IR 05000498/2015001
| ML15113B384 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/2015 |
| From: | Andrew Rosebrook NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B |
| To: | Koehl D South Texas |
| Rosebrook A | |
| References | |
| EA-12-227 IR 2015001 | |
| Download: ML15113B384 (26) | |
Text
May 7, 2015
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2015001 AND 05000499/2015001
Dear Mr. Koehl:
On April 4, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. On April 9, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Andrew Rosebrook, Acting Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-498 and 50-499 License Nos.: NPF-76 and NPF-80
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000498/2015001 and 05000499/2015001 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION IV==
Docket: 05000498, 05000499 License: NPF-76, NPF-80 Report: 05000498/2015001 and 05000499/2015001 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: January 1 through April 4, 2015 Inspectors: A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector N. Hernandez, Resident Inspector S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector Approved Andrew Rosebrook By: Acting Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects-1- Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000498/2015001, 05000499/2015001; 01/01/2015 - 04/04/2015; South Texas Project
Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report.
The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and April 4, 2015, by the resident inspectors at the South Texas Project and an inspector from the NRCs Region IV office. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Significance Determination Process. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
No findings were identified.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the period at 100 percent power and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and entered Mode 3 on March 29, 2015, to begin Refueling Outage 2RE17. The unit remained shut down for the remainder of the period.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
On March 17, 2015, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse weather procedures for hurricane season and evaluated the licensees implementation of these procedures. The inspectors verified that prior to hurricane season; the licensee had corrected weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous hurricane season.
These activities constituted one sample of readiness for seasonal adverse weather, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:
- January 26, 2015, Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump during normal operations
- January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump during normal operations
- March 18, 2015, Unit 2, train B essential cooling water while train A was out of service.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted three partial system walk-down samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on six plant areas important to safety:
- January 27, 2015, Unit 1, standby transformer, Fire Area 99 and Fire Zone 0750
- January 27, 2015, Unit 2, standby transformer, Fire Area 99 and Fire Zone 0750
- February 12, 2015, Unit 1, electrical auxiliary building, Fire Area 02 and Fire Zone Z037
- March 10, 2015, Unit 1, train B emergency diesel generator, Fire Area 37 and Fire Zone Z501
- March 18, 2015, Unit 2, train B essential cooling water, Fire Area 58 and Fire Zone Z605
- March 24, 2015, common to both units, diesel fire pump 2, Fire Zone Z800 For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
These activities constituted six quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
On February 26 through March 25, 2015, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected four underground bunkers that contained risk-significant cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment:
- Unit 2, Class 1E, train C electrical manhole C0XYAKKEM54
- Unit 1, Class 1E, train A electrical manhole A0XYABKEM52
- Unit 2, Class 1E, train C electrical manhole C0XYABKEM56
- Unit 1, Class 1E, train B electrical manhole B0XYABKEM53 The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the bunkers and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion. The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.
These activities constitute completion of one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On March 11, 2015, the inspectors observed simulator training for an operating crew.
The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities.
On March 23, 2015, the inspectors observed just-in-time simulator training for an operating crew. The training included a brief from reactor engineering on the reactivity plan for the shutdown, and a simulator scenario where the crew could practice shutdown procedures and work on communications and responsibilities. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities.
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
On January 22, 2015, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the Unit 2 main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to beginning train A emergency diesel generator surveillance testing, along with replacing makeup water totalizer in the chemical and volume control system.
On March 28 and 29, 2015, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the Unit 2 main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to shutting down the Unit 2 reactor for Refueling Outage 2RE17.
In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs):
- January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump following cleaning and lubrication
- February 2, 2015, Unit 2, failure of resistance temperature detector RTD-420Y during response time testing
- February 11, 2015, Unit 2, control room makeup and cleanup system, flow control valve, FCV-984, failed to modulate following planned maintenance The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
These activities constituted completion of three maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
- January 8, 2015, Unit 2, phase C bushing replacement of breaker Y550 Dow-Velasco 27, 345kV line to south bus
- January 28, 2015, Unit 2, phase B shaft seal repair on breaker Y580 Elm Creek 27, 345kV line to south bus
- March 17, 2015, Unit 2, phase rotation checks on 13.8kV switchgear bus 2F The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.
The inspectors also observed portions of five emergent work activities that had the potential to cause an initiating event, to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems, or to impact barrier integrity:
- January 18, 2015, Unit 2, unplanned extended outage of train A essential chilled water due to a faulty check valve
- February 3, 2015, Unit 1, unplanned extended outage of emergency 13.8kV transformer due to 13.8kV breaker fit-up issues
- February 25, 2015, Unit 1, emergent train A emergency diesel generator maintenance to replace shutdown air pressure control valve PCV-5436
- March 5, 2015, Unit 1, unplanned trip of train C essential chiller while train A essential chiller was out of service for planned maintenance
- March 16, 2015, Unit 1, emergent maintenance on the reactor containment building personnel airlock inner door seal The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees actions for implementing the Configuration Risk Management Program for determining and implementing the risk-informed allowed outage time for the following emergent issues listed above: 1) Technical Specification 3.7.14.a for Unit 2, train A essential chilled water extended maintenance; and 2) Technical Specification 3.7.14.b for unexpected Unit 1, train C essential chiller trip.
These activities constitute completion of eight maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations and one functionality assessment that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:
- February 5, 2015, operability determination of Unit 1, train A 120 Vac inverter following a cooling fan failure
- February 10, 2015, functionality assessment of new fuel received with foreign material found in shipping containers during receipt inspection
- March 2, 2015, operability determination of the Unit 2 mechanical auxiliary building roof following lifting FLEX (Fukashima) diesel generators greater than 20 feet above the roof
- March 5, 2015, operability determination of Unit 1, train A emergency diesel generator due to leakage through removable knockout panels (flood protection panels) during leak testing
- March 6, 2015, operability determination of Unit 1 reactor containment building personnel airlock due to failure of the inner door seal
- March 19, 2015, operability determination of Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump due to degraded governor performance
- March 23, 2015, operability determination of Unit 2 qualified display processing system due to a comparative communication issue between two redundant data processing units The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable or functional, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability or functionality. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability or functionality of the degraded SSC.
These activities constitute completion of seven operability and functionality review samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed one temporary plant modification that affected risk-significant SSCs:
- April 2, 2015, Unit 1, temporary modification to the qualified display processing system, which removed the communication link between database processing units A and C to reduce the number of alarms in the control room The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed this temporary modification in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that this modification did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs.
The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modification to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.
These activities constitute completion of one sample of temporary modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs:
- January 18, 2015, Unit 1, pressurizer level channel 467 following NLP5 circuit card replacement
- January 22, 2015, Unit 2, reactor coolant system water makeup control following controller replacement
- January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump following inspection, cleaning, and lubrication
- February 13, 2015, Unit 2, train A control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning makeup and cleanup following repair of flow control valve FCV-9584
- March 14, 2015, Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump following governor replacement
- March 16, 2015, Unit 1, personnel airlock inner door following seal replacement The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.
These activities constitute completion of six post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the stations refueling outage that began March 28, 2015, and was still in progress as of April 4, 2015 (end of this inspection quarter), the inspectors evaluated the licensees outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:
- Review of the licensees outage plan prior to the outage
- Review and verification of the licensees fatigue management activities
- Monitoring of shut-down and cool-down activities
- Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities
- Observation and review of lowered-inventory activities These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed eight risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:
In-service tests:
- January 16, 2015, Unit 1, train B component cooling water pump in-service surveillance test
- January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump periodic surveillance testing
- February 3, 2015, Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump periodic surveillance testing Containment isolation penetration tests:
- March 16, 2015, Unit 1, local leak-rate test penetration M-90 personnel airlock door seals Other surveillance tests:
- January 12, 2015, Unit 1, engineered safety features power availability surveillance
- January 20, 2015, Unit 1, control room envelope makeup heating, ventilation, and air conditioning periodic surveillance test
- January 21, 2015, Unit 2, power range nuclear instrumentation channel calibration, axial flux difference calibration, and quadrant power tilt ration determination
- March 28, 2015, Unit 2, main turbine mechanical overspeed test The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.
These activities constitute completion of eight surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on February 11, 2015, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance.
The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario; observed the drill from the simulator, technical support center, and the emergency response center; and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports for the period of January 2014 through January 2015 to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these licensee event reports to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operating logs, corrective action program records, and monthly operating reports for the period of January 2014 through January 2015 to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power outages per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred between January 2014 and January 2015. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
Routine Review
a. Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
(Closed) Violation 05000498/2012007-01; 05000499/2012007-01: Failure to Timely Correct Conditions Adverse to Fire Protection (EA-12-227)
During the 2012 problem identification and resolution inspection, the team issued a violation (05000498;05000499/2012007-01) for the failure to implement timely corrective actions for a previous fire protection violation. The licensees corrective actions included a revised submittal of a license amendment request on July 23, 2013.
The licensee supplemented this license amendment request with letters dated May 12 (two letters), May 19, and December 17, 2014.
During the 2014 triennial fire protection inspection, the team reviewed the license amendment request and the compensatory measures the licensee implemented during the review process for the license amendment request. The team performed a timed walk-down of the alternative shutdown procedure and verified that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits, assuming the license amendment request was approved.
On February 13, 2015, the NRC approved the license amendment request. The amendment approved crediting one automatic action and seven operator actions in the main control room prior to evacuation during an alternative shutdown, in addition to manually tripping the reactor previously credited in the fire protection program.
The inspectors performed an in-office review from March 23 to March 31, 2015. The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions, the approved license amendment, and the alternative shutdown procedure. The inspectors noted that the alternative shutdown procedure contained the approved steps for operators to perform the credited actions in the main control room prior to abandoning the control room due to a fire. This violation is closed.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 9, 2015, the inspectors presented the resident inspector inspection results to Mr. D. Koehl, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- R. Aguilera, Manager, Health Physics
- J. Atkins, Manager, Systems Engineering
- M. Berg, Manager, Design Engineering/Testing and Programs
- C. Bowman, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- J. Connolly, General Manager, Engineering
- R. Dunn Jr., Manager, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis
- T. Frawley, Manager, Plant Protection/Emergency Response
- R. Gibbs, Manager, Operations, Production Support
- R. Gonzales, Senior Licensing Engineer
- J. Hartley, Manager, Mechanical Maintenance
- G. Hildebrandt, Manager, Operations
- G. Janak, Operations Training Manager
- J. Lovejoy, Manager, I&C Maintenance
- R. McNeil, Manager, Maintenance Engineering
- J. Milliff, Manager, Security
- M. Murray, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- L. Peter, General Manager, Projects
- J. Pierce, Manager, Unit 1 Operations
- G. Powell, Site Vice President
- M. Ruvalcaba, Manager, Strategic Projects
- R. Savage, Engineer, Licensing Staff Specialist
- R. Scarborough, Manager, Quality Assurance
- M. Schaefer, Plant General Manager
- R. Stastny, Maintenance Manager
- L. Sterling, Supervisor, Licensing
- D. Zink, Supervising Engineering Specialist
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000498/2012007-01 Failure to Timely Correct Conditions Adverse to Fire Protection VIO
- 05000499/2012007-01 [EA-12-227] (Section 4OA5)
Attachment