ML20012C721

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LER 90-003-00:on 900214,discovered That Train B Fuel Handling Bldg Exhaust Air Filter Outlet Damper Would Not Open.Caused by Wiring Error Due to Failure of Technicians to Follow Work Instructions.Technicians counseled.W/900316 Ltr
ML20012C721
Person / Time
Site: South Texas STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 03/16/1990
From: Ayala C, Vaughn G
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-003, ST-HL-AE-3403, NUDOCS 9003230116
Download: ML20012C721 (5)


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b The Light companyS uth Temas Project Electric GeneratingP. Station O. Bos 289 Wadsworth, Temas 77483 Houston Lighting & Power March'16, 1990 ST-HL-AE-3403 File No.: G26 10CFR50.73  ;

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk

-Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-499 Licensee ~3 vent Report 90-003,Regarding-an Inoperable Fuel' Handling Building Exhaust Filter Due to a Wiring Error Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) submits the attached Licensee Event Report (LER 90-003) regarding an inoperable fuel-  !

handling building exhaust filter due to a wiring error. This event did not have any sdverse impact on the. health and safety of the public.

If.you should have any questions on this matter, please contact

.Mr. C..A. Ayala at (512) 972-8628 or myself at (512) 972-7921.

G. E. Vaughn y 1 Vice President Nuclear Operations BEM/n1

Attachment:

LER 90-003 (South Texas, Unit 2) l l

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South Texas Project Electric Generat ng Station File No. : C26 p8Se 2 cc:

Regional Administrator, Region IV Rufus S. Scott Nuclear Regulatory Commission .

Associate General Counsel 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Houston Lighting & Power Company Arlington, TX 76011 P. O. Box 61867 Houston, TX 77208 Coorge Dick, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission INPO Washington, DC 20555 Records Center 1100 circle 75 Parkway

.J. I. Tapia Atlanta, CA 30339-3064 Senior Resident Inspector c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie Commission 50 Be11 port Lane P. O. Box 910 Be11 port, NY 11713 Bay City, TX 77414 D, K. Lacker J. R. Newman, Esquire Bureau of Radiation Control Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. Texas Department of Health 1615 L Street, N.W. 1100 West 49th Street Washington, DC 20036 Austin, TX 78704 D. E. Ward /R.-P. Verret Central Power & Light Company P. O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 J. C. Lanier Director of Cencration City of Austin Electric Utility 721 Barton Springs Road Austin,'TX 78704 R. J. Costello/M. T. Hardt City Public Service Board P. O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296 Revised 12/15/89 14/NRC/

... . ,e-e NRC form 386 U S NUCLtu L ti.ULJ TOa7 COMMIS$10N APPROVED 0448 NO 3100 0104

, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) '"*'a's al e F ACILtTV NAME 11) DOCKif NUMDin tal PAGE '3' South Texas,' Unit 2 016 I o 101014 l 919 1 lOFI 013 An Inoperable Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter Due to a Wir1Tm Error.

$ VENT DAf t ISI LE R NUMet R tel REPORT DATE 471 OTHE R f ACILifit$ INVOLVED let MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR "$$ 4 n ,$ MONTH DAY YEAR 8 Acitif v NAMas DOCKE T NUM9tR:56 0l6l0l0l0l [ ]

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0l2 1l4 90 9l 0 0 l 0l3 0l 0 0l3 1l 6 9h 016101010ill THIS REPORT 18 SutMlYTf D PURSUANT TO THE R$OUIREMENT$ Of to CFR l ICwe eae er more of ,e renowreef till 64004 W 20 402ft) - to 4061st to.73 eH2Hivl 73 TIM R to 406teH1H4 50 38teHit 50 73.eH2itel 73.711el (101 11010 to 40*ieH'Hiii so.s .H2i

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMSIR ARE& COOL Charles Ayala - Supervising Licensing Engineer 5 ; 1, 2 9 ;7 i 2; i 8 g6 p l8 COMPLETI ONE LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT F AILUR$ DESCRISED IN THIS RtPORT 1131 MA C n t OR T A E MA C- PityOR T A E ,

CAUSE SYSTEM COM*0NENT CAU$6 SYSTEM COMPONENT I I I I I I I I I I i i I I l l l 1 l l 1 l l l 1 l I I SUPPLtMENT AL REPORT E XPtCTED (14: MONTH OAV vtAR SUSw$$ ION TtE II. ver cemeten $K91CTWO Sv0wsstON DA TEJ NO l l l A. T R ACT ,L.-, M , m . . ,,,,e.-.,. ,s .y. -. ,,,..~~. ...u o e i On February 14, 1990, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. At approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, a control room operator discovered that the Train B Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Air Filter Outlet Damper would not open. At j_ approximately 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br />,-during troubleshooting of this condition, a wiring error was discovered which had disabled the damper actuator. The wiring error was corrected and the damper successfully tested at 1950 hours0.0226 days <br />0.542 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.41975e-4 months <br /> on February 14, 1990. The cause of the wiring error is unknown; however, it is believed that maintenance technicians failed to follow work instructions

!' during the performance of a preventive maintenance activity. The technicians i have been counseled regarding procedure compliance and a training bulletin

[ regarding this event has been issued to maintenance personnel. As a result of a previous event, HL&P has performed a review of the implementation of the station's procedure compliance policy. An action plan for enhancing procedure compliance has been developed.

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0 l0 012 0F 0 l3 7 xT w - . < -*ac s ass.u nn DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On February 14, 1990, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. At approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, a control room operator discovered that the Train B Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Exhaust Air Filter Outlet Damper would not open.

At approximately 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br /> during troubleshooting of this condition, a wiring error was discovered which disabled the damper actuator. The wiring error was corrected and the damper successfully tested at 1950 hours0.0226 days <br />0.542 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.41975e-4 months <br /> on February 14, 1990. Upon turther investigation, it was determined that the wiring error occurred during a preventive maintenance activity on January 28, 1990. Technical Specification 3.7.8 prec.ludes operation above Mode 5 for more than seven days with one FHB filter train inoperable. The NRC was notified of this violation at 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br /> on February 15, 1990.

An investigation of the cause of the wiring error was performed. It was determined that the damper stopped operating sometime after January 26, 1990, when the last operability test was performed. The only maintenance activity performed after that date was a damper controller calibration on January 28, 1990. This calibration did not require the lifting of any leads, no lifted leads were documented at the time of the calibration and the technicians involved did not recall lifting any leads. No damper operability test was specified or performed since the preventive maintenance activity, if performed correctly, should not have affected the configuration of the actuator wiring. No other activities were identified which could have resulted in the wiring error.

CAUSE OF EVENT:

No specific cause for the wiring error has been identified, however, it is believed that technicians may have failed to follow preventive maintenance work instructions and failed to follow procedural requirements for documentation of lifted leads.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Operation of the plant above Mode 5 in excess of 7 days with one train of the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filtration System inoperable is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.8 which is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B). The redundant 100 percent capacity FHB Exhaust Filtration train was not affected by this damper inoperability and was available to perform the system's required safety function during this time.

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0l 0 0l3 0F 0l3 terv <a a.m. e w ne w Nac w w w nn CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The following-corrective actions are being taken as a result of this

' event:

1. The technicians involved have been counseled regarding procedure eompliance.
2. A training bulletin has been issued to Maintenance personnel regarding this incident and the need to follow procedures.
3. Failing to follow approved procedures was identified previously in Unit 1 Licensee Event Report (LER)89-017. Contained within this LER was corrective action to review the implementation of the station's ,

procedure compliance policy with regard to employee understanding and i management enforcement. The review has been completed and an action I plan for evaluating and enhancing procedure compliance has been developed, j i

Additional Informations i

The following previous events have been reported regarding failure to ]

follow work instructions: i LER 89-013 (Unit 1) Unplanned Engineered Safety Features Actuation of the i I

Fuel Handling Building HVAC Due to Personnel Error LER 90-001 (Unit 1) Engineered Safety Features Actuation Doe to Loss of Power to a Radiation Monitor Relay 1

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