ML17309A416
| ML17309A416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1979 |
| From: | TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17261A806 | List: |
| References | |
| TR-3454-1, NUDOCS 8901100417 | |
| Download: ML17309A416 (108) | |
Text
A TELEDYNE ENGINE="RING SFRVICFS 7mCi-j>j)C~A~ RE~ OP7 TR-3454-1 A S ME SECT) ON X) FRA CTURE hlECHANlCS EVALUAT)ON OF lNLET NOZZ~M INSERV)CP.
NSPEC ) ON. INDICAT)QN
~.
R.E. GINNA UNIT NO. 1 REACTOR VESSEL MARCH 15 1979
t
ROCHESTER GAS ll( ELECTRIC CORPORATIOi'l 89 EAST AVENUE ROCHESTER, NY 14649 R.E. GIf'lilA UNIT NO. 1 REACTOR VESSEL TECHNICAL REPORT TR-3454-1 ASHE SECTIOf'l XI FRACTURE HECHANICS EVALUATION OF INLET NOZZLE INSERVICE
. Ii'lSPECTIOi'l IffDICATIOff i~1ARCH 1", 1979
)ii TELEDYNE ENGli4E=~lNG SERViCES 303 BEAR HILL ROAD
'P/ALTHAiYi, MASSACHUSETTS 02154
TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT
- 1. 0 INTRODUCTION
2.0 CONCLUSION
3.0 DESCRIPTION
OF VESSEL AND REPORTED FLAW 4.0 COMPARISON OF GINNA-1 REPORTED FLAW WITH PREYIOUSLY EVALUATED FLAWS 5.0 MATERIAL PROPERTIES 6.0 PRESSURE - TEMPERATURE LIMITS 7.0 STRESS ANALYSiS 8.0 FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH 9.0 FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSIS AND CRITERIA 10.0 ELASTIC - PLASTi'C ANALYSIS APPENDICES A. STRESS ANALYSIS B. EF"=CT OF FLAW SiZE AND TOUGHNESS VARIATiONS C. E"FFECT OF APPLIED STRESS VARIATiONS D. ELASTiC - PLASTIC EVALUATION A4-3
ENG',NEWlRG SERVICES ABSTRACT I
The Inservice Inspection indication of a near mid-wall flaw in the reactor pressure vessel inlet nozzle N2 has been evaluated in accordance wi th the requirements of Section XI of the ASHE Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The reported flaw satisfies the Code criteria for acceptance by eval-uation. Therefore, at least with respect to this indication, the vessel
.is acceptable for service as is without removal or repair of the indication.
\
1.0 INTRODUCTIOH R.E. G>nna Unit Ho. 1 is a Westinghouse PWR which went into commercial service in June, 1970. The reactor pressure vessel, constructed by the Babcock 6 Wilcox .Company was. subjected to an Inservice Inspection in accordance with Technical Specification and Section XI of the ASHE Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements. When certain alleviating factors are not considered, an ultrasonic indication in excess of the size permitted for acceptance by examination was identified in the weld which attached an inlet nozzle to the vessel.
In support of other approaches being followed by Rochester Gas and Electric personnel,. Teledyne Engineering Services (TES) was requested to,eval-uate the reported indication in accordance with the Section XI requirements vestigations~
for acceptance by evaluation. This report contains the results of that in-A4-5
Z.O CONCLUSIONS 2.1 The reported flaw satisfies the Code criteria for acceptance by evaluation, so is acceptable for service as is without removal
~ ~
or repair of the indication.
2.2 For the reported flaw, of dimensions:
Through-wall depth = 2a = 0.93 inches Len th = I = 5.3 inches Eccentricity = e = 1.0 inches, the calculated stress intensity factor is 9.2 ksi ~in. The Code acceptable value is 63.2 ksi /in. Therefore, the total factor of i 21.7 as corn ared to the code required factor of safety of ~10: 3.16.
2.3 The effect of variations in flaw size or toughness of the material can be determined rom Figure 1. Based upon the results plotte a flaw of through-wall dimension 2a = 4.0 inches, would 'hereon, variant.
satis y Code acceptance requirements even if the toughness we. o reduced zo 67 ksi v in.
The e f -"
of ons in app1 i ed stress across the 7 (aw can "e det .mined =rom Figure 2. Based upon the results plot-.ed therein, tne repor- d flaw, Za = 0.93 inches, would satisfy Code acceptance require:-;.-=. ts even i= the applied stress across the flaw were equa; to the yield strength of the material, or 51 <si, whichever is lower. Stat d differently, the calculat d pressure sLress actiing across the flaw could be increased by a factor in excess of 6 wi-;noui violation of the Code criteria.
2.5 An elastic-plastic fracture mechanics analysis, following the methods applied by Dr. P. C. Paris as a consultant to NRC to a similar investigation indicated that:
- a. The factor of safety against plastic instability failure is in excess of 3 for a flaw through-wall dimension in excess of 2a = 4 inches.
= 4 inches,
- b. For a flaw through-wall dimension in excess of 2a yielding can occur and residual stresses, such as those which result from weldin ,'nd discontinuity stresses, such aq those which result from tern erature differentials or from pipe reaction stresses, would be eliminated from consideration. Although this evaluation results in the conclusion that such stresses may be ignored, such stresses were considered in the evaluations which lead to the previously listed conclusions.
2.6 The previous MCAP-8503 ASHE III, Appendix G analysis was reviewed to determine if the pressure of the reported flaw requires a re-e!aluat:on of the Appendix G requirements. It is a conclusion of this review that the Mestingnouse evaluation of a postulated flaw in the vicinity of an outlet nozzle represents a mucn more signi-f;:cant situation than does the reported flaw. Tnerefore, accepz-abiiit of the postulated outlet nozzle flaw ls fu1tner confirmac'.on
,of the acceptability of the reported flaw.
A4-7
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3.0 DESCRIPTION
OF VESSEL AND REPORTED FLAW The Ginna Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Yesse 1 (RPV) was fabricated by the Babcock 5 Wilcox Company (85W) to the requirements of Section III of the ASt<E Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code in accordance with Westinghouse Electric Company (W) Equip-ment Specification Ho. 676206 Revision 0 with Addendum 676554, Revision 0. The RPV Stress Re orts're B8W 1966, Reports Numbers. 1 through 12.
r The inside diameter, to the inner surface of the cladding, is 132 inches.
The minimum clad thickness is 5/32 inches. The wall thickness is 6 1/2 inches at the beltline and 9 inches at the nozzle course. The nozzle course contains two 52 1/2 inch outside diameter inlet nozzles, two 49 inch diameter outlet noz-
'les and two nominal 4 inch diameter safety injection nozzles. The inlet and outlet nozzles are at a- common el'evation.
A sketch of the inlet nozzle is shown in Figure 3, with the dimensions of configure-ion the weld preparation on the OD of the nozzle sketches above. This is mportant because it locates the reported flaw. Figure 4 shows the inne. por-tion of this weld prepa. ation with the reported flaw lying along the line AC.
The reweld pr paration dimensions are defined on a radial plane through the vessel cen-erline (= = 0' 360'). Since the weld oreparation is machined cylindr cally with the nozzle centerline, the radial dis-ance be-'.veen the inside of the
.esse.
preparation land varies with radial position ~ . The flaw is loca-;ed and -he weld be-ween 305' 9 < 316.5", approximately the 10:30 o'lock position wnen look':ng along the nozzle centerline from outside of the vessel. Figure 4 indicates :~e radial distance from the RPV ID to Point D as varying between 4.2 and ..1 inches.
The reported flaw "through-wall"dimension measured along the weld prepa.ation re-is 0.93 inches. For purposes of analysis,Section XI permits this flaw to b olved into a "throuah-wall" dimension measured perpendicular to the vess'el sur-face which would decrease the 2a dimension, Because of the complex geometry, the cir-advantage is not taken of this factor. The flaw length, measured around cumVerence of the weld preparation as the distance between 305'nd 316.5's 5.27
ENG)NEER)NG SERVtCES inches.Section XI defines the flaw eccentricity as the distance between .the flaw center and the vessel midplane. The distance from the vessel ID to the flaw center varies between approximately 3.55 and 4.47 inches. Conservatively neglecting the increased thickness resulting from the outer nozzle corner radius, therefore taking the total thickness as 9 inches; the eccentrici ty varies between approximately 0 and 1".
8ased upon the above discussion, and noting that an increase in eccentricity increases the calculated stress intensity factor, the flaw is defined for pur-poses of analysis by the dimensions:
pa
= 0.93 inches 1 = 5.3 inches e = 1.0 inch
I lay
A ENGINEERING SERVICES 4.0 COMPARISON OF GINNA-1 REPORTED FLAW WITH PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED FLAWS For purposes of examining pressure-temperature limitations, WCAP-8503*
considered the effects of a flaw adjacent to the outlet nozzle. Although there
~ $N are differences in geometry between the inlet and outlet nozzles, the stresses are very similar. This evaluation considered a surface flaw in a plane passing through the RPV centerline of depth equal to 1.8 inches {a/t = 0.20) and surface length of 1,8 inches {aspect ratio of 1:6). Since a surface flaw of' given length and depth results in approximately the same stress intensity factor as does a subsurface. flaw of the same length and twice the through-wall dimension, the WCAP-8503 evaluation is equivalent to thai which would be obtained for a mid-wall flaw of 2a = 3.6 and 1 = 10.8 in the same orientation...In fact, the WCAP evalu-
'I ation would be very conservative because the surface is subject, to discontinuity stresses which have but little effect near midplane. Of even more importance, however, is the diffe. ence in orientation between the two flaws. The indicated Ginna flaw is circumferential to the nozzle and the WCAP flaw is radial to the nozzle; therefore, the pressure stress normal to the WCAP flaw is about thre times as large as t. at normal to the Ginna indication. The. efore, the indic't d Ginna flaw is of considerable less significance than the nozzle flaw used for the Appendix G evaluation of ihe Ginna vessel The mid-wall, nozzle attachment weld flaw most similar to that indices d in Ginna-1 which has been subjected to extens ve investigation by TES and by the
- HRC is the indication in the Pilgrim-1 recirculation inlet nozzle NZB which was first detec.ed in 1974 and wnich was reevaluated in 1976 by both TES and HRC.
The significant parameters may be compared as follows, using the Pilgrim values evaluated by TES:
WCAP-8'03, "ASME III, Appendix G t Analysis of Rochester Gas h Electric Corporation R.E. Ginna Unitt Ho. 1 Reactor Vessel, July 1975.
A F Ei~jNEER)NG SERVICES Plant: 6 irma-I ~PI'I rim-1 Depth, 2a, in. 0.93 1,5 Length, 1, in. 5.3 5.2 Eccentricity, e, in.. 1.0 0.55 Hoop stress in vessel, 16.5 16.2 ksi(at operating pressure)
Yessej thickness 9.0 7.0 5.2 10. 7 The NRC evaluation assumed somewhat more conservative parameters. Soth the TES and HRC evajuations concluded thaw the Pilgrim-1 RPY was satisfactory ior continued service. Tne calculated stress ntensi y =actors for GInna-1 woutd be expected to be much smaller than those computed =or Pilgrim-l.
Sased upon these iwo comparisons with previously evaluated flaws, one wouid judge thai the Ginna-1 vessel would easily satisfy the Section Xl cri ria =or acceptance by evaluation.
A4-11
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5.0 HATERIAL PROPERTIES values publ i shed in WCAP-8421*, the unirradi a ted ma teria 1
~ 4
~
Based upon the -
properties of the nozzle, using outlet nozzle data, and of the weld, using beltline weld data, are as follows:
Location RTNDT Cy Shel f, ft-1 b Nozzle 0. 09 60 125 Weld 0.23 80
',f 0
18 The computed end-of-life fluence at the nozzle elevation is 1.08(IO) at one-quarter thickness. Using Regulatory Guide 'l.99, Revision 1, the end-of-life properties are computed as:
Location NDT Shelf, ft-lb Nozzl e 60 112 Wel d 70 62
!I, in WCAP-8503 has used an upper shelf KlIR = 200 ksi ~n.
The Sect-ion XI toughness versus temoerature curves are plotted in Figure =
for an end-of-life RTi'=
s Ul 70F.
" 'iCAP-8421, Analysis of Capsule R From the Rochester Gas and lectric Corporation R.:. Ginna Unit No. Reactor ilessel Radiation Surveillance Program, November, 1974.
1
I 6.0 PRESSURE - TEMPERATURE LIMITS The upper limit of the Technical Specification heatup and. cooldown curves are also plotted on Figure 5. Because these limits are controlled by the .higher fluence beltline region, full'operating pressure, ZZSO psig, is not permitted below 315F. This temperature is on the toughness upper shelf by a margin in excess of 100F.,
)> TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES 7.0 STRESS ANALYSIS The significant stresses acting across the flaw indication are those due to vessel pressure and due to welding residual stresses. At the near mid-wall location, thermal stresses and stresses resulting from pipe reaction effects are negligible.
The pressure stresses of interest are those acting in a radial di rection with respect to the nozzle. In the main shell course away from the nozzle, the operating pressure of 2250 psig causes a hoop stress equal to 16.5 ksi and an axial stress equal to 8.3 ksi. The presence of the nozzle reduces the radial stress, sine at a radius equal to the nozzle bore radius the stresses must be equal to -2,3 ksi, I
where'the negative sign indicates compression.
In the course of evaluating similar flaws in other vessels, a very simple stress calculation technique was found to give excellent answers for the pressur memorane stress across the flaw. Specifically, the values obtained with th sim-ole approximation may be compared to other solutions as follows:
!!ethod S imp 1 e approx ima t-:. on 0 8 membrane 30 finite element C 8.7 inner surface 10.3 mid-wall outer surface 20 axisymmetric model, doubled 7.7 inner wall 10.0 mid-wail Thi 5 s lmpl e approximat ion is used in thi s eval uation . in order to obta in the pressure stress acting normal to the F') aw, as contained in Aooendix.A.
>< TELEDYNE EiNGIREERNG SERVICES The residual stresses used in this evaluation are a conservative approximation to those measured in a heavy weldment after post-weld heat treatment*. These data indicate that the residual strssses vary through the thickness with a cosine relationship from 8.0 ksi tensile on the surfaces to 8.0 ksi compression at mid-wall. Despite coniirmation of the presence of compressive residual stresses at midwall by removal of a similar flaw to the one under consideration in a RP'J. Ho credit is taken for these compressive stresses in this analysis. Instead, the residual stresses are considered to vary as a cosine function through the thickness with 8.0 ksi tensile on the surfaces to 0 ksi at the center.
Previous evaluation of a recirculation inlet nozzle in a BtlR, which is sub-jected to larger temperature changes than is the subject PHR inlet nozzle, indi-cates that thermal stresses are not significant as long as the flaw does not approach wi thin about 1 1/2" from the inner surface, This is true during normal and abnormal operations because the inlet nozzle and the adjacent vessel are suojected to the same temperature transient and are similar in thickness. Tnere-fore, thermal stress effects are not considered to be of importance in the range oi ilaw sizes considered, 2a <4 inches.
Pipe reaction stresses in ihe weld region are primarily bending stresses varying irom tensile ai one surface to compressive at the other. Since the re-sorted ilaw oi inte. est is near mid-wall, pipe reaction stresses across the taw are '.'nsignificant.
As a result oi this discussion, the only stresses used in the fracture mechanics analysis of Aopendix 8 are those which result from internal pressure and the weld r'esidual stresses. Since the resulting stress intensity factor is very low, a question often arises as to the consequences of an error in the cal-culated stress. For this reason, an additional evaluation, Appendix C, is made for the indicated flaw dimensions giving the stress intensity factor which would be
'computod for arbitrary values oi membrane stress acting across the flaw.
D..'. Ferr'.'(1 P."". ~uhl and D.R. l1iller, ".'4easurement o7 Residua 1 Stresses in a q sr "e '6 e'lT. ';te'd.,'na ~puma I Resea, cn UDDlemenr., tlovemoer i "co A4-15
)< TELEDYN EZG;XEERIXG SERVICES With respect to Faulted Conditions, the inlet nozzle provides the path for injection flow for about 40 minutes following a LOCA. For the first 20 seconds the flow is from the safety injection accumulators at a temperature of 90'F.
At that time the safety injection pumps are started and deliver 155F fluid from the boric acid tanks. At 140 seconds following LOCA initiation the flow trans-fers to the refueling water storage tank and the water temperature drops to'60F.
At the end of 40 minutes flow switches to the containment dump and flow is at a minimum of 140F, The reactor pressure drops to near zero immediately following a LOCA.
The other Faulted Condition of concern is a Large Steamline Break Accidenl (LSBA). Following a LSBA the reactor coolant temperature end pressure rapidly decreases. When the pressure descreases below 1450 psig, flow from the boric acid storage tanks enters the vessel at 155F. Safety injection terminates ten minutes after the LSBA.
Flow during these events is through the inlet nozzle and down the vessel.
Because the nozzle and vessel are of about the same thickness, but small the.mal discontinuity stresses result. Analysis of similar transient in other nozzles indicates thermal stresses across the weld of less than 5 ksi. Since the pressure nas decreased, the total stress intensity factor, for the Faulted Condition is, smaller than that calculated during normal operation. Therefore, postulatee sur-fac flaws in the vessel beltline region are more limiting than is the reported nozzle weld flaw.
A4-16
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Ei~tNEERIRG SERY}CES 8.0 FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH Because of the operating characteristics of a PWR, the inlet nozzle temperature variations within the power range are negligible. Even when coolant temperature 'changes do occur, the nozzle and vessel respond similarly in that thermal discontinuity stresses are negligibl'e in the vicinity of the reported flaw. Skin-type thermal stresses may be significant at and near the inner surfaces, but not in the vicinity of the reported flaw.
Therefore the only cycle of importance to growth of the reported flaw is pressurization and depressurization. For the reported Flaw, the aK for pres-
.surization to 2500 'psig, the design pressure, is only 8.7 ksi. An. For a subsurface flaw, Figure A-4300-1 predicts a fatigue crack growth rate of 8(10) in/cycle for pressurization to 2500 psig. Therefore no fatigue crack growth is predicted. l
EiM NEERjl4G SERVCES 9.0 FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSIS AND CRITERIA The linear elastic fracture mechanics methods of Appendix A,Section XI of the ASME Code are used. These methods are conservative, but are not overly conservative in the absence of steep stress gradients as is the case in this solution.
The acceptance criteria used are those based on applied stress intensity factor as contained in the Summer 1978 Addenda to Section XI of the ASME Code, IWB-3612. These criteria are identical to those used in the Pilgrim-1 evalu-ation, although at that time the criteria were referenced to a June ll, 1974 letter from ASME to Boston Edison.
10.0 ELASTIC - PLASTIC A!HALYSIS Attachment 4 to the!'(RC Staff Evaluation of the 1976 Pilgrim-1 ISI results, dated April 21, 1976, summarizes an elastic-plastic Fracture Mechanics Analysis performed by Or. P. C. Paris as a consultant to NRC. Appendix O to this report contains an elastic-plastic analysis applicable to the Ginna-1 situation which follows Paris'lternative secondary stress computation method. Also considered is the maximum ilaw size which would result in retention of a factor of safety of burst of at least, three.
This analysis i.ndicates that a flaw through-wall (2a) dimension in exc ss of 4 inches is required to 'reduce the factor of safety below 3.0, using an analysis which assumes a very long flaw. In addi tion, this analysis shows that any residual or secondary stresses wnich are present in the structure will be eliminated by yielding as long as the flaw depth (2a), is less than a nu;.-
be. in excess of 4". That is, weld residual stresses, thermal stresses and pipe reaction stresses need not be conside. ed in evaluating the vesse! saic-y if 2a < 4 inches.
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a ATTACHMENT 3 SCOPE OF ULTRASONIC EXAMINATIONS OF THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL WELDS
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The following is a listing of mechanized ultrasonic ezaminations of the reactor pressure vessel welds and adjacent piping welds. These examinations willinclude 1/2T base material for vessel welds and 1/4 inch base material for piping welds. Also shown are the anticipated ezamination angles and the direction of the beam component.
The lower head is forged and has no meridional welds and the shell courses are ring sections with no longitudinal welds. In all cases the goal is to examine 100% of the weld plus 1/2T each side of the weld. Examination of 100% of the weld length is the goal also for the circumferential vessel welds even though 74/S75 Section XI only requires 5%. Interference from other vessel components may limit the desired ezamination coverage. Ifthis was the case in previous ezaminations, it has been noted. A complete discussion of the individual ezamination area coverage wiQ be provided in the final report of the ezaminations as required by Regulatory Guide 1.150 Rev. l.
Mech UT examinations willbe performed on the reactor vessel welds and selected reactor coolant piping welds from the inside surface utilizing the PaR ISI-2 Device and SwHI Fast PaR equipment. Ezamination areas include vessel circumferential, nozzle-to-shell, and nozzle piping welds.
The Mech UT ezaminations of the RPV willbe performed in accordance with the requirements of the 74/S75 Section XI and Reydatory Guide 1.150, Rev. 1.
N a) "RPV Shell and Head AVelds
- 1) 0-degree longitudinal wave (UTOL) examinations will be performed for detection of laminar reQectors which might affect interpretation of angle-beam results.
- 2) 0-degree longitudinal wave (UTOKV) ezaminations will also be performed for detection of reflectors in the weld and base material.
- 3) 45-degree and 60-de~ ee shear wave (UT45 and UT60) ezaminations will be performed for detection of reflectors in the weld and base material oriented parallel to the weld.
- 4) 45-degree and 60-degree transverse shear wave (UT45T and UT60T) ezaminations willbe performed for detection of reflectors in the weld and base material oriented transverse to the weld.
- 5) In the case of the RPV welds, SwRI 50/70 tandem search units v% be used to ezamine to a depth of approximately 2.25 inches for detection of reQectors in the clad-to-base metal interface area and also in the volume between the examination surface and the depth of the first Code calibration reQector.
These dual-element tandem search units develop an interactive beam with longitudinal
'wave propagation and produce an ezamination with significantly improved signal-to-noise ratio over conventional near-surface techniques.
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b) RPV Nozzle Areas The inlet, outlet, and safety injection nozzle-to-vessel welds willbe examined from the bore utilizing 15-degree (for inlet nozzles), 10 degree (for outlet nozzles) 10-degree (for safety injection nozzle) and 45-degree beams for detection of reQectors in the weld and base material. In addition, UT45T and UT60T ezaminations willbe performed from the shell inside surface for detection of reQectors oriented transverse to the weld and base material. These transverse examinations vrillutilize a computer to control the X-Y-Z movements of the PaR
. device to assure accurate positioning around the nozzle during ezaminations. 50/70 tandem search units wiH be utilized from the bore and shell inside surfaces for detection of reflectors located in the clad-to-base metal interface region and also the volume between the examination surface end the Qrst Code calibration reQector for the purpose of satisfying the requirements in Section XI.
c) Piping Welds Nozzle Pi in Welds For the inlet safe end-to-nozzle welds, a UTOL scan willbe used for detection of reQectors which might affect interpretation of the angle-beam results. UT45 and UT 60 scans willbe used for detection of reQectors parallel to the weld from both sides of the weld. A UT45T scan will be used for detection of reflectors oriented transverse to the weld. The acoustic properties of the inlet elbows preclude ezamination from the elbow side; therefore, a UTOW scan will be performed in addition to the scans identifled above.
Limitations are expected around the vessel support lugs, safety injection and inlet nozzles due to the proximity of these components. Other limitations are listed.
I. Circumferential welds Estimated time - (2.5 shifts)
Ring fory'ng-to-lower head weld (RPV-E)
Ezamination area Angle Beam Component 0- 360 0,45,60,50/70 up/dn 0- 360 0,45T,60T,50/70T mv/cd Lower sheD-to-ring forging weld (RPV-D)
Ezamination area Angle Beam Component 0- 360 0,45,60,50/70 up/dn 0- 360 0,45T,60T,50/70T cw/ccw Limitations due to prozimity of core support lugs @
0 from (344.20 - 15.90) CG-1 90 from (74.20 - 105.80) CG-2 180 from (164.20 - 195.80) CG-3 270 from (255.25 - 284.75) CGA Intermediate sheD-to-lower shell weld (RPV-C)
Ezamination area Angle Beam Component 0- 360 0,45,60,50/70 up/dn 0- 360 0,45T,60T,50/70T mv/cd
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Examination area Angle Beam Component 0- 360 0,45,60,50/70 up/dn 0- 360 0,45T,60T,50/70T cw/ccw II. Upper shell region area (A) Estimated time - (3.0 Shifts)
A. Flange-to-upper shell weld (RPV-A) from shell Examination area Angle Beam Component 0- 360 0,45,60,50/70 up 0- 360 0,45T,60T,50/70T cw/cd B. Outlet nozzle-to-shell welds (N1A), (NlB) from shell Examination area Angle Beam Component nozzle (0 - 360) 0,45T,GOT,50/70T nv/cd C. Inlet nozzle-to-shell welds (N2A), (N2H) from shell Examination area Angle Beam Component nozzle (0 - 360) 0,45T,GOT,50/70T cw/cd D. Safety injection nozzle-to-shell weld (AC-1002), (AC-1003) from shell Examination area Angle Beam Component nozzle (0 - 360) 0,45T,60T,50/70T av/cd III. Upper shell rey'on area (B) Estimated Time - (1.5 shifts)
A. Flange-to-upper shell weld (RPV-A) from seal surface Examination area Angle Beam Component 0- 360 18, 11, 4 dn B. Vessel support lugs'mmination area Angle Beam Component Vessel support (RPV-VSL-1) 0,45,60,50/70 up/dn Vessel support (RPV-VSL-1) 0,45T,60T,50/70T nv/cd Vessel support (RPV-VSL-2) 0,45,60,50/70 up/dn Vessel support (RPV-VSL-2) 0,45T,60T,50/70T cw/ca,v A 1-3
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IV. Nozzle inner radius, integral mention and nozzle bore Estimated time - (3.5 shifts)
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Examination area Angle Beam Component Outlet A (N1A-IRS) 10,45,50/70 To Vessel C/L cw/ccw Outlet B (NlB-IRS) 10,45,50/70 To Vessel C/L cw/cmv Outlet A (N1A-IE) 50/70 To Vessel C/L Outlet B (N1B-IE) 50/70 To Vessel C/L B. Inlet nozzle inside radius region Examination area Angle Beam Component Inlet A (N2A-IRS) 50/70 cw/cmv Inlet B (N2B-IRS) -
50/70 cw/cd C. Nozzle-to-sheD welds from nozzle bore Examination area Angle Beam Component Inlet A (N2A) 15,45,50/70 To Vessel C/L nv/cd Inlet B (N2B) 15,45,50/70 To Vessel C/L zv/ccw D. Safety injection inside radius region and nozzle bore Emmination area Angle Beam Component Safety injection A(ACr1003-IRS) 0,10 To Vessel C/L Safety injection B(AC-1002-IRS) 0,10 To Vessel C/L Safety injection nozzle integral nxension Ezamination area Angle Beam Component Safety injection A{AC-1003-IE) 70 Av Safety injection B{AC-1002-IE) 70 Wv V. Nozzle-to-piping welds Estimated Time - (3.5 Shifts)
Elbow-to inlet nozzle welds Ezamination area Angle Beam Component Inlet A (PL-FW-V) 0,45,60 Away from Vessel C/L Inlet B (PL-PV-VII) 0,45,60 Away from Vessel C/L Inlet A (PL-FKV-V) 45RLT nv/cd Inlet B (PL-FW-VII) 45RLT cw/cnv Inlet A (PL-FW-V) 45RL To Vessel C/L Inlet B (PL-FW-VII) 45RL To Vessel C/L
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B. Nozzle-to piping welds Examination area Angle Beam Component Outlet A (PI PW-II) 0,45,60,45T,60 Away from Vessel C/L Outlet A (PL-FW-Il) 0,45,60,45T,60 To Vessel C/L Outlet B (PL-FiV-IV) 0,45,60,45T,60 Away from Vessel C/L Outlet B (PI FW-IV) 0,45>60,45T,60 To Vessel C/L C. Safe end-to-nozzle welds Examination area Angle Beam Component Safety injection A(AC-1003-1) 0,45,45T,60 Away from Vessel C/L Safety injection A(AC-1003-1) 0,45,45T,60 To Vessel C/L Safety injection B(AC-1002-1) 0,45,45T,60 Away from Vessel C/L Safety injection B(AC-1002-1) 0,45,45T,60 To Vessel C/L D. Piping-to-safe end welds Examination area Angle Beam Component Safety injection'A(AC-1003-2) 0,45,45T,60 Away from Vessel C/L Safety injection A(AC-1003-2) 0745,45T,60 To Vessel C/L Safety injection B(AC-1002-2) 0,45,45T,60 Away from Vessel C/L Safety injection B(AC-1002-2) 0,45,45T,60 To Vessel C/L
SCHEDULE OF MECHANIZED EXAMINATIONS FOR R. E. GIHHA RPV Days On Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 ~==Vessel anination Areas Shift 2 [ 1 2 I
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RPV-A, H1A, N18, H2A, HZB, AC-1002,
& AC.1003 Upper Shell Region Area Welds (8)
RPV-VSL1) RPV-VSL2(
& RPV-A Nozzle Inside Radius Sections and Integral Extension Outlet A (H1A-IRS,- IE)
Outlet 8 (N18-IRS,-IE)
Inlet A (H2A-IRS)
Inlet 8 (H28-IRS)
Safety injection AC.1003.IRS,-IE AC 1002 IRS,- IE Piping Melds ----X Elbow co Inlet Nozzle A PL-FM.V 8 PL FM;VII Outlet Nozzle to Pipe A PL-FN-II 8 PL-FM-IV SI Safe End to Nozzle A AC-1003-1 8 AC-1002 1 SI Pipe to Safe End A AC.1003.2 8 AC-1002.2
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