ML17023A145

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Summary of Teleconference with PSEG Regarding Hope Creek HPCI
ML17023A145
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 01/23/2017
From: Barkley R
Reactor Projects Branch 3
To: Fred Bower
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Barkley R
References
Download: ML17023A145 (2)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 January 23, 2017 MEETING

SUMMARY

MEMORANDUM TO: Fred L. Bower III, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects FROM: Richard S. Barkley, Senior Project Engineer /RA/

Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects LICENSEE: PSEG Nuclear, LLC FACILITY: Hope Creek Generating Station

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF TELECONFERENCE ON DECEMBER 21, 2016 On December 21, 2016, from 10:30 am to noon, staff from DRP and DRS conducted a teleconference with representatives of PSEG Nuclear LLC. The purpose of the call was to ask clarifying questions regarding the material submitted in writing on December 14, 2016 (ML16349A604), and available via an electronic reading room as the 30-day written response regarding the proposed White apparent violation (AV) at Hope Creek on HPCI in IR 05000354/2016003. Specifically, the NRC identified an AV regarding the inoperability of HPCI for a period in late June to early August 2016 due to excessive water in the HPCI oil system. While PSEGs written response acknowledged the performance deficiency identified, the company asserted that the NRCs risk analysis of this event was overly conservative.

Based on additional refinements of their PRA models, PSEG asserted that the risk of this event posed a delta CDF/yr of less than 1E-06. Thus PSEG requested that the finding be assessed as a Green NCV.

The questions posed by the DRS specialist staff centered on clarifying three main areas of the PSEG submittal: 1) changes in the assumptions regarding the modeling of actions in response to fires for certain accident scenarios, 2) the exposure time when HPCI should have been considered inoperable, and 3) the availability of condensate and main feedwater for medium break accident scenarios given the loss of support systems (e.g., cooling to bearings and cooling to instrument air compressors).

No regulatory conclusions or staff decisions were made during the conference call. The NRC staff did not make any formal request for additional information, but PSEG offered to provide supplemental clarifying information in a docketed letter. The supplemental information was received in a letter dated January 3, 2017 (ML17003A319).

PSEG did not have an opportunity to comment on this summary.

ML17023A145 Non-Sensitive Publicly Available SUNSI Review Sensitive Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRS RI/ORA RI/DRP CCrisden/MMM for NAME RBarkley FArner FBower w/comment DATE 1/10/17 1/19/17 1/17/17 1/23/17