ML18012A357

LER 96-016-00:on 960814,reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Surveillance Test,Required by TSs Not Performed.Caused by Inadequate Procedures Not Ensuring Testing Done Prior to Placing Them in Svc.Procedures revised.W/960912 Ltr

ML18012A357
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/13/1996
From:	Donahue J, Verrilli M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-96-158, LER-96-016, LER-96-16, NUDOCS 9609190064
Download: ML18012A357 (4)

Text

y CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION@BR:9609190064 DOC.DATE: 96/09/13 NOTARIZED:

NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M.

Carolina Power&I ight Co.DONAHUE,J.W.

Carolina Power&Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000400

SUBJECT:

LER 96-016-00:on 960814,reactor trip bypass breaker surveillance test, required by TSs not performed.

Caused by inadequate procedures not ensuring testing done prior to placing them in svc.Rev of deficient procedures.W/960912 ltr DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL)SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.A NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.05000400 t" 0 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHYiG.A NRC PDR COPIES RECIPIENT LTTR ENCI ID CODE/NAME 1 1 LE,N 1 AEGD/SP-D/~B 1 FILE CENTE~R 1 NRR DE/EE~B 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POOREgW.1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 R D U N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD-5(EXT.415-2083)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 Carolina Power 8a Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 SEP 1 8 1996 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-96-158 10CFR50.73 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-400 LICENSE NO.NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-016-00 Sir or Madam: In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.

This report describes a failure to perform proper surveillance testing on the reactor trip bypass breakers as required by Technical Specifications.

Sincerely, J.W.Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant MV Enclosure c: Mr.J.B.Brady (HNP Senior Resident-NRC)Mr.S.D.Ebneter (NRC Regional Administrator

-Region II)Mr.N.B.Le (NRC Project Manager-NRR)'9609i90064 960rsti3 PDR ADOCK 05000400 S PDR State Road H34 New Hill NC NRC FORM 366 (4.95)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150.0104 EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THI MANDATORY WFORMATION COLLEC'I)ON REOUESTI 5M HRS.REPORTED lESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED (NTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AHD FEO BACK TO UIOUSTRY.FORWARD COMMENTS REGAROU(G BURDEN ESTIMATE'FO THE)NFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT6 f33L US.NUCLEAR REGUtAIORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555600), ANO YO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 0)50.OID(l OfFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.FACIUTY NAME (I)Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 OOCKET NUMBER 12)50-400 PAGE (3)1OF2 TITLE (4)Failure to perform reactor trip bypass breaker surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications.

MONTH OAY 8 14 YEAR EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)YEAR SEO E I NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 96-016-0 REPORT DATE (7)MONTH OAY YEAR 9 13 96 FACIUTY NAME FACIUTY NAME OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)OOCKET NUMBER 05000 DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)1 00%20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)

(1)20.2203(a)(2) li)20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)

(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)

(3)(n)20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)TELEPHONE NUMBER Bnoivde Area Code)50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NAC Form 366A THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR SUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR B)(Check one or more)(11)Michael Verrilli Sr.Analyst-Licensing (919)362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (lf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH OAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single.spaced typewr((ten lines)(16)On August 14, 1996, during a review of the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), a deficiency was identified with surveillance testing for the reactor trip bypass breakers.Specifically, Technical Specifications require performing a remote manual shunt trip test prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breaker in service.Testing of the remote manual shunt trip at HNP has previously been conducted after the reactor trip bypass breakers were racked into the"connected" position and closed.Therefore, the breakers were actually in service and connected to the rod control system during previous testing of the remote manual shunt trips.This condition was caused by inadequate surveillance test procedures which did not ensure testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers before placing them in service.This condition has existed since May 1986, when the procedures were revised to incorporate testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers.A probable cause for the May 1986 procedure error was a mis-interpretation of the term"in-service" and how it applied to the reactor trip bypass breakers.Investigation also revealed that conflicting information in the FSAR could have been a contributing factor to the procedure error.Immediate corrective actions included revising the deficient surveillance procedures.

Additional corrective actions will include revising the deficient FSAR sections and reviewing the event with appropriate Operations and Maintenance personnel.

NRC fORM 366A l496)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION US.NUCLEAR REGULATORT COMMISSION TAG)LITT NAME n)Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant~Unit rY1 OOCXET 50400 LER NUMBER IB)BEOUENTIAL RETIBION NUMBER NUMBER 96-016-00 PAGE I3)2 OF 2 TEXT III mort spssv r's rsrprpsd.vsv sddr)drrrsl sopr'vs ol fYRC form 36QI ill)EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On August 14, 1996, with the plant in mode 1, operating at 100%power, a deficiency was identified with the Train A and Train B Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic&Master Relay Tests (MST-I0001 and MST-I0320).

This deficiency was identified during a review of the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)which describes the testing process for the reactor trip bypass breakers (EIIS Code: JG-BKR).Specifically, Technical Specification Table 4.3-1 requires performing a remote manual shunt trip test prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breakers in service.However, testing of the remote manual shunt trip at HNP has previously been conducted after the reactor trip bypass breakers were racked into the"connected" position and closed.Therefore, the breakers were actually in service and connected to the rod control system during previous testing of the remote manual shunt trips, which constitutes a violation of Technical Specifications and is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(b).

CAUSE: The cause of this event was inadequate surveillance test procedures.

MST-I0001 and MST-I0320 did not ensure that the reactor trip bypass breakers were tested before being placed in service.These breakers have a"test" position which should have been used, rather than racking the breaker into the"connected" position and closing them, which actually connected the reactor trip bypass breakers to the rod control system and placed them in service.This condition has existed since May 1986, when both procedures were revised to incorporate testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers.A probable cause for the May 1986 procedure error was a mis-interpretation of the term"in-service" and how it applied to the reactor trip bypass breakers.Investigation also revealed that conflicting information in FSAR section 7.2.2.2.3.10 could have been a contributing factor to the pr'ocedure error.This section incorrectly states that HNP"does not propose to verify the operability of each bypass breaker prior to placing it in service each time the main reactor trip breakers are to be tested." SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event.MST-I0001 and MST-I0320 have provided previous testing of the reactor trip bypass breaker remote manual shunt trips prior to opening the main reactor trip breakers.Based on a review of completed testing, the reactor trip bypass breakers functioned properly during this previous testing.PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: There have been no previous HNP events related to improperly testing the reactor trip bypass breakers prior to placing them in service.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1.Procedures MST-10001 and MST-I0320 were revised to ensure that the reactor trip bypass breakers are properly tested before placing them in service.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED: 1.'SAR section 7.2.2.2.3.10 will be revised to eliminate the conflicting wording pertaining to the testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers.This will be completed by November 15, 1996.2.This event will be reviewed with Maintenance and Operations personnel involved with developing, revising and reviewing procedures to emphasize the importance of fully understanding Technical Specification testing requirements.

This will be completed by December 1, 1996.