Text

IR 05000321-03-002 and IR 05000366-03-002 on 01/05 - 04/25/03 for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant. No Violations Noted
	ML031220044
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	05/01/2003
From:	Brian Bonser; NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB2
To:	Sumner H; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
	IR-03-002
	Download: ML031220044 (24)
	v • d • e

May 1, 2003

Mr. H.L. Sumner, Jr.

Vice President - Hatch Plant

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

P. O. Box 1295

Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED

INSPECTION REPORT 50-321/03-02 AND 50-366/03-02

Dear Mr. Sumner:

On April 5, 2003, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at

your Hatch Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection

findings which were discussed on April 15, 2003 with Mr. Dennis Madison and other members

of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available

Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible

from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic

Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Brian R. Bonser, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366

License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-321, 366/03-02

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (See page 2)

SNC 2

cc w/encl:

M. J. Ajluni, Licensing

Services Manager, B-031

Southern Nuclear Operating

Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution

D. E. Grissette

General Manager, Farley Plant

Southern Nuclear Operating

Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution

J. D. Woodard

Executive Vice President

Southern Nuclear Operating

Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution

State Health Officer

Alabama Department of Public Health

RSA Tower - Administration

Suite 1552

P. O. Box 303017

Montgomery, AL 36130-3017

M. Stanford Blanton

Balch and Bingham Law Firm

P. O. Box 306

1710 Sixth Avenue North

Birmingham, AL 35201

William D. Oldfield

Quality Assurance Supervisor

Southern Nuclear Operating Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Distribution w/encl: (See page 3)

SNC 3

Distribution w/encl:

F. Rinaldi, NRR

C. Evans (Part 72 Only)

L. Slack, RII EICS

RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB

PUBLIC

OFFICE DRP/RII DRP/RII DRP/RII DRS/RII DRS/RII DRS/RII DRS/RII

SIGNATURE cr ng via e-mail wb via e-mail sr et via e-mail ab (for) jk

NAME CRapp:vyg NGarrett WBearden SRose ETesta DForbes JKreh

DATE 5/1/2003 5/1/2003 5/1/2003 5/1/2003 5/1/2003 5/1/2003 5/1/2003

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

PUBLIC DOCUMENT YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML031220044.wpd

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-321, 50-366

License Nos: DPR-57, NPF-5

Report No: 50-321/03-02 and 50-366/03-02

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: P.O. Box 2010

Baxley, Georgia 31515

Dates: January 5, 2003 - April 5, 2003

Inspectors: N. Garrett, (Acting) Senior Resident Inspector (SRI)

C. Rapp, Senior Project Engineer

W. Bearden, SRI, Browns Ferry Unit 1 (Section 1R08)

S. Rose, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11)

E. Testa, Senior Health Physics Inspector

(Sections 2OS1, 2OS2, and 2PS2)

D. Forbes, Health Physics Inspector

(Sections 2OS1, 2OS2, and 2PS2)

J. Kreh, Health Physics Inspector (Sections

2OS1, 2OS2, 2PS2)

R. Moore, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5.2)

Approved By: Brian R. Bonser, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2003-002, 05000366/2003-002; Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.;

1/05/2003 - 4/05/2003; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, routine integrated report.

The report covers a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and a senior project

engineer, and announced inspections by a regional in-service inspection (ISI) inspector,

regional health physics inspectors, a regional operations engineer, and a regional senior reactor

inspector. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the

safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight

Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

None

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) during this inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent RTP until March 1 when the unit was shut down for a

refueling outage. The unit was restarted on March 28 and reached 100 percent RTP on April

3. The unit operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems to verify the

availability of redundant or diverse systems, and components and to verify that

defense-in-depth was maintained during periods when safety equipment was

inoperable. The inspectors compared system configuration to the associated licencee

procedures, system and component checklists, and system P&IDs to verify systems

and components were properly aligned. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed selected

Condition Reports (CRs) to verify that equipment alignment issues were being identified

and adequately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

2A Core Spray (CS) and 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Systems

1A, 2A, and 2B Standby Gas Treatment System

1B and 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors toured the following six risk significant areas, identified in the licensees

Independent Plant Evaluation for External Events, to assess the material condition of

the fire protection and detection equipment and to verify fire protection equipment was

not obstructed. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-008-OS, Fire

Protection Program, and conducted area walkdowns to assess the licensee's control of

transient combustibles. The inspectors also reviewed the Site Fire Hazards Analysis

and applicable Pre-fire Plan drawings to verify that the necessary fire fighting

equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications

equipment, was in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Intake Structure Unit 1 & 2 Fire Area 0501

2

Diesel Generator Building Fire Areas, 2A EDG, Switchgear 2E, and Hall, Fire Areas

2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 0401

Unit 2 158' Reactor Building, Fire Areas 2203K, 2205I, 2205H, 2205N, 2210, 2211

Unit 2 185' and 203' Reactor Building, Fire Areas 2203I, 2205Q, 2205R, 2205S,

2205T, 2205U, 2205Y, 2205Z

Diesel Generator Building Fire Areas 1A EDG room, Switchgear rooms 2G and 1E.

Fire Areas 1411, 1412, and 2409

Unit 1 & 2 Cable Spread Room, Fire Area 0024A

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the licensees inspection activities for the 2C EDG jacket

coolant, oil cooler, and air coolant heat exchangers. The inspectors observed licensee

inspection activities to verify licencee implementation of licensee procedures 52PM-R43-

001-0, Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection and 42IT-TET-012-2S, Plant

Service Water (PSW) and RHR Service Water Piping Inspection Procedure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed in-process ISI work activities on Unit 2 and reviewed selected

ISI records. The observations and records were compared to the Technical

Specifications (TS) and the applicable Code (ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,

Sections V and XI, 1989 Edition), to verify compliance. The inspectors reviewed non-

destructive examination (NDE) reports for the following completed liquid penetrant (PT),

visual (VT1), and ultrasonic testing (UT) examinations:

S03H2U001, RPV head to vessel stud ligaments 21 to 40

S03H2U002, RPV head to vessel studs 21 to 40

S03H2U004, Main Steam piping weld, 2B21-1MS-24A-18

S03H2U008, Main Steam piping weld, 2B21-1MS-24B-10

S03H2V008, RPV Head Vent N6A Nozzle inner radius

S03H2V009, RPV Head Vent N6B Nozzle inner radius

S03H2V010, RPV Head Vent N7 Nozzle inner radius

S03H2P001, Main Steam piping weld, 2B21-1MS-24B-10

Ongoing dry powder Magnetic Particle (MT) examinations of the 24 inch ASME Class 1

Main Steam piping welds 2B21-1MS-24-18 and 2B21-1MS-24A-20 along with the PT

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examination of the 28 inch ASME Class 1 Recirculation Pump Suction piping weld 2B31-

1RCM-28AS-9 were observed.

The inspectors also reviewed video recordings of various completed augmented

inspections included in the licensees Vessel Internals Program (VIP). This included

remote visual inspection of welds on 1P7 weld 10 and 4P5 weld 37 on CS Sparger

downcomer piping; 1P1 weld 2, 1P2 weld 3, 1P3 weld 4, 1P3 weld 17, and 2P1 weld 31

on T-Box junctions on the on the CS sparger piping; and steam dryer lifting eye and

lifting rod.

Qualification and certification records for examiners, equipment and consumables, and

NDE procedures for the above ISI examination activities were reviewed. Three licensee

audits associated with ISI activities and the VIP program were reviewed. Additionally,

two CR associated with ISI activities which had been documented in the licensees

corrective action program were reviewed. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

Resident Observation: The inspectors observed the performance of simulator scenario

LT-SG-50431, Loss of Off-Site Power. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures

10AC-MGR-019-0S, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896N, Operations

Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage,

alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory

oversight. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedure 73-EP-EIP-001-0,

Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, to verify that the event action level was

correctly identified and reported. The inspectors attended the post exercise critique of

operator performance to assess if the licensee identified issues were comparable to

issues identified by the inspectors.

Annual Operating Test Results: The inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of

the individual Job Performance Measure operating tests, and the simulator operating

tests (required to be given per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee during

calender year 2002. These results were compared to the thresholds established in

Manual Chapter 609 Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance

Significance Determination Process.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the following two systems. The

inspectors performed a system walkdown and interviewed the system engineer to

determine the existing system configuration and deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed

the system health reports, maintenance work orders (MWO), CRs, and system

modifications to assess overall system condition and maintenance related issues.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees MR reports and scoping documents

to determine that the systems were properly scoped, in the proper maintenance rule

category, and appropriate actions were being taken on the system. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System

Unit 2 Off-Gas System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the five licensee Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed

below and the daily risk management evaluation to verify that risk assessments were

performed prior to components being removed from service. In addition, when

emergent work was identified, the inspectors held discussions with licensee personnel

and walked down plant systems to verify that actions were taken to minimize the

probability of an initiating event and to maintain the functional capability of mitigating

systems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

POD for Week of 1/11-17; Failure of Unit 1 RCIC during surveillance test.

POD for Week of 1/25 - 31

POD for Week of 2/1-7

POD for Week 2/15 - 21

POD for Week 2/22-28

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

5

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

For the two events described below, the inspectors observed control room operator

actions, reviewed operator logs, and reviewed plant procedures to verify that operator

actions were taken in accordance with plant procedures.

On January 24, 2003, the Emergency Notification Network and Emergency Notification

System phones systems were disabled when a Bell South fiber cable was severed

between the plant and Baxley, Georgia. The inspectors observed the Main Control

Room (MCR) response to the loss of communication and subsequent event

notification to the NRC.

On March 25, 2003, a radiological event was declared when a hot spot was formed in

the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system piping on the 185 foot level of the reactor

building. The inspectors observed the MCR response to the event to assess the

licensees implementation of 73EP-RAD-001-0, Radiological Event, 34AB-D11-001-2,

Radiological Release Control, and 34AB-T22-003-0, Secondary Containment Control.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five operability evaluations to assess the technical

adequacy of the evaluation and verify if continued operability was justified. The

evaluations were compared to the requirements identified in TS and the UFSAR as

required to ensure that operability was adequately assessed and the system or

component remained available to perform its intended function. In addition, the

inspectors assessed the adequacy and implementation of compensatory measures

resulting from the evaluation. The inspectors verified that the operabiity determinations

were performed in accordance with licensee procedure 00AC-REG-006-0, Operability

Determinations.

LR-REG-001-0203, Unit 2 Diesel Generator 2A, PSW valve 2P41-F339A not fully

closing

LR-REG-001-0103, Unit 2 Scram Discharge Volume Inboard Vent and Drain Valves

2C11-F011, 2C11-F010A, and 2C11-F010B

LR-REG-011-0203, Missed ASME Code Section XI Inspection following replacement

of valve 1G11-F020

CR 2003002130, 11 Tubes Plugged on Control Room Chiller - 1Z41-B008A

LR-REG-004-0103, Unit 2 RHR & CS Pump Room Cooler - 2T41-B002B

6

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors either observed personnel performance or reviewed the test results for

the following five maintenance testing activities to verify the scope of testing

demonstrated that the work performed was correctly completed and the affected

equipment was functional and operable. The inspectors reviewed the maintenance

package to verify procedural requirements were met. The inspectors reviewed

equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to

perform the required safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

MWO 10300065, Replace Unit 1 RCIC EGR

MWO 20203138, 20203139, and 20204149, Rebuild and troubleshooting of

2C11F010B and 2C11F011

MWO 20201859 and 20202140 Perform 18 Month PM and 6 Month PM on 2C Diesel

Generator

MWO 20300072 Clean/Repair/Replace 2P41-F036B

MWO 20300821 Replacement of 2P41-F339B Flange

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the overall outage safety assessment for the refueling outage

and the outage schedule to verify the licensees use of risk management, operating

experience and past lessons learned for the Unit 2 refueling outage conducted from

March 1 - 30, 2003. The inspectors reviewed the outage safety assessment procedure

to verify the licensee was correctly maintaining required equipment in service in

accordance with the overall outage safety assessment. In addition, the inspectors

reviewed the outage safety assessment to verify the licensee had contingency plans and

equipment to maintain defense in depth. During the refueling outage the inspectors

monitored licensee control over outage activities listed below. Documents reviewed are

listed in the Attachment.

Plant shutdown including insertion of manual scram and the following reactor coolant

system cooldown to verify the cooldown rate did not exceed TS limits.

Various clearances to verify implementation of the clearance process and the

associated equipment was properly configured to support the function of the

clearance.

7

Calibration of reactor instrumentation used to monitor reactor water within surveillance

requirements.

Monitoring of decay heat removal by the decay heat removal and fuel pool cooling

systems.

Reactor water inventory sources controlled in accordance with the outage risk

assessment.

Refueling activities, including portions of core offload, fuel shuffles, and core reload to

verify these activities were performed in accordance with TS and plant procedures and

verify fuel movements were tracked.

TS and licencee procedures to verify mode change requirements were met.

Walkdown of the drywell to verify material conditions supported plant operations.

Plant startup, heatup, and power ascension

Licensee determination of the shutdown margin determination to verify adequate

shutdown margin in the core configuration.

Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to refueling outage activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following six surveillance test procedures and either

observed personnel performance or reviewed test results to verify the scope of the test

adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors

reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure

adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The

inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386N, Evolution and Pre-and

Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure

requirements were met.

34SV-E11-004-1, RHR Service Water Pump Operability (IST)

34SV-R43-006-1S, Diesel Generator 1C Semi-Annual Test

34SV-E11-001-2, Residual Heat Removal Pump Operability

42SV-TET-001-2, Primary Containment Periodic Type B and Type C Leakage Tests,

2E41-F102/F103/F104 (CI valves)

42SV-C71-001-2S, Reactor Protection System LSFT

42SV-TET-001-2, Primary Containment Periodic Type B and Type C Leakage Tests,

2P33-F224 and 2T33-X11 (CI valves)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

8

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed an emergency drill conducted on January 29. The inspectors

observed licensee activities in the simulator and Technical Support Center to verify

implementation of 10AC-MGR-006-0S, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors

reviewed 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, to verify the

licensee properly classify the simulated event and developed the proper protective

action recommendations. The inspectors also reviewed 73EP-EIP-073-0, Offsite

Emergency Notification, to verify the licensee made proper offsite notifications. The

inspectors attended the post-drill exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness

in identifying areas of improvement.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas

a. Inspection Scope

Access Controls: The licensees procedures for controlling access to airborne

radioactivity areas, radiation areas, high radiation areas, and very high radiation areas

were evaluated. The licensees activities and guidance for posting, surveying, and

access controls to radiologically significant areas listed in the report Attachment were

evaluated against applicable 10 CFR Part 20 and TS requirements. During tours

conducted March 3-7, 2003, and March 17-21, 2003, the inspectors evaluated

radiological postings, barricades, and surveys associated with the Unit 1 and Unit 2

reactor, turbine, plant stack building areas, and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage

Installation (ISFSI). Dose rates at various locations in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 buildings

and around the spent fuel pool area were independently surveyed by the inspectors and

compared to current licensee survey map data.

The inspectors evaluated eight Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) used for work in

radiologically significant areas associated with the 2003 Unit 2 refueling outage and one

associated for non-outage work. The selected RWPs were evaluated for incorporation

of access controls, and specified electronic dosimeter (ED) set point alarms were

evaluated against RWP criteria for appropriateness with regard to the expected work

area dose rates.

The inspectors conducted interviews concerning RWP requirements and ED set points

with radiation workers. Radiological worker and radiation protection technician

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training/skill level, adherence to access control procedures and RWP specified access

controls were observed and evaluated by the inspectors during selected job site reviews

and tours throughout the radiological control area (RCA). The inspectors attended the

RWP 03-2209 briefing for work activities associated with a diver entering the reactor

vessel to remove a potential loose part from the steam dryer support seat. In addition,

the inspectors interviewed management personnel associated with the Unit 2 vessel

diving operation, observed the dive mock-up facility and diving operation to assess the

radiological controls implemented, and attended the pre-job brief and diver debrief

conducted by the licensee to review lessons learned from the evolution. The inspectors

also evaluated the radiological controls and surveys for the expected airborne work

areas established for the Unit 2 replacement of control rod drive mechanisms.

Access control procedures for locked high radiation areas (LHRAs) were reviewed and

discussed with radiation protection management and supervision. The inspectors

reviewed documentation of the licensees weekly inspections which verified the status of

the locked doors and independently assessed LHRA doors status during plant tours.

Implementation of key controls for Very High Radiation Areas (VHRAs) and LHRAs and

controls for accessing posted VHRAs also was assessed.

The inspectors verified the postings located on the fence of the ISFSI and independently

surveyed and verified the dose rates on the storage spent fuel casks located on the

storage pads. The environmental thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD) fence line

doses at the ISFSI were evaluated for compliance with 10 CFR 20, Subpart D. The

inspectors evaluated the Edwin Hatch Nuclear Plant ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent

Release Report, dated February 11, 2003, and the ISFSI Occupancy Factor White

Paper dated November 21, 2002.

Problem Identification and Resolution: Licensee CRs associated with access controls to

radiologically significant areas were reviewed. Six CRs listed in the Attachment were

reviewed and evaluated in detail for issues identified.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

ALARA: Implementation of the licensees ALARA program during the Unit 2 refueling

outage was observed and evaluated by the inspectors during the periods March 3-7 and

March 17-21, 2003. The inspectors reviewed, and discussed with licensee staff, ALARA

planning, dose estimates, and prescribed ALARA controls for selected outage work

activities expected to or had the potential to incur significant collective doses. Those

activities included replacement and transfer of control-rod drives, drywell in-service

inspections, drywell valve work, diving activities, and drywell local leak-rate tests.

Incorporation of the planning, work controls, and expected dose and dose rates into the

most current RWPs and ALARA pre-job briefings for those activities also was reviewed.

A proposed increase in the overall projected outage exposure (from 124 to 136 person-

10

rem) was reviewed and discussed with licensee staff prior to being considered by the

Plant ALARA Review Committee (PARC). The inspectors also reviewed the minutes of

the 2002 PARC meetings and the lessons learned from the 2002 Unit 1 outage. These

elements of the ALARA program were evaluated for consistency with the methods and

practices delineated in applicable licensee procedures.

The inspectors observed a pre-job ALARA briefing associated with control-rod-drive

(CRD) replacement, and made observations of limited under-vessel activity (preparatory

to the CRD work) via a closed-circuit video monitoring system.

The plant collective exposure history for the years 1999 through 2001, based on the

data reported pursuant to 10 CFR 20.2206 (c), was reviewed and discussed with

licensee staff, as were established goals for reducing collective exposure. The

inspectors also reviewed the licensees program for declared pregnant workers,

although at the time of the inspection there were no declarations.

Through the above reviews and observations, the licensees ALARA program

implementation and practices were evaluated by the inspectors for consistency with TS Section 5.4.1, Procedures, and Section 5.7, High Radiation Area Controls;

10 CFR Part 20 requirements; and procedural guidance documented in the Attachment.

Problem Identification and Resolution: Licensee CRs and PARC ALARA activities were

reviewed and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify,

characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues. Documents reviewed and

evaluated in detail for the identified issues are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation

a. Inspection Scope

Waste Processing and Characterization: During the weeks of March 3-7, 2003 and

March 17-21, 2003, the configuration status and operability of selected radioactive

waste (radwaste) processing systems and equipment were evaluated. Inspection

activities included document review, direct inspection of processing equipment, and

interviews with plant personnel.

The document review of radwaste systems included evaluation of program guidance for

waste classification and procedures for processing spent resin. The inspectors

reviewed the licensees 10 CFR Part 61 contract laboratory sample gamma analysis

results for the waste streams. The 2003 data were evaluated for consistency with the

most current 10 CFR Part 61 sample data collected in 2002. The licensees use of

scaling factors for hard-to-detect nuclides was assessed for the primary resin waste

stream. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedure for clearing clean trash from

11

the RCA. The inspectors reviewed procedures for transferring and de-watering spent

resin to ensure compliance with the process descriptions in the Process Control

Program (PCP) and the system diagrams in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

(UFSAR), Section 11. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The direct inspection of radwaste equipment included walk-downs of resin lines and

observation of abandoned radwaste equipment. Observations were conducted of clean

trash monitoring, Low Level Waste Storage Building activities and inspection of the

solidification dewatering operation.

Licensee personnel were interviewed regarding waste classification analyses and

radwaste processing equipment. The inspectors assessed the individuals knowledge of

regulations, understanding of licensee procedures, and familiarity with radwaste

systems. The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the Licensing Action Report (LAR) 91-

006, Safety Evaluation for Authors Document Incorporation Form (ADIF) 12A-001 dated

July 13, 1993. The inspectors reviewed the revised drawing and observed the current

operational and configuration status of the radwaste processing equipment during

system walk-downs. Waste stream sampling frequency, response to changing plant

conditions, and laboratory counting techniques were also discussed and assessed.

The licensees program for classifying and processing solid radwaste was evaluated

against 10 CFR Part 61, the Branch Technical Position on Waste Classification and

Waste Form, the Process Control Program, the UFSAR, Section 11, Radioactive Waste

Management, and licensee procedures.

Transportation: The inspectors evaluated the licensees activities related to

transportation of radioactive material. The evaluation included document review and

direct observation of shipping activities.

The document review consisted of evaluation of licensee procedures, review of shipping

records, and assessment of worker training. Records for five shipments, listed in the

Attachment, were reviewed for compliance with regulations and consistency with

licensee procedures. Training records for two technicians qualified to ship radioactive

material were evaluated for completeness. In addition, training curricula provided to

these workers were assessed. The inspectors discussed Department of Transportation

(DOT) training and shipping paper requirements with the Radioactive Material Control

supervisor.

On March 4, 2003, the inspectors directly observed the preparation of resin for shipment

to a vendor for volume reduction. The inspectors assessed the technicians

performance in completing the required documentation and characterization using the

RADMAN computer code and in conducting appropriate surveys of the loaded package.

Transportation program guidance and implementation were reviewed against

regulations detailed in 10 CFR Part 71, 49 CFR Parts 170-189, and licensee

procedures. In addition, training activities were assessed against Subpart H of 49 CFR

Part 172 and the guidance documented in NRC Bulletin 79-19.

12

Problem Identification and Resolution: Licensee CRs associated with radwaste

processing and transportation were reviewed. CR 2002011605, Two Sea Land

Radwaste Storage Containers Had Unexpected Corrosion, was reviewed and evaluated

in detail.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees Unit 1 and Unit 2 submittals for the PIs listed

below. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during the period, PI definitions

and guidance contained in licensee procedure 00AC-REG-005-0, Preparation and

Reporting of NRC PI Data, and NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline,

Revision 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.

Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI

The inspectors reviewed the PI results for the period January 1, 2002, through March 5,

2002. Selected CRs issued during the review period were reviewed and assessed for

potential PI occurrences.

Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone

Radiological Effluent TS/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent PI

The inspectors reviewed and discussed the PI results for the period May 1, 2002,

through March 15, 2002. For the review period, the inspectors reviewed data reported

to the NRC and evaluated selected radiological liquid and gaseous liquid and gaseous

effluent release data, out-of-service process radiation monitor and compensatory

sampling data, abnormal release results, and CRs documented in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

13

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Review of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Evaluation Report

On February 5, the inspectors reviewed the results of an INPO evaluation of licensee

performance conducted during October/November 2002. The report was dated January

7, 2003. The report did not identify any significant licensee performance issues that had

not been previously addressed and/or reviewed by the NRC.

.2 (Closed) URI 50-366/02-06-03: Design Control of High Pressure Coolant Injection

(HPCI) System Steam Line Drain Pot

During the Safety System Design and Capability Inspection (NRC Report No.

50-321,366/02-06), the inspectors identified that, under some conditions, the HPCI

steam trap could be isolated with the potential for condensate backup into the turbine

steam supply line. It could not be determined during the inspection whether the possible

water slug inflow to the HPCI turbine would impact the operability of the HPCI pump.

Following the inspection, the licensee provided vendor test documentation which

enveloped the conditions expected by the steam trap isolation and demonstrated that

the pump would meet its safety function. The inspectors reviewed the test

documentation and concluded there is no actual safety consequence.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On April 15, 2003, The inspectors presented the inspection results to D. Madison and

the other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information

was not provided or reviewed during the inspections.

.2 Annual Assessment Meeting Summary

On April 9, 2003, the NRCs Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 2 and the Senior Resident

Inspector assigned to the Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) met with Southern Nuclear

Operating Company to discuss the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the

HNP annual assessment of safety performance for the period of January 1, 2002 -

December 31, 2002. The major topics addressed were: the NRCs assessment

program, the results of the HNP assessment, and NRC security activities. Attendees

included HNP site management, corporate management, and plant co-owners.

This meeting was open to the public. The presentation material used for the discussion

is available from the NRC s document system (ADAMS) as accession number

ML030990064. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

Betsill, J., Assistant General Manager - Plant Support

Davis, D., Plant Administration Manager

Dedrickson, R., Engineering Support Manager

Googe, M., Performance Team Manager

Hammonds, J., Operations Manager

Coleman, V., Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor

Kirkley, W., Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

Lewis, J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

Madison, D., Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations

Reddick, R., Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

Roberts, P., Outage and Planning Manager

Thompson, J., Nuclear Security Manager

Tipps, S., Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager

Wells, P., General Manager - Nuclear Unit Superintendent

NRC Personnel

Brian R. Bonser, Chief, Divisions of Reactor Projects, Branch 2

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

50-366/02-06-03 URI Design Control of High Pressure Coolant Injection System

Steam Line Drain Pot

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

34SO-E11-010-2, Residual Heat Removal System

34SO-E21-001-2S, Core Spray System

34SO-T46-001-1S, Standby Gas Treatment System

34SO-T46-001-2S, Standby Gas Treatment System

34SO-R43-001-1, Diesel Generator Standby AC System

34SO-R43-001-2, Diesel Generator Standby AC System

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Plant Drawing A-43965, Sheet 109B, 115B, 120B

Plant Drawing A-43966, Sheet 5B, 27B

Drawing A-43966, Sheets 16B, 17B and 26B.

Drawing A-43965, Sheet 44B.

Attachment

2

Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection

Procedures:

Inspection and Testing Services (ITS) Procedure, VT-H-750, Visual Examination of Reactor

Pressure Vessel Internals Rev. 12

ITS Procedure, UT-H-401, Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Full Penetration Ferritic Welds

(Appendix VIII), Rev. 3

ITS Procedure, UT-H-402, Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Full Penetration Austenitic Welds

(Appendix VIII), Rev. 2

ITS Procedure, VT-H-701, Visual Examination (VT-1), Rev. 5

ITS Procedure, MT-H-500, Magnetic Particle Examination, Rev.10

ITS Procedure, PT-H-600, Solvent Removable, Color Contrast or Fluorescent Liquid Penetrant

Examination, Rev. 8

Condition Reports (CRs):

CR 2001008653, Unit 2 Condensate piping elbow below thickness values (Flow Accelerated

Corrosion action level)

CR 2003002491, Documentation of pipe elbow wall thickness reinspections as result of

engineering evaluations required by CR 2001008653

ML031220044

Text

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