ML17306B093

From kanterella
Revision as of 10:05, 29 October 2019 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Suppl 1 to Special Rept 3-SR-92-004:on 920817,seven-day Period for Returning PASS to Service exceeded.30DP-9WP04 Revised to Retest for PASS & Gaseous Radwaste to Be Completed by 921120
ML17306B093
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 10/30/1992
From: James M. Levine
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-00807-JML-T, 192-807-JML-T, 3-SR-92-004, 3-SR-92-4, NUDOCS 9211060240
Download: ML17306B093 (10)


Text

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMO 'RATION SYSTEM REGULA>. Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIOI SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9211060240 DOC.DATE: 92/10/30 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-530, Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document. Control Branch (Document, Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Suppl 1 to Special Rept 3-SR-92-004:on 920817,seven-day period for returning PASS to service exceeded.30DP,-9WP04 revised to re retest for PASS & Gaseous Radwaste to be completed by 921120.

D.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL / SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), ncident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000530 -g RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 D TRAMMELLPC '1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPBll 2 . 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 NRR-- --- PLB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 I RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 2" 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHYPG.A 1 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE V'ASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK.

ROOhI Pl-S7 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 31 ENCL 31

J Arizona Public Service Company PALO,VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 ~

192-00807-JML/TRB/JJN JAMES M. LEVINE VICE PAESIDENZ October 30, 1992

.NVCI.EAA PADDUCTIDN U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

'Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 (License No. NPF-74)

Special Report 3-SR-92-004-01 File: 92-020-404 Enclosed please find Supplement- 1 to Special Report 3-SR-92-004 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System being inoperable for greater than seven days. This supplement is being submitted to provide additional information regarding the cause of the event and the corrective action. A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator,.NRC Region V.

If you have any questions, please contact Thomas R. Bradish at (602) 393-5421.

Sincerely, JML/TRB/JJN/pmm Enclosure V

cc: J. B. Martin (all w/enclosure)

J. A. Sloan W. F. Conway 92ii060240 92i030 PDR ADOCK 05000530 S , PDR

ENCLOSURE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS

r PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 3 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS

,LICENSE NO. NPF-74 DOCKET NO.. 50-530 SPECIAL REPORT 3-SR-92-004-01 INITIALCONDITIONS:

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) was inoperable for a period greater than seven days. The seven-day period for returning PASS to service was exceeded at approximately 1005 MST on August 17, 1992.

R BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

P PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under post accident conditions. The liquid sample portion of the system provides pressurized and depressurized reactor coolant samples as required for analysis. The gas sample portion of the system provides containment atmosphere samples as required for analysis.

ACTIONS TAKEN'n August 10, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 1 (power operation) when PASS was declared inoperable at approximately 1000 MST for maintenance. The maintenance involved rerouting field tubing to permit easier access for future maintenance. Following the completion of work at approximately 1503 MST on August 10, 1992, PASS was declared operable.

On September 2, 1992, Chemistry Technicians discovered that the PASS was unable to draw a vacuum on the gaseous sample bomb. Initial troubleshooting determined on September 4, 1992, that the maintenance performed on August 10, 1992, may have caused the PASS to be inoperable.'he PASS was reworked and operability was restored on September 5, 1992.

1 of 2

CAUSE OF THE INOPERABILITY:

The investigation determined that the tubing was rerouted using additional 1/4 inch tubing and modifying the existing 1/2 inch tubing. The additional 1/4 inch tubing was installed between the same diameter tubing that extended from the PASS station and the rerouted 1/2 inch tubing. Due to the additional length and number of turns in the rerouted vent line, sufficient vacuum could not be established after the modification.

The planner had intended the line to be rerouted using 1/2 inch tubing and prescribed inventory numbers which corresponded to 1/2 tubing. However, the mechanic rerouted the line using shop stock material and did not have to order any more material. APS is continuing to investigate this issue to determine what actions are appropriate for similar circumstances in the future. This investigation is expected to b'e completed by November 16, 1992. The results of this investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report.

This supplement is expected to be submitted by December 14, 1992.

In addition to the work which resulted in the PASS being inoperable, an appropriate retest was not conducted to identify that PASS was inoperable prior to declaring the PASS operable. An Inservice Leak Test was originally specified but later deleted since the tubing was open ended and could not have been readily pressurized. Operations, Chemistry, and the Work Control Supervisor concurred with the decision to delete the retest requirement and determined that no further testing was required.

1 Appendix A of the retest procedure (30DP-9WP04) lists parameters (pressure, temperature, flow) to be checked for work involving tubing. Flow requirements. could have been checked by attempting to draw a vacuum.

As corrective action, 30DP-9WP04 will be revised to specify that Chemistry personnel will be responsible to determine retest for PASS and Gaseous Radwaste. This change is expected to be completed by November 20, 1992. Additionally, the Chemistry System Status procedure, 74DP-9ZZ04, was revised to direct Chemistry personnel to ensure that a functional test is performed following maintenance which may affect the sampling capability.

PLANS AND SCHEDULE FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO SERVICE:

Following satisfactory completion of repairs and required surveillance testing, PASS was returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 2137 on September 5, 1992.

2of2