ML18016A189

LER 97-020-00:on 970814,inadequate Fire Protection Provided for safety-related EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Cables Resulted in Operation Outside Design Basis.Caused by Engineering Oversight.Established Fire watches.W/970912 Ltr

ML18016A189
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/12/1997
From:	Donahue J, Verrilli M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-97-174, LER-97-020, LER-97-20, NUDOCS 9709180097
Download: ML18016A189 (7)

Text

CATEGORY I REGUIATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9709180097 DOC.DATE: 97/09/12 NOTARIZED:

NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina AUTH.NAME.AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI I M.Carolina Power 6 Light Co.DONAHUE,J.W.

Carolina Power a Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000400 A E 05000400 NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.

SUBJECT:

LER 97-020-00:on 970814,inadequate fire protection provided for safety-related EDG fuel oil transfer pump cables caused operation outside design basis,was identified.

Caused by engineering oversight.

Established fire watches.W/970912 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POOREgW.NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME ROONEYiV CE NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCEiJ H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 D 0 C N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25 O.l 4~t t t h S I ,l F~s'f 1 I l I r 1 t 4 Carolina Power&Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 SEP 12 1997 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-97-174 10CFR50.73 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-400 LICENSE NO.NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 97-020-00 Sir or Madam: In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.

This report describes a design deficiency related to inadequate fire protection for safety-related cables.Sincerely, MV J.W.Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant Enclosure c: Mr.J.B, Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)Mr.L.A.Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)Mr.V.L.Rooney (NRC-NRR Project Manager)9709180097 970912 PDR ADGCK 05000400 8 PDR State Road 1134 New Hill NC lllllilI5lllllllElllllllllllllllllll NRC FORM 366 (495)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROVED BY OMB No.3160-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THS MANDATORY D(FORMATION COLLECTION REOUESR QN HRS.REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE BICORPORATEO UITO THE UCENQNG PROCESS ANO FEO BACK TO INDUSTRY.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDB(G BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT4 F33l, US.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISIOH, WASHINGTOIL OC 20555000), ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)50.OIO(L OFF)CE OF MANAGEMEHT AND BUDGET, WASHBIGTOH, OC 20503.FACIUTY NAME Ill Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)50-400 PAOE (3)1 OF3 TITLE (4)Inadequate fire protection provided for safety-related EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump cables resulting in operation outside design basis.EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)MONTH DAY YEAR 14 97 YEAR SEQUENTIAl NUMBER REVIIDN NUMBER 97-020-00 MONTH DAY 97 FACIUTY NAME FACIUTY NAME OOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)kAME 1005G 50.73(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)

(2)(v)20.2201(b) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(l

)20.2203(a)(2)(i) 73.71 20.2203(a)

(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)

(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)20.2203(a)

(4)50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)TELEP)(ONE NUMBER Urcrude Ares Code)OTHER W Specify In Abstract belo or in NRC Form 306A THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR B: (Check one or morel (11)Michael Verrilli Sr.Analyst-Licensing (919)362-2303'COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABIE TD NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (lf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (16)MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single.spaced typewritten lines)(16)On August 14, 1997, with the plant at approximately 100%power in mode 1, design discrepancies were identified during an Engineering review of the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire.These discrepancies pertain to safety-related Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer pump electrical cables.These cables are required for safe shutdown in case of a fire, but were not adequately protected.

Specifically, section 9.5.1 of the Harris Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)provides separation requirements for redundant safe shutdown divisions to maintain safe shutdown capability.

During the Engineering review, Cables 12549E-SA and 12550A-SB, located in the 261'levation of the Reactor Auxiliary Building were found to not meet the specific design requirements.

The first cable (12549E-SA) was in an area that had automatic fire detection/suppression systems, but was not separated by a 3-hour fire barrier or 20 feet of horizontal distance and was not enclosed in a 1-hr rated barrier.The second cable (12550A-SA) was separated by 20 feet horizontally, but no suppression/detection system was provided in its location, nor was a 3-hour barrier provided.These design deficiencies were caused by engineering oversight and inadequate design verification during initial plant construction.

Immediate corrective actions included establishing fire watches for the areas with unprotected cables.A plant modification will be developed and installed to provide the required protection.

NRC FORM 3SSA I4.85l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION US.NUCEEAR RECUIATORZ COMMISSION FACIUTZ NAME (I)Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant~Unit rII1 TEXT pl sssdr sptssis sssisisd.dss sdStknd soidss ol A'RC Fam 3SQI ill)OOCKET 50400 IER NUMBER ISI SEOUENTIAl.

REZISION NUMBER NUMBER 07-020-00 PACE Ql 2 OF 3 EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On August 14, 1997, with the plant at approximately 100%power in mode 1, design discrepancies were identified during an Engineering review of the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire performed per Engineering Service Request (ESR9500433).

These discrepancies pertain to safety-related"A" and"B" Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer pump electrical cables.These electrical cables are required for safe shutdown in case of a fire, but were not adequately protected.

Specifically, section 9.5.1 of the Harris Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)provides separation requirements for redundant safe shutdown divisions to maintain safe shutdown capability.

FSAR section 9.5.1 requires protection of cables outside containment by one of the following methods such that at least one division of redundant safe shutdown cables located within the same fire area are protected from fire damage: (1)Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant safe shutdown divisions by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating or equivalent.

Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers is protected to provide resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier.(2)Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant safe shutdown divisions by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards.In addition, fire detectors and an automatic suppression system is installed in the area.(3)Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating.In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are installed in the fire area.During the ESR-9500433 Engineering review, Cables 12549E-SA and 12550A-SB, located in the 261'levation of the Reactor Auxiliary Building were found to not meet the above requirements.

The first cable (12549E-SA), which provides control power for the"A" EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump, was in an area that had automatic fire detection/suppression systems, but was not separated by a 3-hour'fire barrier or 20 feet of horizontal distance and was not enclosed in a 1-hr rated barrier.Approximately 50 feet of conduit for this cable will require additional protection.

This will involve installation of a one hour fire wrap and a penetration seal.The second cable (12550A-SA), which provides the supply power for the"B" EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump, was separated by 20 feet horizontally, but no suppression/detection system was provided in its location, nor was a 3-hour barrier provided.Approximately 80 feet of conduit for this cable will require additional protection.

This will be accomplished by sealing a wall to provide a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier.CAUSE: These design deficiencies were caused by engineering oversight and inadequate design verification during initial plant construction.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no actual safety consequences resulting from these deficiencies.

Had a fire occurred in either of the plant locations containing the unprotected cables, it is conceivable that the Fuel Oil Transfer pump and opposite train EDG could be rendered inoperable and when the day tank on the remaining EDG emptied in approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, both EDGs would be unavailable.

This could impair the ability to maintain hot standby and negate the capability to reach cold shutdown.This scenario would only be of consequence if off-site power was also lost during the fire event, thereby requiring operation of the EDGs.The above scenario also takes no credit for the actions of the fire brigade or the fire suppression system to mitigate the extent of fire damage.Considering the defense-in-depth approach to fire protection at the Harris Plant (prevention, detection, suppression, spatial separation, fire fighting capability etc.)the NRC FORM 366A H.BQ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U rr.NUCLEAR REGULATORT COMMISSION FACILITT NAME II)Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant~Unit 41 TENT RY rrrvrv srsvsv N rcpvhd, vsv vrsrrir'orrvl sssrrBs oMRc Form SrrarU i1 Tl DOCKET 50100 LER NUMBER I6I TEAR SEGUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-020-00 PAGE gr 3 OF 3 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: (continued) probability of the assumed worst case fire occurring and simultaneously losing off-site power is extremely low.This condition is being reported per 10CFR50.73.a.2.ii as a condition outside the design basis of the plant.PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: LER f97-06 was submitted on April, 17, 1997 and reported deficiencies in a Thermo-Lag fire barrier wall which resulted in the plant operating outside the design basis.However, the scope and corrective actions for LER f97-06 were specific to the Thermo-Lag barriers within the plant and would not be expected to identify or prevent the deficiencies identified in this LER.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

Immediate corrective actions included establishing fire watches for the areas with unprotected cables.This was completed on the day the deficiencies were identified, August 14, 1997.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED: A plant modification will be developed and installed to provide the required protection for the cited cables.This will be completed by November 15, 1997.