ML042520167

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E-mail Dated 2/10/04 Waterford - Draft RAI from Human Performance, Piping Integrity and Electrical Groups
ML042520167
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/10/2004
From: Kalyanam N
NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD4
To: Barry Miller
- No Known Affiliation
Kalyanam N, NRR/DLPM, 415-1480
References
TAC MC1355
Download: ML042520167 (2)


Text

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Kalyan'

- -4' 11 From: N. Kaly Kalyanam To: Bryan Miller Date: 2/10/04 1:48PM

Subject:

Draft RAI from Human Performance, Piping Integrity, and Electrical Groups Bryan:

I am attaching the RAI from the three groups referenced.

The number of questions are 4, 1, and 1 respectively from the three groups.

Please review the questions and let me know if they can be responded to within thirty days of the receipt of our formal RAI contaning the questions.

Thanks Kaly I0 -T7

,e- P-HE s -

N.Kaly Kalynar -MC1355-Draft RAICai_Trehan.Davis.npd - Page 1 4 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 EXTENDED POWER UPRATE EMCB (B) Pining Integrity

1. Identify all reactor coolant pressure boundary materials and provide a discussion for each of these materials as to why the proposed EPU will not effect material integrity.
2. Identify dissimilar metal welds within the primary coolant piping system (including vessels safe end welds)
3. Identify any mitigating steps that have been taken to control primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) or any other degradation mechanism in the reactor coolant pressure boundary system.
4. If mitigating steps have been taken, discuss why the EPU will not adversely effect the mitigating steps that have been taken.

IROB (B) Human Performance

5. With regard to operator actions, the submittal indicates that the power uprate has the general effect of reducing the time available for the operators to complete recovery actions. Table 2.11-1 in the submittal provides a comprehensive list of post-initiator operator actions that would have changed available times as result of the power uprate, including several events with significant decreases in time available. Specifically, for events EHFALPABSP and HHFALNABSP, the existing time available is 60 minutes, and the EPU time available would be decreased to 14 minutes. Additionally, for the events EHFALPABMP and HHFALNABMP, the existing time available is40 minutes, and the EPU time available would be limited to only 2.83 minutes, with a note explaining that "the 2.83 minutes time limit does not include the effect of the safety injection tanks, which would extend this time." Please provide the basis (e.g., demonstration) for determining that all operating crews will be able to successfully accomplish the required tasks in the reduced times available. In the response, please also include description of the times required to complete the necessary actions. Additionally, please explain what is meant by the note to events EHFALPABMP and HHFALNABMP regarding the effect of the safety injection tanks on time available including the length of the time extension, and again provide a basis (e.g., demonstration) for determining that all operating crews will be able to successfully accomplish the required tasks in the times available.

EEIB (B) Electrical

6. Address the compensatory measures that the licensee would take to compensate for the depletion of the nuclear unit MVAR capability on a grid-wide basis.