substantive factual issues identified at the June 12, 1991 Public Meeting. By nerely attaching these to the preliminary finding, the Task Force disbanded without completing its assignment, and left it to the Commission to address and ,
assess the import of the additional facts that the Task Force couldn't take the time to consider.
If the Commission does not assess these issues and arrive at a clear determination, it will have failed the people of the Pilgrim EPZ once again. For the Commission to make no decision now would be as inappropriate as was its wrong decision three years ago. -
Although the same' issues continue to plague planning time and time again, it now appears that FEMA, the State, and the utility will find acceptable solutions if they are given the necessary strong incentive to do so. That incentive is
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Yl_, Maior violations nf federal Rectulittiqt13 ADIl GuidelineJ
- 1. 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(1); (b)(8)
Nureg 0654(j)(12);(A)(4)
General Population -Wellesley
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Request for a Commission DecisionPlannina at Pilarim }{ucleqr Ep; ;f Recardina Emergency The recent events surrounding Emergency Planning for Pilgrim unfortunately c)ouded the end results of the task force. FEMA's fir. ding of adequacy did not resolve the situation; rather it resulted in doubting not only the ,
adequacy of planning, but also the integrity of FEMA as an agency. Fortunately, for those of us who truly want planning, FEMA is not the ultimate authority. As the Courts have found, "the responsibility for making the final determination on the adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness plans rests with the NRC." Ohio ex rel.
Celebreeze v. NRC, 868 F.2d 816.
-Accordingly, I am requesting that the NRC Commission consider and make the final determination regarding Emergency Planning for the Pilgrim EPZ. The need for the Commissionall to i
make this final determination can be seen on many levels, on any of which lead to the same conclusions - If we are, it will only honest basis, to have " reasonable assurance",
be because the Commission made the determination based but also not the only on the facts presented by the task force, other pertinent facts I have recently, or am now, presenting to the Commission for its consideration.
its
.-The Task Force performedHowever, the fact it finding phase of falls short of charter in a excellent manner.
its assigned charter in assessing the significance of these facts and did not make a final recommendation to the Commission. Indeed, it is my undersranding that the task force didn't even attempt to assess the substantive issues raised at the final public meeting,-but in presenting its final recommendation to the Commission, merely attached the testimony and evidence presented at the public meeting as an attachment to its already printed preliminary findings.
As part of its fact-finding function, the Task Force clearly identified the fundamental flaws that existed in 1988, and' equally clearly identified fundamental flaws that exist today. In both cases, these fundamental flaws did and do preclude " reasonable assurance". Consistent'88 with FEMA's flaws were 1987 withdrawl of "reusonable assurance", theHowever, the Task '
clearly identified and assessed as such.
Force's assessment of the current flaws are often ambiguous; and in some cases the Task Force blatantly accepted
' resolutions which do not comport withCollectively, neither 10CFR 50.47 nor these the Federal Guidelines NUREG 0654.
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current flaws extend across a myriad of issues, as indicated by the testimony given at the Public Hearing Juno 12, 1991.
I shall not attempt to restste all the problems again, I 1
will focus on a few insucc, which clearly indicate thoro is a nood for the Con: mission to make its own determination. I oncourago the Commission to becomo familiar with all the testimony presented June 12,1991. The issues that 1 '
prusonted to the NRC on September 6, 1991, and to the Task Force on January 31 and June 12, 1991 are all violations of 1 10 CFR 50.47.and NUREG 0654; however, my opinion is also that '
all can be renolved in a workable aannor --IF YOU GIVE US AN OPPORTUNITY TO FINALLY PUT PLANNING IN PLACE. Mako the propor dctormination and, Sot the Clock.
What are the issues that the Commission should now i considor? There are six.
L Tank Eqrre Accentanco nf ,the " Quit); Eix" The " Quick Pix" is discussed in some detail in tho testimony that I have already presented to the Commission (Sco Attachment A). The Task Force's neceptanco of the
" Quick Pix" has resulted in more questions than resolutions.
- The resulting inadequacy of staffing, and the plain conflict of interest, are clear and were rai sed in my previous testimony to the Commission. (sot att A) The advance knowledge the utility appeared to have, the pressure applied
- by Region I staff members, the acceptanco of the " Quick Fix",
the " gift" surrounding it, and the appearance of a delay in tbo completion of their work to accommodate the " Quick rix",
all tainted the initial honest effort the Task Force performed. All of this is evidenced by Attachment, a collection of documents referenced in the Task Force report.
11 The "GIPT" The questionablo S50,000 " gift" from DECO to MCDA - ?,sfa after the Task Force ro' ported to Region I that the Mass.
National Guard could not staff the Wellesley Rocoption Centor in a timely manner, and concurront with DECO's creation of the the " quick fix", casts suspicion on the utility's motivation for giving, and MCDA's for accpoting the " gift".
' My subsequent conversations with the key players have confirmed rather than relieved my suspicion. The utility presented a similar " gift" of $15,000 to Bridgewater College, o
under circumstances that appear to be closely connected to a strategic "fix" there as well. All of this is admittedly
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l the final policy decision bauod on the factual background, and in doing so it must be aware that the Task Forco's
" policy making" displayed significont shortcomings.
The Task Torce identiflod many fundamontal flaws and lorsor flaws. Many of the fundamental flaws identified in .
1991 nro ossentially the samo as those that precluded a finding of " reasonable assurance" in 1997. The NRC's present policy statos that a fundamental flaw can be ascertained from a review of a plan itself, and should be corrected when found. The-Task Force seems to have ignored this policy, at d inutoad decided that whether the " fundamental flaw" really existed should be determined in the planned December 1991 exercised. This comports with the FEMA philosophy that deficiencies aro identified solely through an exercico; but it also plainly illustrates why the applicable federal regulations require that in making the final decision of
" reasonable assurance" the NRC exercise its own judgment and not be bound by FEMA's findings.
In addition, and as pointed out above, the factual basis on which the Task Force made its " policy" decision, was incompleto; it did not even attempt to address the substantive factual issues identified at the June 12, 1991 public Mooting. By moroly attaching those to the preliminary finding, the Task Forco disbanded without completing its assignment, and left it to the Commission to address and .
assess the import of the additional facts that the Task Force couldn't take the time to considor.
If the Commission does not assoas those issues and arrivo at a clear determination, it will have failed the people of the pilgrim EPZ once again, for the Commission to mako no decision now would be as inappropriato as wau its wrong decision three years ago.
Although the same' issues continue to plague planning t' s and timo again, it now appears that FEMA, the Stato, and the utility will find acceptable solutions if they are given the necessary strong incentive to do so. That incontivo is
YL. linigr V.i01at1Qna si fciteral Hagulatimig and Guide _1impn
- 1. 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(1); (b)(8)
Nurog 0654(j)(12);(A)(4)
General Population -Wellesley
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This is the goal I am looking for - an opportunity to ' '
I truly FIX the problems in planning. As a political aside, if
- the NRC were to demonstrate its authority over FEMA for the )
sake of Public Health and Safety, that action would certainly assist the NRC to solidify its position as the ultimate authority, contrary to the direction being taken in the bill ;
now being presented to the House of Representatives by Rep.
Studds.
1 L The 1988 Commi__sS.i.QD Decision In Oct.and Dec. of 1988 the NRC staff _ presented the Commission with unbalanced and inaccurate information. )
Based on their review, the staff advised the commission that, 1
in 1988, there was reasonable assurance that adequate _,
protective measures could and would be taken in the event of an accident at Pilgrim. The current Task Force review has-conclusively determined that this was not true -in 1988 there ;
were fundamental flaws in planning that would have precluded a finding of reasonable assurances. _ Some of_the fundamental flaws werot No reception center for people evacuating to the North, Untimely arrival of transportation officers precluded a timely evacuatior, of all transportation dependent, t Ir. adequate-identification of, and plans to meet the needs of, the handicapped, No adequate plans for school children, inadequate '
transportation and no host schools.
i The undisputed fact that the Commission.made an incorrect decision in 1988 emphasizes two clear facts now -
- 1. The Commission.cannot afford to do nothing, it must make a decision.rather than permitting the future to continue by default, and 2.
' -The decision made-now must be based on accurate facts, both those found by the Task Force and thoso
- presented during the review of the Task Force's
" interim" findings.
The Commission, not the Task Force, is charged with making
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l' The "the gravity of the outstanding deficiencies", i.e., the inability to provide monitoring within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (NUREG 0654 j 12), in obvious; as are "the limitations of interim compennating measures," i.e., inadequate staffing and a clear conflict of interest. (See Attachment A.) Indeed, the Commission has already recognized the obvious limitationo that are inherently present within the utility's " Quick Fix" (Memorandum to James M. Taylor EDO, from Samuel J Chilk,
Subject:
CECY-91-022, da ted 6 sjo-91 ; see Attachment 2, pages 3 and 4 to the SECY Ictter).
E Leiln1 l'rRGndnnt FE!4A's recent finding of adequacy does not relieve the Commission of its responsibility to review and make a determination concerning Pilgrim's Emergency preparedness.
According to the Jan.16, 1991 Inspector General's Audit:
"The Commission has acknowledged that Shere nnfntcnnent RC.t1DD 19 91Ulcr GDRE111tratiOL FEMA 's Views aro accorded " great weight," but that the Commission's consideration under the regulation is necessarily broader than FEMA's.In the Matter of Consolidnted Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Indian point, Unit 2) CLI-83-11, 17 i4RC 731,733 (1983)"
In CQEMRnwenlth Qf liDIERChMDfits L HRC, 878 F.2d 1516 (1st Cir. 1989) the court noted that section 50.54(s)(3) required the NRC to review FEMA findings, but not to give them conclusive weight.
Likewise, in Qhin .tx rpL _CplchrnnIn L HRL EB F.2d 816, the Court said:
"the responsibility for making final determination on the adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness plans rests with the NkC."
In discussing the NRC's proper role, the I.G. Audit goes on to say:
"In general, the regulatory process is designed to allow for FEMA-NRC cooperation. NRC will inform the licensees of their opportunity to make an alternative showing of non-significance. This will usually lead to increased FEMA-licensee cooperation with attention directed towards improving the significant deficiencies found by PEMA."
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p circumstantial, based on information I obtained i Document the Commission roomtofrom determine Task Force what documents s".
could I n the Public leave b it "PT' to implied intent of the " gift" und whethe e perceived as the
' acceptance of the " Quick Fix" by MCDA. r it offected the III.
Inrd; forno pKnnnding Chnttgr ,
is whether the Task Force exceeded itsWhat is, definitelyI w t jurisdiction directed it to assoas the significance ofcharter - which I tried-to resolve thene problems by accepti problems when it
" Quick Fix" and " interim compensatin ng the utility's desire to avoid the clock than in presentiappeared ty's mor l Commission a. clear picture of the facts i ng to the t had found. ['
Although the-Commission did ask that the Task Force, "in formulating its recommendation, ... duly State entities to compensate for EP a nesses and we kconsid I
while working tnwards permanent solutions" the local"interin or Statemeasures" entities. and " Quick Fix" w r
i State's then on going work towards being developed by the State.)
usurped the a perconceive I manent solution. .
6 BEco's action in developing an " interim well have been appropriate nLtgr the 120action" day clmight itolled nterim(See com Section 50.54(s ock has I' promptly"),pensating but not before.actions)(have been or will be taken2)(ii) "o '
-attempt to avoid the clock being set jumped ahIt appears that BEco in an action as though premature the clock had been set.
and usurped ead and took was and is working on.an ac'ceptable permanent solution NCDA Their actions were The actions, carefully taken before ;
the Commission invoked section 50.54(s)
, also usurped the:
outstanding deficiencies" Commission's ravity duty.to of determine w other factors, limitations of interim co,mpensatory ures, and the meastheir persis arace periods, taken-together, shutdown." (IG Audit, Apperd.x pg 19]
I,and the impo', tion instea i
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- 2. 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(8); (b)(10); (b)(1)
HUREG 0654 (J)(10)g;-(A)(3); (A)(4)
Transportation Officers ,
Inadequate Numbers of Buses (Strawman v. Strawman Comparisons)
New LOA Format Obviously, I have focused on only two issues. But, as I have learned from NRC personnel over many years, planning in its most basic context reduces to these two points -
"Get them out"-
and
" Monitor them " .
Her even these most basic critoria has not been met, please, make a determination, and invoke 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2). _Give the utility, State and FEMA the initiative to do their job and do it right. As I have already stated, there is a solution to the fundamental flaws; but that solution will not be found if the responsible parties continue to go to great lengths to avoid'doing~what is right, rather than simply doing their job. You alone have the power to make thn solutions happen.
. As always I appreciate your time and consideration. I am always available for further clarification of any issue, if you need it.
Sincerely, Jane A. Fleming I
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. . . . . . ND, Sill {I (OMNilfilI ON AGING g 3 71l 4 .g July 3, 1991
Dear Mr. Rathbun:
I am writing on behalf of my constituent, Jane Fleming of Duxbury whoac cortespondence in attached.
Mrs. Pleming would-like clarification of the HRC's position on the current status of emergency planning for the Pilgrim Nuclear power Station, a n r* whether the Commission feels that the public haa reasonable annurance that their nafety in accured in the event of an accident at the plant.
I will appreciate your attention to Mrn. Fleming's concern and your reply to my South Shore office: 2 Columbia Road, Pembroke, MA 02359, att'n: Mary Lou Dutler.
Sin:erel',
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G4 r y P i ha Mr. Dennis K. Rathbun j !
Director, Congreat,ional Affairn I I Office-of Government and Public Affairs Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20$55 Enclosure l
THlf, ST AT40NERY PPtN1tD ON PAPtM h4ADt OF Mt(:vCitD f!(tEMS
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