Text

Reactor Water Cleanup Sys Temporary Repair of Nonisolable Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking, Revised 820301
	ML20050B348
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	03/01/1982
From:	; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20050B332	List: ML20050B331; ML20050B348;
References
	NUDOCS 8204050236
	Download: ML20050B348 (100)
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COMMONWE AI.Tl! EDISON COMPANY i QUAD-CITIES STATION UNIT 2 REACTOR WATER CLEAN-UP SYSTEM TDiPORARY REPAIR OF 1

NON-ISOIABLE ICSCC REVI S ED: MARCll 1, 1982 NRC DOCKET No. 50-265 LICENSE NO. DPR-30 l

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8204050236 820322 PDR ADOCK 05000265 r cro

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l TABLE OF 00NTENTS 1 i

PACE I. IntTOductlon . . . . . ... . . . . . .. . e e . . . e . . I A. Description of the Problem . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 1 B. NRC Discussions . . . .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . 1

'?. . Schedule of Repairs . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 2

11. Inspect ion and Flaw Characteriza tion . . , .. . . . . . . . 3 A. Inspection Results, Procedures, and Edison Reviev . . . 3 B. Summary of Characterization of Flaws . . . . . . . . . 6

!!I. Design of Repair . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 A. Repair Assumptions / Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 B. Circumferential Flaw Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 C. Axial Flaw Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 D. Sock-o-let Repair . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 8 E. Analys is of Repair . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 IV . Repair Procedures . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 17 A. Welding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 17 M. Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

'g C. Tempo ra ry Suppo rt s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 O. Back-Up Mea sures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

- Freeze Plug

- Clamps for Overlay and Sleeve ,

- Restraint of 2-inch Vessel Drain Line E. Administrat ive Cont rol . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 20 F. Quali ty Assurance . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 20 V. Technical Evaluation of Repair . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 22 A. Crack Extension During Welding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 H. Crack Ext ension Pos t Welding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 C. Mat erial Select ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 D. Mock-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 VI. Safety Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 A. I.eak De t ect ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 H. On-Site Reviev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 C. Of f-Si t e Revi ev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 VII. Rep.t i r Progr am Summa ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 A. Detailed Event Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 H. Status of Piptng Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

C. 'tanpowe r .ind Rad i a t ion Exposu re . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Vltl. Table of Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 ID/A2-K .

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I I. INTRODUCTION C( ) A. Description of the Problem Unit 2 experienced a IS-week refueling outage which ended on December 26, 1981.

On January 2, 1982, a step increase of 0.5 gallons per minute was observed.

This was attributed at the time to a possible valve packing leak. On Janaary 15, 1982 the 2B Reactor Recirculation MG Set was tripped due to a problem with the exciter brushes. At that time the decision was made to rectify a low oil level alarm for the 2B Reactor Recirculation Pump motor that had "reviously annunciated, and to identify the existing drywell leakage As a result a drywell entry was made. While the Operating Engineer was in the drywell, he noticed that water was leaking from the insulation around the Reactor Water Clean-Up System suction piping. The unit was shut down.

B. NRC Discussions discussions over the telephone were held between the NRC and the station on numerous occasions between January 18, l',82 and January 23, 1982.

Region III and/or NRR were involved in these conversations. On January 26, 1982, a meeting was held at Region III, to present the details of the repair program to the NRC. NRR personnel were also in attendance.

Following additional phone conversations with the NRC, CECO received formal approval to proceed with the repair program on February 1, 1982.

An action item list was transmitted to the station from Region 111, giving O

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20 items which must be completed prior to proceeding with the repairs, and l actions which must be taken following the repairs. The items required to be completed prior to starting the work were completed in a timely manner.

C. Schedule of Repairs - (Refer to Isometric Drawing on page y for location and nomenclature of weld identifications.)

Repair work commenced on February 3,1982. The initial schedule called for installing the sleeve over weld F6; installing the weld pads over welds F12, S10, and S9; and installing the cone-shaped sleeve over weld FIA in that order. This work was expected to take at least three weeks to complete. A swnmary for the events comprising actual repair program is provided in Section VIII of this report.

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II. INSPECTION AND FI.AW CHARACTERIZATION O

A. Inspection Results, Procedures, and Edison Review Subsequent to the discovery of a leaking crack on the pipe side of weld joint S-14, a UT inspection program was initiated to examine two adjacent welds, S-15 and S-16 (see isometric drawing on page 5). As a result of discovering linear indication on these two welds, the program was expanded to inspect all butt welds in the RWCU line up to the outboard isolation valve Radiation levels were very high in this area (400 - 800 mR per hour). The llT examination was limited to discovery of t' laws on the isolable side and required 17.9 Man-Rem, exposure to complete. However, the welds on the non-isolable side were examined thoroughly, sometimes by three different UT inspectors. Commonwealth Edison's three UT inspectors, including the Level III inspector, evaluated the results of contractor's work and where needed, persenally examined some welds for verification of other inspectors' test results.

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Based on these examinations, it was discovered that: q I

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1. Eight out of eleven butt welds downstream of the inboard isolation valve (isolable) had UT reflectors indicative of cracks.

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2. None of the four welds outside the containment had any unacceptable 3 indications. ;

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3. Four out of ten butt welds upstream from the inboard isolation valve [

showed UT indications. -

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4. All axial cracks were found on the elbow side of the welds. i,.

5. All circumferential cracks were found in the Heat Affected Zone (HAZ)

I of the pipe, a

Test results are summarized in the table on page 8. '.

The isometric drawing on page 7 shows the locations of the wrlds identified y in the summary table.

Vhile the UT inspettors were performing inspections on the piping butt ,

welds, one of the inspectors observed a droplet of water on the socket __

i weld which attaches the .!-inch reactor vessel bottom drain line to the I

Sock-o-let on the RWCU line (Weld F-1A). Subsequent visual and high l

temperature penetrant examination failed to reveal any linear indications l

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indtrative of a through-wall crack.

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l III. DESIGN OF REPAIR O

A. Repa i r As sump t ions /ph ilosophy The repair der.c rthed in this section and in the repair progre, which is in the Appendix to this r e po r t , is based on two annumptions. e i'

The non-isolable sect ton of the line cannot he replaced due to fuel storage concerns.

The fix is tanporary; a pemanent repair vill he pe rf ormed during t he I

198i ttnit 2 re f tiel out age .

l The hisic philosophy of the repair in t o c rea te .1 new pressu re hoianda rv usine, Inter-Granular St res s Corrosion Cracking (ICSCC) resistant ru t er i al s (as id ent i f i<wl in NUH Ff;-0113 Revision I such as low carbon ma terial s and we! d met al) . Implicit in this philosophy in that each flaw ident i f ied ha s develoned to a through wall crack. Secondarily, the weld pad repairs offer a tavarahla res idual st ress dist r ibut ion.

H. 4:t rcinf erent tal Flaw Repair The e t teinf oreat tal flaw repair ( Figu ren lA. IR. and IC) unca a low carknn staleb S %t eel sleeve arounit t he flawed weld ext ending, approstrut elv six inches on ei t her s ide. The ulce e i s ma ch i ned frm wrought ma t erial ; and is split and wet tied around 'the pi pe usine fiill pene t ra t ion wel ds. Th e -

O ir i s4- . < < - -ia a '- '" rir ier r><i e '<,'i e -ia wi'h 178 3

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cove:1 fillets. The sleeve allows space for the existing veld crown. An

() 1/S ,1h h hole is drilled in the 6 inch pipe through a 1/4 inch threaded hole in the alce' e. ,This hole provides an unobstructed pathway to the e

annulus from the intilde- of the pipe to prevent excessive. pressure buildup y in the annulus ,due t'o a postulated flow path through the pipe crack. A i

threaded 1/4 inch plu'g is seat velded into thr' sleeve. The plug is shown

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, i C. Axial Flav 3 pair

- The axial flaw repair (Figure 2) establishes a " cast - in place" pipe

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, sleeve f r on veld me t al . In addition to the f avorable compressive residual

's tren a pa t teriy. the Type 30SL veld me tal in restatant to propagation of c

the IGSCC crack. ,

D. Sock-o-let Repair

.' - cope-shaped alceve la provided around the sock-o-let connecting the .

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two-inch drain line to the alt. inch RWCU line. This repair in shown in Figure 1A .i id in. A 1/4 tr' %reated hole l.; provided in the sleeve. It wan origna ky intende/ . t !' an 1/8 inch hole through the 1/4 inch hole into the two inch line, but thie ein not donc due to the ext rme likelihood l

'that no crack exint ed in the first place. A 1/4 inch plug had been machined.

1 and it in located in the QA stor'. ige area in the storcroom .. future une, if necennary.

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E. Analysis of Repairs O

The stress analysis and flaw propagation calculations necessary to initially justify the repairs are contained in the Appendix to this report.

The unrepaired and unreinforced welds should not be subject to higher stresses as a result of this repair program, and should not have a higher propensity for cracking. The unisolable section of piping, including the l

MO-2-1201-2 isolation valve, was allowed freedom of movement during the '

repairs. Although the piping was adequately supported, there was allowance for shrinkage due to the weld deposits and to prevent stiffness. The isolable piping section repairs were not completed until after the sleeve and weld overlays were completed and inspected. A piece consisting of 40

' and 47 elbows and a small 3-3/4 inch pipe section was installed at the '

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very end to account for the shrinkage / distortion and to align the repaired and replaced (isolable piping) pipe sections. The distortion has been evaluated by NUTECH, and has beets deemed acceptable,

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F\6URE 38 SECTIOM 8-6 f
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IV. REPAIR PROCEDURES
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A. Welding Procedures Weld Overlay: CECO Automatic Weldi.; Procedure WPS-8-8-DA.
Mechanical Incorporated Procedure VPS-800A.
Sleeve Welds: Axial Seam Welds using Mechanical Incorporated Procedure WPS-800A.
Circumferential welds using Mechanical Incorporated Procedure WPS-800A.
Sock-o-let Welds: Axial seams welds using Mechanical Incorporated Procedure WPS-800A.
Circumferential welds using Mechanical Incorporated Procedure WPS-800A.
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B. Inspection Procedures O
The following procedures were used to verify quality of the repair:
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Welding overlay:
PT of the first pass - CECO procedure.
UT of the joint - Developed by Ceco from the mock-ups.
Sleeve Welds:
PT of the welds - CECO procedure.
O UT of the welds - CECO standard procedure.
Sock-o-let Welds:
PT of the welds - CECO procedure.
C. Temporary Sup po rt s During the courne of the repair, the non-isolable piping was supported with temporary restraints. The supports account for normal pipe / vater we igh t . repair equipment weight, and relocation of existing restraints.
Restraints were removed or relocated to provide welder / welding equipment
() ac ces s ib ili ty . Prior to removal / relocation of existing restraints. the t emporary support syst em was installed .
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Two existing restraints were affected by the repair. Spring hanger !
(') 1202-W-110 located on the isolable piping, was disengaged to allow piping replacement. Inboard Isolation valve MO 2-1201-2 was secured with chain hoists prior to disengagement of 1202-W-110. Restraint 1202-M-107 was removed to allow access to welds S9 and S10. Temporary blocking was placed near the downstream guide 1202-G-109, and chain hoists were placed upstream of weld S9 to account for removal of 1202-M-107.
D. Back-Up Measures in the event that leakage occurred during the repair, back-up measures were established to stop the leak, and allow repairs to proceed. Mechanical clamps were designed for each generic repair zone. Prior to starting welding repairs on the 6 inch line (sleeve and weld pad installation), a freeze plug was established. For the weld pads, the freeze plug was removed after 1/8 inch of weld muterial was deposited.
The freeze plug equipment was standard liquid nitrogen freezing equipment sized as required. Each leak scenario was considered to assure that I
plugging can be accomplished for each scenario. l l
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The mechanical clamping devices were designed for the pipe sleeve, the l
weld overlay, and the sock-o-let sleeve. A clamp capable of encompassing the pipe and the pipe sleeve was available. Clamping for the weld overlay consisted of various widths of standard pipe clamps combined with a rubber membranc. An example is shown on page 2),
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The sock-o-let sleeve clamp, installed prior to the start of sleeve instal-() lation, consisted of a pipe clamp around the 2-inch line, which was tied to the six-inch Rk'CU line with cable. This clamp prevented any displacement during a postulated break in the sock-o-let, thus limiting any leakage to a small and manageable amount.
i
, Training on the usage of the clamps, damage control organization and procedure, and phot . graphs of the clamp devices are addressed and provided in the Administrative Procedure contained in the Appendix.
E. Administrative Control A detailed procedure for administrative control and operational support of this repair has been written, and is appended to this report.
O F. Quality Assurance All work was performed in accordance with the Commonwealth Edison Company Quality Assurance Manual.
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l O I A special high-strength ductite iron 2 tugs witn mutuaiiy supporting siieing 3 run circumference.singie or muitinie alloy lug utillZes a strength efficient fingers to assure proper bolt alignment . section stainless steel bands available
( in 7%",10",12%".15". 20" and 30" l Computer sided design that's not only while tightening. Permits maximum stronger, but lighter and easier to install. torque without bending of bolts, widths.
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The band locking system us.s 5 Briege piate viusn mounied :
. g.f , a unique lug core design and a band hemming process that and benced to the gasket assures even distnbution of l
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" resists pull-out and provides gasket pressure and prevents ;
maximum band retention. cnmpng.
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Rockwell design that securely attaches the tugs to the band. \ l l
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l V. TECILNICAL EVALUATION OF REPAIR
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l A. Crack Extension During Welding i
I The risk of causing a failure of the RWCU line during welding is non-existent l due to the very high toughness of austenitic stainless steel. Studies by EPRI and General Els'tric on austenitic stainless steel have shown that ,
i flaws very much larger than those detected in the RWCU line would be l stable under normal and upset operating conditions. The repairs were i
performed with 23 psig pressure in the pipe, and with the shutdown cooling i
the only system operating (intermittently) within the drywell. Stresses :
from these sources are insignificant.
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Welding stresses could be significantly high in the localized weld regions.
The attachments for the sleeve repair to the circumferential flaw in weld I
F6 were located several inches away from the existing weld. There was no ?
significant thermal or mechanical stressing of the existing weld during ;
sleeve attachment. The weld overlay repairs to the axial flaws could f i I conceivably cause some extension of the flaws. Such extension could only i take place with very high tensile stress present at the edge of the flaw.
The stresses from welding are highly localizec and any t< tension would be 5
arrested in a very short distance due to the reduced stress field. A nearby through-wall flaw has the potential of extending radially to produce a small leak. Low heat input was used in depositing the first layer over the flaw regions to minimize penetration and stresses.
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l In the unlikely event that a small leak occured, a rubber-lined me.:hanical !
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1 clamp was available to seal off the leak. With a freeze plug in place and '
the line drained to stop leakage, a localized repair to seal the leak would be performed. Once the leak is sealed off, the freeze plug would be l
allowed to melt and the repair completed as originally planned. l The sleeve repair to the sock-o-let was attached to the 6-inch RWCU line 1
and to the 2-inch drain line above the existing socket weld. The attachment l weld to the 6-inch line did not tie into the existing sock-o-let weld.
There was no significant thermal or mechanical. stressing of the existing welds during sleeve attachment.
Due to the uncertainty of the condition causing the water droplet noted during examination, a strap clamp was applied prior to attaching the O ;
sleeve. The strap clamp supplemented the existing rigid support on the !
2-inch line to mechanically restrain the 2-inch line from pulling out of the se c.k-o-let in the very unlikely event of failure. If leakage were to occur during repair, attempts would be made to accomplish freeze plug i isolation to permit completion of the repair.
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l l B. Crack Extension Post Welding i i
I i l IGSCC can only occur when the combination of sensitization, tensile stress, l and aggressiveness of the environment is sufficient to cause it. The sleeve repairs will not change the degree of sensitization or the environ-ment near the existing welds. The effect on residual stresses of adding
{} the sleeves is uncertain, but it is not expected that any significantly 1
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l increased tensile stresses will result. Crack extension may occur during
() operation, but this is not of concern as the sleeves are designed as new, independent pressure boundaries around the existing welds. The sleeves can accomodate complete separation of the existing welds. If through-wall t
penetration occurs, the annulus between the sleeve and pipe will be wetted with primary water. The Type 304L sleeve material and Type 308L weld metal will resist initiation of IGSCC during service. It is extremely t
unlikely that IGSCC could initiate in the existing pipe near a sleeve i
attachment weld and propagate through pipe material under the veld to produce a crack. Even if such a crack were to occur, the result would be a detectable leak, and no risk of pipe breakage would be presented.
The weld overlay repairs to the axial flaws were performed by depositing circumferential stringer beads. The deposition was accomplished in layers' with each layer completed before beginning the next layer. Circumferential stringer beads will produce a constrictive force as the underlying pipe, due to weld metal shrinkage. The accumulated effect of the stringer beads comprising the overlay will be to produce compressive circumferential residual stresses under the overlay. As the overlay will extend well beyond the existing axial flaws, propagation of these flaws during opera-tion would be mitigated by the changed residual stress pattern. Also, crack extension in the axial direction would be mitigated due to the absence of butt weld sensitization from the original butt veld and the
(
l
1 reduced residual tensile stresses beyond the heat af fected zone of the
() original weld. Even if crack extension were to occur, the crack would be i I
arrested in the radial direction by the ICSCC resistant weld metal overlay. !
In the very unlikely event of extension in the axial direction to beyond the weld overlay, the result would be a detectable leak, an'd no risk to pipe breakage would be presented.
The weld overlay could produce residual tensile stresses at t he ins id e surf ace of the existing pipe near the ends of the overlay. The magnitude of these stresses is reduced by tapering the ends of the overlay. ICS CC is unlikely to occur at these transition regio,ns as significant sensitiza-tion is not expected at the inside surf ace. The overlay was applied at low heat input and the water present inside the pipe produced rapid cooling.
The degree of sensitization produced by the weld overlay process was evaluated by a representative mock-up snd metallurgical testing, i
C. Materials Select ion l
The materials used to accomplish the repair have been selected to provide a high resistance to ICSCC. The vrought material for the sleeves is Type 104L stainless steel having 0.035 percent (maximun) carbon and meeting the mechanical requirements of regular Type 304 The consumable welding ma t e ri al is Type 308L s tainless steel . Type 304L and Type 308L stainless steel are listed as acceptable materials in NURFA 0313 Revision I for l
cons t ruct ton of piping avstems.
i O
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D. Hock-Up O
The repair of axial cracks on the elbow side of the elbow to pipe joint called for deposition of weld metal on the 0.D. surface to produce a weld i
pad approximately 4 inches long and 1/2 inch thick.
Commonwealth Edison has used this particular mechanized welding equipment previously at Dresden. CECO has the required procedures and is familiar with the equipment; however, a mock-up study was conducted to evaluate the following:
j 1. Feasibility of using mechanized welding on elbows:
A new elbow was welded to a straight length of pipe for conducting
! O this test. The test spool piece then was pad welded to produce a weld pad of 6-3/4 inches long and 1/2 inch thick. The feasibility of l
mechanized welding was adequately demonstrated.
. 2. Evaluation of quality of weld metal:
i The pad welded mock-up sample was examined by VT, PT and RT methods.
The NDE results were evaluated to ASME Section III Class I acceptance standards, and found to be acceptable. )
The test sample was sectioned for metallurgical examination. The heat affected zone (HAZ), quality of weld deposit, and the bond along the fusion line were thoroughly investigated. Microstructure in the HAZ l
has been evaluated using ASTM A 262 practice A. The degree of sensiti-() zation (DOS) observed has been compared with DOS generally observed in a typical butt welded nanple. The final results indicate no evidence of adverse af fects.
3. UT inspectibility of the pad weld.
A section of the pad welded sample has been retained for the development of a UT procedure. The latest UT technology has been applied to develop a UT procedure to inspect the production welds.
4 Extension of existing crack during pad weld repair.
(} The elbow to pipe joint (F-17) remaved from service has been utilized for this purpose. The weld joint was radiographed to locate the crack. The pipe was filled with wa ter and pad welded on the 0.D. to produce a 6 inch - 1/2 inch thick pad.
After the first layer was laid down, the weld layer was prepared for a thorough PT examination. PT was performed to determine if the existing flaw has broken through the weld layer. The crack was found not to break through, and subsequent veld passes were deposited.
The comple ted weld repair was examin 'd by raltography. Original and final radiographs were compared to dete rmine if any significant crack ext ension had occurred. The f Inal rallograph f ailed to demons trate O t" cr c' 1"aicette" 6 c e er eta 6"ita"e aee etrv-
l
5. Concern over welding on marginally sensitized material.
O ,
From previous metallurgical investigations, it is possible that the elbow material may be in a slightly sensitized condition. Concern has been raised over degradation of this slightly sensitized material due to additional welding. It is not possible to section the contaminated elbow and prepare for metallographic samples in a reasonable period of time.
i 0
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1
l VI. SAFETY EVALUATION O l A. Leak Detection 1
1 To ensure that any postulated additional cracking will be detected prior to potential pipe rupture, leakage within the drywell is closely monitored.
Reactor coolant leakage in the drywell is monitored in accordance with the appended Quad-Cities Station Procedure QOS 1600-7. The procedure ensures adequate leak detection, and the performance of this procedure is shown in 1
the attached tabulation of leakage monitored at Unit 2. The procedure did identify the additional leakage due to the through wall IGSCC in the isolatable portion of the reactor water clean-up system. This leakage was l well below limits, but the change in leakage was identified for this small I l
defect.
i A revision to QOS 1000-7 was made (Temporary Procedure 1631) to reflect an NRC commitment to investigate a 1 gpm unidentified leakage increase over a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months period subsequent to Unit 2 startup. This procedure will remain in effeet until the next Unit 2 refueling outage.
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B. Onsite Review i
O An on-site review of the proposed repair to the Unit 2 Reactor Wter Clean-Up System IGSCC was conducted on January 25, 1982 and was recorded in Review Report Number 82-05. This review report is appended. Contained in the On-Site Review package are:
1. Event description.
2. 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation.
3. Isolable section rapair program, with SNED approval.
4. Non-isolable proposed repair program and description with SNED approval.
I C. Off-Site Review j
)
Art off-site review was conducted and the report is appended. The review is documented in report 82-03.
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I i
DAILY U-2 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP READINGS GAL. PER GAL. PER HIN AVG 24 HOUR IN 24 IIR PERIOD PERIOD 12/26/81 0 gal 0.00 gpm l
12/27/81 300 gal 0.02 gpm START UP FOLLOWING l REFUEL OUTAGE 12/28/81 280 gal 0.19 gpm 1 12/29/81 330 gal 0.23 gpm 12/30/81 370 gal 0.26 gpm 12/31/81 410 gal 0.28 epm 01/01/82 770 gal 0.53 gpm 01/02/82 1420 gal 0.99 gpm 01/03/82 1090 gal 0.76 gpm SCRAM RECOVERY O m/04/82 1590 sai 1.10 8Pm 01/05/82 1650 gal 1.15 gpm 01/06/82 1670 gal 1.16 gpm 01/07/82 1700 gal 1.18 gpm 01/08/82 1710 gal 1.19 gpm 01/09/82 1810 gal 1.26 gpm 01/10/82 2030 gal 1.41 gpm 01/11/82 1950 gal 1.35 gpm 01/12/82 1930 gal 1.34 gpm 01/13/82 1820 gal 1.26 gpm 01/14/82 2020 gal 1.40 gpm 01/15/82 1680 gal 1.17 gpm 01/16/82 120 gal 0.08 gpm UNIT SifUT DOWN llIGifEST 4 !;0UR PERIOD WAS 480 GAL OR 2 GPM (01/14/82). TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT FOR UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE IS S GPH.
i F
VII. REPAIR PROGRAM
SUMMARY
h The purpose of this section of the report is to provide a detailed summary of '
l the events which took place as the repair program progressed, and to document completion of the program in accordance with the commitments and procedures associated with the program.
Prior to the start of the repair work, the items required by the NRC to be completed were verified to be satisfactorily done. A detailed work package, including a station traveler, was prepared and approved. Training sessions were conducted persuant to the work package, damage control, and administrative procedures to be in effect. Qualified welders and welding procedures were j in place, and the necessary clamps and freeze-seal equipment were made available. g Fuel storage rack procurement was arranged for, and the prerequisites of the Administrative Procedure were satisfied. An ALARA evaluation was performed, and it was discussed by telephone with an NRC Region III representative.
The weld pads for the F6 weld sleeve, and the S9 and S10 overlays were to be performed using an automatic welding process. GAPCO, Inc. was contracted by the station to provide the equipment and personnel to perform the work. The weld overlay for veld F12 would be done manually due to the lack of space to utilize the automatic welder.
A detailed eveat chronology fcllows, which highlights the events that followed the progress of the repair program.
,O V 37
A. Detailed Event Chronology
-] l 2/3/32 Commenced establishing the freeze plug. The GAPCO welding equipment and remote video camera were set up to initiate welding the first pad for the sleeve over weld F6. Difficulty was encountered in establishing the freeze plug, and a second jacket was installed.
2/4/82 The freeze seal appeared to be holding, but after welding commenced, '
the heat caused the fre ze seal temperature to rise. It was i decided to augment the freeze seal process by using cans full of l carbon dioxide (d.y ice).
l 2/5/82 The use of dry ice resulted in the successful establishment 'of the freeze plug. Finished weld pads for F6 sleeve.
2/6/82 Commenced fit-up and welding of F6 sleeve halves to weld pads.
I i
2/7/82 Started welding pad on weld F12, and completed 1/8 inch buildup. .
PT was successful. Started automatic welding for veld pad on S10. I 2/8/82 Completed 1/8 inch buildup on S10, and PT was satisfactory.
Started welding pad for weld S9.
s 2/9/82 Completed 1/8 inch buildup on weld pad for S9. Cone sleeve for 2 inch socolet (FIA) was fit up and welding began. Freeze seals were closed off and thawed. Automatic welding began on veld pad O
,,l l
l 2/10/82 Completed 1/2 inch weld buildup on S9, and started welding on S10.
( l
)
2/11/82 Completed welding on FIA cone sleeve. ^
)
s' _
q '
's 3
2/12/82 Finished weld buildup on S10.
2/13/82 Started welding sleeve on F6. y 2/14/82 Completed visual inspections of completed welds on FIA cone sleeve'- ,
and F6 sleeve. Started welding pad on F12 using mechanical welding process.
2/15/82 Completed various h'DE on completed welds.
() 2/16/82 Completed UT on completed FIA and F6 welds, and weld pads over S9 and S10, 2/17/82 Performed welding to buildup pad on weld F12.
through #
2/19/82 2/19/82 Drilled 1/8 inch hole in pipe through F6 weld s!ceve. I'nstalled 1/4 inch plug and tightened. Sta rted scal-welding plug. Clamp was removed from FIA cone.
2/20/82 F6 sleeve plug was scal-welded and PT was visually inspected.
{} Weld buildup on F12 was completed. '
i a
w -- - --
h l,
, 4 2/21/82- IT on F12 veld pad was satisfactory. The Damage Control Tea.n was released. UT was empleted on F12 veld pad.
2/22/82 Pipe hange'rs were made up and t4nporary pipe hangers were rewoved.
., 2 s
, r- -
/ 2/23/82 Completed satisf acterv h;dro-tes.t on non-isolable piping section.
'\ t B. Status of Piping Ins talla tion
\
t The s:atua of the Unit 2 non-isolable rea: tor water cleanup systm repairs t y is stemarized as follows: )
\
4. Wel d F6: Sleeve installed over weld h6, ypproximately 12 inches long.
\)\
The ale.cya has a 1/4 inch plug installed ~' ver a 1/8 inch hole in the pipe. The pia? is sc rewed into the sleeve and seal-velded, and is s
,. s located ai a point on the nieeve 9 inches downtream from the edge of the sleev e f acing the reactor side.
l I' i ,
i
2. Weld FI A: A cone-shaped sleeve is installed over the sock-o-let and i
weld FIA. The sleeve has a 1/4 inch hole drilled into i t a t a po int 3 inchen up f rom where it is wel'ded to the 6 inch cleanup pipe. -
3. Welds S9 and S10: A4 incti long. 1/2 inch thick weld g ad is inntalled.
centered over each clhow weld. The veld pads were inst alled by auto- l l
mat ic welding proccan.
l o .
t l
1 l
1
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4. Veld F12: A 1/2 inch tbtek weld pad was mechanically installed over O this ethe -to-
'eweid. coverina 2-i/2 inches o the etsew. veid Fil was IIT inspectol af ter the Fl2 weld pad van coupleted, and the results wre acceptable.
t Phot raphs of the completed repairs are shown on page 38 t
i As requested by the NRC, tran marks were made on the pipe and elbows ad jac ent to the proposed repairs print to initiating the repair work.
Measurernents were taken and documeneed before and af ter the repairs.
This data is provided in thin report on subnequent pages. The extent of distort ton has been evaluated and deemed acceptable.
Pipe hangers were replaced upon caspletion of the repair progrm. The non-teolable piping nection was connected to the isolat le section by o o ricann . of a 40 pipe ethou, a 47 pipe elbow, and A 3-3[4 inch Iong
" pup" piece. Inese velds wra PT and RT exaratned, and a hydro-test van satisfactorily perfonned.
C. Hanpowr and Radiat ton Espoimare A numstry of t he mnpover and meemula ted radiation cupneu re aegneiatet with the non-inotahic l'nt t 2 reactor water cleanup synt m repair is pro-vided on the f oi loving page. The exponore project tona for the welding operattona wre connervat tve. Ilowever, a substantial amount .if exposure wn= accm ulatai hv the fittern and Inhorern in auppo rt of t he wo rk , and hv the NI)E and insulit ton personnel.
/
a
EXPOSURE ASSOCIATED WITH VELDING O 't'o NUMBER rao3tctro MAN-REM
^ctrr^'
MAN-REM
"^xo bTLDING
^ tiro WELDING 12S-F-1A 21.0 13.643 13.643 125-F-6 23.0 23.589 19.297 4.292 125-S9 & S-10 5.2 10.695 10.695 125-r-12 80.0 52.283 52.283 (revised projection of 2/3/82)
TOTA!.S 129.2 100.210 85.223 14.987 CONTRACTOR PERSONhTL CLASS OF NUMBER OF TOTAL EXPOSURE CONTRACTOR P_ERS0 g L PERSONNEL (IN MAN-REM kTI.DERS (!!AND) 69 85.223 VELDERS (AUT0) 13 16.255 (1) FITTERS 82 42.678 (2) LABORERS 24 28.139 INSU!ATORS 14 7.208 CON-AM (NDE) 15 10.897 (1) The fitters also supported the automatic welders.
(2) The laborcrs set up and removed lead shielding and scaffolding.
EXPOSURE
SUMMARY
GROUP MAN-REM OPERATIONS .429 MECil. MAINT. (SUPER) 5.074 MECll. MAINT. (UNION) 1,002 El.EC. MAINT. (SUPER) .195 El.EC. MAINT. (UNION) 1.279 R.C.T.*a .500 STATION SilPER .109 TECil STAIT 2.174 Q.C. 2.904 kT.I.DERS (MECH-INC) 85.22)
FITTERS (MECil-INC) 42.678 f.All0RERS (MECll-INC) 28.139 CON-AM INSPECTION 10.897 AUTO kT.I.DE." (CAPCO) 16.255 KREZ INSill.ATORS 7.208 206.061 0 51-
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VIII. TABLE OF APPENDICES l
1. QOS 1600-7, Reactor Coolant Leakage in the Drywell (Temporary Procedure 1631).
2. On-S i t e R ev i ew No. 82-05, including proposed repair progrrri.
3. Of f-Sit e Review No. 82-03, 4 Administ rat tve Cont rol Procedure fo r Repair of Nor.-Isolah'a Unit 2 Clean-Up Pipe in Drywell (Temporary Procedure 1634).
5. Freeze Seal Procedu res. l l i
! 6. Prelininary Calculations and Analysis, f
7. Administrative Procedure Training Docinentation.
8. Fuel Rack Availability Letter.
9 Preliminary A! ARA Review.
10. NRC Required Actions Prior to Start of Repair Program.
11. Mock-Up Examina t ion Report.
l O b
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-4 3-(
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QOS 1600-7 Revision h PIACTOR CDCI. ANT LF.ATAGE IN T:i?. DRFc.LL J .-- . ,
M S.R.
ID/7D A. PURPOSE The purpose of thts procedure is to detect and inositor identified and unidentified leakage in the drywell.
B. REFERENCES APPROVFD
.,$6
i. % ovus-oli%.MPO 9 .RY .
C. PREREQUISITES
1. None.
PROCEDUi - 1631.,% g6 D. PRECAUTIONS NOT VALlO AFTER ,
1. None. FEB 2 8 E. LIMITATIONS AND ACTIONS
1. In the event that any one or more the following criteria are exceede!,
commence an orderly shutdown if:
a. The volume piu ped from the drywell floor drain sump in a four hour period is equal to or greater than:
(1) 1200 gallons (5 gpm).
(2) 480 gallens greater than the previous 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months pump down(Q p )
b. The volume (a gallons) pumped from the dryvell floor drain sump at the end of ar.y four hour period when averaged with the previon I five a gallons is greater than twice the average of the prevto.>
six a gallons.
c. The volumt- pumped f rom the drafwell equipment dr.1id su.mp in v-eia,ht hou: per:rd :s e;ual t'a or greater than 9tMO galler: 2 .'
, gpm)..
d. I f le nige is exces.stve bitt.halow it.'itts. not:tv th .4it -
- t o c o ri t .i s t. Had Protecttuu ta perto:n .: cr.mell wtito.1 > .i q . e -
survey to tdentify the leakage source.
2. If either integrator reading has drif ted f ro:a the end of one pump to l the start of the next write a work request to enrrect it.
3. bM ^' " f
- c^ 4- h puuEd 2. @hk n epid.ut A g.,,,.,,,,_.,
' ' ~ ' '
A2no )k p(.k1 A luo A 420@) cytubm 4- h M % . Y AUG2
%MM4@
% t. T h A dQ A t.
MN% W D.
0 c 0.13.
s . i l
'f . PROCEDl:RE l 0 1.
Drywell equipment drain sump. '
a. Pump down the dryvell equipment drain sump twice a shift (app ro::i-mately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ).
b. Record drywell equipment drain su=p integrator readings, 901 -(202-4),-
on QOS 1600-S13 immediately bef ore and af ter pumping the sump.
c. Transfer the sum of the pumping for the shif t to the Operatton's Department Weekly Summary of Daily Surveillance, QOS 005-51. ,
d. Compare the volume pumped against the limiting criteria. if 4
unacceptable, notify the Shif t Engineer and refer t Techn' Specification 3.6.D.
. 2. Dryvell floor drain sump.
a. Pump down thAaP.teeMIEB> every oo rs-Record dryw boph.hrb) sum.RMtorreadia8s.9o2-c(902-4),
b. !
j
,- on QOS 1600-S9 ic=ediately before and af ter pumping the sump. -
c. Close i o a h im.bNy hter pu.,p trips on low level.
] d. Record in
e g l
d a na FTElYtunped on the " Unit Dr{vell ~
, ; Floor Dra . D .
g
e.
Average the latestqgaggyith the five previous recorded ;
gallons an1 record the new eMculated 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months average.
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, f. Once a shift (approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ) traqpfer the sum of the l pm: ping for the shif t on Operation's Department Veekly Surm.-e of Daily Surveillance QOS 005-S1 item 2. i
g. Compare the volume pumped per four hours against the limiting j c rite ria . If unseceptable, notify the Shift Engineer to contact Rad Protection to perform a dry.cIl air m.intfold suple m! reNr i
to Technical Specification 3.6.D.
G. CHECNL_IS_TS .
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-O I 1. Section 3.6.D.
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l 00AD-CITIES STATION ONSITE REVIEW ASSIGNMENT DATE 1/22/82
, REV I EV NO . 82-05 REVIEW PARTICIPANTS: L. Gerner W. Burkamper R. Bax
T. Tamlyn -
J. Tietz CollSULTANTS: R. Gal tonde (OAD) G. Schulte (NSD-Maint) ,
R. Tarvninga (NSD-Maint) .T. Spry (NST-Maint)
J. Gavula (NUTECH) E. Hemzy (Of f-Si te Staf f)
D. Pitcairn (NUTECH) 9 - . -
ASSIGNMENT: P,rovide 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation of Proposed Repair Program for Unit 2 Reactor Water Cleanup System Pipe Cracks in the Drywell '
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STATION SUPERINTENDT.NT O
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QUAO-CITIES STATIO'l Revision 2.
OH-SITE REVIE11 REPORT February 1977
' " ' "- ' ' " : 5" "" "*'t '""" '
O"*""c OSR tio: RJ- O[ Station )( Off-Site Review Review Date: /!2A/r2 NLA Other
'Raquest Date: / J 2,!P t NFS Was Request Ceeplete:
SNED Yes No (Attach material submitted)
UWIY" Tw* o Reac h (Aja 7~er C /e a p - Q D y z 7 &"
blP M Repir Reason For *1eview:
Tech. Spec. 6.1.G.2.a _ (On-Site)
Tech. Spec. 6.1.G.I a (Of f-Si te)
Other: NRC Bulletin Deviation )(
AIR Request Station 'X l On-Site Reference Materials (attach): ,
Safety Evaluation X, Procedures Affected Tech Spec Pages HOD Number '
FSAR Pages AIR Number I I
QA Manual Pages Other j Off-Site Comoletion info: i Check List Complete X Advance Notification i f 33f%2 - W %.
{
Forward to Off-Site X Date 8fM)N Off-Site Review Humber N Person k- ,
Disposition: '
Routine Report X Off-Site Review for Concurrence (T.S . 6.1. G.2.a. (5)) x AIR issued (/ )
NRC Subaitta1 Needed O recheicei Sneci fication C8ae9e Unreviewed Safety Question M I' F N < '- :. >;
Other No Further Acticn f * * ' ' } ;' 7 7 0ther 6 C. C , t,, ;;.,
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OSR FORM - 1 RECORO OF REQUEST FOR OFFSITE REVIEW O
Station Quad-Cities Onsite Review No. 82-05 G. Tietz Date 1/22/82 Suomitted by Test or experiment not involving an unreviewed safety question.
Proposed test or experiment invo.1ving an unreviewed safety question Proposed change to procedure, equipment or system involving an i unreviewed safety question. !
Proposed change to Tech. Spec. or license.
Unanticipated deficiency of design or operation of safety related structures, systems, or components.
Proposed change to GSEP.
A Referral by T. S. Supervisor, Station Superintendent, Division Vice President fluclear Stations, or Manager of Quality Assurance
,- Adoitional subject description: The Unit Two Reactor Water Clean-Up System iping Repair Supporting documents attached: Safety Evalua: ion, M. C. Strait' Letter of January 22, 1982, to N. J. Kalivianakis, Repair Program COM 3402-002 Rev. I Repair Program COM 3402-003 Rev. O, Baseline Data Figure 65-11 i
Date required for Offsite Review compl'tinn: e l
.Macatved by Date Senior Participant ffsite Review tio . -
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Quad-Citics Station
, On-Site Review No. 82-5 Unit Two Reactor Vater Clean-up Piping Repair O
SUMMARY
The Unit Two Reactor Water Clean-up piping butt welds inside t eh Drywell on line 2-1202-6"-A, from the RHRS Shutdown Cooling Suction tie-in to penetration X-14 were UT examined by CONAM and G.E., and the data obtained were verified by OAD. The indications found were divided into two. categories; 1) Isolable, downstream of isolation valve MO-2-1201-2 and; 2) Non-isolable, upstream of the isolation valve.
There were 8 Indications discovered on the 11 buttwelds on the isolable portion.
Seven of these eight welds had circumferential indications on the pipe side HAZ. One weld (125-517) and an axial Indication on the elbow side of the weld.
Of the 10 butt welds on the non-Isolable line, four indicaticns were found. A O circumferential crack Indication was found in the HAZ of one side of the pipe to pipe weld 12S-F6. Axial flaws were found in the elbow side of the elbow to pipe welds 125-59 and 125-510. Three axial crack Indications were found in the elbow side of the elbow to valve weld 125-F12.
A visual observation of the sockolet weld to bottom vessel drain line 2-1265-2"-A revealed this may also have a possible flaw. This weld will be PT examined to confirm the visual observation.
The repair to the isolable portion of this line consists of replacing the existing piping from isolation valve MO-2-1201-2 to the containment penetration.
The original routing and pipe supports will be utilized. New piping will consist of stainless steel type 304L having the mechanical properties of type
() 304 stainless steel.
2 The repair to the non-Isolable portion of line 2-1202-6"-A corsists of three
(])
separate methods. The first method will Install a welded sleeve around the pipe-to-pipe weld 125-F6. This sleeve will encompass the entire Heat Af fected Zone, HAZ, of weld 125-F6, and consist of two halves welded together
!)ngitudinally with a full penetration weld and a circumferential partial penetration weld to the pipe. The axial flaws will be repaired using an automatic welding machine to lay a pad of weld material over the Indicated flaws.
Should the two inch sockolet weld require repair, a sleeve will be installed which covers the crack. The sleeve will consist of two halves welded longitudinally, full penetration weld to the six-inch pipe, and circumferential t
partial penetration welds to the two-Inch pipe. Temporary pipe restraints shall be provided to assure the integrity of the socolet welds during the sleeve installation.
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. The following 10 CFR 50 59 Safety Evaluation is provided for the proposed o
(j repair program for the non-isolable weld flaws:
1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previousl'/ evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
The pipe from the RHRS Shutdown Cooling tie-in to the MO-2-1201-2 valve will remain intact and will not be cut open during this repair. "All welding will be performed on the external pipe surfaces, thus maintaining primary coolant boundary integrity. To mitigate the consequences of a highly improbable pipe leak, the following measures will be taken:
a. A pipe clamp will be available to expeditiously plug a small leak, freeze plug equipment will then be utilized to isolate the line prior to comencing further repairs.
b. The LPCI Mode of RHRS, both Core Spray subsystems, and a Condensate Feedwater flow path with pumpir.g capability will be operable,
c. Current Standby Diesel Generator Technical Specifications will apply.
The repair program will be performed and documented in accordance with the Commonwealth Edison Company Quality Assurance Program as approved by the NRC and the AIA. Detailed installation and inspection procedures will be written and approved to execute this repair program in a manner consistent wi th the highest quality of safety-related work. Quality Control, Quality Assurance, and the ANI will provide evaluations and
] hold points throughout the program. The sleeve installation, weld overlay and sockolet sleeve are being evaluated to meet ASME Section 111 Stress allowables. The piping section to be repaired serves as a primary coolant pressure boundary; however, the Reactor is in the Cold Shutdown condition with nonaal water level. Therefore, only head pressure (approximately 23 psig) is seen at the pipe elevation. Since this piping system does not involve an engineered safeguard system, it is not being structurally degraded during the repair program, and the Reactor is shut-down, no adverse safety implications are presented.
2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not creater.
The repair program will utilize established materials, procedures, welding techniques, and examination methods that have been utilized previously. No new nor unapproved methods or materials will be used.
During the next refueling outage, a permanent repai r will be implemented.
Protection for personnel involved with the repair work will be afforded proper radiological protective practices t) assure that personnel exposures 1 wi 11 be ALARA. l l
3 The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification )
is not reduced. !
The safety limit of maintaining Reactor water level greater than 12 inches Q above TAF wi th the Reactor in cold shutdown will be maintained. Re dundan t water level instrumentation will remain operable, and routine surveillance will continue to be performed. Secondary containment, SBGTS, Reactor Building vent isolation capability, and all low-pressure ECCS will be operable per Technical Specification requirements. ,
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12SE29 -
2S 7 ELEV 624 ft -IS74 h.
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Figure 61-11 Rosctor Cleanup (Ref. Dwg 2-1202-ED-1 & 2) -
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l RECOMMENDATION l
1 it is the conclusion of the On-Site Review Committee that the above refair 1 program is technically feasible and sound. When NUTECH, the ANI, the NRC cnd Ccrnmonwealth Edison OAD, SNED, TSN, NSD-Maint., and QA organizatier.s have concurred with this program, the repair will be initiated. The above Safety Evaluation is hereby approved, and it is recorrrnended that the repair program be carried out to completion.
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January 22,1982 i
4
Subject:
Reactor Vater Clean-up Line Repair Progras COM.3402 002, Rev.1, Dated January 19,1982 l
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xr. i.J. 'rallvianat ts, '
SMED has reviewed the subject progras and concur with the ;
the n pipe requiresents. However, we would lite to esphasize th hould be routed identical to the old pipe routing.
analysis of the old routing which would apply to the new piping prni ed e d be ed kn bull dr v n ha b rv r ed aSNE up ,
to confirs the no pipe routing is the same as the old p p .
any questions or cozaents, please contact us.
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O - e ioo- 11 > _
,p/J[,k c tuntenancel aevision 0 January 20, 1982 i " o wnin.& Tech REPAIR PROCRAM - g ,,,,onn.,- - - NON-ISOIATABLE PORTION OF ~ _ REACTOR WATER CLEAN-UP LINE } , _. QUAD-CITIES UNIT 2 A. DesNMron of Repair This program addresses the repair cf the 6" NPS schedule 80S Reactor Water Clean Up Line, Line No. 2-1202-6"A. These repairs are located between the i
tie-in to the 20" recirculation line and the inboard isolation valve (2-1201-2). B. Jurisdictional Concerns
1. The maintenance of nuclear power camponents is addressed in Section VIII of the Illinois Boiler Safety Act, Vessel Code, Sections III and XI. In addition,10CFR50 dictates the use of ASME Section XI for the repairs.

2. 'Ihis repair progras shall be submitted to the Authorized Nuclear Ins pecto r. In addition, this progra:n is subject to review by all Q enforcement and regulatory authorities having jurisdiction at the plant.

3. The repair shall meet the requirenents of ASME Section IX,1977 Edition j up to and including the Summer 1978 Addenda.
C. Code of Cons truction The Reactor Water Clean-Up Line fran the reactor vessel to the isolation valve was designed, f abricated, examined and tested in accordance with the 1965 Edition of ASME Section I with the Winter 1966 Addenda and Sargent &
Lundy Specification R-2330. D. Code of Repair This repair shall be perfor=ed in accordance with the original Code of Construction and Design Specification referenced in Section C, except as modified in Section F of this program. E. Flav Description and Failure Mode Evaluation
1. The flaws are circunferential and logitudinal stress corrosion cracks located in the dryvell between the inboard isolation valve and the reactor.

2. The flaws were revealed by ultrasonic examination.
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3. The failure mode is intergranular stress corrosion cracking. In order to prevent future occurrence of this type of failure, low carbon O stainless steel and stainless steel veld metal vill be used as repair material. F. Repair Requirements
1. ,Paterial

a. Existing: '
~
(1) The existing pipe is ASIM A312 TP 304 l (2) The existing fittings are ASIM A403, Gr. WP304.
b. New material shall meet the following:
(1) Pipe: ASMZ SA-312 Tp 304L with physical properties meeting the requirements of TP 304 (2) Plate: AS3E SA-240 Type 304L vith physical properties meeting the require =ents of TP 304 Rolled plate shall be solution annealed. (3) Welding material: Type 308Latainless steel. (4) Bar stock: Type 304Lstainless steel.
)
2. Fabrication

a. All velding shall be performed in accordance with velding procedure specifications which have been qualified in accordance with ASME Section IF..

b. All velders shall be qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX.

c. The repair is exempt from postweld heat treatment.
i 3. Testing An initial cervice leak test shall be perfor=td. l 4 Nondestructive Examination l
a. All full penetration butt welds shall be visually examined, liquid penetrant examined and ultrasonically examined in accordance with Commonwealth Edison Special Process Procedure .

b. All other velds shall be visually and liquid penetrant examined in '
accordance with Commonwealth Edisen Special Process Procedures. l
5. Code Stamping Code stamping of the repair is not required and shall not be perforced.
G. Quality As surance All work shall be performed in accordance with the Mechanical Incorporated Quality Assurance Program as it interfaces with Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Progras. H. Records
1. Code Data Report An ASME Section XI NIS-1 Focs shall be prepared and shall be signed by the Authorized Nuclear Inspector.

2. Documentation Permanent records to be maintained by Quad-Cities Station are:

a. Certified Material Test Reports for all material.

b. Welding Procedure Specificaticas and Qualification Records.

c. Velder Qualification Records.

d. Nondestructive Examination Reports.

e. Nondestructive Examination Procedures and Personnel Qualifications.

f. Comple ted Station Travele r.

g. Repair Program.

h. As-built drawings of ska teches of the repair.

1. Code Data Report for the repair. '
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1 j l ID/ DAILY-D 1 REACIOR VATER CLEANUP SYSTDi REPAIR DESCRIFTION 1 A. Findings
1. The initial leak was noted in veld S-14 (ref. drvg. ISI-119) . '
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2. UT exam of all 6" RWCU butt velds between the 20" shutdown cooling '
ruction header to the outboard isolation valve (outside containment) was performed. l 1
3. Within containeent 8 of 11 butt welds downstream of the inboard isolation valve had UT reflectors indicative of cracks. -
i 4 Seven of these S welda had circumferential indications on the pipe , s id e EAZ. One veld (F17) had an axial indication on the elbow side of the weld.
5. No indications were found in velds outside containment.

6. The isolable portion of the RWCU line within containment will be -
replaced with Type 304L stainless steel having .035 mar. carbon and ' meeting the mechanical requirenanta of regular Type 304 ~
7. The non-isolable side has 10 butt welds. The ultrasonte examination O- found indications in 4 of the velds.

8. A circumferential crack indication approximately 95% through well and 1-1/2" in length was found in the RAZ of one side of the pipe to pipe weld Odentified F6.

9. Longitudinal crack indications were formed in the elbow side of the elbow to pipe velds designated S9 and $10. These indications were apprormietely 3/4" long and 50% of well.

10. Three longitudinal crack indications were found in the elbow side of the elbow to valve veld F12. These indications were approximately 3/4" long and 50% to 95% of vall. '

11. A suspected leak was noted at a 2" branch line to sockolet veld.
The sockolet to 6" line veld is designated FI A.
12. Weld F5 had been examined under the ISI program during the recent refueling outage and again at this time. The veld was found to be acceptable.
B. Repair
)
(~T The pipe to pipe joint F6 containing the ci7cumf erential crack indication l k/ vill be repaired using a sleeve as showa in Figure l'. The sleeve vill l provide an independent pressure boundary around and to either side of the l existing veld F6. Fartial penetration velds as shosn 11n Fig. N3-4244(d)2 q l 1 _ _ _ . L
w . H '
/ of ASME Section III will be used for the circunferential welds of the -
pipe sleeve. The final sleeve dimensions and attachment weld size vill
{ be determined by stress analysis. The sleeve material vill be Type 304L stainless steel with 0.035 max carbon and having mechanical properties of Type 304 The aleeva pecvides pressure boundary integrity for mechanically -

separated 6" pipe sections.
I The 1cugitudinal crack indications in the elbos : at joints 59, S10, and i F17 will be repaired by depositing weld metal 360* around and to either side of the existing welds (Figure 2). The weld deposited bands will be approximately 6" long and 1/2", thick although final dimensions will be determined by stress analysis. The bands will provida pressure boundaries independent of the of the underlying original veld joints. The suspected leak in ths 2" side of the sockolet will be repaired with a sleeve as shown in Figure 3. This slaeve<similar to a standard type 1 ' sockolet will provide'en independent' pressure boundary around the entire existirg sockolet by attaching to the 6" RWCU line and to the 2" drain line ' <bove the seekole t. ' e
' The repairs to the non isolable portion cf the RWCU line are temporary and the line will be repbced at the next refueling outage plannet for the spring of 1983. <
a C. _ Technical Evaluations " The crack indications in all, instances are assumed to be intergranular O tr
<erra ta= =r cut == (tcsec)- ra t > tr tr isht forvsrd in establishing an indepardant pressure boundary around the welds with indications. ICSCC is associated with the weld heat affectsd zones (HAZ) of Type 304 stainless steel. The existing crack indications may propagate in the heat affected zones and become through wall; however, ;
the conditions for ICSCC only exist in the HAZ where sensitization haa l occurred due to the heat of welding and sresidual stresses due to welding tre relatively high. The sleeve designs can accanodate complete separation of the existing velds. The type 304L sleeve material is highly resistant to ICSCC in the welded condition and is listed as an acceptable material in NUREG 0313 Rev. 1 Tha weld deposited bands over the longitudinal crack indications are similar to sleeves and provide independent pressure boundaries around the existing velds. 3' I,ongitudinal ICSCC cracks should not propagate significantly beyond the RAZ due to the absence of sensitization and the reduced weld' residual stresses. The lengths of the longitudinal crack indications in the GlCU line are similar to those found in the investigati n of the Quad-Cities Unit 2 core coray piping. The shrinkage l ' of the weld metal during deposition of the bands is expected to produce compresalve ciretsaferential stresses in the underlying base and weld metal. Compressive residual stresses should mitigate propagation of the existing indications. Weld metal has proven to be highly resistant to propagatten of ICSCC. Therefore even if the existing crack indications Q should propagate through wall, they would be arrested by the weld metal bands.
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i () January 25, 1982
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Quad Cities Offsite Review 82-3
Subject:
Unit Two Reactor Water Clean-up System Piping Repair Background and Discussions on Thursday, January 14, 1982 Quad Cities Unit 2 experienced a B Recirculation Pump MG set trip resulting from improper exciter brush seating reducing reactor power to approxi-mately 50%. Af ter repair of brushes and subsequent pump restart, a low oil 1cvel alarm was received on the lower motor bearing necessitating a drywell entry for inspection. During the inspection, leakage was detected from a clean-up system 6" line weld located at an elbow downstream of the inboard M.O. isolation valve. Prior to the Recirculation MG set trip an upward trend had been detected on the drywell floor drain sump input indicating ( ) some additional unidentified The unit was immediately shutdown for aleakage over normal. determination of the extent of the leakage and repair. On Sunday, January 24, 1982 three Nuclear Safety personnel attended a briefing meeting at the station to review the safety significance of the proposed repair. During the station briefing and subsequent telecons, the repair program was determined to be adequate based on the technical expertise involved and in conformance with the ASME Code methods allowed for repair. The station onsite review lists those Company personnel involved in the development of the repair program. Conclusion Offsite Review concurs with the program presented in Quad Cities OnSite Review 82-05 for the Unit 2 reactor water clean-up system pipe repair. Offsite Review believes that the present leak detection methods are adequate for detecting future pipe cracks and recommends that because the pipe configuration of Unit 1 is the same as Unit 2. Offsite Review recommends a visual inspection o t' Unit 1 clean-up system at pressure during the next outage.
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f.. Participants /Discialines , C E. Budzichowski a,),c,h E. Budzi'chowski J. S. Kolanowski a,b,c Senior Participant ' i i l l hYh ^ / M Supervisor of Offsite Review and Investigative Function : l I i i
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e Administrative Procedure for Unit Two Reactor Water clean up Pipe Repair Upstream of MO-2-1201-2 A. Purpose The purpose of this procedure is to outline the method to provide administrative instructions, procedures, and guidelines to assure that the repair of the non-isolable section of the Unit Two Reactor Water Clean up Pipe is carried out in a manner that will assure the safety of the Reactor and plant personnel. B. Re fe rences
1. Quad-Cities Station On-Site Review 82-05, including 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation.

2. Repai r Program COM-3402-003, Revision 0, dated January 20, 1982, including repair description.
3 Work Request Package Ql7244, with associated travelers, procedures, and support ing documentat ion. 4 Quad-Cities Station Operating Surveillance Procedures Q05 005-2 (Normal Control Room inspection) and QOS 005-51 (Weeki / Surnary of Daily Surveillance).
5. Cocoonwealth Edi;on Company Quality Assurance Manual.

6. Abnormal Operating Procedures QGA-1 (Large Line Break inside Cr;n ta inmen t ) an i QGA-2 (Sma l l Leak Inside Containment), and QGA-18 (Loss of Feedwater) .

7. Operating Procedures QOP 1000-5 and 1000-12.
C. Prercouisites g --.7 r *\ e t s'I q\ ../ g\7
1. Prior to ini t i at ing the repa i r programs and]rgcedurer-9ptl,ined ,jn y On-Site Review 82-05 and Work Request Package Ql'72 Mi,Ithit fol ic4nti I prerequisites must be satisfied:

a. An P C7 n OperatingEngineershallbeonsitFat"aTI'UFtercl dur.6 1
ing 31 - t his repair program. NOT VALID At- 1 ER l
b. The LPCI Mode of RttRS shall be operable,
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c. Both Core Spray subsystems shall be operable at all times,
() including the Core Spray pumps and valves constituting the injection paths being in their normal configuration.
d. Both the 1/2 .J 2 Diesel Generators shall be operable.
Technical Speci fication 3 9.E.2 (Diesel Generator preventative , maintenance for one and or e-hal f hours) may be applied during ) this clean up pipe repair period. !
e. A Condensate-Feedwater System flow path shall be available. l with pumping capability.
1
f. Suppression Pool water level within Technical Speci fi:ation limits (between -2 inches and +2 inches).

g. Contaminated Condensate Storage Tanks at sufficient levels to provide backup water to Suppression Pool for Core Spray and LPCI.
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h. Secondary Containment shall be in ef fect with both SBGT Systems '
operable and the capability for Reactor Building Ventilation,,
' j isolation in ef fect. - ~
i. Reactor water temperature being properly controlled utilizing the intermittent operation of the Shutdown Cooling tede of RHRS ( j~E in accordance with QOP 1000- 5, n @ , ,

j. Reactor water level shall be closely nonitored at all times during this repair program from all Control Room Reactor Water Level instrumentation. Normal Control Room inspection procedure.
Q05 005-2. shall govern this item, and procedure QOS 005-51 shall be used to document the normal routine level instrument checks. QyQ y ) e h .,kpRu>ux 4'30" M -t60" M .Atud .
k. The control switches on panel 902-4 for the Orywell floor and E q u i pmen t Drain Sump Pumps shall be kept in pull-to-lock, escent when the sumps are pumped evesy four hours, per procedures.
O p
3 Clamps for 6 inch ID pipe and freeze-seal equipment available. (q) I. Clamp assembly Installed to restrain 2 inch bottom vessel drain ! pipe to the 6 inch clean up lines. Clamp available that will cover up the 6 inch pipe sleeve assembly and weld F-6. Variu s other clamp and seal devices (straps, rubber, Devcon, etc.) i should be available as contingencies.
m. The itaster Electrician or Electrical Foreman will inspect the set up, installation, and arrangement of all welding machines.
The Operating Engineer will verify that the electrical load from the machines is compatible with present bus loads,
n. Communications will be established between the Control Room and the Drywell. Normal communications will be maintained using radios or the P.A. System. Backup communications are provided by the dial phones in the Drywell, and adjacent to the desk out-side the Drywell,

o. Radiation surveys and air samples taken to assure proper radiation exposure planning and management to keep doses Al. ARA. Shielding should be installed so that exposures are optimized and kept as low as possible,

p. The Shift Engineer shall be notified just prior to the initiation o f,we l d i n g,
,. m . . . t3
] b
q. Freeze-seal jackets in place for 6 inch pipe weld repairs.
addition, prior to initiating weld In overlay repairs, a f reeze plug shall be established ',- IN "'
.. 2'd_ J * .udtS.d M
2. Prior to starting welding on the non-isolable section of clean up .
system piping inside the Drywell, a detailed training session shall be held, and documented as per Attachmentt IA, 18, and IC:
a. Job Supervisory and Damage Control personnel shall be instructed on the condit ion of the Reactor, the level of water in the Reactor, the piping configuration with respect to the Reactor, and the implications of a leak in the system.

b. Job Supervisory and Damage Cont rol personnel shall be instructed in the organization outline and malfunction procedure given in Attachmen t 2.

c. Damage Control Supervisors shall be instructed on the use of the freeze seal equipment.
O
4 Md
d. Supervisory, personnel shall be instructed in the use of the fh pipe clamp devices.
J THE ABosj E f'REEEGV (S tTES ARE 90 tow.EPT EP 09 AWACHVAE NT 3 BY TME OPEE.AT i pCr Ep6R. D. Precautions I. Monitor Reactor . vater level throughout the repair period.
2. All personnel in the area of the repair will wear the proper protective clothing and respiratory equipment, as prescribed by Radiation Protection. The RCT on duty at the Drywell has responsibility to ensure radiation exposures are properly documented. The ALARA Coordinator shall evaluate the shielding ef fect iveness throughout the repair program, based on dose received and work conditions. Periodic air samples and area surveys shall be taken. Exposure approvals shall b4.
iri compl iance wi th QRP 100-1, Radiat ion Cont rol Standards. 3 St rict enforcement of and adherence to the Out-Of-Service procedure involving the Unit Two Clean-up System is necessary. E. Limitations and Actions
1. If during the repair, a critical step is in progress at shift change of the repair personnel, the critical path operation shall be completed prior to the shift change.
O 2- ^ s"i rt io9 s"eii de - inteinee ev a cosetz nt coco svaer isor Drywel1. Significant items should be logged, including tin , t the description, and any necessary corrective or supplementary actions taken. Status of the repair should be understood by all supervisory personnel. 3 Surveillance on plant systems and components in accordance with the Technical Speci fications is permissible upon concurrence with the Operating Engineer.
4. h umn L ecI, . ceu h,, m DG, o S 6c TS .A~.
N wAn @ TuL LCo.
~ % ~ *fW >
F. Procedure
% % 'ect d gi s N.e ,VFD
1. Per form the repai r program
-c in accordance with L th y 7k backage.' \y 2.
A to pipe leak mi t i ga te caused by the welding the c ,nsequences proc of a leak g h{i
.indu 4 t'Q)4 f
pol ik(ly.. '{ t{c.seve 6 inch r , occur on the line. a pipe clamp is availabIe to be installed on the line adjacent to the location of the weld deposit areas. leak, the following is to be performed:
-tt?V dipcpvgrvA p y { Q O . . 1
5
a. As quickly as possible, remove the welding apparatus from the
.b x_-
area.
b. Install the clamp over the leak and tighten down on the bolts sufficiently to slow down and stop tne leak. The water in the pipe will be at approximately 23 psig pressure (with 30 inches .
Reactor water level indicated).
c. Initiate malfunction procedure as per Attachment 2.

d. Using f reeze-seal equiprent, install freeze plug in line upstream of the leak using approved procedure.

e. Af ter leakage has stopped, remove clamp and continue with repair.
NOTE Water leakage of a minor quantity will flow to the Drywell floor drain sump. Routine pumping of the sump will keep it from overflowing. There will be no likely response on the . Reactor water level instrumentation for a small leak. 3 T^ " i t igate the consequences of a leak from the 2 inch bottom vessel drain line where it ties into the 6 inch clean up line, the following is to be perforced:
a. As quickly as possible, remove the welding apparatus from the O area.

b. Tighten down on straps to bring 2 inch pipe into the sockolet.
This should reduce the leakage.
c. Initiate malfunction procedure as per Attach-ent 2.

d. Steps will be taken to stop the leak.

4. Should a highly unlikely catastrophic failure occur that causes significant leakage that cannot be stopped, perform the following:

a. Initiate malfunction procedure as per A t t acnet e t 2. Isolate the Reactor Buildinq Vent System and STADT an SSCTS train,

b. Usinq the Condensate-Feedwater System, add .va t e r to the Acactor vessel as follows:
(1) START. or s c r i t ,- running a Condensate-Condensate Booster O wp.
12) Verif< Fee d,,a t e r Heater isolation salves are Or[N.
(3) OPEN a Feedwater isolation val.c. cither "0 3205A or so 32 05 B . g-) L., i l l
1 6 (4) Use low flow Feedwater Regulator A0-2-643 to control Reactor vessel level. l (5) Avoid water level drop to Group 11 Isolation / Reactor scram - level (+8 inches) or ECCS initiation level (-59 inches). (6) Pump water f rom the Suppression Pool to the Condenser Hotwell using procedure QOP 1000-12.
b. If a Condensate-Feedwater malfunction occurs, Core Spray or LPCI must be used to fill the vessel. Refer to QGA-18.
(1) Core Spray: (a) START es ther 2A or 2B Core Spray Pump. (b) OPEN injection valve MO-2-1402-25A/B to admit water to the vessel. (c) Core Spray injection valves cannot be throttled; there-fore, to stop flow, the pump must be shut off and then re-started to add water to the vessel again. (d) initiate redundant Core Spray 1. cop, if necessary, using above steps. h (2) LPCI: (a) On loop that is not being used for shutdown cooling, START an RHRS pump and OPEN injection valve t40-2-1001-29A/B. (b) Throttle flow using valve MO-2-1001-28A/B to maintain desired water level. START the other RHR pump in that loop i f cure flow is needed. (c) Initiate additional flow capacity by terminating shut-down cooling and starting up t igction loop. [ ' bg [edwadaM t i $ G. Checklists .. { 6.
.y > r\ RY
1. Attachivnt 1, ) l ,1 1

2. Attachment 2. Organization T ra i n i ng DocOutline.
umen t aPi t ion . ,l, H. Technica,1 Speci,fication c References \,. (,,0 AFTER
1. Section 1.1. 0. 1

2. Section 3 . 5 . F . , ../
3 SeJtion 3.7.C.1, i 1 .9 l l l i
3 1., vw 1
~
ATTACHMENT lA
n CECO Supervisory Personnel Training
.U for Non-Isolable Unit Two i
Reactor Water Clean up Pipe Repair
1. I have received training on the condition of the Reactor, Reactor water .
! level. Clean up Piping configuration, and implications of system leakage. ,I l l
! SIGNATURE DATE TIME
2. I have been instructed in the organizational outline and malfunction procedure.
SIGNATURE DATE TIME 3 I have been instructed in the use of the pipe clamp devices. S!GNATURE DATE TIME
4. I have instructed welders and fitters on the significance of the job and who to notify should a leak develop.
SIGNATURE DATE TIME lilSTRUCTOR DATE TIME APPROVED
'Tcgpo'ARY i- . 1 r, a 4 PROCU E# '
3AFTER t40 T \'",d
., 1 O
l 1 ,
)
l
9 GH ATTACHMENT IB TP
;O Ceco Damage Control Supervisory Personnel Training %) for Non-isolable Unit Two Reactor Water Clean-up Pipe Repair
1. I have received training on the condition of the Reactor, Reactor water level, Clean up Piping configuration, and implications of system leakage.
SIGNATURE DATE TIME
2. I have been instructed in the organizational outline and malfunction procedure.
SIGNATURE DATE TIME 3 I have been instructed in the use of the pipe clamp devices. SIGNATURE DATE TIME i O "- ' " ve eee" i"strectee om the ese or treeze-seei ea iame"t-SIGNATURE DATE TIME i i
'nSTRucToa PPROV2D TEMP- ' 0RY PROCELa:.t 163i NOT V.A L U AFTER n
v l 2 l 1
ATTACHMENT IC CECO Damage Control Mechanic Personnel Training O ror Non-Isolable Unit Two Reactor Vater Clean up Pipe Repair i
1. I n. ve received training on the condition of the Reactor, Reactor water '

l' v

I, Clean up Piping configuration, and implications of system leakage.
SIGNATURE DATE TIME
2. I have been instructed in the organizational outline and malfunction procedure.
i SIGNATURE DATE TIME , i 3 I have been instructed in the use of the pipe clamp devices. I SIGNATURE DATE TIME INSTPUCTOR DATE TIME i l i i I l t l t I t i ( O 3 (final)
be ATTACHMENT 2 Unit Two Reactor Water Clean up Systcm Repair - Non-Isolable Portion Organization Outiine Manpower Requirenent/ Shift , j Operating Engineer: l' SRO Job Supervisor: 1 Supervisor Damage Control- at least one supervisor (, I mechanic shall be at the Drywell - 2 supervisors and 2 mechanics i Radiation Protection: 1 RCT Others: (1) Authorized Nuclear Inspector (2) NDE Personnel (3) CECO Q.C. and CECO Q.A. (4) Welders, Pipe Fitters as necessary Malfunction Procedure If a malfunction should occur, the Damage Control Team should be promptly l notified. Fo r a snu l l leak, these personnel should enter the Drywell in rubber gear (if necessary) and administer the installation of the pipt clamp. They should then proceed to instail .he freeze-scal on the pipe if it is not established already. The RCT should dre ,5 up and enter the Drywell to O assess the leak from a personnel contamiration and exposure viewpoint. The Control Room should be not i fled of the pr oblem, who wi11 notify the Shift Engineer. The Job Supervisor should ass'st the Damage Control Team, and direct the need for further assistance. For a large leak, the Danage Control Supe rvisors and the RCT sMuld enter the 3rywell in rubber gear to assess the situation. Personnel should be evacuated from the Dry.eell in this case. The Control Room must be promptly notified to initiate Reactor water level restoration. The Damge Cont rol Supervisors and Team will determine the proper equipment and nunpowe r neces sary to stop the leak. They will then re-enter the Drywell and terminate the leak. The Job Supervisor W^ age Control Team personnel shall be trained in the ge qf )C[$gfs) ige Control Supervisors wiIi be trained on the use f.re dz e dal e uip, Ti. .i ' 1 ,:11 p.i , .; .. - gQg
,i.i ,., ..l. io AFTER s . . .(!
O I (final)
Operating Engineer Checklist for Procedure Prerequisites I I D AYf ' y ,
~ ~ *--l ~
i ITEM SHW T -l2 . '., i c. i t i2 ; io t la l { . 1 i
1. Oper Eng On-Site ! i I i . ,
i
2. LPCI Operable '
i I 4 ,
. I Both Core Spray Operable l 3 -
4. DG I/2 6 2 Operable ! -
i 5 Cond-FW Available I
6. Torus Level Normal .
i 7 CCST Level Nornal l l
8. Secondary Cont,in E f fec t !
i , I 9 SBCTS RB Vent isol Oper i i ' Rx Water Te mp No rma l i
10. I O 11 Rm Water Level Normal I
i i
12. Ow Sump pumps in PTL I * '
) (except during pumping) l : I i Clamps Available - 13 I
.m \*""f 70 t ' i i /d I
14. Freeze-scal Equip Available i e - n_ annoaRY j l$. WelJing Machine Setup inspected '
I l 3 i 'n -
} f) '$ l
16. Corinunications Estabtished ? sk
17 Rad Surveys t Air Sa ples Current ' _~1, - 1FTER mvi iS. sh ft Engineer I,forevd i 19 Ikmn.w .f.br! Pe r >onnel Te il ned 2.0 . CeJA4 N W j , [
%M O
M} ! 1 1 (final) l l
O M ., Q' .'. ' .fi O
n.
6- tuta Piet , ctAnp APPROVED TF~^/iPO 9 A RY PI L 1 :: :: 1 I O 'i V A l.. t ) At-1ER O
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i i _ PIPE CLAM 9' CLEVIS? yN. PtPE 2-12.66 2."A g38
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I CABLE L' AMPS ' .M,
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PlPE CLAMP
+ . .s. .
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( .) PIPE Z-/201-6"A 1- ' ec ,.N ED
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NOT VI..LlD AFTER j
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DAMAGE CONTROL LOCKER'INVENTO'RY : g-h:f,jh
>;s- .#.; . a . .
Ay".w:.?p
- -m4 . -
Skinne'r Pipe Clamps -7
;j;.i . .j.(2)v ,; . ., . .: . . ,.;a n u '
r,U .. Rockwell Full'l Circle-3 Bolt Clamp. c.(3) - . 2 .<.g.';
.y; l
7. ._ -
n. ,.'
Rockwel1 Elbow C1 amp-l Bolt (3)
's,... ,>+ .n.
Ff.d,* B" Dresser Full Circle Clamp ,. '. (1 ) ~
. M. ' . ,is 12" Dresser Full' Circle Clamp (1) ]..::.%.% . +.p],p Band-It Bander (1) J. 9.54 -?gg; ?
2" to 6" Adjustabl'e Restraint (1) -
. .' M' ' . '
Sleeve Clamp-(weld '125-F6 with Sleeve) (1) 1.
f. , ,.,-. '
,...,7,..
1/4" Band Clamps 2 Dozen l
, ,JJi c p 9.
I f t. Wide Rubber Gasket Material 1 Roll -f.y .:'44 -
~:

f. : W. .:.

4. ~ ~ -?,,ti i
1/4"' Thick Gum Rubber ~4 Sheets . ; t- }
1. . . .
Presstite Permagum-Plastic Duct Seal 2 Packages f C,~9 4,:,:- .
~ c. .
Duct Tape 6 Rolls '.', l O C-
. I Hiscellaneous Hand Tools '
i
. ('
I i T, i
*# e ag , .:p <q . . :- t ?f. . ' t ., '. ' .;^,
l i l APPROVEDY
- p.MPORAR ,
pr.c,r_m./mE
- - .. t. c. ;.,1 g y \/ t ,
O l i
Q*.P 300-3 T.evisior. 1
. r$
lflG A KE a A. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to outline the method to freeze se i .. pipe using jackets and liquid nitrogen (LN7 ).
3. REFERENCES

1. None.
FOR.RE..R. E. 0N!.Y
. PREREQUISITES
1. Before frec e scaling a pipe, tite normal operating pressure and t r: era-ture of the system should be reduced as low as possible in accors*:. .ne with the approved cooldown procedure. The pressure of the syste:
should be reduced to atmospheric and the pipe cooled to ambient t em:.e ra-ture. When it is impractical to attain atmospheric pressure and ambient temperature, the following maximum conditions shall prevail: i a. Ambient T.mperature - 110nF. 'l 0
b. System Vater Temperature - 200 F.
O c. neximum difrercetisi pressure across rr=e=e aiua: (1) Stainless Stect - 200 psi. (2) Carlon and Lew Alloy ; teel - O psi. (Pressure may be higbar with Maintenanc. E N n.:e i v a; - .
2. ttaterial and compiinents needed to freeze seal pi;c:

a. Adequate supply of liquid nitrogen (LN2 ).

b. Freeze chanbers of proper si=e.

c. Heat transfer cement (Ocw. Corning 340 heat sink ccmpound) er (Thermon).

d. 3/8" copper tubing with rubber refrigeration insulation and fittings,

e. Thermon.sters with remote bulbs (two or more).

t. Insulaticn to provide minimum two inches on cha..:acr.
9 Duct tape. 4PPROVED O h. Tools / supplies pursuant to Individual seal. SEP 1 ' '^73 . Q. C. c. O, p,
.. - .--- - _ . .,mm _ _ _ n. . _
4
. , '. le i 1 D. PitECUATIONS O 1. A man should be assigned to ccr.:rol cach freeze. Itc should hav. . . ,
other dutics.
2. The same man may control two frtczes If they are in elose proxicity and he has no other duties.
The man assigned a freeze r.:ust not leave his post. The foreman is
'3 responsible to provide a relief when required.
t
f. Precautions should be taken to protect both persc :ncl and material in the event that the Ice plug should be blown out of t! .: pipe, e.g. U.e.
freeze arca should be located to that a pipe cibv.s or bend lies b t.:.r.n the freeze arca and the location where the, pipe will be cut.
5. ' .use of its low temperature, liquid fl2 can destroy human tissue. '
Precautions must be taken to cover exposed parts of the body. h. r insulated (non po.ous) gloves, a face shield and protective clot:.Inj. ,
6. The work arca must be adequately ventilated to insure an oxygen content of at least 10t. by volu.ac.
E. LIMITATIONS AND ACTIONS l s e. , When two Ice plugs are to be u:.cd to isolate a sirgle pipe se: C l. they must be located greater ti:an 30 pipe-dict eters cpart. {
2. No freeze seal shall be applic1 less than 20 pipe-diameters frcm ..
closed valve or other component that blocks the flow -f exp.v:sien water as the ice plug forms. 3 The freeze arca must not incluce any fittings.
4. The pipe must be full of water before initiating t rceze scal sper::ica-:-
5 The ice plug must be completely melted before the pipe is restored t.. service, if it is not allowed to melt completely, pressure : a. ::. . .. l up in the pipe, or the ice plug may damage a ccc:;onent insid the ;. i ; - { if it breaks loose. ,
6. Freeze sealing carbon and low alloy steel. To insure against br'ittle fracture when f reezing water in carbon and low alloy steel pipe, the following must be observed:

a. The pressure in tne pipc -'"st be reduced to zero t,ciore a tteca:In3 a freeze seal.

b. The lowest temperature to which the material can be subjec:ed :s
-400F.
0 APPROVEC SEP 141978 Q.C.O.S.R. i m ~ _._ m....._-_ -
F.evision i
c. The pipe must be adequately supported (temporary pipe suppe-t , nay be used to supplement permanent pipe hangers), and must not be O sub; cted to env shock or impact rocces. l l
F, PROCEDURE
l. Filling Lfl2 t.ottics from main storage tank:

a. flotify Shif t Engineer prior to filling. [
l
b. The following safety precautions must be observed:
(1) Do not inhale gas vapors. (2) Personnel must wear gloves and entire arm must be covered. (Lisinld is at -3200 F; will boil at -2800F.)
c. Check level of main tank, i f below 50" H20, check with Hain-tenance Engineer before filling any bottles.
NOTE Level will drop approximately 2" H 2O for each 163 liter.(42 9allon) bottle filled. -
d. IIcok up t.attle to fill connection. (Inspect bottic for da:.nage).
Il0TE Main tant. supply is at 120 - 140f; bottle relief is set at 22#.
c. Open vent on bottle to vent 515. (Stay clear of vent and r :li-_f valve.)

f. Open fill valve an bottle (1 turn), then slowly cract open mi -
tank valve, (1/4 - 1/2 turn). i 9 Slowly feed nitrogen through bottle to cool it dcwn. ;
h. Fill slowly until level indicator shows full. Fill slow enough e,o that relief does not open'. (Keep bottle pressure between 15 - 20 pounds).
NOTE No. mal .perating pressure for these bottles is t0 psig. which is above main storage tank pressure of 140 psiq. so there is little danger of bottle qpPROVE bursting even if the 22 ps relief lifts. ' Q. C. o s, p. l
-c . , _ , . . _ _ _ _ . . .v m r e T .m .m . r,3. , . g , , o,-g,7. .,,,4 g y , ,,- ,;_,.._--
_ _ , _ , . , - - . - _ _ _ y _ _ _ _ - -- --
QMP 800-E P.evision 1
1. Close i111 valve on main tank, then close valve on bott!c and O aeicuiv iiscceeect riii do== ==xia9 ="r to de are:seri=e 'i'=
througli onnector before rc=cving. . J. Close v..it on bottle. . L. S ec u r e c.p i pn:.:n t . 111Y
2. Installatim of f recee Chambers
' VERT lCA1. !!OR 170.!iAL W
Y ' f.. N !/r M . 7 -
"[5117& /$UL0 f s/ --.[- '
1 " *
. .u ~ J' --- .d . 'f I
D.i l 3
&l.:~1' Lt.l3. 2 ULET O a .gv V a-t:0TES .
a. Ileat Ir n. et ev.npvund i:. applied to cover 1.D. of the ON.n'_;;
halvo l..iore installation en pipe.
t. C ha.abe r 1..lves are secured on pipe with exhausts at highet.t :. int l
using lio:.e clamps, band-Its, or cloth reir. forced tape. l Temper.iture bulb. are located 3/4" to 1" frca the char.ber, j
c. i

d. Chambert are inr.ulated with 2 layers of spun fiberglass and extends at least 6 inches beyond the chamber.

e. Uig piping arrangernent from bottle to chamber should be as follows:
APPROVED SEP 141978 i 1
.1, .
Q.C.O.S.R. , Os
1 i o
- ' cx? 8c0-8 F.evision 1 1
fBR REfEK. DUi D - l
" 6 .'9..:bys. c! n & ; .h.. I-_ .
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l'
.t.
U / C;*141f.si~- t Ltd2. 1-i do r n.c . I! f 0.~.TA'JT
a. Each sid.: of the cha:nber mu:.t have its own throttlin3 valve. .
O The ti.. i..t<ie .....nireid i. .ntionai. ir one is aat u:ee. the .
o. .
supply lii. i..> tt c..unn.. <! d i rec tly to a 1.r:2 bottle at Win /. .
c. Coonect Iine to a t.lf.UID valve on bcttle,

d. FraviJe ior Jdlt1.snal s.sS.eu;.C C.1pabiIity if are., I s no t ...; I '
ventilat.J. 3 LN F r e c.: t- 1.ntructions
a. Es tat.1 i =!.i.us a f r.:eze scal. .
(1) Op..n all valves in supply line te allow max.imum flow to . col c har.ibe r s . (2) Adjust thethrottlinhvalveforonesideofthecha.?berto eno.ilize the splashing and overflow between the two charnbers. Txcen one of the throttle valves open f ui t at eli times.) ' Us.' the root valve to control splashing / overflow frem bot. l ch..ehers sin.iltaneousiv. (j) wii. .i both t e.noc e..t ares a re les s th.1n -10 F . shu t the root valse A treeze is now established.
^PPROVED O 5-SEP i .' 1973 C. C. O. S. R.
* * .QHP 800-8 . - ,4;;j, ifie.
ev '9 '* l .
.- . . . . , .c . ..
psvisicn 1
b. Maintainisig a fre.:ze seal.
(1) When the highest tc.m rerature reaches -10 F, open the root - valve until both char-hers are overficwing with Lil2 or untilthe the lowest temperature is not lower than -l 00F, then stiut rest valve.
0TE 00 fl0T AITLMi'T 10_ "THROTTI.E" Ti!E Lfl2 TO t'.Al! TA!!~ A T EMPERAll':4t .
G. CHECI:ll5TS
l. Freeze Scal D.ita Sheet QMF S00-5fe.

2. Table For freeze Seals QMP S00-T1.
3 Freeze Seal Lo.3 qrtP CGO-55 H. TECH:llCAL SPECIFICATl0:1 REFERE!:CF.S
1. None.
o i i l
\
l l APPROVED SEP 141978 Q.C.O.S.R. O' (final) 1 l
. 1 ~
a--
q - - Gr4P 800-04 Revision 1 I FREEZE LEAL DATA SilEET August 1978 s d O* << .
l. PLA!!:ll flG This section rnust be completed before seal application for cach freeze
, location. - . o 2 1 3 l 4 i Location *:o. 1 Pipe Srcol .!;o. _ ) 1:cn. 5 * :c /.i nc h .;,) __
l Elev:ticq f ' I l l ' L Lc._,1c- < l li ' Vi; . : , o r 'e c I . ..__.. i I. i l ./. sci- . c : . c. .__. L _ _ s ____ i 88 Pip. 5-ont I a .;; : c t : v Re .ei rerec..G s : 5:'J.*T? 0F LO: S T ' '. * . . I,. , w C Vis. ' -- l'.0 i.J s u r c ? . *1! ". [ Pc.-*rsr.t Test f: <* fore & Af ter) (Rer,'d for Cic'. !) . I~_ \,' (Atte.ch all results) L c [ flaintain f ree:c b [ Tha.4 and re-freeze . C '
'J y Total Lil2 requirement, (ca'culatc) bud I
[ r:ake arran.g- n:s for chanc,: a rea an t Ra i a : i on P r o; a c t i c .' cc . c r.'v; .- Octails of it;TERitt OR BACi;t.:P 150LATl0:1
/~'N p' ,J t
V _ .- _ _ _ _ . 4
~ - APPROVEC u
SEP 1 t 1978 n (.) , (' n - s'
. .\;l ' ,,
QHP 800-54 t
- Revision 1 A. .
Initial wh.en complete. Cha.T.ber Ir.,s tallation. (to be completed by foreman). - O'II. c , tillTI AL C0!'PLETl0tl i~ 2 L 3 i 4 i ! Ld:ation lb. l 1
? -
g G l Pipe Spoo7 Inspection Ccmplete , j . . . j Temp. bulb location verifled . I i installed c insulated per -Dug. A . _ I
' Lill supply c er.haust inspected l ] Indicate r;}: anti ty of L!!2 on hand .
Verbal approvc3 to s tcrt f res:c(5) cbl.ained fror. SM f t Ensina.sr.
' / i Fortis:n Date _ T!ns , 111. Estohilsh ..d moln*.cin fre .1 per instructicas. . 's
1. Itainte,in ter.;er .ture 1c3 fc.* tich , loc : *o: (cttach).
\
2. 05tato verbal a. proval fre.m Shif t Engler.r to cpen systsm.
Dato T!rra
,g Fo re:r.:n _ ,
l'OTE: . thep Shi f t Er.;!r aer Inforr a.d of In*,tcliatirin or re .ovc! of br.ckv:s isolation, tha.iing and re-frcering; operations.
/* )
IV. When work is cc .plete, disa.sse&Ma frecie che-bars. i Initial sehen ec.mplete.. Itil,T I A'._C0!:P_1.F.T I 0:: _
, I 2 1 1 1. 4 l Location f.o. 1 ] , Pipe spool c1 caned
l e Pipe spool inspection complete -- s
, , insulation re-installed .
i i t Piping released for service ___ Free:c equip. returned to locker l F01FLifEsEM DNT ' T.
,x
IliPonTAtlT i
s use onl/ approved cleaning solver.ts to clean stainless stest piping. (Denatured Alcohol Acetone and Sovasol 15 are approyed for such tase.) l
'Q j V. Vork completed by: ,
Foreman Date ,
. ttechanic(s) i 1
1 APPRGVED
" (final) SIP 141973
l
....,. P i
I qKP 800-T1 - n Revision 2
. J,'.
() TABLE FOR FREEZE SEALS September 1978 *y,, ,
' h. , e '
Minimun time and refrigerant required for making freeze seals in horizontal or vertical stainless steel pipe. ., i : Pipe Min. Jacket , Size Length Min. N Min. Time ../ i (Inch) (Inch)* (Lbs.)2 (Min.) , j l. 4 3 6 l 1/2 to i 1 5 5 1-1/2 6 10 30 . l' 20 40 ! 2 7 - 9 40 50 ^- 3 fi 11 70 60 4
' APPROVED i
Jacket length is the dist"*f4*efbit or shop fabricated contalherr.' 4 feQDIAlif(Ndges mL 6 of the mask ng tapes .
R 1 6 ,9 2 * - NOTES: P(t)OCEDURE Freeze-sealing temperature and O time allowances vary with the NOP..tVAUlsrAGii3'th ear . (2) Time rkuir*Mritkare for tempera-tures (water, pipe and area) of J 700F. A longer time will be 1 ,
% when any of these t @ T. dh.ls w.J equired above 700F. ,
(3) Minimum amounts of N2 are for making the seal; amount does not include maintaining the seal. (4) Times are based on no ficw throuhh ' the freeze seal. { APPROVED i O
@/ $EP 1 t i1978
o. c. o. s. n.
i
-l-(final) t t .
l l
.~_ . - . . _ _ _ -
, 1 - .
s FORRETERECE 00 . enp 800.ss r. 1
--l - Revision 1 -
l FREEZE SEAL LOG . August 1973 -
)
Date - APPROVED
. l 1
tlork Request flo.
SEP 141970 l 1.ocation llo.
Q. C. O. C. R. Exhaust' Oppo.ite Er.hsus t 0l.posite 5:.t; Lust Op p:.$ i t;- T le.e End. End Time End End Time End End Teto. Tern. Temp. Temp. . Tc.m3 Teen.
' c i
l i 1 l _ . i ! I
# . i
h. . .!
l i. I
! 6 - u I
I
)
ll 1 . - . 140TES : ' t
1. Establish and r.ialntain f ree:c per written Instrinctions.

2. Rec,rd ter..uratiiro resd!ngs eva.ry 10 ninistes. -
3 t:ct i f y Forenan ti mediately i f ei ther ter p.:rature car.iot be r aintained belo..
+200T. .
O.5. oo aot troa : 2 det aen t"o ciosaa vaive'. Take frer,oent c=ygen readings. ::otify fore en if 0, percent..ge 7 decresses I I to 18%. Se: ore freeze and Icavu crea if 02 percentsoe decreases to 1&,. l is l ll (finall j
"5 id Description of Analytical Effort to Support Implementation '
[
)
of Temporary Pixes for Ouad Cities 2 .',' RWCU System Pipe Cracks . .- 2' 1.0 Pipe Sleeve > 1.1 Strength / load capacity comparison for fix versus original configuration 1.2 Stress analysis for region of temporary fix using axisymmetric thin t'nell of revolution mathematical model. 1.3 Loads applied to model taken from piping analysis of ' system performed for IE bulletin 79-14. . 1.4 Stresses from analysis compared to allowable stress values from ASME Code Subsection NC. 1.5 Analysis to assess atress and fatigue effects of differential thermal expansion between sleeve and pipe. (]) 1.6 Fracture mechanics analysis ef pipe to sleeve weld to evaluato susceptibility of weld to intergranular stress corrosion cracking. 2.0 Sockolet 2.1 Strength / load capacity comparison for fix versus ' original configuration. 2.2 Analysis to assess stress and fatigue effects of differential thermal expansion between sleeve and pipe. l 2.3 Fracture mechanics analysis of pipe to sockolet s1 cove weld to evaluate susceptibility of weld to intergranular stress corrosion cracking. t l 3.0 Weld Overlay 3.1 Strength / load capacity comparison for fix versus original configuration 3.2 Analysis to assess stress and fatigue effects of differential thermal expansion between pipe and weld overlay.
}
3.3 Fracture mechanics analysis of weld overlay to evaluate I susceptibility of weld to intergranular stress corrosion cracking. 1 1
i
I O -
Strength comparison of Temporary Pipe Sloove Fix Versus Original Confirguration original Temporary Quantity configuration Fix Wold Cross-Sectional Area 8.4 16.6 (in.2) Wold Homent of Inertia 40.5 90.8 (in.4) Sleeve / Pipe Cross sectional 8.4 13.8 Area (in.2) S1covo/Pipo
Moment of 40.5 105.3 l Inertia (in.4) l O
l
m
\ 'N. ? l 1
o . . ; l .] E of pipe .
& sleeve <p s, ,
1 I i t=0.432" - e o I o O t=0.5625" - + i
; 4 t=0.432" to 1
l i R=3.0965" R"3.9063" = Mathematical Model og pip,fgleeve Temporary Fix O
Piping Analysis Forces Used in Stress e Analysis of Temporary Fix l Seismic Maximum Force Thermal Gravity Combined
"[
o rf.cnt Component plus OBE I x
,1 ) -20, 423. 768. 1191.
Y 588. -90. 324, 912. (Shear) F z 153. 464. () (Shear)
-10. -301. -7344. -19,056. 16,368. 42,768.
(Torsion) My (Dending) 4260. -22,872. 16,680. 39,552. Mz 15,792. -13,500. 25,608. 41,400. (Dending) Notes:
1) Internal pressure of 1250 psi also used in stress analysis of temporary fix l
l l
I l l Stresses in Region of Temporary Fix Excluding Pice/ Sleeve Differential Thermal Exoansion Stresses Membrane Plus Membrano Bending l l Component i Calc. Allowable Calc. Allowable l l (]) Pipe 9.0 15.9 40.5 47.7 l 1 Sleeve 5.1 15.9 29.5 47,7 Weld 3.6 9.5 15.8 17.7 Notes
1) Allowable stresses for oipe an1 sleeve taken from ASME Subsection NC.

2) Allowable wold stresses based on a joint efficiency factor of 0.60 for shear and 0.74 for tension ,
l O
F
\
4 , l O O - Strength Comparison of Sockolet Sleeve Versus Original Conficuration l Original Temporary Quantity Configuration Fix at base 4.6 7.2 Wold Cross-Sectional Area - (in.2) at top 1.3 2.6 l Weld Moment at base 5.1 14.8 ! of Inertia O <in.4) at top o,9 1,9 i j l Sleeve /Sockolc t Cross Sectiona] Area (in.2} at top 2.2 5.2 S1 cove /Sockol.et at base 5.1 14.8 Cross Sectional h (in.4) NiftOf Let, m at top 2.0 5.6 l i l lO l
e 9 . O l l l l l l Strength Compraison of Weld Overlay Fix l Versus Original Configuration l l l
\
Original Temporary Ouantity Fix t Configuration l l O Cross Sectional Area (in.2) 8.4 11.2. 1 1 Moment of Inertia (in.4) 40.5 71.4 l l l l l l O
h rO m u-a og f@ H f.naakna wnnig , af,/e2 . e - W. Ax ch(%) W AKK4 cz y LW c p &_4M,mys vb f [S2(dp A~, ~ Osc/ cLle p f *.=.ve / .s
^"
e 9' Ja 2 nun Jway,< - G. 7c 4 J ,.u7n
' ?WH M*.- e. . . - . . _ _
04'W ge <,n-
,y . : : =~
W l O #/) l l February 2.1982 bJ5 Ltr. 782-147 TU: N. J. Kaltvisnekla 511B JF.CT: Ponntble Une of Dteeden Fuel Racks at Quad Citten Station Thte latter confirms Dresden Station *e support, if necessary, to ehtp used spent fuel storage racks. which are currently stored in our tin 1C 1 tuel transfer pool, to Quad Citice S tat ion. Dresden Station possesses a steel tr ansf er container of strong, tight construction ulth a h>1ted cover which wde designed and construct-ad to allow transfer of thene racks from the Unit 3 fuel storage f pool to the Unit I fuel transfer pool. We would use thte shipping con t a inst and carepeny transportation as an excluelve use c a rr ie r to tr a n s po r t tui racks at a time from Dresden to Quad Cities as taw Spectftc Activity (LSA) esterial. We cattmate t ha t the first ( O nhtpoent could be on the road to Quad C1t tes within 12 hours cf your notificatino of need. l Usins a conservative aneiraptinn of 16 hourn turnaround time. we project that 8 apont fuel racks could be delivered to Quad Cities within 64 hours from tour initial not i f ica t ion. A total of 15 racks are ava11shle for shipment to Quad Cities. Based on does rate esasurc=ents t.tken of the racke during ti.it trans-tot tros the Linit 3 pool to the Unit I pool, we are confident that the activity level of the rache is such that they con be ehtpped as LSA astertal. J
/ / (isGx)/1
D. h Scott S t at ton Super in t enitent Dienden Nuclest Power Station DIS /jsh cci C. Myttek File /Hi c. F il e / Num e r i c a l 1 l l l l
y' l O J.P-32-1 February 1, 13o2 TO: Larry Gerner Su tsJE CT : ALARA Re view of Repairs to Clean-Up Line on U-2 The following i s a suma r y of estimated hours and man-rem on the repairs to the U-2 Clean up Line, weld Number nelding by Hand Auto. Welding E;i pos u r e Hours Hours Man-Rem 125-FIA 24 0 21.0 125-F6 24 (20) 8 (3) 23 0 125-59 and 513 0 40 5.2 125-Fl2 24 0 33.0 0 82.2 I f t he f o l low i ng re comen da t i on s a re f o l l owed the above man- rem totals should be met. 125-F12 (24 hours) Repair Veld on 1201-2 Valve 4 R/hr ( contact with Valve l R/hr @ l' 850 mr/hr Working Oose Rate w/o Shielding General Area 200 - 300 mr/hr 1 1
1. The man not welding to remain in a shielded area. By doing this the man-rem would be 38, using 850 nr/hr dose rate.

2. Try to shield the valve body to reduce dose rate to 750 nr/nr.
The man-rem -ould then be 33 3 Try to shieId t he valve body to reduce dose rate to 450 mr/hr. The man-rem would then be 18.
4. ShseId four fout of the ver t e cal Iine below eIbow. The ran-rem estim.ite aas to en from #2 above.
de a Dwf :
' I S El0 ##!"# ~ , , , g r3 .2 - '"" = ,., ;. :_ " " '. , l i;e ers wowed it. O * ', g goeangjag ,y ass F, 77/t : f 'd 14.e
o wes un d o rt
'/ C O ' ) y- g,g
.e. . ?res J. V ,
- g, 1 Larry Cernc r February 1, 1)f2 () Page 2 125-59 and 510 (40 nours) ! . Velds on Elbow . ) Oose Rates: @ contact 2.2 R/hr, 9 l' I R/hr, 850 mr/hr working dose l rate w/o shielding General Area 100 - 150 mr/hr 1
1. Use lead shield enclosure to reduce exposure:
A - to 60 mr/hr = 7.5 man-rem for the joo B - to 5 mr/hr = 5.2 man-rem for the job The man-rem above inc lude s se t ti ng up we 'de r. The man-rem es t ima te was taken . f rom B above. 125-F6 Weld Sleeve 2 R/hr @ con ta .t i R/hr e l' 850 mr/hr working Dose Rate w/o Shielding Gene ral Area 100 - 150 mr/hr Automatic Welding (8 hours) O 1. The man using the welder should have a small lead blanket enclosure made to reduce exposure to 100 mr/hr or less.
2. The man setting up the we lde r should know how to set up welder as quickly as possible as no shielding can be done for this part of the job. The total exposure f or this job should be 3 man- rem.
This includes set up time. Hand Welding (24 hours)
1. When the hand welding is being dcne the man not welding should be in the enclosure used by the man that ran the automa t i c we lde r .

2. Rig chain f alls on both sides of the area to.be weiced, af ter automatic weiding i s comple te and cove r 3' to 4' of the line on eitwer side of the sleeve.
20 man-rem exposure -cold be requires, u.iles. .i.e sleeve reduce > dose ra te tiiereby seducing the an-ren. O
l
. 1 LJrry ve r r'e r F :t r var f i, s')52 O Pai; : 3 75 FiA ( .8 - hou r e, i W.: i d S N e ve or: 2" Line 3 R/hr e contact 1.4 Hihr & l' Working Do e Rate 750 mr/h w/o Shielding I. Shielding .hould be piaced on R.ri.R. Line, the vessel drain l i ne: ,
and the Reci rc. Line including the 48 valve.
2. By shielding to 600 mr/hr =
39 man-sem to 500 mr/hr = 34 man-rem 2 to :50 nr/nr . 21 man-rem 3 Build or find shieldec arca for man not we lding. I think we should shield to this level, s 4 John Piercy ALARA Coordinator JWP:mko O 1
. . . . . . . . . - = _ ) 4 // '
The following identifies actions which must be completed prior to proceeding with the Re.htor Water Cleanup System repairs and actions which must be taken , m n . folluwing the repairs. -] l i 1 4
1. Prior to starting sockolet weld repair, install mechanical restraint on ,
2" line. Verify accessibility and clearance for welding truncated cone sleeve in place. Recognizing space limitations, deconstrate capability _ l to minimize leak, should one develop, during the repair of the sockolet. ; e 1 3
2. Establish and maintain a freeze plug during the first l'8" thickness of l
-4 I
weld overlay on the flaw repairs for veld joint S-9 S-10, and F-12. : Maintain the equipment in place for the remainder of the weld repair such ,. that the freeze plug could be reestablished. - [5 l V l
3. Personnel designated to install the three types of mechanical cla= ping .,
;) .levises are to be familiar with and instructed in the installation of the -
4 2 devices, v
.,I r J i
1 4 P r e p.i r e , review, and approve all ;,rocedures to be used during the RWCU (r line repair prior to the start of work. This includes all Quad Cities )1 procedures included and referenced in the handout given to NRC at RIi1 1
?
on I.inuary 26, 1982. -} 4,
5. Welding ;>rocedures and welders are to be qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX prior to start of work.
3 A Mock-up studies, cetallurgical examinations and evaluations included l l in the handout for the fanuary 26 1982 meeting will be ce=pleted prior to : art of work on :he weld .>ver1.iys. 7
*s t
I i
7. Establish ANI concurrence and ASKE Code acceptability of all parameters of this repair. Also, assure all ANI hold points are O est 6ti hea-

8. Establish by use of instrumentation or mechanical devices the
' extent of distortion of each point of repair. Acceptability of any distortion will be evaluated prior to startup.
9. Mechanical clamping devices will be available at the work pla:e.
At least one supervisor shall be available in the repair area (may be outside of drywell) ready to install the clamp should a leak develop. ! 10. The capability to provide fuel storage racks shall be arranged for, such that, if needed, the racks can be inscalled onsite suel, that removal of fuel from the ore can commence following removal of the reactor head. O
11. tilt rasonically examine weld joint F-Il after the repair of weld joint F-12.

12. A complete summary of stress analyses performed will be available early during the morning of February 1, 1982. The summary will include as a minimum, a desc ript ion of the met hods and analys's being done, the load combina ions used, and the results of the analysis.

13. Communications will be established between the welding operator supe: visor 1
I and the control room during welding operations. l l () 1 1 l l l
. I i
14 The ir. board isolation valve 2-1201-2 will be chain locked to prevent inadvertent opening. The valve may be cracked to relieve pressure when g the freeze plug is established.
15. A!. ARA evaluation for the repair program has been performed prior to start of work.

16. Perform visual inspection of repaired sections of piping when unit is in hot standby.

17. Establish temporary procedures to be used during reactor operation to h,
, I require that if the volume pumped from the dryvell floor drain sump in l k
a 4-hour period exceeds the previous 4-hour p T.pdown by 240 gallons or a i more, drywell entry will be made to investigate and determine the cause , of t: ? increase. The unit will be shut down if the increase is determined to he caused by pipe degradation or if any of the limits in QOS 1600-7 are exceeded.
18. Update and submit to Region Ill, the summary of repairs document handed out during the January 26, 1982 meeting.

19. Per f orm a pump operabilit y t est f or CS and 1.PCI prior to start of repairs.

20. Dur ing t he repairs, the vessel water level will bc =aintained with all four ranges indicating the normal level. f i.
I i 1
RECElVED e-MET-585-82
) '82 2-17-82 Rourt A l Asst Supt ) _
H tot **"S' -
.g c t h ntenanr*l_ SYSTEM MATEAIALS ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT REPORT D Admen g1xh2 ON ~
i p.,sonn n_ ' ~4rTOR WATER CLEAN-UP SYSTEM, QUAD CITIES UNIT 2
- p .". /
un January 15, 1982, leaks were found in the Reactor Water Clean-Up S y s t e'n uJction pipinq at Quad Ci t ies Stat ion. Unit 2. A repair procedure was developed ahich required a technical evaluation of a mock up spool piece. As part of the technical evaluat ion of t he repai r, a s t ra irjht length of 6 inch schedule 80 type 30l* L stainless steel was welded to a 900 elbow of the same material. This spool piece (fiqure 1) was used to evaluate the feasibility of mechanized weldirq as well as to evaluate the quality of weld met al , and degree of sensitization f0051 in the heat affected Zone (HAZ) of the base metal. The we.hanized weldinq machine deposi ted a pad j inch thick 6 3/4 inches lonq over a pipe to elbow joint. Strinqer heads (approx. 1/12' thickl of type f9308L SFA $.9 A-6 filler -etal were deposited layer by laver to build up t h *=
. inch thich pad. Durinq fabrication of the spool piece. a 300oF maximum inter-pass temperature limitation was followed. To facilitate in completion of the "vick up, as well as to simulate expected 1 ield condi t i ons. The spool piece e s kept filled with water.
The , pool piece was radioqraphed prior to destructive examinatio" as ner ASME Section 3. The radiographs were reviewed by a level 3 inspector and deter-
.ne' to be in cor p l i ance wi t h the ASMI Section 3 standards.
The spool piece was sectioned lonqitudinal'y throuch the axis of symmetry. Four lonaitodiual st-ips were removed; two from the top and two from the bottom. The .t ins were ounted and polished for metallurgical examination. Practice A
*rns the ASTM A 262 spec i f icat ion was used to etch the samples and da* ermine the .feq ree of sensitilation l005). Fiqures 2 and 3 are typical ~'icrostructures de-pictind the 005, each of which are classified as acceptable structures per ASTM A 262 prat t ice A. Fiqure 4 is a photomicrocraph of an area away # rom t"e weld on %e pipe s i .te una*fected hs the heat of weldino. The area has an unsens+titeq . t ro ne.' ' . .al,t i.in vnealed structoro O
1 1 1 1
MET-585-82 Pace 2 Me.)sisremnt s we re made t o de termi ne t he depth of r ae t rat ion . Usino scrst case observations, a conservitive approach, the average depth of penetration is ) 0.050 .nr.hes. Fiqures 5 and 6 are photry9icrographs showing the deDth of penetra-tion at the toe of the pad weld on the pipe and elbow sides respeCIively. I Discussion F, Conclusion Desults presented above as well as observations made in the 'ield, inidicate t k.i t t he re is no de.aradation of the base metal as a result of the propos.ed repair p r ric e(!y r . I l O : i l l ( ' ,
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MrT-585-82 Page 5
'2M/D Deport on Peactor Water Clean-Up Systen. Quad Ci t ies Uni t 2 ,..<,z.,, ,r-,
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j MET-585-82 Page 6 SHAD Report on Reactor Water Clean-Up System. Quad Cities Unit 2 i i I7 yr.
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5 8. p -$v-+ h l N8S $M b~ e' INWInist.W -i
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-W A & ' (*'p l+b .- - ?, $ k..% '.5b $, .~ .Ay * , .. _ __ _ _ _ = - ^
_ _.N p w..,,"
... y..
II. ; '0 (' - Figure 5 . *
Figure 6 Both photomicrographs depict the depth of penetration. As can be seen, the pipe (fig. 5) and elbow (fig. 6) sides of the spool piece, average 0.050 inches.
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_ ___ _ ______ - . _ _ _ _ _ _}}

ML20050B348

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