ML18018B898

Elimination of Arbitrary Intermediate Break Points in Main Feedwater Sys.

ML18018B898
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	02/13/1985
From:	CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML18018B897	List: ML18018B896 ML18018B898
References
NUDOCS 8502200162
Download: ML18018B898 (47)

Text

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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ELIMINATIONOF ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE BREAK POINTS IN THE MAIN FEEUWATER SYSTEM 8502200162 8502i3 DR A~~~~

T t F'DR (1083PSA/mf)

<v CONTENTS I. Introduction 1 IIO Scope 0000010100000010000101000000.0000..1.000000100000001.0000.00. 1 III. Summary of Proposed Changes ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ t~1~~~~~~~~~~~~1~~~~ 1 IV. Justification ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 Ao Safety 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t~~~~~~ 4 B. Technical Justifications ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ 4 CD Economic ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 6 Vo FSAR Revisions o.......o...o....o.oooooooo.oo.oo....o..o..o.ooooooo C

8 APPENDICES A. Provisions for Minimizing Stress Corrosion Cracking in High ....... 9 Energy Lines B~ ,Provisions for Minimizing the Effects of Thermal Vibration ........ 10 Induced Piping Fatigue C. Provisions for Minimizing Steam/Water Hammer Effects .............. 11 Do Provisions for Minimizing Local Stresses from Welded Attachments .. 12 E~ Final Safety Analysis Report Changes .............................. 13

~ V (1083PSA/mf)

I. Introduction Shearon Harris has been designed in accordance .with the guidance provided in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Branch Position papers MEB 3-1 and APCSB 3-1 (Standard Review Plan 3.6.2 and 3.6.1).

Consequently, breaks in high energy piping* have been selected on the basis of stress levels in the piping and at the terminal ends. The resulting consequences of these breaks including pipe whip, jet impingement and environmental effects have been factored into the layout, selection and design of components essential for safe shutdown.

This report explains why relaxation of NRC guidelines for the postulation of intermediate high energy pipe breaks is warranted for Shearon Harris. Specifically, we provide justification for eliminating arbitrary intermediate breaks** and their accompanying effects when the piping stresses and Cumulative Usage Factor (Safety Class 1 piping only) are less than the mandatory break selection levels identified in MEB 3-1. This relaxation will result in a safer, less congested plant and significant cost savings both in the near term during the final stages of construction and throughout the operating life of the plant.

II. ~Sco e This report covers high energy, Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category I portion of the Main Feedwater piping system in the Containment and Auxiliary Buildings. Figure 1 depicts the boundaries of this system.

III. Summary of Proposed Chan es Elimination of the arbitrary intermediate pipe breaks results in:

A. A reduction of 15 breaks from consideration.

B. Elimination of 7 whip restraints. Table I lists the deleted pipe whip restraints.

C. Numerous components throughout the plant including pipes, tubes, conduit, duct, etc., need not be routed to avoid these eliminated jets or designed to withstand the jet loads. This applies not only to components being installed prior to commercial operation, but also to new components added throughout the 40 y'ar operating life of the plant.

• High Energy Piping Piping systems which, during normal operating conditions, exceed 200'F and/or 275 psig.

• • Arbitrary Intermediate Breaks Break points which are selected to meet the minimum number of breaks as called for in Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1. These points are below the break selection stress level of BTP MEB 3-1 ~ .

(1083PSA/mf)

4 CONTAlN MENT SOU t4DAR'f WALL 4"

AFW'TEAM AU X FKEQ GKN PUMP II FROM 'TURt 1NK DRLVK STM GEH AFW PUMP HP FFK HEATKR F W HEADER STEAN GEN FKKD PUMP MAlN FE.EYEWATER AUX FPE.DWAt'E.'R CAROLlNA, POWE.R 4 LlGHT COMPANY gHPQROQ }(Qgg1& NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PIGURE 1 N1A1H AND AUXlLIARY FEEPWATBFt

&YSTQ~ XBOUNE)AR1F &

TABLE I DELETED PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS Restraint No. Location R-FW-13-4-20S C/B R-FW-13-R-21CM C/B R-FW-17-R-8S C/B R-FW-17-R-9CM C/B R-FW-17-R-10H C/B R-FW-17-R-llS C/B R-FW-17-R-13S C/B C/B Inside Containment Building (1083PSA/mf)

IV. Justification A. Safety Elimination of the 7 whip restraints identified in Table 1 will facilitate access during operation, maintenance, and inspections with resulting reduced radiation exposure.

Additionally, there will be reduced potential restricted thermal movement and unanticipated restraint of piping due to thermal growth and seismic motion.

B. Technical Justification The following items provide generic technical justification for the elimination of arbitrary intermediate pipe breaks and the associated pipe whip restraints which are required per Standard Review Plan 3.6.1 and 3.6.2.

1. The operating procedures and piping system designs minimize the possibility of stress corrosion cracking, thermal and vibration induced fatigue, and water/steam hammer. Detailed descriptions of the design provisions for these .phenomena are provided in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively.

2. Melded attachments are generally not located in close proximity to the breaks to be eliminated. Consequently, local bending stresses resulting from these attachments will not significantly affect the stress levels at the break locations (refer to Appendix D).

3~ Pipe breaks are postulated to occur when the stresses (both primary and secondary) or cumulative usage factor (0afety Class 1 piping only) exceed arbitrarily selected values. This is explained more specifically in FSAR Sections 3 '.2.1.1.2 and 3.6.2.1.1.3. The arbitrary intermediate breaks to be eliminated all exhibit stresses and/or usage factors below these conservative thresholds. An example of typical stress levels for high energy piping on Shearon Harris is given in Figure 2 ~

4. Pipe rupture is recognized as a rare event which may only occur under unanticipated conditions.

5. Arbitrary intermediate breaks are only postulated to provide additional conservatism in the design. There is no technical justification for postulating these breaks. These breaks are selected at points which are less than 80% of the acceptable stress range and 10% of the Cumulative Usage Factor allowed by the industry standard: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,-

Section III.

6. Elimination of pipe whip restraints associated with the arbitrary breaks will facilitate in-service inspection and reduce heat losses at the restraint locations.

4 (1083PSA/mf)

I o 1.0 .8 ITS Sh+ SA)

R-HCS-118-2 R-HRC&5<

HRI SR~F4 HRI SR~.330 R-HCS-118-1 R-HRCAS-3 HRI SR~.302 HRI SR~.341 O .5 R-HCS-83-7 R-HRCAS-2 I ~ HRI SR~475 HRI SRR311 R-HCS-83-4 R-HRC-45-1

.4 TE SR .157 TE SR.202

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VALVE VALVE IL'o O

In IC RI lU NODE POINTS 2CS3-83SN-1 1CS3-118SN-1 IRC3<SSN-1 Anendnenc No. 9 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Carolina Power & Light Company FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CONTAINMENTBUILDING PLOT OF PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS REF. IIO.r CVCS 5 RC PIPING CALO.IIO:. FRA.W.C$ .0010 IC~ FIGURE XEA0. FICURE SEA 10. FIOURE SEA RCALC FIGURE 3.6A 8PLOT A FIGURE 2. Example from the FSAR of a typical chart for safety class piping showing stress levels relative to break selection stresses. I

7. Pipe break related equipment qualification (EQ) requirements will not be affected by the elimination of the axbitrary breaks. Breaks are postulated non-mechanistically for EQ purposes.

8. No restraints have been deleted which are required to maintain the stresses in the break exclusion region below the levels prescribed in Branch Technical Position HEB 3-1.

9. Additional whip restraints added for this additional "layer" of conservatism may reduce rather than improve plant safety. This has been demonstrated in "Effects of Postulated Event Devices on Normal Operation of Piping Systems in Nuclear Power Plants,"

NUREG/CR-2136, Teledyne Services, 1981.

C. Economic The elimination of these 7 whip restraints, which are designed to protect against the effects of arbitrary intermediate breaks, results in significant immediate cost savings by reducing construction tasks. Xn addition, there will be savings realized from other sources including:

o No review required for jet impingement effects from these 15 arbitrary bxeaks. This is applicable prior to initial operation and fox subsequent additions to the plant.

o Final shimming of restraints to the required gaps is both labor and time intensive. Further, for some systems shimming cannot be performed until after hot functional testing, and final verification can be made only subsequent to fuel load. By reducing the number of xestraints there will be a corresponding decrease in cost and construction activities during what is primarily a final testing period.

o Reduced heat loss due to better insulation of the piping at points where whip xestraints are deleted. There would also be a concurx'ent x'eduction in building cooling costs.

Table Il summarizes the economic benefits that will result from the elimination of the bxeaks.

(1083PSA/mf )

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TABLE II

SUMMARY

OF BENEFITS RESULTING FROM THE ELIMINATION OF ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE PIPE BREAKS ON SHEARON HARRIS MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM

~Cate or Benefit 1~ Design, material, and erection costs $0 ~ 1 Million.

associated with elimination of arbitrary intermediate breaks.

2. Relief of congestion, improving access 29 man-rem reduction for operation, maintenance and ISI. $ 0el Million (man-rem plus other costs).

3. Improvement in overall plant safety Elimination of potential for (NUREG/CR-2136). restricted thermal movement.

4. Reduction in the required arbitrary Future benefits.

intermediate breaks to be considered in future plant modifications.

5. Reduced heat loss at restraint locations. Not quantitatively assessed. Insulation can be installed on piping at current locations of arbitrary intermediate break pipe whip restraints.

(1083PSA/mf)

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IV. FSAR Revision Appendix E identifies draft changes to the various selections of the FSAR which require revision due to the elimination of the arbitrary intermediate breaks. Upon NRC approval, a FSAR amendment will incorporate these changes.

(1083PSA/mf)

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PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZING STRESS CORROSION CRACKING IN HIGH ENERGY. LINES Industry experience has demonstrated (NUREG 0691) that stress corrosion cracking (SCC) will not occur unless the following cond1tions exist simultaneously: high tensile stresses, susceptible piping mater1al, and a corrosive environment. Although any stainless or carbon steel piping will exhibit some degree of residual stresses and material susceptibility, Carolina Power 6 Light Company minimizes the potential for SCC by choosing piping material with low susceptibility to stress corrosion and by preventing the existence of a corrosive environment. The material specifications consider compatibility with the system's operating environment (both internal and external), as well as other materials 1n the system, applicable ASME code requirements, fracture toughness characteristics, and welding, processing, and fabrication techniques.

For the Main Feedwater System, ferritic type carbon steel has been the choice for the piping, fittings, and valve bodies forming the pressure boundaries.

This ferritic material has been found satisfactory from the standpoint of non-susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking for the service conditions encountered. The secondary systems of PWRs are not made of stainless steels; therefore, the problem of stress corrosion cracking as reported in stainless steels does exist in secondary systems at Shearon Harris.

The piping involved in the elimination of arbitrary intermediate breaks will be cleaned externally and flushed as part of the pre-operational test program. The piping will be flushed with demineralized water subject to written criteria for limits on total dissolved solids, conductivity, chlorides, dissolved oxygen, silica and pH. Flush water quality w111 be monitored daily. The flushing will be controlled by detailed procedures.

Water chemistry for pre-operational testing will be controlled by written specifications.

During plant operation, primary and secondary side water chemistry will be monitored. Contaminate concentrations will be kept below the thresholds known tn be conducive to stress corrosion cracking. The major water chemistry control standards will be included in the plant operating procedures. Process fluid oxygen concentrat1on in stainless steel piping is expected to be less than 0.005 ppm during normal power operation, thereby further minimizing the likelihood of stress corrosion cracking. Operating water chemistry guidelines for secondary side piping are given in Table 10.3 '-1 of the FSAR.

(1083PSA/mf)

APPENDIX B PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZING THE EFFECTS OF THERMAL VIBRATION INDUCED PIPING FATIGUE I. General Fati ue Desi n Considerations For Class 2 lines, fatigue is considered in the allovable stress range check for thermal expansion stresses. The code allovable for this check is based on a maximum of 7,000 thermal cycles; a reduction would be required if there vere more cycles. Shearon Harris Main Feedwater System is expected to experience much fewer than 7,000 cycles.

II. Thermal Desi n Considerations By limiting the mixing of lov velocity, low temperature auxiliary feedwater with high temperature water in the steam generator inlet nozzles, cyclic thermal stresses in the Main Feedwater piping are minimized.

Mixing of the low velocity, low temperature Main Feedwater with high temperature water in the steam generator is prevented by isolating flow to the Main Feedwater nozzle and introducing feedvater through the 6-inch Auxiliary Feedwater steam generator inlet nozzle at operating conditions below 15 percent power or 250'F feedwater temperature. Above 15 percent pover, stratification and stxipping are prevented by feedwater flushing of cold water in the Feedwater line downstream of the Main Feedwater isolation valves. Mixing is prevented in the Main Feedwater supply to the steam generator by a piping arrangement that utilizes a 45'lbow at the Feedwater inlet nozzle. Feedwater temperature instrumentation is provided on the 16-inch steam generator Main Feedwater'line to monitor and alarm the backflow of high temperature water.

For a more detailed explanation of the operation of the Main Feedvater System refer to FSAR Section 10.4.9 ~

The physical layout of the Main Feedwater piping temperature monitoring/alarm instrumentation, and minimum feedwater flow rates are in compliance with the Westinghouse design criteria for the Main Feedwater supply piping to the steam generator.

III. Vibration Desi n Considerations The Main Feedwater System is designed and supported to minimize transient and s"eady state vibration. Piping system vibration tests and acceptance criteria are currently being developed in accordance with the guidance presented in Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2. These are pre-operational tests to verify that the design process adequately supports and restrains the piping system for flow induced vibrations.

10 (1083PSA/mf)

APPENDIX C PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZING STEAM/MATER HAMMER EFFECTS Feedwater system operation and physical layout were designed to minimize possible waterhammex events as discussed below:

A. Feedwater Control Valve (FCV) instabilities have been minimized by ensuring that components in the system are compatible. Consequently, the feedwater pump impellers have been trimmed and the FCVs modified as follows:

o Full open C was lowered, o Valve flow characteristics were changed to a modified equal percentage characteristic, and

~ A small bypass control line was provided to stabilize operation at low power levels.

B. The pipe routing is such that minimal volume is available for steam bubble formation.

Co Analyses were pexformed and the piping/suppoxts were designed to accommodate the loads resulting from rapid closure of the PW isolation and FW control valves.

D. The physical system was analyzed to ensuxe operability following unanticipated waterhammer transients including feedling checkvalve slam following a line break and bubble collapse.

ED Vents and drains have been prov'ided.

The design of the Main Feedwater system and confirmatory analyses performed provide assurance that the piping and supports will withstand any anticipated dynamic events. The feedwater system has been reviewed in light of the findings of NUREG-0927. The Shearon Harris Main Feedwater System is believed to adequately cope with the problems that have been experienced at operating plants as reported in the aforementioned NOREG.

ll (1083PSA/mf)

APPENDIX D PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZING LOCAL STRESSES FROM WELDED ATTACHMENTS Deleted arbitrary intermediate break locations were reviewed to determine if pipe supports with welded attachments were located in close proximity. There are no cases where welded attachments are located such that the pipe stresses at the break point would be influenced by the attachment. {Attachments have a local effect on pipe wall stresses as defined by ~RT where R is radius and T is wall thickness of piping. This definition is per ASME III Code Case No. N-318 '

{1083PSA/mf)

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FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CHANGES (1083PSA/mf)

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - UNIT NO. 1 E INATION OF MAIN FEEDWATER SYS ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE BREAK POINTS FSAR PAGES AFFECTED 3.6A-23 3.6A-24 3.6A"25 3.6A-41 3.6A-42 3.6A"43 Figure 3.6A-1"Calc Sheet .1 of 3 Figure 3.6A-1"Gale Sheet 2 of 3 Figure 3.6A"1-Gale Sheet 3 of 3

'Figure 3.6A-1-Plot-A Sheet 1 of 2 Figure 3.6A-1-Plot"B Sheet 2 of 2 Figure 3.6A-l"Plot-C Sheet 2 of 2 Figure 3.6A-5 Figure 3.6A-6 Figure 3.6A-6-Gale Figure 3.6A-6-Plot A Sheet 1 of 3 Figure 3.6A-6-Plot A Sheet 2 of 3 Figure 3.6A-6-Plot A Sheet 3 of 3 Figure 3.6A-7 Figure 3.6A-29 Figure 3.6A-30 Figure 3.6A-31 Figure 3.6A-33

ThbLK 3.6A-2 i tlPE QHEP RFSTRAl NTS fEEDMATER PKPllC - lIISlIIF COHTAIHCFNT Pi @hi P Restraint Protection identifi- Mrectioe~ type of L'ine Pipe of Fijure cation No. hxial Let Vert aestrelntae Oes lans t ion Steak Ho IIreak+++ liow a-PM-l S-a-l Qfb Xi Sof t 2FM l6-68SII-l C 3 6A 7 6 S,M Loop 2 3 6A-30 yg- HFA.ig p a-PM-1$ -k-lsh Z,-y 2FMI fi-68SN-l a-HFM-68-3 C 36A76 Loop<<2 + g-HFM-ir&~Z- 3 Sh-3A w

a-Rt-l S-k-2' x.a 2'6-fi8SN-l a-HFM-68-l C 3 fih-7 C Loop-2 k-IIFM-68-2 3 6A-30 +g) a-IIFM-68-3 k-Itnt-68-'4 a-FM-l X,+y 2FVl 6-68'-I k-IIFII-68-l C 3.6A-S S Loop-2 -Imf-68-2 a-m&-68-3 3 M-f s-k-3'-fv-lS-a-4cN 2 fVl6-MS'-1 3.6A-5 6 X,E X',+y

~2 a-IIFH-68-4 Fw -<c-g C

3 fih-30 X,Q 2' 6-68SII-l a-IIm 3.fih-7 6 Estop-2 ~ g,.Hfu-t'b 3 6A-3n X,S 2m 1 6-68SN-l k II<V-68@+ C 3 6A-5 6 snop-2 -II' 3 fih-30 2FMl 6M8SN-1 a~FV-68-5 C M-5 6 Locip-2 3. fih-30 O

l ThhLK 3i6A-2 (cont'd)

PIPF. MHIP RE,STRhllrrS FFFINATER PIPING - INSIDF. CWTAIHHEHT P pe Whip Restraint Protection type Identifi- Direct) on+ Type of Line Pi pe of F) pure cotton Noi hei al Lat Ver Res traint+a Besigna ticm Srea'k No break+++ Ho+

Soft 2')6-69SN-I R-HFM-69-1 C 3i6h-7 6 k-FM-17-7'-FM-)7-IIS Loop-3 3. 6A-3)

Z,-y Sof t 2') 6-69 SII- I R-IIFV-69-2 R-IIFV-69-'3 C 3 6h-7 &

Loop-3 3.6A-31 R-EV-I 7-90k Hard 6 Ot 2FM) 6-69SII- I R-HFM-69-2 C 3 6A-7 6 Loop-3 R-HFM-69-3 3i6A-3)

R-FM-I 7-10[I Z,+y Hard 2') 6-69'-I R-FllM-69-2 C 3.6A-5 4 Xnop-3 R-FIN&9-3 ~ 3 6A-31 R-W-17-118 Soft 2FM) 6-69SM-I R-IIFII-69-4 C 3.fih-5 6 E-5 Loop-3 3+ 6A-31 R-W-l7-13S Sof t 2FV) 6-69'-I 3 6A-5 4 hoop-3 3-6A-31 R-FV-I7-ICS Sof t 2M)6&9SII-I Cmobs-3

-HFM-69-6

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3. M-3)

R-FV-I 7-) 6QCS Soft 4 M 2FV) ~9SII-I R-mM-69-5 3 Q-SC loop-3 3.6A-31 R-FM-17-171I 2')6-69~) g-yIFM-69-5 3 CA-'5 6 Loop-3 3.r.A-31

ThhlS 3 6h-2 (contend)

PIPE %HIP RPSTRAINTS

'f FRKDMATFR PIPIT INSIDE CXNThifÃFAY Pipe Mhlp Restraint Protection yy pe Identifi- Direction* Type of Line Pipe Figure cation So Axial Lat Vert Rea tra int** Sea 1 gaa t ion areak No brcakaaa No R-yV-13-190k I, Sof t 2PM1 6&7'-I R-HFM C 3 6A-7 6 S-V 'Loop-1 +R- H&4f-2. 3 6h-29 I-FM-l 3-2AS X,-y So ft 2PV16-67 SH-1 a-mV-67-l C 3 6h-7 l Loop-l 3 6A-24 X,b Soft 6 a 2Rfl6-67SN-I a-le-67-3 a-HFM-67-l C 3.6A-7 3~6A-29 C

Loop-1 I-FQ-13-21'>I R-FM-13-23H liard 2FVf 6&7Slf-1 k-HFV-67-1 C 3 6h-5 6 Loop-1 -RFQ-6 -4 3.6A-29 R-FM-13-260f. 20%16-67'-1 R-llFV-67-5 C 3 6A-5 6 Loop-l 3 6A-29 k-M-13-275 2Fit1~7~1 a-%PS-47-5 C 3 Sh-5 C En'-1 3-6h-24 a

ah b

- Parallel

- Parallel to hxia of Pipe ~

to Axia of Pipe belcw I -- Nortle; S-Sooth; K>>Eaat; Q-Rot CL 3 I Neve Supported in both Oirectioaa, Kacept %ere Otbervlae Noted tt +y - Abo~ The Restraint

-y aelat The Restraint O ~lX - Oras4eble fhterla1 Type Restraint

- ~ 4~~gqy (q~q j,n +Ay CIPn~~e ~<j""

+~aC Ctrcmfereatlal break

TALC.P. 3.6h-l l PEPE MHit kFSTMlÃFS FEEWATEIC - OMITS llK CNThlWFHT Pipe Mbip Restraint Protection Afoul Type Identifi- Direction+ Type of Line Pipe of Fipur cation Noi Axial Lat Tert kestrainta+ i Ses gna Cion %rest No SreA*s+

h-FM-l2-R-I Sard 6-12.-1 A-HFV-12-l No',6A-6 3.6A-33

-mt-12-3 A-HFM-12%

h-FM-12-1C-2 Hard LFM16>>12-l 3.6A-6 A-HFM-l2- 3.6A-33 A-.HFM-12-3 AM -l 2-4 APV l6-12-1 h~-12-l 3.6A-5

~-1 k~-12-3 3-6A-33 LMFV-12&

h-Rt-12M A ~16-12-1 L~-12-1 C '4 6A-A-IIFV~12- Q 3 6A-3 k-HFV-k-RFM-12M k-fV-12M-$ Sar J AFH14<<12-1 k-SF@-12-1 C 3.6A-7 3.6A-33 l 8

PIPE MRIF kESTININTS FKEBMATER - CXITS IN'. CNTA1 MFA Pipe Mbtp kes tra1nt Protection

'dentffi- Directions Type oF Lfne tfpe Type of Figure catfon IIo. hxfal Let Vert Restrafntaa Oesfgnatfon hrest Ilo " IIreak*** IIo

-h-FM-1 4-kW HV16-14-1 A-NFM-14-1 C 3i6A-7 3.6A-33+1 h-FM-l6-k-l hFMI6-I6-1 h-BFM-I6-1 C 3.6A-7 3.6A-33il h-EV- l4-k-8 AFM16-14-1 A-IIFM-14-1 C 3 6AM

-BFM-I 3 6A-33 A-)IFM-14-3 A-II -14&

hFMI6-14-1 h&IFM-14-1 C 3.6AM

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3 6A-33 tn PI h-IIFM-]4-4 h-H1-14&-10 AFM I $ 1 h-I@M-14-)

A-AfV-14-2

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3.6A-33 ~

h-HFM-14-4 h-PM-I 4-0-11 hFM16-I 4-1 1 C 3 6A-5 A-II'-I 4-2 3 6A-33 A-mV-14-3 h -14%

TASLE 3 6h-ll (cont'd)

-alt tEPK kl'STkh1NTS FFEDMATFR OUTStlC CNfthIHNFJtt Ftpe Mbtp kestralnt trotect1on ldeattfl- Dl rect ton+ 'type of- Line pipe of Figure catlon No hxlal Lat Vert kestrafnt++ Deaigns t 1 on Sreak $ 4+ Break+++ NO ~

h-FV-16-k-12 A@F16-16-1 h-HVV-16-1 C 3 6A-fi h-Hat-16-2 1.6A-33 A-HRt-16-3 h-Her-16-4 h-Plt-16-k-13 APlt16-16-1 A-HFV-16-1 C 3 6A-6

-BW-l6- 3 6h-33 h-IIW-l6-3 h-HW-l6-4 A-W-16&-14 Hard APVl6-16-1 h-8FM-1&-l C 3.LL-5

-HFM-16-2 3 6A-33 h-HFV h-SF'-16-4 A-PM-16&-15 AFlF16-16-1 A-~R6-1 C 3 6h-5 3 lih-33 A~NW-I~

A~16-4

~h Parallel I -l'era'tlel toto Axis Axis oF Ftpe hhore of ttpe melo' tbrth; S-Sooth: Met-. 0-uest I N ans Supported fa %at% Olrectloasy

~Q kscept Oashable Rterl al

+~~C Ctrceafereattal Taupe Restraint

'Ireak 34

SUMMARY

OF CALCU Tl N MS 5 FD WATER PIPE BREAK LOCATION8 CR I ~

NODE BREAK PHYSICAL DESCR IPTION STRESS (I) BREAK(b)

POINT NUMBER OF BREAK POINT RATIO TER IA TYPE 301 R-HFW 67-1 STM GEN I A.SN NOZZLE .536 302 R.HFW 67-2 END OF EI.BOW DWNSTRMOF NOZ, .472 HRI 3024 R HFW.67.3 BOTH ENDS OF ELBOW ,383 HRI 3124 R.HRW 67 4 @ fL. 265' .422 HRI R HFW 67.5 PENET M.4 INSIDE CONTAINMENT,418 TE 712 R.HMS 1~1 STM. GEN. NOZZLE ,638 TE G 4 R.HMS 1 2 BOTH ENDS OF ELBOW ,375 HRI G 5 R.HMS 1 3 IgI EL. 326'.7M .'370 HRI G 20 R HMS.1 4 ONE END OF ELBOW 4 EL. 279'.0 .427 HRI G 23 R HMS.1.5 PEN E T M.1 INSIDE CONTAINMENT ,528 TE G IAI HIGH ENERGY SYSTEMS: IB) f HIGH NE ROY 5YSTNMS:

TE ~ TERMINAI. END O <<QUII.LOTINE {CIRCUMFERENTIAL)

HRI ~ HIGH RELATIVE INTERMEDIATE S  % SL.OT ILONQITUDINAI.)

STRESS POINT MODERATE ENERGY SYSTEMS: MODERATE ENERGY SYSTEMSI HM ~ HIGH MODERATE ENERGY C ~ THftOUQH WALL LEAKAGE STRESS POINT CRACK REF. NO.:

CALC. NO: PRA-W-MSlFW-1168-ao, FIGURE 3.SA 1, FIGURE 3.8A 6, FIGURa 3 SAT AIIIenrltaenc No. 9 SHEARON HARRIS FIGURE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTOR 8E REACTOR AUXILIARYBUILDING

SUMMARY

OF PIPE BREAK LOCA% IONS Carolina MAIN STEAM 5 FEEDWATER PIPING 3.6A-1-CALC Powur & Light Company LOOP 01 SHEEI'1 OF 3 FINALSAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

II

SUMMARY

0 F CA LCULATION S MAIN STEAM PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS NODE BREAK PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION STRESS AI'PLICABLE BREAK POINT 'UMBER OF BREAK POINT RATIO CRITER IA TYPE'LI W

712 R-HMS-2-1 STM GEN IB.SN NOZZLE 0.474 TERMINAL END 4

4 R. HMS-2.2 'R fLBOW IEI EL 326 7h

~

0.444 HIGH REI.ATIVE Lh Y2i I

co LLI LLI Q

9 R.HMS 2 3 . LH ELBOW I'EL 282 6 ~

0.4N HIGH RELATIVE <<t LU I 0 90 ,R.HMS 24 KO LLI LR ELBOW IEI EL 278 6~

0,466 HIGH RELATIVE R-HMS-2 5 JJUl 12 CONT. PENETRATION M 12 0,385 TERMINAL END 4 Lt FEEDWATER PIPE BREAK I.OCATIONS.

NODE BREAK PH YSICAL DESCR IPT ION STRESS APPLICABLE BREAK POINT .NUMBER OF BREAK POINT RATIO CR ITER IA

,TYPE'01 LLI W R.HFW.68 1 STM GEN IB.SN NOZZLE 0.517 TERMINAL END 4i~ co CC 3034 R-H F W.68.2 I.R E LBOW 8 EL 265' 2 0,706 HIGH RELATIVE 3036 R.HFW 68.3 LR E LBOW IEI EL 274'3 0.700 HIGH RELATIVE r>u Lr) LLI LLJ 3041 R.HFW 68 4 I.R ELBOW I EL 274' 0,704 HIGH RELATIVE LLj I O-JJ Jth 0

LL LLI 317 R HFW 68;5 CONT. PENETRATION M.5 0 397 TERMINAL END g

'G ~ GUILLOTINE {CIRCUMFERENTIAL)

L ~ SLOT (LONGITUDINAL)

REF. NO.:

CALC. NOL PRA-W-MSIFW 1157-3. FIOURE 3.8A.1, FIOURE 3.8A 5, FIOURE 3 8A'7 Ar.:endment ~

tio. 9 SHEARON HARRIS FIGURE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTOR Iti REACTOR AUXILIARYBUILDING

SUMMARY

,OF PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS Carolina MAIN STEAM 5 FEEDWATER PIPING 3.6A-1-CAI.C Power tti Light Company LOOP ¹2 SHEET 2 OF 3 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

SUMMARY

OF CALCULATIONS MS Br FW PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS NODE BREAK PHYSICAL DESCR IPTION STR ESS CR I ~ (I) R EAK(b)

POINT NUMBER OF BREAK POINT RATIO TER IA TYPE 712 R.HMS.3.1 STM GEN IC-SN NOZZI.E 0.484 TE G 4 R-HMS 3.2 BOTH ENDS OF ELBOW 0.375 HRI G 5 R-HMS 3-3 I9I EL. 326'.7'h 0.341 HRI 20 R.HMS 3 4 END OF ELBOW Igt E L 279',00 0,412 HRI G 23 R-HMS 3 6 PENET M3 INSIDE CONT, 0,494 TE G 301 R.HFW 69-1 STM. GEN. NOZZLE 0,415 TE 3034 R HFW 692 END OF ELBOW DWNSTRM OF NOZ, 0,376 HRI G

, 3035 R.HFW 69-3 END OF ELBOW DWNSTRM OF NOZ, 0,374 HRI G 304 R.HFW.69 4 END OF ELBOW@SEC. SM. WALL 0.361 HRI 325 R HFW 69.5 PENET M6 INSIDE CONT. 0 378 TE IA) HIGH.ENERGY SYSTEMS: (BI HIGH ENERGY SYSTEMS:

TE ~ TERMINALEND G ~ GUILLOTINE (CIRCUMFERENTIALI HR I ~ HIGH RELATIVE INTERMEDIATE S > SLOT (LONOITUDINALI STRESS POINT.

MODERATE ENERGY SYSTEMS'M MODERATE ENERGY SYSTEMS:

~ HIGH MODERATE ENERGY C ~ THHOUGH WALl LEAKAGE STflESS POINT CHACK REF. NO.:

CALC. NO: PRA-W-MS/FW-1165-39, FICURE 3.5A 1, FIOURE 3.8A 5, FIOURE 3.5A 7 AmenrIment No. 9 SHEARON HARRIS F I OUR E NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTOR Sr REACTOR AUXILIARYBUILDING

SUMMARY

OF PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS Carolina MAIN STEAM & FEEDWATER PIPING 3.6A 1.CALC Power 5 Light Company LOOP aI3 SHEET 3 OF 3 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

1 A IIZSh+SAI 8-HFW47-1 8-HFW-Q-R HRI SR A72

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FINALSAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT REACTOR Sa REACTOR AUXILIARYBLDG BREAK Sc RESTRAINT LOCATIONS Sc JET IMPINGEMENT ENVELOPES FEEOWATER PIPING PLANS RES. DWO.I SK>>110$ 4NS447C IRSV. Tl FIGURE 3$ A.S

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I FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT gR%

TURBINE BUILDING BREAK Bt RESTRAINT LOCATIONS FEEOWATER PIPING PLANS enolesIIIIwlo72lsev II FIGURE 3.6A4 B2F owot

lllkTQBII FEEDWATER PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS NOOE BREAK ~

PHYSICAL OESCRIPTION STRESS CRI ~

BREAK POINT NUMBER OF BREAK POINT RATIO TERIAIa) TYPEI")

2721 A.H F W-.1 2.1 END OF LR ELBOW 0.336 TE 2720 A-HFW.12.2 END OF LR fLBOW 0.308 HRI 2723 A-HFW-12.3 END OF LR ELBOW 0.254 HRI 274 A.HFW 12.4 END OF LR ELBOW 0.330 TE 4402 A HFW 16.1 END OF LR ELBOW TE 441 A HFW 16.2 fND OF LR ELBOW HRI G 4444 A.HFW.16-3 END OF LR ELBOW 0.268 HRI G 445 A HFW-1 &4 END OF LR ELBOW 0.316 369 A-HFW-14.1 END OF LR ELBOW 0.294 3691 A HFW.14.2 END OF LR ELBOW 0.285 HRI 3693 A.HFW 14-3 END OF LH ELBOW 0.262 HRI 370 A.HFW.14 END OF LR ELBOW 0.309 NOTES: 1) POSTULATED BREAK POINTS ARE SELECTED AS PER SRP 3.6.2

2) PIPING IN THIS AREA IS NON SEISN)IC, THEREFORE STKESSES ARE NOT AVAILABLE.

IA) HIGH ENERGY SYSTEMS: (B) HIGH ENERGY SYSTEMS:

TE ~ TERIYIINALEND >. GUILLOTINE ICIRCUMFERENTIAL)

~

Q HRI ~ HIGH RELATIVE INTERMEOIATE S ~ SLOT (LONQITUOINAL)

STRESS POINT I

MODERATE ENERGY SYSTEMS: MODERATE ENERGY SYSTEMSt HM  % HIGH MOOERATE ENERGY C < THROUGH WAI.L LEAKAGE STRESS POINT CRACK REF. No.i CAt.C. NO: PRA-W-FW-72-1A-ad, FIGURE 3.8A 8, FIGURE 3.8A 33 hnlendmerte'o, 9 SHEARON HARRIS FIGURE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TURBINE BUILDING Carolina

SUMMARY

OF PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS Power Sr Lioht Company FEEDWATER PIPING 3,6A 6 CALC FINA!. SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

t

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31'4 NOTE. PDSTUWTED PIPE BREAKS ARE SELECTEC AS PEA SAP 10.2 I {12 Bh+ BA) s 37.800 1$ {9)l s FVI-12<<1 TE SAP~

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C Anendnent Hot 9 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

~ ta el CIMva at Carolina Power BI Light Company Ia ~T IHII al H a SCCTNS S a.tlINW Peg-F FINALSAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

\I ~ I ea REACTOR Ec REACTOR AUXILIARYBLDG BREAK Ec RESTRAINT LOCATIONS Ec JET IMPINGEMENT ENVELOPES FEEOWATER PIPING SECTIONS REF. DTICLI EX 11064%6-MTS IREV, 61 FIGURE 3.6A.7

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MAINSTEAM AND F E EDWATER INSIDE CONTAINMENT-LOOP 3 FIGURE 3.6A41

w

~ 8 Cg WV AHENDHENT NO. 2 SHEARDN HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CaroNina Power & Ught Company FINALSAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 1

MATHEMATICALMODEL- F EEDWATER I PIPING OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT i FIGURE 3.BA43 lief owo> ItoMttRIC 1Aoe1~1(atVSI

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