ML18018B898

Elimination of Arbitrary Intermediate Break Points in Main Feedwater Sys

ML18018B898
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	02/13/1985
From:	CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML18018B897	List: ML18018B896 ML18018B898
References
NUDOCS 8502200162
Download: ML18018B898 (47)

Text

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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ELIMINATIONOF ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE BREAK POINTS IN THE MAIN FEEUWATER SYSTEM 8502200162 8502i3 DR A~~~~

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F'DR (1083PSA/mf)

<v CONTENTS I.

Introduction 1

IIO Scope 0000010100000010000101000000.0000..1.000000100000001.0000.00.

1 III.

Summary of Proposed Changes

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1 IV.

Justification

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4 Ao Safety 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

B.

Technical Justifications CD Economic

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6 Vo FSAR Revisions o.......o...o....o.oooooooo.oo.oo....o..o..o.ooooooo 8

C APPENDICES A.

Provisions for Minimizing Stress Corrosion Cracking in High.......

9 Energy Lines B ~

,Provisions for Minimizing the Effects of Thermal Vibration........

10 Induced Piping Fatigue C.

Do Provisions for Minimizing Steam/Water Hammer Effects..............

11 Provisions for Minimizing Local Stresses from Welded Attachments 12 E ~

Final Safety Analysis Report Changes 13

~ V (1083PSA/mf)

I.

Introduction Shearon Harris has been designed in accordance

.with the guidance provided in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Branch Position papers MEB 3-1 and APCSB 3-1 (Standard Review Plan 3.6.2 and 3.6.1).

Consequently, breaks in high energy piping* have been selected on the basis of stress levels in the piping and at the terminal ends.

The resulting consequences of these breaks including pipe whip, jet impingement and environmental effects have been factored into the layout, selection and design of components essential for safe shutdown.

This report explains why relaxation of NRC guidelines for the postulation of intermediate high energy pipe breaks is warranted for Shearon Harris.

Specifically, we provide justification for eliminating arbitrary intermediate breaks** and their accompanying effects when the piping stresses and Cumulative Usage Factor (Safety Class 1 piping only) are less than the mandatory break selection levels identified in MEB 3-1.

This relaxation will result in a safer, less congested plant and significant cost savings both in the near term during the final stages of construction and throughout the operating life of the plant.

II.

~Sco e

This report covers high energy, Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category I portion of the Main Feedwater piping system in the Containment and Auxiliary Buildings.

Figure 1 depicts the boundaries of this system.

III.

Summary of Proposed Chan es Elimination of the arbitrary intermediate pipe breaks results in:

A.

A reduction of 15 breaks from consideration.

B.

Elimination of 7 whip restraints.

Table I lists the deleted pipe whip restraints.

C.

Numerous components throughout the plant including pipes,

tubes, conduit, duct, etc.,

need not be routed to avoid these eliminated jets or designed to withstand the jet loads.

This applies not only to components being installed prior to commercial operation, but also to new components added throughout the 40 y'ar operating life of the plant.

High Energy Piping Piping systems which, during normal operating conditions, exceed 200'F and/or 275 psig.

• • Arbitrary Intermediate Breaks Break points which are selected to meet the minimum number of breaks as called for in Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1.

These points are below the break selection stress level of BTP MEB 3-1 ~.

(1083PSA/mf)

4

CONTAlN MENT SOU t4DAR'f WALL 4"AFW'TEAM GKN AUX FKEQ PUMP II FROM 'TURt 1NK DRLVK STM GEH AFW PUMP FFK HP HEATKR F W HEADER STEAN GEN FKKD PUMP MAlN FE.EYEWATER AUX FPE.DWAt'E.'R CAROLlNA, POWE.R 4 LlGHT COMPANY gHPQROQ }(Qgg1& NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PIGURE 1

N1A1H AND AUXlLIARY FEEPWATBFt

&YSTQ~ XBOUNE)AR1F&

TABLE I DELETED PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS Restraint No.

R-FW-13-4-20S R-FW-13-R-21CM R-FW-17-R-8S R-FW-17-R-9CM R-FW-17-R-10H R-FW-17-R-llS R-FW-17-R-13S Location C/B C/B C/B C/B C/B C/B C/B C/B Inside Containment Building (1083PSA/mf)

IV. Justification A.

Safety Elimination of the 7 whip restraints identified in Table 1

will facilitate access during operation, maintenance, and inspections with resulting reduced radiation exposure.

Additionally, there will be reduced potential restricted thermal movement and unanticipated restraint of piping due to thermal growth and seismic motion.

B.

Technical Justification The following items provide generic technical justification for the elimination of arbitrary intermediate pipe breaks and the associated pipe whip restraints which are required per Standard Review Plan 3.6.1 and 3.6.2.

1.

The operating procedures and piping system designs minimize the possibility of stress corrosion cracking, thermal and vibration induced fatigue, and water/steam hammer.

Detailed descriptions of the design provisions for these.phenomena are provided in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively.

2.

Melded attachments are generally not located in close proximity to the breaks to be eliminated.

Consequently, local bending stresses resulting from these attachments will not significantly affect the stress levels at the break locations (refer to Appendix D).

3 ~

Pipe breaks are postulated to occur when the stresses (both primary and secondary) or cumulative usage factor (0afety Class 1 piping only) exceed arbitrarily selected values.

This is explained more specifically in FSAR Sections 3'.2.1.1.2 and 3.6.2.1.1.3.

The arbitrary intermediate breaks to be eliminated all exhibit stresses and/or usage factors below these conservative thresholds.

An example of typical stress levels for high energy piping on Shearon Harris is given in Figure 2 ~

4.

Pipe rupture is recognized as a rare event which may only occur under unanticipated conditions.

5.

Arbitrary intermediate breaks are only postulated to provide additional conservatism in the design.

There is no technical justification for postulating these breaks.

These breaks are selected at points which are less than 80% of the acceptable stress range and 10% of the Cumulative Usage Factor allowed by the industry standard:

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,-

Section III.

6.

Elimination of pipe whip restraints associated with the arbitrary breaks will facilitate in-service inspection and reduce heat losses at the restraint locations.

4 (1083PSA/mf)

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R-HCS-118-2 HRI SR~F4 R-HRC&5<

HRI SR~.330 R-HCS-118-1 HRI SR~.302 R-HRCAS-3 HRI SR~.341 O

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.4 R-HCS-83-4 TE SR.157 R-HCS-83-7

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HRI SR~475 R-HRCAS-2 HRI SRR311 R-HRC-45-1 TE SR.202

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I VALVE VALVE OInIL'o IC RI lU 2CS3-83SN-1 NODE POINTS 1CS3-118SN-1 REF. IIO.r CALO.IIO:.FRA.W.C$.0010 IC~ FIGURE XEA0. FICURE SEA 10. FIOURE SEA RCALC IRC3<SSN-1 Anendnenc No.

9 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Carolina Power & Light Company FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT CONTAINMENTBUILDING PLOT OF PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS CVCS 5 RC PIPING FIGURE 3.6A 8PLOT A FIGURE 2.

Example from the FSAR of a typical chart for safety class piping showing stress levels relative to break selection stresses.

I

7.

Pipe break related equipment qualification (EQ) requirements will not be affected by the elimination of the axbitrary breaks.

Breaks are postulated non-mechanistically for EQ purposes.

8.

No restraints have been deleted which are required to maintain the stresses in the break exclusion region below the levels prescribed in Branch Technical Position HEB 3-1.

9.

Additional whip restraints added for this additional "layer" of conservatism may reduce rather than improve plant safety.

This has been demonstrated in "Effects of Postulated Event Devices on Normal Operation of Piping Systems in Nuclear Power Plants,"

NUREG/CR-2136, Teledyne Services, 1981.

C.

Economic The elimination of these 7 whip restraints, which are designed to protect against the effects of arbitrary intermediate

breaks, results in significant immediate cost savings by reducing construction tasks.

Xn addition, there will be savings realized from other sources including:

o No review required for jet impingement effects from these 15 arbitrary bxeaks.

This is applicable prior to initial operation and fox subsequent additions to the plant.

o Final shimming of restraints to the required gaps is both labor and time intensive.

Further, for some systems shimming cannot be performed until after hot functional testing, and final verification can be made only subsequent to fuel load.

By reducing the number of xestraints there will be a corresponding decrease in cost and construction activities during what is primarily a final testing period.

o Reduced heat loss due to better insulation of the piping at points where whip xestraints are deleted.

There would also be a

concurx'ent x'eduction in building cooling costs.

Table Il summarizes the economic benefits that will result from the elimination of the bxeaks.

(1083PSA/mf )

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TABLE II

SUMMARY

OF BENEFITS RESULTING FROM THE ELIMINATION OF ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE PIPE BREAKS ON SHEARON HARRIS MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM

~Cate or Benefit 1 ~

Design, material, and erection costs associated with elimination of arbitrary intermediate breaks.

$ 0 ~ 1 Million.

2.

Relief of congestion, improving access for operation, maintenance and ISI.

29 man-rem reduction

$0el Million (man-rem plus other costs).

3.

Improvement in overall plant safety (NUREG/CR-2136).

Elimination of potential for restricted thermal movement.

4.

Reduction in the required arbitrary intermediate breaks to be considered in future plant modifications.

Future benefits.

5.

Reduced heat loss at restraint locations.

Not quantitatively assessed.

Insulation can be installed on piping at current locations of arbitrary intermediate break pipe whip restraints.

(1083PSA/mf)

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IV.

FSAR Revision Appendix E identifies draft changes to the various selections of the FSAR which require revision due to the elimination of the arbitrary intermediate breaks.

Upon NRC approval, a FSAR amendment will incorporate these changes.

(1083PSA/mf)

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PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZING STRESS CORROSION CRACKING IN HIGH ENERGY. LINES Industry experience has demonstrated (NUREG 0691) that stress corrosion cracking (SCC) will not occur unless the following cond1tions exist simultaneously:

high tensile stresses, susceptible piping mater1al, and a

corrosive environment.

Although any stainless or carbon steel piping will exhibit some degree of residual stresses and material susceptibility, Carolina Power 6 Light Company minimizes the potential for SCC by choosing piping material with low susceptibility to stress corrosion and by preventing the existence of a corrosive environment.

The material specifications consider compatibility with the system's operating environment (both internal and external),

as well as other materials 1n the system, applicable ASME code requirements, fracture toughness characteristics, and welding, processing, and fabrication techniques.

For the Main Feedwater System, ferritic type carbon steel has been the choice for the piping, fittings, and valve bodies forming the pressure boundaries.

This ferritic material has been found satisfactory from the standpoint of non-susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking for the service conditions encountered.

The secondary systems of PWRs are not made of stainless steels; therefore, the problem of stress corrosion cracking as reported in stainless steels does exist in secondary systems at Shearon Harris.

The piping involved in the elimination of arbitrary intermediate breaks will be cleaned externally and flushed as part of the pre-operational test program.

The piping will be flushed with demineralized water subject to written criteria for limits on total dissolved solids, conductivity, chlorides, dissolved oxygen, silica and pH.

Flush water quality w111 be monitored daily.

The flushing will be controlled by detailed procedures.

Water chemistry for pre-operational testing will be controlled by written specifications.

During plant operation, primary and secondary side water chemistry will be monitored.

Contaminate concentrations will be kept below the thresholds known tn be conducive to stress corrosion cracking.

The major water chemistry control standards will be included in the plant operating procedures.

Process fluid oxygen concentrat1on in stainless steel piping is expected to be less than 0.005 ppm during normal power operation, thereby further minimizing the likelihood of stress corrosion cracking.

Operating water chemistry guidelines for secondary side piping are given in Table 10.3 '-1 of the FSAR.

(1083PSA/mf)

APPENDIX B PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZINGTHE EFFECTS OF THERMAL VIBRATION INDUCED PIPING FATIGUE I.

General Fati ue Desi n Considerations For Class 2 lines, fatigue is considered in the allovable stress range check for thermal expansion stresses.

The code allovable for this check is based on a maximum of 7,000 thermal cycles; a reduction would be required if there vere more cycles.

Shearon Harris Main Feedwater System is expected to experience much fewer than 7,000 cycles.

II.

Thermal Desi n Considerations By limiting the mixing of lov velocity, low temperature auxiliary feedwater with high temperature water in the steam generator inlet

nozzles, cyclic thermal stresses in the Main Feedwater piping are minimized.

Mixing of the low velocity, low temperature Main Feedwater with high temperature water in the steam generator is prevented by isolating flow to the Main Feedwater nozzle and introducing feedvater through the 6-inch Auxiliary Feedwater steam generator inlet nozzle at operating conditions below 15 percent power or 250'F feedwater temperature.

Above 15 percent pover, stratification and stxipping are prevented by feedwater flushing of cold water in the Feedwater line downstream of the Main Feedwater isolation valves.

Mixing is prevented in the Main Feedwater supply to the steam generator by a piping arrangement that utilizes a 45'lbow at the Feedwater inlet nozzle.

Feedwater temperature instrumentation is provided on the 16-inch steam generator Main Feedwater'line to monitor and alarm the backflow of high temperature water.

For a more detailed explanation of the operation of the Main Feedvater System refer to FSAR Section 10.4.9 ~

The physical layout of the Main Feedwater piping temperature monitoring/alarm instrumentation, and minimum feedwater flow rates are in compliance with the Westinghouse design criteria for the Main Feedwater supply piping to the steam generator.

III. Vibration Desi n Considerations The Main Feedwater System is designed and supported to minimize transient and s"eady state vibration.

Piping system vibration tests and acceptance criteria are currently being developed in accordance with the guidance presented in Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2.

These are pre-operational tests to verify that the design process adequately supports and restrains the piping system for flow induced vibrations.

10 (1083PSA/mf)

APPENDIX C PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZINGSTEAM/MATER HAMMER EFFECTS Feedwater system operation and physical layout were designed to minimize possible waterhammex events as discussed below:

A.

Feedwater Control Valve (FCV) instabilities have been minimized by ensuring that components in the system are compatible.

Consequently, the feedwater pump impellers have been trimmed and the FCVs modified as follows:

o Full open C

was lowered, o

Valve flow characteristics were changed to a modified equal percentage characteristic, and

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A small bypass control line was provided to stabilize operation at low power levels.

B.

The pipe routing is such that minimal volume is available for steam bubble formation.

Co D.

Analyses were pexformed and the piping/suppoxts were designed to accommodate the loads resulting from rapid closure of the PW isolation and FW control valves.

The physical system was analyzed to ensuxe operability following unanticipated waterhammer transients including feedling checkvalve slam following a line break and bubble collapse.

ED Vents and drains have been prov'ided.

The design of the Main Feedwater system and confirmatory analyses performed provide assurance that the piping and supports will withstand any anticipated dynamic events.

The feedwater system has been reviewed in light of the findings of NUREG-0927.

The Shearon Harris Main Feedwater System is believed to adequately cope with the problems that have been experienced at operating plants as reported in the aforementioned NOREG.

ll (1083PSA/mf)

APPENDIX D PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZINGLOCAL STRESSES FROM WELDED ATTACHMENTS Deleted arbitrary intermediate break locations were reviewed to determine if pipe supports with welded attachments were located in close proximity.

There are no cases where welded attachments are located such that the pipe stresses at the break point would be influenced by the attachment.

{Attachments have a

local effect on pipe wall stresses as defined by ~RT where R is radius and T

is wall thickness of piping.

This definition is per ASME III Code Case No.

N-318 ' {1083PSA/mf)

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FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CHANGES (1083PSA/mf)

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - UNIT NO.

1 E

INATION OF MAIN FEEDWATER SYS ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE BREAK POINTS FSAR PAGES AFFECTED 3.6A-23 3.6A-24 3.6A"25 3.6A-41 3.6A-42 3.6A"43 Figure 3.6A-1"Calc Sheet

.1 of 3 Figure 3.6A-1"Gale Sheet 2 of 3 Figure 3.6A"1-Gale Sheet 3 of 3

'Figure 3.6A-1-Plot-A Sheet 1 of 2 Figure Figure 3.6A-1-Plot"B Sheet 2 of 2 3.6A-l"Plot-C Sheet 2 of 2 Figure 3.6A-5 Figure 3.6A-6 Figure 3.6A-6-Gale Figure 3.6A-6-Plot A Sheet 1 of 3 Figure 3.6A-6-Plot A Sheet 2 of 3 Figure 3.6A-6-Plot A Sheet 3 of 3 Figure 3.6A-7 Figure 3.6A-29 Figure 3.6A-30 Figure 3.6A-31 Figure 3.6A-33

ThbLK 3.6A-2 i tlPE QHEP RFSTRAl NTS fEEDMATER PKPllC - lIISlIIF COHTAIHCFNT Pi

@hi P Restraint identifi-cation No.

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Pipe of Steak Ho IIreak+++

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6-68SII-l Estop-2 2m 1 6-68SN-l snop-2 2FMl6M8SN-1 Locip-2 k-IIFII-68-l C

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Fw -<c-g a-IIm ~ g,.Hfu-t'b k II<V-68@+

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3.6A-S S 3 M-f 3.6A-5 6 3 fih-30 3.fih-7 6 3 6A-3n 3 6A-5 6 3 fih-30 M-5 6

3. fih-30

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ThhLK 3i6A-2 (cont'd)

PIPF. MHIP RE,STRhllrrS FFFINATER PIPING - INSIDF. CWTAIHHEHT P pe Whip Restraint Identifi-cotton Noi k-FM-17-7'-FM-)7-IIS R-EV-I7-90k R-FM-I7-10[I R-W-17-118 R-W-l7-13S R-FV-I7-ICS R-FV-I7-) 6QCS R-FM-17-171I Protection Direct) on+

hei al Lat Ver Z,-y Z,+y E-5 Type of Res traint+a Soft Soft Hard 6 Ot Hard Soft Soft Soft Soft 4 M Line Besigna ticm 2')6-69SN-I Loop-3 2') 6-69 SII-I Loop-3 2FM)6-69SII-I Loop-3 2')6-69'-I Xnop-3 2FM)6-69SM-I Loop-3 2FV)6-69'-I hoop-3 2M)6&9SII-I Cmobs-3 2FV)~9SII-I loop-3 2')6-69~)

Loop-3 type Pi pe of Srea'k No break+++

R-HFM-69-1 C

R-IIFV-69-2 C

R-IIFV-69-'3 R-HFM-69-2 C

R-HFM-69-3 R-FllM-69-2 C

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3. 6A-3) 3 6h-7 3.6A-31 3 6A-7 6 3i6A-3) 3.6A-5 4 3 6A-31 3.fih-5 6 3+ 6A-31 3 6A-5 4 3-6A-31 3 6A-'5 4

3. M-3) 3 Q-SC 3.6A-31 3 CA-'5 6 3.r.A-31

ThhlS 3 6h-2 (contend)

PIPE %HIP RPSTRAINTS FRKDMATFR PIPIT - INSIDE CXNThifÃFAY Pipe Mhlp Restraint Identifi-cation So R-yV-13-190k Protection Direction*

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'Loop-1 yype Pipe 'f areak No brcakaaa R-HFM C

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Figure No 3 6A-7 6 3 6h-29 I-FM-l3-2AS I-FQ-13-21'>I R-FM-13-23H R-FM-13-260f.

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a-le-67-3 C

a-HFM-67-l k-HFV-67-1 C

-RFQ-6 -4 R-llFV-67-5 C

a-%PS-47-5 C

3 6h-7 l 3 6A-24 3.6A-7 C

3~6A-29 3 6h-5 6 3.6A-29 3 6A-5 6 3 6A-29 3 Sh-5 C

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TALC.P. 3.6h-l l PEPE MHit kFSTMlÃFS FEEWATEIC - OMITSllK CNThlWFHT Pipe Mbip Restraint Identifi-cation Noi h-FM-l2-R-I Protection Direction+

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IIreak***

A-NFM-14-1 C

h-BFM-I6-1 C

Figure IIo 3i6A-7 3.6A-33+1 3.6A-7 3.6A-33il h-EV-l4-k-8 h-H1-14&-10 AFM16-14-1 hFMI6-14-1 AFMI$-14-1 A-IIFM-14-1 C

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h&IFM-14-1 C

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TASLE 3 6h-ll (cont'd) tEPK alt kl'STkh1NTS FFEDMATFR - OUTStlC CNfthIHNFJtt Ftpe Mbtp kestralnt ldeattfl-catlon No h-FV-16-k-12 h-Plt-16-k-13 A-W-16&-14 trotect1on Dlrect ton+

hxlal Lat Vert

'type of-kestrafnt++

Hard Line Deaigns t 1 on A@F16-16-1 APlt16-16-1 APVl6-16-1 pipe of Sreak

$4+

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h-Hat-16-2 A-HRt-16-3 h-Her-16-4 A-HFV-16-1 C

-BW-l6-h-IIW-l6-3 h-HW-l6-4 h-8FM-1&-l C

-HFM-16-2 h-HFV h-SF'-16-4 Figure NO ~

3 6A-fi 1.6A-33 3 6A-6 3 6h-33 3.LL-5 3 6A-33 A-PM-16&-15 AFlF16-16-1 A-~R6-1 C

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~h Parallel to Axis oF Ftpe hhore I - l'era'tlel to Axis of ttpe melo' tbrth; S-Sooth: Met-. 0-uest I N ans Supported fa %at% Olrectloasy kscept

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'Ireak 34

SUMMARY

OF CALCU Tl N

MS 5 FD WATER PIPE BREAK LOCATION8 NODE POINT 301 302 3024 3124 BREAK NUMBER R-HFW 67-1 R.HFW 67-2 R HFW.67.3 R.HRW 67 4 PHYSICAL DESCR IPTION OF BREAK POINT STM GEN I A.SN NOZZLE END OF EI.BOW DWNSTRMOF NOZ, BOTH ENDS OF ELBOW

@ fL. 265' STRESS RATIO

.536

.472

,383

.422 CR I ~(I)

TER IA HRI HRI HRI BREAK(b)

TYPE 712 4

5 20 23 R HFW 67.5 R.HMS 1 ~ 1 R.HMS 1 2 R.HMS 1 3 R HMS.1 4 R HMS.1.5 STM. GEN. NOZZLE BOTH ENDS OF ELBOW IgI EL. 326'.7M ONE END OF ELBOW 4 EL. 279'.0 PEN ET M.1 INSIDE CONTAINMENT

,638

,375

.'370

.427

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IAI HIGH ENERGY SYSTEMS:

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HIGH fNE ROY 5YSTNMS:

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SUMMARY

OF PIPE BREAK LOCA% IONS MAINSTEAM 5 FEEDWATER PIPING LOOP 01 SHEEI'1 OF 3 REF. NO.:

CALC. NO: PRA-W-MSlFW-1168-ao, FIGURE 3.SA 1, FIGURE 3.8A 6, FIGURa 3 SAT AIIIenrltaenc No.

9 FIGURE 3.6A-1-CALC

II

SUMMARY

0 F CALCULATIONS MAINSTEAM PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS NODE POINT 712 4

9 90 12 BREAK

'UMBER R-HMS-2-1 R. HMS-2.2 R.HMS 2 3

,R.HMS 24 R-HMS-2 5 PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF BREAK POINT STM GEN IB.SN NOZZLE

'R fLBOW IEI EL 326

~ 7h

. LH ELBOW I'EL 282

~ 6 LR ELBOW IEI EL 278

~ 6 CONT. PENETRATION M 12 STRESS RATIO 0.474 0.444 0.4N 0,466 0,385 AI'PLICABLE CRITER IA TERMINALEND HIGH REI.ATIVE HIGH RELATIVE HIGH RELATIVE TERMINALEND BREAK TYPE'LI W

4 I co Lh LLI LLI Y2i Q

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NODE POINT BREAK

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,TYPE'01 3034 3036 3041 317 R.HFW.68 1

STM GEN IB.SN NOZZLE R-H FW.68.2 R.HFW 68.3 R.HFW 68 4 I.R E LBOW 8 E L 265' 2

LR E LBOW IEI EL 274'3 I.R ELBOWI EL 274' R HFW 68;5 CONT. PENETRATION M.5 0,706 0.700 0,704 HIGH RELATIVE HIGH RELATIVE HIGH RELATIVE 0 397 TERMINALEND 0.517 TERMINALEND LLI W CC ~

4i co Lr) LLI LLJ r>u LLj I LL O- 0 LLI J Jth J g

'G ~ GUILLOTINE{CIRCUMFERENTIAL)

L ~ SLOT (LONGITUDINAL)

REF. NO.:

CALC. NOL PRA-W-MSIFW 1157-3. FIOURE 3.8A.1, FIOURE 3.8A 5, FIOURE 3 8A'7 Ar.:endment

~ tio.

9 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Carolina Power tti Light Company FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT REACTOR Iti REACTOR AUXILIARYBUILDING

SUMMARY

,OF PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS MAINSTEAM 5 FEEDWATER PIPING LOOP ¹2 SHEET 2 OF 3 FIGURE 3.6A-1-CAI.C

SUMMARY

OF CALCULATIONS MS Br FW PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS NODE POINT BREAK NUMBER PHYSICAL DESCR IPTION OF BREAK POINT STR ESS CR I ~(I)

RATIO TER IA R EAK(b)

TYPE 712 4

5 20 23 301 3034

, 3035 304 R.HMS.3.1 R-HMS 3.2 R-HMS 3-3 R.HMS 3 4 R-HMS 3 6 R.HFW 69-1 R HFW 692 R.HFW 69-3 R.HFW.69 4 STM GEN IC-SN NOZZI.E BOTH ENDS OF ELBOW I9I EL. 326'.7'h END OF ELBOW Igt E L 279',00 PENET M3 INSIDE CONT, STM. GEN. NOZZLE END OF ELBOW DWNSTRM OF NOZ, END OF ELBOW DWNSTRM OF NOZ, END OF ELBOW@SEC. SM. WALL 0.484 0.375 0.341 0,412 0,494 0,415 0,376 0,374 0.361 TE HRI HRI HRI TE TE HRI HRI HRI G

G G

G G

G 325 R HFW 69.5 PENET M6 INSIDE CONT.

0 378 TE IA)

HIGH.ENERGY SYSTEMS:

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MODERATE ENERGY SYSTEMS'M

~ HIGH MODERATE ENERGY STflESS POINT (BI HIGH ENERGY SYSTEMS:

G ~ GUILLOTINE(CIRCUMFERENTIALI S

> SLOT (LONOITUDINALI MODERATE ENERGY SYSTEMS:

C ~ THHOUGH WALlLEAKAGE CHACK SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Carolina Power 5 Light Company FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT REACTOR Sr REACTOR AUXILIARYBUILDING

SUMMARY

OF PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS MAINSTEAM & FEEDWATER PIPING LOOP aI3 SHEET 3 OF 3 REF. NO.:

CALC. NO: PRA-W-MS/FW-1165-39, FICURE 3.5A 1, FIOURE 3.8A 5, FIOURE 3.5A 7 AmenrIment No.

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