ML17250B199

Responds to NRC 900509 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/89-81.Corrective Actions:Improved Battery Load Profile Developed Incorporating Calculational Improvements Contained in Current Industry Std IEEE 485-1983

ML17250B199
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	06/08/1990
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	MARTIN T T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 9006200487
Download: ML17250B199 (37)

See also: IR 05000244/1989081

Text

xREGULATOY

INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTZOYSTEM

(RIDE)x~xACCESSION

NBR:9006200487

DOC.DATE:

90/06/08NOTARIZED:

NO;CFACIL:50-244

RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester

GAUTH.NAME~~~~AUTHORAFFILIATION

CREDY,R,C.

Rochester

Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME

RECIPIENT

AFFILIATION

MARTINET.T.

Region1,OfcoftheDirectorSUBJECT:RespondstoNRC900509ltrreviolations

notedinInspRept50-244/89-81.

DISTRIBUTION

CODE:IEOZDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR

1ENCL3SIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp

Rept/Notice

ofViolation

ResponseNOTES:License

Expdateinaccordance

with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

DOCKET0500024405000244cRECIPIENT

IDCODE/NAME

PD1-3PDRGN1ERNAL:LPDRNSICINTERNAL:

AEODAEOD/TPAD

NRRMORISSEAU,D

NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10

NRR/DREP/PEPB9D

NRR/DST/DIR

8E2NUDOCS-ABSTRACT

OGC/HDS2FILE01COPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT

IDCODE/NAME

JOHNSONFA

AEOD/DEIIB

DEDRONRRSHANKMAN,S

NRR/DOEADIR11NRR/DRIS/DIR

NRR/PMAS/ILRB12

OE~IREG~02NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111<11~~+NG:P3fo)579+/NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASCONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESKROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE

YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION

LISTSFORDOCUMENTS

YOUDON'TNEED!ADD,TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR22ENCL22

AE;f,Nfe~~~5OAA55455ROCHESTER

GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION

~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,

N.Y.14849-PPPI

June8,1990TEEER<04C

AREACODE75555462700Mr.ThomasT.MartinRegionalAdministrator

RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

475Allendale

RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406Subject:ResponsetoInspection

Report50-244/89-81

SafetySystemFunctional

Inspect'ion

--RHRSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantNRCDocket50-244DearMr.Martin:Thisletterprovidestheinitial30-dayresponsetotheSafetySystemFunctional

Inspection

(SSFI)oftheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SystemattheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,conducted,

betweenNovember6andDecember8,1989.TheNRCletterofMay09,1990fromMarvinW.Hodges(NRC)toRobertC.Mecredy(RG&E)transmitted

thereportforthatinspection.

ThisletterprovidestheRG&Eresponses,

pursuantto10CFR2.201,tothetwoviolations

issuedinconjunction

withtheSSFIreport.Inaddition,

weareproviding

scheduleinformation

concerning

theunresolved

issues,including

thepostulated

floodingoftheRHRroom,identified

intheinspection

report.Additional

information

willbeprovidedinthe120-dayresponsetotheSSFIreport.Thenuclearindustryisgoingthroughmajorupgradeeffortsinvolving

configuration

management

anddesignbasisdocuments.

RG&Eisnotaloneinrecognizing

thebenefitsoftheseimprovements

andhasbeenproceeding

withtheseefforts.OnMarch6,1990RG&Emadeaformalpresentation

toNRCRegionIstaffandonMarch27,1990madeapresentation

toNRRregarding

ourconfiguration

management

program.Wehavecompleted

threepilotsystemdesignbasisdocuments

andarereviewing

themtodetermine

theoptimalspecification

fortheoveralldesignbasisdocumentprogramfortheremaining

plantsystems.Inaddition,

RG&Ehasdeveloped

aseparateprogramtoprovidefurtherassurance

thatalldesignbasisinformation

and,commitments

whichmayhavebeenrelieduponbytheNRCarecaptured.

Theobjective

oftheNRCSSFIoftheRHRsystemswastoassessthecapability

ofthatsystemtoperformitsdesignbasisfunctions.

Aspartofthatinspection,

theSSFIteamassessedtheoveralldesigncontrolprogramandotherworkprocesses

usedbyRG&E.Thereviewoftheseprogrammatic

aspectswasfarbroaderthantheRHRsystem.Specialemphasiswasplacedupontheengineering

processes

andtheirinterfaces

withotheractivities.

900b200487

900b08PDRADOCK050002448PNUggIJt~fP(

2TheprimaryresultoftheSSFIwasthatnosituations

wereidentified

thatwouldprohibittheRHRsystemfromperforming

itsintendedfunctions

undernormalanddesignbasisaccidentconditions.

AswouldbeexpectedfromanSSFIofanynuclearpowerplant,andinparticular

oneoftheearlySEPplants,theSSFIidentified.

areaswhereimprove-mentiswarranted.

TwoSeverityLevelIVviolations

werecited.,andtenspecificunresolved

itemsweredocumented.

TheNRCletterofMay09,1990requiresthattheviolations

beaddressed,

pursuantto10CFR2.201,within30days.TheletteralsorequeststhatRG&Eprovideitsevaluation

ofthespecificunresolved

itemsandplannedactions,within120days.Inaddition,

theNRCletterrequeststhatRG&Ealsoprovidescheduleinformation

regarding

theactionstoaddresstheunresolved

items,within30days.Theschedules

requested

areexclusive

ofunresolved

item89-81-11,

Engineering

Assurance,

forwhicharesponsewasrequested

in120days.kResponses

totwoviolations

identified

ar'eprovidedasEnclosures

A&Btothisletter.Thefirstviolation

involved.

notmaintaining

anup-to-dateloadprofileforthebatteries.

Theactualcapability

ofthebatteries

wasnotanissue,onlytheadequacyofthetesting.RG&Ehadalreadyreachedastateoffullcompliance

onthismatterwhentheSSFIreportwasreceived.

>>Thesecondviolation

citedhadtwoparts.Thefirstpartinvolveshavingnotalreadydeveloped

aperiodictestingprogramforthemoldedcasecircuitbreakers.

Thesecondpartinvolvesnothavinganexplicitacceptance

criterion

inthetestprocedure

forthesetpoints

ofthedcundervoltage

alarmrelays.Althoughagenerally

acceptedperiodictestmethodformoldedcasecircuitbreakersisnotavailable

intheindustrytoday,wechoosenottotakeissuewiththisviolation.

Theindustryiscurrently

examining

theneedforand/orrequirements

formoldedcasecircuitbreakertesting.RG&Ewillimplement,

when.available,

thosetestingmethodsandrequirements

endorsedbytheindustry.

Withregardtotheacceptance

criterion

fortheundervoltage

relaysetpoints,

wehadalreadyreachedastateoffullcompliance

onthismatterwhentheSSFIreportwasreceived.

Inaddition,

onourowninitiative,

wehaveexpandedthisconcerntoincludetheacundervoltage

relaysforthesafetybuses.Inadditiontotheseviolations,

NRCalsoidentified

tenunresolved

items.Theidentification

oftheseitemsiscontained

inEnclosure

C.Severaloftheseunresolved

itemshavealreadybeencompleted

andseveralmoreareinprocess.DuringtheRG&EreviewoftheSSFIreport,management

recognized

thatmanyoftheunresolved

itemswereexamplesofbroader,underlying,

programmatic

concerns.

Manyoftheseconcernsfocusedonengineering

functions

and,controls'.

BecauseRG&Eunderstands

theimportance

ofresolving

theprogrammatic

andmanagement

issuesaswellasthespecificitemscitedbytheNRC,wearedeveloping

asystematic

approachtoaddressbothtypesofconcerns.

Thisapproachisatwo-part,paralleleffort.Thefirstpartfocusesonthemanagement

processes

inadisciplined

manner,whilethesecond.partfocusesontheresolution

ofthespecificunresolved

items.

P

Tobeginthereviewofthebroaderconcerns,

wehavere-reviewed

theSSFIreportandthecitedissues,andhavecategorized

themintogeneraltopicalareas.Forexample,unresolved

item89-81-05involvesnothavingamechanism

toassurethatdesigncalculations

aremain-tainedup-to-date.

Weseethisspecificitemasbeingpartofamoregeneralareacalleddesigncontrol.Enclosure

Disapreliminary

categorization

oftheunresolved

itemsintothegeneraltopicalareas.Inaddition,

RG&Eisinitiating

amoredetailedreviewoftheworkprocesses

andtheircontrolsforeachofthegeneralareaswhichcontainsignificant

identified,

weaknesses.

Thisreviewwillencompass

identifying

thecauseoftheviolations,

aswellastheunresolved

issues,identified

bytheSSFIreport.Enclosure

Econtainstheschedular

information

asrequested

bythestaff.Wehaveseparated

thisscheduleinformation

intotwocatego-ries:resolution

completed

andscheduled

forresolution.

RG&Ehasresolveditems89-81-04,

06,07A,and10asidentified

inEnclosure

C.Inparticular,

RG&Ehaspromptlyresolvedtheissueregarding

floodingoftheRHRpumproom.TheUFSARhasbeenupdated,andtheEOPsandtrainingdocuments

havebeenrevised.Adetailedaccountofthoseactionstakentoresolvetheitemsidentified

abovearecon-tainedinEnclosure

E.RG&Ebelievesthattheapproachoutlinedinthisletterassuresproperandcompleteresolution

ofthespecificissuesidentified

aswellasthemoreprogrammatic

issuesdiscussed.

Verytrulyyours,RobertC.MeceyDivisionManagerNuclearProduction

GAHN108Enclosures

xc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

(original)

DocumentControlDeskWashington,

D.C.20555AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorate

I-3Washington,

D.C.20555GinnaNRCSeniorResidentInspector

0

ENCLOSURE

AResponsetoNoticeofViolation

50-244/89-81

Violation

1

.InsectionReort44/88-81VIOLATION

1:STATEMENT

OFVIOLATION-

10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

III,requiresinpartthatmeasuresbeestablished

toensurethatapplicable

regulatory

requirements

anddesignbasesaretranslated

intospecifications

andprocedures.

Thesemeasuresshallprovideforverifying

theadequacyofdesignbyperformance

ofdesignreviews.GinnaStationQualityAssurance

Manual,SectionNo.11,"TestCon-trol,"requiresthatengineering

establish

designtestrequirements

andthattestingbeperformed

inaccordance

withapprovedprocedures

whichincorporate

therequirements

andacceptance

criteriacontained

inapplicable

Technical

Specifications

andregulatory

requirements.

Contrarytotheabove,onNovember15,1989,thedesignreviewsforEngineering

WorkRequest(EWR)3891wereinadequate

inthattheEWRdidnotestablish

thebatteryload,requirements

therebyresulting

inabatteryload.profileusedduringtheservicetest.notreflecting

thedesignbasisloadrequirements.

ThisisaSeverityLevelIVViolation

(Supplement

1).ACCEPTANCE

OFVIOLATION:

RG&EagreesthatitdidnotupdatethebatteryloadprofileaspartofEWR3891.DISCUSSION:

ThepurposeofEWR3891wastoreplacethebatteries

becausetheywerenearingtheendoftheirservicelifeand,whilereplacing

them,toincreasethecapacitymargin.EWR3891didnotincludeanupdat-ingofthebatterytestprofilebecauseithadbeendetermined

thatnolargeloadshadbeenadded.tothebatterysincetheoriginalloadprofilehadbeendeveloped.

ThebatteryloadprofilewasbasedupontheoriginalWestinghouse

designdata.Thatinformation

wasconsistent

withindustrypracticeatthetimeitwasdeveloped.

Analytical

techniques

werenotassophisticated

asthoseinusetoday.Ratherthanexplicitly

quanti-fyingsuchfactorsasmomentary

loadsand.theloadstartingcurrents,

itwasgeneralpracticetoprovideadditional

batterysizingbaseduponexperience

andengineering

judgement.

Today'sstandards

(suchasIEEEstandard485)suggestamorerefined,moreprecisely

quanti-fiedanalysis.

Theactualbatterycapacitywassufficient

toprovideitssafetyfunctions.

Thebatteryhasbeenshowntohaveadequatecapacityasconfirmed

byaphysicaltest.Althoughthereisnorequirement

fortheGinnaNuclearPowerPlanttoincorporate

allnewly-developed

industrystandards,

webelieveitprudenttousethecurrentindustrystandards

fordeveloping

revisedbatteryloadprofiles,

andhavedoneso.A-1

CORRECTIVE

STEPSTApreliminary

analysis,

performed

duringtheinspection,

demonstrated

thatthebatterysizeisadequate.

Therevisedbatterysizecalculation

had,beenfinalized

subsequent

totheNRCinspection

andpriortothereceiptoftheinspection

report,whichconfirmsthatthebatterysizeisnotaconcern.Animprovedbatteryloadprofilehasbeendeveloped

whichincorpo-ratescalculational

improvements

contained

incurrentindustrystandardIEEE485-1983.

Theupgradedbatteryloadprofile(DesignAnalysisEWR3341"SizingofVitalBatteries",

datedMarch12,1990)hasbeentransmitted

byEngineering

totheplantstaff,andthebatterytestingprocedures'PT-10.2

andPT-10.3,BatteryServiceTests)havebeenrevised.Thebatteries

weretestedduringtherecentoutageusingtherevisedprocedures.

Theresultsdemonstrated

theadequacyofthebatterycapacity.

CORRECTIVE

STEPSTOBETAKENTOPREVEBVPREClJRRENCE:

Theapplicability

ofthisviolation

hasbeenbroadened

byRG&Etoassurethatnotonlytheimportant

dcelectrical

loadsareanalyzedandtested,butalsothattheimportant

acelectrical

loadswhichmayimpacttheoperation

oftheplantemergency

dieselgenerators

areidentified

andtracked.Wehaveimplemented

anelectrical

load'rowth

programasdescribed

underunresolved

item89-81-05.

DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCE

WILLBEACHIEVED:

Engineering

established

updatedbatteryloadrequirements.

Thebatterytestprocedures

havebeenrevisedandthebatteries

havebeentestedusingthenewprocedure.

Theseactionswerecompleted

priortothereceiptoftheNRCinspection

report.RG&Eisinfullcompli-ance.A-2

ENCLOSURE

BResponsetoNoticeofViolation

50-244/89-81

Violation

2

IP

~RG&E/Ginna

InsectiReort50-244/89-81

VION2:STATEMENT

OFVIOLATION:

R.E.GinnaTechnical

Specifications

Section6.8.1requiresthatwrittenprocedures

beestablished

and.implemented.

foractivities

suchassurveillance

andtestingactivities

ofsafety-related

equipment.

GinnaStationQualityAssurance

Manual,SectionII,"TestControl,"

establishes

therequirements

forestablishing

andimplementing

testprogramstodemonstrate

thatsafety-related

systemsandcomponents

willperformsatisfactorily.

Furthermore,

thissectionrequiresthattestingshallbeperformed

inaccordance

withwrittenprocedures

whichincorporate

acceptance

criteria.

Contrarytotheabove,onDecember9,1989,Class1E480Vacmoldedcasecircuitbreakershavenotbeensubjected

toscheduled

periodictesting.Furthermore,

thereisnoestablished

acceptance

criteriafortestingthedcundervoltage

relayal'armsinProcedure

PT-11,"60-CellBatteryBanks'AB'hisisaSeverityLevelIVViolation

(Supplement

1).ACCEPTANCE

OFVIOLATION:

RG&Eagreesthattheperiodictestingprogramofsafety-related

equipment

attheGinna.Nuclear

PowerPlantdoesnotcurrently

includemoldedcasecircuitbreakers.

RG&EalsoagreesthattheGinnaperiodictestprocedure

PT-11"60-CellBatteryBanks'AB'"didnotspecifyanacceptance

criterion

forthesetpointofthedcundervoltage

relayalarms.Thisviolation

hastwopartswhichareaddressed

separately

below:Part1:MoldedCaseCircuitBreakerTestingDISCUSSION:

Moldedcasecircuitbreakersaredesignedfornuclearandnon-nuclear

applications.

Thistypecircuitbreakerissealed.anddoesnotincludedesignfeaturestotestallthecapabilities

ofthebreakerbeyondfunctional

tests.RG&Erealizestheimportance

ofassuringproperoperation

ofthesebreakers.

RG&Ehasnotbeenlaxinitsattention

totheimportance

oftestingmoldedcasecircuitbreakers.

Thisproblemwasself-identified

byRG&Eandwasincorporated

intotheRCMprogram.Onourowninitiative,

wedeveloped

andimplemented

receipt-inspection

testingforallnewmoldedcasecircuitbreakersatGinna.Wehavealsoperformed

testingonmolded,casecircuitbreakersinanefforttodetermine

theircharacteristics.

Threeyearsago,RG&Eperformed

specialtestingofallofitsexist-ingmagneticonly,moldedcasecircuitbreakersatGinnaStationonaspecialone-timebasis.Successful

operation

hasindicated

noknowndegradation.

B-1

WhilethefunctioniO~

ofmoldedcasecircuithkersisimportant

tosafetyandwhilethereisanNRCrequirement

foratestprogramtoassurethatsafety-related

structures,

systemsand.components

willperformsatisfactorily,

thereisnospecificrequirement

totestperiodically

everypieceofequipment.

Asstated.inAppendixB,Criterion

XI,"Thetestprogramshallinclude,asappropriate,

operational

tests...ofstructures,

systemsandcomponents."

Theterm"asappropriate"

isapplicable

andincludestheavailability

ofappropriate

testmethods.Moldedcasecircuitbreakersarenotdesignedforinsitutestingandwouldrequiredetermination

andretermination

toperformthetesting.Thevendorsofthisequipment

havealsonotmaderecommendations

forperiodictesting.Becauseofgenericapplicability,

periodictestingformoldedcasecircuitbreakershasbeenanindustry-wide

issueandnogenerally

acceptedtestmethodhasbeendeveloped

atthistime.Thenuclearindustryhasresponded

totheNRCthroughNUMARCconcern-ingmoldedcasecircuitbreakertestingandRG&Eispursuingthisinconjunction

withthiseffort.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTAKEN:RG&Eiscontinuing

toworktowarddeveloping

appropriate

testmethodsformoldedcasecircuitbreakers,

aspartoftheReliability

CenteredMaintenance

(RCM)program.TheGinnaNuclearPowerPlantisoneofthetwo"pilotplants"inthenationfortheEPRIsponsored

RCMprogram.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTOBETAKENTOPR1DGQFZRECURRENCE-

Theindustryiscurrently

examining

theneedfor,andbenefitsof,moldedcasecircuitbreakertesting.RG&EwillcontinuetoworkcloselywiththeindustryandEPRItodetermine

appropriate

testmethodsand.requirements.

DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCE

WILLBEACHIEVED:

AlthoughRG&Edoesnotconsiderthisacompliance

matter,RG&Ewillimplement,

whenavailable,

thosetestingmethodsandrequirements

endorsedbytheindustry.

Part2:Undervoltage

RelayAlarmAcceptance

CriteriaCORRECTIVE

STEPSTAKEN:Theperiodictestprocedure

PT-11"60-CellBatteryBanks'AB'"hasbeenrevisedtoexplicitly

definetheacceptance

band/criterion

forthedcundervoltage

alarmrelays.Thedcrelayshavesubsequently

beencalibrated

andtested.Therelayshavebeenverifiedtoperformwithinthespecified

acceptance

criterion.

B-2

~10

.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTAKENTOPREVIXTREE:Theapplicability

ofthisviolation

hasbeenbroadened

byRG&Etoassurethatnot.onlythetestprocedures

fordcundervoltage

alarmrelayshaveexplicitacceptance

criteria,

butalsothatthetestprocedures

fortheacundervoltage

relaysforthesafeguards

buseshaveexplicitacceptance

criteria.

Thetestprocedure,

PT-11forthedcundervoltage

alarmrelayshasbeenrevisedandPT-9.1forthe480Vacsafeguards

busesisbeingrevisedtoprovideexplicitacceptance

criterion.

DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCE

WILLBEACHIEVED:

Thetestprocedure

forthedcundervoltage

alarmrelayshasbeenrevisedtoprovideanexplicitacceptance

band/criterion.

Thisactionwascompleted

priortothereceiptoftheNRCinspection

report.RG&Eisinfullcompliance.

B-3

0t'

ENCLOSURE

CIdentification

ofSpecificUnresolved

ItemsNote:Thestatements

ofissueshavebeendirectlyextracted

fromtheSSFIreport.Inafewinstances

theissueshavebeencondensed

andparaphrased.

r00e

.89-81-01ServicerSingleFailureSusceptlityPotential

lossofcoolingwater[flow]tobothemergency

dieselgenerators

duringorfollowing

aseismicevent.Thecoolingwaterforthewaterjacketheatexchanger

andlubeoilheatexchanger

discharges

throughacommonnon-safety

non-seismic

10-inchdischarge

pipe.Thecoolingwaterdischarge

pipewouldhavetofail[orhasbeenpostulated

bytheNRCSSFIteamtofail]soastoprevent[block/pinch

off]theflowoftheservicewater.89-81-02Resolution

ofSafetyConcernsThelicenseewasunabletoprovidetheteamwithadocumented

orverifiable

processavailable

atRG&Ethataddresses

howsafetyconcernsraisedoutsidethenormalengineering

processarebroughttotheattention

oftheNuclearSafetyandLicensing

staffandresolved.

89-81-03RHRPumpNPSHAconsultant

independently

evaluated

theavailable

NPSHduringpost-accidentrecirculation

modefromthecontainment

sumpand,aprelimi-naryresultindicates

thattheremaybesomemodesofoperation

oftheRHRpumpsunderwhichadequateNPSHisnotavailable.

Licenseeisevaluating

thevalidityofthesemodesandtheprobability

ofoccurrence.

Licenseeisalsoevaluating

thepossibility

thattheconsultant's

analytical

modelwastooconservative.

89-81-04Class1EBatteryTestingFailuretotestthebatteries

withaloadprofilewhichtrulyrepre-sentedtheloaddemandonthebatteryisconsidered

aviolation

of10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

III.89-81-05Electrical

LoadGrowthControlProgramRG&Edoesnothaveamechanism

toassurethatplantcalculations

affectedbymodifications

areupdatedtoensurethattheyaremain-tainedup-to-date

andaccurate.

Thedesignprocessprovidesguidancetoengineers

toreviewthesystemcapacityandotherattributes,

buttheguidanceaddresses

onlyspecificmodifications

astheyareperformed.

Thereisnoformalloadtrackingsystemtoensurethatsystemcapacityisreviewedfortheintegrated

effectofseveralmodifications

insteadofjustone.Thelicenseestatedthatanon-lineprogramtocaptureelectrical

loadgrowthandupdateaffectedcalculations

wouldbedeveloped.

89-81-06MoldedCaseCircuitBreakersand,Undervoltage

RelayAlarmsFailuretoperiodically

testthemoldedcasecircuitbreakersandnotestablishing

anacceptance

criteriafortheundervoltage

relayalarmsareaviolation

offacilityTechnical

Specifications

6.8.1,whichrequirestestingofsafety-related.

components

inaccordance

withestablished

procedures.

.89-81-07A

Calibrate

ofControlRoomInstrumeThecontrolroomdcvoltmeters

arenotcalibrated

onaperiodicbasistoensurereliablesystemvoltageindication

tooperators.

89-81-07B

ControlRoomP&IDsPipingandInstrument

Diagram(P&ID)updatesandDesignChangeRequests(DCRs)postedinthecontrolroomwerereviewedbytheteam.ItwasnotedthattheRHRsystemP&ID(33013-1247)

didnotreflectthecurrentvalvepositionconfiguration

fortheRHRsystem.Also,theexistingDCRsoutstanding

againstthisdrawingcouldnotbeused.toderivethecorrectvalvepositions

inthatDCRs1247-4,and1247-5hadnotbeenapprovedbyRG&EEngineering

anddidnotreflectthecurrentpositionofvalve822B.Processing

ofDCRsdoesnotalwaysoccurinatimelymannersuchthatthecontrolroomP&IDscanbeimmediately

updated.Plantoperations

organization

makespermanent

changestosystemvalvepositions,

thereisnotanimmediate

markuporannotation

madeontheeffecteddraw-ings.Theteamnotedthatpermanent

changestovalvepositions

insystemoperating

procedures

areoccurring

withoutthepriorconcurrence

ofRG&Eengineering.

UFSAR,sections5.4.5.3.5

and5.4.5.2,referstotworemotelyoperat-edvalveswhichcanbeutilizedtoisolateanRHRloopfromoutsidethepumproom.ThesystemwalkdownandtheupgradedP&IDsindicatethatthereisnolongeranymethodavailable

toisolateanRHRloopremotely(i.e.,viareachrods).Althoughthisinformation

hasbeenremovedfromtheRHRP&ID,thereisnoidentified

punchlist

itemtodeletethisinformation

fromtheUFSAR.Theteamnotedthatuncontrolled

trainingmaterial(LessonTexts)havenotbeenupdatedtoreflectsystemchangesaccomplished

duringthelastoutage.Thereisnostationrequirement

tomaintainthistrainingmaterialcurrent.Theinspection

teamconsiders

thatmakingthistypeofinformation

available

tocontrolroomoperators

insuchanuncontrolled

mannerrepresents

anotableprogramweakness.

Thelackoftimelyoperating

information

updatesforcontrolroomuseisconsidered

anunresolved.

item.89-81-08Equipment

Environmental

Qualification

Evaluation

TheNRCquestioned.

thebasisfortheassumption

thatRHRpumpsealfailurewilloccurafter24hours.TheNRCrequestsRG&Etosub-stantiate

themethodofdetecting

anyleakintheRHRpumproomifthepumpsealweretofailbeforethestated24hourperiod.C-2

Thesafetyreliefvalvetestprocedures

containgeneralandminimalinstructions

forperforming

thereliefsetpointtest.Standardtestpractices

arenotalwaysperformed.

ordocumented.

Aswritten,thetestprocedure

requiresonlyonesuccessful

setpointtest.Datafromreliefvalvetestinghasbeenrecordedinaccurately

and.inconsistent-

lyinsomecases.TheNRCconcluded

thatRG&Eshouldformalize

testprocedures

instructions

anddatarecording

requirements.

Duringtheon-goingprocedure

upgradeeffort,RG&Eshouldassurethatvalvetestprocedures

incorporate

allnew(1986)ASMECodeSectionXI,IWV-3512,

andANSI/ASME

OM-1-1981

requirements

forsafetyreliefvalves.Inparticular,

morethanonesuccessful

"poptest"atthedesignated

liftpressureshouldbeperformed

andtheresultscomp-letelyandaccurately

documented.

Valvesetpointandleaktestingshouldalsobeperformed

withtheallowable

specification

listedintheprocedure.

Valvetestresultsanddatashouldaccurately

reflect'heresultsofalltestactivities.

RG&Eshouldalsoconsiderthebenefitsofaddingotherperiodicvalvetestssuchastheas-foundreliefliftsetpoint,

valveaccumulation,

and.valvecapacity.

89-81-10Translation

ofFSARRequirements

intoOperating

Procedures

TheGinnaUFSARcontains"operational"

information

anddatawhichtheinspectors

determined

tobeinvalidand,withoutasupporting

designbasis.,Specifically,

Section5.4.5.3.5

statesthatintheeventofa50gpmRHRpumpsealleakandlossofbothpumproomsumppumps,operators

have4hourstoisolatetheleakbeforetheRHRpumpmotorsbecomeflooded.Theteamdetermined

thata50gpmleakintothepumproom,withtwofailedsumpmotors;cannotbesustained

intheRHRpumproomforfourhoursbeforefloodingthepumpmotors.Itwassuggested

.thatthefourhourallowance

wasoriginally

intendedjusttoindicatearoughsystemmarginforcopingwithgrossleakageinthepumppit.Theteamwasunabletofindanyconsideration

ofthisinanyoftheavailable

designdocuments

associated,

withtheRHRsystem.Italsocouldnotbefoundinanyofthesystemoperating

oremergency

procedures.

Thealarmresponseprocedure

forthehighsumplevelalarmrequirescontrolroomoperators

todispatchanauxiliary

operatortoinvestigate

possiblepumproomflooding,

howeverthereisnoreference

tomaximumtimelimittoisolatealeakingRHRtrainifnecessary.

Theteamreviewedtheinstrumentation

devicesavailable

tocontrol,roomoperators

whichwouldindicateRHRleakageinthepumproom.Theonlyknownindication

wouldbefromahighlevelsumpalarm.However,thesumpalarminstrument

isnotqualified

forserviceinaharshenvironment.

Operating

procedures,

emergency

procedures,

andoperator.

trainingmaterialdonotreflectthelimitingdesignbasisofthesystem.Theapparently

unsupported

4hourfloodinglimitisconsidered

anun-resolveditempendingverification

ofthevaluebythelicenseeorcorrection

oftheUFSAR.C-3

O89-81-11Engineer'ssurance

Thedesigncontrolmeasuresasimplemented/practiced

bythelicensee's

engineering

department

wereweak,anddidnotfavorably

comparetogoodengineering

assurance

practices

generally

acceptedintheindustry.

Therewaslackofconsistency

intheimplementation

ofapprovedengineering

procedures

amongthevariousdepartments

andengineering

management

didnotappeartobecognizant

ofthisincon-sistency.

Therewasalackofformaldesigninterface

control,lackofcontroloverexternalcommunication

withdesignconsultants,

andalackofcontroloverdesigndocuments/modification

packagesduringthedevelopment

andimplementation

phase.C-4

ENCLOSURE

.DPreliminary

Categorization

ofIssuesNote:Thecategories

contained

inEnclosure

Dwereselectedtopicsin10CFR50AppendixBandothersources.Tobeginthereviewofthebroaderconcerns,

wehavereviewedtheSSFIreportandthecitedissues,andhavecategorized

themintogeneraltopicalareas.Forexample,unresolved

item89-81-05involvesnothavingamechanism

toassurethatdesigncalculations

aremaintained

up-to-date.

Weseethisspecificitemasbeingpartofamoregeneralareacalleddesigncontrol.Enclosure

Disapreliminary

categorization

oftheunre-solveditemsintothegeneraltopicalareas..Itiscurrently

plannedtocategorize

alltheconcernsidentified

intheinspection

report.

DESIGNCONTROLGeneralControlofDesignInputsControlofDesignProcessSSFIURI89-81-05:

SSFIURI89-81-08:

Electrical

LoadGrowthCon-trolProgramEquipment

Environmental

Qual-ification

Evaluation

ControlofDesignOutputsSSFIURI89-81-07B:

ControlRoomP&IDsControlofDesignInterfaces

and.Coordination

ControlofDesignChangesDesignReviews/Engineering

Assurance

SSFIURI89-81-05:

Electrical

LoadGrowthControlProgramSSFIURI89-81-11:

Engineering

Assurance

SpecificDesignConcernsSSFIURI89-81-01:

ServiceWaterSingleFailureSusceptibility

SSFIURI89-81-03:

RHRPumpNPSHPROCEDURES

SSFIURI89-81-09:

SafetyReliefValveTestingDOCUMENTCONTROLSSFIURI89-81-07B:

ControlRoomP&IDs

0

ORGANIZATIONAL

.ACESSSFIURI89-81-02:

Resolution

ofSafetyConcernsSSFIURI89-81-07B:

ControlRoomP&IDsSSFIURI89-81"10:

Translation

ofFSARRequire-mentsintoOperating

Proce-duresHANDLINGOFSAFETYCONCERNSSSFIURI89-81-02:

Resolution

ofSafetyConcernsSURVEILLANCE

TESTINGMAINTENANCE

SSFIURI89-81-07A:

Calibration

ofControlRoomInstruments

SSFIURI89-81-09:

SafetyReliefValveTestingD-2

ENCLOSURE

EResolution

ofSpecificIssuesNote:Wehaveseparated.

thescheduleinformation

contained

inthisenclo-sureintotwocategories:

resolution

completed,

andscheduleforresolution.

ListedfirstarethoseitemsforwhichRG&Ehascomplet-edresolution.

ThosemeasurestakenbyRG&Eareidentified.

Someoftheunresolved

itemslistedcannotbeadequately

resolved,

withoutaddressing

thebroadermoreprogrammatic

issuessuchasdesigncontrolandengineering

assurance

andrequiremoretimetoresolvethanthespecificitems.Theschedules

providedforsomeitemsmaychangeasRG&Efurtheridentifies

theunderlying

concerns.

Anupdatedschedulewillbeprovidedinthe120dayresponse.

0

~Resolution

Comlete~89-81-04Class1EBatteryTestingThisitemwasresolvedpriortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.seeEnclosure

Aforactionstakenforresolution.

Please89-81-06Undervoltage

RelayAlarmsandMoldedCaseCircuitBreakersPleaseseeEnclosure

Bforactionstakenforresolution.

89-81-07A

Calibration

ofContxolRoomInstruments

ThisitemwasresolvedpriortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.Theactionstakentoresolvethisissueinclude:1)Calibration

ofallcontrolroomdcbusvoltmeters

duringtherecentrefueling

outage(thevoltmeters

werefoundtobewithinthespecified

acceptance

criteria).

2)Alldcbusvoltmeters

arenowcalibrated

perCalibration

Proce-,dureCP-514onanannualbasis.3)Allemergency

dieselgenerator

andvarioussecondary

systempowermetercalibrations

havebeenaddedtotheCP-500seriesprocedures,

andthemeterswerecalibrated

duringthe1990refueling

outage.89-81-10Translation

oftheFSARRequirements

intoOperational

Procedures

Thisitemwasresolvedpromptly.

Theactionstakentoresolvethisissueinclude:1)Performance

ofareanalysis,

duringtheSSFIinspection,

whichdetermined

thatoperators

havetwohourstorespond.(DesignAnalysis,

10CFR50.59

SafetyEvaluation,

NSL-0000-015,

Rev.0,datedDecember8,1989,ResidualHeatRemovalLeakageProvi-sions.)T2)UpdateofUFSARsections5.4.5.3.5,

5.4.5.2and6.3.3.8,submit-tedaspartoftheUFSARupdateonDecember16,1989.3)RevisionofTrainingSystemDescription

RGE-25duringtheinspection.

4)RevisionofEOPspriortoreceiptoftheinspection

report.(Procedure

E-1,LossofReactororSecondary

Coolant,Step18wasaddedandES-1.3,TransfertoColdLegRecirculation,

anotebeforeStep9wasadded.)

.Schedule

forResolu.n89-81-01ServiceWaterSingleFailureSusceptibility

Asnotedintheinspection

report,thefailureofthe10inchdis-chargelineinamannerwhichwouldstopservicewaterflowtothedieselgenerators

isalowprobability

event.Thiseventisalsobeyondthedesignandlicensing

basisoftheplant.Nevertheless,

RG&Eplanstofurtherevaluatethepotential

riskofthisscenarioduringthePRA/IPEeffort.OurIPEiscurrently

scheduled

tobesubmitted

inthethirdquarterof1991.89-81-02Resolution

ofSafetyConcernsAninterimprocessforhandlingsafetyconcernsisunder-development

andwillbediscussed

inour120dayresponse.

89-81-03RHRPumpNPSHDocumentation

oftheanalysisfindingsisscheduled

tobecompleted

byDecember31,1990.Inaddition,

RG&EplanstoconsiderthismatterinthePRA/IPE.89-81-05Electrical

LoadGrowthProgramRG&Ehasimplemented

aninterimprocessforallmodifications

toperformthefollowing

actions:Currentsystemloadingsforthedcbatteries

havebeenestab-lishedinDesignAnalysis,

EWR3341,SizingofVitalBatteries,

andforthedieselgenerator

loadsinDesignAnalysis,

EWR4136,DieselGenerator

Loading.2)AnElectrical

Engineering

DesignGuide,Electrical

Interface

Checklist

EDG-15D,Rev.0,isbeingimplemented

onallmodifica-

tionswhichrequiresidentification

ofloadchangestothedcbatteries

andthedieselgenerator

acloads.3)Aprocesscontrolled

byElectrical

DesignGuide,DesignVerifi-cationModelEDG-15B,Rev.0,hasbeenestablished

withintheElectrical

Engineering

DesignVerification

Groupwhichupdatestheloadingdatafortheimpactedpowersupplyanddetermines

theremaining

capacitymarginforacanddcloads.Wearetakingactionstointegrate

thisprocessintotheappropriate

Engineering

(QE)procedures.

Weanticipate

completion

oftheseactionsbythedateofour120dayresponse.-

89-81-07B

ControlRoomP&IDsRG&Ehasconsidered

theexamplesidentified

bythestaffwhichresultedinthestaff'sconclusion

thatinformation

updatesforcontrolroomusearenotimplemented

inatimelymanner.RG&Ehasresolvedseveraloftheexamplesidentified.

Theseinclude:E-2

C4'C0

.1)RG&Ehasimpleilhted

improvedcontrolsinDrawingChangeRequest(DCR)process.RG&EhasassignedZ"StationEngineerwithresponsibi

lityfortrackingandprocessing

allDCRs.~~2)TheUFSARhasbeenreviewedtoassurethattheappropriate

information

withregardtotheisolation

oftheRHRpumpsealiscorrect.3)RGGEhasrevisedthelessontexttoreflecttherevisedRHR'pumpsealleakagetimelimitation

oftwohours.Aninterimprocessforenhancing

theupdateprocessforcontrolroominformation

iscurrently

underreviewandwillbediscussed,

inthe120dayresponse.

89-81-08Equipment

Environmental

Qualification

Evaluation

Thepassivefailure'ofaRHRpumpsealisassumedtooccurat24hours,consistent

withSRP15.6.5.Theconsequences

ofthisassumedpassivefailure,concurrent

withtheassumeddesignbasisLOCA,wasevaluated,

bytheNRCduringthereviewofSEPTopicXV-19andfoundtobeacceptable.

Nevertheless,

RGGEplanstofurtherevaluatethisscenarioduringthePRA/IPEeffortwithitsattendant

requirement

toperformaninternalfloodinganalysis.

OurIPEiscurrently

sched-uledtobesubmitted

inthethirdquarterof1991.Theresultsofthisevaluation

willdetermine

iftheupgradeofthesumplevelswitchestoasafety-related

statusisrecommended.

89-81-09SafetyReliefValveTestingand,Documentation

RGGEhascommit/ed

toincorporate

ASMECodeSectionZI-IWV-3512

(1986)andimplement

ANSI/ASME

OM-1-1987

aspartoftheISTProgramUpgrade.Procedure

changestoincorporate

theserequirements

werecompleted.

priortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.RGfiEwillhavecompleted.

alltestingsunderthesenewrequirements

byDecember31,1994.E-3

e