IR 05000498/2005008
| ML053610004 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/2005 |
| From: | Paulk C J Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Sheppard J J South Texas |
| References | |
| IR-05-008 | |
| Download: ML053610004 (19) | |
Text
December 23, 2005
James J. Sheppard, President and Chief Executive Officer STP Nuclear Operating Company
P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483
SUBJECT: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT - NRC SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN ANDPERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2005008;
Dear Mr. Sheppard:
On December 2, 2005, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspectionat your South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, facility. The enclosed integrated report documentsthe inspection findings which were discussed on December 2, 2005, with you and members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC PublicDocument Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC'sdocument system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/Charles J. Paulk, ChiefEngineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor SafetyDockets: 50-498; 50-499Licenses: NPF-76; NPF-80 STP Nuclear Operating Company-2-
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000498/2005008; 05000499/2005008
w/Attachment:
Supplemental InformationDISTRIBUTION:E. D. Halpin Vice President, Oversight STP Nuclear Operating Company
P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483S. M. Head, Manager, LicensingSTP Nuclear Operating Company P.O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5014 Wadsworth, TX 77483C. Kirksey/C. M. CanadyCity of Austin Electric Utility Department721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704J. J. Nesrsta/R. K. TempleCity Public Service Board P.O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296Jack A. Fusco/Michael A. ReedTexas Genco, LP 12301 Kurland Drive Houston, TX 77034Jon C. WoodCox Smith Matthews 112 E. Pecan, Suite 1800 San Antonio, TX 78205A. H. Gutterman, Esq.Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20004INPORecords Center 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064Director, Division of Compliance &Inspection Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of State Health Services 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756Brian AlmonPublic Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701-3326Environmental and Natural Resources Policy Director P.O. Box 12428 Austin, TX 78711-3189Judge, Matagorda CountyMatagorda County Courthouse 1700 Seventh Street Bay City, TX 77414Terry Parks, Chief InspectorTexas Department of Licensing and Regulation Boiler Program P.O. Box 12157 Austin, TX 78711Susan M. JablonskiOffice of Permitting, Remediation and Registration Texas Commission on Environmental Quality MC-122, P.O. Box 13087 Austin, TX 78711-3087Ted Enos4200 South Hulen Suite 630 Fort Worth, TX 76109 STP Nuclear Operating Company-3-Electronic distribution by RIV:Regional Administrator (BSM1)DRP Director (ATH)DRS Director (DDC)DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)Senior Resident Inspector (JXC2)Branch Chief, DRP/A (CEJ1)Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A (TRF)Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)RITS Coordinator (KEG)DRS STA (DAP)J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)ROPreports STP Site Secretary (LAR)SUNSI Review Completed: cjp _ ADAMS:
O Yes G No Initials: cjp
______ O Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive O Non-SensitiveSRI:EB1RI:EB1RI:EB1RI:EB1C:EB1C:DRP/AC:EB1JTapia/lmbGGeorgeBHendersonDProulxCJPaulkCEJohnsonCJPaulk/RA//RA//RA//RA//RA/TRF for/RA/12/22/0512/22/0512/21/0512/22/0512/22/0512/23/0512/23/05OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax EnclosureENCLOSUREU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Dockets:50-498, 50-499 Licenses:NPF-76, NPF-80 Report No:05000498/2005008;05000499/2005008 Licensee:STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility:South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2Location:FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483Dates:November 14 through December 2, 2005 Team Leader:J. I. Tapia, P.E., Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Inspectors:G. George, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1B. Henderson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 D. Proulx, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1Accompanied by:B. Smith, Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program J. Leivo, P.E., Contractor, Beckman & Assoc., Inc.Approved By:C. Paulk, ChiefEngineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000498/2005-08, 05000499/2005-08; 11/14 -12/2/2005; South Texas Project, Units 1and 2; Safety System Design and Performance Capability; Evaluations of Changes, Tests, orExperiments.The report covered a 2-week period of inspection on site by a team of three region-basedengineering inspectors and one consultant. No findings of significance were identified. The
NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors isdescribed in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
B.Licensee-Identified Violations
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
IntroductionThe NRC conducted an inspection to verify that licensee personnel adequatelypreserved the facility safety system design and performance capability and that licenseepersonnel preserved the initial design in subsequent modifications of the systemsselected for review. The scope of the review also included any necessary nonsafety-related structures, systems, and components that provided functions to support safetyfunctions. This inspection also reviewed the licensee's programs and methods for monitoring the capability of the selected systems to perform the current design basisfunctions. This inspection verified aspects of the initiating events, mitigating systems,and barrier cornerstones.Licensee personnel based the probabilistic risk assessment model for the South TexasProject on the capability of the as-built safety systems to perform their intended safetyfunctions successfully. The team determined the area and scope of the inspection by reviewing the licensee's probabilistic risk analysis models to identify the most risksignificant systems, structures, and components. The team established this accordingto their ranking and potential contribution to dominant accident sequences and/orinitiators. The team also used a deterministic approach in the selection process by considering recent inspection history, recent problem area history, and all modifications developed and implemented. The team assessed the adequacy of calculations, analyses, engineering processes, andengineering and operating practices that licensee personnel used for the selected safety system and the necessary support systems during normal, abnormal, and accidentconditions. Acceptance criteria used by the team included NRC regulations, thetechnical specifications, applicable sections of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, applicable industry codes and standards, and industry initiatives implemented by the licensee's programs.
1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of changes tofacility structures, systems, and components, risk-significant normal and emergencyoperating procedures; test programs; and the updated final safety analysis reports in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments." The team utilizedInspection Procedure 71111.02 for this inspection.The minimum sample size for this procedure is 6 evaluations and 12 screenings. Theteam reviewed 9 licensee-performed 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations to verify that licensee personnel had appropriately considered the conditions under which the licensee may make changes to the facility or procedures or conduct tests or experiments without prior NRC approval. The team reviewed 13 licensee-performed 10 CFR 50.59 screenings, in
-2-which the licensee personnel determined that evaluations were not required, to ensurethat the exclusion of a full evaluation was consistent with the requirements of10 CFR 50.59. The team selected evaluations and screenings in the cornerstones of initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity, with the majority of evaluationsand screenings encompassing the mitigating systems cornerstone. The team selectively reviewed the licensee's design modifications and supportingdocuments associated with replacement of underground cables serving the 480 Vac loads in the essential cooling water (ECW) intake structure, replacement of Class 1E 480 Vac motor control center buckets, and Class 1E 120 Vac inverters. The review focused on the potential impact of the changes on the design and licensing basis, and post-modification testing of the cable and inverters. The specific documents the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed. The team also reviewed and evaluated the most recent licensee 10 CFR 50.59 programself assessment to determine whether licensee personnel conducted sufficient in-depth analyses of their program to allow for the identification and subsequent resolution of problems or deficiencies. In addition, the team reviewed the licensee's self assessment plan to verify the licensee's program in resolving issues associated with the application of the 50.59 process.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (71111.21)The minimum sample size for this procedure is one risk-significant system for mitigatingan accident or maintaining barrier integrity.
The team completed the required sample size by reviewing the ECW and the emergency electrical systems. The primary reviewprompted parallel review and examination of support systems, such as, power,instrumentation and controls, cooling and related structures and components..1System Requirements
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the following attributes of the selected systems:
- (1) processmedium (water, steam, air, electrical signal),
- (2) energy sources,
- (3) control systems,and
- (4) equipment protection. The team examined the procedural instructions to verify that instructions were consistent with actions required to meet, prevent, and/or mitigate design basis accidents. The team also considered requirements and commitments identified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, design basis documents, and plant drawings. In conjunction with the primary review, a parallel review and examination of support systems and related structures and componentswere also conducted.
-3-
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2System Condition and Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the periodic testing procedures for the selected systems to verifythat the capabilities of the systems were periodically verified. The team also reviewedsystem health reports, as well as a sample of the governing procedures anddocumentation for the control of calculations that were translated into values used inplant procedures. In addition, the team performed walkdowns of the selected systemsto ascertain the material condition of the systems.To assess the licensee's monitoring of the condition of underground cables, the teamreviewed a sample of insulation resistance test procedures, test results, and trending for the power cable serving the 4160 Vac ECW pump motors and the power cable serving the 480 Vac motor control centers in the ECW intake structure. The team also reviewed a sample of surveillances of the 13.8/4.16 kV engineered safety features transformers.
The specific documents the team inspected are identified in the list of documentsreviewed.The team also reviewed the operation of the systems by reviewing normal, abnormal,and emergency operating procedures. The review included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports, technical specifications, design calculations and drawings.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..3Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of problems associated with the selected systems thatwere identified by licensee personnel in the corrective action program to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues and aging hardware.
The sample included open and closed condition reports and their disposition via maintenance work orders, or apparent cause evaluations, as documented in the licensee's corrective action program. The sample covered the past 3 years and the documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report. Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," was used as guidance to perform this part of the inspection. The team reviewed a sample of licensee condition reports involving electricalcomponents and cable. The sample included conditions whereby cables in the underground duct bank to the ECW intake structure had become flooded, or had potential for flooding, and where the licensee had reported adverse trends of insulation
-4-resistance for underground cable serving 480 Vac ECW loads. The specific conditionreports the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..4System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the selected systems. The team focused on the installation, configuration, and visible material condition of equipment and components. During the walkdowns, the team assessed:The placement of protective barriers and systems,The susceptibility to flooding, fire, or environmental conditions,The physical separation of trains and the provisions for seismic concerns, Accessibility and lighting for any required operator action,The material condition and preservation of systems and equipment, andThe conformance of the currently-installed system configuration to the design andlicensing bases.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..5Design Review
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the current as-built instrument and control, electrical, andmechanical design of the selected systems and support systems. These reviewsincluded an examination of design assumptions, calculations, environmental qualifications, requir ed system thermal-hydraulic performance, electrical power systemperformance, control logic, and instrument setpoints and uncertainties. The team assessed the adequacy of calculations, analyses, test procedures, and operating procedures that licensee personnel used during normal and accident conditions.The team also reviewed t he adequacy of the original system design to perform thedesign basis functions during normal, accident and post-accident conditions. The review included: design basis documents; specifications; reliability calculations;instrument uncertainty/setpoint calculations; uncertainty calculations related to
-5-emergency operating instruction action levels; and schematic diagrams. The adequacyof the design and maintenance of selected support systems was also reviewed.In the electrical design portion of the inspection, the team selectively reviewed:
- The calculations demonstrating that adequate voltage would be provided to theECW pumps and motor-operated valves from the preferred (offsite) ac sources, and from the standby (onsite) diesel generator sources, under design basis conditions*The calculations demonstrating that the ampacities of the underground feedercables to the ECW pump motors and ECW motor control centers were adequate*The calculations demonstrating that the electrical protection for the ECW pumpmotors and feeder cables, and screenwash booster pump motor thermal overload protection, were adequate, and would preclude premature trip.*The calculation for sizing the Class 1E batteries and instrument bus inverters forboth design basis and station blackout conditions.The review was focused on the acceptability of design inputs, assumptions, andmethodology used in the calculations, translation of values to and from dependent documents, and the degree of design margin demonstrated by the results and conclusions. The specific calculations the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.6. Safety System Inspection and Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the program and procedures for testing and inspecting selectedcomponents for the selected systems and support systems. The review included theresults of surveillance tests required by the technical specifications and a selective review of inservice tests.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
-6-4OA6Management MeetingsExit Meeting SummaryThe inspection findings were presented by the team leader during an exit meeting onDecember 2, 2005, to Mr. James J. Sheppard and other members of licensee management staff. The team leader confirmed that proprietary information, while reviewed, had not been retained by the team.
A-1ATTACHMENTPARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTEDLicenseeR. Aguilera, Radiological Manager, Radiological EngineeringT. Bowman, Manager, Operations D. Dayton, Electrical System Engineer G. Jones, Instrumentation and Control Design Engineer E. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight E. Heacock, Electrical Design Engineer S. Head, Manager, Licensing J. Jump, Manager, Process Improvement Leadership Team Q. Lee, HVAC Design Engineer J. Loya, Licensing Engineer, 10 CFR 50.59 M. McBurnett, Manager, Quality and Licensing M. Meier, General Manager, Station Support L. Merritt, HVAC System Engineer W. Mookhoek, Senior Engineer, Quality and Licensing G. Parkey, Vice President, Generation M. Prinz, Electrical System Engineer D. Rencurrel, Manager, Plant Engineering K. Regis, Essential Cooling Water System Engineer R. Savage, Senior Staff Specialist P. Schimpf, Motor Test Engineer W. Schultz, Mechanical Design Engineer J. Sheppard, President and CEO K. Taplett, Licensing Engineer D. Towler, Manager, Quality B. Weigand, Electrical Design Engineer D. Weigand, Fire Protection Engineer J. Winters, Maintenance Rule Coordinator D. Zink, Electrical Design Engineer
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
CalculationsEC-5000, Voltage Regulation Study, Revision 12, 11/04/05EC-5003-2, Cable Ampacity in Underground Ducts - Problems No. 5 through 10, Revision 8, 07/03/98EC-5008, Class 1E Battery, Battery Charger and Inverter Sizing, Revision 13, 02/02/05.
EC-5014, Maximum Length of Control Cables/Class 1E and non-Class 1E, Revision 4, 10/21/99
AttachmentA-2EC-5029, 4.16 kV Switchgear Relay Setting. Revision 5EC-5052, Degraded and Undervoltage Protection, Revision 5, 06/08/04
EC-5067, PSB-1 Test Results Analysis - Unit 1, Revision 0, 08/24/88
EC-5100, Standby Diesel Generator Transient Response Model, Revision 1, 04/07/00MC-6472, DVAC Calculation for AC Motor MOVs, Revision 0, 10/21/99
3R289MC5633, Essential Cooling Water Pump Submergence, Revision 2
MC-6476, Jacket Water and Lube Oil Cooler Performance, Revision 0
MC-6498, STP Pond Program, Revision 0
MC-6498, Essential Cooling Pond Thermal Performance Analysis, Revision 1
SP130(105), ECW Pump Trip Forcing Functions with 2" and 1/2" Vacuum Breakers, Revision 0
MC-6288, ECW Trip Forcing Functions with Vacuum Breakers, Revision 1
ZC-7028, Loop Uncertainty Calculation for Essential Cooling Water Pump DischargeTemperatures, Revision 1Engineering Evaluations05-07071-405-07303-605-07667-205-08601-2205-10323-101-19410-0Condition Reports05-8601-005-8601-5
99-12591-1
2-16395-1
03-10793
03-15730-305-10323-105-15263
05-15679
96-04859-20
97-1861303-1383903-18389
05-01384
05-01437
05-0706705-0987805-11548
05-11757
05-11882
05-1214205-1520905-15242
05-15317
05-15453
05-15685Preventative Maintenance Work Orders (PMWO)
31904316 31911121 31915035 319190883192653231934141
AttachmentA-3Procedures0PGP03-ZA-0090, Work Process Program, Revision 300PGP03-ZM-0028, Erection and Use of Temporary Scaffolding, Revision 11
0POP01-ZA-001, Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines, Revision 24
0POP02-EW-00001, Essential Cooling Water Operations, Revision 36
0POP09-AN-02M3, Annunciator Lampbox 2M03 Response Instructions, Revision 17
0POP09-AN-02M4, Annunciator Lampbox 2M04 Response Instructions, Revision 18
0PSP11-ZE-0001, Check Valve Inspection, Revision 9
0PEP07-ZE-0008, Non-Intrusive Check Valve Testing, Revision 5
0POP02-0001, Essential Cooling Water Operations, Revision36
0PMP05-PK-1000, Auxiliary ESF Transformer Test, Revision 70PMP05-PM-4800, Motor Control Center Maintenance, ITE Gould, Revision10 0PMP05-ZE-0201, Insulation Resistance and Overpotential Testing of Cables and Buses,Revision 8 0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision11
0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision10
0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision 9Design Change PackagesDCP 98-687-13, Replace Obsolete Class 1E MCC E2A2 and E2A4 ,Motor Controller and CircuitBreaker Units, Revision 0DCP 98-687-85, Replace the Overload Heaters for MCC E2A3, Revision 0
DCP 02-17395-12, Replace the Overload Heaters for MCC E1B1 Cubicle L3 and E1B1Cubicle Q4, Revision 0DCP 03-11137-9, Alternate Basket Assembly for the ECW Traveling Screen, Revision 0
DCP 04-11533-7, Revise High Alarm Setpoint N2EWPDSH6859, Revision 0
DCP 97-6297-85, EW Calculations, Revision 0
AttachmentA-4DCP 05-52-192, Special Treatment Requirement Exemption for Actuator Spring for EWFV6934Valve, Revision 0DCP 04-168-194, Alternate Replacement for 1/2" Aluminum Bronze Ball Valve, Revision 0
DCP 04-5417-1, Class 1E Battery Charger Paralleling, Revision 0
DCP 04-5388-4, Install Diodes Across Battery Chargers E2D11-1 and E2D11-2 Alarm Relays,Revision 0DCP 02-3305-6, Install New 480V Power Cables to Class 1E MCC E1A3 to Replace theExisting Deteriorating Power Cables, Revision 0DCP 03-3600-03, Revise UFSAR Section 3.5.1.4 to Delete the Missle Barrier Function of theECW Door and Add New 3.7.4 TRM Section for ECW System Intake Structure which Include
Compensatory Measures to Restore the Door's Flooding Function, Revision13 DCP 04-1238-88, Replace the Class 1E NSSS Inverter Systems, Revision13
DCP 03-01705, Special Treatment Requirement Exemption for 1-1/2 inch X 2-1/2 inch ECWRelief Valves (ASME Class 3), Revision 1DCP 03-15428, Alternate Repair Method for Backwash Arm of the ECW Self-Cleaning Strainer,Revision 2DCP 04-02317, Open RTD in 'C' Phase of ECW Pump 1A Motor, Revision 2DCP 05-07071, ECW Train 1B Piping Repair, Revision 3Modification Packages,,90075, Replace ECW Bellows to SBDG, Revision 0
Drawings00000E0AAAA, Sheet 1, Revision 19, Single Line Diagram, Main One Line Diagram, Units 1
and 29-E-PKAA-01 #1, Revision 12, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1A
9-E-PKAB-01 #1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1B
9-E-PKAC-01 #1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1C
9E0DJAA#1, Sheet 1, Revision 18, Single Line Diagram 125 Vdc Class 1E DistributionSwitchboard E1A11 (Channel I)
AttachmentA-59E0PLAA#1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1A9E0PLAB#1, Revision 14, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1B
9E0PLAC#1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1C
9EPMAA-01 #1, Sheet 1, Revision 22, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1A19EPMAA-01 #1, Sheet 2, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1A19E0PMAB#1, Sheet 1, Revision 21, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1A29E0PMAC#1, Sheet 1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1A39E0PMAD #1, Sheet 1, Revision 20, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1B19E0PMAD #1, Sheet 2, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1B19E0PMAE #1, Sheet 1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1B29E0PMAF #1, Sheet 1, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1B3Maintenance and Test RecordsStartup Test Item 1PM01-117355, 480 Vac Motor Control Center, Power Cable PM LC-E1B1-4Eto MC-E1B3-E1, performed 12/04/85EM-1-97000386, Clean/Inspect/Test MCC E1B3, performed 05/18/05 [includes insulationresistance (MeggerŽ) test of cables]EM-1-98000559, PM Work Order, DC Step Voltage Test/Trend, ECW Pump 1C, performed
05/26/05EM-2-EW-98000561, PM Work Order, DC Step Voltage Test/Trend, ECW Pump 2B, performed
05/26/05EM-1-98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 1A, performed 10/26/04
AttachmentA-6EM-1-EW-98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1A, performed 05/16/03EM-1-EW- 98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1A, performed 04/16/02EM-1-EW- 98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1A, performed 06/17/99EM-1-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 1B, performed 05/20/05EM-1-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 1B, performed 10/09/03EM-1-EW-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1B, performed 01/02/01EM-1-EW-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1B, performed 06/23/99EM-1-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 1C, performed 05/26/05EM-1-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 1C, performed 11/11/03EM-1-EW-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1C, performed 04/30/01EM-1-EW-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1C, performed 07/27/99EM-1-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 2A, performed 05/19/04EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2A, performed 06/20/03EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2A, performed 02/26/01EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2A, performed 02/03/99EM-2-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 2B, performed 12/09/04
AttachmentA-7EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2B, performed 12/15/01EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2B, performed 07/24/00EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2B, performed 01/13/99EM-2-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 2C, performed 05/04/04EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2C, performed 10/21/02EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2C, performed 07/31/01EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2C, performed 02/18/00EM-2-PK-97000382, PM Work Order, Inspect/Test 13.8kV to 4160 Vac ESF Transformer E2A,performed 10/19/02Miscellaneous Documents
DCN CD-226, Add Note to the Drawing to Allow Up to an Additional 2" of Limestone GroundCover in the Protective Area, Revision 0 CR 05-11558, Request Civil Engineering Evaluate the Observed Conditions to Determine ifRework is Required to Meet the Design Criteria to Prevent Surface Water from Entering the
Manholes, Revision 0PCF 101343 A, Remove Check Valve Internals, Revision 0
5R289MB1006, UFSAR Essential Cooling Water System, pages 4-139 to 4-143, Revision 5
IRAGs 50.59, Programs Self-Assessment Plan, Revision 0
SPR 910401, Corrective Action Group Closure Documentation Checklist, Revision 0
USQE 97-6297-7, Engineering Evaluation for Abandonment of 150 Ton Essential Chillers,Revision 001-9518-6, USFAR Change 01-9518-5 Increase in Pressurizer Water Level Above Program inMode 3, Revision 0
AttachmentA-8USQE 99-66-64, Replace Model E SG UFSAR Section 6.2.1 Containment LOCA/MSLBPressure/Temperature Analyses with Delta-94 SG Analyses, Revision 001-10770-2, Change UFSAR and Tech Spec to Reflect Rod Withdrawal Analysis Result,Revision 1101-14284-6, Change UFSAR Chapter 15 for OPDT/OTDT 2-second Time Constant Modification,Revision1302-19072-34, Unit 2 Main Turbine Generator Rotor Torsional Response Test, Revision 0
USQE 00-16902-6, Design Change to Declare One RHR Heat Exchanger as a Spare Train,Revision 0STP Probablistic Risk Assessment Level 1 Quantification, Revision 4
Plant Change Form 101343A
27-008-400, Essential Cooling Pond Fish Population Study, Revision 0
STP Nuclear Operating Company Letters:NOC-AE-05001894, "Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code"NOC-AE-05001999, "Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code"
NOC-AE-05001819, "Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code"PM 05000352 Information Form, printed 11/15/2005 [preventive maintenance requirements forinverter 3E241EIV1201]PM 05000358 Information Form, printed 11/15/2005 [preventive maintenance requirements forinverter 3E241EIV1201 electrolytic capacitor replacement]4E510EQ1005, Revision 8, "Design Criteria for Class 1E AC Power Distribution," including
DCN 0300042.EMT917.03, Basic Test Equipment, Insulation Resistance and High Potential Testers [trainingpackage for EMTs].Setpoint Index Record Print Out 11/30/05, for ECW MOVs 0121,0137, 015; and ECWscreenwash booster Pumps 1A, 1B, 1C.Bechtel Letter ST-YS-HS-8958 dated 11/17/1986, Subject: HL&P's South Texas Project Units 1& 2, HVAC for EAB Battery Rooms Hydrogen Removal.OE 15631, "Breaker Cell Switch Failure Caused Essential Cooling Water Pump Trip," 08/14/03.