IR 05000254/2014007

IR 05000254/2014007; 05000265/2014007, September 8, 2014 Through September 26, 2014, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2, NRC Problem Identification and Resolution

ML14302A754
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/29/2014
From:	Christine Lipa NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1
To:	Pacilio M Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
IR 2014007
Download: ML14302A754 (22)

Text

UNITED STATES ber 29, 2014

SUBJECT:

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2014007; 05000265/2014007

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On September 26, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution biennial inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on September 26, 2014, with Mr. S. Darin and other members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to problem identification and resolution and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the inspection samples, the inspection team concluded that implementation of the corrective action program (CAP) at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station was effective. The licensee had a low threshold for identifying problems and entering them into the CAP. Items entered into the CAP were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria; were properly evaluated commensurate with their safety significance; and corrective actions were implemented in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance.

Operating experience was entered into the corrective action program and appropriately evaluated for applicability to station activities and equipment. The use of operating experience was integrated into daily activities. Audits and self-assessments were performed at appropriate frequencies and at an appropriate level to identify issues. The assessments reviewed were thorough and effective in identifying site performance deficiencies, programmatic concerns, and improvement opportunities. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, workers at the site expressed freedom to enter safety concerns into the CAP. The Inspectors did not identify any impediments to the establishment of a safety conscious work environment at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant. Two NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified. One finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because the issue was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a non-cited violation (NCV) in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the subject or severity of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the findings in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)

component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Christine A, Lipa, Branch Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30

Enclosure:

IR 05000254/2014007; 05000265/2014007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION III==

Docket Nos: 50-254; 50-265 License Nos: DPR-29; DPR-30 Report No: 05000254/2014007; 05000265/2014007 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Cordova, IL Dates: September 8 through September 26, 2014 Inspectors: C. Phillips, Project Engineer (Team Lead)

R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector G. ODwyer, Reactor Inspector R. Walton, Senior Operations Examiner C. Mathews, Illinois Emergency Management Agency Approved by: C. Lipa, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Report 05000254/2012007, 05000265/2012007; 09/08/2014 - 09/26/2014;

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection.

This inspection was performed by three NRC regional inspectors, the senior resident inspector, and the onsite Illinois Emergency Management Agency inspector. Two Green findings were identified by the inspectors. One finding was considered a non-cited violation (NCV) of NRC regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow,

Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision 5, dated February 2014.

Problem Identification and Resolution On the basis of the samples selected for review, the team concluded that implementation of the corrective action program (CAP) at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station was effective. The licensee had a low threshold for identifying problems and entering them into the CAP. Items entered into the CAP were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria; were properly evaluated commensurate with their safety significance; and corrective actions were implemented in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance.

Operating experience was entered into the corrective action program and appropriately evaluated for applicability to station activities and equipment. The use of operating experience was integrated into daily activities. Audits and self-assessments were performed at appropriate frequencies and at an appropriate level to identify issues. The assessments reviewed were thorough and effective in identifying site performance deficiencies, programmatic concerns, and improvement opportunities. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, workers at the site expressed freedom to enter safety concerns into the CAP. The inspectors did not identify any impediments to the establishment of a safety conscious work environment at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the inspectors when they determined that non-licensed operator general area rounds and field checks were inadequate for the circumstances. The inspectors determined that the failure to have non-licensed operator rounds package acceptance criteria that met procedural requirements was a performance deficiency. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as Issue Report (IR) 02385609, PIR - Operator Rounds For HPCI Bearing Oil Lvl Differ between Units. The licensee had not had time to determine corrective actions before the end of the inspection.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability to response to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and is therefore a finding.

Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04 Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, the finding was screened against the mitigating systems cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was/did not: 1) a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system or component, 2) represent a loss of system and/or function, 3) represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, 4) represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and 5) did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding or severe weather event. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of Human Performance in the aspect of Training. Specifically, the non-licensed operators should have been trained that an oil level not between the marked bands on the oil level indicator was an issue regardless of the rounds acceptance criteria for that parameter. (IMC 0310 H.9) (Section 4OA2.1.b(1))

Green.

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors when they determined that Technical Specification (TS) surveillance procedures contained inadequate acceptance criteria.

The failure to have TS surveillance procedure acceptance criteria that ensured the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) loading would not exceed the maximum licensed limit was a performance deficiency. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as IR 02389102, PIR Admin Controls For Allowed EDG Frequency Tolerance. The licensee had not had time to determine corrective actions before the end of the inspection.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and is therefore a finding. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the acceptance criteria for EDG frequency and voltage would not affect the operability and reliability of the engine and safety related structures, systems or components. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04 Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the mitigating systems cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system or component. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of resolution in the area of problem identification because the licensee did not take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee did not implement adequate administrative controls to their EDG testing procedures to ensure that the procedures adequately addressed the non-conservative TS. (IMC 0310 P.3) (Section 4OA2.1.b(3))

Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

The activities documented in Sections

.1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of

problem identification and resolution as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program (CAP) implementing procedures and attended CAP meetings to assess the implementation of the CAP by site personnel.

The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensees CAP since the last U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) problem identification and resolution inspection in August 2012. The selection of issues ensured an adequate review of issues across NRC cornerstones. The inspectors used issues identified through NRC generic communications, department self-assessments, licensee audits, operating experience reports, and NRC documented findings as sources to select issues. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed issue reports (IRs) generated as a result of facility personnels performance in daily plant activities. In addition, the inspectors reviewed IRs and a selection of completed investigations from the licensees various investigation methods, which included root cause, apparent cause, equipment apparent cause, common cause, and quick human performance investigations.

The inspectors selected the residual heat removal service water systems for Units 1 and 2 for a detailed review. The inspectors review was to determine whether the licensee staff properly monitored and evaluated the performance of the system through effective implementation of station monitoring programs. A 5-year review was performed to assess the licensee staffs efforts in monitoring for system degradation due to aging aspects. The inspectors also performed partial system walkdowns of the residual heat removal service water systems for Units 1 and 2.

During the reviews, the inspectors determined whether the licensee staffs actions were in compliance with the facilitys corrective action program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements. Specifically, the inspectors determined if licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the plant issues into the stations CAP in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also determined whether the licensee staff assigned the appropriate investigation method to ensure the proper determination of root, apparent, and contributing causes. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports. This included completed investigations and NRC findings, including non-cited violations.

b. Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors concluded that problem identification was generally effective. Based on the information reviewed, the inspectors determined that Quad Cities Station personnel had a low threshold for initiating IRs; station personnel appropriately screened issues from both the NRC and industry operating experience at an appropriate level and entered them into the CAP when applicable; and identified problems were generally entered into the CAP in a complete, accurate, and timely manner.

The inspectors determined that the station was generally effective at trending low level issues to prevent larger issues from developing. The licensee also used the CAP to document instances where previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.

Findings

Introduction:

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the inspectors when they determined that non-licensed operator general area rounds and field checks were inadequate for the circumstances.

Description:

On May 19, 2014, the inspectors identified that the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) booster pump outboard bearing oil was high out-of-specification. The inspectors questioned the operability of the Unit 2 HPCI pump due to the high bearing oil level. The licensee wrote IR 01661876, NRC IDD HPCI LP Pump OB Brng High Oil Lvl. In the basis for operability the licensee wrote that the HPCI systems safety-related mission time was only ten minutes. The licensee also wrote that the HPCI system had been run on May 6, 2014, for about one hour and again on May 12, 2014, for about 15 minutes with no detrimental effects and that no oil had been added since these runs.

The inspectors concluded that the HPCI booster pump bearing oil had been out-of-spec high for at least 13 days. The inspectors reviewed the non-licensed operator (NLO) logs for both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI pumps. The Unit 1 log stated, Verify oil level is marked, and the Unit 2 log stated, Verify oil level is at marked levels. The inspectors determined these acceptance criteria were inadequate to ensure operability of the HPCI booster pump. Both units HPCI booster pump outboard bearing oil level indicators have marked oil level bands. The correct oil level is between the lower and upper band.

Operating procedure, OP-AA-102-102, General Area Checks and Operator Field Rounds, Revision 12, Section 4.2 states, in part, that rounds data requirements consist of: the name of the parameter and/or gauge # and a high limit for the parameter and a low limit for the parameter.

Analysis:

The inspectors determined that the failure to have NLO rounds package acceptance criteria that met procedural requirements was a performance deficiency.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability to response to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and is therefore a finding.

Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04 Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, the finding was screened against the mitigating systems cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was/did not: 1) a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system or component, 2) represent a loss of system and/or function, 3) represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, 4) represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and 5) did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding or severe weather event. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of Human Performance in the aspect of Training.

Specifically, the NLOs should have been trained that an oil level not between the marked bands on the oil level indicator was an issue regardless of the rounds acceptance criteria. (IMC 0310 H.9)

Enforcement:

No violation of a regulatory requirement was identified. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as IR 02385609, PIR - Operator Rounds For HPCI Bearing Oil Lvl Differ between Units. The licensee had not had time to determine corrective actions before the end of the inspection. Because this finding does not involve a violation and is of very low safety significance, it is identified as a FIN (FIN 05000254/2014007-01; 05000265/2014007-01, Inadequate Rounds Package Acceptance Criteria).

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors concluded that identified problems were generally prioritized and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance, including an appropriate consideration of risk. Higher level evaluations, such as root cause and apparent cause evaluations were generally technically accurate; of sufficient depth to effectively identify the cause(s); and adequately considered extent of condition, generic implications, and previous occurrences.

The inspectors determined that the station ownership committee and management review committee meetings were generally thorough and meeting participants were actively engaged and well-prepared. Station ownership committee and management review committee meetings accurately prioritized issues.

The inspectors determined that overall, Quad Cities Station personnel evaluated equipment operability and functionality requirements adequately after a degraded or non-conforming condition was identified, and appropriate actions were assigned to correct the degraded or non-conforming condition. There was one example the inspectors identified where an NRC identified issue, IR 01661876, NRC IDD HPCI LP Pump OB Brng High Oil Lvl, regarding the U2 HPCI booster pump outboard bearing oil level was assessed for operability but not for functionality. The inspectors concluded this issue was minor because U2 HPCI was not credited for safe shutdown and the mission time for station blackout was equal to or less than that for a design basis accident. Therefore U2 HPCI was functional. The licensee documented the issue in IR 2386293, Functionality Assessment Not Performed For IR 1661876.

Findings No findings were identified.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions Based on the results of the inspection, overall, the corrective actions reviewed were found to be appropriately focused to correct the identified problem and were implemented in a timely manner commensurate with the issues safety significance.

Problems identified through root or apparent cause evaluations were resolved in accordance with the CAP procedural and regulatory requirements. Corrective actions intended to prevent recurrence were generally comprehensive, thorough, and timely.

The corrective actions associated with selected NRC documented findings and violations, as well as licensee-identified violations, were generally appropriate to correct the problem and were implemented in a timely manner.

Findings

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green)and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when they determined that Technical Specification (TS)surveillance procedures contained inadequate acceptance criteria.

Description:

In January 2013, the inspectors identified that the diesel generator loading calculations were inadequate to demonstrate that the system design basis was met.

This issue was dispositioned as NCV 05000254/2012005-01; 05000265/2012005-01, Diesel Generator Technical Specification Frequency and Voltage Variation not Considered in Loading Calculations. The determination was made that the TS requirements for frequency and voltage were non-conservative because operation of the EDG at the far ends of bands could result in exceeding the licensed maximum load limit of the EDGs. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as IR 1463907 on January 17, 2013.

Licensee procedure OP-AA-108-115, Operability Determinations, Section 4.5.18, Non-conservative TS, stated, in part, The imposition of administrative controls in response to a non-conservative TS is considered acceptable short-term corrective action. The administrative controls should be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The inspectors determined that the licensee implemented administrative controls to test procedures for the EDG; however, the procedure test acceptance criteria were not revised to ensure that the EDG would not be accepted in a condition that could exceed the licensed loading limits of the engine.

Analysis:

The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to have TS surveillance procedure acceptance criteria that ensured the EDG loading would not exceed the maximum licensed limit was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the acceptance criteria for EDG frequency and voltage would not affect the operability and reliability of the engine and safety related structures, systems and components.

The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the significance determination process in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04 Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding was screened against the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system or component.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of resolution in the area of problem identification because the licensee did not take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee did not implement adequate administrative controls to their EDG testing procedures to ensure that the procedures adequately addressed the non-conservative TS.

(IMC 0310 P.3)

Enforcement:

Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures that shall have appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. The licensee established QCOS 6600-41, Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Load Test, Revision 48, as the implementing procedure for diesel generator surveillance testing, an activity affecting quality.

Contrary to the above, from January 17, 2013, until September 26, 2014, the licensee failed to have a procedure with appropriate acceptance criteria for ensuring that the EDG could meet its TS surveillance test design loading limits. Specifically, QCOS 6600-41, Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Load Test, Revision 48, acceptance criteria failed to verify that the EDG loading would not exceed the maximum licensed value.

Immediate corrective actions were not completed as of the close of the inspection.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the licensees CAP as IR 02389102, PIR Admin Controls For Allowed EDG Frequency Tolerance, this violation is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000254/2014007-02; 05000265/2014007-02, Inadequate Administrative Controls).

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the facilitys Operating Experience (OE) program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed implementing OE program procedures, attended CAP meetings to observe the use of OE information, completed evaluations of OE issues and events, and selected monthly assessments of the OE composite performance indicators. The inspectors review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensees program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented.

b. Assessment In general, OE was appropriately used at the station. The inspectors observed that OE was discussed as part of the daily station and pre-job briefings. Industry OE was disseminated across the various plant departments. No issues were identified during the inspectors review of licensee OE evaluations. The inspectors also verified that the use of OE in formal CAP products such as root cause evaluations and equipment apparent cause evaluations was appropriate and adequately considered. Generally, OE that was applicable to Quad Cities Station was thoroughly evaluated and actions were implemented in a timely manner to address any issues that resulted from the evaluations.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee staffs ability to identify and enter issues into the CAP program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits.

b. Assessment Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors did not identify any issues of concern regarding Quad Cities Station staffs ability to conduct self-assessments and audits. Assessments were conducted in accordance with plant procedures, were generally thorough and intrusive, adequately covered the subject area, and were effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. Identified issues were entered into the CAP with an appropriate significance characterization and corrective actions were completed and/or scheduled to be completed in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees safety conscious work environment (SCWE)through the reviews of the facilitys employee concern program implementing procedures, discussions with coordinators of the employee concern program, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. In order to assess Quad Cities safety culture, interviews were conducted with a representative group of station employees over the course of the first and third weeks of the inspection.

Additionally, the sites most recent safety culture assessment was reviewed and the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) coordinators were interviewed.

b. Assessment Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors did not identify any issues that suggested conditions were not conducive to the establishment and existence of a SCWE at Quad Cities Station. Information obtained during the interviews indicated that an environment was established where Quad Cities Station employees felt free to raise nuclear safety issues without fear of retaliation; were aware of and generally familiar with the CAP and other processes, including the ECP and the NRC, through which concerns could be raised; and safety significant issues could be freely communicated to supervision.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Management Meeting

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On September 26, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. S. Darin and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

S. Darin, Site Vice President

K. OShea, Plant Manager

W. Beck, Regulatory Assurance Manager

H. Dodd, Maintenance Director

D. Collins, Radiation Protection Manager

T. Wojcik, Nuclear Oversight Manager

J. Wooldridge, Chemistry/Environ/Radwaste Manager

K. Ohr, Site Engineering Director

D. Kimler, Operations Director

B. Wake, Shift Operations Supervisor

T. Peterson, Regulatory Assurance

C. Berry, Corrective Actions Manager

S. Mroz, Senior Design Engineering

D. Damhoff, Design Engineer Structural

N. Howard, RHRSW System Engineer

M. Hurley, RHRSW System Engineer

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

C. Lipa, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1

LIST OF ITEMS

Opened

05000254/2014007-01; FIN Inadequate Rounds Package Acceptance Criteria

05000265/2014007-01 (Section 4OA2.1b.(1))

05000254/2014007-02 NCV Inadequate Administrative Controls

05000265/2014007-02 (Section 4OA2.1b.(3))

Closed

05000254/2014007-01; FIN Inadequate Rounds Package Acceptance Criteria

05000265/2014007-01 (Section 4OA2.1b.(1))

05000254/2014007-02 NCV Inadequate Administrative Controls

05000265/2014007-02 (Section 4OA2.1B.(3))