ML022490103

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure

ML022490103
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	08/26/2002
From:	Trokev D AmerenUE
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EIP-ZZ-C0010
Download: ML022490103 (205)

Text

DATE: 08/26/02 AMEREN/UE PAGE: 64 TIME: 07:35:31 DOCUMENT CONTROL SYSTEM ARDC8801 DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL TRANSMITTAL NUMBER: 491566 RETURN ACKNOWLEDGED TRANSMITTAL AND TO CONTROL NUMBER: 338U SUPERSEDED DOCUMENTS (IF APPLICABLE) TO:

TITLE: OTHER ADMINISTRATION RECORDS DEPT: NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM. AMEREN/UE LOCATION: USNRC - WASH DC CALLAWAY PLANT TRANSMITTAL DATE: 20020826 P.O. BOX 620 FULTON, MO 65251 TRAN DOC RET ALT ALT CODE TYPE DOCUMENT NUMBER REV REV MED COPY MED COPY AFFECTED DOCUMENT PROC EIP-ZZ-C0010 R PROC EIP-ZZ-00101 027 026 C R 030 029 C 1 D PROC 02-0009 029 C 1 EIP-ZZ-00101 R PROC EIP-ZZ-00102 030 029 C 1 R PROC EIP-ZZ-00220 016 015 C 1 D PROC 02-0245 015 C 1 EIP-ZZ-00220 R PROC EIP-ZZ-00220 APPI 082 022 C 1 R PROC EIP-ZZ-00240 031 030 C 1 D PROC 02-0463 030 C 1 EIP-ZZ-00240 R PROC EIP-ZZ-00260 012 011 C 1 R PROC EIP-ZZ-01211 024 023 C 1 ACKNOWLEDGED BY: DATE:

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EIP-ZZ-CO010 Revision 027 July 23, 2002 CALLAWAY PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EIP-ZZ-C0010 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OPERATIONS RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURE OWNER D. E. Trokev WRITTEN BY D.E. Trokev PREPARED BY D. E. Trokev APPROVED BY __

ISSUED AUG 2620 DATE ISSUED - ACCOUNTABLE This procedure contains the following:

Pages 1 through 6 Attachments 1 through 7 Tables through Figures through Appendices through Checkoff Lists through This procedure has checkoff list(s) maintained in the mainframe computer.

Conversion of commitments to TRS reference/hidden text completed by Revision Number:

Non-T/S Commitments 018

EIP-ZZ-CO010 Rev. 027 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1 2 RESPONSIBILITIES 1 3 INITIATING CONDITIONS 3 4 PROCEDURE 4 5 REFERENCES 5 6 RECORDS 6 - Recovery Manager Checklist 3 Pages - Off-Site Liaison Coordinator Checklist 2 Pages - Protective Measures Coordinator Checklist 4 Pages - Plant Assessment Coordinator Checklist 4 Pages - Logistics Support Coordinator Checklist 3 Pages - Dose Assessment Coordinator Checklist 8 Pages - Backup EOF Checklist 4 Pages

-i-

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OPERATIONS 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidance to Emergency Response Personnel who report to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Backup EOF (BEOF).

2 RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1 RECOVERY MANAGER (RM) 2.1.1 The Recovery Manager is responsible for ensuring that the EOF/BEOF becomes operational after notification of an ALERT, SITE or GENERAL EMERGENCY classification and has overall command and control of the entire Ameren-UE Emergency Response Organization. Duties include the following: (COMN 3361, 3415)

NOTE: The responsibilities that the RM may delegate are indicated with an asterisk (*).

2.1.1.1

• Establishing and maintaining communications with the Emergency Coordinator.

2.1.1.2

• Requesting off-site support (i.e., NSSS, A/E, INPO, Federal, State and Local).

2.1.1.3

• Ensuring responsibility for notifications and communications with off-site agencies is transferred from the Control Room to the EOF Emergency Response Organization (excluding NRC ENS communications).

2.1.1.4 Authorizing notifications to off-site agencies.

2.1.1.5 Assuming responsibility from the Control Room for dose assessment.

2.1.1.6 Assuming responsibility from the Control Room for making Protective Action Recommendations.

2.1.1.7

• Maintaining command and control over personnel in the EOF and providing considerations necessary for their safety.

2.1.1.8

• Ensuring coordinated emergency response among Ameren UE and off-site agencies EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 2.1.1.9 Authorizing personnel exposure in excess of 10CFR20 limits (the Emergency Coordinator also has this authority).

2.2 PROTECTIVE MEASURES COORDINATOR (PMC) 2.2.1 The PMC reports to the RM and is responsible for formulating Protective Action Recommendations and assisting the RM, State and Federal Officials in the interpretation of any plant related data.

2.3 PLANT ASSESSMENT COORDINATOR (PAC) 2.3.1 The PAC reports to the PMC and reviews plant conditions and EALs to verify the adequacy of the existing Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and assists in formulating new PARs when necessary.

2.4 PLANT ASSESSMENT STAFF 2.4.1 The Plant Assessment Staff reports to the PAC and is knowledgeable in plant equipment, systems, and operations. They may provide additional technical expertise while maintaining status boards displaying plant conditions.

2.5 DOSE ASSESSMENT COORDINATOR (DAC) 2.5.1 The Dose Assessment Coordinator reports to the PMC (or the RM if the PMC has not arrived) and is responsible for providing dose projection calculations based on radiological effluent monitors and field data. The DAC directs Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs), reviews effluent based EALs and assists the PMC in formulating Protective Action Recommendations. (COMN 3375) 2.6 DOSE ASSESSMENT STAFF 2.6.1 The Dose Assessment Staff reports to the DAC and is responsible for FMT communications and updating radiological status boards. (COMN 3355) 2.7 FIELD MONITORING TEAMS (FMTs) 2.7.1 Field Monitoring Teams are dispatched by the DAC and are responsible for taking direct radiation measurements and collecting air, soil, water and vegetation samples.

2.8 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT COORDINATOR (LSC) 2.8.1 The LSC reports to the RM and is responsible for contracting with vendors for engineering services, materials, and services needed for emergency mitigation and restoration. The LSC also provides administrative and logistical support to the Emergency Response Organization (ERO).

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 2.9 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT STAFF 2.9.1 The Logistical Support Staff reports to the LSC and is responsible for the development of specifications for repair parts, equipment, and services, locating materials and services needed, and expediting their delivery to the site. They may initiate purchase orders, contracts for services, or use whatever procurement means approved by the RM to obtain goods and services to assist in mitigation and recovery of this situation. The Logistical Support Staff also provides administrative support to the EOF Emergency Response Organization.

2.10 OFF-SITE LIAISON COORDINATOR (OSL) 2.10.1 The OSL reports to the RM and assumes off-site notification responsibilities from the Communicator in the Control Room. The OSL is also responsible for keeping off-site authorities up-to-date regarding on-site emergency response activities, receiving responding representatives from off-site agencies, assisting in meeting their communications and logistic needs, and other duties as assigned by the RM. (COMN 3329) 2.11 EOF COMMUNICATOR 2.11.1 The EOF Communicator reports to the Off-site Liaison Coordinator. The EOF Communicator transmits PARs and emergency notification updates to State and Local agencies and other off-site authorities as directed by the Off-Site Liaison Coordinator.

3 INITIATING CONDITIONS This procedure is initiated to startup the Emergency Operations Facility upon declaration of an ALERT or higher emergency classification. The EOF ERO may also be activated at the discretion of the EC for any classification.

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 4 PROCEDURE 4.1 STARTUP 4.1.1 Staff members arriving at the EOF are responsible for signing in with name and badge number on the facility sign-in board.

4.1.2 Coordinators should obtain their emergency packet and commence activation of their respective areas utilizing checklists 1 through 6.

4.1.3 The Control Room Staff should be expeditiously relieved of peripheral duties and communications not directly related to Control Room manipulations.

4.2 OPERATIONS 4.2.1 EOF personnel ensure the assumption of the following responsibilities:

"* Notifications.

"* Protective Action Recommendations.

"* Dose Assessment.

"* Requests for outside assistance.

"* Interface with Federal, State and Local authorities.

4.2.2 Declaration of Recovery 4.2.2.1 The Recovery Manager should coordinate the establishment of a Recovery Organization with the Emergency Coordinator per EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Plant Recovery.

4.2.2.2 EOF personnel continue activities until the Recovery Organization is established.

4.2.3 Event Closeout 4.2.3.1 The Recovery Manager should coordinate Closeout with the Emergency Coordinator per EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Plant Recovery.

4.3 BACKUP EOF (BEOF) 4.3.1 If the EOF is uninhabitable, the Recovery Manager directs the Off-site Liaison Coordinator to ensure EOF responsibilities are transferred to the TSC and/or Control Room, EOF personnel are relocated, and the BEOF is activated in accordance with Attachment 7, Backup EOF Checklist (COMN 5730, 42514)

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 4.3.1.1 If time permits, operations should continue at the EOF until the designated individuals reach the BEOF and assume responsibilities. Then the remaining personnel should report to their designated facilities.

4.3.2 The Recovery Manager transfers responsibilities to the Emergency Coordinator until the Backup EOF is activated.

5 REFERENCES 5.1 EIP-ZZ-00201, Notifications 5.2 EIP-ZZ-00211, Field Monitoring 5.3 EIP-ZZ-00212, Protective Action Recommendations 5.4 EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Plant Recovery 5.5 EIP-ZZ-01211, Management Action Guides for Nuclear Emergencies (MAGNEM) 5.6 OOA-UB-EPG50, EOF Diesel Emergency Start 5.7 OOA-UB-00004, Emergency Operations Center Ventilation 5.8 HPCI 96-0007, Emergency Response Facility Habitability Guidelines 5.9 OOA-HD-00001, EOF Chemical & RW Drain Tank (THDO1) Level Indication Panel (HDO01) Operation.

5.10 HTP-ZZ-04101, Operation of the Ludlum Model 177 Series Alarm Ratemeter.

5.11 HTP-ZZ-04135, Operation of the NNC Gamma-10 Portal Monitor.

5.12 HTP-ZZ-04137, Operation of the Eberline AMS-3 EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 6 RECORDS NOTE: All Facility Logs, SENTRY or MAGNEM screen prints, office memos, notes, etc. should be attached to the Coordinator Checklist and turned in to the Logistics Support Coordinator and/or the EP Department.

6.1 QA RECORDS 6.1.1 Attachment 1, Recovery Manager Checklist (File #K171.0010) 6.1.2 Attachment 2, Off-Site Liaison Coordinator Checklist (File #K171.0010) 6.1.3 Attachment 3, Protective Measures Coordinator (PMC) Checklist (File #K 171.0010) 6.1.4 Attachment 4, Plant Assessment Coordinator (PAC) Checklist (File #K1171.0010) 6.1.5 Attachment 5, Logistics Support Coordinator (LSC) Checklist (File #K 171.0010) 6.1.6 Attachment 6, Dose Assessment Coordinator (DAC) Checklist (File #K 171.0010) 6.1.7 Attachment 7, Backup EOF Checklist (File #K1171.0010)

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 DATE: TIME INITIATION

" 1. Sign in on Facility Sign-in board. Obtain the RM package and clip on Recovery Manager badge. (If the EOF is uninhabitable, direct the OSL to initiate Attachment 7 and relocate to the BEOF.)

O 2. Review KOA-ZZ-A0002, Command and Control Guidelines.

o 3. Initiate Facility Log Sheet.

--1 4. Receive briefing by:

o Off-Site Liaison Coordinator (facility conditions).

0 Emergency Coordinator (plant conditions).

Coordinator to Ol 5. Direct the OSL and DAC to begin turnover from the control room, and the Protective Measures begin turnover of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).

NOTE: DO NOT assume responsibilityfor communications,Dose Assessment, and PARs until both the OSL

& DA C have completed turnover.

for Communications, Dose Assessment 0 6. Notify the Control Room and the EC prior to assuming responsibilities and PARs using the EML phone, if available.

responsibilities for Offsite OJ 7. Make a site wide announcement that, "The EOF has accepted emergency Notifications, Dose Assessment and PARs from the Control Room."

check out with the Security

" 8. Make Facility Announcement that "All personnel leaving the EOF should Officer prior to leaving the facility." If a release above normal operating limits is in progress or anticipated, announce "an HP brief from the DAC will also be required."

NOTE: If a release above normal operatinglimits is in progress or anticipated,ensure all personnel dispatchedfrom the EOFhave dosimetry. The Security Officer will verify HP briefs prior to exit.

U 9. Upon arrival of the PMC and PAC, direct the PMC to coordinate Notifications with the PAC and DAC for your review and approval.

L] 10. Ensure the following positions have been filled in the EOF

[I Communicator L) PMC E3 PAC O LSC 0 11. Make a facility announcement; "EOF Coordinators should assess manpower requirements in your respective areas. Request for additional support staff should be addressed to the Logistics Coordinator for callout. All excess personnel should assemble in the Media Area and await further instructions."

Support Coordinator.

O 12. Discuss any additional manpower support or supplies required with the Logistical Instruct the Logistical Support Coordinator to inform excess personnel to return home and remain near their phones for further instructions concerning shift relief schedules and report times.

Priorities white board.

O 13. Instruct Logistical Support Coordinator to assign Clerical Support to the Page 1 of 3 ATTACHMENT 1 CA-#732

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that MUST be frequently reviewed U *1. Periodically update EOF personnel including priorities, habitability status, Site radiological conditions and events, and ensure Priorities board is updated.

• 2 Provide status reports to:

o SEMA 0 NRC 0 Counties o Corporate Spokesperson Q *3 If the EOF becomes uninhabitable, direct the OSL to initiate Attachment 7 and relocate to Backup Emergency Operations Facility.

'- *4. Authorize exposure in excess of 10CFR20 limits if required and requested from the HPC.

TURNOVER U 1. Incoming Recovery Manager briefed on EOF status and log reviewed.

Q 2. Emergency Coordinator and Shift Supervisor informed.

U 3. Turnover announced to EOF staff.

U 4. Turnover complete Time.

D 5. Turnover logged.

U 6. Initiate a new checklist CA#732.

RECOVERY UL 1. EOF personnel continue activities per procedures until Recovery Organization established.

U- 2. Discuss the expected response of State and Federal agencies.

U 3. Discuss availability of and provisions for State and Federal agencies with the Off-Site Liaison Coordinator and the Logistics Support Coordinator.

U 4. Declare Recovery per EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Recovery.

o Emergency Coordinator contacted.

o Shift Supervisor contacted.

o NRC contacted.

Ul 5. Recovery organization established.

Ul 6. Make a site wide announcement of Recovery Declaration.

Page 2 of 3 ATTACHMENT 1 CA-#732

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN LU 1. Operations shutdown or transferred to the TSC, as applicable.

o Notifications 0 Protective Action Recommendations o Requests for Outside Assistance o Authorizing exposure in excess of 10CFR20 limits U 2. Coordinators directed to shutdown EOF Time.

U] 3. Make site wide announcement.

Recovery Manager Signature Page 3 of 3 ATTACHMENT 1 CA-#732

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 I OF-ITIFK*I LLUSlllON ('00llll NT ORllill[ [lI[XlNLlS DATE: TIME INITIATION O* 1. Sign in on Facility Sign-in board. Obtain the OSL and Communicators packages and clip on the Off-Site Liaison badge.

0 2. Inform Recovery Manager of your presence.

L] 3. Adjust Gai-tronics to an acceptable level.

LU 4. Ensure the EOF has power.

"o Normal power, (i.e. lights on, power available to computers, etc.).

"o No Power-Start the EOF diesel and contact Radwaste personnel in EOF Dose Assessment Staff or call for an Equipment Operator to perform manual switching of the 480V supply for the EOF per OOA-UB-EPG50. Inform the person performing the manual switch over that appropriate PPE is available at the EOF to perform this task to expedite their arrival.

Ul 5. Shift/verify the PC power supplies to the UPS position.

o Communicator (2).

0 Phone room (134) bridge.

o Telecommunications room (130) bridge located inside the ERFIS cabinet (not locked).

Ul 6. Check fax machine for any communications.

Ul 7. Initiate Facility Log sheet.

L3 8. Ensure the SENTRY PC is powered on, and the OUTLOOK application is running.

L) 9. Check OSL and Communicator phone lines for dial tone.

U 10. Turn on projected statusboard.

U- 11. Upon direction of the RM, using EIP-ZZ-00201Attachment 3 (CA#234), contact the Control Room Communicator to get a brief on the status of Communications (prepare to transfer communications to EOF).

(If the EOF is uninhabitable, communications should remain in the Control Room until the BEOF is staffed.)

LU 12. Notify the RM when you are ready to assume your duties. TIME:

U 13. Obtain RM approval to transfer communications to the EOF, then relieve the control room communicator of communications and notifications.

(Communications and Dose Assessment should be transferred to the EOF at the same time.)

Ul 14. Communicator: (as assigned) 0_ Name U' 15. Contact County EMDs and assess the need for County Technical Representatives and dispatch Technical Representatives as needed. (Use list of JPIC Technical Representatives.)

OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that MUST be frequently reviewed.

U1

• I. Using the flowchart from Attachment 3, EIP-ZZ-00201, Notifications, notify the required authorities and agencies.

NOTE.: Notifications of a new classificationor Protective Action Recommendations must be made in 15 minutes. Follow up notifications are made approximately every 30 minutes.

U1 *2. Provide support to Federal, State, and Local personnel in the EOF, as appropriate, including provisions for office space and communications.

U *3. Ensure the Emergency Classification status board is properly updated.

Page 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 2 CA-#733

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 OFF-SFFF LIAISON ('()()RD1N2V1_()R ('11F('KL1S'F TURNOVER Brief the oncoming Off-Site Liaison Coordinator on the status of the facility and on-site and off-site emergency response activities. Review log.

Brief the oncoming Communicator on the status, information transmitted and the frequency of updates.

Inform the Recovery Manager.

Turnover complete Time.

Turnover logged.

Initiate a new checklist CA#733.

RECOVERY ol 1. Continue providing requested information.

or until directed OJ 2. Continue activities per procedures and checklist until Recovery Organization is established otherwise by the Recovery Manager.

EOF SHUTDOWN L" 1. Ensure area is put into order and logs collected and give to the Logistics Support Coordinator.

the plant operating staff

[- 2. Ensure EOF operations, if any, as specified by the Recovery Manager are transferred to or the TSC, if operational.

their normal condition.

L) 3. Ensure that emergency equipment and supplies are returned and/or stored to 0 Radio o Emergency Equipment Kits o Emergency Diesel Generator 0 Ventilation System 0 Portable Monitoring Equipment o Microfiche Reader o Return ALL UPS's to LINE position.

0) 4. After completion of the above steps, inform the Emergency Coordinator that the EOF has been shutdown.

Coordinator/Emergency "13 5. Ensure that all EOF emergency records are collected and given to the Logistics Support Preparedness Department.

07 6. Ensure that State and Local officials are informed of the EOF shutdown.

Off-Site Liaison Coordinator Signature Page 2 of 2 ATTACHMENT 2 CA-#733

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 DATE: TIME INITIATION

• 1. Sign in on Facility Sign-in board. Obtain the PMC package and clip on the Protective Measures Coordinator badge.

LU 2. Ensure the EOF has power.

"o Normal power, (i.e. lights on, power available to computers, etc.).

"o No Power-Start the EOF diesel and contact Radwaste personnel in EOF Dose Assessment Staff or call for an Equipment Operator to perform manual switching of the 480 V supply the EOF diesel per OOA-UB-EPG50. Inform the person performing the manual switchover that appropriate PPE is available at the EOF to perform this task to expedite their arrival.

NOTE: These steps are performed if the Off-Site Liaison has not reported for duty.

-l 3 Ensure the EOF HVAC system is in recirculation/filter mode per OOA-UB-00004. Keys to the HVAC room are in the OSL packet..

El 4 Check computer and printer power supplies have been shifted to the UPS position:

o Computer o Color Printer El 5. Recovery Manager informed of your presence.

L1 6. Initiate Facility Log sheet.

El 7. 0 Plant Assessment Coordinator (PAC) Name o3 Dose Assessment Coordinator (DAC) Name

[L 8. Check PMC phone lines for dial tone.

LU 9 Assist in the transfer of PARs to Plant Assessment Coordinator and dose assessment to the Dose Assessment Coordinator.

LU 10. Inform the Recovery Manager when ready to assume PARs, Dose Assessment, and Notifications.

Ul 11. Assume responsibilities when Recovery Manager gives permission.

NOTE: If the Plant Assessment Coordinator is not staffed, it is your responsibility to provide the Recovery Manager with Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) based on Plant Conditions per EIP-ZZ-00212, PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS. Ensure the Technical Assessment Coordinator in the TSC is aware of your presence in the EOF. Inquire of any PARs already in place.

OPERATION

(* Steps are recurring items that need to be reviewed on a continual bases)

Q *1. Evaluate input from plant conditions (PAC), dose assessment (DAC), and EIP-ZZ-00212, Protective Action Recommendations. Default to the most conservative recommendation, time is essential.

[- *2. Request release duration estimate from the PAC or Tech Assessment Coordinator (TAC) and provide updates to the DAC U' *3. Review all notifications and obtain Recovery Manager approval for all notifications prepared by the EOF Communicator.

Notifications to the State and Counties are made within 15 minutes of a classification declaration or a change in Protective Action Recommendations and at approximately 30-minute intervals thereafter.

Page 1 of 4 ATTACHMENT 3 CA-#737

EIP-ZZ-CO010 Rev. 027 TURNOVER I

Brief the oncoming PMC on the status of the facility and on-site and off-site emergency response activities.

Review log.

Inform the Recovery Manager.

Turnover complete Time.

Turnover logged.

Initiate a new checklist CA# 737.

RECOVERY O] 1. Continue providing requested information.

o 2. Continue activities per procedures and checklist until Recovery Organization established or otherwise by the Recovery Manager.

until directed TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN L] 1. When directed, assist with the EOF deactivation.

U 2. Ensure area is put into order and logs collected and give to the Logistics Support Coordinator.

Protective Measures Coordinator Page 2 of 4 ATTACHMENT 3 CA-#737

EIP-ZZ-C00 10 Rev. 027 PLANT COMPUTER GUIDE Color and Description of Computer Point Quality Codes The Plant Computer System (PCS) assigns a "Data Quality Code" to each field input and calculated variable at the time the point is processed. These quality codes are determined by a series of checks/tests performed during both input-data validation and point processing. A list of the quality codes follows which is ordered by severity:

1. UNK (Blue) - Unknown; point not yet processed. If a point is deleted from processing when SAIPMS is first activated, "UNK" quality code will be assigned. This quality code will also be displayed for calculated or derived points which have not yet cycled through their first processing period.

2. DEL (Blue) - Point has been deleted from processing. Ifa point was active when the SAIPMS software was activated, and was subsequently disabled from processing, the quality code "DEL" is assigned and no further engineering unit conversion is attempted.

3. NCAL (Blue) - Derived point not calculable. This quality code is assigned when it has been determined that insufficient inputs exist to accurately perform the associated equation or calculation.

4. INVL (Blue) - Invalid code is generated when a point's defined hardware channel address has not been selected, does not exist, or cannot be accessed. This usually indicates either an invalid hardware channel address, or a failed hardware component. For example, if a defined card slot address does not contain a card, all points assigned to that card will be tagged as INVL. Also, if a multiplexer has either failed or been taken offline, all points assigned to that multiplexer will be tagged as INVL.

5. RDER (Blue) - Sensor Read Error code is generated when no test return/input is received for a point in response to a scan command/output to a valid hardware channel address. This usually indicates a faulty sensor or a multiplexer communication problem. Whenever a quality code of RDER is observed, a hardware error condition exists.

6. OTC (Blue) - Open thermocouple.

7. BAD (Blue) - The BAD (Bad Scanned Value) code is generated when the "corrected" scanned value (i.e. adjusted for A/D gain and zero-drift error) exceeds the sensor range as defined by a point's "SENSOR LIMIT LOW" and "SENSOR LIMIT HIGH" values in the database.

8. HRL (Blue) - Point exceeds high reasonable limits. This condition is tested after engineering unit conversion and if the value exceeds the defined High Reasonable limit, a quality code of "HRL" is assigned.

9. LRL (Blue) - Point exceeds low reasonable limits. This condition is tested after engineering unit conversion and if the value exceeds the defined Low Reasonable limit, a quality code of "LRL" is assigned.

10. REDU (Cyan) - Point fails redundant point check. If a point has a defined Redundant Point and its current value does not match the defined point within the specified tolerance, it is assigned a quality code of "REDU".

Page 3 of 4 ATTACHMENT 3 CA-#737

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027

11. HIHI (Red) - Point above high alarm limit. This condition is met when a point's current value has exceeded the defined High Alarm limit, and is assigned a quality code of "HIHI".

12. LOLO (Red) - Point below low alarm limit. This condition is met when a point's current value is less than the defined LOW Alarm limit, and is assigned a quality code of "LOLO".

13. HALM (Yellow) - Point above high warning limit. This condition is met when a point's current value has exceeded the defined High Operating limit, and is assigned a quality code of "HALM".

14. LALM (Yellow) - Point below low warning limit. This condition is met when a point's current value is below the defined Low Operating limit, and is assigned a quality code of "LALM".

15. ALM (Red) - State/Change-of-State alarm. Any logical-value point may be alarm monitored against either a defined logical state (i.e., "TRUE", or "FALSE"), or a defined change-of-state condition (i.e., "TRUE" to "FALSE", "FALSE" to "TRUE", or either state change). A quality code of "ALM" is assigned if the point meets any of the above conditions.

16. SUB (Cyan) - Substitute value inserted for point. If a substitute value has been entered for a point, the point is assigned a quality code of "SUB", and no further alarm checks or engineering unit conversions are made.

17. DALM (Cyan) - Point is deleted from alarm checks. If a point is currently disabled from alarm processing, it is assigned a quality code of "DALM", and no further alarm checks are made.

18. INHB (Green) - Point is inhibited from alarm by cut-out point. If a point has an assigned cut out point, and the current state of the cut-out point matches the specified alarm inhibit state, the point is assigned a quality code of "INHB", and no alarm transaction is generated. While inhibited, the point value WILL continue to update, only the alarm condition is inhibited.

19. GOOD (Green) - Point passed all the above checks. The quality code "GOOD" indicates that all defined alarm conditions, states, or values have not been exceeded or met.

Page 4 of 4 ATTACHMENT 3 CA-#737

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 I"LikN'I'.ýkSSIý'.SSiNl-l,'N"1'(.'OOIZI)IN/k'FoIZ C11F('KL1S'U DATE: TIME INITIATION ol 1. Sign in on Facility Sign-in board. Obtain the PAC package and clip on the Plant Assessment Coordinator badge ID 2. Ensure the EOF has power.

o Normal power, (i.e. lights on, power available to computers, etc.).

o No Power-Start the EOF diesel and contact Radwaste personnel in the EOF Dose Assessment Staff or call for an Equipment Operator to perform manual switching of the 480V supply for the EOF per OOA-UB-EPG50. Inform the person performing the manual switch over that appropriate PPE is available at the EOF to perform this task to expedite their arrival.

NOTE: These steps are performed if not previously performed by the OSL or PMC.

ID 3. Ensure the EOF HVAC system is in recirculation/filter mode per OOA-UB-00004. Keys to the HVAC room are in the OSL packet.

NOTE: These steps are performed if not previously performed by the PMC.

[] 4 Check computer and printer power supplies have been shifted to the UPS position.

o Computer o Color Printer NOTE: These steps are performed if not previously performed by the PMC.

U 5. Protective Measures Coordinator informed of your presence.

U] 6. Initiate Facility Log sheet.

U] 7. 0 Plant Assessment Staff Name Name U] 8. Turn on projected statusboards.

U] 9. Check PAC phone lines for dial tones.

U 10. Contact the TAC in the TSC and request information on any EALs and PARs already in place, and request that preparations be made to transfer PARs to the EOF.

U] 11. Notify the PMC when you are ready to assume your duties, including PARs.

U] 12. Evaluate PSB1, PSB2, and PSB3 on the Plant Computer.

U] 13. Initiate Free Format Logs as needed.

U] 14. Formally accept PARs from the TSC, when permission is granted from the PMC or RM.

OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that MUST be frequently reviewed U] *1. Evaluate input from plant conditions and EIP-ZZ-00101 and EIP-ZZ-00212, Protective Action Recommendations.

[- *2. Provide the Protective Measures Coordinator with plant based Protective Action Recommendations.

U *3. Request release duration from TAC.

Page 1 of 4 ATTACHMENT 4 CA-#735

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 TURNOVER o 1. Brief the oncoming PAC on the status of the facility and on-site and off-site emergency response activities.

- 2. Review log.

U 3. Inform the Protective Measures Coordinator.

" 4. Turnover complete Time.

o 5. Turnover logged.

- 6. Initiate a new checklist CA#735.

RECOVERY 0 1. Continue providing requested information.

established or until directed L0 2. Continue activities per procedures and checklist until Recovery Organization otherwise by the Protective Measures Coordinator/Recovery Manager.

TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN 1i. When directed, assist the OSL with the EOF deactivation.

ol 2. Ensure area is put into order and logs collected and give to the Logistics Support Coordinator.

Plant Assessment Coordinator Page 2 of 4 ATTACHMENT 4 CA-#735

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 Color and Description of Computer Point Quality Codes The Plant Computer System (PCS) assigns a "Data Quality Code" to each field input and calculated variable at the time the point is processed. These quality codes are determined by a series of checks/tests performed during both input-data validation and point processing. A list of the quality codes follows which is ordered by severity:

1. UNK (Blue) - Unknown; point not yet processed. If a point is deleted from processing when SAIPMS is first activated, "UNK" quality code will be assigned. This quality code will also be displayed for calculated or derived points which have not yet cycled through their first processing period.

2. DEL (Blue) - Point has been deleted from processing. If a point was active when the SAIPMS software was activated, and was subsequently disabled from processing, the quality code "DEL" is assigned and no further engineering unit conversion is attempted.

3. NCAL (Blue) - Derived point not calculable. This quality code is assigned when it has been determined that insufficient inputs exist to accurately perform the associated equation or calculation.

4. INVL (Blue) - Invalid code is generated when a point's defined hardware channel address has not been selected, does not exist, or cannot be accessed. This usually indicates either an invalid hardware channel address, or a failed hardware component. For example, if a defined card slot address does not contain a card, all points assigned to that card will be tagged as INVL. Also, if a multiplexer has either failed or been taken offline, all points assigned to that multiplexer will be tagged as INVL.

5. RDER (Blue) - Sensor Read Error code is generated when no test retum/input is received for a point in response to a scan command/output to a valid hardware channel address. This usually indicates a faulty sensor or a multiplexer communication problem. Whenever a quality code of RDER is observed, a hardware error condition exists.

6. OTC (Blue) - Open thermocouple.

7. BAD (Blue) - The BAD (Bad Scanned Value) code is generated when the "corrected" scanned value (i.e. adjusted for A/D gain and zero-drift error) exceeds the sensor range as defined by a point's "SENSOR LIMIT LOW" and "SENSOR LIMIT HIGH" values in the database.

8. HRL (Blue) - Point exceeds high reasonable limits. This condition is tested after engineering unit conversion and if the value exceeds the defined High Reasonable limit, a quality code of "HRL" is assigned.

9. LRL (Blue) - Point exceeds low reasonable limits. This condition is tested after engineering unit conversion and if the value exceeds the defined Low Reasonable limit, a quality code of "LRL" is assigned.

Page 3 of 4 ATTACHMENT 4 CA-#735

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027

/-'1*] 11Fll L/-T fffA -r#j

10. REDU (Cyan) - Point fails redundant point check. If a point has a defined Redundant Point and its current value does not match the defined point within the specified tolerance, it is assigned a quality code of "REDU".

11. HIHI (Red) - Point above high alarm limit. This condition is met when a point's current value has exceeded the defined High Alarm limit, and is assigned a quality code of "HIHI".

12. LOLO (Red) - Point below low alarm limit. This condition is met when a point's current value is less than the defined LOW Alarm limit, and is assigned a quality code of "LOLO".

13. HALM (Yellow) - Point above high warning limit. This condition is met when a point's current value has exceeded the defined High Operating limit, and is assigned a quality code of "HALM".

14. LALM (Yellow) - Point below low warning limit. This condition is met when a point's current value is below the defined Low Operating limit, and is assigned a quality code of "LALM".

15. ALM (Red) - State/Change-of-State alarm. Any logical-value point may be alarm monitored against either a defined logical state (i.e., "TRUE", or "FALSE"), or a defined change-of-state condition (i.e., "TRUE" to "FALSE", "FALSE" to "TRUE", or either state change). A quality code of "ALM" is assigned if the point meets any of the above conditions.

16. SUB (Cyan) - Substitute value inserted for point. If a substitute value has been entered for a point, the point is assigned a quality code of "SUB", and no further alarm checks or engineering unit conversions are made.

17. DALM (Cyan) - Point is deleted from alarm checks. If a point is currently disabled from alarm processing, it is assigned a quality code of "DALM", and no further alarm checks are made.

18. INHB (Green) - Point is inhibited from alarm by cut-out point. If a point has an assigned cut out point, and the current state of the cut-out point matches the specified alarm inhibit state, the point is assigned a quality code of "INHB", and no alarm transaction is generated. While inhibited, the point value WILL continue to update, only the alarm condition is inhibited.

19. GOOD (Green) - Point passed all the above checks. The quality code "GOOD" indicates that all defined alarm conditions, states, or values have not been exceeded or met.

Page 4 of 4 ATTACHMENT 4 CA-#735

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 DATE: ______TIME____

INITIATION O 1. Sign in on Facility Sign-in board. Obtain the Logistics Support Coordinator (LSC) package and clip on the Logistics Support Coordinator badge U 2. Recovery Manager informed of your presence.

U 3. Initiate Facility Log sheet.

U 4. Equipment energized / made ready.

E] Check and Synchronize clock [] Copier E] FAX (Out)

[] LSC Computers 0l Microfiche Reader El LAN Printer E] LSC Telephones El FAX (In)

U 5. Admin Coordinator contacted and administrative operations and responsibilities discussed. Obtain the names of the clerical support staff reporting. Assume the responsibility of requesting outside assistance.

U 6. Personnel Assessment Logistics Support Staff (name)

(Name)

Clerical Support Staff (name) (assign to Recovery Manager)

(Name) (assign to Priorities board)

(Name)

U 7. When directed by the RM, evaluate extra personnel.

"o Assemble all extra responders in the Media Area to await further instructions. (Obtain key from the Off Site Liaison Coordinator.)

"o Establish needs of coordinators.

"o Inform extra responders of established routes to take when leaving.

"o Send personnel home, or to a designated Reception and Care Center, with instructions to stand by until they can be contacted with a designated time to return.

U 8. If adverse radiological conditions exist or occur, post signs and posters regarding "No Eating, Drinking, Smoking, or Chewing".

U 9. If additional support is needed, contact the Administrative Coordinator for callout.

OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that MUST be frequently reviewed 1

• 1. Contact Administrative Coordinator and request additional clerical support as needed.

U *2. Check status of EOF/JPIC emergency responders per EIP-ZZ-00200, Attachment 3. Do NOT delete messages until all positions are filled. Distribute copies of Attachment 3 to Coordinators periodically until all positions are filled. Paging or calling using the Emergency Telephone Directory may be required.

[E Call 64777 Audix.

El Enter 68202 and the # sign.

[] Enter the password which is the # sign.

El Follow instructions to listen to new messages and complete Attachment 3.

El Contact SAS (68785) for any positions that were logged due to Audix message transfer.

Page 1 of 3 ATTACHMENT 5 CA-#736

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 o *3. If asked to track the weather, use the internet or call 1-800-992-7433, St. Louis Flight Briefing Service.

O3 *4. Serve as liaison with American Nuclear Insurers and INPO as required.

(NOTE: The communicators contact both groups with notifications.)

o3 *5. Contact Regional Regulatory Affairs Group and have them review notifications required per APA-ZZ-00520, Reporting Requirements And Responsibilities.

L3 *6. Contact area Motels to begin prearranging lodging:

o Ensure motels being contacted are outside the Plume Exposure Pathway.

"O Establish a list of motels with number of rooms available for each (the list should be generated for the next several days at a minimum).

"o Request if some (your best estimate dividing between available motels) rooms may be held for 6:00PM cancellation daily for the next several days.

o *7. Meal Arrangements 0 Contact area restaurants/caterers to determine availability of meals.

(This should be coordinated with the Admin Coordinator in the TSC who shares this responsibility.)

• 8. Temporary facilities needed.

• 9. Contact the Emergency Procurement personnel at the Ameren GOB to establish a working relationship.

[]

• 10. Review letters of agreement and the INPO Resources book for resources available from other plants.

[]

• 11. If requests for additional support personnel and services are made:

o Keep Recovery Manager informed of request being made for additional support.

o Contact vendors and obtain the following information:

1) Name(s) of personnel.

2) Social Security Number(s).

3) Point of Departure.

4) Transportation requirements (airline tickets, land transportation, etc.).

5) Lodging requirements.

6) Anticipated Work Location.

7) Estimated time of arrival.

0 Contact Admin Coordinator to ensure access requirements are obtained and required training is scheduled.

[]

• 11. Request additional equipment as needed:

0 Keep Recovery Manager informed of request being made for additional support services/equipment.

o Requesting organization should provide:

1) Explicit equipment requirements in writing.

2) Amount needed.

3) Delivery location.

4) Person on site to contact.

5) Justifiable reason for request.

o Contact vendor and obtain the following information:

1) Availability.

2) Shipping Mode.

3) Special handling requirements.

4) Estimated arrival time.

o Contact the following to coordinate the delivery/arrival:

1) Security Coordinator.

2) OSL for traffic control.

3) Requesting group.

Page 2 of 3 ATTACHMENT 5 CA-#736

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 TURNOVER 1.

I1 Brief the oncoming LSC on the status of the facility and on-site and off-site emergency response activities.

1J 2. Review log.

Ll 3. Inform the Recovery Manager, Logistics and Clerical Staff of the turnover.

U 4. Turnover complete Time.

o] 5. Turnover logged.

L) 6. Initiate a new checklist CA# 736.

RECOVERY o 1. Continue providing requested information.

o 2. Continue activities per procedures and checklist until Recovery Organization established otherwise by the Recovery Manager.

or until directed TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN E] 1. When directed, assist the OSL with the EOF deactivation.

Preparedness E] 2. Ensure area is put into order and all EOF logs collected and forward to the Emergency Department.

Logistics Support Coordinator Page 3 of 3 ATTACHMENT 5 CA-#736

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 DATE: ______TIME____

INITIATION

-- 1 Sign in on Facility Sign-in board. Obtain the DAC package and clip on the Dose Assessment Coordinator badge.

U 2. Inform Recovery Manager/Protective Measures Coordinator of your presence.

UJ 3. Adjust Gai-tronics in Recovery Center to an acceptable level.

U] 4. Switch the DAC's computers (2) power supplies to the UPS position.

U 5. Initiate Facility Log sheet.

Report any U 6. Check DAC phone lines for dial tone and Dose Assessment Equipment available and operable.

deficiencies to the Logistics Support Coordinator.

E3 7. Turn on overhead projector.

dose E3 8. Upon direction of the RM, Contact the Rad/Chem Technician in the Control Room who is performing assessment and request a turnover of dose assessment activities including elevated Radiation Monitor readings and trends (prepare to accept transfer of Dose Assessment to EOF).

(If the EOF is uninhabitable, Dose Assessment is maintained in the TSC until the BEOF is staffed.)

E3 9. If vital busses NB01 and NB02 are degraded, refer to KOA-ZZ-00125 to determine effect of degraded condition of Plant computer points.

U 10. Notify the RM or PMC when you are ready to assume your duties. TIME:

[- 11. Obtain RM approval to transfer Dose Assessment to the EOF, and then relieve the Rad/Chem Technician in the Control Room of his Dose Assessment responsibility.

(Communications and Dose Assessment should be transferred to the EOF at the same time.)

Plume

- 12. Contact the HP Coordinator (HPC) and discuss the need to Assign R/C Support Personnel to the Rapid Assessment Tech. position, if not already dispatched.

U 13. Contact the HP Coordinator (HPC) in the TSC and request:

"* Two (2) Field Monitoring Teams (FMT) be dispatched, and

"* Two (2) Dose Assessment Staff personnel to be sent to the EOF.

NOTE: If release above normaloperating limits is in progress or imminent, brief the FMTs on the radio.

I OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that MUST be frequently reviewed.

(**) Frequently reviewed steps that can be completed by Dose Assessment staff.

U *1. When the Missouri Department of Health arrives at the EOF, provide them the following information:

o Plant Status Operating / Reducing Power / Shutdown o Emergency Declaration ALERT / SITE / GENERAL O Meteorological Conditions Wind Direction / Speed / Stability Class 0 Release Start Time O Estimated Release Duration 1] Affected Map Sectors o Protective Action Recommendations o Ameren Field Monitoring Team Locations O Comments / Questions Page 1 of 8 ATTACHMENT 6 CA-#734

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 IISt*ml* Di I[KI[ Ik Cf*klI~~nl0 IECllI*l Ti*

El *2. Upon determination that the emergency involves an actual or potential release of radioactive material, perform dose projections in accordance with EIP-ZZ-0 1211, Management Action Guides For Nuclear Emergencies (MAGNEM). (COMN 42538) PRINT and SAVE all dose calculations.

NOTE: Request Rapid Plume Assessment Tech. (ifdispatched)to obtain closed window RO-2 readingat or near Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB). This is to initially quantify the release.

Rad Chem Helper Cell Phone 573-220-4233 Hazmat Cell Phone 573-220-4232 NOTE. If the release is determined to be above normal operating limits, contact Health Physics Coordinator 68711 Security Coordinator 68701 to inform them that the release is above normal operatinglimits.

[3 *3. The DAC will be responsible for briefing individuals leaving the EOF once a radiological brief is required.

El *4. Notify the Health Physics Coordinator (HPC) and Field Monitoring Teams (FMT) when projected thyroid dose reaches 25 Rem or greater. Recommend KI for Amneren UE Personnel and brief on KI Precautions per HDP-ZZ-01300 section 7, items 7.1 through 7.1.4.

L- *5. Wind shifts and changes in meteorological conditions should be announced to the RM, FMTs, and/or PMC and noted on maps. Notification of Offsite Agencies MUST be initiated within approximately 15 minutes of changes to Protective Action Recommendations. When available, coordinate recommendations with the Missouri Department of Health (DOH).

o **6. Obtain weather forecast initially and approximately every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Brief the PMC and/or the RM of any anticipated changes in the weather conditions and their effects on PARs.

(St. Louis Flight Briefing Service 1-800-992-7433 or use the Internet)

O] *7. Monitor Radiation Monitor Trends for Group 1 and 2 EALs in accordance with EIP-ZZ-00101. Notify the RM and/or PMC of any setpoints that have been exceeded or are being approached.

NOTE: Refer to KOA-ZZ-00125 during degradedNBOJ/NB02 conditions to determine validity ofplant computerpoints.

J *8. When the field monitoring teams are available, brief and dispatch as per EIP-ZZ-0021 1, Field Monitoring Direction and Assessment.

NOTE. If release above normal operating limits is in progress or imminent, briefthe FMTs on the radio.

• 9. Evaluate input from the FMT's and monitor Protective Action Recommendations based on radiological conditions per EIP-ZZ-00212, Protective Action Recommendations. When available, coordinate recommendations with the Missouri Department of Health (DOH).

L)* 10. Request update of release duration from the PMC/PAC or the TAC if the PMC/PAC is not available.

L]* 11. Provide the Protective Measures Coordinator with the radiological based Protective Action Recommendations.

NOTE: If the Protective Measures Coordinatoris not staffed, provide the Recovery Manager with the above information.

o

• 12. Initiate Free Format Logs as needed.

O ** 13. Establish Radiological Habitability Controls in the EOF.

o Close both vestibule doors, ensure stanchions are pulled across hallway.

0 Response Response check the Portal Monitor (page 5 of 8, this attachment or HTP-ZZ-04135) o AMS 3 energized and source checked (page 6 of 8, this attachment or HTP-ZZ-04137)

O Control dosimetry set o Have Logistics Support post signs on doors to facility.

[l**14. Set up a frisking station using a model 177 ratemeter, (per page 4 of 8, this attachment or HTP-ZZ-04101).

[]**15. Issue TLDs to those plant personnel in the EOF that do not have TLDs (Use Page 8 of 8, this attachment for issue).

Page 2 of 8 ATTACHMENT 6 CA-#734

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 U **16. Ensure that facility habitability is maintained using portable instrumentation and secondary monitoring devices.

Habitability Action Levels:

0 600 mrem/hr direct dose rate, inform the RM, and commence monitoring cumulative dose.

o 4400 mrem cumulative dose, recommend facility evacuation.

o 5000 mrem/hr or greater direct dose rates recommend facility evacuation.

0 Iodine concentrations of 2.4 E -6 uCi/ml or greater, inform the Recovery Manager and commence air sampling to ensure total intake does not exceed 25 rem CDE.

"o Iodine concentrations of 1.9 E -5 uCi/ml or greater, recommend evacuation.

"o Appropriate protective actions, as per Health Physics procedures, should be recommended when experiencing the above radiological conditions and considering how and when to evacuate.

O-** 17. Ensure the four (4) decon sinks are directed to the Radioactive Holding Tank when handling radioactive waste. The Waste Holding Tank is to be monitored for level and disposed of properly when full. See OOA-HD-O0001.

U ** 18. Set up frisker at entry to Decon Area for use by returning FMTs.

TURNOVER El 1. Brief the oncoming DAC and FMTs on radiological release and dose information, field monitoring activities, and in-plant Radiation Monitor trends.

L- *2. Arrange for Field Monitoring Team (FMT) turnover by briefing and dispatching relief FMTs. Ensure returning FMTs access the EOF via the Decon Area in back of the Lab.

UJ 3. Review log.

U 4. Inform the Recovery Manager, Dose Assessment Staff and Field Monitoring Teams of the turnover.

U 5. Notify DOH personnel of turnover.

Q 6. Turnover complete Time.

U 7. Turnover logged.

U 8. Initiate a new checklist CA# 734.

RECOVERY D 1. Continue providing requested information.

U- 2. Ensure that Field Monitoring Teams are informed of the Recovery declaration.

U 3. Continue activities per procedures and checklist until Recovery Organization established or until directed otherwise by the Recovery Manager.

Page 3 of 8 ATTACHMENT 6 CA-#734

EIP-ZZ-CO010 Rev. 027 TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN E 1. When directed, assist with the EOF deactivation.

S2.Ensure area is put into order and logs collected and given to the Logistics Support Coordinator.

El 3. Ensure dose assessment equipment is turned off and/or stored and UPS units selected to LINE.

[E 4 If sinks and showers are no longer needed for decon purposed, survey sinks and showers. If free of contamination, return drains to the sanitary tank.

"- 5. Secure friskers and store in locker.

E' 6. Secure AMS-3.

[J 7. Collect and make preparations to read TLDs issued from the EOF.

Dose Assessment Coordinator Page 4 of 8 ATTACHMENT 6 CA-#734

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 an This Startup Sequence augments HTP-ZZ-04101, Operation of the Ludlum Model 177 Series Alarm Ratemeter. It is designed to be used in Emergency Response Facility when a HP Operations Technician is not immediately available.

1. Remove Model 177 ratemeter, frisker probe, detector cable, power cord, and check source from the E-Kit cabinet.

2. Connect detector and power cords, if not already connected, to the Model 177 ratemeter and verify the following switch settings:

Front Panel: 1. On/Off switch in "ON" position.

2. Volume adjusted to hear audible counts.

3. Response switch in "slow" position.

4. Range switch to "XI" scale.

Rear Panel: 1. Alarm set at '5'.

2. Subtract switch in "Off' position if meter has Subtract Switch.

3. Perform response check as follows:

-- Ensure instrument has a current calibration sticker.

"- Set the range switch to the appropriate position and place the detector on the check source bracket.

- Verify the response is within the acceptable range as specified on the response value determination form/sticker for that check source.

- Check the instrument alarm by adjusting the ALARM SET switch so that it is slightly less than the count rate of the source.

' Remove the source from the detector.

[-- Depress the RESET button. The alarm condition should clear.

"- If the pre-operational checks are satisfactory, complete the attached pre operational check sticker. If either the alarm or the response check failed, notify the Health Physics Coordinator and obtain an operational ratemeter.

4. Return the check source to the E-Kit cabinet.

Page 5 of 8 ATTACHMENT 6 CA-#734

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 This Startup Sequence augments HTP-ZZ-04135, Operation of the NNC Gamma-10 Portal Monitor. It is designed to be used in an Emergency Response Facility when a HP Operations Technician is not immediately available.

NOTE: The key for the electronics cabinet is attached to the response source.

1. Verify 110 VAC power to the unit. If it is ON, proceed to Step 2. If the monitor is OFF, perform the following:

"* Supply 110 VAC to the unit through the UPS unit.

"* Set the NIMBIN power supply On-Off switch to ON and ensure the power light is illuminated.

"* Set the HV-2 NIM On-Off switch to on and ensure the Positive LED is illuminated.

2. Verify that a current calibration label is affixed to the Electronics Box and the pot settings, on the box, are the same as identified on the label.

3. Inspect the monitor for physical damage.

4. Verify no alarms are activated. (If an alarm is activated, clear the alarm and depress the RESET on the portal before continuing.)

5. Pass the Gamma- 10 Response Source through the central region of the monitor. The Contamination alarm should activate on the box, a light and buzzer, and a red light on the portal should illuminate.

6. Depress the RESET button on the portal. The alarms should clear and the green operational light should remain lit.

7. If the monitor passes this check, initial and date the Pre-Operational Check Sticker affixed to the Electronics Box.

If the monitor fails the Pre-Operational Checks, tag the unit Out Of Service and notify the Health Physics Coordinator. Set up Frisking Station and have personnel entering the building and those already in the building frisk for contamination, if it is expected.

Page 6 of 8 ATTACHMENT 6 CA-#734

EIP-ZZ-C0010 Rev. 027 This Startup Sequence augments HTP-ZZ-04137, Operation of the Eberline AMS-3. It is designed to be used in an Emergency Response Facility when a HP Operations Technician is not immediately available.

1) Connect AMS-3 (monitor) and air sampler to 110 VAC power.

2) Ensure monitor and air sampler have current calibration label.

3) Inspect the chart paper. Ensure an adequate supply of paper remains. If a RED line appears on the chart paper, notify Health Physics and continue the startup procedure.

4) Set monitor ON-OFF switch (located on back of monitor) to the ON position. Allow monitor to warm-up for 5 minutes.

5) Set BACKGROUND SUBTRACT switch to the ON position.

6) Push in "PUSH TO SET" on bottom left side of monitor and note the alarm setpoint value of 20,000 cpm (this is the first scale mark to the right of the 104 scale value.

7) Set alarm setpoint to 103 cpm by adjusting the SET knob while holding in "PUSH TO SET" button.

8) Remove sample holder located on the right front side of monitor by loosening the clamp and pulling out on handle.

9) Obtain check source from HP E-Kit Locker. Center source over sample holder opening with the recessed side of the source bracket facing the opening.

10) The audible alarm and the alarm light should energize (activate). If not notify Health Physics.

(The startup procedure should not continue until the problem is resolved).

11) Press ACKNOWLEDGE button to silence alarm.

12) Verify count rate on chart recorder is as indicated on the response value listed on back of source bracket or a sticker on the instrument.

13) Remove check source. Ensure alarm light resets and count rate decreases on chart recorder.

14) Remove the filter in the filter holder. (Remove the filter retaining ring on the filter holder, this snaps on the end of the filter holder assembly, and may fit somewhat tight.)

15) Obtain a new filter from the HP Emergency Kit Locker and place it on the sample holder with the "ROUGH SIDE" of filter facing upwards.

16) Replace retaining ring on the sample holder and insert the sample holder into the sample chamber. Lock the filter holder into place.

17) Set the alarm setpoint to 2x10 4 cpm by adjusting the SET knob while holding in the "PUSH TO SET" button.

18) Place the toggle switch on the power cord to the "ON" position. The air sampler pump should start.

19) Ensure airflow as indicated on flowmeter is within the tolerance listed on the calibration label (read the flow at the center of the rotometer float ball.) If it is not, notify Health Physics.

20) Initial and date the Preoperational Check sticker.

Page 7 of 8 ATTACHMENT 6 CA-#734

EIP-ZZ-CO010 Rev. 027 I DOSE kSS ESSNI ENT COORDINATOR CHECKLIST I Page 8 of 8 ATTACHMENT 6 CA-#734

EIP-ZZ-CO010 Rev. 027 DATE: ______TIME____

TRANSFER TO BACK-UP EOF to activate the Backup EOF due to U i. OSL-Contact SEMA and County EOCs and notify them of the decision the EOF being uninhabitable. Inform SEMA of the estimated time of arrival to the Backup EOF.

NOTE: This step can be satisfied by adding this information to a SENTRY Notification Form or by using backup communication lines.

1- 2. OSL or RM-Contact the NRC Operations Center and notify them of the decision to startup the Backup EOF or contact the TSC ENS Communicator and ask them to inform the NRC OPS Center of the decision.

below. If personnel have Ll 3. OSL-Inform the appropriate EOF emergency personnel to relocate as indicated not arrived at the facility, inform the Security Officer in the EOF to direct arrivals to the appropriate facility (Backup EOF or TSC). See attached map and layout for the Backup EOF:

NOTE: The BEOFhas Emergency Packetsfor the staff. Personnelreporting to the TSC need to take their packet with them.

o Recovery Manager to the Backup EOF.

"o Protective Measures Coordinator to the Backup EOF.

"o Off-Site Liaison Coordinator to the Backup EOF.

"o Communicator, to the TSC to report to EC.

"o DACs, one to the Backup EOF and one to the TSC to report to EC.

"o Dose Assessment Staff, one to the Backup EOF and one to the TSC o Plant Assessment Coordinator to the TSC to report to TAC.

o Logistics Support Coordinator to the TSC to work with the Admin. Coord.

o JPIC Tech Rep (EOF) to the TSC and communicate with JPIC.

0 All Others - Contact the Admin Coordinator in the TSC to determine if EC needs additional personnel in the TSC. If not needed, personnel should be instructed to return home and standby their phones.

the responsibility for the S4. RM-Direct the EC and TSC to take charge of all ERO operations including following until the BEOF is activated. Maintain contact, to the extent possible, using Cellular phones while in route to Backup EOF o Protective Action Recommendations in accordance with EIP-ZZ-00212.

o Dose Assessment/ FMT Coordination in accordance with EIP-ZZ-01211 and EIP-ZZ-00211 o Notifications in accordance with EIP-ZZ-00201.

NOTE: Notifications may be sentfrom the Control Room using SENTRY or be initiatedfrom the TSC using backup communication lines.

INTERIM OPERATION WHILE AWAITING BACKUP EOF ACTIVATION and coordinate notification

[0 1. Communicator - (Reporting to TSC) Announce your presence to the EC completion with the DAC and TAC.

o Make Notifications using SENTRY, BURS, or commercial phone lines in the TSC.

NOTE Ensure copies of all notificationsare Faxed to the Backup EOF. (See attached drawingfor phone #.)

portions of the DAC Checklist

" 2. DAC - (Reporting to TSC) Work with the HPC and perform all applicable Attachment 6.

NOTE: FieldMonitoring Teams (FMTs) should remain under the control of the TSC DAC until the DAC in the Backup EOF is ready to assume control. Primarycommunications with the FMTs to the Backup EOFwill be via cellularphones. Secondary radio communications can be established if necessary.

Page 1 of 4 ATTACHMENT 7 CA-#2339

EIP-ZZ-CO010 Rev. 027 S 3. Dose Assessment Staff - (Reporting to TSC) Assist the DAC with FMT direction.

- 4. PAC - (Reporting to TSC) Report to the TAC and perform applicable portions of Attachment 4.

S5. LSC - (Reporting to TSC) Work with the Admin Coordinator performing the applicable portions of Attachment 5.

BACKUP EOF ACTIVATION

-U 1. OSL -Upon arrival at the Backup EOF.

0 Ensure equipment/materials are setup (Refer to Page 3 of this Attachment).

0 Ensure the MAGNEM PC is set up and operating including testing the printer.

o Phones are removed from the cabinet, plugged in, and operable.

o Introduce yourself and the RM to the appropriate State officials.

L- 2. RM -Recovery Manager contact the Emergency Coordinator, receive update, and request transfer of the following to the Backup EOF:

"o Protective Action Recommendations in accordance with EIP-ZZ-00212.

"o Dose Assessment/ FMT Coordination in accordance with EIP-ZZ-01211 and EIP-ZZ-00211.

Note: FieldMonitoring Teams remain under the controlof the TSC DA C.

"o Notifications in accordance with EIP-ZZ-00201.

[' 3. PMC - Perform applicable portions of PMC Checklist Attachment 3 using input from the TAC, PAC (in TSC) and DAC (Backup EOF).

El 4. DAC - Coordinate with the Missouri Department of Health (DOH) and assume Field Monitoring Team coordination from the TSC, using cellular phones as the primary communication with the Teams. Perform applicable portions of Attachment 6.

E- 5. OSL - Perform applicable portions of the OSL Checklist Attachment 2 and ensure a comprehensive turnover of offsite notifications with the concurrence of the RM.

NOTE: DO NOT assume responsibilityof notifications until PMC and DA C have assumed responsibility.

o3 6. OSL - Report the assumption of responsibilities to the Recovery Manager.

ol 7. OSL - Log the Backup EOF activation time Ul 8. OSL - Inform the Emergency Coordinator, SEMA, County EOCs and the NRC of the assumption of responsibilities in the Backup EOF.

Off-Site Liaison Coordinator Signature Page 2 of 4 ATTACHMENT 7 CA-#2339

EIP-ZZ-COO10 Rev. 027 BEOF LAYOUT (F-07)__ (F-06,) (F-05)

(F-08,)

49524567 9167 PC PC 9166 pcPC 9165 I 9274*

FT DA 9 92721 14503 4253 1 Rumr ontrolJ T AC114E L J (F-16) F-IS 9230 SRecovery Managler 913]

9175 9174 J191E973 Co. Spkrs T2ch Re (F-23) [182 JPlC F9258*

9207i (F-22) 9231 OSL/COMM D9179 9180 Z178 ICopier I 9197 PC 9186 9187 9186 9185 9184 9183 IPC9'19 ~526-9188 All 9XXX phone numbers are 526-9XXX All 4XXX phone numbers are 634-4XXX

• Indicates analog phone line Field Monitoring Team Cellular Phones Chem Vehicle (573) 220-0173 HPTS Vehicle (573) 220-0628 I&C Vehicle (573) 220-2507 Radio for FMT communications is located in the SEMA Radio Room When dialing out, use 8 (area code) XXX-XXXX.

Page 3 of 4 ATTACHMENT 7 CA-#2339

EIP-ZZ-COO10 Rev. 027 Page 4 of 4 ATTACHMENT 7 CA-#2339

EIP-ZZ-00101 Revision 030 July 22, 2002 CALLAWAY PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EIP-ZZ-00101 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURE OWNER W. R, Bevard WRITTEN BY W, R. Bevard PREPARED BY W. R. Bevard APPROVED BY 44 *>

DATE ISSUED ___________

This procedure contains the following:

Pages 1 through 8 Attachments 1 through 3 Tables through Figures through Appendices through Checkoff Lists through This procedure has checkoff list(s) maintained in the mainframe computer.

Conversion of commitments to TRS reference/hidden text completed by Revision Number:

Non-T/S Commitments 024

-14

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1 2 DEFINITIONS 1 3 RESPONSIBILITIES 3 4 INITIATING CONDITIONS 3 5 PROCEDURE (COMN 3384) 4 6 FINAL CONDITIONS 7 7 REFERENCES 7 8 RECORDS 8 Emergency Action Levels 10 Pages Emergency Action Levels Indicators Bases 50 Pages ARM Dose Rates 4 Pages

-i-

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES I PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 PURPOSE This procedure provides guidelines for classification of emergencies.

1.2 SCOPE Establishes indications for determining conditions at which specific emergency classifications are to be declared.

2 DEFINITIONS 2.1 Emergency Classifications

" Unusual Event - This classification is characterized by events in progress or which have occurred indicating a potential degradation of the level of safety of the Plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

"* Alert - This classification is characterized by events in progress or that have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

"* Site Emergency - The SITE EMERGENCY class includes accidents in which major failures of Plant functions needed for protection of the public have occurred or are likely to occur.

Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 General Emergency - The GENERAL EMERGENCY class includes accidents which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity, and other accidents that have large radioactive release potential. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.

2.2 Safe Shutdown Area - Section 5.4A.2 of the FSAR lists the systems required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown. The following areas contain these required systems:

"* Area 5

"* Containment

"* Aux Feed Pump Rooms

"* Aux Building

"* Diesel Generator Building

"* UHS Cooling Tower

"* ESW Pumphouse

"* Control Building

"* RWST

"* Fuel Building 2.3 Transient - A transient is defined as a reactor power change of

+ 10% or safety injection initiated.

2.4 Invalid - Invalid alarms and readings may be the result of electronic noise, radio frequency interference, electromagnetic frequency interference, or spurious spikes of unknown nature. A buildup of radioactivity within the monitor or an increase in the ambient background for the monitor would also cause invalid alarms and readings.

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 2.5 Valid - Valid alarms and readings are those verified by the operators to be the results of actual events or, in the case of effluent alarms and readings, verified to be the results of effluent concentrations.

3 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 SHIFT SUPERVISOR 3.1.1 Upon classification of an emergency, the Shift Supervisor assumes the position of Emergency Coordinator and initiates emergency actions including making Protective Action Recommendations to authorities responsible for implementing off-site emergency measures. The Shift Supervisor assigns on-shift personnel to emergency duties as deemed necessary, and notifies the EDO of the emergency. The Shift Supervisor continues as acting Emergency Coordinator until relieved by the EDO. When relieved, the Shift Supervisor will resume normal duties in directing Plant Operations activities from the Control room. (COMN 3314) 3.2 EMERGENCY COORDINATOR 3.2.1 The Emergency Coordinator is responsible for directing overall emergency response on-site. Initially, the Shift Supervisor assumes the responsibilities of Emergency Coordinator. At the ALERT (or higher) emergency classification levels, the EDO will relieve the Shift Supervisor and assume the Emergency Coordinator duties.

The Emergency Coordinator directs the Emergency Response Organization from the TSC after relieving the Shift Supervisor.

(COMN 3327) 3.3 PLANT PERSONNEL 3.3.1 Responsible for immediately reporting any abnormal condition or event to the Shift Supervisor.

4 INITIATING CONDITIONS This procedure is initiated when:

4.1 Alarms, abnormal instrument readings, or reports of conditions that indicate an emergency situation (either real or potential) have occurred.

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 4.2 A subsequent action step in a plant operating off-normal, or Emergency Procedure which refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant conditions.

5 PROCEDURE When abnormal or emergency conditions (real or potential) occur, the Shift Supervisor SHALL: (COMN 3384)

NOTE: Initial classification should take place as soon as possible but not > 15 minutes after recognition of initiating conditions.

5.1 Ensure that immediate actions (e.g., use of Emergency Procedures, dispatch the Fire Brigade, personnel, etc.) are taken for the safe and proper operation of the plant.

5.2 Using the indications available (alarms, readings, reports, etc.) and Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levels, determine the appropriate emergency classification as follows: (COMN 42546)

NOTE: Instrumentation listed in Attachment 1 is the primary means of determining conditions; if these are inoperative, others may be substituted.

5.2.1 Refer to the "Group" (in Attachment 1) that relates to the indications being received. The groups are:

Group One - Abnormal Radiation Events Group Two - Fission Product Barriers (COMN 41525)

Group Three - Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Group Four - System Malfunctions 5.2.2 Find the corresponding indication(s) and condition(s) appropriate to the actual indication(s).

5.2.2.1 Emergency Classification can also be based upon projected conditions/indications to ensure adequate measures are taken to mitigate any consequences of the emergency. (COMN 20606)

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 5.2.2.2 If extra personnel are desired when no conditions exist that in his opinion warrant the declaration emergency he may have the SAS operator activate the Emergency Paging System per KOA-ZZ-00200, Activation of the Callaway Plant Emergency Paging System, for duty rapid responders using MESSAGE #2 or for all available rapid responders, ERO Coordinators, and engineers using MESSAGE #10.

5.2.2.3 The Emergency Coordinator has the option to declare an UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY when conditions exist that in his opinion warrant the declaration. This can be independent of any specific EAL.

5.2.2.4 Specific examples of other conditions which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an event:

(COMN 43073) a) Each Group 2 barrier could be considered for other factors that could determine whether a barrier is Potentially Lost or Lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier could be a factor in considering the barrier Potentially Lost or Lost.

b) Specific examples of events that may require Emergency Coordinator judgment for the Unusual Event:

1) Aircraft crash on-site.

2) Near site explosion which may adversely affect normal site activities.

3) Near site release of toxic or flammable gas which may adversely affect normal site activities.

4) Uncontrolled RCS cool down due to Secondary Depressurization.

5) Unplanned loss of> 75% of plant annunciators due to event(s) not covered elsewhere.

6) Safeguards security events not covered elsewhere.

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 c) Specific examples of events that M require Emergency Coordinator judgment for the Alert:

1) Conditions exist that indicate that plant systems may be degraded, and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

2) Safeguards security events not covered elsewhere.

d) Specific examples of events that may require Emergency Coordinator judgment for the Site Emergency:

1) Conditions exist that indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

e) Specific examples of events that may require Emergency Coordinator judgment for the General Emergency:

1) Conditions exist that indicate actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment.

2) Conditions exist that indicate potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases expected to exceed EPA PAG plume exposure levels outside the EAB.

3) Safeguards security events not covered elsewhere.

5.2.2.5 The possibility exists that situations may have characteristics in two or more classes. In such an event, the emergency SHALL be categorized in the more severe class to ensure a conservative approach is taken. (COMN 3383) 5.2.3 Declare the emergency classification that is listed corresponding to the condition derived from Step 5.2.2 to facility personnel.

NOTE: Initial notifications to State and Local Agencies shall be initiated within 15 minutes after declaration of the emergency classification.

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 5.3 Perform the necessary emergency implementing actions as outlined in EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions, to ensure the proper response is taken to implement the Callaway Plant Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

NOTE: If necessary, the EDO should be contacted to discuss emergency actions.

5.4 Reclassify the emergency as conditions dictate in accordance with this procedure.

6 FINAL CONDITIONS 6.1 Event Closeout or Plant Recovery has been declared per EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Plant Recovery.

7 REFERENCES 7.1 Callaway Plant Radiological Emergency Response Plan 7.2 NUREG-0818, Emergency Action Levels for Light Water Reactors 7.3 EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions 7.4 EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Plant Recovery 7.5 Callaway Plant Final Safety Analysis Report 7.6 Callaway Plant Technical Specifications 7.7 APA-ZZ-00703, Fire Protection Operability Criteria and Surveillance Requirements 7.8 APA-ZZ-01003, Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual 7.9 NESP-0007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 7.10 Reg. Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors 7.11 OTO-SG-00001, Seismic Event 7.12 OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 7.13 CTP-ZZ-01300, Atmospheric Hazard Control 7.14 OTO-RK-00001, Loss of Control Room Alarms 7.15 EIP-ZZ-01211, Management Action Guides For Nuclear Emergencies (MAGNEM) 7.16 KOA-ZZ-00200, Activation of the Callaway Plant Emergency Paging System 7.17 Emergency Action Level (EAL) Descriptions 7.18 EPCI-98-01, EAL Bases Calculation 7.19 FSAR CN 00-065, GTRE59/60 Alert and High Alarm Computer Setpoints 7.20 CTP-ZZ-08100, Post Accident Sampling Guidelines 8 RECORDS None EIP-ZZ-"- 1 01 EMERGENCY ACTIt LEVELS Rev. 0ý'

Group 1 ABNORMAL RADIATION EVENTS Offsite Events UNUSUAL EVENT [ ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY A. B. C. D.

Any Unplanned Release of Radioactivity Any Unplanned Release of Radioactivity EAB Dose Resulting From an Actual or EAB Dose Resulting From an Actual or to the Environment That Exceeds 2 Times to the Environment That Exceeds 200 Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity the Radiological Effluent Control Limits in Times the Radiological Effluent Control Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem the ODCM, (APA-ZZ-01003) for >60 Limits in the ODCM, (APA-ZZ-0 1003) for Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of CDE Thyroid for the Actual or Projected minutes. Ž15 minutes. the Release. Duration of the Release.

MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators

1. All of the following: 1. All of the following: Any of the following: Any of the following:

a. A valid alarm and reading on any of a. A valid alarm and reading on any of the following effluent monitors: the following effluent monitors:

• 1. A valid reading on the Unit Vent monitor, GT-

• 1. A valid reading on the Unit Vent monitor, GT HB-RE-18 HB-RE-18 RE-21 B, > 2.42E+8 pCi/sec for 15 minutes or RE-21 B, > 2.42 E+9 i.tCi/sec for 15 minutes or GT-RE-21 B GT-RE-21B longer, longer.

GH-RE-10B GH-RE-10B *@2. Both of the following: *@2. Both of the following:

b. The valid reading is 200 times the Hi a. A Valid reading on any of the following monitors: a. A Valid reading on any of the following monitors:

b. The valid reading is 2 times the Hi Hi AB-RE-0111 >146 mrem/hr AB-RE-s:11 >1460 rnrem/hr alarm setpoint value. Hi alarm setpoint value.

AB-RE-01 12 >146 mrem/hr AB-RE-0112 >1460 mrem/hr

c. The release cannot be terminated c. The release cannot be terminated within 60 minutes of the alarm within 15 minutes of the alarm AB-RE-01 13 >146 nrem/hr AB-RE-01 13 >1460 nmenmhr actuation. actuation. AB-RE-01 14 >146 mren-/hr AB-RE-01 14 >1460 mrem/hr OR OR FC-RE-0385 >850 mrem/hr FC-RE-0385 >8500 mrem/hr

2. Both of the following: @2. Both of the following: b. The reading has been, or is expected to be, b. The reading has been, or is expected to be,

a. Confirmed sample analysis indicates a. A Valid reading on any of the exceeded for 15 minutes or longer, exceeded for 15 minutes or longer.

that a release exceeding 2 times the following monitors:

applicable values of the ODCM AB-RE-01 11 >27 mrem/hr 3. A valid dose projection indicates >100 mrem 3. A valid dose projection indicates >1000 mrem (APA-ZZ-01003), has occurred. AB-RE-01 12 >27 nrem/hr TEDE or >500 mrem CDE thyroid dose at, or TEDE or >5000 mrem CDE thyroid dose at, or

b. The release cannot be terminated AB-RE-0113 >27 mrem/hr beyond, the EXCLUSION AREA beyond, the EXCLUSION AREA within 60 minutes. AB-RE-0114 >27 mrenvmhr BOUNDARY using in plant rad data or field BOUNDARY using in plant rad data or field FC-RE-0385 >150 reminhr monitoring team survey results. monitoring team survey results.

b. The release cannot be terminated within 15 minutes. 4. Field survey results at, or beyond, the EAB 4. Field survey results at, or beyond, the EAB O t__R t corresponding to >100 mrem/hr TEDE for I corresponding to >1,000 mrem/hr TEDE for 1

3. onfi of the following: hour (or expected to continue for I hour) or hour (or expected to continue for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) or

a. Confirmed sample analysis indicates >500 mrem/hr CDE thyroid for I hour of >5,000 mremfhr CDE thyroid for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of that a release exceeding 200 times the inato.ihlto.

applicable values of the ODCM (APA-ZZ-01003), has occurred. *Declare the event using this indicator only if actual *Declare the event using this indicator only if actual

b. The release cannot be terminated dose projections per Indicator 3 cannot be performed dose projections per Indicator 3 cannot be performed within 15 minutes. within 15 minutes of the monitors exceeding the within 15 minutes of the monitors exceeding the reading. reading.

@ Release values based on average @ Release values based on average @ Release values based on average meteorological data and a I hour release meteorological data and a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> release meteorological data and a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> release duration. duration. duration.

Page I of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-P"'0 EMERGENCY ACTI( IEVELS Rev. 03%'0 Group 1 ABNORMAL RADIATION EVENTS Onsite Events UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT ALERT E.* F.* G.*

An Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation. Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level Release of Rad Material, or an Increase in Rad Level that That Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Either Impedes Safe Operations or the Ability to Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel. Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times Unless Noted MODES: At All Times Indicators Indicators Indicators AU of the following: AM of the following: Any of the following:

1. Spent Fuel Pool level is decreasing on EC-LI-0039A 1. A VALID Hi-Hi Alarm on Fuel Building exhaust 1. Valid (confirmed by HP) reading on SD-33 (Control with Normal makeup being added, and all irradiated monitors GG-RE-27 or 28 (Channel 273 or 283). Room) >15 mR/hr.

fuel assemblies remain covered.

2. Containment refueling bridge area radiation monitor 2. Valid (confirmed by HP) reading on the following

2. Refueling Pool level is decreasing on BB-LI-0053A (SD-41) > 100 mRlhr. (Mode 6 only.) Safe Shutdown ARMs:

or B with Normal makeup being added, and all SDRE-26 AB 2026 RHR Hx Area Wall irradiated fuel assemblies remain covered. 3. Fuel building area radiation monitor (SD-37 or 38) SDRE-23 AB 2000 RHR Hx Area Corridor

> 30 mR/hr. SDRE-15 AB 1974 West Corridor-Central

3. Any valid (Confirmed by HP survey) ARM (other SDRE-16 AB 1974 West Corridor-South than a Group 1,G. Safe Shutdown ARM) >1000 4. Report of visual observation of loss of water level > 1000 times normal (normal levels can be times normal. (Normal levels can be considered as resulting in irradiated fuel being uncovered, considered as the monitor reading prior to the the monitor reading prior to the noticed increase.) noticed increase).

This Initiating Condition is not meant to apply to This Initiating Condition is not meant to apply to This Initiating Condition is not meant to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned anticipated temporary increases due to planned anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, upper container movement, depleted resin transfers, upper container movement, depleted resin transfers, upper internal movements, etc.) internal movements, etc.) internal movements, etc.)

Page 2 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ- ^'01 EMERGENCY ACTIL LEVELS Rev. 03L GrouD 2 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS A. UNUSUAL EVENT B. ALERT C. SITE EMERGENCY D. SITE EMERGENCY E. GENERAL EMERGENCY Any CONTAINMENT Any RCS BARRIER Indicator Any RCS BARRIER Indicator A CTMT BARRIER Loss Indicator A Loss Indicator from any two barriers BARRIER Indicator or and and and Any FUEL CLAD BARRIER Any FUEL CLAD BARRIER Any RCS or FUEL CLAD BARRIER Any Indicator from the third Indicator Indicator Indicator I CONTAINMENT BARRIER RCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER MODES: 1-4 1 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 Loss indicators: Loss indicators: Loss Indicators:

I. Containment Pressure 1. RCS Leak Rate 1. Critical Safety Function Status a) A rapid unexplained loss of CTMT pressure following an initial Safety Injection initiated with a loss of subcooling (less than Meet the entry requirements for increase in pressure. instrument error) using Attachment 2 or 3 of Emerg. Procedure FRC. 1, Red Path for Core cooling.

or E-0. *2. Primary Coolant Activity Level b) CTMT pressure or sump level not increasing with a LOCA. 2. SG Tube Rupture RCS coolant activity >300pgCi/cc

2. Containment Isolation Valve Status a) Any of the following: dose equivalent 1-131.

Incomplete CTMT isolation allowing a release to the environment, 1) GE-RE-92 (Channel 925) >2.OE-5 ptCi/cc 3. Containment Radiation Monitoring following a valid CTMT isolation signal (CISA, CISB, CPIS). 2) BM-RE-25 (Channel 256) >I.OE-4 itCi/cc GT-RE-59 or 60 (Channels 591 or

3. SG Release with Primary-Secondary Leakage 3) SJ-RE-02 (Channel 026) >I.OE-4 jiCi/cc 601) reading >2.8E+3 R/hr.

a) Pri-to-sec leakage verified greater than 150 gpd per SG, or 600 gpd 4) Level in any SG continues to increase in an total through all SGs. T. S. 3.4.13 uncontrolled manner Potential Loss indicator:

and and 4. Critical Safety Function Status b) Any of the following: b) Any of the following: Meet the entry requirements for

1) The leaking SG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner 1) The ruptured SG pressure is decreasing in an FRC.2, Orange Path for Core or completely depressurized. Cooling or FRH. 1, Red Path for uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.

2) Use of the ruptured SG PORV for cool down or temperature Heat Sink.

2) Use of the ruptured SG PORV for cool down or control.

temperature control.

3) The leaking SG is supplying the TDAFW turbine. 5. Core Exit Thermocouples

3) The leaking SG is supplying the TDAFW turbine.

Potential Loss indicators: Core exit TCs >700'F.

3. Containment Radiation Monitoring

4. Critical Safety Function Status GT-RE-59 or 60 (Channels 591 or 601) reading > 6.4 E+0 R/hr.

Meet the entry requirements for FRZ. 1, Red Path Summary for CTMT. 6. Reactor Vessel Water Level

5. Containment Pressure a) RVLIS (Pumps Off) less than a) H2 concentration in containment >4%. Potential Loss indicators:

4. Critical Safety Function Status 40%

2r b) Less than I full train of Ctmt spray and Ctmt cooling fans, with Ctmt Meet the entry requirement for FRH. 1, Red Path Heat Sink or or pressure greater than 27 psig. FRP. 1, Red Path for Integrity. b) RVLIS (Pumps On) less than

6. Significant Radioactive Inventory in Ctmt 5. RCS Leak Rate minimum GT-RE-59 or 60 (Channels 591 or 601) reading >1.5 E+4 R/hr RCS leakage >50 gpm. RCP's on Minimum

7. Core Exit Thermocouples 6. SG Tube Rupture 4 44 a) Core exit TCs >1200°F and restoration procedures not effective in 15 a) Any of the following: 3 30 minutes. 1) GE-RE-92 (Channel 925) >2.0 E-5 XtCi/cc 2 20

2) BM-RE-25 (Channel 256) >1.0 E-4 ýtCi/cc 1 13 or b) Core exit TCs >700°F and RVLIS (pumps off) <40% and restoration 3) SJ-RE-02 (Channel 026) >1.0 E-4 jiCi/cc procedures not effective in 15 minutes. 4) Level in any SG continues to increase in an

8. Radiation Increase Outside Containment uncontrolled manner.

Unexplained increase in radiation levels in areas adjacent to the and containment. b) the primary-to-secondary leak rate exceeds 50 gpm.

• Refer to CTP-ZZ-08100.

Page 3 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-e "'01 EMERGENCY ACTk ,EVELS Rev. OR Group 3 HAZARDS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY A. B. C. D.

Confirmed Security Event Which Security Event in the Plant Protected Security Event in a Safe Shutdown Area. Security Event Resulting in a Loss of the Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Area. Ability to Reach and Maintain Cold Level of Safety of the Plant. Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Any of the following: Confirmed report of an intrusion by a Agy of the following Any of the following:

hostile force into the plant Protected 1. Bomb device discovered within gy

1. Bomb device discovered within the Area. of the following areas: 1. Occupation of the Control Room by a plant Protected Area and outside the

• Area 5 hostile force.

following Safe Shutdown Areas:

• Containment

• Aux Feed Pump Rooms 2. Occupation of the Aux Shutdown

• Area5

• Aux Building Panel by a hostile force.

• Containment

• Diesel Generator Building

• Aux Feed Pump Rooms

• UHS Cooling Tower

• Aux Building

• ESW Pumphouse

• Diesel Generator Building

• Control Building

• UHS Cooling Tower

• RWST

• ESW Pumphouse

• Fuel Building

• Control Building

• RWST 2. Confirmed report of an intrusion by a

• Fuel Building hostile force into Ay of the following areas:

2. Confirmed report of an attempted

• Area 5 entry or sabotage. 0 Containment

• Aux Feed Pump Rooms

3. A site specific credible security

• Aux Building threat.

• Diesel Generator Building

• UHS Cooling Tower

• ESW Pumphouse

• Control Building

• RWST

• Fuel Building Page 4 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-0' 01

.-EVELS Rev.03, EMERGENCY ACTI Group 3 HAZARDS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY E. F. G. H.

Fire Within Protected Area Boundary Fire Affecting the Operability of Plant Natural and Destructive Phenomena Natural and Destructive Phenomena Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes Safety Systems Required to Establish Affecting the Protected Area. Affecting a Safe Shutdown Area.

of Verification. or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators

1. Fire in or adjacent to any of the I. Fire in Ay of the following areas: AM of the following: AMy of the following:

following:

• Area 5 1. a. Response spectrum recorder 1. a. Operating basis earthquake

• Area 5 0 Containment operating annunciator 98E annunciator 98D alarms in the

• Containment 0 Aux Feed Pump Rooms alarms in the Control Room Control Room

• Aux Feed Pump Rooms 0 Aux Building and and

• Aux Building

• Diesel Generator Building b. Verified to be a real event per b. Earthquake greater than OBE

• Diesel Generator Building 0 UHS Cooling Tower OTO-SG-00001. levels (0. 12g) in the horizontal and SUJHS Cooling Tower

• ESW Pumphouse 2. Report of a main turbine rotating vertical directions as indicated by

• ESW Puniphouse

• Control Building component failure resulting in LIGHT "OSG-AE- " or LIGHT

• Control Building

• RWST casing penetration or major damage "OSG-AE-2"

• RWST

• Fuel Building to seals causing a rapid loss of 2. a. Report of a tornado, high wind,

• Fuel Building and lubricating oil or hydrogen. vehicle crash, explosion, or other and 2. There is visible damage to 3. Explosion, vehicle crash or tornado natural or destructive phenomena

2. Not extinguished within 15 permanent structures or in or adjacent to Any of the to any of the following Safe minutes of control room equipment, affecting the following: Shutdown areas:

verification of a fire. operability of safety related "* Area5 0 Area5 equipment. "* Containment 0 Containment

• Aux Feed Pump Rooms

• Aux Feed Pump Rooms

• Aux Building

• Aux Building

• Diesel Generator Building

• Diesel Generator Building

• UHS Cooling Tower

• UHS Cooling Tower

• ESW Pumphouse

• ESW Pumphouse

• Control Building

• Control Building

• RWST

• RWST

• Fuel Building

• Fuel Building and

b. There is visible damage to permanent structures or equipment, affecting plant operations.

Page 5 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIPZZ_0O 101 EMERGENCY ACTI( .,EVELS Rev. 03.

Group 3 HAZARDS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Control Room Evacuation Events ALERT SITE EMERGENCY I. J. K. L.

Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Control Room Evacuation Has Been Control Room Evacuation Has Been Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation Within a Facility Structure Which Initiated. Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be of the Plant. Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Established.

Required to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators AU of the following: AU of the following: Entry into OTO-ZZ-00001, Control 1. Entry into OTO-ZZ-00001,

1. Report or detection of toxic or 1. Report or detection of toxic or Room Inaccessibility, is required. Control Room Inaccessibility, is flammable gases that enter within flammable gases, not properly required.

the Exclusion Area Boundary, that contained, within or adjacent to any have created a HAZARDOUS of the following Safe Shutdown and ATMOSPHERE per Areas, that have created a CTP-ZZ-01300, deemed HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE 2. Control of the Aux Feed System detrimental to safe operation. per CTP-ZZ-01300jeopardizing and a SG PORV for cooldown

2. Confirmed report by local, County operation of systems required to cannot be established within 15 or State Officials of potential establish or maintain Cold minutes.

evacuation of site personnel as Shutdown determined from the DOT evacuation tables for selected

• Area 5 hazardous materials in the DOT 0 Containment Emergency Response Guide for 0 Aux Feed Pump Rooms Hazardous Materials. 9 Aux Building

• Diesel Generator Building

• UHS Cooling Tower

• ESW Pumphouse

• Control Building

• RWST 0 Fuel Building Page 6 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIPZZO, 101 EMERGENCY ACTI( _EVELS Rev. 03k.

Group 4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Annunciator Events UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY A. B. C.

Unplanned Loss of Most or All Alarms (Annunciators) for Unplanned Loss of Most or All Annunciators With Either a Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress.

Greater Than 15 Minutes. Transient In Progress, or the Plant Computer is Unavailable.

MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 Indicators Indicators Indicators

1. Any of the following: 1. Any of the following: 1. Any of the following:

a. 3 of 4 field power supplies indicate < 105 volts for a. 3 of 4 field power supplies indicate < 105 volts for a. 3 of 4 field power supplies indicate < 105 volts greater than 15 minutes (loss of all annunciators) greater than 15 minutes (loss of all annunciators) (loss of all annunciators).

and not a result of planned action. and not a result of planned action. b. Field Power Supply Bus voltage is less than 105

b. Field Power Supply Bus voltage is less than 105 b. Field Power Supply Bus voltage is less than 105 volts (loss of all annunciators).

volts for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all volts for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all c. Ten or more logic power supplies have failed (loss annunciators) and not a result of planned action. annunciators) and not a result of planned action. of all annunciators).

c. Ten or more logic power supplies have failed for c. Ten or more logic power supplies have failed for d. Five or more Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have greater than 15 minutes (loss of all annunciators) greater than 15 minutes (loss of all annunciators) failed (loss of all annunciators).

and not a result of planned action. and not a result of planned action. or

d. Five or more Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have d. Five or more Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have 2. All of the following:

failed for greater than 15 minutes and not a result failed for greater than 15 minutes and not a result a. Any combination of power supplies (including of planned action. of planned action. Optical Isolators) or Multiplexer Adapter Rack or or Fuses have failed.

2. All of the following: 2. AIll of the following: b. Any minimum compensatory actions, per

a. Any combination of power supplies (including a. Any combination of power supplies (including OTO-RK-00001, cannot be maintained.

Optical Isolators) or Multiplexer Adapter Rack Optical Isolators) or Multiplexer Adapter Rack and Fuses have failed for greater than 15 minutes. Fuses have failed for greater than 15 minutes. 3. Any of the following:

b. Any minimum compensatory actions, per b. Any minimum compensatory actions, per a. A change in reactor power greater than +/- 10%.

OTO-RK-00001, cannot be maintained. OTO-RK-0000 1, cannot be maintained. b. Safety injection initiation.

c. The loss does not result from planned action. c. The loss does not result from planned action. and and 4. Compensatory plant parameters monitored via the plant

3. Any of the following: computer, per OTO-RK-00001, are not valid or cannot

a. A change in reactor power greater than +/-10%. be obtained.

b. Safety injection initiation.

c. Compensatory plant parameters monitored via the plant computer, per OTO-RK-0000 1, are not valid or cannot be obtained.

Page 7 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-Q' 01 EMERGENCY ACTI( _-EVELS Rev. 03L Group 4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Electrical Events (Operating) Electrical Events (Shutdown)

GENERAL UNUSUAL UNUSUAL ALERT UNUSUAL ALERT SITE SITE EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EVENT EVENT EVENT H. I. J. K.

D. E. F. G.

Loss of Required DC Loss of All Loss of All Offsite Loss of All Offsite Only One AC Source Loss of All Offsite Loss of All Vital Prolonged Loss of All Power During Cold Offsite Power to Power and Loss of All Power to Essential to Essential Busses for Power and Loss of All DC Power Offsite Power and Prolonged Shutdown or Refueling Essential Busses Onsite AC Power to Busses for Greater >15 Minutes Such That Onsite AC Power to Loss of All Onsite AC Mode for Greater Than for Greater Than Essential Busses During Than 15 Minutes. Any Additional Single Essential Busses. Power.

15 Minutes. 15 Minutes. Cold Shutdown or Failure Would Result Refueling.

in Station Blackout.

MODES: 5,6 MODES: 5,6 MODES: 5, 6, Defueled MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators

1. Loss of Division I I. Loss of I. Loss of all4ofthe All of the 1. Loss of any 3 of 1. Loss of all 4 of the I. Loss (Bus All of the following:

Vital DC power as offsite power following power following: the following following power Voltage I. Loss of offsite power to indicated by to NBO1 and sources:

I. Loss of power sources: sources: < 106.9 VDC) NBO1 and NB02. *

<106.9 VDC on NB02.

• a. Offsite power offsite power a. Offsite power a. Offsite power of all 4 of the 2. Loss of both Emergency NKO1 or NK03. to NBO0

• to NBOI and to NBO0

• to NB01

• following Diesel Generators NEOI and and b. Offsite power NB02.

• b. Offsite power b. Offsite power busses: and NE02.

Loss of Division 2 2. The loss of to NB02

• to NB02

• to NB02

• a. NKOI 3. a. Restoration of at Vital DC power as offsite power c Emergency

2. The loss of c. Emergency c. Emergency b. NK02 least one indicated by has occurred Diesel NEO 1 offsite power Diesel NEO1 Diesel NEOI c. NK03 emergency bus

<106.9 VDC for >15 d. Emergency has occurred d. Emergency d. Emergency d. NK04 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NK02 or NK04. minutes. Diesel NE02 for >15 Diesel NE02 Diesel NE02 not likely.

and minutes. and or and 2. The loss of all 4 and and 2. Failure to b. Meet the entry

2. The loss of both has occurred for

2. The loss of all 3 2. The loss of all 4 restore power requirements for Divisions has >15 minutes.

has occurred for has occurred for to at least one FRC. 1, Red Path for Core Cooling. occurred for > 15

>15 minutes. >15 minutes. DC bus within 15 minutes.

minutes.

• Note: Supply Breakers opening due to degraded switchyard voltage is considered a Loss of Offsite Power.

Page 8 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-_0', 01 EMERGENCY ACTI(_ EVELS Rev. 03.

Group 4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Shutdown Capability UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY SITE EMERGENCY M. N. 0.

Inability to Perform a Required Shutdown Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown. Loss of Water Level That Has or Will Complete Loss of Function Needed to Within Technical Specification Limits. Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel. Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

MODES: 1-4 MODES: 5,6 MODES: 5, 6 MODES: 1-4 Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators

1. The plant is not brought to a required 1. AY of the following: 1. Any of the following: I _. of the following:

All operating mode within a Technical a. Complete loss of both trains of a. Complete loss of both trains of a. Failure to bring the reactor Specification LCO action completion RHR. RHR. subcritical with the control rods time. b. Complete loss of both trains of b. Complete loss of both trains of fully inserted.

CCW. CCW. b. Complete loss of all Boron Injection

c. Complete loss of both trains of c. Complete loss of both trains of Flowpaths.

ESW. ESW. or and and 2. All of the following:

2. Either of the following: 2. Either of the following: a. All steam generator levels <10%

a. Greater than 200'F on any valid a. Greater than 200'F on any valid wide range.

incore thermocouple.* incore thermocouple.* b. All steam dump valves to condenser

b. Uncontrolled temperature rise, with b. Uncontrolled temperature rise, with (AB UV-34, 35 and 36) are NOT no actions available that will likely no actions available that will likely responding to steam header pressure prevent approaching 200°F on any prevent approaching 200°F on any controller (AB PK-507 or valid incore thermocouple.* valid incore thermocouple.* AB UK-33).

and c. All steam generator steam dump

3. a Water level in the reactor vessel is valves to atmosphere are NOT less than 2.0 inches on operating properly (AB-PIC-I A, BB-LI-0053A or B. 2A, 3A and 4A).

or d. Complete loss of both RHR trains.

b. RVLIS (pumps off) <55% (A complete loss of ESW or CCW constitutes a complete loss of RHR.)

or

3. All of the following:

a. The Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) is If a thermocouple is not available, use Wide If a thermocouple is not available, use Wide inoperable as a result of level or It is not intended to declare an Unusual Range Hot Leg temperature indications: Range Hot Leg temperature indications: temperature.

Event due to an unknown condition or

• BBTI413A - Loop 1

• BBTI413A - Loop 1 b. Complete loss of both UHS Cooling failure resulting in exceeding the ° BBTI423A - Loop 2 ° BBTI423A - Loop 2 Tower trains.

allowable action statement time. The ° RECORDERS ° RECORDERS allowable action statement time is always BBTR413 - Loop I BBTR413 - Loop I available from the time of the discovery. BBTR423 - Loop 2 BBTR423 - Loop 2 BBTR433 - Loop 3 BBTR433 - Loop 3 BBTR443 - Loop 4 BBTR443 - Loop 4 Page 9 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-P"" 01 EMERGENCY ACTI ,EVELS Rev. 03\[

Group 4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Communication Events RCS/Fued Events Reactor Protection System SITE GENERAL UNUSUAL EVENT UNUSUAL EVENT UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY P. Q. R. S. T. U.

Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Leakage Failure of Reactor Protection Failure of Reactor Protection Failure of the Reactor Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite System Instrumentation to System Instrumentation to Protection System to Communication Capabilities Complete or Initiate an Complete or Initiate an Complete an Automatic Trip Automatic Reactor Trip Automatic Reactor Trip Once and Manual Trip Was NOT Once a Reactor Protection a Reactor Protection System Successful and There Is System Setpoint Has Been Setpoint Has Been Exceeded Indication of an Extreme Exceeded and Manual Trip and Manual Trip Was NOT Challenge to the Ability to Was Successful. Successful. Cool the Core.

MODES: 1-6 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1, 2 MODES: 1,2 MODES: 1, 2 MODES: 1-6 Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators Indicators

1. Anyofthe I. Anyofthe 1. All of the following: 1. All of the following: 1. All of the following:

1. All of the following on-site following: following: a. An automatic (not a. An automatic (not a. An automatic (not systems:

a. >1.0 ptCi/gram a. Unidentified manual) reactor trip manual) reactor trip manual) reactor trip

a. Complete failure of Plant Dose leakage greater setpoint has been setpoint has been setpoint has been telephone systems Equivalent than 10 gpm. exceeded as listed in exceeded as listed in exceeded as listed in

b. Complete failure of Gai 1-131 for b. Pressure Attachment 1 of Attachment I of E-0. Attachment I of E-0.

tronics systems greater than a boundary E-0. b. An automatic reactor b. An automatic reactor

c. Complete failure of Plant 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> leakage greater b. An automatic trip is NOT trip is NOT radios continuous than 10 gpm. reactor trip is NOT successful. successful.

d. Complete failure of Plant period. c. Identified successful. c. A manual reactor c. A manual reactor Emergency Dedicated Phones.

b. Dose leakage greater c. A manual reactor trip is NOT trip is NOT or successful using Equivalent than 25 gpm. trip IS successful successful using

2. All of the following offsite systems:

1-131 activity using manual trip manual trip switches manual trip switches

a. Complete failure of ENS (Red exceeding the switches SB-HS-1 SB-HS-l on RL003 SB-HS-1 on RL003 Phone) line.

limits of Tech on RL003 OR AND SB-HS-42 on AND SB-HS-42 on

b. Complete failure of Back Up Spec Fig. SB-HS-42 on RL006. RL006.

Radio System (BURS).

3.4-1. (ITS RL006. d. Meet the entry

c. Complete failure of Plant Fig. 3.4.16-1) requirements for telephone system.

FRC. I0_R FRH. 1,

d. Complete failure of the c. >I 00/E bar p Ci/gram of red path summaries Sheriffs radio system.

gross for core cooling and

e. Complete failure of the radioactivity. heat sink.

SENTRY notification system.

Page 10 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS IND I CATORS BASES Page I of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 1 Abnormal Radiation Events Emergency Classification Initiating Condition Unusual Event A. Any Unplanned Release of Radioactivity to the Environment That Exceeds 2 Times the Radiological Effluent Control Limits in the ODCM (APA-ZZ-01003) for

Ž60 minutes.

MODES: At All Times Indicators

1. All of the following:

a. A valid alarm and reading on any effluent monitor:

HB-RE-18 (Channel 186)

GT-RE-21B (Channel 213)

GT-RE-10B (Channel 103) setpoint) value.

b. The valid reading is 2 times the Hi Hi alarm setpoint (trip actuation.

c. The release cannot be terminated within 60 minutes of the alarm OR

2. Both of the following:

a. Confirmed sample analysis indicates that a release exceeding 2 times the applicable values of the ODCM (APA-ZZ-01003), has occurred.

b. The release cannot be terminated within 60 minutes.

Bases The Radiological Effluent Control Limits (REC's) used are in the FSAR Chapter 16.

Any Unplanned Release would be any inadvertent or accidental release of radioactive material.

An Unplanned Release is also a release via normal pathways without a release permit or proper authorization, or without proper sampling and analysis, or resulting in significant deviation from the requirements of the release permit.

Valid alarms and readings are those verified by the operators to be the results of effluent concentrations. Invalid alarms and readings may be the result of electronic noise, radio frequency interference, electromagnetic frequency interference, or spurious spikes of unknown nature. A buildup of radioactivity within the monitor or an increase in the ambient background for the monitor would also cause an invalid alarm.

The time frame of 60 minutes is used to indicate a definite loss of control. This is also the time used in IOCFR50.72 for a continuing release that would require notification. This loss of control for >60 minutes is of more significance than the level of release in this EAL.

Page 2 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 1 Abnormal Radiation Events Initiating Condition Emergency Classification B. Any Unplanned Release of Alert Radioactivity to the Environment That Exceeds 200 Times the Radiological Effluent Control Limits in the ODCM (APA-ZZ-01003) for a15 minutes.

MODES: At All Times Indicators

1. All of the following:

a. A valid alarm and reading on any effluent monitor:

HB-RE-18 GT-RE-21B GT-RE-10B

b. The valid reading is 200 times the Hi Hi alarm setpoint (trip setpoint) value.

c. The release cannot be terminated within 15 minutes of the alarm actuation.

OR

2. Both of the following:

a. A Valid reading on any of the following monitors:

AB-RE-0111 >27 mrem/hr AB-RE-0112 >27 mrem/hr AB-RE-0113 >27 mrem/hr AB-RE-0114 >27 mrem/hr FC-RE-0385 >150 mrem/hr

b. The release cannot be terminated within 15 minutes.

OR

3. Both of the following:

a. Confirmed sample analysis indicates that a release exceeding 200 times the applicable values of the ODCM (APA-ZZ-01003), has occurred.

b. The release cannot be terminated within 15 minutes.

Bases The Radiological Effluent Control Limits (REC's) used are in the FSAR Chapter 16. The release values for 2.a. are based on average meteorological data and a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> release duration.

This event escalates from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of 100. The increased level of release is the significant factor in this EAL. The duration is reduced to 15 minutes in recognition of the increased level.

Page 3 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 1 Abnormal Radiation Events Initiating Condition Emergency Classification C. EAB Dose Resulting Site Emergency From an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Any of the following:

"*1. A valid reading on the Unit Vent monitor GT-RE-21B indicates

>2.42E+8 PCi/sec for 15 minutes or longer.

• @2. Both of the following:

a. A Valid reading on any of the following monitors:

AB-RE-0111 >146 mrem/hr AB-RE-0112 >146 mrem/hr AB-RE-0113 >146 mrem/hr AB-RE-0114 >146 mrem/hr FC-RE-0385 >850 mrem/hr

b. The reading has been, or is expected to be, exceeded for 15 minutes or longer.

3. A valid dose projection indicates >100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem CDE thyroid dose at, or beyond, the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY using in plant rad data or field monitoring team survey results.

4. Field survey results at, or beyond, the EAB corresponding to

>100 mrem/hr TEDE for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (or expected to continue for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) or

>500 mrem/hr CDE thyroid for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of inhalation.

• Declare the event using this indicator only if an actual dose projections, per Indicator 3 cannot be performed within 15 minutes of the monitors exceeding the reading.

@Release values based on average meteorological data and a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> release duration.

Bases Valid alarms and readings are those verified by the operators to be the results of effluent concentrations. Invalid alarms and readings may be the result of electronic noise, radio frequency interference, electromagnetic frequency interference, or spurious spikes of unknown nature. A buildup of radioactivity within the monitor or an increase in the ambient background for the monitor would also cause an invalid alarm.

The 100 mrem integrated dose in this initiating condition provides a desirable gradient (one order of magnitude) between the Alert, Site Emergency, and General Emergency classes. It is deemed that exposures less than this limit are not consistent with the Site Emergency class description. The 500 mrem integrated thyroid dose was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA Protective Action Guidelines for whole body and thyroid.

The release value for item 1 above, rad monitor GT-RE-21B, is based on average meteorological data and a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> release duration. Actual meteorology should be used whenever possible since it gives the most accurate dose assessment. (CARS 200104820)

The release values for 2.a. are based on average meteorological data and a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> release duration. Actual Meteorology should be used whenever possible since it gives the most accurate dose assessment.

Thyroid doses are based upon EPA 400, manual of protective action guides and protective actions for nuclear incidents.

Page 4 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 1 Abnormal Radiation Events Initiating Condition Emergency Classification D. EAB Dose Resulting General Emergency From an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity Exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Any of the following:

• 1. A valid reading on the Unit Vent monitor GT-RE-21B indicates >2.42E+9 pCi/sec for 15 minutes or longer.

• @2. Both of the following:

a. A Valid reading on any of the following monitors:

AB-RE-0111 >1460 mrem/hr AB-RE-0112 >1460 mrem/hr AB-RE-0113 >1460 mrem/hr AB-RE-0114 >1460 mrem/hr FC-RE-0385 >8500 mrem/hr

b. The reading has been, or is expected to be, exceeded for 15 minutes or longer.

3. A valid dose projection indicates >1000 mrem TEDE or >5000 mrem CDE thyroid dose at, or beyond, the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY using inplant rad data or field monitoring team survey results.

4. Field survey results at, or beyond, the EAB corresponding to >1000 mrem/hr TEDE for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (or expected to continue for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) or >5000 mrem/hr CDE thyroid for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of inhalation.

• Declare the event using this indicator only if an actual dose projections per Indicator 3 cannot be performed within 15 minutes of the monitors exceeding the reading.

@Release values based on average meteorological data and a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> release duration.

Bases Valid alarms and readings are those verified by the operators to be the results of effluent concentrations. Invalid alarms and readings may be the result of electronic noise, radio frequency interference, electromagnetic frequency interference, or spurious spikes of unknown nature. A buildup of radioactivity within the monitor or an increase in the ambient background for the monitor would also cause an invalid alarm.

The setpoints in Indicator 1., are 10 times the values calculated for EAL 1C. The 1000 mrem whole body and the 5000 mrem thyroid integrated dose are based on the EPA protective action guidance which indicates that public protective actions are indicated if the dose exceeds 1 rem whole body or 5 rem thyroid. This is consistent with the emergency class description for a General Emergency. This level constitutes the upper level of the desirable gradient for the Site Emergency.

The release value for item 1 above, rad monitor GT-RE-21B, is based on average meteorological data and a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> release duration. Actual meteorology should be used whenever possible since it gives the most accurate dose assessment.

The release values for 2.a. are based on average meteorological data and a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> release duration. Actual Meteorology should be used whenever possible since it gives the most accurate dose assessment.

Thyroid doses are based upon EPA 400, manual of protective action guides and protective actions for nuclear incidents.

Page 5 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 1 Abnormal Radiation Events Initiating Condition Emergency Classification E.* An Unexpected Increase in Unusual Event Plant Radiation.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Any of the following:

1. Spent Fuel Pool level is decreasing on EC-LI-0039A with Normal makeup being added, and all irradiated fuel assemblies remain covered.

2. Refueling Pool level is decreasing on BB-LI-0053A or B with Normal makeup being added, and all irradiated fuel assemblies remain covered.

3. Any valid (Confirmed by HP survey) ARM (other than a Group 1,G. Safe Shutdown ARM) >1000 times normal. (Normal levels can be considered as the monitor reading prior to the noticed increase.)

• This Initiating Condition is not meant to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, upper internal movements, etc.)

Bases Valid alarms and readings are those verified by the operators to be the results of effluent concentrations. Invalid alarms and readings may be the result of electronic noise, radio frequency interference, electromagnetic frequency interference, or spurious spikes of unknown nature. A buildup of radioactivity within the monitor or an increase in the ambient background for the monitor would also cause an invalid alarm.

All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary, thus impact to public health and safety is very low.

Indicator 3 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

Page 6 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 1 Abnormal Radiation Events Initiating Condition Emergency Classification F.* Major Damage to Irradiated Alert Fuel or Loss of Water Level That Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Any of the following:

1. A VALID Hi-Hi Alarm on Fuel Building exhaust monitors GG-RE-27 or 28

2. Containment refueling bridge area radiation monitor (SD-41) >100 mR/hr.

3. Fuel building area radiation monitor (SD-37 or 38) >30 mR/hr.

4. Report of visual observation of loss of water level resulting in irradiated fuel being uncovered.

• This Initiating Condition is not meant to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, upper internal movements.

Bases This Initiating Condition applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage.

NUREG-0818, "Emergency Action Levels for Light Water Reactors," forms the basis for these EALs.

For indicator 1, the Hi-Hi alarm setpoint is the Tech. Spec. 3.3.8-3 required trip setpoint value. This setpoint is established such that the actual submersion dose rate would not exceed 4 mR/hr in the fuel building. This would be representative of the conditions required for this EAL.

Page 7 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 1 Abnormal Radiation Events For Indicator 2:

Containment Dose Rate factor.

The Dose Rate Conversion Factor for this calculation is an EPA 400 based conversion Rev. 1. See Attachment 3, Page 1 of 4. The The source term originates from Calc ZZ-341, of 5 E-3 RCi/cc will result in a dose rate of Tech Spec (FSAR 16.11.2.4.1.B) concentration 100 mR/Hr to personnel inside containment.

D/R = (CONC) (DRCF) equivalent This corresponds well to the Tech Spec (FSAR 16.11.2.4.2) basis statement that the Therefore, a dose rate on SD-41 of >100 mR/Hr would dose rate is "approximately 150 mR/Hr."

be an indication for declaration of an Alert (currently set to Alarm at 100 mR/Hr to indicate a High Radiation Area).

D/R > 100 mR/Hr (ARM SD-41)

For Indicator 3:

Fuel Building Dose Rates The Dose Rate Conversion Factor for this calculation is an EPA 400 based conversion factor.

4. A The source term originates from Calc ZZ-341, Rev. 1. See Attachment 3, Page 2 of 1.46 E-3, the Hi-Hi alarm setpoint on GT-RE-27/28 will result in a dose rate concentration of of 30 mR/Hr to personnel inside the Fuel Building.

of Therefore, a dose rate of >30 mR/Hr on SD-37 or -38 would be an indication for declaration mR/Hr per Tech Spec Table 3.3-6 (FSAR 16.3.3.6) based on an Alert (Alarm setpoint is 15 criticality monitoring).

D/R > 30 mR/Hr (ARM SD-37 or 38) 7 as at Indicator 4, eliminates the need for Spent Fuel Pool & Refueling Pool level indication, capable of displaying level as low as the top of a fuel assembly.

Callaway indication is not Page 8 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 1 Abnormal Radiation Events Initiating Condition Emergency Classification G.* Release of Rad Material, Alert or an Increase in Rad Level that Either Impedes Safe Operations or the Ability to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Any of the following:

1. Valid (confirmed by HP) reading on SD-33 (Control Room) >15 mR/hr.

2. Valid (confirmed by HP) reading on the following Safe Shutdown Area ARMs:

SDRE-26 AB 2026 RHR Hx Area Wall SDRE-23 AB 2000 RHR Hx Area Corridor SDRE-15 AB 1974 West Corridor-Central SDRE-16 AB 1974 West Corridor-South

>1000 times normal (normal levels can be considered as the monitor reading prior to the noticed increase).

• This Initiating Condition is not meant to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, upper internal movements, etc.)

Bases Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed by the operators to be correct.

This Initiating Condition addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The cause and/or magnitude of the increase in radiation levels are not a concern of this Initiating Condition. The Emergency Coordinator must consider the source or cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if any other Initiating Condition may be involved. For example, a dose rate of 15 mR/hr in the control room may be a problem in itself. However, the increase may also be indicative of high dose rates in the containment due to a LOCA. In this latter case, a Site Emergency or General Emergency may be indicated by the fission product barrier matrix ICs.

Areas requiring continuous occupancy include the control room. The value of 15 mR/hr is derived from the GDC 19 value of 5 rem in 30 days with adjustment for expected occupancy times. Although Section III.D.3 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements", provides that the 15 mR/hr value can be averaged over the 30 days, the value is used here without averaging, as a 30 day duration implies an event potentially more significant than an Alert.

For Indicator 2, 1000 times normal represents the factor used in the Unusual Event, however these particular monitors are located in areas of required infrequent access to maintain plant safety functions.

This Initiating Condition is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

Page 9 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 2 Fission Product Barriers CONTAINMENT BARRIER EALs:

The Containment Barrier includes the containment building, its connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier also includes the main steam, feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the containment building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

Loss Indicators

1. Containment Pressure Rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure increase indicates a loss of containment integrity. Containment pressure and sump levels should increase as a result of the mass and energy release into containment from a LOCA. Thus, sump level or pressure not increasing indicates containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity.

2. Containment Isolation Valve Status This EAL is intended to address incomplete containment isolation that allows a breach of the containment barrier as described above. It represents a loss of the containment barrier. It is not intended to address failures during testing. The existence of an in-line charcoal filter does not stop a release path since the filter is not effective at removing fission noble gases.

3. SG Release With Primary To Secondary Leakage This EAL addresses SG tube ruptures with secondary side releases to atmosphere including those from the atmospheric steam dump valves (manual or automatic), main steam safety valves and steam supplied to the TDAFW Turbine unless successfully isolated via appropriate isolation valves. For larger breaks RCS BARRIER SG Tube Rupture "Loss" or "Potential Loss" EALs would result in an Alert. For SG tube ruptures which may involve multiple steam generators or unisolable secondary line breaks, this EAL would exist in conjunction with RCS BARRIER "Loss" EAL 2 and would result in a Site Emergency. Escalation to General Emergency would be based on the addition of a "Loss" or "Potential Loss" of the FUEL CLAD BARRIER.

Page 10 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 2 Fission Product Barriers CONTAINMEN4T BARRIER EALs (cont):

Potential Loss Indicators

4. Critical Safety Function Status RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function derived from appropriate instrument readings and/or sampling results, and thus represents a potential loss of containment. Conditions leading to a containment RED path result from RCS barrier and/or Fuel Clad Barrier Loss. Thus, this EAL is primarily a discriminator between Site Emergency and General Emergency representing a potential loss of the third barrier.

5. Containment Pressure The second potential loss EAL represents a potential loss of containment in that the containment heat removal/depressurization system (e.g., containment sprays, but not including containment venting strategies) are either lost or performing in a degraded manner, as indicated by containment pressure greater than the setpoint at which the equipment was suppose to have actuated.

6. Significant Radioactive Inventory in Ctmt If GT-RE-59 and GT-RE-60 are not available, refer to HTP-ZZ-07010, Alternate Method to Obtain CHARMS Reading.

The (>15,000 R/hr) reading is a value, which indicates significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of RCS Barriers. A major release of radioactivity requiring offsite protective actions from core damage is not possible unless a major failure of fuel cladding allows radioactive material to be released from the core into the reactor coolant. Regardless of whether containment is challenged, this amount of activity in containment, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment, such that a General Emergency declaration is warranted. NUREG-1228, "Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents,"

indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less than 20%. The radiation monitor reading corresponding to 20% fuel clad damage was calculated using the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) "Post Accident Core Damage Assessment Methodology" (CDAM) dated November 1984. This document was approved by the NRC for core damage assessment. Based upon a Containment high Range Area Radiation Monitor (CHARM) reading, a percent clad damage (equivalent to percent noble gas release) can be estimated. Westinghouse makes the assumption that any percent noble gas release requires an equal percent clad damage. Conversely, a Radiation Monitor reading can be produced given the percent clad damage.

7. Core Exit Thermocouples The condition in this EAL potential loss represents imminent melt sequence which, if not corrected, could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure.

8. Radiation Increase Outside Containment This potential loss indicator represents a loss of the containment barrier by increased radiation levels in areas adjacent to the containment which cannot be explained from leaks outside of the containment barrier.

Page I11 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 2 Fission Product Barriers CONTAINMENT BARRIER EALs (cont):

3

)

Radiation Monitor Reading (R/hr) x CTMT Volume (ft R/hr - MWt =

Plant Power (MWt) x 2xl06(ft 3

)

where:

R/hr - MWt = 5.5 for a 20% noble gas release equivalent to 20% clad failure.

6 3 CTMT Volume = 2.5x10 ft Plant Power = 3565 MWt Solving for Radiation Monitor Reading:

3 5.5(3565 MWt) (2xl0 6 ft )

CHARM Reading = 2.2.5xl_

5x106ft _3 _ _

= 15686 R/hr

7. Core Exit Thermocouples In this EAL, the function restoration procedures are those emergency operating procedures that address the recovery of the core cooling critical safety functions.

The procedure is considered effective if the temperature is decreasing or if the vessel water level is increasing.

The conditions in this potential loss EAL represent imminent melt sequence, which, if not corrected, could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. In conjunction with the core exit thermocouple EALs, RCS BARRIER indicator

1. and FUEL CLAD BARRIER indicator 1., this EAL would result in the declaration of a General Emergency -- loss of two barriers and the potential loss of a third. If the function restoration procedures are ineffective, there is no "success" path.

Several accident analyses (e.g., NUREG--1150) have concluded that function restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the reactor vessel in a significant fraction of the core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core melt sequence.

Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes.

The Emergency Coordinator should make the declaration as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be ineffective.

RCS BARRIER EALs:

The RCS Barrier includes the RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

Page 12 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 2 Fission Product Barriers Loss Indicators

1. RCS Leak Rate The "Loss" EAL addresses conditions where leakage from the RCS is greater than available inventory control capacity such that a loss of subcooling has occurred. The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory control systems are inadequate in maintaining RCS pressure and inventory against the mass loss through the leak. Safety injection initiated indicates all available inventory control capacity is in service.

2. SG Tube Rupture This EAL is intended to address the full spectrum of Steam Generator (SG) tube rupture events in conjunction with Containment Barrier "Loss" EAL 3 and Fuel Clad Barrier EALs. The "Loss" EAL addresses ruptured SG(s) with an unisolable Secondary Line Break corresponding to the loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers (RCS Barrier and Containment Barrier, this EAL will always result in Containment Barrier "Loss" EAL 3).

This allows the direct release of radioactive fission and activation products to the environment. Resultant offsite dose rates are a function of many variables. Examples include: Coolant Activity, Actual Leak Rate, SG Carry Over, Iodine Partitioning, and Meteorology. Therefore, dose assessment in accordance with EAL 1D., "Site Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 mR Whole Body or 5000 mR Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release Using Actual Meteorology", is required when there is indication that the fuel matrix/clad is potentially lost.

Indications are consistent with the diagnostic activities of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) . This includes indication of S/G level increasing uncontrollably, increased secondary radiation levels, and an uncontrolled or complete depressurization of the ruptured SG. Secondary radiation increases are observed via radiation monitoring of Condenser Air Ejector Discharge, SG Blowdown, and SG Sampling System.

Determination of the "uncontrolled" depressurization of the ruptured SG should be based on indication that the pressure decrease in the ruptured steam generator is not a function of operator action. This should prevent declaration based on a depressurization that results from an EOP induced cooldown of the RCS that does not involve the prolonged release of contaminated secondary coolant from the affected SG to the environment. This EAL includes unisolable steam breaks, feed breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves. The manual use of a ruptured SG PORV for cooldown and steam supplied to the TDAFW Turbine also meets this Initiating Condition.

Page 13 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 2 Fission Product Barriers RCS BARRIER EALs (cont):

3. Containment Radiation Monitoring If GT-RE-59 and GT-RE-60 are not available, refer to HTP-ZZ-07010, Alternate Method to Obtain CHARMS Reading.

The (6.4 R/hr) reading is a value, which indicates the release of reactor coolant to the containment. The reading was calculated assuming the instantaneous release and dispersal of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory associated with normal operating concentrations (i.e., within T/S) into the containment atmosphere.

Table 6 of ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 was used to determine the RCS source term for nominal concentrations of noble gas and iodine radionuclides. A containment radiation level of greater than 6.4 R/Hr on GT-RE-59/60 is used to indicate a loss of RCS barrier fission product barrier. See Attachment 3, Page 3 of 4.

Potential Loss Indicators

4. Critical Safety Function Status RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function derived from appropriate instrument readings, and these CSFs indicate a potential loss of RCS barrier.

5. RCS Leak Rate The "Potential Loss" EAL is based on the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by normal operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System which is considered as any one of three centrifugal charging pumps discharging to the charging header. In conjunction with the SG Tube Rupture "Potential Loss" EAL this assures that any event that results in significant RCS inventory shrinkage or loss (e.g., events leading to reactor trip and ECCS actuation) will result in no lower than an "Alert" emergency classification. The 50 gpm indicator is based on 1 CCP in service with a 75 gpm letdown orifice in service.

6. SG Tube Rupture The "Potential Loss" indications are consistent with the diagnostic activities of the Emergency Operating Procedures with indications based on the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by normal operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System. This is considered as any one of three centrifugal charging pumps discharging to the charging header. In conjunction with the RCS Leak Rate "Potential Loss" EAL this assures that any event that results in significant RCS inventory shrinkage or loss (e.g., events leading to reactor trip and ECCS actuation) will result in no lower than an "Alert" emergency classification.

Page 14 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 2 Fission Product Barriers FUEL CLAD BARRIER EALs:

The Fuel Clad Barrier is the zircalloy tubes that contains the fuel pellets.

Loss Indicators

1. Critical Safety Function Status RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function. ORANGE path indicates a severe challenge to the safety function.

Core Cooling - RED indicates significant superheating and core uncovery and is considered to indicate loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

A separate core exit TC value is not used as a loss indicator, as a 12000 TC value is a red path for core cooling and would be a redundant indication.

2. Primary Coolant Activity Level Assessment by the NUMARC EAL Task Force indicates that this amount of coolant activity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. This amount of clad damage indicates significant clad heating and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost.

DEI is determined by Chemistry procedure CTP-ZZ-08100, Post Accident Sampling Guidelines.

3. Containment Radiation Monitoring If GT-RE-59 and GT-RE-60 are not available, refer to HTP-ZZ-07010, Alternate Method to Obtain CHARMS Reading.

The >2800 R/hr reading is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage, into the containment. The reading was calculated assuming the instantaneous release and dispersal of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory associated with a concentration of 300 RCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131 into the containment atmosphere. Reactor coolant concentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the maximum concentrations (including iodine spiking) allowed within technical specifications and are therefore indicative of fuel damage (approximately 2 - 5% clad failure depending on core inventory and RCS volume). See Attachment 3, Page 4 of 4.

Page 15 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 2 Fission Product Barriers FUEL CLAD BARRIER EALs (cont):

Potential Loss Indicators RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function. ORANGE path indicates a severe challenge to the safety function.

4. Critical Safety Function Status Core Cooling - ORANGE indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad damage may occur. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme challenge and thus these two items indicate potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

A separate core exit TC value is not used as a potential loss indicator, as a 7000 TC value is an orange path for core cooling and would be a redundant indication.

5. Core Exit Thermocouples The 7000 corresponds to a loss of subcooling that will require at least a Core Cooling "ORANGE path".

6. Reactor Vessel Water Level This level is approximately at the top of the active fuel and corresponds to the Core Cooling "ORANGE path" values.

Page 16 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification A. Confirmed Security Event Unusual Event Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Any of the following:

1. Bomb device discovered within the plant Protected Area and outside the following Safe Shutdown Areas:

"* Area 5

"* Containment

"* Aux Feed Pump Rooms

"* Aux Building

"* Diesel Generator Building

"* UHS Cooling Tower

"* ESW Pumphouse

"* Control Building

"* RWST

"* Fuel Building

2. Confirmed report of an attempted entry or sabotage.

3. A site specific credible security threat.

Bases:

A Security Threat is any event in which there is a reason to believe that a person or persons has threatened to commit or cause, or attempted to commit or cause any of the following.

1. A theft or unlawful diversion of nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel from the plant site.

2. Significant physical damage to the plant, its equipment, nuclear fuel, spent nuclear fuel or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel.

3. Interruption of the plant's normal operations through the unauthorized use of, or tampering with, the plant's equipment, machinery, components, controls or security system.

4. Any armed attack of the plant's Protected area.

5. Credible bomb or extortion threat.

6. Confirmed hostage or duress situation at the Callaway Plant.

A confirmed threat is considered credible if notification of the threat has come from the NRC, FBI, or Local Law Enforcement and they consider the threat to be credible or if the threat is deemed credible by the SS/EDO, and the threat is specifically directed at the Callaway Plant.

Page 17 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification B. Security Event in the Alert Plant Protected Area.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Confirmed report of an intrusion by a hostile force into the plant Protected Area.

Bases:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Unusual Event.

Page 18 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification C. Security Event in a Site Emergency Safe Shutdown Area.

MODES: At All Times Indicator Any of the following

1. Bomb device discovered within any of the following areas:

"* Area 5

"* Containment

"* Aux Feed Pump Rooms

"* Aux Building

"* Diesel Generator Building

"* UHS Cooling Tower

"* ESW Pumphouse

"* Control Building

"* RWST

"* Fuel Building

2. Confirmed report of an intrusion by a hostile force into any of the following areas:

"* Area 5

"* Containment

"* Aux Feed Pump Rooms

"* Aux Building

"* Diesel Generator Building

"* UHS Cooling Tower

"* ESW Pumphouse

"* Control Building

"* RWST

"* Fuel Building Bases:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert Initiating Condition in that a hostile force has progressed from the Protected Area to a Safe Shutdown Area. These areas contain Safe Shutdown Systems as defined per the FSAR Appendix 5.4(A).

Page 19 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Emergency Classification Initiating Condition D. Security Event Resulting General Emergency in a Loss of the Ability to Reach and Maintain Cold Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times Indicator Any of the following:

1. Occupation of the Control Room by a hostile force.

2. Occupation of the Aux Shutdown Panel by a hostile force.

Bases:

This Initiating Condition encompasses conditions under which a hostile force has taken physical control of Safe Shutdown areas required to reach and maintain safe shutdown.

Page 20 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification E. Fire Within Protected Unusual Event Area Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Verification MODES: At All Times Indicator

1. Fire in or adjacent to any of the following:

"* Area 5

"* Containment

"* Aux Feed Pump Rooms

"* Aux Building

"* Diesel Generator Building

"* UHS Cooling Tower

"* ESW Pumphouse

"* Control Building

"* RWST

• Fuel Building and

2. Not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room verification of a fire.

Bases:

The purpose of this Initiating Condition is to address the magnitude and extent of fires that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. This excludes such times as fires within administration buildings, waste-baskets fires, and other small fires of no safety consequence. This Initiating Condition applies to buildings and areas adjacent to Safe Shutdown areas or other significant buildings or areas. The intent of this Initiating Condition is not to include buildings (i.e., warehouses) or areas that are not immediately adjacent to Safe Shutdown areas. These areas contain Safe Shutdown Systems as defined per the FSAR Appendix 5.4(A). Verification of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the control room to determine that the control room alarm is not spurious.

Page 21 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification F. Fire Affecting the Alert Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times Indicators

1. Fire in any of the following areas:

"* Area 5

"* Containment

"* Aux Feed Pump Rooms

"* Aux Building

"* Diesel Generator Building

"* UHS Cooling Tower

"* ESW Pumphouse

"* Control Building

"* RWST

"* Fuel Building and

2. There is visible damage to permanent structures or equipment, affecting the operability of safety related equipment.

Bases:

Areas containing functions and systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant are specified per FSAR Appendix 5.4(A).

The inclusion of a "report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The declaration of an Alert and the activation of the TSC will provide the Emergency Coordinator with the resources needed to perform these damage assessments.

Page 22 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification G. Natural and Destructive Unusual Event Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Any of the following:

1. a. Response spectrum recorder operating annunciator 98E alarms in the Control Room and

b. Verified to be a real event per OTO-SG-00001.

2. Report of a turbine rotating component failure resulting in casing penetration or major damage to seals causing a rapid loss of lubricating oil or hydrogen.

3. Explosion, vehicle crash or tornado in or adjacent to any of the following:

"* Area 5

"* Containment

"* Aux Feed Pump Rooms

"* Aux Building

"* Diesel Generator Building

"* UHS Cooling Tower

"* ESW Pumphouse

"* Control Building

"* RWST

"* Fuel Building Bases:

The Protected Area Boundary is defined in the site security plan.

Indicator 1 was developed on a site-specific basis. Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate. Method of detection is response validated per OTO-SG-00001. As defined in the EPRI-sponsored "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake", dated October 1989, a "felt earthquake" is:

An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators on duty at the time, and (b) for plants with operable seismic instrumentation, the seismic switches of the plant are activated. For most plants with seismic instrumentation, the seismic switches are set at an acceleration of about 0.01g.

Page 23 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Indicator 2 is intended to address main turbine rotating component failures of significant magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for rapid loss of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment.

In indicator 3 only those events in or adjacent to any area containing Safe Shutdown Systems, should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration.

Page 24 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification H. Natural and Destructive Alert Phenomena Affecting a Safe Shutdown Area.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Any of the following:

1. a. Operating basis earthquake annunciator 98D alarms in the Control Room and

b. Earthquake greater than OBE levels (0.12g)in the horizontal and vertical directions as indicated by LIGHT ,'OSG-AE-l"or LIGHT "OSG-AE-2"

2. a. Report of a tornado, high wind, vehicle crash, explosion, or other natural or destructive phenomena to any of the following Safe Shutdown areas:

• Area 5

• Containment

• Aux Feed Pump Rooms

• Aux Building

• Diesel Generator Building

• UHS Cooling Tower

• ESW Pumphouse

• Control Building

• RWST

• Fuel Building and

b. There is visible damage to permanent structures or equipment, affecting plant operations.

Bases:

Indicator 1 is based on FSAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude can cause damage to safety functions.

Indicator 2 specifies areas containing systems and functions required for safe shutdown of the plant per FSAR Appendix 5.4(A). This indicator is intended to address such items as plane or helicopter crash into a plant vital area.

Each of these EALs is intended to address events that may have resulted in a plant vital area being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to plant safety systems. The initial "report" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment magnitude of the damage. The declaration of an Alert and the activation of the TSC will provide the Emergency Coordinator with the resources needed to perform these damage assessments.

Page 25 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification I. Release of Toxic or Unusual Event Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Any of the following:

1. Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that enter within the Exclusion Area Boundary, that have created a HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE per CTP-ZZ-01300, deemed detrimental to safe operation.

2. Confirmed report by local, County or State Officials of potential evacuation of site personnel as determined from the DOT evacuation tables for selected hazardous materials in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials.

Bases:

This Initiating Condition is based on releases in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health of plant personnel or affecting the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (i.e., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.) The evacuation area is as determined from the DOT Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials, in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials.

This EAL does not apply to routine or planned activities such as painting, use of cleaners/solvents, etc., that do not affect safe operation of the Plant.

Page 26 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification J. Release of Toxic or Alert Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Any of the following:

1. Report or detection of a toxic or flammable gases, not properly contained, within or adjacent to any of the following Safe Shutdown Areas, that have created a HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE per CTP-ZZ-01300, jeopardizing operation of systems required to establish or maintain Cold Shutdown.

"* Area 5

"* Containment

"* Aux Feed Pump Rooms

"* Aux Building

"* Diesel Generator Building

"* UHS Cooling Tower

"* ESW Pumphouse

"* Control Building

"* RWST

"* Fuel Building Bases:

This Initiating Condition is based on gases that have entered a plant structure affecting the to Safe Shutdown Areas. The safe operation of the plant. This Initiating Condition applies (i.e., warehouses) or other intent of this Initiating Condition is not to include buildings It is appropriate that areas that are not immediately adjacent to Safe Shutdown Areas. damage has occurred.

increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential Page 27 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification K. Control Room Evacuation Alert Has Been Initiated.

MODES: At All Times Indicators Entry into OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility, is required.

Bases:

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or other Emergency Operations Center is necessary.

Page 28 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 3 Hazards Affecting Plant Safety Initiating Condition Emergency Classification Control Room Evacuation Site Emergency L.

Has Been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Established.

MODES: At All Times Indicators

1. Entry into OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility is required.

and

2. Control of the Aux Feed System and a SG PORV for cooldown cannot be established within 15 minutes.

Bases:

Expeditious transfer of safety systems has not occurred but fission product barrier damage may not yet be indicated. The time for transfer is based on how quickly control must be reestablished without core uncovering and/or core damage. In cold shutdown and refueling modes, operator concern is directed toward maintaining core cooling such as is discussed in Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal." In power operation, hot standby, and hot shutdown modes, operator concern is primarily directed toward maintaining critical safety functions and thereby assuring fission product barrier integrity.

The 15 minutes is consistent with Westinghouse Response Plan for Immediate Evacuation of the Control Room Time Study. "Plant cooldown established" per OTO-ZZ-00001 would require Aux feed to be initiated and control of SG Power Operated Relief valves and the Aux feed pumps to be established from the Aux shutdown panel.

Page 29 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification A. Unplanned Loss of Most Unusual Event or All Alarms (Annunciators) for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

MODES: 1-4 Indicators

1. Any of the following:

a. 3 of 4 field power supplies have failed for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all annunciators) and not a result of planned action.

b. Field Power Supply voltage is less than 105 volts for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all annunciators) and not a result of planned action.

c. Ten or more logic power supplies have failed for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all annunciators) and not a result of planned action.

d. Five or more Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have failed for greater than 15 minutes and not a result of planned action.

or

2. All of the following:

a. Any combination of power supplies (including Optical Isolators) or Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have failed for greater than 15 minutes.

b. Any minimum compensatory actions, per OTO-RK-00001, cannot be maintained.

c. The loss does not result from planned action.

Bases:

This Initiating Condition and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment.

Since the system is operating at just over 3 amps, and each power supply is rated for a maximum 3 amps, soon after losing the third power supply the fourth will fail due to overcurrent. Output voltage of the Field Power Supply less than 105 volts indicates that a degraded voltage situation exists. Under this condition, all Field Power Supplies are considered inoperable.

Losing 10 of the 14 logic power supplies is considered losing "Most" annunciators.

Losing 5 of the 8 annunciator racks is considered losing "Most" of the annunciators.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled modes, no Initiating Condition is indicated during these modes of operation.

This Unusual Event will be escalated to an Alert if a transient is in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication.

Page 30 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification B. Unplanned Loss of Most or All Alert Annunciators With Either a Transient In Progress, or the Plant Computer is Unavailable.

MODES: 1-4 Indicators

1. Any of the following:

a. 3 of 4 field power supplies have failed for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all annunciators) and not a result of planned action.

b. Field Power Supply voltage is less than 105 volts for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all annunciators) and not a result of planned action.

c. Ten or more logic power supplies have failed for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all annunciators) and not a result of planned action.

d. Five or more Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have failed for greater than 15 minutes and not a result of planned action.

or

2. All of the following:

a. Any combination of power supplies (including Optical Isolators) or Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have failed for greater than 15 minutes.

b. Any minimum compensatory actions, per OTO-RK-00001, cannot be maintained.

c. The loss does not result from planned action.

and

3. Any of the following:

a. A change in reactor power greater than + 10%.

b. Safety injection initiation.

c. Compensatory plant parameters monitored via the plant computer, per OTO-RK-00001, are not valid or cannot be obtained.

Bases:

This Initiating Condition and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient. Recognition of the availability of computer based indication equipment is considered SPDS, plant computer, etc.)

Since the system is operating at just over 3 amps, and each power supply is rated for a maximum 3 amps, soon after losing the third power supply the fourth will fail due to overcurrent. Output voltage of the Field Power Supply less than 105 volts indicates that a degraded voltage situation exists. Under this condition, all Field Power Supplies are considered inoperable.

Losing 10 of the 14 logic power supplies is considered losing "Most" annunciators.

Losing 5 of the 8 annunciator racks is considered losing "Most" of the annunciators.

"Planned" loss of annunciators or indicators includes scheduled maintenance and testing activities.

If both a major portion of the annunciation system and all computer monitoring are unavailable to the extent that additional operating personnel are required to monitor indications, the Alert is required.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and defueled modes. No Initiating Condition is indicated during these modes of operation.

This Alert will be escalated to a Site Emergency if the operating Crew cannot monitor the transient in progress.

Page 31 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition EmerQencv Classification C. Inability to Monitor a Site Emergency Significant Transient in Progress.

MODES: 1-4 Indicators

1. Any of the following:

a. 3 of 4 field power supplies indicate < 105 volts (loss of all annunciators).

b. Field Power Supply voltage is less than 105 volts (loss of all annunciators).

c. Ten or more logic power supplies have failed (loss of all annunciators).

d. Five or more Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have failed (loss of all annunciators).

or

2. All of the following:

a. Any combination of power supplies (including Optical Isolators) or Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have failed.

b. Any minimum compensatory actions, per OTO-RK-00001, cannot be maintained.

and

3. Any of the following:

a. A change in reactor power greater than +10 %.

b. Safety injection initiation.

and

4. Compensatory plant parameters monitored via the plant computer, per OTO-RK-00001, are not valid or cannot be obtained.

Bases:

This Initiating Condition and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient. A Site Emergency is considered to exist if the control room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public.

Since the system is operating at just over 3 amps, and each power supply is rated for a maximum 3 amps, soon after losing the third power supply the fourth will fail due to overcurrent. Output voltage of the Field Power Supply less than 105 volts indicates that a degraded voltage situation exists. Under this condition, all Field Power Supplies are considered inoperable.

Losing 10 of the 14 logic power supplies is considered losing "Most" annunciators.

Losing 5 of the 8 annunciator racks is considered losing "Most" of the annunciators.

"Planned" actions are included in this EAL since the loss of instrumentation of this magnitude is of such significance during a transient that the cause of the loss is not important.

Page 32 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification D. Loss of All Offsite Power Unusual Event to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

MODES: 1-6 Indicators All of the following:

1. Loss of offsite power to NB01 and NB02.

2. The loss of offsite power has occurred for >15 minutes.

Bases:

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Page 33 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Conditions Emergency Classification E. Only One AC Source to Alert Essential Busses for

>15 Minutes Such That Any Additional Single Failure Would Result In Station Blackout.

MODES: 1-4 Indicators

1. Loss of any 3 of the following power sources:

a. Offsite power to NB01

b. Offsite power to NB02

c. Emergency Diesel NE01

d. Emergency Diesel NE02 and

2. The Loss of all 3 has occurred for >15 minutes.

Bases:

The condition indicated by this Initiating Condition is the degradation of the off-site and on site power systems such that any additional single failure would result in a station blackout.

The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Emergency after an additional 15 minutes.

Page 34 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification F. Loss of All Offsite Site Emergency Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses.

MODES: 1-4 Indicators

1. Loss of all 4 of the following power sources:

a. Offsite power to NB01

b. Offsite power to NB02 C. Emergency Diesel NE01

d. Emergency Diesel NE02 and

2. The Loss of all 4 has occurred for >15 minutes.

Bases:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

The 15 minutes ensures the loss is other than a transient or momentary power loss.

Page 35 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification Site Emergency G. Loss of All Vital DC Power MODES: 1-4 Indicators

1. Loss (Bus Voltage < 106.9 VDC) of all 4 of the following busses:

a. NKO 1

b. NK02 C. NK03

d. NK04 and

2. Failure to restore power to at least one DC bus within 15 minutes.

Bases:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Page 36 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification H. Prolonged Loss of All General Emergency Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power.

MODES: 1-4 Indicators All of the following:

1. Loss of offsite power to NB01 and NB02.

2. Loss of both Emergency Diesel Generators NE01 and NE02.

3. a. Restoration of at least one emergency bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely.

or

b. Meet the entry requirements for FRC.1, Red Path for Core Cooling.

Bases:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCs, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will lead to loss of fuel clad, RCS, and containment. The 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to restore AC power is based on a site blackout coping analysis FSAR Appendix 8.3A "Station Blackout", performed in conformance with 10 CFR 50.63 and Regulatory Guide 1.155, "Station Blackout".

This Initiating Condition is specified to assure that in the unlikely event of a prolonged station blackout, timely recognition of the seriousness of the event occurs and that declaration of a General Emergency occurs as early as is appropriate, based on a reasonable assessment of the event trajectory.

The likelihood of restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions. In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be degraded. Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to give the Emergency Coordinator a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

1. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is IMMINENT?

2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier can be prevented?

Page 37 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification Unusual Event I. Loss of Required DC Power During Cold Shutdown or Refueling Mode for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

MODES: 5,6 Indicators

1. Loss of Division 1 Vital DC power as indicated by <106.9 VDC on:

NK01 or NK03 and Loss of Division 2 Vital DC power as indicated by <106.9 VDC on:

NK02 or NK04.

and

2. Failure to restore power to at least one operable Division of Vital DC power within 15 minutes.

Bases:

The purpose of this Initiating Condition and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This EAL is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

Unplanned was not used in this Initiating Condition and EAL, because as written one Division of Vital DC power can be inoperable for planned maintenance activities. The loss of the remaining operable train would require an Unusual Event. In no instance would maintenance be planned on both divisions.

The 106.9 VDC bus voltage in Indicator 1, is based on the minimum bus voltage necessary for the operation of safety related equipment.

Page 38 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification Loss of All Offsite Power Unusual Event J.

to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

MODES: 5-6 Indicators All of the following:

1. Loss of offsite power to NB01 and NB02.

2. The loss of offsite power has occurred for >15 minutes.

Bases:

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Page 39 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification K. Loss of All Offsite Alert Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses During Cold Shutdown or Refueling.

MODES: 5,6, and Defueled Indicators

1. Loss of all 4 of the following power sources:

a. Offsite power to NBO0

b. Offsite power to NB02

c. Emergency Diesel NE01

d. Emergency Diesel NE02 and

2. The loss of all 4 has occurred for >15 minutes.

Bases:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink.

When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the emergency busses, relative to that specified for the Site Emergency EAL. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Page 40 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification L.* Inability to Perform a Unusual Event Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits.

MODES: 1-4 Indicators

1. The plant is not brought to a required operating mode within a Technical Specification LCO action completion time.

• It is not intended to declare an Unusual Event due to an unknown condition or failure resulting in exceeding the allowable action statement time. The allowable action completion time is always available from the time of discovery.

Bases:

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored.

Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one hour report fewer than 10 CFR 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action completion time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action completion time in the Technical Specifications.

Page 41 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification M. Inability to Maintain Alert Plant in Cold Shutdown MODES: 5,6 Indicators

1. Any of the following:

a. Complete loss of both trains of RHR.

b. Complete loss of both trains of CCW.

c. Complete loss of both trains of ESW.

and

2. Either of the following:

a. Greater than 200'F on any valid incore thermocouple.*

b. Uncontrolled temperature rise, with no actions available that will likely prevent approaching 200'F on any valid incore thermocouple.*

• If a thermocouple is not available, use Wide Range Hot Leg temperature indications:

"* BBTI413A - Loop 1

"* BBTI423A - Loop 2

"* RECORDERS BBTR413 - Loop 1 BBTR423 - Loop 2 BBTR433 - Loop 3 BBTR443 - Loop 4 Bases:

Indicators 1 and 2 indicate a complete loss of Technical Specification required functions to maintain Cold Shutdown.

For PWRs, this Initiating Condition and its associated EAL are based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal." A number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, steam generator U-tube draining, RCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show that sequences that can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost. Under these conditions, RCS integrity is lost and fuel clad integrity is lost or potentially lost, which is consistent with a Site Emergency.

"Uncontrolled" means that system temperature increase is not the result0 of planned actions by the plant staff. The intent is to declare the ALERT when less than 200 F, only when temperature is increasing and it is known that there is not time to take action to stop the 0

temp from exceeding 200 F.

Page 42 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification N. Loss of Water Level That Site Emergency Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel.

MODES: 5, 6 Indicators

1. Any of the following:

a. Complete loss of both trains of RHR.

b. Complete loss of both trains of CCW.

c. Complete loss of both trains of ESW.

and

2. Either of the following:

a. Greater than 200°F on any valid incore thermocouple.*

b. Uncontrolled temperature rise, with no actions available that 0

will likely prevent approaching 200 F on any valid incore thermocouple.*

and

3. a. Water level in the reactor vessel is less than 2.0 inches on BB LI-0053A or B.

or

b. RVLIS (pumps off) <55%.

• If a thermocouple is not available, use Wide Range Hot Leg temperature indications:

• BBTI413A - Loop 1

• BBTI423A - Loop 2

• RECORDERS BBTR413 - Loop 1 BBTR423 - Loop 2 BBTR433 - Loop 3 BBTR443 - Loop 4 Bases:

Under the conditions specified by this Initiating Condition, severe core damage can occur and reactor coolant system pressure boundary integrity may not be assured.

For indicator 3.a. 2.0 inches is used as the lowest readable level on the instruments within their accuracy. For indicator 3.b. RVLIS (pumps off) is used. If a Reactor Coolant pump is running, void fraction rather than core water level would have to be considered.

This Initiating Condition covers sequences such as prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal. Thus, declaration of a Site Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the Initiating Condition. Escalation to a general emergency is via radiological effluence.

Page 43 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification

0. Complete Loss of Function Site Emergency Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

MODES: 1-4 Indicators

1. All of the following:

a. Failure to bring the reactor subcritical with the control rods fully inserted.

b. Complete loss of all Boron Injection Flowpaths.

or

2. All of the following:

a. All steam generator levels <10% wide range.

b. All steam dump valves to condenser (ABUV34, 35, and 36) are NOT responding to steam header pressure controller (AB PK507 or AB UK-33).

c. All steam generator steam dump valves to atmosphere are NOT operating properly (AB-PIC-lA, 2A, 3A, and 4A).

d. Complete loss of both RHR trains. (A complete loss of ESW or CCW constitutes a complete loss of RHR.)

or

3. All of the following:

a. The Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) is inoperable as a result of level or temperature.

b. Complete loss of both UHS Cooling Tower trains.

Bases:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, including ultimate heat sink and reactivity control, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public. Thus, declaration of a Site Emergency is warranted.

Indicator 1. a., control rods, defines the inability to shutdown the reactor normally.

Indicator l.b., defines the inability to add boric acid to the RCS. A complete loss of Boron Injection is defined as a loss of the required FSAR 16.1.2.2 Boron Injection flowpath(s).

Indicator 2 indicates a complete loss of Heat Sink.

Indicator 3 indicates a complete loss of the Ultimate Heat Sink.

Page 44 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification P. Unplanned Loss of All Unusual Event Onsite or Offsite Communication Capabilities MODES: 1-6 Indicators

1. All of the following on-site systems:

a. Complete failure of Plant telephone systems.

b. Complete failure of Gai-tronics systems.

c. Complete failure of Plant radios.

d. Complete failure of Plant Emergency Dedicated Phones.

or

2. All of the following offsite systems:

a. Complete failure of ENS (Red Phone) line.

b. Complete failure of Back Up Radio System (BURS).

c. Complete failure of Plant telephone system.

d. Complete failure of the Sheriff's radio system.

e. Complete failure of the Sentry notification system.

Bases:

The purpose of this Initiating Condition and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

Indicator 1, encompasses the total loss of all means of routine communications.

Indicator 2, encompasses the loss of all means of communications with offsite authorities.

This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.)

Page 45 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification Q. Fuel Clad Degradation Unusual Event MODES: 1-6 Indicators

1. Any of the following:

a. >1.0 pCi/gram Dose Equivalent 1-131 for greater than a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> continuous period.

b. Dose Equivalent 1-131 activity exceeding the limits of Tech Spec Fig.

Fig. 3.4.16-1.

c. >100/E bar pCi/gram of gross radioactivity.

Bases:

This Initiating Condition is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems.

Indicators 1, 2 and 3 are Technical Specification 3.4.16 limits.

The Alert alarm for the Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown Monitor (Failed Fuel Monitor) SJ-RE-01 was not used as an indicator for high coolant activity. If the monitor alarms, our procedures require sampling to confirm hi activity. Listing it as an indicator duplicates the other indicators.

Page 46 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification R. RCS Leakage Unusual Event MODES: 1-4 Indicators

1. Any of the following:

a. Unidentified leakage greater than 10 gpm.

b. Pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm.

c. Identified leakage greater than 25 gpm.

Bases:

This Initiating Condition is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e.g., mass balances). The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage.

Page 47 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification S. Failure of Reactor Alert Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded AND Manual Trip Was Successful.

MODES: 1,2 Indicators

1. All of the following:

a. An automatic (not manual) reactor trip setpoint has been exceeded as listed in Attachment 1 of E-0.

b. An automatic reactor trip is NOT successful.

c. A manual reactor trip IS successful using manual trip switches SB-HS-I on RL003 OR SB-HS-42 on RL006.

Bases:

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor.

This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS.

A reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue.

Page 48 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification Failure of Reactor Site Emergency T.

Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded AND Manual Trip Was NOT Successful.

MODES: 1, 2 Indicators

1. All of the following:

a. An automatic (not manual) reactor trip setpoint has been exceeded as listed in Attachment 1 of E-0.

b. An automatic reactor trip is NOT successful.

c. A manual reactor trip is NOT successful using manual trip switches SB-HS-I on RL003 AND SB-HS-42 on RLOO6.

Bases:

Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console was required to trip the reactor.

load Under these conditions, the reactor may produce more heat than the maximum decay heat for which the safety systems are designed.

A Site Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that may lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS. Although this Initiating Condition may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation Initiating Condition, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

Page 49 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATORS BASES Group 4 System Malfunctions Initiating Condition Emergency Classification U. Failure of the Reactor General Emergency Protection System to Complete an Automatic Trip AND Manual Trip Was NOT Successful AND There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

MODES: 1, 2 Indicators

1. All of the following:

a. An automatic (not manual) reactor trip setpoint has been exceeded as listed in Attachment 1 of E-0.

b. An automatic reactor trip is NOT successful.

c. A manual reactor trip is NOT successful using manual trip switches SB-HS-I on RL003 AND SB-HS-42 on RL006.

d. Meet the entry requirements for FRC.1 OR FRH.1, red path summaries for core cooling or heat sink.

Bases:

Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to scram the reactor.

Under the conditions of this Initiating Condition and its associated EALs, efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed.

Although there are capabilities away from the reactor control console, such as emergency boration, the continuing temperature rise indicates that these capabilities are not effective. This situation could be a precursor for a core melt sequence.

The entry requirements for FRC.1 indicate an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core. The entry requirements for FRH.1 indicate a extreme challenge to the ability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this sequence.

In the event either of these challenges exist at a time that the reactor has not been brought below the power associated with the safety system design (typically 3 to 5% power) a core melt sequence exists. In this situation, core degradation can occur rapidly. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum off-site intervention time.

Page 50 of 50 ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 Containment ARM Dose Rate for Abnormal Radiation Events FHA-RB Iodine EPA-400 EDE Dose Rate Source Term Filter Corrected PE6CIENT Table 5-3 Weighted Unit Weighted Tech Spec equivalent to from calc Correction for OFTOTAL Dose Conversion Dose Converson correction Dose Conversion value for Tech Spec value ZZ-341 revl Factor* pre-filtration in Cont. FACTOR FACTOR factor FACTOR Cont. Conc of 5.0E-3 uCilcc IS1OTPE (Ci) (unitless) (Ci) Dec. equiv. (rem-cm3/uCi-Hr) (rem-cm3/uCi-Hr) (mr/rem) (mr-cm3/uCi-Hr) (uCi/cc) (mR/hr)**

Kr-83m 0.00E+00 1 O.OOE+00 0.000 0.00E+00 O.0OE00 11.00E+03 0.OOE-00 5.00E-03 0.00E+00 Kr-85 2.46E+02 1 2.46E+02 0.019 1.30E+00 2.42E-02 1.00E+03 2.42E+-01 5.00E-03 1.21E-01 Kr-85m 0.OOE+00 1 0.00E+00 0.000 9.30E+01 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 5.00E-03 0.00E+00 Kr-87 0.00E+00 1 0.00E+00 0.000 5.10E+-02 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 5.00E-03 0.00E+00 Kr-88 0.00E+00 1 0.00E+00 0.000 1.30E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 5.00E-03 0.00E+00 Kr-89 0.00E+00 1 0.00E+00 0.000 1.20E+03 0.00E+00 1.OOE+03 0.00E4-00 5.00E-03 0.00E+-00 1-131 1.29E-01 100 1.29E+01 0.001 2.20E+02 2.15E-01 1.00E+-03 2.15E+02 5.OOE-03 1.07E+00 Xe-131m 9.75E+01 1 9.75E+01 0.007 4.90E+00 3.61E-02 1.00E+03 3.61EE+01 5.00E-03 1.81 E-01 1-132 1.09E-01 100 1.09E+01 0.001 1.40E+03 1.15E+00 1.00E+03 1.15E+03 5.OOE-03 5.77E-00 1-133 1.36E-02 100 1.36E+00 0.000 3.50E+02 3.60E-02 1.00E+03 3.60E+01 5.00E-03 1.80E-01 Xe-133 1.26E+04 1 1.26E+04 0.952 2.00E-01 1.90E+01 1.00E+03 1.90E+04 5.00E-03 9.52E+01 Xe-133m 2.38E+02 1 2.38E+02 0.018 1.70E-01 3.06E-01 1.00E403 3.06E+02 5.00E-03 1.53E+00 1-134 0.00E+00 100 0.00E+00 0.000 1.60E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 5.00E-03 0.00Ei-00 1-135 9.71 E-06 100 9.71 E-04 0.000 9.50E+02 6.97E-05 1.00E+03 6.97E-02 5.00E-03 3.49E-04 Xe-135 2.31E+01 1 2.31E+-01 0.002 1.40E-02 2.44E-01 1.00E-03 2.44E+02 5.OOE-03 1.22E+00 Xe-135m 7.79E-02 1 7.79E-02 0.000 2.50E+02 1.47E-03 1.00E+03 1.47E+00 5.00E-03 7.36E-03 Xe-138 0.00E+00 1 0.00Ei00 0.000 7.10E_-02 0.OOE+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 5.OOE-03 0.00E4-00 1OTALS 1.32E+04 1.000 2.11E+04 1.05E+02

• The source term in calc zz-341, revl isa post filter source term based on a 99% Iodine removal efficiency. Snce the EALdose rate isforthe atmosphere within containment (upstream of the filter), the removed portionsof the iodineshad to be refactored back into the equation.

• • Assjmes lmr/hr=lm Rhr Page I of 4 ATTACHMENT 3

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 Fuel Bldig ARM Dose Rate for Abnormal Radiation Events FHA-FB Iod ine EPA-400 EDE Dose Rate Source Term Filter Corrected PERCENT Table 5-3 Weighted Unit Weighted Hi-Hi equivalent to from calc Correction for OF1OTAL Dose Conversion Dose Converson correction Dose Converson alarm setpoint Hi-Hialarm on ZZ-341 revl Factor* pre-filtration in FB FACTOR FACTOR factor FACTOR on GT-RE-27/28 GT-RE-27/28 ISOTOPE (Ci) (unitless) (Ci) Dec. equiv. (rem-cm3/uCi-Hr) (rem-cm3/uCi-Hr) (mdrem) (mr-cm3/uCi-Hr) (uCi/cc) (mR/hr)**

"Kr-83m 0.00E+00 1 0.OOE+00 0.000 0.00E*-00 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.46E-03 0.00E+00 Kr-85 5.89E+02 1 5.89E-02 0.019 1.30E+-00 2.41 E-02 1.00E+03 2.41E+01 1.46E-03 3.53E-02 Kr-85m 0.00E+-00 1 0.00E+00 0.000 9.30E+01 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.46E-03 0.00E+00 Kr-87 O.00E+00 1 0.00E+00 0.000 5.10E+02 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+-00 1.46E-03 0.00E+00 Kr-88 0.00E+00 1 0.OOE+00 0.000 1.30E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.46E-03 0.00E+00 Kr-89 0.00E+00 1 0.00E+00 0.000 1.20E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+-00 1.46E-03 0.00E+-00 1-131 3.33E-01 100 3.33E+01 0.001 2.20E+02 2.31 E-01 1.00E+03 2.31 E+02 1.46E-03 3.37E-01 Xe-131m 2.34E+02 1 2.34E+02 0.007 4.90E+00 3.62E-02 1.00E+03 3.62E-01 1.46E-03 5.28E-02 1-132 2.82E-01 100 2.82E+01 0.001 1.40E_03 1.24E+00 1.00E+03 1.24E+-03 1.46E-03 1.82E+00 1-133 3.52E-02 100 3.52E+-00 0.000 3.50E+-02 3.88E-02 1.00_E-03 3.88E+01 1.46E-03 5.67E-02 Xe-133 3.02E+04 1 3.02E+04 0.952 2.00E+01 1.90E+01 11.00E+03 1.90E+04 1.46E-03 2.78E+01 Xe-133m 5.70E+-02 1 5.70E+02 0.018 1.70E+-01 3.06E-01 1.00E+03 3.06E+02 1.46E-03 4.46E-01 1-134 0.00E+00 100 0.001E+00 0.000 1.60E+03 0.00E+00 1.OOE+03 0.00E+00 1.46E-03 0.00E+00 1-135 2.51 E-05 100 2.51 E-03 0.000 9.50E+02 7.52E-05 1.OOEt03 7.52E-02 1.46E-03 1.10E-04 Xe-135 5.55E+-01 1 5.55E+01 0.002 1.40E+02 2.45E-01 1.00E+03 2.45E+-02 1.46E-03 3.58E-01 Xe-135m 1.87E-01 1 1.87E-01 0.000 2.50E+02 1.47E-03 1.00E+03 1.47E+00 1.46E-03 2.15E-03 Xe-138 0.OOE+00 1 0.00E+00 0.000 7.10E+02 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.46E-03 0.00E+00 TOTALS 3.17E+04 1.000 2.12E+04 3.09E+01 The source term in caic zz-341, revI isa post filter seurce term based on a 99% iodine removal efficiency. Snce the EALdose rate isforthe atmostphere within the fuel building (upstream of the filter), the removed portionsof the iodineshad to be refactored back into the equation.

• • Assumes lmR=lmr Page 2 of 4 ATTACHMENT 3

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 Containment ARM Dose Rate for RCS Barrier EAL RCSS~urce Surce Term Total activity Concentration EPA-400 EDE Term Normal Unit ANS-18.1, 1984 RCS Dispersed Containment of activity Table 5-3 concentration Converson corrected Volume within the Volume dispersed into Dose Conversion ANS-1 8.1, 1984 Factor for units RCS Containment FACIOR Dose Rate IS IOPE (uCi/gm) (gm/cc)* (uCi/cc) (cc) (uCi) (cc) (uCi/cc) (rem-cm3/uCi-Hr) (R/hr)**

Kr-85 4.30E-01 6.92E-01 2.98E-01 3.46E+08 1.03E4-08 7.08E+ 10 1.45E-03 1.30E+00 1.89E-03 Kr-85m 1.60E-01 6.92E-01 1.11E-01 3.46E+08 3.83E+07 7.08E+10 5.41E-04 9.30E+01 5.03E-02 Kr-87 1.50E-01 6.92E-01 1.04E-01 3.46E+08 3.59E+07 7.08E+ 10 5.07E-04 5.1OE+02 2.59E-01 Kr-88 2.80E-01 6.92E-01 1.94E-01 3.46E+08 6.70E-07 7.08E+ 10 9.47E-04 1.30E+03 1.23E+00 1-131 4.50E-02 6.92E-01 3.11E-02 3.46E+08 1.08E+.07 7.08E+ 10 1.52E-04 2.20E+02 3.35E-02 Xe-131m 7.30E-01 6.92E-01 5.05E-01 3.46E+08 1.75E+08 7.08E+ 10 2.47E-03 4.90E+00 1.21 E-02 1-132 2.10E-01 6.92E-01 1.45E-01 3.46E+08 5.03E+07 7.08E+10 7.1OE-04 1.40E+03 9.94E-01 1-133 1.40E-01 6.92E-01 9.69E-02 3.46E+08 3.35E+07 7.08E+10 4.73E-04 3.50E+02 1.66E-01 Xe-133 2.60E+00 6.92E-01 1.80E+00 3.46E-08 6.23E+08 7.08E+10 8.79E-03 2.00E+01 1.76E-01 Xe-133m 7.OOE-02 6.92E-01 4.84E-02 3.46E+08 1.68E+07 7.08E+10 2.37E-04 1.70E+01 4.02E-03 1-134 3.40E-01 6.92E-01 2.35E-01 3.46E+08 8.14E+07 7.08E+10 1.15E-03 1.60E+03 1.84E+00 1-135 2.60E-01 6.92E-01 1.80E-01 3.46E+08 6.23E+07 7.08E4-10 8.79E-04 9.50E+02 8.35E-01 Xe-135 8.50E-01 6.92E-01 5.88E-01 3.46E+08 2.04E+08 7.08E+10 2.87E-03 1.40E+-02 4.02E-01 Xe-135m 1.30E-01 6.92E-01 9.OOE-02 3.46E+08 3.11E+07 7.08E+ 10 4.40E-04 2.50E+02 1.10E-01 Xe-137 3.40E-02 6.92E-01 2.35E-02 3.46E+08 8.14E+06 7.08E*-10 1.15E-04 1.10E+02 1.26E-02 Xe-138 1.20E-01 6.92E-01 8.30E-02 3.46E+08 2.87E+07 7.08E+ 10 4.06E-04 7.1OE+02 2.88E-01 6.42E+00

• ANS-18.1 unitsare in uCi/gm. Assuming an average temperature of 600 degrees Fand 2250 psi, luCVgm= 0.692 uCi/cc.

Keenan & Keys Seam Tables 1970

"**Assumes 1 R= 1 Rem.

Page 3 of 4 ATTACHMENT 3

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 030 Containment ARM Dose Rate for Fuel Clad Barrier EAL Source Term Surce Term Massof Total activity Concentration EPA-400 EDE 1%failed fuel DB-131 Converted equivalent RC S Dispersed Containment of activity Table 5-3 from FSA*R Factor to DR-131 to 300 uCi/gm FSARtable within the Volume dispersed into Dose Converson Table 11.1-5 "1D-14844 lodinesonly DF1-131* 11.1A-1 IRCS Containment FACTOR Dose Rate ISOTOPE (uCi/gm) (unitless) (uCi/gm) (uCi/gm) (gim) (uCi) (cc) (uCi/cc) (rem-cm3/uCi-Hr) (R/hr)**

Kr-83m 1.82E-01 0 0.OOE+00 1.67E+01 2.40E_-08 4.00E+09 7.08E+10 5.65E-02 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 Kr-85 6.70E-02 0 0.00E+00 6.14E+00 2.40E+08 1.47E+09 7.08E+ 10 2.08E-02 1.30E-00 2.70E-02 Kr-85m 9.00E-01 0 0.00E+00 8.24E+01 2.40E+08 1.98E+10 7.08E+ 10 2.79E-01 9.30E+01 2.60E+01 Kr-87 5.27E-01 0 0.00E+00 4.83E+01 2.40E+08 1.16E+10 7.08E+10 1.64E-01 5.1OE+02 8.35E+01 Kr-88 1.69E+00 0 0.00E+-00 1.55E4-02 2.40E+08 3.72E_10 7.08E+ 10 5.25E-01 1.30E+03 6.82E+02 Kr-89 4.53E-02 0 0.00E+00 4.15E+00 2.40E+08 9.96E+-08 7.08E+ 10 1.41 E-02 1.20E+03 1.69E+01 1-131 2.25E+00 1.000 2.25E_-00 2.06E+02 2.40E-08 4.95E+ 10 7.08E-10 6.99E-01 2.20E+02 1.54E-02 Xe-131m 1.59E-01 0 0.O0E+00 1.46E+01 2.40E+08 3.50E+09 7.08E-10 4.94E-02 4.90E+00 2.42E-01 1-132 8.33E-01 0.036 3.00E-02 7.63E+01 2.40E+08 1.83E+10 7.08E+10 2.59E-O1 1.40E+03 3.62E502 1-133 3.17E+-00 0.270 8.56E-01 2.90E+02 2.40E+08 6.97E+10 7.08E-10 9.84E-01 3.50E+02 3.44E+02 Xe-133 4.33E+01 0 0.O0E-00 3.97E+03 2.40E+08 9.52E+ 11 7.08E+10 1.34E+01 2.00E+01 2.69E-02 Xe-133m 8.67E-01 0 0.00E+00 7.94E+01 2.40E_-08 1.91 E+ 10 7.08E+10 2.69E-01 1.70E+01 4.58E+00 1-134 3.92E-01 0.017 6.66E-03 3.59E+01 2.40E+08 8.62E+09 7.08E+-10 1.22E-01 1.60E+03 1.95E-02 1-135 1.58E+00 0.084 1.33E-01 1.45E+02 2.40E+08 3.47E+ 10 7.08EB10 4.91E-01 9.50E+02 4.66E+02 Xe-135 2.58E+00 0 0.00E+00 2.36E-02 2.40E+08 5.67E+10 7.08E+10 8.01E-01 1.40E+02 1.12E-02 Xe-135m 1.18E-01 0 0.00E+00 1.08E+01 2.40E+08 2.59E409 7.08E+10 3.66E-02 2.50E+02 9.16E-00 Xe-137 8.15E-02 0 0.00E+00 7.47E+-00 2.40E+08 1.79E'-09 7.08E+10 2.53E-02 1.10E+02 2.78E4-00 Xe-138 3.96E-01 0 0.00E+00 3.63E+01 2.40E-08 8.71_E-09 7.08E+ 10 1.23E-01 7.10E+02 8.73E-01 Total DB-131 3.28E+00 2.81 E4-03

• Multiply the %urce term in column 2 by 300/3.28 total for 1-131 DB.

"**Assumes1 R= 1 Rem.

Page 4 of 4 ATTACHMENT 3

EIP-ZZ-00102 Revision 030 July 22, 2002 CALLAWAY PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EIP-ZZ-00102 EMERGENCY IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURE OWNER W. R. Bevard WRITTEN BY W. R. Bevard PREPARED BY W. R. Bevard APPROVED BY &0/444AZ

• *ISSUED AUG 2'C2002 DATE ISSUED *Y c*-D ACCOUNTABLE This procedure contains the following:

Pages 1 through 6 Attachments 1 through 5 Tables through Figures through Appendices through Checkoff Lists through This procedure has checkoff list(s) maintained in the mainframe computer.

Conversion of commitments to TRS reference/hidden text completed by Revision Number:

Non-T/S Commitments 019

EIP-ZZ-00102 Rev. 030 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1 1

2 DEFINITIONS 1

3 RESPONSIBILITIES 4 PROCEDURE 2 6

5 REFERENCES RECORDS 6 6 - Emergency Announcement 1 Page 1 Page - Operations Personnel Emergency Actions 1 Page - Set-Up and Operation of the Model 177 Ratemeter 1 Page - Off Site Notification Form 2 Pages - Procedure Flow Chart t

-i-

EIP-ZZ-00102 Rev. 030 EMERGENCY IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 This procedure provides guidance to the Emergency Coordinator for implementing emergency actions when an emergency has been classified or reclassified per EIP-ZZ-00101, Classification of Emergencies. (COMN 3312) 2 DEFINITIONS 2.1 RELEASE ABOVE NORMAL OPERATING LIMITS - A discharge of radioactive effluent that results in a reading of 0.1 mrem/hr or greater at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB).

3 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 EMERGENCY COORDINATOR 3.1.1 Responsible for implementing this procedure and directing emergency response as follows: (COMN 42570)

NOTE: The responsibilities that the Emergency Coordinator may delegate are indicated with an asterisk (*).

3.1.1.1 Classifying and declaring emergencies.

3.1.1.2 Authorizing personnel exposure in excess of 10CFR20 limits.

3.1.1.3 Assumes decision-making responsibilities for implementing strategies identified in the Severe Accident Management Guidelines.

3.1.1.4 *Directing operations of emergency response organizations.

3.1.1.5 *Requesting the formation of emergency teams.

3.1.1.6 *Initiating the implementation of on-site protective actions.

3.1.1.7 *Ensuring that on-site and off-site emergency response organizations are kept up to date on emergency conditions.

EIP-ZZ-00102 Rev. 030 3.1.1.8 *Ensuring that site-wide announcements are made on the plant Public Address (PA) system.

3.2 SHIFT SUPERVISOR 3.2.1 Until relieved, the Shift Supervisor acts as the Emergency Coordinator. (COMN 3314) 4 PROCEDURE NOTE: Monitor Emergency Action Levels (EALs) throughout this procedure.

NOTE: The flowchart Attachment 5 may be use to assist in the performance of this procedure.

4.1 Notify Facility Personnel:

4.1.1 Announce the Emergency Classification and the time of declaration.

4.1.2 Announce the Cause.

4.2 Manually Initiate ERFIS from Main Control Board and Do Not "Reset" until instructed by Tech Assessment Staff.

4.3 Notify On-Site Personnel:

CAUTION: If CODE RED or CODE BLACK is in progress, on-site emergency announcements should be held to a minimum and prohibit movement of personnel until CODE condition is secured.

4.3.1 Prepare Attachment 1. If an Alert or higher is being declared, the Emergency Response Organization SHALL be activated. (COMN 42535) (COMN 3391)

NOTE: The Emergency Response Organization may be activated prior to an ALERT as necessary to provide additional support.

4.3.2 Sound the Plant Emergency Alarm from the Control Room.

4.3.3 Perform Attachment 1, making the emergency announcement applicable to the Emergency Classification. Include if there is a localized emergency (e.g., fire, flood), announcing the type and location, and instruct personnel to stand clear of the affected area.

EIP-ZZ-00102 Rev. 030 NOTE: Pager activation does not need to be done if the pagers have been activated already at a lower classification level.

4.4 At an ALERT or higher classification call out the emergency organization by having the SAS operator activate the Emergency Paging System per KOA-ZZ 00200 for rapid responders using MESSAGE #1.

NOTE: The Shift Supervisor has a Satellite Cellular Phone to be used as a last resort backup to the telephone and radio systems. If installed systems and backups fail the Satellite Cellular Phone may be used for offsite communications.

4.5 Notify Off-Site Agencies:

4.5.1 Shift Supervisor complete or direct completion of the SENTRY screen or complete Attachment 4 and give it to the Communicator.

NOTE: If the condition or cause of the classification has already been corrected the form should be completed as prescribed for the emergency. A statement should then made in the Notes section, lower right hand side, "The condition that caused the (emergency classification) has been corrected and Event closeout has been declared. Also ensure NRC operations is notified within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. CARS 199700852 NOTE: After the initial reporting, if the NRC Operations Center is activated, the NRC will request additional information. The personnel communicating with NRC should be knowledgeable with the facility's operation and with the event to provide and update information about the evolving incident. The level of communication will depend on the development and the significance of the event.

EIP-ZZ-00102 Rev. 030 CAUTION: As a minimum, the immediate protective action recommendation for a GENERAL EMERGENCY, is evacuation within a 2 mile radius and 5 miles downwind of the plant in affected sectors.

(COMN 3954) 4.5.2 Incorporate protective action recommendations in accordance with EIP-ZZ-00212, Protective Action Recommendations.

4.5.3 Implement EIP-ZZ-00201, Notifications. Initial notifications to State and Local Authorities SHALL be initiated within 15 minutes after declaration of an emergency. (COMN 3946)

NOTE. Notifications should be initiated within 15 minutes if conditions change and approximately every 30 minutes if conditions are stable. When at an Unusual Event and conditions are stable the notification frequency may be extended with the concurrence of SEMA and the EPZ Counties.

4.6 Ensure Attachment 2, Operations Personnel Emergency Actions, is taken to the Field Office for use by the Field Supervisor or first available individual. Extra Operations personnel report to the Field Office at the first Emergency Announcement.

4.7 Notify the Emergency Duty Officer and discuss the following: (COMN 3946) 4.7.1 Emergency Classification.

4.7.2 Plant status and actions taken.

4.7.3 Callout of response organizations.

4.7.4 Notification of off-site agencies.

4.8 Notify the Recovery Manager of an Unusual Event. (COMN 3946)

NOTE: Notification of the Recovery Manager is not required at an Alert or higher as this is accomplished using EIP-ZZ-00200 and KOA-ZZ-00200.

4.9 If a Release above normal operating limits is in progress or projected ensure dose assessment and EIP-ZZ-00212 is initiated.

EIP-ZZ-00 102 Rev. 030 4.9.1 DISCUSS the need to dispatch the Rapid Plume Assessment Tech (RPAT) with the On Shift Dose Assessment Tech. ref (KOA-ZZ-1212A).

4.9.2 If Abnormal In-plant radiological conditions exist, set up a ratemeter at the door of the Control Room per Attachment 3.

4.10 Implement EIP-ZZ-00217, Emergency Response Data System Activation (ERDS) as soon as possible but in all cases within one-hour of an ALERT or higher classification. The Shift Supervisor may delegate this to Tech Assessment in the TSC.

4.11 Evaluate Assembly/Evacuation per EIP-ZZ-00230, Accountability.

(COMN 3983) (COMN 3986)

NOTE: Accountability SHALL occur within 30 minutes of an Assembly/Evacuation announcement. (COMN 42531) 4.12 Form and/or Dispatch Emergency Teams as necessary using EIP-ZZ-00220, Emergency Team Formation.

4.13 Contact Chemistry and initiate Post-Accident Sampling as required.

4.14 Implement the Severe Accident Management Guidelines as required.

4.14.1 The control room should implement SACRG-1, Severe Accident Control Room Guideline Initial Response.

4.14.2 The control room should implement SACRG-2, Severe Accident Control Room Guideline for Transients after the TSC is Functional.

4.15 If non-Ameren support is needed, direct the Admin Coordinator to implement the Additional Assistance section of their checklist.

4.16 Event Reclassification/Plant Recovery/Event Closeout 4.16.1 If emergency has been reclassified return to Step 3.1 and perform the applicable steps.

4.16.2 Evaluate EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Plant Recovery, to determine if plant recovery or closeout conditions have been met.

I NOTE: The NRC should be notified of the intent to declare recovery.

4.17 Return to Step 3.11 and continue assessment if emergency has not been reclassified or event closeout/plant recovery has not been declared.

EIP-ZZ-00102 Rev. 030 5 REFERENCES 5.1 Callaway Plant Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) 5.2 APA-ZZ-00743, Fire Team Organization and Duties 5.3 EIP-ZZ-00200, Augmentation of the Emergency Organization 5.4 EIP-ZZ-00201, Notifications 5.5 EIP-ZZ-00211, Field Monitoring 5.6 EIP-ZZ-00212, Protective Action Recommendations 5.7 EIP-ZZ-00217, Emergency Response Data System Activation 5.8 EIP-ZZ-00230, Accountability 5.9 EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Plant Recovery 5.10 KOA-ZZ-1212A, Rapid Plume Assessment Tech 5.11 NRC Correspondence 11/27/2000, Recording Emergency Notification System Telephone Conversations 6 RECORDS 6.1 All facility logs, SENTRY or MAGNEM screen prints, office memos, notes, etc.,

should be attached to the Coordinator checklist and turned in to the Admin Coordinator and/or Emergency Preparedness (EP)

NOTE: Recordings of Emergency Notification System (ENS) and Health Physics Network (HPN) lines are available from the NRC recording system following the termination of an emergency event.

6.2 QA Records 6.2.1 Attachment 1, Emergency Announcement (File K171.0010)

EIP-ZZ-00102 Rev. 030 Emergency Announcement NOTE: If CODE RED or CODE BLACK is in progress, on-site emergency announcements should be held to a minimum and prohibit movement of personnel until CODE condition is secured.

SOUND THE PLANT EMERGENCY ALARM ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL!

UNUSUAL EVENT A(N) ALERT HAS BEEN DECLARED AT__

SITE EMERGENCY (time)

GENERAL EMERGENCY THE CAUSE OF THE EMERGENCY IS Emergency Organization Activation

" Unusual Event ALL MEMBERS OF THE ON-SHIFT EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION REPORT TO YOUR STATIONS.

0 Alert or Higher ALL MEMBERS OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION REPORT TO YOUR STATIONS.

Actions For Non-Essential Personnel O] Unusual Event ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL CONTINUE WITH YOUR NORMAL DUTIES UNLESS FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN.

o3 Alert ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL CONTINUE WITH YOUR NORMAL DUTIES UNLESS FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN. IF YOU ARE NOT BADGED FOR PROTECTED AREA ACCESS, YOU MUST EVACUATE THE PLANT SITE.

[] Site/General 0 Normal hours ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL REPORT TO YOUR PRE-DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY AREAS IN THE CMB (Consider weather and AND TRAINING CENTER. TAKE ALL PERSONAL radiological conditions BELONGINGS SUCH AS COATS, CAR KEYS AND PRIOR to making PURSES. FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS OF YOUR announcement.) SUPERVISOR AND SECURITY OFFICERS.

ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE PERFORMED.

0 Off-normal ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL PROCEED TO THE hours TSC AND AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE PERFORMED.

Special instructions, (i.e. special routes during releases. seek cover during storms)

PERSONNEL CAUTION (If required)

L0 Potential Airborne Contamination THERE WILL BE NO EATING, DRINKING, SMOKING, OR CHEWING UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

(REPEAT ALL ANNOUNCEMENTS)

EC/RM APPROVAL Page I of 1 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00102 Rev. 030 OPERATIONS PERSONNEL EMERGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Pre-designated Personnel inside the Protected Area report to the Control Room/Field Office upon a Reactor Trip or at the first Emergency Announcement. All are Essential Personnel unless specifically released by the Shift Supervisor. Once released they do not report to the Field Office if accountability is declared, they respond as all other Non-Essential Personnel.

I THE FIELD SUPERVISOR, OR DESIGNEE, PERFORMS THE FOLLOWING:

1.1 Prepare a list of personnel reporting to the Field Office along with their badge numbers.

(Note: A Security officer is generally assigned to pick up a copy of the list for accountability). Include on-watch Equipment Operators, (EO's). Have all personnel card into the Field Office Conference Room card reader (The card reader is used for accountability only).

1.1.1 The Polisher and Primary EO's should report to the Control Room to provide assistance.

They should return to the Field Office when relieved by I&C Technicians.

1.1.2 The formation and dispatch of Emergency Teams should use EIP-ZZ-00220 as a guide.

1.1.3 Rad Chem Technician(s) report to the Control Room/Field Office to assist in personnel monitoring, team briefing and rapid dose assessment. Emergency Team Briefing Form in EIP-ZZ-00220 may be used as a guide.

NOTE: When personnel leave the Field Office on assignment they should sign out, card out and be tracked to maintain accountability.

1.2 Designate the Fire Brigade members using personnel not on watch if available. Refer to APA-ZZ-00743, Fire Team Organization and Duties.

1.3 All Field Office personnel should go to HP Access, obtain an Electronic Dosimeter (ED) and sign in on RWP 911. If released as Non-Essential Personnel, individuals should sign off of RWP 911 and return their ED prior to leaving the site. This is to ensure all personnel dispatched from the Control Room or Field Office have their dose tracked.

CAUTION: Remain aware of plant radiological conditions and do not dispatch operators into areas where conditions may be changing without Health Physics support and briefings.

1.4 If radiological conditions are a potential hazard, set up a ratemeter at the door and allow entrance only through that door. Refer to Attachment 3.

1.5 If the Field Office is required to be evacuated, all personnel then report to the Control Room or TSC as needed.

1.6 Assign Operators to the TSC for emergency team support as required and available.

Page 1 of I ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00102 Rev. 030

1. Remove Model 177 ratemeter, frisker probe, detector cable, power cord, and check source from the E-Kit cabinet located behind the control boards. There are two instruments, one for the door to the field office, one for the door to the Control Room.

2. Connect detector and power cords, if not already connected, to the Model 177 ratemeter and verify the following switch settings:

Front Panel: "] On/Off switch in "ON" position.

[-- Volume adjusted to hear audible counts.

-- Response switch in "slow" position.

Rear Panel: - Subtract switch in "Off" position (if meter has Subtract Switch.)

3. Prior to the first use of the day, perform response check as follows:

F-] Ensure instrument has a current calibration sticker.

El Set the range switch to the appropriate position and place the detector on the check source bracket.

EJ Verify the response is within the acceptable range as specified on the response value determination form/sticker for that check source.

[I Check the instrument alarm by adjusting the ALARM SET switch so that it is slightly less than the count rate of the source.

- Remove the source from the detector.

LI Depress the RESET button. The alarm condition should clear.

'- If the pre-operational checks are satisfactory, complete the attached pre operational check sticker. (If either the alarm or the response check failed, notify the Health Physics Coordinator and obtain an operational ratemeter.)

'] Return the check source to the E-Kit cabinet.

4. Set up one ratemeter at the door to the Field Office and one rate meter at the door to the Control Room for use. For each:

Connect detector and power cords, if not already connected, to the Model 177 ratemeter and verify the following switch settings:

Front Panel: -- On/Off switch in "ON" position.

F-1 Volume adjusted to hear audible counts.

F- Response switch in "slow" position.

L- Range switch to the value necessary to maintain "on scale" display. Normally, this should be the "XI" scale.

Rear Panel: -- Alarm set at "5".

--1 Subtract switch in "Off' position if meter has Subtract Switch.

-' Ensure the probe sets "face up" when not being used. (This allows the next user to frisk prior to handling the detector, and allows the detector to monitor area and airborne radiation levels.)

5. If the ratemeter background reading exceeds the "XI" scale (500 CPM) during use, notify the Health Physics Coordinator.

Page I of I ATTACHMENT 3

OFF SITE NOTTPICATION FORM EIP-ZZ-00 10 (FAX Copy to TS( 604 & EOF-64900) Rev. 030 GENERAL INFORMATION: PROTECTIVE ACTIONS:

0 YES 0 NO 19) PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED: 0 YES 0 NO

1) DRILL MESSAGE:

2) EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIOIl 20) BASED ON: I II SECTORS

3) DATE/TIME DECLARED: I / I I_ TYPE LOCATION 23)

21) 22)

4) EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: L - I 24) 25) 26)

27) 28) 29)

30) Additional Protective Actions:

-w

6) REACTOR STATUS: I I"1 RELEASE STATUS:

7) RELEASE INFORMATION:

I 1 0 YES O NO PROJECTED DOSES:

8) LIQUID RELEASE:

I MPH 31) BASED ON:

9) WIND SPEED:

PROJECTED

31) BASED DOSES:

ON: Thyroid (Rem)

10) WIND DIRECTION: From I Degrees 11)TO IDegrees Distance TEDE (Rem)

EAB 32) 36)

12) AFFECTED SECTORS:

Hrs. 2 miles 33) 37)

13) RELEASE START TIME: II 14) RELEASE DURATION:

5 miles 34) 38)

PLUME ARRIVAL TIME:

15) 2 Miles I  : 116) 5 Miles I  :::I 17) 10 Miles I 10 miles 35) 39)

18) UPDATE WIND PARAMETERS z I ADDITIONAL NOTES:

40)

EC/RM APPROVAL:________________ COMMUNICATOR:

Distribution:Recovery Manager Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT 4 CA-#0231 Communicator State of Missouri File # K171.0010

EIP-ZZ-00 102 Rev. 030 SSTART NOTIFY FACILITY PERSONNEL ANNOUNCE THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION, THE DECLARATION TIME, and THE CAUSE.

I I MANALLYINITIATE ERFIS I

NOTIFY ON-SITE PERSONNEL COMPLETE ATTACHMENT 1 SOUND THE EMERGENCY ALARM CONTACTE~TE] No*

THE LHAER orHihe Consider having ACTIVATE PAGERS per KOA-ZZ-00200 SAS ACTIVATE PAGERS Message #1 per KOA-ZZ-00200 Message #2 or #10 if not already activated for extra help at a lower classification EIP-ZZ-00212 DROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION EVACUATION 2 MILES AROUND 5 MILES DOWN WIND MINIMUM MERGENC l

No EIP-ZZ-00212 EVALUATE PLANT CONDITIONS S TO DETERMINE IF ADDITIONAL NOTIFY OFF-SITE AGENCIES PAR REQUIRED Complete SENTRY or Complete Attachment 4, Give to Communicators to Implement EIP-ZZ-00201 NUI I: I fluo"llln UpJelvisui has a Satellite Cellular Phone to be used as a last resort No ALERT or Higher backup to the telephone and radio systems. If installed systems and backups fail the Yes Satellite Cellular Phone may be used for offsite ASSIGN ATTACHMENT 2 O THE FIELD SUPERVISOR OR OTHER AVAILABLE communications.

PERSONNEL REPORTING TO THE FIELD OFFICE NOTIFY EDO The EDO should call in when paged WITHIN 1 HOUR INITIATE ERDS PER EIP-ZZ-00217 MAY BE DELEGATED TO TECH ASSESSMENT

PAGE 2 Page 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 5

EIP-ZZ-00102 Rev. 030 SFROM PAGE 1 NORMAL~Ye OPRTN IIS-IINITIATE DOSE ASSESSMENT ORIAND)

PRJCE EIP-ZZ-0021 DISCUSS the need to dispatch the Noo RPAT with the Dose Assessment Tech KOA-ZZ-1212A SET UP CONTROL ROOM DOOR RATEMETEI ATTACHMENT 3 EVALUATE ASSEMBLYIEVACUATION PER EIP-ZZ-00230 Note: Site or General evacuation mandatory FORM AND DISPATCH EMERGENCY TEAMS PER ATTACHMENT 2 FOR ON-SHIFT ACTIVITIES INITIATE CHEMISTRY SAMPLING AS REQUIRED SSEVERE CCIIDENT MANAGEMENT GGUI DELI REQUIRED ~

WHEN TSC IS FUNCTIONAL IMPLEMENT SACRG-2 NON YY es ADMIN COORDINATOR AMEREN- UE SUPPORT TO REQUEST NEEDED REQUIRED ASSISTANCE No VETRCAS RETURN TO START (EVALUATE EIP-ZZ-00260D CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY Page 2 of 2 ATTACHMENT 5

EIP-ZZ-00220 Revision 016 July 17, 2002 CALLAWAY PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EIP-ZZ-00220 EMERGENCY TEAM FORMATION RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURE OWNER K. J. Bruckerhoff WRITTEN BY W, R. Bevard PREPARED BY W. R. Bevard APPROVED BY ____________________

DATE ISSUED ACOUTALER This procedure contains the following:

Pages 1 through 7 Attachments 1 through 4 Tables through Figures through Appendices 1 through 1 Checkoff Lists through This procedure has checkoff list(s) maintained in the mainframe computer.

Conversion of commitments to TRS reference/hidden text completed by Revision Number:

Non-T/S Commitments 011

EIP-ZZ-00220 Revision 016 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1 1.1 PURPOSE 1 1.2 SCOPE 1 2 RESPONSIBILITIES 1 3 INITIATING CONDITIONS 3 4 PROCEDURE 3 4.1 FORMATION OF EMERGENCY TEAMS 3 4.2 BRIEFING AND DISPATCH OF EMERGENCY TEAMS 4 4.3 DEBRIEFING OF EMERGENCY TEAMS 5 5 FINAL CONDITIONS 6 6 REFERENCES 6 7 RECORDS 6 - Emergency Team Briefing Checklist 1 Page - Emergency Team Health Physics Briefing Checklist 1 Page - Emergency Team Debriefing Checklist 1 Page - Plant Map 1 Page Appendix 1 - No Radio Transmission Rooms 1 Page

-i-

EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 EMERGENCY TEAM FORMATION 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 PURPOSE 1.1.1 To provide guidance to individuals responsible for forming, briefing, dispatching and debriefing Emergency Teams.

1.2 SCOPE 1.2.1 Upon declaration of an emergency, establishes responsibilities for coordinating the activities of the Fire Brigade, Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT), Search & Rescue Teams, and Emergency Repair Team. (CARS 200001029) 1.2.2 Provides a checklist for briefing and debriefing emergency teams.

1.2.3 On shift activities are not included in the scope of this procedure.

(CARS 200001029)

NOTE: On shift activities are performed in accordance with Attachment 2 of EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions.

2 RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1 EMERGENCY COORDINATOR / SHIFT SUPERVISOR (EC) 2.1.1 Requests the formation of emergency teams. This responsibility may be delegated to the Operations Support Coordinator.

2.1.2 Initially, the Shift Supervisor assumes the responsibilities of the EC. At the ALERT (or higher) emergency classification levels, the EDO relieves the Shift Supervisor and assumes the EC duties.

(COMN 3324) (COMN 3325) 2.1.2.1 MERT and the Fire Brigade continue to report to the Shift Supervisor. Responsibility for these two Emergency Teams cannot be delegated to the Emergency Coordinator. (COMN 3413)

(COMN 41801)

EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 2.2 OPERATIONS SUPPORT COORDINATOR (OSC) 2.2.1 Assesses plant information from the Control Room and technical support staff to establish emergency team priorities and direct operation support activities. (COMN 3324) (COMN 3325) 2.2.1.1 The OSC reports to the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the Technical Support Center (TSC).

2.3 EMERGENCY TEAM COORDINATOR (ETC) 2.3.1 Assists the Operations Support Coordinator (OSC) in formation, briefing, direction, tracking and debriefing of Emergency Teams.

2.3.1.1 The ETC reports to the Operations Support Coordinator (OSC) in the TSC.

2.4 HEALTH PHYSICS COORDINATOR (HPC) 2.4.1 Assesses radiological conditions and determines radiological protective measures to be implemented.

2.4.2 Ensures that emergency teams are briefed and debriefed on radiological conditions.

2.4.3 Ensures Health Physics support is available for emergency teams, as necessitated by radiological conditions.

NOTE: On-Shift Health Physics personnel may perform these duties prior to the time the TSC is operational.

2.5 PROTECTIVE SERVICES STAFF 2.5.1 Approval authority for all appendices for this procedure.

2.6 WORK CONTROL MANAGEMENT CARS 200107510 2.6.1 Designate personnel qualified to be members of Repair Teams and Search & Rescue Teams.

2.6.1.1 These personnel are typically journeymen craft or planners and supervisors with applicable craft experience.

EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 3 INITIATING CONDITIONS 3.1 The procedure is implemented upon direction of the Emergency Coordinator per EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions.

4 PROCEDURE The Emergency Team Coordinator (ETC) or designee, at the direction of the Operational Support Coordinator (OSC) ensures completion of the following actions:

4.1 FORMATION OF EMERGENCY TEAMS 4.1.1 Assemble an Emergency Team consisting of the following personnel:

CAUTION: Fire Brigade Members perform Emergency Team duties when hazards require use of personal protective equipment (PPE), such as bunker gear, proximity suit, level "A" chemical suit, and/or SCBA, for which they are specifically trained and qualified. (CARS 200000160)

The Fire Brigade continues to report to the Shift Supervisor if the activity is a fire or Hazmat response. Response to a fire or Hazmat incident cannot be delegated to the ETC.

4.1.1.1 A Repair Team consists of at least two (2) plant personnel as appropriate for the specific repairs. (COMN 3325)

NOTE: Fire Brigade Members are trained in damage control repairs, such as plugging, patching, containment, etc., and manipulating valves, breakers, and other Plant Equipment.

EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 4.1.1.2 A Search and Rescue Team consists of at least two personnel, one of which SHALL be qualified in first aid procedures.

(COMN 3324) 4.1.1.2.1 During an event, the Security force, MERT and/or the Fire Brigade may be conducting search and rescue operations. The Fire Brigade and MERT report to the Shift Supervisor. The Security force reports to the Security Coordinator. The ETC should coordinate with the Control room and Security Coordinator to eliminate duplicate searches or other logistical problems.

(CARS 200002079) (CARS 200002143) 4.1.1.2.2 The ETC should remain cognizant of search areas, both those completed and those still needing to be searched.

4.1.1.2.3 Unless directed otherwise by the Shift Supervisor or Fire Brigade Leader, when a Fire Brigade Leader is involved in a search and rescue or medical emergency, the Incident Command System should be implemented. With this, all coordination efforts for Search and Rescue Teams, MERT, nurses, ambulances, etc. are directed by the Fire Brigade Leader.

4.1.1.2.4 The ETC should contact the Security Coordinator to identify last known locations of the missing person(s). The Security Coordinator should also brief the ETC on known plant hazards.

4.1.2 Health Physics support for the Emergency Teams is coordinated by the HPC if conditions warrant. (COMN 3324) (COMN 3325) 4.2 BRIEFING AND DISPATCH OF EMERGENCY TEAMS 4.2.1 Prioritization for timely dispatch of Emergency Teams should be made when preparing to dispatch a team. (CARS 199901711) 4.2.1.1 A Search and Rescue or Repair Team for trouble shooting or investigations may not require an extensive brief, and when possible should be expedited through the process and dispatched in a timely manner. (CARS 199901711) 4.2.1.2 Repair Teams with detailed work instructions, assigned a seldom performed task, or multiple tasks may require a more extensive brief and/or copies of drawings, procedures, etc.

EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 4.2.2 The OSC/ETC, or designee, completes Attachment 1, CA0235a, Emergency Team Briefing Checklist, for each team to be dispatched.

4.2.2.1 The ETC or designee conducts a task brief,Section II, Attachment 1.

4.2.2.2 Refer to Appendix 1, CA0235e, No Radio Transmission Rooms, as appropriate.

4.2.2.3 If conditions warrant, the Health Physics Coordinator or designee conducts a briefing on radiological conditions/hazards, Attachment 2, CA0235b, Emergency Team Health Physics Briefing Checklist and CA0235d, Plant Map. (CARS 199701061) 4.2.3 Copies of the briefing checklist should be provided to the Emergency Team leader.

4.2.4 Record Emergency Team on the Emergency Team Status Board.

4.2.5 Dispatch Emergency Team ensuring they check out with Security prior to leaving the TSC.

4.2.6 Ensure the OSC is informed the Emergency Team has been dispatched.

4.2.7 Maintain communications with the team at intervals specified during the briefing and relay any plant announcements to the team.

(COMN 5402) 4.2.8 Ensure the OSC is informed of the status of all Emergency Teams at frequent intervals.

4.3 DEBRIEFING OF EMERGENCY TEAMS 4.3.1 As soon as possible, debrief the team in accordance with Attachment 3, CA0235c, Emergency Team Debriefing Checklist.

4.3.2 Ensure the Emergency Coordinator is notified of accidental or emergency dose in excess of occupational limits.

4.3.3 Assign team members to other duties as required.

EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 5 FINAL CONDITIONS 5.1 The Emergency Team Coordinator ensures the following actions are accomplished:

5.1.1 Emergency Team members are debriefed and assigned other duties.

5.1.2 Attachments 1, 2 and 3 are completed.

5.1.3 Emergency Team Status Board is up-to-date.

5.1.4 All repairs are reviewed to determine permanency or if condition tags are required to complete final repair or equipment restoration.

(CARS 200107510) 6 REFERENCES 6.1 Callaway Plant Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) 6.2 EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions 6.3 HDP-ZZ-01450, Authorization to Exceed Federal Occupational Dose Limits 6.4 I-DP-ZZ-01300, Internal Dosimetry Program.

6.5 APA-ZZ-00310, Workman's Protection Assurance and Caution Tagging 6.6 APA-ZZ-00802, Confined Space Program 6.7 SDP-ZZ-00010, Radio Use 6.8 HPCI 01-05, Estimation of TEDE and CDE Thyroid Dose for Emergency Personnel 7 RECORDS 7.1 QA RECORDS 7.1.1 Attachment 1, Emergency Team Briefing Checklist (File K171.0010).

7.1.2 Attachment 2, Emergency Team Health Physics Briefing Checklist (File K 171.0010).

EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 7.1.3 Attachment 3, Emergency Team Debriefing Checklist (File K171.0010).

7.2 COMMERCIAL RECORDS None EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 EMERGENCY TEAM BRIEFING CHECKLIST TEAM DESIGNATOR 0 EMERGENCY REPAIR TEAM [3 SEARCH & RESCUE TEAM TEAM FORMATION.

• Emergency Repair Teams require two (2) individuals. COMN 3325 0 Search and Rescue Teams require two (2) individuals, one must be qualified First Aid. COMN 3324 I

• Complete top portion of CA0235b, and give to HPC or designee.

NAME Badge Number /

EID First Aid Yes/No NAME Badge Number /

Eli)

First Aid Yes/No ii. TASK BRIEFING (CARS 200106271) 03 Report of Problem or Condition and Suspected Cause:

"o Description of Task: (Perform assessment, operations, or repairs)

"o Time Estimate to Complete Task:

n Task Location:

• Proceed to the location where emergency repair is to be performed. Report abnormal conditions to the Emergency Team Coordinator (ETC).

• After arriving at the repair location assess equipment operability and habitability conditions; report the following to the ETC:

- Extent of damage/equipment status.

- Abnormal and/or unusual conditions.

- Additional assistance needed (e.g., tools, equipment, personnel, etc.).

- Dose rate and contamination levels. (if necessary).

• For Search and Rescue Teams, consider the following:

- Request Fire Brigade Leader Support, if available.

- Coordinate efforts with the Control Room and Security Coordinator.

- Search areas and search patterns are clearly defined (e.g. room #, north to south, elevation #,

east to west) o3 Special tools, vehicles, equipment needed:

• Perform safety and operability checks on equipment. Replace/substitute equipment, if necessary.

o Keys (may be obtained from these locations)

Security Coordinator / OSC Packet (tool room keys) / TSC key locker ol Communications: (Maintain communications with the ETC at predetermined intervals)

(Radio -channel, Gaitronics-channel, Telephone-No.)

"*ETC phone 68426 or

"*Radio Channel I or

"*Primary: _ Secondary:

"*Contact Intervals:I5min/30min/ Other

"* Radio usage is prohibited in "No Transmission Areas" as identified by orange signs in the Plant. (CARS 199901711) Refer to Appendix I of this procedure.

"* Radio check performed SAT.

[] Hazards 0 Personal Safety: "*Electrical Conductors No/Yes Personal Protective equipment

"* Fall Protection No/Yes

"*CSEP (APA-ZZ-00802) No/Yes

"* Face Protection No/Yes "*WPA (APA-ZZ-00310) No/Yes #

"* Chemical Protection No/Yes "*Fire (EIP-ZZ-00226) No/Yes

"*Gloves No/Yes

"* HAZMAT (EIP-ZZ-03010) No/Yes

"* Bunker Gear No/Yes Yes, requires Fire Brigade Member "*OTHER (Specify) No/Yes

"* Level A Suit No/Yes Yes, requires Fire Brigade Member

"*Proximity Suit No/Yes Yes, requires Fire Brigade Member

"* SCBA No/Yes Yes, requires Fire Brigade Member o Remarks:

Time ____________

Date Time Task Brief completed by (ETC or Designee):

[] Copy of briefing form to team leader.

0] Sign out team on Emergency Team Status Board 0] Inform Team to Check out with Security K171.0010 Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT I CA-#0235a

EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 EMERGENCY TEAM HEALTH PHYSICS BRIEFING CHECKLIST TEAM DESIGNATOR

[I EMERGENCY REPAIR TEAM [3 SEARCH & RESCUE TEAM I. TEAM FORMATION.

" Emergency Repair Teams require two (2) individuals. (COMN 3325)

" Search and Rescue Teams require two (2) individuals, one must be qualified First Aid. (COMN 3324)

Name EID Exposure Debriefed RWP EXIT Margin (mRern) Yes/No Sign-Out Dose (toRem)

(ETC Complete) (HP Complete)

I]

El II. H1EALTH PHYSICS BRIJEF (required if, or the potential for, a radioloelcal hazard exists.)

Radiological Work Permit: (CARS 199803482,CARS 200106250,CARS 200106224)

I 0 Emergency RWP (enter year) __ 9 1 1 2 0 EMERG / ADMIN / FED / DRILL o SRWP Number:

Radiological Protection:

"* Do not enter areaswhere radiationlevels are not measurable.

"* If anticipateddose is in excess of IOCFR20 limits, follow instructions in HDP-ZZ-01450

"* ED Fast Entry mode should only be used for initial entries. Current OccupationalDose DOES NOT have to be consideredwhen assigning Emergency Dose Limits. If dose rate alarm is received during the dispatch of the Team, contact the HPCto determine if the Team should proceed.

[o Request an air sample, if appropriate, and not already taken o TEDE/CDE Evaluation:

"* If no airsample, estimatefrom radiationlevels.

"* MRem yx 3 = TEDE, MRem yx 40 = CDE thy o Dosimetry (monitor approx. 15-30 minutes) (CARS 199803482) (COMN 3960)

[o Alarms - Fast Entry Dose(mRem) 1000 Dose Rate(mRem/hr) 10000 Other Dose(mRem) Dose Rate(mRem/hr)_____

o Extremity Dosimetry None / Location:

[o PC's (circle one): None / Partial / Full / Double

[o Respirator (circle one): None / Full Face Air Purifying / GMRI / SCBA (Fire Brigade Member)

Recommend Potassium Iodide:

0 No o3 Yes

"* You should not take KI ifyou are allergicto iodine.

"* If the use of KI is recommendedfollow instructions in HDP-ZZ-O1300, Attachment 1.

Turnaround Dose/Dose Rate: (CARS 199803482)

• If Team receives dose rate alarm, contact the HPCforfurther instructions. Team can continue and seek low dose area with approval of HP Coverage Technician. Withdrawal of the Team should be based on integrateddose.

o En route to job site 10 R/hr I Other o At job site 10 R/hr / Other Radiological Conditions: (if known) (CARS 199803482)

• Conditions en route to the job site. 03 Not Known

[3 Routes Release above Normal Operating Limits in progress or anticipated - see Attachment CA0235d, Plant Map.

o Radiation Levels (mrem/hr)

"O Contamination Levels (dpm/1 00cm2)

"O Airborne (DAC): Particulate Iodine __ Noble Gas o3 High Beta Radiation(mrad/hr) 0 Conditionsat the job site 0 Not Known 0 Radiation Levels (mrem/hr) 0 Contamination Levels (dpm/I00cm2) 0 Airborne (DAC): Particulate Iodine __ Noble Gas 0 High Beta Radiation(mrad/hr)

Decon Facilities (CARS 199802961) 0 HPAC 0 TSC 0 Other 0 Remarks:

HPC Review Health Physics Brief Performed by_ Date Time K171.0010 Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT 2 CA-#0235b

EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 EMERGENCY TEAM DEBRIEFING CHECKLIST TEAM DESIGNATOR 0 EMERGENCY REPAIR TEAM 03 SEARCH & REscuE TEAM TEAM DEBRIEFING Task Completion 0 Job done YES / NO o3 Dosimetry reading recorded as Exit Dose o3 If an individual's dose is in excess of 10CFR20 limits, follow instructions in HDP-ZZ-01450.

Personnel signed out on RWP.

o3 Collect ED's and any Extremity TLD's, that were issued.

o3 Survey data obtained. (Attach copies).

0 Actions Taken:

0 o Further Actions Needed:

o Unanticipated problems or hazards encountered (include on future briefs):

o3 Complete and collect all records.

o Remarks:

Date Time Debriefing Performed by K171.0010 Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT 3 CA-#0235c

EIP-ZZ-00220 Rev. 016 PLANT MAP K171.0010 Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT 4 CA-#0235d

EIP-ZZ-00220 July 17, 2002 NO RADIO TRANSMISSION ROOMS By Description and Room Number Area Room Description Room No.

Aux Bldg Area 5 1127 1207 1329 South Electrical Penetration Room 1409 North Electrical Penetration Room 1410 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Room 1413 Containment Containment 1507 Control Bldg NBO 1 Switchgear Room 3301 NB02 Switchgear Room 3302 D/G 'A' Room 3302 D/G 'B' Room 3302 DC Switchboard Rooms 3403 3404 3405 3407 AUG 2 6 2002 3408 ACCOUNTABLE 3409 Lower Cable Spreading Room 3502 Control Room 3604 3605 SAS Room 3609 Upper Cable Spreader Room 3801 Comm Corridor BOP Battery Charger/Inverter 4101 Turbine Bldg EHC Control Cabinet Room 4504 Approval 9 Date g. I q -0_ z_

Staff Page I of 1 Appendix 1

EIP-ZZ-00240 Revision 031 July 15, 2002 CALLAWAY PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EIP-ZZ-00240 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OPERATIONS RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURE OWNER T. W. PARKER WRITTEN BY T. W. PARKER PREPARED BY T. W. PARKER APPROVED BY 4 ACONT C?

DATE ISSUED________

This procedure contains the following:

Pages 1 through 7 Attachments 1 through 9 Tables through Figures through Appendices through Checkoff Lists through This procedure has checkoff list(s) maintained in the mainframe computer.

Conversion of commitments to TRS reference/hidden text completed by Revision Number:

Non-T/S Commitments 022

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number I PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1 2 RESPONSIBILITIES 1 3 PROCEDURE 4 4

3.1 TSC STARTUP 4

3.2 TSC OPERATION 4

3.3 TSC EVACUATION 5

3.4 EVENT CLOSEOUT 5

3.5 TSC SHUTDOWN 6

4 REFERENCES 7

5 RECORDS Attachment I Emergency Coordinator Checklist ............................................. 2 Pages Technical Assessment Coordinator (TAC) Checklist ............... 5 Pages Operations Support Coordinator (OSC) Checklist .................... 3 Pages Administrative (Admin.) Coordinator Checklist ....................... 3 Pages Health Physics (HP) Coordinator Checklist .............................. 7 Pages TSC (ENS) Communicator Checklist ....................................... 1Page Chemistry Coordinator Checklist .................... 2 Pages Security Coordinator (SC) Checklist ................................. 2 Pages Emergency Team Coordinator (ETC) Checklist ....................... 3 Pages

-i-

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OPERATIONS 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 Establishes responsibilities for the Emergency Response Organization, provides guidance and checklists for each coordinator in the Technical Support Center (TSC) during emergency operation of the TSC, including the Operations Support Area (SA).

2 RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1 EMERGENCY COORDINATOR (EC) 2.1.1 The Emergency Coordinator has overall responsibility for TSC operations.

2.2 TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT COORDINATOR (TAC) 2.2.1 The TAC reports to the EC. The TAC is responsible for directing technical analysis of plant conditions to formulate EAL'S and emergency mitigating recommendations to the EC. Responsible for coordinating Protective Action Recommendations (PAR'S) consistent with plant conditions with the Recovery Manager and Dose Assessment Coordinator in the EOF prior to the arrival of the Protective Measures Coordinator (PMC) and Plant Assessment Coordinator (PAC). The TAC also evaluates Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG's). (COMN 3333) 2.3 ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATOR (AC) 2.3.1 The AC reports to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC. The AC is responsible for ensuring the completion of the Admin Coordinator checklists. The AC is also responsible for ensuring that technical documents are available, providing food and beverage needs, and ensuring continuity of resources for the On Site Emergency Response Organization. (COMN 3341) 2.4 TSC (ENS) COMMUNICATOR (TC) 2.4.1 The TSC Communicator reports to the EC. He is responsible for manning the ENS Communication Line and relaying technical information to the NRC.

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 2.5 HEALTH PHYSICS COORDINATOR (HPC) 2.5.1 The HPC reports to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC. The HPC is responsible for assessing on-site radiological conditions, reviewing radiological EAL's, and directing in-plant radiation protection activities. (COMN 3331) 2.6 OPERATIONS SUPPORT COORDINATOR (OSC) 2.6.1 The OSC reports to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC. The OSC assesses plant information from the control room and technical support staff to establish emergency team priorities and direct operation support activities. (COMN 3336) 2.7 SECURITY COORDINATOR (SC) 2.7.1 The SC reports to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC. The SC establishes communications with the Shift Security Supervisor (SSS), assumes overall plant security responsibility, and directs the security force through the SSS. These responsibilities include access control, personnel evacuation and accountability, coordination of any off-site law enforcement agency involvement, and normal and emergency security activities in accordance with the security plan. (COMN 3347) 2.8 CHEMISTRY COORDINATOR (CC) 2.8.1 The CC reports to the Technical Assessment Coordinator, and assumes responsibility for plant chemistry operations from the shift supervisor. The Chemistry Coordinator directs primary and secondary chemistry operations, (including post-accident chemistry) and non-radiological environmental monitoring. The CC ensures that the TAC is aware of chemistry activities and provides input to the TSC engineering staff in assessing plant chemistry problems. The CC directs the Rad/Chem Technicians Chemistry. (COMN 3349) 2.9 EMERGENCY TEAM COORDINATOR (ETC) 2.9.1 The ETCs report to the OSC and assist in formation, briefing, direction, and tracking of emergency teams. The Fire Brigade and MERT continue to report to the Shift Supervisor in the Control Room.

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 2.10 STORES PERSONNEL 2.10.1 A member of the Materials Department reports to the OSC and is responsible for obtaining parts, supplies, and materials when needed.

2.11 OTHER TSC STAFF MEMBERS 2.11.1 Each TSC coordinator that arrives at the TSC is responsible for starting their Checklist. If the TSC is without power, they should start the TSC diesel per OOA-UB-EPG70 if it is within their capability.

2.11.2 All personnel are responsible for walking through the portal monitor and carding in on the accountability reader as they enter the TSC during a radiological emergency or drill.

NOTE: The portal monitor should be response checked as soon as possible by the Health Physics group 2.11.3 Personnel that leave the Facility should check out with the Security Officer and card out on the accountability reader. If a release above normal operating limits has occurred or is likely to occur a HP brief is required. CARS 199701061 2.11.4 The following TSC coordinators are responsible for their attachment to this procedure.

a) Emergency Coordinator (EC) b) Technical Assessment Coordinator (TAC) c) Operations Support Coordinator (OSC) d) Administrative (Admin) Coordinator (AC) e) Health Physics (HP) Coordinator (HPC) f) TSC (ENS) Communicator (TC) g) Chemistry Coordinator (CC) h) Security Coordinator (SC) i) Emergency Team Coordinator (ETC)

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 3 PROCEDURE 3.1 TSC STARTUP 3.1.1 Each TSC staff member that arrives at the TSC is responsible for carding in on the accountability card reader, assisting in the facility startup and initiating their checklist.

3.2 TSC OPERATION 3.2.1 The Emergency Coordinator ensures that Attachment 1, Emergency Coordinators Checklist, is used as a guide.

3.2.1.1 The EC should periodically discuss priorities, habitability of the facility and Site radiological conditions with the HPC. If evacuation of the TSC becomes necessary refer to Section 3.3.

3.2.1.2 The EC should ensure TSC personnel receive a periodic plant status update, including priorities, any change to facility habitability or Site radiological conditions.

3.2.2 Each TSC coordinator is responsible for completing their Checklist.

3.3 TSC EVACUATION 3.3.1 Evacuation of the facility should be considered:

a) When direct dose rates reach or exceed 5,000 mrem/hour, or b) When cumulative dose reaches or exceeds 4,400 mrem, or c) When iodine concentration reaches or exceeds 1.9 E-5

[LCi/ml.

3.3.2 Evacuation may be required if power is unavailable or the ventilation system fails.

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 3.3.3 Coordinators should go to the facilities as indicated depending on their availability.

a) Emergency Coordinator (EC) - to Control Room.

b) Technical Assessment Coordinator (TAC) - to Field Office if habitable then Control Room.

c) Operations Support Coordinator (OSC) - to Field Office if habitable then Control Room.

d) Administrative (Admin) Coordinator (AC) - to EOF.

e) Health Physics (HP) Coordinator (HPC) - to Field Office if habitable then Control Room.

f) TSC (ENS) Communicator (TC) - to Control Room.

g) Chemistry Coordinator (CC) - to EOF.

h) Security Coordinator (SC) - to EOF.

3.3.4 Coordinators reporting to the Control Room should evaluate minimum staff required to go with them and assign others to the EOF.

3.3.4.1 The OSC should take the Emergency Team Coordinators and minimum number of team members.

3.4 EVENT CLOSEOUT 3.4.1 If the emergency conditions allow the initiation of recovery operations or the closeout of the event, the Emergency Coordinator should contact the Recovery Manager (RM) and discuss implementation of EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Recovery.

3.4.2 TSC personnel continue activities in accordance with this procedure until turned over to the Recovery Organization or closeout is declared.

3.5 TSC SHUTDOWN 3.5.1 If the TSC is to be shut down, direct the Coordinators to initiate Termination and Shutdown section of their Checklist.

3.5.2 The Emergency Coordinator should make preparations with the Shift Supervisor to transfer remaining responsibilities to the Control Room.

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 3.5.3 The Administrative Coordinator assesses the status of the TSC and ensures the following actions have been completed:

3.5.3.1 All functional equipment/supplies have been restored to startup conditions.

3.5.3.2 The entire TSC staff has been relieved of all duties associated with the operation of the TSC.

3.5.3.3 All records generated during the operation of the TSC have been collected.

3.5.4 After shifting responsibilities, inform the Shift Supervisor and Recovery Manager that the TSC is shut down.

4 REFERENCES 4.1 Callaway Plant Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) 4.2 EIP-ZZ-00101, Classification of Emergencies 4.3 EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions 4.4 EIP-ZZ-00212, Protective Action Recommendation 4.5 EIP-ZZ-00213, Technical Assessment 4.6 EIP-ZZ-00217, Emergency Response Data System Activation 4.7 EIP-ZZ-00220, Emergency Team Formation 4.8 EIP-ZZ-00230, Accountability 4.9 EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Recovery 4.10 OTN-ZZ-00001, TSC Building HVAC System.

4.11 HPCI 96-007, Emergency Response Facility Habitability Guidelines 4.12 Severe Accident Management Guidelines EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 5 RECORDS NOTE: All Facility Logs, SENTRY and MAGNEM screen prints, office memos, notes, etc. should be attached to the Coordinator Checklist and turned in to the Admin Coordinator and/or Emergency Preparedness (EP).

5.1 QA RECORDS 5.1.1 Attachment 1, Emergency Coordinator Checklist (File K171.0010) 5.1.2 Attachment 2, Technical Assessment Coordinator (TAC) Checklist (File K171.0010) 5.1.3 Attachment 3, Operations Support Coordinator (OSC) Checklist (File K171.0010) 5.1.4 Attachment 4, Administrative (Admin) Coordinator Checklist (File K171.0010) 5.1.5 Attachment 5, Health Physics (HP) Coordinator Checklist (File K171.0010) 5.1.6 Attachment 6, TSC (ENS) Communicator Checklist (File K171.0010) 5.1.7 Attachment 7, Chemistry Coordinator Checklist (File K 171.0010) 5.1.8 Attachment 8, Security Coordinator (SC) Checklist (File K171.0010) 5.1.9 Attachment 9, Emergency Team Coordinator (ETC) Checklist (File K171.0010)

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Date Time:

INITIATION O 1. 0 Card in on the accountability card reader.

0 Sign in on Facility Sign-in board.

o Obtain the EC package.

o Clip on Emergency Coordinator badge.

o Adjust Gaitronics Volume o Review KOA-ZZ- A0002 "COMMAND AND CONTROL GUIDELINES" o 2. Initiate Log Sheet.

U 3. Receive briefing by:

o Technical Assessment Coordinator. (EAL Monitoring).

o Shift Supervisor and relieve him as Emergency Coordinator.

[ 4. Announce assumption of "Emergency Coordinator" duties to TSC staff.

- 5. Review plant/group status with TSC Coordinators:

O Administrative.

0 TSC (ENS) Communicator.

o Health Physics.

o Operations Support/Support Area.

0 Technical Assessment.

o Chemistry.

o Security.

-I 6. Ensure the following responsibilities have been transferred from Control Room.

o EAL MONITORING.

0 ENS COMMUNICATION.

0 PAR MONITORING (if the RM position in the EOF is not manned).

o SAMG Implementation (if applicable).

from the Control Q 7. Make a site-wide announcement that, "The TSC has accepted emergency responsibilities Room."

personnel U 8. Announce the following: "TSC Coordinators assess your manpower needs and request additional from the Admin Coordinator as needed. All excess personnel should assemble in the Operations Support Area and await further instructions."

QL 9. After assessing manpower needs, instruct all excess personnel to return home or return to work (ALERT) and remain near their phones. Personnel sent home should remain fit for duty and will be contacted concerning shift relief and turnover.

OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that MUST be frequently reviewed

[U

• 1. Periodically update TSC personnel including priorities, habitability status and Site radiological conditions.

Note: Priorities should be listed on the Priority Status Board U *2. Continue activities per EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions.

U *3. Perform periodic briefs with the below individuals concerning on-site activities:

o TSC Coordinators.

O RM.

O SS.

0] On site NRC personnel.

K171.0010 Page 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 1 CA-#259

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 TURNOVER L3 1. Incoming Emergency Coordinator briefed on TSC status and log reviewed.

U 2. Recovery Manager and Shift Supervisor informed.

Lo 3. Turnover announced to TSC staff.

O' 4. Turnover complete __Time.

Ul 5. Turnover logged.

U 6. Initiate a new checklist CA# 259.

RECOVERY Declare Recovery per EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Recovery (if applicable).

"o Recovery Manager contacted.

"o Shift Supervisor contacted.

"o Recovery organization established.

"0 Make site wide announcement.

TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN o- 1. Shutdown TSC (if required).

"o Coordinators directed to shutdown TSC Time.

"o Make site wide announcement.

Emergency Coordinator Signature K171.0010 Page 2 of 2 ATTACHMENT 1 CA-#259

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Date Time:

INITIATION

-1 1. Card in on the accountability card reader.

0 Sign in on Facility Sign-in board.

o1 Obtain the TAC package o] Clip on the Tech. Assessment Coordinators badge.

0 Adjust Gaitronics Volume U 2. Ensure the TSC has power.

[] Normal power, (i.e. lights on, power available to computers, etc.).

o No Power. Start the TSC diesel per OOA-UB-EPG70. (WCE Supervisors, WCE Planners, Journeyman Electricians and EOs should be used to operate the Manual Transfer Switch MTSUB7001.) CARS 200200182 o] 3. Shift the following to UPS power:

"o Computer link located in the closet near the kitchen.

""] PC power supplies CARS 200105972 U] 4. If outside temperature is approximately 40°F or above, locate panel FIKUB7001 TSC Air Handling Unit Control Panel, just inside the TSC Equipment Room Door and to the left. Place the TSC Air Handling Unit Control Switch CSUB7005 in the COOL position. CARS 200002783 U- 5. Initiate Log Sheet.

ol 6. Activate Plant Status Boards from the Plant Computer (Cancel, type PSB, Return) or use keyboard the PC.

commands on NOTE: In the event of Plant Computer System failure, refer to EIP-ZZ-00213, Technical Assessment, for further guidance.

Keyboard controls Q] 7. Turn on the Projected Status Boards using the remote control. They are connected to the PCs.

MUST be used for the PCs.

until the Control U" 8. Obtain brief from the SS, STA or other CR personnel. Contact CR via phone as little as possible Room TSC Liaison is staffed then use the Tech Assessment Line (dial 211), always provide your name and title.

L) 9. The following should be logged:

o Plant Status/Event Status o Current EAL(s) o Equipment Status (equipment out of service?)

o Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) Issued per EIP-ZZ-00212.

o Dose Assessment contact (name) section Inform Control Room when accepting EAL(s) PAR(s) SAMG(s) responsibilities Additional instructions?

Ul 10. Activate Emergency Response Data System ERDS per EIP-ZZ-00217 (if not already activated) from the Plant Computer. (Cancel, type ERDS, return type in password NRCERDS, return, select F2 to activate) When ERDS is activated the system displays "Data Transmission in Progress". To return to PSB's, select Cancel, type PSB, Return; ERDS continues to run unaffected in the background. Inform the ENS Communicator if ERDS cannot be activated (i.e., loss of Plant Computer). CARS 199903613 L] 11. Assign the Reactor Engineer to:

o Project Shutdown margins for current and anticipated conditions taking into consideration transient Xenon and Boron concentration.

U Perform core damage assessment using EDP-ZZ-00005.

U] 12. Begin monitoring Emergency Action Levels (EAL) per EIP-ZZ-00101.

U3 13. Brief the Emergency Coordinator, upon his arrival, on the TSC activities.

U1 14. Place TSC Ventilation System in the Filter Mode per OOA-UB-00005. (An EO may be used if available.)

K171.0010 Page 1 of 5 ATTACHMENT 2 CA-#261

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 ___ ___

l315. Personnel Assessment Rev.

EIP-ZZ-

"o Chemistry Coordinator (Name)(1 required)

"0 Technical Assessment Status Board Keepers (Name) (3 required)

(Name)

(Name)

Engineers Lead Engineer (1 required).

Mechanical (1 required) Electrical (I required)

Reactor (1 required) ___I&C (1 required) clock

-LU 16 Ensure the Facility clock is synchronized to the plant computer or control room Emergency Coordinator.

"13 17. Technical Assessment Group ready to accept responsibilities. Log and inform the Coordinator.

U] 18. Discuss any additional support or supplies required with the Admin OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that MUST be frequently reviewed

[]

• 1. Engineering Personnel that leave the Facility should check out with the Security Officer. If a release above normal operating limits has occurred or is likely to occur a HP brief is required. CARS 199701061 minutes to ensure they U] *2. If personnel are dispatched to another facility a follow up call should be initiated in 15-20 arrive safely. CARS 199901904 enter FF; select the U *3. To obtain Plant Status Boards printout from the Plant Computer terminals (not PCs), Cancel, TSC printer, then Fl. To use the color printer depress Ctrl & PF20 simultaneously.

or keyboard

" *4. Toggle between PSB 1 and PSB2 using the Blue TOUCH areas on the Plant Computer terminals commands on the PCs. To obtain area radiation monitors type ARM or PCD - Return.

cause a change in EAL's (i.e.

U *5. Inform the EC of any changes in EAL's or of any conditions or trends, that could radiation levels, releases, etc.).

U *6. Plant Computer turn on codes o ARM Area Radiation Monitors o PCD Dose Assessment general overview including MET data, Rad data and flow status.

o PCDU Dose Assessment for the Unit Vent, Containment and Aux Building releases.

o PCDRS Dose Assessment for Radwaste and Steam releases.

UJ *7. Upon entry into the Recirculation Phase of RHR perform the following:

o Direct the Chemistry Coordinator to obtain 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> RWST samples per CSP-ZZ-07540.

o3 Inform HPC of probable increase in Auxiliary Building dose rates.

O3 Inform HPC of possible valve leakage back to RWST, which could change dose rates.

K171.0010 Page 2 of 5 ATTACHMENT 2 CA-#261

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 TURNOVER UL 1. Incoming Technical Assessment Coordinator briefed on TSC status and review log.

L 2. Emergency Coordinator informed.

E] 3. Turnover announced to Technical Assessment staff.

Ul 5. Turnover complete Time.

"l 6. Turnover logged.

Q- 7. Initiate a new checklist CA# 261.

RECOVERY U 1. Assess the following:

o a. Plant equipment status 0 b. Accident assessment o c. Control of radiological releases

[o d. Ability to resume normal operations or RM.

U 2. Continue Technical Assessment activities until directed otherwise by the Emergency Coordinator TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN U 1. When directed by the Emergency Coordinator, inform Tech Assessment staff of deactivation.

U 2. Ensure equipment and supplies are deactivated and/or stored.

Ul 3. Ensure documents are collected and given to the Admin Coordinator.

U- 4. Restore PC UPS power supply to LINE.

U 5. Contact Operations to return TSC Ventilation to Normal Mode UL 6. Restore TSC Air Handling Unit Control Switch to AUTO position.

Technical Assessment Coordinator Signature K171.0010 Page 3 of 5 ATTACHMENT 2 CA-#261

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 COLOR AND DESCRIPTION OF COMPUTER POINT QUALITY CODES The Plant Computer System (PCS) assigns a "Data Quality Code" to each field input and calculated variable at the time the point is processed. These quality codes are determined by a series of checks/tests performed during both input-data validation and point processing. A list of the quality codes follows, which is ordered by severity:

1. UNK (Blue) - Unknown; point not yet processed. If a point is deleted from processing when SAIPMS is first activated, "UNK" quality code is assigned. This quality code is also displayed for calculated or derived points which have not yet cycled through their first processing period.

2. DEL (Blue) - Point has been deleted from processing. If a point was active when the SAIPMS software was activated, and was subsequently disabled from processing, the quality code "DEL" is assigned and no further engineering unit conversion is attempted.

3. NCAL (Blue) - Derived point not calculable. This quality code is assigned when it has been determined that insufficient inputs exist to accurately perform the associated equation or calculation.

4. INVIL (Blue) - Invalid code is generated when a point's defined hardware channel address has not been selected, does not exist, or cannot be accessed. This usually indicates either an invalid hardware channel address, or a failed hardware component. For example, if a defined card slot address does not contain a card, all points assigned to that card are tagged as INVL. Also, if a multiplexer has either failed or been taken offline, all points assigned to that multiplexer are tagged as INVL.

5. RDER (Blue) - Sensor Read Error code is generated when no test return/input is received for a point in response to a scan command/output to a valid hardware channel address. This usually indicates a faulty sensor or a multiplexer communication problem. Whenever a quality code of RDER is observed, a hardware error condition exists.

6. OTC (Blue) - Open thermocouple.

7. BAD (Blue) - The BAD (Bad Scanned Value) code is generated when the "corrected" scanned value (i.e. adjusted for A/D gain and zero-drift error) exceeds the sensor range as defined by a point's "SENSOR LIMIT LOW" and "SENSOR LIMIT HIGH" values in the database.

8. HRL (Blue) - Point exceeds high reasonable limits. This condition is tested after engineering unit conversion and if the value exceeds the defined High Reasonable limit, a quality code of "HRL" is assigned.

9. LRL (Blue) - Point exceeds low reasonable limits. This condition is tested after engineering unit conversion and if the value exceeds the defined Low Reasonable limit, a quality code of "LRL" is assigned.

10. REDU (Cyan) - Point fails redundant point check. Ifa point has a defined Redundant Point and its current value does not match the defined point within the specified tolerance, it is assigned a quality code of "REDU".

K171.0010 Page 4 of 5 ATTACHMENT 2 CA-#261

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031

11. HIHI(Red) - Point above high alarm limit. This condition is met when a point's current value has exceeded the defined High Alarm limit, and is assigned a quality code of "HIHI".

12. LOLO (Red) - Point below low alarm limit. This condition is met when a point's current value is less than the defined LOW Alarm limit, and is assigned a quality code of "LOLO".

13. HALM (Yellow) - Point above high warning limit. This condition is met when a point's current value has exceeded the defined High Operating limit, and is assigned a quality code of "HALM".

14. LALM (Yellow) - Point below low warning limit. This condition is met when a point's current value is below the defined Low Operating limit, and is assigned a quality code of "LALM".

15. ALM (Red) - State/Change-of-State alarm. Any logical-value point may be alarm monitored against either a defined logical state (i.e., "TRUE", or "FALSE"), or a defined change-of-state condition (i.e., "TRUE" to "FALSE", "FALSE" to "TRUE", or either state change). A quality code of "ALM" is assigned if the point meets any of the above conditions.

16. SUB (Cyan) - Substitute value inserted for point. If a substitute value has been entered for a point, the point is assigned a quality code of "SUB", and no further alarm checks or engineering unit conversions are made.

17. DALM (Cyan) - Point is deleted from alarm checks. If a point is currently disabled from alarm processing, it is assigned a quality code of "DALM", and no further alarm checks are made.

18. INHB (Green) - Point is inhibited from alarm by cut-out point. Ifa point has an assigned cut-out point, and the current state of the cut-out point matches the specified alarm inhibit state, the point is assigned a quality code of "INHB", and no alarm transaction is generated. While inhibited, the point value WILL continue to update, only the alarm condition is inhibited.

19. GOOD (Green) - Point passed all the above checks. The quality code "GOOD" indicates that all defined alarm conditions, states, or values have not been exceeded or met.

K171.0010 Page 5 of 5 ATTACHMENT 2 CA-#261

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Date Time:

INITIATION U 1. 0 Card in on the accountability card reader.

o Sign in on Facility Sign-in board.

o Obtain the OSC package.

o Clip on the Operations Support Coordinator badge.

o Adjust Gaitronics Volume U 2. Ensure the TSC has power.

0] Normal power o No Power. Start the TSC diesel per OOA-UB-EPG70. (WCE Supervisors, WCE Planners, Journeyman Electricians and EOs should be used to operate the Manual Transfer Switch MTSUB7001.) CARS 200200182 U 3. Inform Emergency Coordinator and Admin. Coordinator of your arrival.

LJ] 4. Initiate Log Sheet.

L] 5. Control Room/TSC Liaison contacted and status brief obtained.

status.

Ll 6. Contact Emergency Team Coordinator(s) (ETC) and obtain the Support Area (SA)

ID 7. Personnel Assessment

a. Emergency Team Coordinator (s) Mechanical: (name) (1 required)

Electrical: (name) (1 required)

b. Personnel: Mechanics (number) (2 required)

Electricians (number) (2 required)

I&C Techs. (number)(This should include the shift Techs) (2 required)

Storekeeper (name) (1 required) ol 8. OSC Group ready for responsibilities Time. (Also make log entry).

L] 9. Emergency Coordinator and Admin. Coordinator informed OSC ready.

O 10. Discuss any additional support or supplies required with the Admin Coordinator. OSA Support Request may be made utilizing page 3 of 3 of this attachment.

OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that MUST be frequently reviewed

]*1. Maintain contact with Control RoomiTSC Liaison and keep Emergency Coordinator informed of significant activities/events.

Teams.

U *2. Periodically brief the Emergency Coordinator on the priorities that have been established for Emergency CARS 199903669 Officer. If a U *3. Inform the ETC that Support Area Personnel that leave the Facility should check out with the Security release above normal operating limits has occurred or is likely to occur a HP brief is required. CARS 199701061 U *4. If personnel are dispatched to another facility a follow up call should be initiated in 15-20 minutes to ensure they arrive safely. CARS 199901904 "L *5. Ensure Emergency Teams are formed and briefed as needed per EIP-ZZ-00220 Emergency Team Formation.

U1 *6. Ensure Emergency Team Coordinators track Teams as to location and progress of their assignment.

K171.0010 Page 1 of 3 ATTACHMENT 3 CA-#262

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 U *7. Interface with the Technical Assessment and Health Physics Groups to ensure coordination of activities.

U 8. If accountability is declared, provide Security Coordinator with badge numbers of personnel that have been assigned to an emergency team that has left the TSC.

O *9. Monitor TSC operating equipment periodically:

o TSC Emergency Diesel.

o TSC Emergency Ventilation Filter System. (NOTE: Be aware of rapidly changing radiation levels during periods of releases.)

TURNOVER L" 1. Incoming OSC Coordinator briefed on OSC status and review log.

[] 2. Notify the Emergency Team Coordinators of the turnover.

O3 3. Notify the Control Room/TSC Liaison of the turnover.

0] 4. Emergency Coordinator informed.

[l 5. Turnover complete Time.

U 6. Turnover logged.

U 7. Initiate a new checklist CA# 262.

RECOVERY

[L] 1. Assess the following:

o Plant equipment status.

o Emergency team status. All Emergency Team work needs to be completed, turned over to Recovery or normal maintenance.

o Ability to resume normal operations oJ 2. Continue Operations Support activities until directed otherwise by the Emergency Coordinator or RM.

I TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN Upon direction of the Emergency Coordinator/Administrative Coordinator, contact the Emergency Team Coordinator and inform of deactivation and SHUTDOWN Ensure OSC/SA equipment and TERMINATION supplies are deactivated and/or stored.

Ensure documents are collected and given to the Admin Coordinator.

Operations Support Coordinator Signature K171.0010 Page 2 of 3 ATTACHMENT 3 CA-#262

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 OSA SUPPORT REQUEST Administrative (Admin.) Coordinator, The Operations Support Area (OSA) requires the following support. This support is needed (circle one)

Immediately At next Shift, at _(enter time)

POSITION NUMBER NEEDED Operations Support Coordinator Electrical Emergency Team Coordinator Mechanical Emergency Team Coordinator Storekeeper Mechanical Supervisor Electrical Supervisor I&C Supervisor Mechanical Planner Electrical Planner I&C Planner Electrician Machinist Welder I & C Technician Electrical Apprentice Machinist Apprentice Welder Apprentice I&C Apprentice Insulator Plant Helper Nuclear Utility Worker Tool Room Mechanic Operating Supervisor (Shift Supervisor concurrence obtained)

Equipment Operator (Shift Supervisor concurrence obtained)

K171.0010 Page 3 of 3 ATTACHMENT 3 CA-#262

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Date Time:

INITIATION 01 Card in on the accountability card reader.

0l Sign in on Facility Sign-in board.

0 Obtain the Admin Coordinators package.

o Clip on the Admin Coordinators badge o Adjust Gaitronics Volume Ll 2. Inform Emergency Coordinator and Technical Assessment Coordinator of your presence.

U 3. Shift the SENTRY Computer power supply to UPS position.

13 4. Initiate Log Sheet.

OPERATIONS CARS 199903558

(*) Steps or items that must be frequently reviewed U] 1. Equipment availability and operation.

Check on:

o Personal Computers (PC) 0l SENTRY Computer (NOTE: Ensure SENTRY is operational) CARS 200105707 0l Telephones 0l Copier El Fax El Reader/Printer El Print Plotter

[] 2. Status TSC Coordinators and keep the EC informed periodically until all positions are filled.

El Technical Assessment Coordinator El Health Physics Coordinator El Operations Support Coordinator El TSC (ENS) Communicator El Chemistry Coordinator

_E Security Coordinator

[ *3. Check status of TSC emergency responders per EIP-ZZ-00200 Attachment 2. DO NOT delete messages until all positions are filled. Distribute copies of Attachment 2 to the coordinators periodically until all positions are filled.

Paging or calling using the Emergency phone directory may be required.

El Call 64777 to obtain Audix.

El Enter 68400 and the # sign.

El Enter the password which is only the # sign.

El Follow the instructions to listen to the new messages and complete attachment 2.

El Contact SAS (68785) for any positions that was logged due to Audix message transfer.

U 4. Personnel Assessment Admin/Clerical Support Personnel (call in as necessary) CARS 199903558 El (name) One NIS Support person should be considered.

El (name) One person to callout/canvass additional support.

El (name) One person for the RM in the EOF.

o (name) One person for the LSC in the EOF.

El (name) One person for the EC in the TSC.

El (name) o (name) o (name)

As personnel request are made, contact Admin Personnel in the CMB by calling 68369 or by Gaitronics.

K171.0010 Page 1 of 3 ATTACHMENT 4 CA-#263

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 r

L] *5. 0 Monitor the Declaration Status Boards.

"o Ensure the Declaration Status Boards are current with the Emergency Classification announcements.

CARS 199903558 "O Monitor the receipt of SENTRY Notifications at LAN printer and /or Fax machine and deliver to ENS Communicator.

• 6. Personnel that leave the Facility should check out with the Security Officer. If a release above normal operating limits has occurred or is likely to occur a HP brief is required. CARS 199701061

• 7. If personnel are dispatched to another facility a follow up call should be initiated in 15-20 minutes to ensure they arrive safely. CARS 199901904 L1 *8. Ensure the availability of the following administrative services:

o Typing, Word Processing 0 Copying, Reproduction O1 Fax o Document control o Drawings o Message and mail Delivery o Telephone Repair and Installation o Radio Repair (Ameren Telecom.)

0 _

0 _

1] *9. If operations become or have the potential to become long term, coordinate with the Logistics Support Coordinator (LSC) in the EOF to address the following items for site personnel.

O Contact Security for number of personnel inside the protected area. CARS 199903558 O Meals ordered and scheduled for the entire organization; personnel informed of meal times and locations.

0 Sleeping space arranged for emergency personnel: personnel informed as to location.

o Shift schedule prepared for emergency personnel: appropriate personnel notified. (Use the sign in board and Emergency Telephone Directory to make up roster.)

o Janitorial/waste disposal services arrangements made.

LJ *10. Requests for additional vendor support personnel are to be coordinated with the Logistics Support Coordinator in the EOF.

Obtain the following information from the Logistics Support Coordinator:

o Name(s) of personnel o3 Social Security Number o Work space requirements o Estimated time of arrival

Contact:

o Supervisor Admin, Access Control and arrange for plant access as required.

o Plant helper group to set up desk etc., as required.

1 *11. Coordinate requests for additional equipment with the Logistics Support Coordinator in the EOF.

0 Obtain the information from the requesting organization and supply it to the Logistics Support Coordinator:

o Explicit equipment requirements in writing o Amount needed O Delivery location o Person on site to contact th Ui *12. Contact the Logistical Support Coordinator in the EOF and coordinate to provide Administrative Support to entire organization.

K171.0010 Page 2 of 3 ATTACHMENT 4 CA-#263

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 MHUMNATI I 1-1 "13.

L3 *13. In the event of an accident or illness perform the following: (Note: DO NOT release the individual'sname.)

Call the control room (CR/TSC Liaison via OSC) and obtain the following. CARS 199903558 o Nature of injury or illness.

o Contaminated?

"o Transported offsite to doctor, hospital etc.

"o If the incident may attract media attention call the JPIC Administrator or Coordinator and supply them with the information.

I TURNOVER TURNOVER review log.

3 1. Brief the incoming Admin. Coordinator of the status of administrative activities and

-- 2. Notify the Admin. and clerical staff of the turnover.

L3 3. Notify the Emergency Coordinator turnover complete.

o3 4. Turnover complete Time.

-- 5. Turnover logged.

U- 6. Initiate a new Checklist CA# 263.

RECOVERY

[U 1. Continue Administrative activities until directed otherwise by the Emergency Coordinator or RM.

TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN

[U 1. Upon direction of the Emergency Coordinator, begin terminating operation as follows 0 Responsibilities transferred to the Control Room.

o All functional equipment/supplies have been restored to startup conditions.

o Restore SENTRY Computer UPS power supply to Line position.

o Records collected, and forwarded to Emergency Preparedness Department.

o Staff relieved of TSC duties.

U) 2. Control Room informed of TSC shutdown.

U 3. TSC shut down Time Administrative Coordinator Signature K171.0010 Page 3 of 3 ATTACHMENT 4 CA-#263

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Date Time:

INITIATION S10 Card in on the accountability card reader.

o Close front door to vestibule and back hallway door from support area.

o Direct incoming traffic to enter through portal monitor o Sign in on Facility Sign-in board.

o Obtain the Health Physics Coordinators package.

o Clip on the Health Physics Coordinators badge.

o Adjust Gaitronics Volume Ul 2. Inform Emergency Coordinator and Admin. Coordinator of your presence.

L" 3. Initiate Log Sheet.

O- 4. Shift the HPC Plant Computer power supply to the UPS position.

L 5. Personnel Assessment On Shift:

0] (name) HP Ops Shift Technician (HPOPS). Obtain Plant status and radiological concerns. Status setup of Control Room / Field Office in accordance with EIP-ZZ-00102, Attachment 2. HPOPS Tech to provide HP coverage for On Shift personnel as directed by Shift Supervisor.

Li (name) HP Tech Support Technician (HPTS). Obtain Plant, radiological release, meteorological, and Protective Action Recommendation status from the HPTS Tech performing dose assessment.

El (name) Chemistry Technician. The Chemistry Technician is responsible for sampling and analysis as needed to identify the source and magnitude of the emergency. Chemistry Technicians are qualified as Support Area Personnel in the Health Physics group.

"6. OSA Responders NOTE: Minimum 14 R/C Support Personnel required, (one MUST be a Chemistry Tech.)

Assign personnel as they arrive to the TSC based on priorities, not as listed, using the below guidance.

1-_ Contact the DAC and discuss the need to Assign R/C Support Personnel to the Rapid Plume Assessment Tech, (RPAT) position if not already dispatched.

2. __ Assign 2 R/C Support Personnel to FMTs. HPC obtains FMT Driver from OSA, Engineering or Rad Chem Departments. Dispatch the teams and drivers

3. in accordance with EIP-ZZ-0021 1.

4. EL Assign 2 R/C Support Personnel to the EOF for Dose Assessment Staff and FMT Communicator. Brief with FMTs if personnel are available, but do not

5. delay dispatching.

6. [L Assign R/C Support Personnel to perform Onsite survey of plume if a release above normal operating limits is suspected or in progress, monitor habitability of MAF, Field Office, HPAC, and Control Room as needed.

7. __ Assign R/C Support Personnel to monitor Plant Computer Screens, maintain Facility Log, and answer phones / radio. Initiate FF Logs and update HPC on any changes approx. every 15 minutes. Wind speed and wind direction should be closely monitored along with In Plant radiological conditions.

K171.0010 Page 1 of 7 ATTACHMENT 5 CA-#264

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031

8. E Assign HP Brief Tech to report directly to the OSC to support Radiological Briefings and Emergency Teams. All prepared radiological briefings should be reviewed with HPC prior to conducting brief of Emergency Team.

9 Have R/C Techs response check portable instruments, prepare equipment and

10. _supplies.

1 Have R/C Tech set up EDs in Rapid Entry Mode. Request Setpoints from HPC E Have R/C Tech ensure all OSA personnel read and sign the Emergency RWP.

11. TEDE/CDE Evaluation: Mrem gamma X 3 = TEDE Mrem gamma X 40 =CDE thy

12. __ Assign Chemistry Support Personnel to the Chemistry Coordinator (if needed).

13. __ Assign R/C Support Personnel to communicate with the NRC via the HPN line (if requested from NRC).

14. 0] Assign R/C Support Personnel to maintain Habitability of TSC per Initiation Step 8 and Operation Step 10 of HPC Checklist. Direct R/C Tech to conduct HP briefs and provide dosimetry for personnel leaving the facility that are not assigned to Emergency Teams (as needed).

S7. Contact Dose Assessment Coordinator (DAC) at EOF (ext. 64999):

- Inform DAC of RPAT, FMT, Dose Assessment Staff, and FMT Communicator deployment status.

8. Establish Radiological Habitability Controls in the TSC:

0 Portal Monitor energized and response checked.

o Set up a frisking station using a model 177 Rate Meter, as needed, to backup the portal monitor.

o AMS 3 energized and source checked.

O Control Dosimetry placed at HPC Desk.

9. Notify Emergency Coordinator that HP is ready for operation and habitability in the TSC is established.

[] 10. HP Group ready for responsibilities at Time. (Also make log entry)..

OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that must be frequently reviewed.

S"1 Make Facility Announcement that "All personnel leaving the TSC should check out with the Security Officer prior to leaving the facility." If a release above normal operating limits is in progress or anticipated, announce "an HP brief will also be required."

NOTE: If a release above normal operating limits is in progress or anticipated, ensure all personnel dispatched from the TSC are issued Electronic Dosimeters and dose is tracked. The Security Officer will verify HP briefs prior to exit.

[l *2. If personnel are dispatched to another facility a follow up call should be initiated in 15-20 minutes to ensure they arrive safely. CARS 199901904.

K171.0010 Page 2 of 7 ATTACHMENT 5 CA-#264

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Review needed protective actions for On Site personnel: Rev.

EIP-ZZ-002 "o Ensure dosimetry issued to Security personnel and Security Coordinator briefed on radiological conditions, wind speed and direction.

"o Inform Security Coordinator if a Release Above Normal Operating Limits occurs.

o Coordinate Assembly and Evacuation actions per EIP-ZZ-00230 with the Security Coordinator.

(Assembly and Evacuation are required at a SITE and GENERAL EMERGENCY. When discussing Evacuation routes utilizing MAGNEM, use the 10 Mile projected map.)

0 If Needed the Hearnes Center is the preferred Care and Reception Center.

NOTE: If the Hearnes Center is not available, the Security Coordinator will provide an alternate based on discussions with SEMA.

o Determine need for R/C Support Personnel to monitor Assembly and Evacuation.

Evaluate restricting access to areas due to release or potential release based on wind direction.

00]

Evaluate need for Respiratory Protection per HTP-ZZ-01201.

Evaluate Potassium Iodide (KI) distribution to Emergency Teams, Ops Department and Security nersonnel ner HDP-ZZ-01300 section 7. items 7.1 throu2h 7.1.4..

[ 4. Obtain Respirator Issue Log and Daily Dose Report from HPACA if LAN and Mainframe Computer are unavailable in the TSC.

LJ *5. Monitor Plant Computer Screens associated with Group 1 & 2 EALs from EIP-ZZ-00101, Classification of Emergencies. Report any changes in readings to the Technical Assessment Coordinator and EC.

the TSC can be Ul *6. Personnel requiring decontamination should be sent to HPACA. If needed, the back entrance of staged to receive contaminated personnel.

• 7. Verify sufficient inventory of the following (additional quantities are available from HPAC or Cal Facility):

0 Electronic Dosimeters (ED)

O Portable Instruments O Respirators o Protective Clothing (PC) o Consumables (rope, postings, bags, etc.)

in the U *8. Consider preparation of Emergency Dose Extensions for selected Operations Support Area personnel event Plant radiological conditions change in accordance with HDP-ZZ-01450.

L3 *9. Monitor Plant conditions and emergency activities to ensure personnel dose is maintained ALARA.

o Monitor and trend Plant Area Radiation monitors, including Control Room and HPACA.

o Radiation levels are expected to increase when Safety Injection recirculation is lined up to Containment.

o Monitor the RWST radiation levels when in the recirculation mode.

0 Notify the EC and make announcements to the TSC as Radiological Conditions change.

o Establish radiological postings in the Plant as time and resources allow (MUST be performed prior to Re-entry).

U3

• 10. Monitor facility habitability radiological conditions and recommended appropriate protective actions:

o Direct dose rate >600 mrem/hr, inform the EC, and commence monitoring cumulative dose.

o Cumulative dose of Ž4,400 mrem, recommend evacuation of the facility.

o Direct dose rate of >:5,000 mrem/hr, recommend evacuation.

o Iodine concentrations of >2.4E 6 tCi/ml, inform the EC, and commence air sampling to ensure total intake does not exceed 25 rem CDE.

o Iodine concentrations of 21.9E -5pCi/ml, recommend evacuation.

U]

• 11. Periodically update the Emergency Coordinator on radiological conditions in the Plant and the status of TSC habitability.

K171.0010 Page 3 of 7 ATTACHMENT 5 CA-#264

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Q *12. If additional HP support or supplies are needed, coordinate requests through the Admin. Coordinator or Stores person.

TURNOVER

11. Brief the oncoming HP Coordinator on radiological information, and any protective actions, both recommended and implemented.

[- 2. Brief the oncoming HP Coordinator on the status of deployed Emergency Teams.

O3 3. Review HPC Checklist and Log.

El 4. Contact Dose Assessment Coordinator in EOF

- Arrange for FMT turnover.

- Obtain weather forecast.

- Inform DAC of oncoming relief.

I'-L 5. Notify the Emergency Coordinator of the Turnover U- 6. Turnover complete Time.

o1 7. Turnover logged.

LU 8. Initiate a new Checklist CA# 264.

RECOVERY Q1 1. Discuss:

0l Maintaining of personnel exposure ALARA and preventing spread of contamination.

0 Survey and Posting Status.

0 Need to implement EIP-ZZ-00225, Reentry o Decontamination activities.

0 Need for additional assistance, supplies, or equipment.

o Long term monitoring.

o Activation of Automated Access Control.

1U 2. Continue HP operations until directed otherwise by the Emergency Coordinator or RM.

TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN

'-I1 Upon direction of the Emergency Coordinator/Admin. Coordinator, notify R/C personnel of shutdown.

U" 2. Turn over any HP support to normal plant staff.

U" 3. Contact DAC in EOF.

10 should U 4. Ensure HP equipment is de-energized, supplies and materials are stored as required. (Note: Gamma remain on.)

5. Ensure documents are collected and given to the Admin. Coordinator.

Ul 6. Restore HPC Plant Computer UPS power supply to LINE position.

HP Coordinator Signature K171.0010 Page 4 of 7 ATTACHMENT 5 CA-#264

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031

1. Verify 110 VAC power to the unit (green operational light is illuminated and no alarms are activated).

2. Set the NIMBIN power supply On-Off switch to ON and ensure the power light is illuminated.

3. Set the HV-2 NIM On-Off switch to on and ensure the Positive LED is illuminated.

4. Verify that a current calibration label is affixed to the Electronics Box and the pot settings, on the box, are the same as identified on the label.

5. Inspect the monitor for physical damage.

6. Verify no alarms are activated. If alarms are activated clear alarms before continuing.

7. Ensure green operational light is illuminated.

8. Pass the Gamma-10 Response Source through the central region of the monitor. The Contamination alarm should activate on the box, a light and buzzer, and a red light on the portal should illuminate.

9. Depress the reset button on the portal. The alarms should clear and the green operational light should remain lit.

10. If the monitor passes this check, initial and date the Pre-Operational Check Sticker affixed to the Electronics Box.

If the monitor fails the Pre-Operational Checks, tag the unit Out Of Service and notify the Health Physics Coordinator. Set up Frisking Station and have personnel entering the building and those already in the building frisk for contamination, if it is expected.

K171.0010 Page 5 of 7 ATTACHMENT 5 CA-#264

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 This Startup Sequence augments HTP-ZZ-04137, Operation of the Eberline AMS-Ill. It is designed to be used in an Emergency Response Facility when an HP Operations Technician is not immediately available.

1) Connect AMS-3 (monitor) and air sampler to 110 VAC power.

2) Ensure monitor and air sampler have current calibration label.

3) Inspect the chart paper. Ensure an adequate supply of paper remains. If a RED line appears on the chart paper, notify Health Physics and continue the startup procedure.

4) Set monitor ON-OFF switch (located on back of monitor) to the ON position. Allow monitor to warm-up for 5 minutes.

5) Set BACKGROUND SUBTRACT switch (located on front of monitor) to the ON position.

6) Push in "PUSH TO SET" on bottom left side of monitor and note the alarm setpoint value of 20,000 cpm (this is the first scale mark to the right of the 104 scale value.

7) Set alarm setpoint to 1000 cpm by adjusting the SET knob while holding in "PUSH TO SET" button.

8) Remove sample holder located on the right front side of monitor by loosening the clamp and pulling out on handle.

9) Obtain check source from HP E-Kit Locker. Center source over sample holder opening with the recessed side of the source bracket facing the opening.

10) The audible alarm and the alarm light should energize (activate). If not notify Health Physics.

(The startup procedure should not continue until the problem is resolved).

11) Press ACKNOWLEDGE button to silence alarm.

12) Verify count rate on chart recorder is as indicated on the response value listed on back of source bracket or a sticker on the instrument.

13) Remove check source. Ensure alarm light resets and count rate decreases on chart recorder.

14) Remove the filter in the filter holder. (Remove the filter retaining ring on the filter holder, this snaps on the end of the filter holder assembly, and may fit somewhat tight.)

15) Obtain a new filter from the HP Emergency Kit Locker and place it on the sample holder with the "ROUGH SIDE" of filter facing upwards.

16) Replace retaining ring on the sample holder and insert the sample holder into the sample chamber. Lock the filter holder into place.

17) Set the alarm setpoint to 20,000 cpm by adjusting the SET knob while holding in the "PUSH TO SET" button.

18) Place the toggle switch on the power cord to the "ON" position. The air sampler pump should start.

19) Ensure airflow as indicated on flowmeter is within the tolerance listed on the calibration label (read the flow at the center of the rotometer float ball.) If it is not, notify Health Physics.

20) Initial and date the Preoperational Check sticker.

K171.0010 Page 6 of 7 ATTACHMENT 5 CA-#264

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031

1. Remove Model 177 ratemeter, frisker probe, detector cable, power cord, and check source from the E-Kit cabinet.

2. Connect detector and power cords, if not already connected, to the Model 177 ratemeter and verify the following switch settings:

Front Panel: 1. On/Off switch in "ON" position.

2. Volume adjusted to hear audible counts.

3. Response switch in "slow" position.

4. Range switch to "Xl" scale.

Rear Panel: 1. Alarm set at '5'.

2. Subtract switch in "Off' position if meter has Subtract Switch.

3. Perform response check as follows:

-- Ensure instrument has a current calibration sticker.

l] Set the range switch to the appropriate position and place the detector on the check source bracket.

-- Verify the response is within the acceptable range as specified on the response value determination form/sticker for that check source.

D] Check the instrument alarm by adjusting the ALARM SET switch so that it is slightly less than the count rate of the source.

L-I Remove the source from the detector.

I] Depress the RESET button. The alarm condition should clear.

I- If the pre-operational checks are satisfactory, complete the attached pre operational check sticker. If either the alarm or the response check failed, notify the Health Physics Coordinator and obtain an operational ratemeter.

4. Return the check source to the E-Kit cabinet.

K171.0010 Page 7 of 7 ATTACHMENT 5 CA-#264

EEP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Date Time:

INITIATION

[ 1. 0 Card in on the accountability card reader.

o Sign in on Facility Sign-in board.

o Obtain the ENS Communicators package.

o Clip on the Communicators badge.

o Adjust Gaitronics Volume

- 2. Ensure the TSC has power.

"o Normal power, (i.e. lights on, power available to computers, etc.).

"o No Power. Start the TSC diesel per OOA-UB-EPG70. (WCE Supervisors, WCE Planners, Journeyman Electricians and EOs should be used to operate the Manual Transfer Switch MTSUB7001.) CARS 200200182

" 3. Shift the PC power supplies to the UPS position.

[' 4. Emergency Coordinator and Admin Coordinator informed of your presence.

L] 5. Initiate Log sheet.

U 6. Activate Plant Status Boards on the Plant Computer (Cancel, type PSB, Return).

"-l 7. Check dial tone on the ENS line. (If phone is manned in CR the line will not have a dial tone.)

U1 8. Contact Control Room Communicator and get a brief as to the status of ENS Communications.

L) 9. Accept responsibility of ENS Communications per EIP-ZZ-00201, CA-#2517B , or as directed by the NRC.

O 10. Discuss any additional support or supplies required with the Admin Coordinator.

OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that must be frequently reviewed.

] 1. Call the NRC or accept transfer from the Control Room on the ENS line and inform them of your name and that you are communicating from the Callaway Plant Technical Support Center.

El *2. Remain on the phone and gather facts as requested by the NRC from individual positions, plant computer or status boards and relay those facts back to the NRC, per EIP-ZZ-00201. (All notifications transmitted to the State and local agencies should also be given to the NRC Operations Center unless directed otherwise.)

U3 *3 Log information requested and relayed to the NRC as deemed appropriate.

U *4 Personnel that leave the Facility should check out with the Security Officer. If a release above normal operating limits has occurred or is likely to occur a HP brief is required. CARS 199701061 U *5 If personnel are dispatched to another facility a follow up call should be initiated in 15-20 minutes to ensure they arrive safely. CARS 199901904 TURNOVER U 1. Brief the incoming ENS Communicator on the status of NRC requests, awaiting information and review log.

U3 2. Log turnover.

U 3. Turnover complete Time.

U] 4. Inform Emergency Coordinator or Technical Assessment Coordinator turnover complete.

S5. Initiate a new checklist CA# 265.

RECOVERY S1.I Continue providing the NRC with requested information.

TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN L] 1. When directed, assist with the TSC deactivation.

U 2. Ensure area is put into order and logs collected and give to the Admin Coordinator.

U] 3. Restore PC UPS power supply to LINE.

TSC Communicator (ENS)

K171.0010 Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT 6 CA-#265

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Date Time:

INITIATION U 1. 0 Card in on the accountability card reader.

0 Sign in on Facility Sign-in board.

o Obtain the Chemistry Coordinators package.

o Clip on the Chemistry Coordinators badge.

o Adjust Gaitronics Volume o 2. Inform Emergency Coordinator and Admin. Coordinator of arrival and ready to assume duties of Chemistry Coordinator. (Make log entry.)

o 3. Initiate Log sheet.

L1 4. Contact on shift Chemistry Tech and ensure o Remind on-duty Chem tech to card in at the Field Office during accountability.

o RERP vehicle is operational and in the parking lot.

0 All sample results are updated immediately on Chemistry Data Management System (CDMS).

o Verify CCW is lined up to the SJ panel.

L" 5. Personnel Assessment Rad./Chem. Chemistry technicians (2 required) o (name), (responsibilities) o (name), (responsibilities) o (name), (responsibilities)

Rad./Chem. Technicians available. (Chemistry) _ (number).

U3 6. Assign an available Chemistry Supervisor to the Hot Lab as needed.

Ul 7. Discuss plant chemistry status with Emergency Coordinator and Tech Assessment Coordinator.

OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that must be frequently reviewed.

U

• 1. Review and distribute updated CDMS data as it becomes available:

Give a copy of CDMS Data to the:

o Tech Assessment Coordinator.

o HP Coordinator.

o Reactor Engineer.

U *2. Personnel that leave the Facility should check out with the Security Officer. If a release above normal operating limits has occurred or is likely to occur a HP brief is required. CARS 199701061 U *3. If personnel are dispatched to another facility a follow up call should be initiated in 15-20 minutes to ensure they arrive safely. CARS 199901904 U

• 4. Compare latest results of Dose Equivalent 1-131 and 100/E bar total specific activity to Group 2 & 4 EAL's per EIP-ZZ-00101 , Classification of Emergencies, and report any EAL that is being approached or exceeded to the Technical Assessment Coordinator and Emergency Coordinator.

U] *5. Evaluate Secondary Chemistry conditions including Primary-to-Secondary Leakage, SEE CTP-ZZ-02590 and APA-ZZ-01023..

K171.0010 Page 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 7 CA-#267

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 U 6. If Post Accident Sample is requested, refer to CTP-ZZ-08 100 located in CC Packet.

o *7. Monitor Post Accident Sampling data and provide recommendations as necessary.

• 8. On a SI actuation, SJ sample cooling water will be lost.

0 Request the Tech to secure high temp samples.

o Request Ops to open EGHV69A & B and EGHV70A & B to restore cooling flow as soon as practical.

CVCS letdown samples will remain representative as long as letdown flow is available.

S9. Identify additional support (e.g. personnel, off-site analysis) and coordinate requests through the Admin Coordinator.

TURNOVER U 1. U Brief the incoming Chemistry Coordinator of Chemistry activities and review log.

L3 2. U Notify the Tech. Assessment Coordinator of the Turnover.

U 3. Turnover complete Time.

Ul 4. Turnover logged.

0 5. Initiate new checklist.

RECOVERY U 1. lContinue Chemistry activities until directed otherwise by the Emergency Coordinator or RM.

TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN Ul 1. Upon direction assist with TSC deactivation.

U 2. Ensure Chemistry work area is deactivated and/or stored.

U] 3. Ensure documents are collected and given to the Admin Coordinator.

Chemistry Coordinator Signature K171.0010 Page 2 of 2 ATTACHMENT 7 CA-#267

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Date Time:

INITIATION

- 1. 0 Card in on the accountability card reader.

O Sign in on Facility Sign-in board.

o Obtain the Security Coordinators package.

o Clip on the Security Coordinators badge o Adjust Gaitronics Volume.

Ol 2. Inform Emergency Coordinator and Admin. Coordinator of arrival.

o3 3. Initiated Log sheet.

U- 4. Personnel Assessment (Call in extra personnel as required).

o Contact the Shift Security Supervisor and obtain number and names of security personnel available for assignment.

-- 5. Station security officers at the Emergency Response Facilities entrances to log personnel entrance and egress.

U 6. Contact Health Physics Coordinator (Health Physics Tech Support on back shift 68496) and request:

• Is there a Release Above Normal Operating Limits In Progress? YES / NO

• What is wind direction? From: TO:

SWhat are the affected sectors? _ _ _ _ _

U 6.1

• If YES, contact SEMA. Normal hours 751-2748, off-hours 17188 (Troop F) and request activation of Hearnes Reception and Care Center.

L3 6.2

• If YES, instruct the Security Personnel performing the OCA Sweep to use "ANNOUNCEMENT # 2".

U 6.3

• If NO, instruct the Security Personnel performing the OCA Sweep to use "ANNOUNCEMENT # 1".

U 7. Discuss any additional support or supplies required with the Admin Coordinator.

OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that must be frequently reviewed.

Ul 1. Conduct normal and emergency security activities in accordance with the Security Plan. If the plan cannot be followed, obtain authorization from the EC to deviate (refer to OTO-SK-00001 Attachment 1), in accordance with 10CFR50.54(x)(y) to deviate. Inform the ENS Communicator (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> NRC notification).

CARS 199901754 U 2. Ensure patrol(s) initiate a sweep of OCA/EAB at the ALERT classification per Owner Controlled Area Patrol Post Instruction. Unbadged personnel MUST evacuate the site unless authorized by EC or Security Coordinator.

CARS 200201995

" *3. Assist the EC in Evacuation and Accountability per EIP-ZZ-00230.

Ul 4. If accountability is declared, obtain badge numbers of personnel assigned to emergency teams that have left the TSC from the OSC, and report these badge numbers to the SSS.

S*5. Personnel that leave the Facility should check out with the Security Officer. If a release above normal operating limits has occurred or is likely to occur a HP brief is required. CARS 199701061 U *6. If personnel are dispatched to another facility a follow up call should be initiated in 15-20 minutes to ensure they arrive safely. CARS 199901904 K171.0010 Page 1 of2 ATTACHMENT 8 CA-#2219

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 11'3 *7. Contact the HiP Coordinator to determine te artectea areas m me case of a release above norlm o.etatl .

If Security is to be pulled back from their posts, consider requirements in Step 1, Operations (above).

o *8. Ensure that the Security Force has the appropriate dosimetry. Check with the HPC.

L3 *9. Coordinate plant access control.

L3

• 10. Contact local law enforcement to coordinate traffic control (i.e. for evacuation routes).

L] 11. If SITE Evacuation is announced, ensure Patrol(s) initiate sweep of OCA/EAB per Owner Controlled Area Patrol Post Instruction, to ensure all personnel have left areas in question. CARS 200201995 U

• 12. Coordinate personnel evacuation and accountability.

(NOTE: Accountability is required within 30 minutes of declaring accountability.)

U *13. Coordinate any off-site law enforcement agency involvement.

TURNOVER 3 1. Brief the incoming Security Coordinator of Security activities and review log.

[U 2. Notify the Emergency Coordinator of the turnover.

U 3. Turnover complete Time.

[ 4. Turnover logged.

U 5. Initiate new checklist.

RECOVERY U 1. Continue Security activities until directed otherwise by the Emergency Coordinator.

TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN Upon direction assist with TSC deactivation.

U 2. Ensure security equipment is deactivated and/or stored.

S3. Ensure documents are collected and given to the Admin Coordinator.

Security Coordinator Signature K171.0010 Page 2 of 2 ATTACHMENT 8 CA-#2219

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 Date Time:

INITIATION O- 1. 0 Card in on the accountability card reader.

o Sign in on Facility Sign-in board.

o Obtain the ETC package.

o Clip on the Emergency Team Coordinator badge.

O Adjust Gaitronics Volume o Adjust Gaitronics Volume in the OSA El 2. Inform Operations Support Coordinator (OSC) of your arrival. If OSC has not reported, initiate OSC Checklist.

L3 3. Initiate Log Sheet.

L3 4. Personnel Assessment (number)

Supervisor / Planner

a. Management: /

b. Personnel: Machinist/Welders (2 required) (machinist)

_(welder)

Electricians (2 required)

Plant Helpers Nuclear Utility Workers I&C Other L3 5. Open Key Box and Tool Cabinets.

O 6. ETC Group ready for responsibilities Time. (Also make log entry).

o3 7. Operations Support Coordinator informed ETC ready.

can be

[U 8 Brief and Pre-stage an investigative/search & rescue team for immediate response. Team members reassigned after accountability and job priorities are completed.

[- 9. Discuss any additional support or supplies required with the Admin Coordinator. Page 3 of 3 of this attachment, OSA Support Request, may be used as an aid.

OPERATIONS

(*) Steps are items that MUST be frequently reviewed L

• 1. Keep Operations Support Coordinator informed of significant activities/events.

Officer. If a Ul *2. Inform Support Area Personnel that leave the Facility that they should check out with the Security release above normal operating limits has occurred or is likely to occur a HP brief is required. CARS 199701061 L3 *3. Ensure Emergency Teams are formed and briefed as needed per EIP-ZZ-00220 Emergency Team Formation.

intervals.

U *4. Ensure Emergency Teams are tracked to location and progress of their assignment at specified

[U *5. Interface with the Health Physics Groups to ensure coordination of activities.

K171.0010 Page 1 of 3 ATTACHMENT 9 CA-#262a

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 TURNOVER

11. Incoming ETC Coordinator briefed on ETC status and review log.

U 2. Notify the Operations Support Coordinator of the turnover.

-- 3. Notify the OSA Support personnel of the turnover.

L) 4. Turnover complete Time.

U- 5. Turnover logged.

EU 6. Initiate a new checklist CA#0262a.

RECOVERY U] 1. Assess the following:

o Emergency team status. All Emergency Team work is completed or turned over to the Recovery Organization or normal maintenance.

o Able to resume normal operations.

U 2. Continue Emergency Team activities until directed otherwise by the Operations Support Coordinator.

TERMINATION and SHUTDOWN U] 1. Ensure OSA equipment and supplies are deactivated and/or stored.

Ul 2. Ensure documents are collected and given to the Admin Coordinator.

Emergency Team Coordinator Signature K171.0010 Page 2 of 3 ATTACHMENT 9 CA-#262a

EIP-ZZ-00240 Rev. 031 OSA SUPPORT REOUEST Administrative (Admin.) Coordinator, The Operations Support Area (OSA) requires the following support. This support is needed (circle one)

Immediately At next Shift, at (enter time)

POSITION NUMBERNEEDED Operations Support Coordinator Electrical Emergency Team Coordinator Mechanical Emergency Team Coordinator Storekeeper Mechanical Supervisor Electrical Supervisor I&C Supervisor Mechanical Planner Electrical Planner I&C Planner Electrician Machinist Welder I&C Technician Electrical Apprentice Machinist Apprentice Welder Apprentice I&C Apprentice Insulator Plant Helper Nuclear Utility Worker Tool Room Mechanic Operating Supervisor (Shift Supervisor concurrence obtained)

Equipment Operator (Shift Supervisor concurrence obtained)

K171.0010 Page 3 of 3 ATTACHMENT 9 CA-#262a

EIP-ZZ-00260 Revision 012 July 17, 2002 CALLAWAY PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EIP-ZZ-00260 EVENT CLOSEOUT/PLANT RECOVERY RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURE OWNER W. R. Bevard WRITTEN BY W. R. Bevard PREPARED BY W. R. Bevard APPROVED BY __0 b___

DATE ISSUED This procedure contains the following:

Pages 1 through 7 Attachments 1 through 3 Tables through_

Figures through_

Appendices through Checkoff Lists through This procedure has checkoff list(s) maintained in the mainframe computer.

Conversion of commitments to TRS reference/hidden text completed by Revision Number:

Non-T/S Commitments 010 V2\

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1 2 DEFINITIONS 1 3 RESPONSIBILITIES 2 4 PROCEDURE 2 4.1 EVENT CLOSEOUT DECLARATION 2 4.2 PLANT RECOVERY DECLARATION 4 4.3 RECOVERY ACTIONS 4 5 FINAL CONDITIONS 6 6 REFERENCES 6 7 RECORDS 7 - Event Closeout/Recovery Criteria 10 Pages - Event Closeout/Recovery Announcements 1 Page - Recovery Organization and Objectives 1 Page

-i-

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 EVENT CLOSEOUT/PLANT RECOVERY I PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 Provides guidelines for determining when Event Closeout can be declared.

1.2 Provides guidelines for directing plant recovery operations including:

"* Determining when plant recovery can be declared.

"* Establishing a recovery organization.

"* Directing initial and long term recovery operations.

2 DEFINITIONS 2.1 Event Closeout - The condition declared after Emergency Action Level (EAL) specific criteria has been met and initiates the transition from emergency operations back to normal operations.

Event closeout is typically declared after response to an Unusual Event or Alert has been completed.

2.2 Recovery - The condition declared after the immediate hazards to life and safety have been removed and the following conditions exist. COMN 42504

a. In-plant radiation levels are stable or decreasing with time,

b. The reactor is stable with adequate core cooling capability,

c. Release of radioactive materials to the environment are controlled and within Radioactive Effluent Controls limits,

d. Fire, natural events, security threats or other similar emergency conditions are under control and plant effects assessed.

Recovery is typically declared after response to a Site or General Emergency has been completed.

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 3 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 EMERGENCY COORDINATOR 3.1.1 Assesses plant conditions and determines when those plant conditions warrant the declaration of plant Recovery or Event Closeout. COMN 42504 3.2 RECOVERY MANAGER 3.2.1 Assumes overall command and control of Callaway Plant Recovery operations. Coordinates the recovery with the Manager, Callaway Plant and off-site organizations utilizing their input. COMN 42488 3.2.2 Ensures that Plant personnel and off-site authorities are informed when the emergency has been closed out or recovery declared, as appropriate. COMN 3931 3.2.3 Establishes a recovery organization capable of maintaining the plant in a stable condition and directs recovery operations, in an effort to restore the plant to normal operating conditions.

3.2.4 Ensures that Plant recovery operations which have a potential for affecting off-site recovery operations are coordinated with off-site authorities.

3.2.5 Provides off-site authorities with recommendations for off-site recovery activities.

3.2.6 Evaluates and approves/disapproves requests for Plant support for off-site recovery activities. COMN 3933 4 PROCEDURE 4.1 EVENT CLOSEOUT DECLARATION 4.1.1 Assess plant conditions using Attachment 1 to determine if Event Closeout should be implemented when the criteria for the applicable EAL is met.

4.1.2 Notify site personnel of Event Closeout as follows:

4.1.2.1 Sound the plant emergency alarm EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 4.1.2.2 Announce the "Event Closeout" portion of Attachment 2 over the plant gai-tronics system.

4.1.2.3 Notify off-site agencies of the Event Closeout declaration in accordance with EIP-ZZ-00201, Notifications.

4.1.2.3.1 The Recovery Manager should provide a verbal summary of the event to the counties and SEMA upon closeout and extend an invitation to the ERT per the Event Review Team Checklist of APA-ZZ-00542, Event Review.

4.1.2.3.2 A written summary of the event should be provided to the counties and SEMA by Emergency Preparedness on the next working day.

4.1.3 Ensure that a CARS documenting the event which led to the emergency has been submitted in accordance with APA-ZZ-00500, Corrective Action Program.

4.1.4 Ensure that an in service inspection is conducted on all steam generators per the Callaway Plants' Technical Specifications, when any of the following have occurred:

a. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to secondary tube leak greater than allowed by Technical Specification,

b. A seismic occurrence greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE),

c. A Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) requiring activation of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF),

d. A Main Steam or Feedwater line break.

4.1.5 If the emergency was due to high winds/tornado hitting the plant site, ensure divers check the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) pond for debris.

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 4.2 PLANT RECOVERY DECLARATION 4.2.1 Assess plant conditions using Attachment 1 to determine if Plant Recovery can be declared when the criteria for the applicable EAL is met.

NOTE: Review APA-ZZ-00521, Government Agency Interface Instructions, if a NRC Incident Investigation Team is mobilized.

4.2.2 Discuss with the NRC the intent to declare Plant Recovery prior to the declaration if possible. COMN 42504 4.2.3 Notify site personnel of 'Plant Recovery' as follows: COMN 3934 4.2.3.1 Sound the plant emergency alarm.

4.2.3.2 Announce the 'Plant Recovery' portion of Attachment 2 over the plant gai-tronics system.

4.2.4 Notify off-site agencies of the declaration of Plant Recovery in accordance with EIP-ZZ-00201, Notifications. COMN 3934 4.2.4.1 The Recovery Manager should provide a verbal summary of the event to the counties and SEMA upon declaration of plant recovery and extend an invitation to the ERT per the Event Review Team Checklist of APA-ZZ-00542, Event Review.

4.2.4.2 A written summary of the event should be provided to the counties and SEMA by Emergency Preparedness on the next working day.

4.2.5 Determine the staffing requirements necessary to support recovery operations. COMN 3932 4.3 RECOVERY ACTIONS 4.3.1 RECOVERY ORGANIZATION 4.3.1.1 As recovery operations commence, the Recovery Manager should use Attachment 3 as a basic structure for an organization to support on-site and off-site recovery operations. This organization can be modified as necessary to provide 24 hr/day operations as required.

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 4.3.2 SHORT TERM OBJECTIVES COMN 42496 4.3.2.1 Maintain the plant in a safe and stable condition.

4.3.2.1.1 Assign individuals to close out Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures as conditions allow. Modify/revise normal plant procedures as necessary to facilitate recovery operations.

4.3.2.1.2 Administrative controls imposed on normal operations should be maintained during the recovery phase as conditions allow.

Procedures should be generated for each specific operation and maintenance evolution and be reviewed for nuclear safety concerns, personnel safety, and environmental impact by the Onsite Review Committee. COMN 3974 4.3.2.1.3 Ensure that applicable Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO's) and surveillance requirements are complied with, to the extent practical, based on equipment availability and status and safety aspects of post-accident conditions.

4.3.2.2 Maintain control of the release of radioactive material to the environment within Radioactive Effluent Controls limits.

4.3.2.3 Maintain control of personnel exposures.

4.3.2.3.1 Exposure controls will be based upon ALARA considerations, plant conditions and 10CFR20 limits.

4.3.2.3.2 Establish reentry requirements for evacuated plant areas using EIP-ZZ-00225, Reentry, as guidance.

4.3.2.4 Maintain adequate communications with Federal, State and local agencies.

4.3.2.4.1 Provide Plant support to off-site agencies if requested (i.e.

decontamination assistance, etc.).

4.3.2.4.2 The Plant will assist, if requested, the Department of Health (DOH) in evaluating and determining:

"* The adequacy of existing off-site Protective Actions;

"* The need for population relocation and/or return;

"* The total population exposure due to radioactive releases from the plant. COMN 42503 EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 4.3.2.5 Maintain adequate capability to provide timely and factual information to the general public.

4.3.3 LONG TERM OBJECTIVES COMN 42497 4.3.3.1 Restore the plant to its pre-emergency condition 4.3.3.1.1 Ensure that an in service inspection is conducted on all steam generators per the Callaway Plant's Technical Specifications, when any of the following have occurred:

"* RCS to secondary tube leak greater than allowed by technical specification for operation.

"* A seismic occurrence greater than OBE,

• A LOCA requiring activation of the engineered safety features,

• A main steam or feedwater line break.

4.3.3.2 If the emergency was due to high winds/tornado hitting the plant site, ensure divers check the UIHS Pond for debris.

4.3.3.3 Provide for the Storage and/or Disposal of Waste Materials Generated During the Emergency and Recovery Phase.

4.3.3.4 Evaluate the Cause of the Emergency, Response to the Emergency and Potential Effects on Future Plant Operations.

5 FINAL CONDITIONS 5.1 The plant has been restored to a safe operating condition and responsibilities of the Emergency/Recovery Organization have been assumed by the normal plant organization.

6 REFERENCES 6.1 Callaway Plant Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) 6.2 Callaway Plant Technical Specifications 6.3 APA-ZZ-00500, Corrective Action Program 6.4 APA-ZZ-00521, Government Agency Interface Instructions EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 6.5 APA-ZZ-00542, Event Review 6.6 APA-ZZ-01003, Off-site Dose Calculation Manual 6.7 EIP-ZZ-00201, Notifications 6.8 EIP-ZZ-00225, Reentry 6.9 IOCFR20 7 RECORDS None EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY CRITERIA The following table should be used as guidance to determine when an emergency classification (based on a specific Emergency Action Level) can be closed out or when recovery should be declared.

Group 1 ABNORMAL RADIATION EVENTS Offsite Events UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY A. B. C. D.

Any Unplanned Release of Any Unplanned Release of EAB Dose Resulting From an Actual or EAB Dose Resulting From an Actual or Radioactivity to the Environment That Radioactivity to the Environment That Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity Exceeds 2 Times the Radiological Exceeds 200 Times the Radiological Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Effluent Control Limits in the ODCM, Effluent Control Limits in the ODCM, CDE Thyroid for the Actual or Projected CDE Thyroid for the Actual or Projected (APA-ZZ-01003) for >60 minutes. (APA-ZZ-01003) for Ž15 minutes. Duration of the Release. Duration of the Release.

MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times Closeout: Closeout: Recovery: Recovery:

ODCM Effluent Control Limit ODCM Effluent Control Limit Refer to Section 4.2 Refer to Section 4.2 action statements complied with. action statements complied with.

Page I of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY CRITERIA Group 1 ABNORMAL RADIATION EVENTS Onsite Events UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT ALERT E. F. G.

An Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation. Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level Release of Rad Material, or an Increase in Rad Level that That Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Either Impedes Safe Operations or the Ability to Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel. Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times Closeout: Closeout: Closeout:

Cause determined and radiation levels are Fuel in a safe condition, no increasing radiation Cause determined and radiation levels are controlled. Actions are in progress to reduce levels and water level restored. controlled. Actions are in progress to reduce radiation levels, radiation levels.

Page 2 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY CRITERIA Group 2 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS A. UNUSUAL EVENT B. ALERT C. SITE EMERGENCY D. SITE EMERGENCY E.GENERAL EMERGENCY Any CONTAINMENT AM RCS BARRIER Indicator Any RCS BARRIER Indicator A CTMT BARRIER Loss A Loss Indicator from any two BARRIER Indicator or Indicator Indicator barriers AN FUEL CLAD BARRIER and and and Indicator Ay FUEL CLAD BARRIER AU RCS or FUEL CLAD AM Indicator from the third BARRIER Indicator MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 Closeout: Closeout: Recovery: Recovery: Recovery:

Restore the Containment barrier Restore the RCS or FUEL Refer to Section 4.2 Refer to Section 4.2 Refer to Section 4.2 CLAD BARRIER Page 3 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY CRITERIA HAZARDS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Events A. B. C. D.

Confirmed Security Event Which Security Event in the Plant Protected Security Event in a Safe Shutdown Area. Security Event Resulting in a Loss of the Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Area. Ability to Reach and Maintain Cold Level of Safety of the Plant. Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times Closeout: Closeout: Recovery: Recovery:

Event terminated. Event terminated. Refer to Section 4.2 Refer to Section 4.2 Page 4 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY CRITERIA Group 3 HAZARDS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Fires Natural Events UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT I ALERT E. F. G. H.

Fire Within Protected Area Boundary Fire Affecting the Operability of Plant Natural and Destructive Phenomena Natural and Destructive Phenomena Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes Safety Systems Required to Establish Affecting the Protected Area. Affecting a Safe Shutdown Area.

of Verification. or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times Closeout: Closeout: Closeout: Closeout:

Fire extinguished. Fire extinguished and systems Natural or destructive event Natural or destructive event terminated operable or Tech Spec actions terminated or controlled. or controlled.

complied with.

Page 5 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY CRITERIA Group 3 HAZARDS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Toxic Gas Control Room Evacuation Events UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY I. J. K. L.

Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Control Room Evacuation Has Been Control Room Evacuation Has Been Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation Within a Facility Structure Which Initiated. Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be of the Plant. Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Established.

Required to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times MODES: At All Times Closeout: Closeout: Closeout: Recovery:

HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE Control re-established in Control Refer to Section 4.2 eliminated, eliminated. Room or plant is stable and shutdown with control at the Aux Shutdown panel.

Page 6 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY CRITERIA Group 4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Annunciator Events UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY A. B. C.

Unplanned Loss of Most or All Alarms Unplanned Loss of Most or All Annunciators With Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in (Annunciators) for Greater Than 15 Minutes. Either a Transient In Progress, or the Plant Computer Progress.

is Unavailable.

MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 Closeout: Closeout: Closeout:

Alarms restored and compensated for. Alarms are restored and compensated for Alarms are restored and compensated for and and The plant computer is restored or the transient is The plant computer is restored stabilized.

and The transient is stabilized.

Page 7 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 (

EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY CRITERIA Group 4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Electrical Events (Operating)

UNUSUAL ALERT SITE SITE GENERAL EVENT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EMERGENCY D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K.

Loss of All Only One Loss of All Loss of All Vital Prolonged Loss of Loss of Required Loss of All offsite Loss of All Offsite Power Offsite Power AC Source Offsite Power DC Power All Offsite Power DC Power During power to essential buses and Loss of All Onsite AC to Essential to Essential and Loss of and Prolonged Cold Shutdown or for greater than 15 Power to Essential Busses Busses for Busses for All Onsite AC Loss of All Onsite Refueling Mode for minutes. During Cold Shutdown or Greater Than >15 Minutes Power to AC Power. Greater Than 15 Refueling.

15 Minutes. Such That Essential Minutes.

Any Busses.

Additional Single Failure Would Result in Station Blackout.

MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 5. 6 MODES: 5, 6 MODES: 5,6 Closeout: Closeout: Recovery Closeout: Recovery Closeout: Closeout: Closeout:

When When Refer to When power Refer to When power is When power is When power is power is power is Section 4 is restored. Section 4.2 restored. restored. restored.

restored. restored Page 8 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY CRITERIA Group 4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Shutdown Capability UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY SITE EMERGENCY L. M. N. 0.

Inability to Perform a Required Shutdown Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Loss of Water Level That Has or Complete Loss of Function Within Technical Specification Limits. Shutdown. Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Needed to Achieve or Maintain MODES: 1-4 Vessel. Hot Shutdown.

MODES: 5,6 MODES: 5,6 MODES: 1-4 Closeout: Closeout: Recovery: Recovery:

When the Tech. Spec. action statement RHR, CCW and ESW restored Refer to Section 4.2 Refer to Section 4.2 is completed or exited. and less than 2000 on any valid incore thermocouple or Wide Range Hot Leg Indicator.

Page 9 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 (

EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY CRITERIA Group 4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Communication Events RCS/Fuel Events Reactor Protection System GENERAL UNUSUAL EVENT UNUSUAL EVENT UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY EMERGENCY P. Q. R. S. T. U.

Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Leakage Failure of Reactor Failure of Reactor Failure of the Reactor Offsite Communication Protection System Protection System Protection System to Capabilities Instrumentation to Instrumentation to Complete an Automatic Complete or Initiate Complete or Initiate Trip and Manual Trip an Automatic an Automatic Was NOT Successful Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Trip Once a and There Is Indication Reactor Protection Reactor Protection of an Extreme Challenge System Setpoint Has System Setpoint Has to the Ability to Cool Been Exceeded and Been Exceeded and the Core.

Manual Trip Was Manual Trip Was Successful. NOT Successful.

MODES: 1-6 MODES: 1-6 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1, 2 MODES: 1, 2 MODES: 1, 2 Closeout: Closeout: Closeout: Closeout: Recovery: Recovery:

When capability restored. When plant is in Hot When plant is in When ES-0. 1 Refer to Section 4.2 Refer to Section 4.2 Standby with Tave Cold Shutdown or completed.

<5000F. leak isolated.

Page 10 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 EVENT CLOSEOUT/RECOVERY ANNOUNCEMENT

-- Sound the Plant Emergency Alarm -

ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL!

(Repeat All Announcements) 0 CLOSEOUT OF EVENT CLOSEOUT OF EVENT HAS BEEN DECLARED. ALL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL BEGIN DEACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES. ALL OTHER PERSONNEL RESUME NORMAL DUTIES.

L1 PLANT RECOVERY PLANT RECOVERY HAS BEEN DECLARED. ALL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL REMAIN AT YOUR STATIONS AND AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

Page I of I ATTACHMENT 2

EIP-ZZ-00260 Rev. 012 RECOVERY ORGANIZATION

• *;ON-SITE (TSC) I OFF-SITE (EOF)

Operations Engineering Work Control Public Licensing Radiological Administrati' Coordinator Coordinator Coordinator Information & Assessment e Services Coordinator Fuels Coordinator Coordinator Coordinator Operations Coordinator- responsible for day-to-day plant operations and coordinates recovery operations within the plant to ensure that modifications and repairs performed in a safe and competent manner. Requirements for reentry into affected and evacuated areas of the plant during recovery would be established by the operations coordinator and evaluated and approved by the recovery manager. COMN 42489 Engineering Coordinator- Responsible for providing and coordinating technical support to operations and recovery activities. This support includes core physics, thermal hydraulics, design activities, procedure development, and also ensuring that specifications for procurement of materials and equipment are met. COMN 42490 Work Control Coordinator- Responsible for normal and outage planning and scheduling activities to support recovery. COMN 42491 Public Information Coordinator- Appointed by corporate communications to assist the recovery manager and the recovery effort. The position need not be physically located at the plant site. COMN 42492 Licensing & Fuels Coordinator- Responsible for providing licensing and technical support to the recovery effort in areas of reactor systems and fuel related concerns. The licensing and fuels coordinator would also be the liaison between Ameren UE and the NSSS supplier, A/E, and other contractors. COMN 42493 Radiological Assessment Coordinator- Responsible for coordinating activities involving plant personnel or equipment, assisting the state department of health in estimating and assessing population exposure calculations, coordinating off-site sampling total population exposure calculations, and coordinating off-site sampling and analysis. COMN 42494 Administrative Services Coordinator- Responsible for ensuring that administrative, logistical, and personnel support is available to support recovery operations. COMN 42495 Page I of 1 ATTACHMENT 3

EIP-ZZ-01211 Revision 024 July 3, 2002 CALLAWAY PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EIP-ZZ-01211 MANAGEMENT ACTION GUIDES FOR NUCLEAR EMERGENCIES (MAGNEM)

RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURE OWNER T.W. PARKER WRITTEN BY T.W. PARKER PREPARED BY T.W. PARKER APPROVED BY _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

DATE ISSUED A H& DE This procedure contains the following:

Pages 1 through 4 Attachments 1 through 1 Tables through Figures through Appendices through Checkoff Lists through This procedure has checkoff list(s) maintained in the mainframe computer.

Conversion of commitments to TRS reference/hidden text completed by Revision Number:

Non-T/S Commitments 020

EIP-ZZ-01211 Rev. 024 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number I PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1 2 DEFINITIONS 1 3 RESPONSIBILITIES 1 4 INITIATING CONDITIONS 2 5 PROCEDURE 2 6 FINAL CONDITIONS 4 7 REFERENCES 4 8 RECORDS 4 PC Dose Assessment Data Input 2 Pages

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EIP-ZZ-01211 Rev. 024 MANAGEMENT ACTION GUIDES FOR NUCLEAR EMERGENCIES (MAGNEM) 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 PURPOSE This procedure provides guidance for using the MAGNEM computer program for Dose Assessment.

1.2 SCOPE This procedure provides a method of entering data into the MAGNEM computer program using effluent monitors, grab samples, and field monitoring team data.

2 DEFINITIONS 2.1 Above Normal Operating Limits-Is a release threshold indicated by dose rates of 0.1 mr/hr at the EAB either by direct measurement or by dose projection.

3 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 RAD/CHEM TECHNICIAN HPTS (CONTROL ROOM)

COMN 3951 Performs dose calculations using MAGNEM and forwards results to the Emergency Coordinator, until the EOF is manned and ready to accept responsibility.

3.2 DOSE ASSESSMENT COORDINATOR (EOF)

Assumes responsibility from the Dose Assessment Technician (Control Room) when the EOF is manned and ready.

EIP-ZZ-01211 Rev. 024 4 INITIATING CONDITIONS This procedure should be implemented upon declaration of an emergency, which involves or may involve a release of radioactive material to the environment.

5 PROCEDURE 5.1 RUNNING MAGNEM 5.1.1 Log on to the LAN, if available.

5.1.2 Click on MAGNEM, which is in the Windows "START" menu or located on the Desktop.

5.2 DATA COLLECTION FOR MAGNEM INPUT 5.2.1 When the Callaway LAN is available, data will be automatically transferred from the Plant Computer to the appropriate data entry fields for all parameters that have a "manual" override option.

5.2.1.1 To manually enter data into any of these automatic fields, select the "Manual Over-ride" box. The box changes from white to red indicating manual over-ride of data entry is in effect for that field.

5.2.1.2 If the Plant Computer is not available or manual data for all fields must be used, select "MANUAL OVER-RIDE" from the pull-down menu. Select All Manual. This will override all automatic fields and allow manual data only. Data collection for manual entry is described in the following steps.

EIP-ZZ-01211 Rev. 024 5.2.2 Using the plant computer system, display the PC Dose assessment data input screen using the Turn-On-Code P C D, or from the RRIS menu screen, select PC Dose.

5.2.3 Transcribe data from the PCD screen to the appropriate data field in MAGNEM. The PCD screen print option or Attachment 1, Dose Assessment Data Input sheet, may be used to aid in transcribing data.

5.2.3.1 For items not on the Plant Computer System, obtain data from the Chemistry Coordinator, Control Room, Engineering Staff, Field Monitoring Team Leader, or Field Monitoring Team Communicator, as appropriate.

5.2.4 Follow the program prompts after entering data.

5.2.5 If the plant computer is inoperable, dispatch a Rad/Chem Technician to the Control Room to provide effluent monitor data, and to the Plant Computer Room or EOF to provide meteorological data. If meteorological information is not available on-site, obtain wind direction and wind speed, including units, for Columbia, Missouri. The number for obtaining weather information is located in the Federal Emergency Organization section for off-site emergency telephone numbers in the Emergency Telephone Directory.

5.2.5.1 If stability class values are not available onsite, use an "D" stability class.

5.2.6 Obtain weather forecast data initially and every four hours.

5.3 MAGNEM

SUMMARY

SCREEN DISPLAY 5.3.1 The Summary Screen may be displayed upon entering all required information. Verify all input data is correct and select the option to "Calculate doses".

5.3.2 Inform the Recovery Manager or the Protective Measures Coordinator, if present in the EOF, or the Emergency Coordinator of any changes relevant to the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) or Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).

EIP-ZZ-01211 Rev. 024 6 FINAL CONDITIONS 6.1 The emergency has been closed out or the recovery phase has been declared.

6.2 Complete all necessary records and forms according to this procedure and send them to Emergency Preparedness.

7 REFERENCES 7.1 EIP-ZZ-00212, Protective Action Recommendations 7.2 COMN 20363 7.3 FSAR SA TABLE 2.3-55 8 RECORDS NOTE: All Facility Logs, SENTRY and MAGNEM screen prints, office memos, notes, etc. should be attached to the Coordinator Checklist and turned in to the Logistics Support Coordinator and/or Emergency Preparedness.

EIP-ZZ-01211 Rev. 024 RELEASE RATE DATA 0 UNIT VENT NOBLE GAS uCi/cc GT-RE-21B MONITOR uCi/cc GT-RE-21B MONITOR 15 MIN ROLL AVG uCi/sec GT-RE-21B RELEASE RATE IS MIN AVG MET DATA CTMT ATMOSPHERE

______uCi/¢c GT-RE-31 GAS MONITOR WIND SPEED 15 MIN AVG MPH PRIMARY 10 METER uCi/cc GT-RE-32 GAS MONITOR MPH SECONDARY 10 METER MPH PRIMARY 60 METER CHARMS MPH PRIMARY 90 METER R/hr GT-RE-59 CHARMS EAL

__hr GT-RE-60 CHARMS EAL WIND DIRECTION (FROM) 15 MIN AVG 10 METER DEG PRIMARY RADWASTE VENT NOBLE GAS MONITOR DEG SECONDARY 10 METER uCi/cc GH-RE-103B MONITOR 15 MIN ROLL AVG. DEG PRIMARY 60 METER uCi/cc GH-RE-10B RELEASE RATE IS MIN AVG DEG PRIMARY 90 METER uCi/sec GH-RE- 10B 0 PORV MONITORS (A-G)

G) STABILITY CLASS PRIMARY

_r/hr AB-RE-I ll "A" S/G "A" SIG 15 MIN AVG (A-G) SECONDARY uCi/cc AB-RE-I ll AB-RE-I 12 "B" SIG k TEMPERATURE DIFFERENTIAL 15 MIN AVG

_ mr/r "B" S/G 15 MIN AVG DEG PRIMARY 90M - toM uCi/cc AB-RE-I 12 DEG PRIMARY 60M - IOM nit/hr AB-RE-I 13 "C" S/G AB-RE- 113 "C" S/G 15 MIN AVG D SIGMA THETA 15 NUN AVG DEG PRIMARY 10 METER uCi/cc 10 METER mr/hr "D' S/G DEG SECONDARY AB-RE-1 14 "D" S/G 15IMIN AVG DEC} PRIMARY 60 METER AB-RE- 114 0 DEC. PRIMARY UNIT VENT FLOW STATUS 90 METER AUX FEEDWATER TURBINE DISCHARGE MONITOR CURRENT FLOWRATE FC-RE-385 FC-RE-315 MONITOR 15 MIN. AVG. STATUS 15 MIN AVG (CFM) uci/cc VENT FLOW STATUS 18,975 MAIN STEAM ENCLOSURE RADWASTE 1,100 CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL RADWASTE VENT FLOW STATUS 6,930 HPAC C) 9,900 FUEL BLDG EMERG EXHAUST FAN A 9,900 FUEL BLDG EMERG EXHAUST FAN B STEAM FLOWRATES 15 MTNAVG lb/hr 25,000 AUX/FUEL BLD NORM EXH SLOW PORV @ SAFETIES TOTAL FLOW

______ ______ "A" S/G 35,200 AUX/PUEL BRD NORM EXH FAST 22,000 CONTAINMENT SHUTDOWN PURGE "B"S/G 5,000 CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE "C"S/G "D" S!G -TOTAL FLOW RATE 15 MIN AVG N/A N/A ____ AUX FW TURBINE DISCHARGE Page 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 1 CA-#2261

EIP-ZZ-01211 Rev. 024 O a. Obtain these values from the Plant Computer PC Dose Assessment Data Input Screen. If the values are bad or not available, dispatch a technician to the control room to obtain data from the RM- 11 system.

b. Use 15 minute average release rate monitor values. Values are either instantaneous values, 15 minute rolling average, or 15 minute average. 15 minute average parameters are labeled as such.

c. Instantaneous value comes from GTRO02 lB.

d. 15 minute rolling average comes from GTRO02 1G

e. Release Rate 15 min avg. come from Fan Flow x GTRO021G OO Steam Generator PORV and Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Discharge Monitors.

AB-RE- 111, 112, 113, and 114 are not calibrated for readings less than 1 mr/hr (instantaneous) or 4.06 E-2 ýtCi/cc (15 min. Avg.).

FC-RE-385 is not calibrated for readings less than 1 mr/hr (instantaneous) or 5.51 E-2 (15 min.

Avg.).

If these monitor values are above the lower calibration range, use 15 minute average concentrations.

However, if the release has just started and the PCS has not updated with 15 minutes of release data, you should use the instantaneous (mr/hr) values.

O* Total the steam flow rates from both the safeties and the PORVs.

O For a release via the Aux Feedwater Turbine discharge, use this flow rate.

Wind speed should be obtained in the order given. Backup wind speed is available from the BOP computer room.

O Wind direction should be obtained in the order given. Backup data are available in the BOP Computer Room.

O Use the stability class in the order given.

Use the temperature differential in the order given. Backup data are available in the BOP Computer Room.

Use the Sigma Theta values if the temperature differential values are not available and in the order given.

If @ is not available from the plant computer screen, determine operating fan status from the Technical Assessment Coordinator, Technical Support Coordinator, or from the Control Room and total the values to obtain the Unit Vent flow rate.

O* Total unit vent flow is provided on the plant computer system.

Page 2 of 2 ATTACHMENT 1 CA-#2261