Similar Documents at Fermi |
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Category:DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21)
MONTHYEARNRC-97-0141, Deficiency Rept Re Malfunction of EDG Number 11 Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) Printed Circuit Board Rev B,Due to Failure of Operational Amplifier U8 Chip.Avr Board Rev B Was Sent Offsite to Independent Engineering Facility1997-12-23023 December 1997 Deficiency Rept Re Malfunction of EDG Number 11 Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) Printed Circuit Board Rev B,Due to Failure of Operational Amplifier U8 Chip.Avr Board Rev B Was Sent Offsite to Independent Engineering Facility ML20211M6491997-10-0808 October 1997 Addenda 1 to Part 21 Rept Re Weldments on Opposed Piston & Coltec-Pielstick Emergency stand-by Diesel gen-set lube-oil & Jacket Water Piping Sys.Revised List of Potentially Affected Utils to Include Asterisked Utils,Submitted ML20211H7911997-09-30030 September 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Weldment Associated w/lube-oil Piping Sys on 970804 at Millstone,Unit 2.Root Cause Is Not Yet Known.Quality of Weldment Is Being Considered.Listed Util Sites Affected NRC-97-0005, Part 21 Rept Re 961113,EDG 11 Failed Surveillance Test 24.307.01 for LOP Coincident W/Loca.Avr Board Rev B Was Sent Offsite to an Independent Engineering Test Facility. CA Include More Analysis & Testing of AVR Board1997-02-0606 February 1997 Part 21 Rept Re 961113,EDG 11 Failed Surveillance Test 24.307.01 for LOP Coincident W/Loca.Avr Board Rev B Was Sent Offsite to an Independent Engineering Test Facility. CA Include More Analysis & Testing of AVR Board NRC-94-0072, Part 21 Rept Re Improper Installation of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Matl Furnished & Delivered by Thermal Science,Inc. Eight of Ten Thermo-Lag Fire Barriers Installed by Pr Sussman Co Being Replaced1994-08-15015 August 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Improper Installation of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Matl Furnished & Delivered by Thermal Science,Inc. Eight of Ten Thermo-Lag Fire Barriers Installed by Pr Sussman Co Being Replaced ML20070H1471994-07-15015 July 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Problems W/Thermolag Fire Barriers.Initially Reported on 940715.Replaced Thermolag Fire Barriers ML20059H7721994-01-17017 January 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Virginia Power Notifying Fairbands Morse Via Failure Analysis Rept NESML-Q-058 of Defective Air Start Distributor cam,16104412 ML20059F2631994-01-0707 January 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Air Start Distributor Cam Mfg by Fairbanks Morse.Mfg Suggests That Site Referenced in Encl App I Inspect Air Start Distributor Cam as Soon as Practical ML20058G5981993-11-17017 November 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Westronics Recorders,Model 2100C.Signal Input Transition Printed Circuit Board Assembly Redesigned to Improve Recorder Immunity to Electromagnetic Interference.List of Affected Recorders & Locations Encl ML20057G1511993-10-0707 October 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Westronics Model 2100C Series Recorders. Informs That Over Several Tests,Observed That Recorder Would Reset During Peak Acceleration & Door Being Forced Off Recorder.Small Retaining Clips Added to Bottom of Door ML20102B2071992-06-24024 June 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Cracking of Stellite 21 Hardfacing on Guide Nose of Poppets Supplied as Part of MSIV Leakage Improvement Mod.Initially Reported by Clei on 920522. Recommends That Liquid Penetrant Exam Be Performed ML20090L8801992-03-18018 March 1992 Part 21 Re Cracked Piston Castings Received from Acme Foundry,Fairbanks Morse & General Casting.Magnetic Particle Insp of All Pistons Will Be Performed.List of Affected Plants Encl ML20059M1751990-09-24024 September 1990 Supplemental Part 21 Rept 1 Re Defect in Coltec Industries, Inc Connecting Rod Assemblies Nuts/Bolts on Model 38TD8-1/8 Emergency Generators.Initially Reported on 851120.Nuts/bolts for Assemblies at Stated Plants Inspected & Replaced ML20011F1941990-02-22022 February 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Abb 27/59 Relay Catalog Series 211L.Solder Connections to Printed Wiring Runs on Bottom of Circuit Board Deteriorated Due to Thermal Stress.No Actual Failure Occurred & Relays to Be Changed at Next Outage ML20011F5971990-02-22022 February 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Solder Connections in Abb 27/59 Relays Deteriorated Due to Thermal Stress,Causing Bonding of Printed Wiring Pattern to Glass Epoxy Circuit Board.Interim Circuit Board W/Larger Pads & Higher Wattage Will Be Used NRC-89-0267, Deficiency Rept Re Item 143 on as-built Deviations.Qa Audit Conducted on Category C Deviations in Sept 1989.Remaining Category C Deviations Resolved During Refueling Outage1989-11-30030 November 1989 Deficiency Rept Re Item 143 on as-built Deviations.Qa Audit Conducted on Category C Deviations in Sept 1989.Remaining Category C Deviations Resolved During Refueling Outage ML20196B8481988-01-29029 January 1988 Part 21 Deficiency Rept Re HPCI Suction Pipe Overpressure Transient.Initially Reported on 880129.Caused by Installation of Lift/Plug Check Valve.Potential Water Hammer Condition Corrected by Replacing Valve NRC-87-0259, Part 21 Rept Re Unqualified Kalrez Soft Seats Used in Feedwater Check Valves Supplied by Atwood & Morrill Co. Initially Reported on 871203.Soft Seats for Valves Replaced W/Soft Seats Using Parker Compound E692-751987-12-0808 December 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Unqualified Kalrez Soft Seats Used in Feedwater Check Valves Supplied by Atwood & Morrill Co. Initially Reported on 871203.Soft Seats for Valves Replaced W/Soft Seats Using Parker Compound E692-75 NRC-87-0105, Part 21 Rept Re Failures of Hydrogen/Oxygen Sampling Sys Supplied by Exo Sensor,Inc.Initially Reported on 870630. Sensors to Be Replaced at 6-month Intervals & Tested Every 30 Days to Ensure Operability1987-07-0606 July 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Failures of Hydrogen/Oxygen Sampling Sys Supplied by Exo Sensor,Inc.Initially Reported on 870630. Sensors to Be Replaced at 6-month Intervals & Tested Every 30 Days to Ensure Operability ML20215G2441987-06-16016 June 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Load Sequencing Equipment Supplied in Aug 1977 During Scheduled Testing.Caused by Open Electrical Connection on One Crimp Lug.Since 1978,insulated Lugs Used on All Equipment ML20211P7211987-02-23023 February 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Rockbestos Coaxial Cable Used in Sorrento Electronics Digital & Analog high-range Radiation Monitor. Insulation Resistance at High Temp Not High Enough for Ion Chamber & Associated Electronics to Operate Properly ML20206S0841986-06-30030 June 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Cut Wires in Wire Harness of Bbc Brown Boveri K600/K800 Circuit Breakers.Initially Reported on 860509.Safety Implications Listed.Gear Guard Designed to Prevent Cut Wires ML20211D8351986-06-0606 June 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Four External Closing Springs on MSIVs Supplied to Plant Due to Quench Cracks Developed During Mfg Process.Encl List Details Utils,Plants & Quantity & Size of Valves Supplied ML20195E4881986-05-23023 May 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Failure of Ite/Gould Disconnect Switch,Type 7860 Ds Series.Instructions for Verification of Proper Operation of Switches Included in Notification to Plants.New Switches Available by 860901 ML20141A2501986-02-25025 February 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Two Broken Carrier Assemblies from NEMA Size 5 Contactor A103G12,preventing Proper Closing of Contactor. Breakage Believed Due to Dropping Device in Shipping Carton. Packaging Modified as of 860205 ML20151X3641986-01-30030 January 1986 Revised Page 3-4 to Attachment 3 to Deficiency Rept Re Traversing in-core Probe Nitrogen Purge Line Isolation & RWCU Sys Mods.Detailed Review of Potentially Overloaded Embedments Continuing & Will Be Completed Prior to Restart ML20138P0281985-12-13013 December 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Defect Identified in Two Oxygen Sensors. Added Thickness of Matl Will Eventually Cause Failure in Diffusion Membrane of Sensors.Sensors in Field Replaced ML20137S4441985-11-26026 November 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Unparallel Fitup of Nut to Mating Surface of Connecting Rod Cap & Nonperpendicular Faces of Nuts to Thread Pitch Line.Nuts & Bolts in Assembled Calvert Cliffs Onsite Spare Engine Will Be Replaced ML20198C8601985-10-23023 October 1985 Amended Final Deficiency Rept,Item 116 Re Potential Design Defect Which Allowed Freezing of Buried Piping Sys.Initially Reported on 840131.Constant Flow of 0.1 Gpm Through Affected Fire Protection Lines Will Be Maintained ML20210G9921985-08-13013 August 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Isolated Worm Shaft Gear When Certain Critical Speeds Combined W/Repetitive Transfer of Actuator Clutch Mechanism from Manual (Handwheel) to Motor Drive Mode.Two Possible Solutions Noted ML20099M1751985-03-0606 March 1985 Revised Final Deficiency Rept,Item 101 Re Debris in Piping Sys.Initially Reported on 850114.Items Removed & Safety Analysis Performed ML20108D5681985-03-0606 March 1985 Suppl to Final Deficiency Rept,Item 146,re Failure of Emergency Diesel Generators 11 & 12.Actions Taken to Minimize Stress & Deterioration of Bearings.Operating Procedures Modified & Quarterly Oil Filter Checks Planned ML20107K4701985-02-16016 February 1985 Final Deficiency Rept,Item 143 Re Deviations in Instrument Racks from Applicable Instrumentation & Controls Design Drawings.Initially Reported on 841219.Checklists Will Be Used During Verification of Drawing Rev Process ML20107H9371985-02-14014 February 1985 Final Deficiency Rept,Item 145 Re Tubing Configuration & Connection Hook Up Discrepancy.Initially Reported on 850115. Solenoid Valves on Nitrogen Inerting/Purge Makeup Sys Reinstalled.Operation Will Be Verified ML20107F1181985-02-12012 February 1985 Final Deficiency Rept,Item 146 Re Failure of Colt Industries Emergency Diesel Generators 11 & 12.Initially Reported on 850118.Procedures Revised to Require 2-minute Prelubrication Prior to Generator Starts ML20106B5021985-02-0101 February 1985 Final Deficiency Rept,Item 142 Re Failure of Two Target Rock Solenoid Valves.Initially Reported on 841213.Engineering Design Package & Field Mod Request Issued to Change Field Wiring ML20101U0751985-01-18018 January 1985 Interim Deficiency Rept,Item 143 Re Deviations Between Design Documents & as-built Plant.Initially Reported on 841218.Evaluation of as-built Drawings to Define Scope of Problem Performed ML20101U0591985-01-15015 January 1985 Amended Deficiency Rept,Item 111 Re Design Defect on RHR Reservoir Freeze Over.Temporary Auxiliary Boiler Will Be Used to Add Heat to RHR Svc Water Reservoirs,Instead of Operating Emergency Diesel Generators ML20114D2251985-01-11011 January 1985 Interim Deficiency Rept,Item 142 Re Failure of Two Target Rock Solenoid Valves.Initially Reported on 841213. Investigation of Cause,Scope & Necessary Corrective Action for Problem Continuing ML20101P2771984-12-18018 December 1984 Final Deficiency Rept,Item 141 Re Deviations from Specified Clearance Between Cable Trays & Vertical Support Members. Initially Reported on 841107.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e) ML20101M9621984-12-13013 December 1984 Amend to Final Deficiency Rept,Item 114 Re Possible Overpressurization of North RHR Hx.Initially Reported on 840124.Investigation & Analysis Determined HX Acceptable for Intended Function ML20101M9521984-12-12012 December 1984 Final Deficiency Rept,Item 139 Re Deficient Shop Weld in Fluid Head Structure.Initially Reported on 841015.Review of Stress Calculations Revealed Max Stress on Welds Does Not Exceed Allowable.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e) ML20100N8841984-11-30030 November 1984 Supplemental Final Deficiency Rept,Item 111 Re Design Deficiency on RHR Reservoir Freeze Over.Methods for Adding Heat to RHR Reservoir Clarified ML20100N8651984-11-30030 November 1984 Amended Final Deficiency Rept,Item 116 Re Potential Design Deficiency Allowing Freezing of Buried Piping Sys.Walls Will Be Installed & Temp Monitored.Pipes Will Not Be Rerouted ML20100L2041984-11-30030 November 1984 Interim Deficiency Rept,Item 141 Re Deviations from Specified Clearance Between Cable Trays & Vertical Support Members.Initially Reported on 841107.As-built Tray/Hanger Clearance for Hangers & Cable Trays Acceptable ML20100K7301984-11-27027 November 1984 Final Deficiency Rept,Item 129 Re Lack of Design Calculations for HVAC Duct Supports.Initially Reported on 840614.Supports & Base Plates Modified & Installation Discrepancies Documented on Nonconformance Repts ML20099F5011984-11-0505 November 1984 Final Deficiency Rept,Item 121 Re Water Found in HPCI Lube Oil Reservoir.Initially Reported on 840330.Byron-Jackson Field Mod Request 6337 Revised to Provide Proper Piping Configuration for Main Pump Seal ML20099E3911984-11-0303 November 1984 Final Amended Deficiency Rept,Item 76 Re Limitorque Switch Rotor Failures.Initially Reported on 820731.Repairs Performed Per Maint Instructions MI-M070,M179,M182,M203,M272 & M187 ML20099F5381984-11-0202 November 1984 Final Part 21/deficiency Rept Re Contaminated Hydraulic Fluid in Hydraulic Pipe Snubbers.Initially Reported on 821015.All Affected Hydraulic Pipe Snubbers Returned to Power Piping Co for Refurbishment ML20099F5261984-10-31031 October 1984 Final Deficiency Rept,Item 112 Re Poor Quality of Vendor Connection Workmanship in Emergency Diesel Generator Panels. Initially Reported on 840113.Deficient Wiring Terminations Documented on Nonconformance Repts Reterminated 1997-09-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217N4381999-10-25025 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 17 to License DPR-9 ML20217P3551999-10-22022 October 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990922,loaded 9mm Handgun Was Discovered on Truck Cargo Area of Vehicle Inside Protected Area.Caused by Inadequate Vehicle Search.Guidance in Procedures & Security Training to Address Multiple Vehicle Searches Was Provided NRC-99-0095, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fermi 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fermi 2.With NRC-99-0067, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fermi 2.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fermi 2.With NRC-99-0065, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Fermi 2.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Fermi 2.With NRC-99-0088, Detroit Edison Co Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant,Unit 1 Annual Rept for Period 980701-990630. with1999-06-30030 June 1999 Detroit Edison Co Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant,Unit 1 Annual Rept for Period 980701-990630. with NRC-99-0064, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fermi 2.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fermi 2.With NRC-99-0062, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fermi 2.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fermi 2.With ML20206J9301999-05-10010 May 1999 SER Concluding That Util Adequately Addressed Actions Requested in GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Powered-Operated Gate Valves ML20206G5081999-05-0505 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Approving Request for Relief PR-8,Rev 2 on Basis That Licensee Committed to Meet All Related Requirements of ASME OM-6 Std & PR-12 on Basis That Proposed Alternative Will Provide Acceptable Level of Safety NRC-99-0022, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fermi 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fermi 2.With ML20205Q7141999-04-15015 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 16 to License DPR-9 ML20205P9721999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fermi 2 ML20204E0371999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request for NRC Approval of Alternative Rv Weld Exam,Per Provisions of 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(5) for Plant,Unit 2 for 40-month Period ML20204D0361999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fermi 2 ML20198S3341999-01-0606 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 15 to License DPR-9 NRC-99-0005, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fermi 2.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fermi 2.With ML20207B7491998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Operating Rept for Fermi 2 ML20205Q9621998-12-31031 December 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fermi 2 NRC-99-0021, 1998 Annual Financial Rept for Detroit Edison Co. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Financial Rept for Detroit Edison Co. with NRC-98-0153, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fermi 2.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fermi 2.With NRC-98-0160, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fermi 2.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fermi 2.With ML20154R2331998-10-21021 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 13 to License DPR-9 ML20154L1031998-10-14014 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to NRC Bulletin 95-002, Unexpected Clogging of Residual Heat Removal Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode NRC-98-0139, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fermi,Unit 2.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fermi,Unit 2.With ML20154H8161998-09-30030 September 1998 Rev 0 to COLR Cycle 7 for Fermi 2 ML20153B8811998-09-18018 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Request for Relief from Certain Requirements of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20151X0651998-09-11011 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Inservice Testing Program Relief Request VR-63 for Plant NRC-98-0111, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fermi 2.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fermi 2.With ML20153B7921998-08-31031 August 1998 Rev 0 to Fermi 1 Sar ML20237E1171998-08-25025 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Relief Requests for First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Nondestructive Exam Program ML20236X8611998-08-0505 August 1998 SER Related to Revised Feedwater Nozzle Analysis to Facility Operating License NPF-43,Enrico Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 NRC-98-0109, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Fermi 21998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Fermi 2 ML20236K3261998-07-0101 July 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response Related to Revised Feedwater Nozzle Analysis to License NPF-43 for Enrico Fermi Nuclear Power Plant,Unit 2 NRC-98-0097, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Fermi,Unit 21998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Fermi,Unit 2 NRC-98-0127, Annual Rept for Period 970701-9806301998-06-30030 June 1998 Annual Rept for Period 970701-980630 NRC-98-0079, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Fermi 21998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Fermi 2 NRC-98-0076, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Fermi 21998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Fermi 2 NRC-98-0072, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Fermi 21998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Fermi 2 NRC-98-0050, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Fermi 21998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Fermi 2 NRC-98-0019, Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Fermi 21998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Fermi 2 ML20198L4241998-01-0808 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Rev 2 to Relief Request VR-51 Under Fermi 2 Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(6)(i) for First 10-yr Interval NRC-98-0015, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Fermi 21997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Fermi 2 ML20217N3821997-12-31031 December 1997 Annual Operating Rept for 970101-1231 NRC-98-0053, 1997 Annual Financial Rept for Detroit Edison Company1997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Financial Rept for Detroit Edison Company ML20205Q9601997-12-31031 December 1997 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Fermi 2 NRC-97-0141, Deficiency Rept Re Malfunction of EDG Number 11 Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) Printed Circuit Board Rev B,Due to Failure of Operational Amplifier U8 Chip.Avr Board Rev B Was Sent Offsite to Independent Engineering Facility1997-12-23023 December 1997 Deficiency Rept Re Malfunction of EDG Number 11 Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) Printed Circuit Board Rev B,Due to Failure of Operational Amplifier U8 Chip.Avr Board Rev B Was Sent Offsite to Independent Engineering Facility ML20197A9921997-12-15015 December 1997 Rev 0 to Efp,Unit 1 Fermi 1 Sar NRC-97-0131, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Fermi 21997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Fermi 2 ML20248H1151997-10-31031 October 1997 Rev 1 to Colr,Cycle 6 for Fermi 2 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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Novmber 28, 1983 EF2-66480 Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccumission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
Subject:
Interim Report on 10CFR50.55(e) Item on Questionable Qual-ity Control (OC) Acceptance of Pipe Hanger Installations
(#82)
Dear Mr. Keppler:
On Deceber 1,1982, Detroit Edison ccumunicated to Region III that as a result of analyses it had been concluded that a potentially reportable 10CFR50.55(e) deficiency existed involving the adequacy of contractor's quality control (OC) inspection of pipe supports.
Region III Inspector, Mr. I. Yin, investigated the matter, wtiich resulted in a " Confirmatory Action Letter" issued by Region III on December 10, 1982.
This is an interim report involving the first. two action itms of the letter, including the recently i ued final report on one of the tasks undertaken by Stone and Webster (S&W) . The task involved an engineering evaluation of pipe supports, exclusive of the inspection of strut assemblies and inspection of close-clearance and axial restraints. These inspections are being ccrapleted as separate tasks, and will be reported upon at c&pletion.
A meeting was held at the Fermi 2 site on May 20, 1983, where S&W reported to Mr. Yin the results of the inspection and evaluation of 26 percent of supports installed before December 9, 1982. Included in this report, was S&W's reccnmendation to Edison that the program be terminated because of the favorable statistical results. Mr. Yin tentatively concurred.
The attached report includes the results obtained by S&W for 53 per-cent of all safety-related supports installed before December 9, 1982. Please note that only " Attachment 2" of the attachments referenced in the S&W report is included with the copy of the report. Also, note that the inspection and engineering evaluation by S&W was terminated after 53 percent of the supports had been inspected.
8312060246 831128 PDR ADOCK 05000341 S PDR DEC - 1 1983 J62 2
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E Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Novenber 28, 1983 EF2-66480 Page 2 If you have questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. T.A. Alessi, Director - Project Quality Assurance.
Very truly yours,
) Ah DAW /TAA/pn cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcenent U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Paul Byron, Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission 6450 North Dixie Highway Newport, Michigan 48166
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l J.O.No. 13067.64 REPORT ON THE ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF PIPE SUPPORTS J.0.NO. 13067.64 ENRICO FERMI ATOMIC POWER PLANT - UNIT 2 DETROIT EDISON COMPANY Date Approvals:
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2 . HISTORY OF EVENTS t 2
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.,' h DATA, TRENDS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
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J.O.No. 13067.64 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF PIPE SUPPORTS 1 INTRODUCTION Stone & Webster Michigan, Incorporated (SWI) performed an Engineering Evaluation of QA Level 1 Pipe Supports for the Detroit Edison Company's Enrico lermi Atomic Power Plant - Unit 2 (EF2). This report summarizes the procedure, findings, and conclusions of the evaluation, relative to the safety of the as-installed QA Level 1 piping systems in EF2.
As a result of the engineering evaluation and Detroit Edison's commitment to specific corrective actions addressed in this report, SWI concludes that the EF2 QA Level 1 piping systems will serve their intended func-tion.
2 HISTORY OF EVENTS Detroit Edison Project Quality Assurance Department (PQA) reviewed sur-veillance reports of contractor Quality Control (QC) activities on nuclear safety-related pipe supports installed in the EF2 plant. This review resulted in a concern for the adequacy of the QC pipe support inspection. This concern was made known to the NRC - Region III. The result of the investigation that fallowed was the issuance of a con-firmatory action letter (CAL) by the NRC (Attachment 1) on Decem-ber 10, 1982.
SWI was retained by Detroit Edison to address Items 1 and 2 of the CAL, Engineering Inspection of Previously Installed Pipe Supports. From February to June 1983, under Task No. 13067.64, SWI performed an Engi-neering Inspection and Evaluation of QA Level 1 Pipe Supports installed at EF2.
In a meeting held on May 20, 1982, SWI presented to the NRC Inspector at the EF2 site the results of the inspection and evaluation of 1,841 QA Level I supports (26 percent) (Attachment 2).
SWI had established that these supports were well distributed by con-tractor, pipe size, and support type, and that the trends and results were representative of the entire 7,049 pipe supports. In this meeting, SWI concluded that, with Detroit Edison's commitment to implement the recommended corrective actions, the balance of the supports need not be reinspected.
Subsequent to this meeting, SWI and Detroit Edison jointly agreed to tersiinate this program with the firm understanding that Detroit Edison would implement and control two separate programs:
- 1. Reinspect 100 percent of all strut assembly installations.
C2/1306769/6/2RH 1
- 2. Reinspect all close-clearance restraints and axial restraints not reviewed by SWI. In October 1983, Detroit Edison retained SW1 to complete this task.
Deficient installations discovered by either program are t.o be repaired.
3 PROCEDURE This task was performed in accordance with the procedure outlined in SWI Project Instruction PI-22 (Attachment 3), which was reviewed and accepted by Detroit Edison PQA for QA Level I services (Attachment 4). A brief description of that procedure follows.
SWI performed and documented an engineering review and evaluation of QA Level 1 pipe supports installed prior to December 9, 1982, on the Detroit Edison EF2 project. The review included an onsite evaluation of the pipe supports by experienced pipe support engineers. The installation was evaluated against the design documents of record (sketches, DCRs, ABMs, specificati,ns, etc) using a checklist of pertinent engineering attri-butes as a guide. Deviations from the design documents were noted in the checklist. The noted deviations were evaluated on the basis af engi-neering judgment and/or calculations. All judgments rendered and cal-culations performed were submitted through Detroit Edison to the re-sponsible design organizations for their review at the completion of this task for incorporation into their calculation of record.
Deviations that were found to be unacceptable (i.e., those which prevent the support f rom serving its intended function) were documented on the checklist and on a Deviation Disposition Request (DDR) prepared by the SW1 Field Evaluation Group. The DDRs were presented to Detroit Edison PQA for issue and disposition by the appropriate design organization.
The unacceptable installations will be reworked in accordance with the disposition of the DDR, thus ensuring the adequacy of the pipe support.
4 DATA, 'i' RENDS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS At the close of the program, SWI had inspected and evaluated 3,718 (53 percent) of the 7,049 QA Level 1 pipe supports. The supports were inspected for the attributes of the engineering checklist (Attachment 5).
Attachment 6 is a printout of the total data base.
SWI identified 345 supports that require enhancement to bring them within code compliance; they are listed in Attachment 7 and were dis-positioned by DDR-M-11824. Attachment 8 is a legend to be used in reading Attachments 6 and 7.
During the inspection, three generic trends were identified that require corrective action. They were:
4.1 UNQUALIFIED FILLET WELDS PROCEDURE The field welding procedure used an unqualified technique for 3/16-in.
fillet weld connecting plates with thicknesses greater than 1/2 in.
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4.2 STRUT ASSEMBLIES (PIN-TO-PIN)
Many unacceptable deviations of the installed strut assemblies (pin-to-pin) were found.
4.3 GAP CLEARANCES The. gaps on close-clearance supports and the gap between the pipe clamp and the lug on axial restraints often deviated beyond acceptable toler-ances.
SWI suggested the following specific corrective actions for the above generic problems, which Detroit Edison has implemented:
- a. Unqualified Fillet Welds Procedure Detroit Edison will qualify a weld technique sheet for a 3/16-in, fillet weld for greater than 1/2-in. thick materials.
Detroit Edison's field welding engineer qualified the procedure used in compliance with AWS DI.1-75, Section 5, Part B.
- b. Strut Assemblies Detroit Edison will reinspect 100 percent of all struts in-stalled and will rework defective instellations.
- c. Gap Clearances Detroit Edison will reinspect the balance of all supports with engineered gaps that were not already reinspected by SWI under this program and implement corrective actions, as required.
In October 1983 Detroit Edison retained SWHI to complete this task.
5 INSPECTION ATTRIBUTES All supports were inspected using the checklist of pertinent engineering attributes (Attachment 5). However, as discussed in Section 5.8.2 of the procedure (Attachment 3), the attributes reviewed on each support were modified as generic trends and/or generic solutions developed. On April 20, 1983, SWI stopped inspection of strut-related attributes 4B and 6A through 6D. This decision was made to reflect Detroit Edison's commitment to a 100-percent reinspection of the strut assemblies (pin-to-pin).
On May 12, 1983, SWI stopped inspection of all pipe support attributes, except for gap attributes 2A and 5A through SC, This decision was based on SWI's firm opinion that only these attributes .ere of further con-cern.
On June 3, 1983, SWI stopped inspecting supports. This decision was based on Detroit Edison's commitment to inspect all the remaining sup-ports for gap attributes.
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6 NRC PRESENTATION On May 20, 1983, SWI presented to the NRC Inspector at the EF2 site the results of the inspection and evaluation of 1,841 QA Level 1 pipe sup-ports (26 percent). In this meeting, SWI recommended the termination of this task. This meeting is summarized in Attachment 2. Copies of the presentatica material are provided in Attachment 9.
SWI's conclusion that 100 percent of the QA Level 1 piping systems on the EF2 plant will serve their intended functica is based on the data presented in this meeting. Although SWI inspected and evaluated an additional 1,977 suppo: cts (27 percent) beyond those discussed in this meeting, the conclusion of that meeting is still valid for the following reasons:
- 1. SWI demonstrated that the sample upon which the conclusions were drawn was representative of the entire population.
- 2. SWI's review of the additional 1,977 supports indicated that the same trends and conclusions presented at the meeting held on May 20, 1983, have continued without change and still are valid.
7 SAFETY OF QA LEVEL 1 PIPING SYSTEM L. sod on the results of this program, and the implementation by Detroit Edison of the Corrective Action Programs recommended by SWI, SWI con-cludes, with a 95 percent confidence level, that 99.5 percer.t of all QA Level 1 pipe supports and 100 percent of all QA Level 1 piping systems will serve their intended functions.
4 C2/1306769/6/2RH
REPORT ON THE ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF PIPE SUPPORTS ATTACHMENT 2 NOTES OF MEETING, NRC PRESENTATION ON MAY 20,'1983 6 a mim i .
e ,4 Under Task 13067.64, Stone & Webster Michigan, Inc. (SWHI) performed an Engineering Inspection and Evaluation of QA Inval I Pipe Supports installed at the Detroit Edison Enrico Fermi - Unit 2 (EF2) power plant.
SWMI established through the use of Detroit Edison Field Banger Engineer
. Group's Pipe Support Monitoring Report (EFHR 100) that 7,050 QA I4 vel I pipe s2pports were installed and contractor QC-accepted prior to .
December 10, 1982. These 7,050 supports define the total scope of the task. he inspection and evaluation effort was conducted in accordance with a SWHI Project Instruction and SWHI Engineering Mechanics Division technical guidelines.
SWMI divided the personnel assigned to this, effort into two groups, the Field Evaluation Group and the Calculation Group. .
The Field Evaluation Group was organized into teams consisting of a primary ' team member (a pipe support engineer) and a secondary team member (an engineer or designer). He function of the Field Evaluation Group was to perform an onsite inspection of the pipe support and evaluate it against the design documents of record (pipe support sketches, design
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change requests [DCRs], as-built memoranda [ABMs], specifications, etc),
using a checklist of pertinent engineering attributes as a guide.
Deviations from the design documents were noted on the checklist. The noted deviations were evaluated based on a review of the calculation and the disposition was annotated on the checklist. Deviations requiring a more extensive evaluation were referred to the Calculation Group.
The Calculation Group consisted of pipe support engineers. They evaluated all deviatione that required a more ext'ensive review and/or the prepara-tion of supplemental calculations. ,
a he *oers of both groups received training specific for this task, as defined in SWMI's Enrico Fermi II Project Instruction.
The results of each day's inspection and the evaluation of deviations were entered daily into the computar monitoring data base. Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation's Computer Program, Pipe Banger Information i
System (PHIS, IS-202), was used to monitor the progress of this task,
! evaluate the program results, and identify trends in the data.
During the course of this task, Detroit Edison and SWMI Management reviewed the results and trends of this program and gave concurrence to all changes in task direction. Through this management involvement, the f results of this task were, presented to the NRC inspector at the EF2 site on May 20, 1983.
All deviations were evaluated by pipe support engineers and were determined to be acceptable or unacceptable. Acceptable deviations. indicate that the pipe support would serve its intended function and meet the require-ments of the governing code. As indicated above, methods of acceptance, -
including supplemental calculation number, have been clearly documented on the applicable section of the checklist. .
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Pipe supports with unacceptable deviations have been identified and will be enhanced to bring them into code compliance. Bowever, additional l
analysis 1.a,s been performed to assess the impact on plant safety had
- these deviations in the supports gone undetected. -
l First, the s'tructural and functional integrity of the support was veri-fied by allowing the support stress to' increase beyond code limits, but not to exceed yield. If the support did not pass this level of evalua-tion, the piping system integrity was verified either by reanalyzing the piping system to reflect the as-installed
- conditions, or by reanalyzing the piping system assuming that the subject support was not present. In both cases, af ter the reanalysis, the integrity of the piping system, and the pipe supports in the vicinity of the subject support, was verified.
Sumasry of Results l The results of the inspection and evaluation of 1,841 pipe supports was presented to the NRC inspector at the EF2 site on May 20, 1983. These !
1,841 supports represent 26 percent of the 7,050 QA I4 vel I pipe / tubing '
support in the scope of this task.
SWHI has established that the supports inspected are well distributed by contractor, pipe size, and support type, and that the trends and results i are representative of the entire 7,050 pipe supports, f Of the 1,841 supports inspected. 744 supports (40 percent) had no de-viations from the design documents. Of the 1,097 supports (60 percent) with deviations from the design documen.ts, 899 were determined to serve their intended function and in full compliance with code allowables.
The remaining 198 supports with unacceptable deviations are grouped by deviation type, as follows: .
o 83 supports had deviations with the strat element o 91 supports had deviations with gaps on close-clearance frames i and/or lug-to-clamp fitup
'o 24 supports had other deviating attributes The 24 supports with other deviating attributes were evaluated for structural and functional integrity and/or systect integrity. Of the i
24 supports:
o 16 supports had their structural and functional integrity verified o 8 supports had their system integrity verified.
All 198 supports will be brough into compliance with the design documents.
Detroit Edison will establish separate programs to deal with the strut and gap situations. , .
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Conclusions Detroit Ed'ison vill establish separate programs to deal with the gap and strut situations. Recognizing this, SiMI has shown that the current program can be terminated with a 95-percent confidence level that 99.5 per-cent of the uninspected supports and 100 percent of the piping systems vill serve their intended function.
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