ML19329F912

LER 80-006/01T-0:on 800617,during Safeguards Logic Test W/ One Emergency Diesel Generator Out of Svc,Auto Containment Spray Pump Actuation Threatened During Loss of Ac & high- High Containment Pressure.Caused by Personnel Error

ML19329F912
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	06/30/1980
From:	Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19329F907	List: ML19329F906 ML19329F912
References
LER-80-006-01T, LER-80-6-1T, NUDOCS 8007110349
Download: ML19329F912 (3)

Text

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tUL%CJCO' U. S. NUCLEA~J i.EOULATCRY COMMISSION (7 77)

, . LICENSEE EVENT REPORT j

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F 8 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB A8LE CONSEQUENCES h 10121 l On 06-17-80, a routine safeguards logic test was conducted with one l

[ o l a l l emergency Diesel generator out of service for maintenance. On the morn-l o 4 Iing of 06-18-80, it was discovered that fully performing this test l l o i s t l could have defeated automatic containment spray pump actuation during a l 1oisl l loss of AC and a high-high containment pressure. Spray pump automatic l lO lil f actuation was defeated for only about one minute during the test. This l 1018i l event is reportable per Technical Specification 15.6.9.2. A.6. l 7 8 9 80 OE CODE SU8C E COMPONENT CODE SUSCODE SU E l0l9l 7 s lS lB l@ @@ l Xl@ lI lN lS lT lR lU l@ gg l Zl@

9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEOUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION

_EVENTYEAR R EPOR T NO. CODE TYPE NO.

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10 l 0 l 0 lU l 34 lYlg 41 lNlg lNlg lWlIl2l0lg 43 42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h li t o i l The event was caused by personnel error in that a technician failed to l L'i'J l verify that both Diesels were operable before performing the test.

Pet r,-j r; y 21 l sonnel have been instructed to verify precautions on test procedures i

g l before performing any test. All routine testing of the inservice j i 4 l Diesel safeguards train will be deferred when the other is inoperable. l 7 8 9 80 ST S  % POWER OTHER STATUS Dis O RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION E [E j@ l 1 l' 0 l 0 l@l N/A l g gl Test Review l

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7 8 9 to 68 69 80 3 NAME OF PREPARER C. W. Fay Phot <E: 414/277-2811 2 sootu0349 -. -

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ATTACHMENT -TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 80-006/OlT i Wisconsin Electric Power Company -

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2 4 Docket No. 50-301

-At 0805 hours0.00932 days <br />0.224 hours <br />0.00133 weeks <br />3.063025e-4 months <br /> on June 18, 1980 it was discovered that a routine safeguards logic test was conducted on -

June 17 with one. diesel.out-of-service for annual maintenance.

To perform this test, certain safeguards signals must be rendered ineffective so the logic test.can be conducted. Signals. tested  ;

j include "A" and "B" steam line low pressure, primary system low pressure, containment high pressure, and containment high-high

. pressure. The.first four signals are for initiation of safety

injection and any one of them will initiate safety injection.

{ As discussed in the Technical Specifications, there is an inherent

, redundancy between.these four signals in that a loss-of-coolant accident will cause both low primary system pressure and high containment pressure. A steam line break will cause a low steam

~line pressure, a low primary system pressure, and also a high containment pressure if the steam line break is within containment.

! The containment high-high pressure signal is for initiation of

! containment spray. Curing logic testing, each one of these signals

),

is defeated one at a time for about one minute each.

With the 3D emergency diesel generator out-of-service,

, the "A" train is rendered ineffective during a loss of AC accident. With the "A" train. ineffective, the associated safety injection train and containment spray pump will not start upon I

receiving' a start signal since there is no power to the train.

] The "B" train, however, would ~be energized Dy the 4D diesel during i a' loss of AC. The associated safety injection train would have t started on a LOCA or steam line break even if one of the four j associated signals was defeated because of the redundancy. However, i

. the "B" train containment spray pump would not have started if the j

!- containment high-high pressure signal was defeated. This would 1 i

mean that neither spray pump would have operated automatically, although two containment fan coolers would have been energized upon a safety injection signal. The spray pump, however, can be manually started.upon or before a containment high-high pressure

-alarm. Also, the spray pump would have started automatically

, upon unblocking the high-high pressure signal if such a condition existed during and subsequent-to testing of that signal logic.

l

. To cope.with a' loss-of-coolant. accident, the FFDSAR assumes availability of two' fan coolers and one spray pump. The analysis assumes the spray pump and fans are started 60 seconds (vs. 10 and.30 seconds respectively in the safety injection  ;

' sequence) after occurrence of a LOCA. A taximum pressure of 52 )

to 53 psig is predicted vs. a containment. design pressure of 60-psig. .i i

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.. .+ .a . . - - . - - _ _ . - . . - -- - ,,,.-,-

Based on this' fact, rendering the high-high containment pressure signal ineffective for about one minute would yield a sequence '

of events very similar to that analyzed in the FFDSAR.

l The eveet was caused by personnel error. A technician -

failed to verify that both emergency diesel generators were operable before performing'the test. The test procedure contains a precaution stating that if one diesel is out-of-service, the safeguards train associated with the in-service diesel should not be tested. To prevent recurrence of this event, personnel have been instructed to verify all precautions on test procedures prior to performing any test. Also, all routine testing of the in-service emergency diesel generator safeguards train will be deferred when the other diesel is inoperable.

l l'

This event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.6 in that personnel error could have prevented initiation of containment spray for the short time the containment high-high pressure signal was defeated. The unit was at 100% power at the time the test was conducted.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event at about 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br /> on June 18 7.nd the " red phone" notification i: was made at about 0902 hours0.0104 days <br />0.251 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.43211e-4 months <br /> ene same day.

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