Analysis of Habitability of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Operations Facility.ML18018B429 |
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Harris |
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09/30/1983 |
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EBASCO SERVICES, INC. |
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ML18018B428 |
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NUDOCS 8311020118 |
Download: ML18018B429 (26) |
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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18017A8981999-05-12012 May 1999 Technical Rept Entitled, Harris Nuclear Plant-Bacteria Detection in Water from C&D Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Lines. ML18016A8941999-04-0505 April 1999 Revised Pages 20-25 to App 4A of non-proprietary Version of Rev 3 to HI-971760 ML18016A8661999-03-31031 March 1999 Shnpp Operator Training Simulator,Simulator Certification Quadrennial Rept. ML18017A8931999-02-28028 February 1999 Risks & Alternative Options Associated with Spent Fuel Storage at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. ML18016A8531999-02-18018 February 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 3 to HI-971760, Licensing Rept for Expanding Storage Capacity in Harris SFP 'C' & 'D'. ML18016A9371998-06-30030 June 1998 Technical Rept on Matl Identification of Spent Fuel Piping Welds at Hnp. ML18016A7711998-05-26026 May 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 2 to HI-971760, Licensing Rept for Expanding Storage Capacity in Harris Spent Fuel Pools 'C' & 'D'. ML18016A2631997-06-30030 June 1997 1997 Automated Inservice Exam of RPV & Adjacent Piping Welds at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant,Unit 1, Vol 1,final Rept W/Apps ML20217Q2751997-06-30030 June 1997 CP&L Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data for Period 970101-0630 ML18022A9621995-06-30030 June 1995 NPP IPEEE Final Rept. ML18011A9041995-03-0303 March 1995 Shnpp Operator Training Simulator Certification Quadrennial Rept. ML18010B0841993-05-0505 May 1993 NRC Licensing Submittal Review of Licensing Conditions Imposed by NUREG-1216. ML18010A9521992-11-30030 November 1992 NRC Licensing Submittal Review of Licensing Conditions Imposed by NUREG-1216. ML18010A8541992-10-0909 October 1992 Flow Calibration Rept Carolina Power & Light Harris Plant. ML18005A8521988-11-30030 November 1988 Criticality Analysis of Shearon Harris Spent Fuel Racks W/ Ifba Fuel. ML18005A6401988-07-31031 July 1988 Revised Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Facility Info Sys Verification & Validation Final Rept. ML18022A6941988-05-31031 May 1988 SPDS Dynamic Operational/Human Factors Evaluation, Final Rept ML18005A4181988-03-31031 March 1988 Metallurigical Evaluation of EDG Bases from Cp&L,Shearon Harris Nuclear Station. ML18004B8271987-01-31031 January 1987 Criticality Analysis of Shearon Harris Fuel Racks. ML18004A3471986-07-23023 July 1986 Chatham County Emergency Response Plan:Unanswered Questions. ML18019B0461986-06-13013 June 1986 Rev 1 to Analysis for Location of Battery RM SA & SB Eyewash Station & Shower. ML18019B0081986-04-30030 April 1986 Rev 2 to Tdi Diesel Generator Design Review & Quality Revalidation Rept. ML20203N4171986-04-30030 April 1986 Rev 2 to Tdi Owners Group App Ii:Generic Maint Matrix & Justifications ML18019A7931986-04-28028 April 1986 Rev 1 to Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Crdr Final Summary Rept. ML18019A5591985-11-0404 November 1985 Predicted Behavior of Containment Bldg During Structural Integrity Test. ML18019A4551985-10-25025 October 1985 Containment Recirculation Sump Evaluation. ML18019A3801985-09-30030 September 1985 Crdr Final Summary Rept. ML18019A3831985-09-11011 September 1985 Environ Qualification of Mechanical Equipment. ML18019A2561985-07-0202 July 1985 Containment Purge & Vent Valve Operability Review. ML20205B1311985-04-17017 April 1985 Technical Evaluation Rept of Spds,Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant ML18003B0981985-03-31031 March 1985 Control Room Design Review Summary Rept for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,Unit 1. ML18018B8981985-02-13013 February 1985 Elimination of Arbitrary Intermediate Break Points in Main Feedwater Sys. ML18018B8951985-02-11011 February 1985 Seismic & Dynamic Qualification of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment,Master List, Vols 1 & 2 ML18003B1241984-12-31031 December 1984 Electrical Separation Analysis. ML18018B8511984-12-17017 December 1984 Emergency Diesel Generator Equipment. ML18018B8521984-11-30030 November 1984 Vols 1-4 of Tdi Diesel Generator Design Review & Quality Revalidation Rept. ML20134G1621984-11-0909 November 1984 Revised Rept of Results of Interviews Conducted W/Cp&L Personnel Re Selected Aspects of Affidavit Submitted by Former CP&L Employee C Van Vo ML18018B7621984-08-31031 August 1984 Rev 7 to Functional Capability of ASME Class 1 Auxiliary Piping Sys. ML18018B6941984-04-30030 April 1984 Rept on Operability of Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves, PORVs & Electrical Motor Operated Block Valves. ML18018B6321984-03-28028 March 1984 Audit Rept, Human Factors Engineering Detailed Control Room Design Review In-Progress Audit. ML18018B5411984-01-10010 January 1984 Revised Mgt Capability Rept. ML18018B4341983-10-28028 October 1983 Responses to Requests for Addl Info Re Draft SER Open Items 372,63,30,172 & 213 ML18018B4131983-10-14014 October 1983 Nonproprietary Table of Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) 400 Series Stainless Steel Items. ML18018B4291983-09-30030 September 1983 Analysis of Habitability of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Operations Facility. ML18018B5101983-09-30030 September 1983 Safety Analysis of Shearon Harris Safety Parameter Display Sys. ML18018B4301983-09-30030 September 1983 Analysis of Habitability of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Technical Support Ctr. ML18018A6521983-08-0404 August 1983 Revised Mgt Capability Rept. ML18018A4831983-01-31031 January 1983 Rept on Proposed Neuse Fault. 1999-09-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML18017A9181999-10-0808 October 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 991008,CR Emergency Filtration Sys Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Site Personnel Failed to Recognize That Blocking Open CR Emergency Filtration Sys.Procedures Revised.With 991008 Ltr ML18017A9151999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Shearon Harris Npp. with 991012 Ltr ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18017A8671999-09-10010 September 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990811,determined That Cvis ARMs High Alarm Setpoints Were Not within TS Limit.Caused by Not Having Procedure to Verify If Cvis ARM High Alarm Setpoints Were within TS Requirements.Revised Procedures.With 990910 Ltr ML18017A8621999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Harris Nuclear Plant.With 990908 Ltr ML18016B0481999-08-0404 August 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 981124,noted Failure to Comply with TS 4.0.4 & TS 3/4.6.3, Civs. Caused by post-maint Testing That Did Not Adequately Test Control Circuitry & Verify Isolation Time Following Maint.Procedure Was Revised ML18017A8361999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.With 990811 Ltr ML18016B0151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Shearon Harris Npp. with 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18016A9801999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 981124,failed to Comply with TS 4.0.4 & TS 3/4.6.3, Civ. Caused by post-maint Testing That Did Not Adequately Test Control Circuitry & Verify Isolation Time Following Maint.Procedure Will Be Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML18016A9851999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990614 Ltr ML18017A8981999-05-12012 May 1999 Technical Rept Entitled, Harris Nuclear Plant-Bacteria Detection in Water from C&D Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Lines. ML18016A9581999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990513 Ltr ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML18016A9111999-04-12012 April 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990313,plant Exceeded ESFAS TS 3.3.2,Action 21.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Rev Preparation.Licensee Revised Applicable Maint Surveillance Test Procedure (MST-10072) to Identify TS Required Actions.With 990412 Ltr ML18016A8971999-04-0808 April 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990312,unit Trip Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Condition of SG Water Level Flow Control Valve. Replaced Positioners on All Three FW Regulating Valves.With 990408 Ltr ML18016A8941999-04-0505 April 1999 Revised Pages 20-25 to App 4A of non-proprietary Version of Rev 3 to HI-971760 ML18016A9101999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.With 990413 Ltr ML18016A8661999-03-31031 March 1999 Shnpp Operator Training Simulator,Simulator Certification Quadrennial Rept. ML18017A8931999-02-28028 February 1999 Risks & Alternative Options Associated with Spent Fuel Storage at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. ML18016A8551999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Shearon Harris Npp. with 990312 Ltr ML18016A8261999-02-22022 February 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990123,noted That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to Isolation of Fire Protection Containment Sprinkler Sys.Caused by Human Error.Restored Containment Sprinkler Sys to Operable Status.With 990222 Ltr ML18016A8531999-02-18018 February 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 3 to HI-971760, Licensing Rept for Expanding Storage Capacity in Harris SFP 'C' & 'D'. ML18016A8111999-02-12012 February 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990114,RT Due to Not Removing Temporary Device from Relay Following Calibration Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Counseled Personnel Involved in Event.With 990212 Ltr ML18016A7971999-02-0505 February 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990106,SF Pool Water Level Was Not Maintained Greater than 23 Feet Above Stored BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Fasteners Bending Under Specific Circumstances.Increased Water Level.With 990205 Ltr ML18022B0631999-02-0404 February 1999 Rev 0 to Nuclear NDE Manual. with 28 Oversize Uncodable Drawings of Alternative Plan Scope & 4 Oversize Codable Drawings ML20202J1161999-02-0101 February 1999 SER Accepting Relief Requests Associated with Second 10-year Interval Inservice Testing Program ML18016A8041999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.With 990211 Ltr ML18016A7941999-01-29029 January 1999 LER 98-004-01:on 980313,identified Design Deficiency Re Potential Runout of Tdafwp.Caused by Inadequate Original AFW Sys Design.Operability Evaluation Was Completed on 980313 & Addl Engineering Analysis Was Performed by Vendor ML18016A7801998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Shearon Harris Npp. with 990113 Ltr ML18016A7671998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Shnpp,Unit 1.With 981215 Ltr ML18016A9731998-11-28028 November 1998 Changes,Tests & Experiments, for Harris Nuclear Plant.Rept Provides Brief Description of Changes to Facility & Summary & of SE for Each Item That Was Implemented Under 10CFR50.59 Between 970608-981128.With 990527 Ltr ML18016A8351998-11-28028 November 1998 ISI Summary 8th Refueling Outage for Shearon Harris Power Plant,Unit 1. ML18016A7411998-11-25025 November 1998 Rev 1 to Shnpp Cycle 9 Colr. ML18016A7211998-11-17017 November 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981023,turbine Control Anomaly Caused Manual Rt.Caused by Failure to Incorporate Verbal Vendor Guidance in Operating Procedures.Addl Vendor Guidance Will Be Verified & Added to Procedures.With 981117 Ltr ML18016A7071998-11-0303 November 1998 Rev 0 to Harris Unit 1 Cycle 9 Colr. ML18016A7201998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.With 981113 Ltr ML20154F8701998-10-0606 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Requirements of OMa-1988,Part 10,Section 4.2.2.3 for 21 Category a Reactor Coolant Sys Pressure Isolation Valves ML18016A6201998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Harris Nuclear Power Plant.With 981012 Ltr ML18016A5971998-09-21021 September 1998 Rev 1 to Harris Unit 1 Cycle 8 Colr. ML18016A5881998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Shnpp,Unit 1.With 980914 Ltr ML18016A5071998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1998 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant.W/980811 Ltr ML18016A9431998-07-0707 July 1998 Rev 1 to QAP Manual. ML18016A4841998-07-0707 July 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 970207,determined That Cold Weather Conditions Resulted in Mfiv Being Potentially Inoperable During Period 970117-20.Caused by Inadequate Design of HVAC Sys.Implemented Mods to Steam Tunnel HVAC Sys ML18016A9371998-06-30030 June 1998 Technical Rept on Matl Identification of Spent Fuel Piping Welds at Hnp. ML18016A4861998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for SHNPP.W/980715 Ltr ML18016A4701998-06-30030 June 1998 LER 97-021-03:on 980210,discovered That SFP Water Level Had Not Been Verified Greater than 23 Feet Above BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Misinterpretation of TS Requirements. Will Submit TS Change Request to Revise TS 3.9.1.11 ML18016A4491998-06-0808 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980508,failure to Perform Insp & Preventive Maint on MCCB as Required by TS Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Sps.Tested 9 Pressurizer Heater Bank Breakers by Cycling each.W/980608 Ltr ML18016A4521998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.W/980612 Ltr ML18016A7711998-05-26026 May 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 2 to HI-971760, Licensing Rept for Expanding Storage Capacity in Harris Spent Fuel Pools 'C' & 'D'. 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
ANALYSIS OF HABITABILITY OF THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY Prepared for CAROLINA POVYER 8 LIGHT COMPANY EEASCO EBASCO SERVICES INCORPORATED 8311020118 831025 PDR ADOCK 05000400 F PDR SEPTEMBER 1983
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
2.0 EXPOSURES
TO RADIONUCLIDES AIRBORNE INSIDE FACILITY 2.1 Methodology
2.2 Assumptions
and Parameters
2.3 Results
3.0 PROTECTION FACTOR ESTIMATE 3.1 Methodology
3.2 Assumptions
and Parameters
3.3 Results
4.0 CONCLUSION
S PROTECTION FACTOR ESTIMATOR SOLUTION FORM REFERENCES APPENDIX A LIST OF TABLES TITLE 30-Day Inhalation and Submersion doses at the Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Operations Facility Protection Factors for Outdoor Contamination
LIST OF FIGURES TITLE FIGURE NO.Ventilation System of the SHNPP Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Operations Facility Building Key
1.0 INTROOUCT
ION The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)will be operated by Carolina Power and Light Company for the management of overall licensee emergency response, coordination of radiological and environmental assessment, development of recommendations for public protective actions and coordination of emergency response activities with Federal, State and Local supporting agencies.The EOF for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant is located 3,429 meters from the plant site.The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has provided guidance on acceptable design features for EOFs.Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 indicates that an EOF should have a protection factor of 5, ventilation isolation and HEPA filters.Habitability requirements are only for the part of the EOF in which dose assessments, communications and decision making take place.This habitability study consists of an assessment of exposures to individuals in the EOF from radionuclides airborne inside the facility and an analysis of the building protection factors for outside contamination.
2.0 EXPOSURES
TO RADIONUCLIDES AIRBORNE INSIDE FACILITY The EOF ventilation system is designed to draw in 720 CFN outside air.In the event of an incident at SHNPP, the outside.air whether drawn in by the air handling unit or injected into the system by the emergency fan serves to pressurize the system and will leave the system by enfiltration.(See Figure 1)The 30-day thyroid, whole body and skin doses to individuals inside the EOF were evaluated for a design basis loss-of-.coolant accident (LOCA).1 2.1~Nh 2 1 A design basis LOCA provides the radionuclide release rate from the containment using the guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.4.Atmospheric dispersion factors at the EOF were calculated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.145.The detailed description of the activity release and dose evaluation models are given in Appendix 15.0.A of the SHNPP FSAR.
2.2 Assum
tions and Parameters The following lists the assumptions and parameters used in the analysis of inhalation and submersion doses: 1)design basis assumptions presented in FSAR 15.6.5.4.1 are applied, 2)accident duration is assumed to be 30 days, 3)the net free volume of EOF is estimated to be 31,716 ft (898 M), 3 3 allowing 105 of the volume for equipment and furniture.
This volume represents the first floor of the EOF where management and coordination of emergency activities, dose assessment, communications and decision making takes place (See Figure 2), 4)radionuclides are uniformly distributed throughout the EOF net free volume, 5)EOF atmospheric dispersion factors are: Time Period////'/3 0-8 hrs 8-24 hrs 1-4 days 4-30 days 6)occupancy of the EOF is based on the following:
1.1 X 10 8.1 X 10 2.9 X 10 7.1 X 10 Time Period 0-24 hours 1-4 days 4-30 days Occu anc Factor 1~0 0.6 0.4 7)a finite cloud correction is used, 8)filter efficiency of EOF emergency cleanup system for iodine is 99%, 9)a breathing rate of, the occupants of 3.47 X 10 cubic meters per second for the duration of the accident, 10)the EOF air intake flow rate is 720 CFM (with no recirculation), and ll)the assumed unfiltered in-leakage into the pressurized EOF is 3 CFM with air locks as a result of opening and closing of doors.2.3 Results The doses to an EOF occupant are presented in Table 1.These doses are well within the GDC-19 limit of 5 rems to the whole body and the corresponding SRP 6.4 limits of 30 rem to the skin and thyroid.
3.0 PROTECTION
FACTORS ESTIMATE An individual in-the EOF would also receive exposure from outdoor contamination which is 1)airborne and 2)deposited on the ground and roof.Building protection factors have been calculated separately for each type of contamination.
~MM d 1 The models used in the calculation of protection factors for outdoor airborne contamination are included in Appendix-A.Methodology included in Reference 1 was used in the calculation of protection factors for outdoor ground and roof contamination.
The analysis has been performed by dividing the first and second floors into six azimuthal sectors as indicated in Figure 2.Figure 3 indicates that the contribution to exposure through walls in sectors E and F is small due to presence of the building complex and therefore has been ignored in the analysis.The parameters used in the evaluation and results for outdoor surface contamination are included on the PFE solution forms.The chart numbers refer to those included in Reference l.3.2 Assum tions and Parameters The following assumptions and parameters are used in the evaluation of the protection factors for the EOF: 1)interior walls of the building, in which the EOF is located, are 8.0 inches thick.2)walls enclosing the EOF are 8.0 inches thick.3)each floor thickness is 8.0 inches.4)the ceiling heights of the first floor, second floor and mezzanine are 9.7 ft., 8.2 ft.and 8 ft., respectively.
5)density of concrete is 140 lbs/cu.ft.3.3 Results Protection factors calculated for the first and second floors of the EOF are included in Table-2.The values for both outdoor surface and airborne contaminations are above 5 and hence exceed the requirements of NUREG-0737.
4.0 CONCLUSION
S The analysis of the inhalation and submersion (ski n, whole body and thyroid)doses to an EOF occupant has shown that the 30-day exposures will be well within the GDC-19 and SRP 5.4 limits.Consequently, the EOF location and design of its emergency air filtration system have been demonstrated to be appropriately chosen to ensure more than adequate protection of personnel during relatively long periods of occupancy following even the most severe design-basis accident.In addition, the structural aspects of the EOF have been analyzed with regards to the protection level it affords against outside airborne and deposited radioactive contaminants.
The resultant protection factors, prove that there is sufficient shielding between the critical areas of the EOF to be occupied and the outside contamination carried in and deposited by a radioactive plume.4 TABLE 1 30-Day Inhalation and Submersion Doses At The Emergency Operations Facility (Rem)Whole Body Skin Thyroid Dose 0.02 0.60 1.60 TABLE 2 Emergency Operations Facility Protection Factors for Outdoor Contamination Protection Factors Radioactive P ume Surface Contamination First Floor Second Floor 18.5 5.1 50 33 f
PFE SOLUTION FORM SHNPP-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY-FIRST FLOOR Parameters Factor SECTOR OR BUILDING SIDE A B C D Chart W=52.7 0 90.5 66 40 70 70 ROOF MASS THICKNESS:
X',(A,ZX)=Chart 1 4769 22.83 H 3 C,(A,ZX,)=WALL MASS THICKNESS:
.0018 Chart 1 P W=C X,=93.6 A B C 0 X 0,93.6,93.6,0 187.2 X',(X,,A,)
=X=i DX (HW,)=zX (A)=~X (E)=aX (X,)=93.6 6.7 93.6 93.6 6.7 93.6 93.6 6.7 93.6 6.7 Chart 2 Chart 3 WALL HEIGH X=C X'100.3 193.9 193.9 100.3 X, WALL-BY-WALL ANALYSIS: X'100.3 193.9 193.9 100.3 Leave out DX (A)32 48 130 42.5 E h C'X',r)012 0012 0005 0098 Chart 8 PROTECTION FACTOR:.009 RF=C+C PF=.0005.0004.008.018.02 50
PFE SOLUTION FORM SHNPP-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY-SECOND FLOOR Project Parameters Factor SECTOR OR BUILDING SIDE A B Chart W=52.7 66 40 ROOF MASS THICKNESS:
70 70 A=H 90.5 13.17 12.66 X',(A,ZX)=C (AZX)=WALL MASS THICKNESS:
Chart 1~01 8 Chart 1 A=0 W=C X',(X,,A)=X=I 93.6 93.6 0 93.6 93.6 93.6 93.6 Chart 2 X=0 93.6 AX (HW,)=17 17 17 17 Chart 3 X=93.6 A B C D X=0 93.6 93.6,0 X=aX (A)=aX (E)=aX (X,)=9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 Mall Heigh Rul X=X'120.3 13.9 213.9 120.3 X C WALL-BY-WALL ANALYSIS: X'l/120.3 213.9 213.9 120.3 Leave out DX (A)32 48 130 42.5 Y E=-=h C'X',r).008.0008.00033.005 Chart 8 PROTECTION FACTOR: I C (X'I)=RF=C+C.006.0004.0003.004 0.11.03 33 P F E SOLUTION FORM LIST OF SYMBOLS 6 W L A Z H A P W c X X X-=l X X h E x X'C X'hX=X'C g PF=Azimuthal Angle, Width, ft Length, ft The Plan Area of the Building or the Contributing Roof Area, sq ft Distance from Detector Location to Roof, ft Height of Detector Location Above Ground Contamination, ft Percent of Apertures in Exterior Wall.Width of Ground Contaminated Field, ft Total Mass Thickness between a Detector Location and Roof, psf Xf+Xr Exterior Wall Mass Thi,ckness, psf Interior Parti ti on Mass Thi ckness, ps f Floor Mass Thickness, psf Roof Mass Thickness, psf Basement Ceiling Mass Thickness, psf The Exposed Portion of a Partially Exposed Basement Wall, ft The Ceiling Height of an Exposed Basement, ft y/h the Exposed Fraction of a Basement Wall Adjusted Wall Mass Thickness (Corrected for Apertures) psf Total Overhead Contribution Equivalent Overhead Mass Thickness, psf An Incremental Increase (or Decrease)in the Exterior Wall Mass Thickness Used to Equate the Real Building to an Equivalent Building, psf Equivalent Wall Mass Thickness, psf Total Ground Contribution Protection Factor
References:
1."Shelter Design And Analysis", TR-20 (Vol.2), February 1976, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.2.Meteorology and Atomic Energy, 1968.U.S.Atomic Energy Commission.
3."The Effectiveness of Sheltering as a Protective Action Against Nuclear Accidents Involving Gaseous Releases", Protective Action Evaluation Part 1, April 1978.George H.Anno and Michael A.Dore, U.S.Environmental Protection Agency.
a<~te T~ptd(C<q WQA1y~g IG~CV g, 70" C.,~rjc c 700~O A~r L~gg~g~s~<.m.
MP4414 g Q Q rj~~Qlf~g IVY I~l KP~p>A V>M~g)gal L g~)Jg@FIGURE 2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY
Bill I.I)lNG Vl.Y n I lGURl:.3 CVCnGrNCV OVrnnT>ONS rnCil.<TV BUtl.OING KFY
'J APPENDIX A PROTECTION FACTOR CALCULATION MODELS Protection Factors (PF)for the buildings due to outdoor ground and roof contaminations were calculated using the methodology presented in Ref.1, which should be referred to for this purpose.'F for outdoor plume were calculated using the models presented as follows: A structure provides protection by the geometrical effect of limiting the distance of approach of the cloud and by shielding afforded by walls.PF is obtained by assuming the plume to be hemispherical in shape and applying equation 7.77 of Ref.2.PF=(1+Kx.Ux.W) exp (-Ux.W)X ([exp (-v.e)-exp (-u.rl)-'K (1+u.rl)exp (-u.rl)+K (1+u.a)exp (-u.a)j X t.l-exp (-u.rl)-, K (1+u.rl)exp (-u.rl)+Kj Where, Ux=total absorption coefficient for building material;crr2/g or cm-1 u=total absorption coefficient for air;cm/g or cm u=Ua+Us.Ua=energy absorption coefficient; cm/g or cm Us=scattering absorption coefficient; cm/g or cm 1 W=thickness of shield afforded by building material;g/cm2 Kx=component in the buildup factor=(Ux-Ua)/Ua
~~.K,=component in the buildup factor for air=1.25 9 1.0 HeV.*a=effective building radius, cm V x 3~1F V=volume of building;cm3 rl=radioactive plume radius, cm Assuming the plume size is very large and substituting infinity for rl in the above equation;PF=(1+Kx.Ux.W) exp (-Ux.W)X t]+K (1+u.a)j exp (-u.a)1+K B-(i)The term represented by 8 expresses the PF from the geometrical con-siderations, whereas that represented by A expresses the shielding factor.The shielding provided through the roof is different from that provided by walls.Also, walls have windows and doors which do not provide any protection.
Therefore, the above equation has been modified as follows: PF=B X Fw (Ap+(1-Ap)x AwI+Fr x Ar Where, Fr**=fraction of garrrna radiation through roof Fw=fraction of gamma radiation through walls Ap=fraction representing aperture (windows, doors, etc.)in walls.1.0 MEV gamma energy used in the calculation is close to the value in-dicated in Ref.3.**Fr is obtained by using Figure 7.33 of Ref-2 or hand calculation.
Aw=shielding factor for walls Ar=shielding factor for roof A-3