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{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATEDDISTBJBUTIONDEMONSTPA,TIONSYSHMIIREGULATORY-.INFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION,,NBR:9003270120DOC.DATE:90/03/19NOTARIZED:YESFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONMECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas6ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONJOHNSON,A.R.ProjectDirectorateI-3DOCKETG05000244R
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED DISTBJBUTION DEMONSTPA,TION SYSHMIIREGULATORY-.
INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION,,NBR:9003270120 DOC.DATE:
90/03/19NOTARIZED:
YESFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C.
Rochester Gas6ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION JOHNSON,A.R.
ProjectDirectorate I-3DOCKETG05000244R


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
RespondstoGenericLtr89-19,"SafetyImplicationofControlSysinLWRNuclearPlants."DISTRIBUTIONCODEA001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionNOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).DS05000244RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-3LAJOHNSON,AINTERNAL:NRR/DET/ECMB9HNRR/DST8E2NRR/DST/SICB7ENUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS2RES/DSIR/EIBEXTERNAL:LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL115511111111~.10111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-3PDNRR/DOEA/OTSB11NRR/DST/SELB8DNRR/DST/SRXB8E0NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111101111DD'DNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:ADDPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTEICONTACTTHE.DOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPI-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISIRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEEDITOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR21ENCL19 I'lÃlllll/f/EIFIEEIaI(hlaROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONo89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,NY.14649.0001March19,1990TELEPHONEAREACOOE715546.2700U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskAttn:Allen"R.JohnsonProjectDirectorateI-3Washington,D.C.20555
RespondstoGenericLtr89-19,"SafetyImplication ofControlSysinLWRNuclearPlants."DISTRIBUTION CODEA001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:
GeneralDistribution NOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
DS05000244RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3LAJOHNSON,A INTERNAL:
NRR/DET/ECMB 9HNRR/DST8E2NRR/DST/SICB 7ENUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS2RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL:
LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL115511111111~.10111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3PDNRR/DOEA/OTSB11 NRR/DST/SELB 8DNRR/DST/SRXB 8E0NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111101111DD'DNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
ADDPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTEICONTACTTHE.DOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPI-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISIRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEEDITOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR21ENCL19 I'lÃlllll
/f/EIFIEEIaI(hlaROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION o89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER, NY.14649.0001 March19,1990TELEPHONE AREACOOE715546.2700U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:Allen"R.JohnsonProjectDirectorate I-3Washington, D.C.20555


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
GenericLetter89-19,"SafetyImplicationofControlSysteminLWRNuclearPowerPlants"(USIA-47)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244
GenericLetter89-19,"SafetyImplication ofControlSysteminLWRNuclearPowerPlants"(USIA-47)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244


==DearMr.Johnson:==
==DearMr.Johnson:==
GenericLetter89-19requiredlicenseestorespondwithin180daysoftheGenericLetterdetailingwhethertherecommendationsoftheletterwillbeimplementedandanimplementationscheduleifapplicable.TheGenericLetteraddressesconcernsabout.SteamGenerator(SG)overfillprotection.AtGinna,overfillprotectionisinitiatedonaSGhigh-water-levelsignalbasedona2-out-of-3initiatinglogi'c.Thisinstrumentationissafetygradebutoneofthethreechannelsisusedforbothcontrolandprotection.ThesystemisolatesMainFeedwater(MFW)byclosingthemainfeedwater.controlandbypassvalves.IntermsofUSIA-47,thisdesignisconcludedtobeacceptableif:A)TheFeedwaterControlSystemisnotpoweredfromthesamesourceasoverfillprotection.B)Overfillprotectionandfeedwatercontrolarenotlocatedwithinthesamecabinets.C)Overfillprotectionandfeedwatercontrolsignalsareroutedsuchthatafireisnotlikelytoaffectbothsystems.D)Plantproceduresand.TechnicalSpecificationsincluderequirementstoperiodicallyverifyoperabilityofoverfillprotection.ThefollowingaddresseachcriterioninthecontextoftheGinnadesign:5'003270i209003i9PDRADOCK05000244PDC001MjA)py4o$5~P Overfillprotectionisprovidedthroughtripbistablesinthereactorprotectionracks,whicharepoweredfromA,B,CandD120VACinstrumentbuses.Uponbistableactuation,the120VACprotectionrelays(normallypowered.bythebistable)arede-energized,andtherelaycontacts(configuredina2-out-of-3matrix)open,de-energizingtheventsolenoidsfromTrainAandTrainB125VDCpower,resultinginclosureofthemainfeedwatercontrolandbypassvalves.TheFeedwaterControlSystemreceivespowerfromtheAandC120VACinstrumentbuses.Separate-breakersareusedtoprovidepowertotheprotectionracksandthefeedwatercontrolsystemexceptFeedwaterLoopAandLevelLoop461shareacommoninstrumentBusAbreakerandacommonregulator(TWINCO-MQ400A).FailureofthecommonbreakerorregulatorwouldcausealossofLoopAfeedwatercontroland.makeupoftheLT-461portionofoverfillprotectionlogic.LossofanyotherbreakerorregulatorwouldonlyaffectitsassociatedlevelchannelorFeedwaterControlLoopB.Sinceoverfillprotectionisfailsafe,actuationofoverfillprotectionwillventthefeedwatercontrolvalvethusoverridinganyactionsoftheControlSystem.Thedesignofoverfillprotectionisconsideredtobeadequatebecauseofthefailsafedesignandactuationwilloverrideanyactionsofthefeedwatercontrolsystem.2.LocationOverfillprotectionandfeedwatercontrolarephysicallylocatedinseparatecabinets.3.Routin-OverfillProtectionTheSGleveltransmitters,arelocatedinside,.containment.LevelsignalsfromfourofthetransmittersexitcontainmentintheAuxiliaryBuildingIntermediateFloor(ABI).TwoofthelevelsignalsexitcontainmentintheIntermediateBuildingBasement(IBB).Thetripbistablesarelo'catedinprotectionracksintheControlRoom.ThebasicrelaycontactsforsolenoidactuationarelocatedintheSIA&SIBracksintheRelayRoom.RoutingfromthepenetrationtothevalveisillustratedonTable1.Routin-FeedwaterControlTheFeedwaterControlSystemislocatedinthefeedwaterrackintheRelayRoom.TheSGlevelsignalistakenfromLT-461and,LT-471channelsviaisolatorslocatedintheprotectionracksintheControlRoomandsuppliedtothefeedwaterrack.ThevalvecontrolsignalisroutedfromthefeedwaterracktothecontrolvalvesasillustratedonTable1.Overfillprotectionandfeedwatercontrolsharecommonfireareasbutarenotroutedinthesamecable.AreviewofGinna'ssafeshutdowncapabilityintheeventofanycrediblepostulatedfire(whichincludethecommonareas)wasdocumentedinourfireprotectionandAppendixRconformancereviews,andapprovedbytheNRCinSafetyEvaluationReportsdated02/14/79 (FireProtection)and02/27/85(AppendixR).Also,RG&Ehas~documentedcontingencyactionsintheeventoffiresinspecificareas(e.g.,SC-3.30seriesproceduresandotherplanscoveringfire-fightingstrategiesforsafety-relatedfireareas).Thus,itisconsideredthatallrequiredsituationsinvolvingsafeshutdownintheeventofafirehavebeenaddressed,andnoadditionalchangesarewarranted.4.TechnicalSecifications/SurveillanceTechnicalSpecification3.5.2requiresSGoverfillprotectiontobeoperableandspecifieslimitingconditionsforoperationshouldthesystemorportionsofthesystembecomeinoperable.TechnicalSpecificationTable4.1-1requiresSGlevelbetestedmonthly..There'fore,TechnicalSpecificationsrequireperiodicverificationofsystemoperability.ProceduresareinplacethatimplementtheTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.Also,functionallogictestsareperformedthatverifyvalveresponse.BaseduponTechnicalSpecificationsurveillancerequirements,powersupplyconfiguration,fail-safedesignofoverfillprotection,separatecabinetsandadequatecablerouting(fireshavebeenaddressed.-inAppendixRreviews),theGinnadesignprovidessufficientseparationtoensureautomaticSGoverfillprotectiontomitigateamainfeedwateroverfeedevent.NosystemmodificationsareplannedasaresultofthisGenericLetter.Vertrulyyours,RobertC.cdDivisionManagerNuclearProductionSubscribedandsworntobeforemeonthis19thdaofMarch,1990.g~l,HAUCK~~~&&aedNcYorkRWE/091MONROEcoU~Attachmentxc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorateI-3Washington,D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaSeniorResidentInspector TABLE1CABLEROUTINGOVERFILLPROTECTIONLevelSicpalLT-4616LT-472LT-463GLT-471ContainmentPenetration(AE10)ABI(AEll)ABIR~outinABI,CT,CRABI,CT,CRProtectionRackLocationCRSIASIBLocationRR.Routine[RR,AHR,TB,ValveRR,AHR,TB,ValveLT-462&LT"473(CE4)IBBIBB,CRCRRR,AHR,TB,ValveFEEDWATERCONTROLSYSTEHLevelSicgialSignalPickupLocationFeedwaterRackLocation~RoutinLT-461LT-471CRCRRRRR,AHR,TB,ValveRR,AHR;'TB,Valve~Leenu:ABI-AuxiliaryBuildingIntermediateFloorIBB-IntermediateBuildingBasementCT-CableTunnelCR-ControlRoomRR-RelayRoomTB-TurbineBuilding V>g~/C.r}}
GenericLetter89-19requiredlicensees torespondwithin180daysoftheGenericLetterdetailing whethertherecommendations oftheletterwillbeimplemented andanimplementation scheduleifapplicable.
TheGenericLetteraddresses concernsabout.SteamGenerator (SG)overfillprotection.
AtGinna,overfillprotection isinitiated onaSGhigh-water-level signalbasedona2-out-of-3 initiating logi'c.Thisinstrumentation issafetygradebutoneofthethreechannelsisusedforbothcontrolandprotection.
ThesystemisolatesMainFeedwater (MFW)byclosingthemainfeedwater.
controlandbypassvalves.IntermsofUSIA-47,thisdesignisconcluded tobeacceptable if:A)TheFeedwater ControlSystemisnotpoweredfromthesamesourceasoverfillprotection.
B)Overfillprotection andfeedwater controlarenotlocatedwithinthesamecabinets.
C)Overfillprotection andfeedwater controlsignalsareroutedsuchthatafireisnotlikelytoaffectbothsystems.D)Plantprocedures and.Technical Specifications includerequirements toperiodically verifyoperability ofoverfillprotection.
Thefollowing addresseachcriterion inthecontextoftheGinnadesign:5'003270i20 9003i9PDRADOCK05000244PDC001MjA)py4o$5~P Overfillprotection isprovidedthroughtripbistables inthereactorprotection racks,whicharepoweredfromA,B,CandD120VACinstrument buses.Uponbistableactuation, the120VACprotection relays(normally powered.bythebistable) arede-energized, andtherelaycontacts(configured ina2-out-of-3matrix)open,de-energizing theventsolenoids fromTrainAandTrainB125VDCpower,resulting inclosureofthemainfeedwater controlandbypassvalves.TheFeedwater ControlSystemreceivespowerfromtheAandC120VACinstrument buses.Separate-breakersareusedtoprovidepowertotheprotection racksandthefeedwater controlsystemexceptFeedwater LoopAandLevelLoop461shareacommoninstrument BusAbreakerandacommonregulator (TWINCO-MQ400A).Failureofthecommonbreakerorregulator wouldcausealossofLoopAfeedwater controland.makeupoftheLT-461portionofoverfillprotection logic.Lossofanyotherbreakerorregulator wouldonlyaffectitsassociated levelchannelorFeedwater ControlLoopB.Sinceoverfillprotection isfailsafe,actuation ofoverfillprotection willventthefeedwater controlvalvethusoverriding anyactionsoftheControlSystem.Thedesignofoverfillprotection isconsidered tobeadequatebecauseofthefailsafedesignandactuation willoverrideanyactionsofthefeedwater controlsystem.2.LocationOverfillprotection andfeedwater controlarephysically locatedinseparatecabinets.
3.Routin-OverfillProtection TheSGleveltransmitters, arelocatedinside,.containment.
Levelsignalsfromfourofthetransmitters exitcontainment intheAuxiliary BuildingIntermediate Floor(ABI).Twoofthelevelsignalsexitcontainment intheIntermediate BuildingBasement(IBB).Thetripbistables arelo'catedinprotection racksintheControlRoom.Thebasicrelaycontactsforsolenoidactuation arelocatedintheSIA&SIBracksintheRelayRoom.Routingfromthepenetration tothevalveisillustrated onTable1.Routin-Feedwater ControlTheFeedwater ControlSystemislocatedinthefeedwater rackintheRelayRoom.TheSGlevelsignalistakenfromLT-461and,LT-471channelsviaisolators locatedintheprotection racksintheControlRoomandsuppliedtothefeedwater rack.Thevalvecontrolsignalisroutedfromthefeedwater racktothecontrolvalvesasillustrated onTable1.Overfillprotection andfeedwater controlsharecommonfireareasbutarenotroutedinthesamecable.AreviewofGinna'ssafeshutdowncapability intheeventofanycrediblepostulated fire(whichincludethecommonareas)wasdocumented inourfireprotection andAppendixRconformance reviews,andapprovedbytheNRCinSafetyEvaluation Reportsdated02/14/79 (FireProtection) and02/27/85(Appendix R).Also,RG&Ehas~documented contingency actionsintheeventoffiresinspecificareas(e.g.,SC-3.30seriesprocedures andotherplanscoveringfire-fighting strategies forsafety-related fireareas).Thus,itisconsidered thatallrequiredsituations involving safeshutdownintheeventofafirehavebeenaddressed, andnoadditional changesarewarranted.
4.Technical Secifications/Surveillance Technical Specification 3.5.2requiresSGoverfillprotection tobeoperableandspecifies limitingconditions foroperation shouldthesystemorportionsofthesystembecomeinoperable.
Technical Specification Table4.1-1requiresSGlevelbetestedmonthly..
There'fore, Technical Specifications requireperiodicverification ofsystemoperability.
Procedures areinplacethatimplement theTechnical Specification requirements.
Also,functional logictestsareperformed thatverifyvalveresponse.
BaseduponTechnical Specification surveillance requirements, powersupplyconfiguration, fail-safe designofoverfillprotection, separatecabinetsandadequatecablerouting(fireshavebeenaddressed.
-inAppendixRreviews),
theGinnadesignprovidessufficient separation toensureautomatic SGoverfillprotection tomitigateamainfeedwater overfeedevent.Nosystemmodifications areplannedasaresultofthisGenericLetter.Vertrulyyours,RobertC.cdDivisionManagerNuclearProduction Subscribed andsworntobeforemeonthis19thdaofMarch,1990.g~l,HAUCK~~~&&aedNc YorkRWE/091MONROEcoU~
Attachment xc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorate I-3Washington, D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaSeniorResidentInspector TABLE1CABLEROUTINGOVERFILLPROTECTION LevelSicpalLT-4616LT-472LT-463GLT-471Containment Penetration (AE10)ABI(AEll)ABIR~outinABI,CT,CRABI,CT,CRProtection RackLocationCRSIASIBLocationRR.Routine[RR,AHR,TB,ValveRR,AHR,TB,ValveLT-462&LT"473(CE4)IBBIBB,CRCRRR,AHR,TB,ValveFEEDWATER CONTROLSYSTEHLevelSicgialSignalPickupLocationFeedwater RackLocation~RoutinLT-461LT-471CRCRRRRR,AHR,TB,ValveRR,AHR;'TB,Valve~Leenu:ABI-Auxiliary BuildingIntermediate FloorIBB-Intermediate BuildingBasementCT-CableTunnelCR-ControlRoomRR-RelayRoomTB-TurbineBuilding V>g~/C.r}}

Revision as of 13:20, 29 June 2018

Responds to Generic Ltr 89-19, Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Plants (USI A-47). Overfill Protection Provided Through Trip Bistables in Reactor Protection Racks Powered from 120-volt Instrument Buses
ML17261B015
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/19/1990
From: MECREDY R C
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: JOHNSON A R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-GTECI-A-47, REF-GTECI-SY, TASK-A-47, TASK-OR GL-89-19, NUDOCS 9003270120
Download: ML17261B015 (6)


Text

ACCELERATED DISTBJBUTION DEMONSTPA,TION SYSHMIIREGULATORY-.

INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION,,NBR:9003270120 DOC.DATE:

90/03/19NOTARIZED:

YESFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas6ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION JOHNSON,A.R.

ProjectDirectorate I-3DOCKETG05000244R

SUBJECT:

RespondstoGenericLtr89-19,"SafetyImplication ofControlSysinLWRNuclearPlants."DISTRIBUTION CODEA001DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:

GeneralDistribution NOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

DS05000244RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3LAJOHNSON,A INTERNAL:

NRR/DET/ECMB 9HNRR/DST8E2NRR/DST/SICB 7ENUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS2RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL:

LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL115511111111~.10111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3PDNRR/DOEA/OTSB11 NRR/DST/SELB 8DNRR/DST/SRXB 8E0NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111101111DD'DNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

ADDPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTEICONTACTTHE.DOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPI-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISIRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEEDITOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR21ENCL19 I'lÃlllll

/f/EIFIEEIaI(hlaROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION o89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER, NY.14649.0001 March19,1990TELEPHONE AREACOOE715546.2700U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:Allen"R.JohnsonProjectDirectorate I-3Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

GenericLetter89-19,"SafetyImplication ofControlSysteminLWRNuclearPowerPlants"(USIA-47)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

DearMr.Johnson:

GenericLetter89-19requiredlicensees torespondwithin180daysoftheGenericLetterdetailing whethertherecommendations oftheletterwillbeimplemented andanimplementation scheduleifapplicable.

TheGenericLetteraddresses concernsabout.SteamGenerator (SG)overfillprotection.

AtGinna,overfillprotection isinitiated onaSGhigh-water-level signalbasedona2-out-of-3 initiating logi'c.Thisinstrumentation issafetygradebutoneofthethreechannelsisusedforbothcontrolandprotection.

ThesystemisolatesMainFeedwater (MFW)byclosingthemainfeedwater.

controlandbypassvalves.IntermsofUSIA-47,thisdesignisconcluded tobeacceptable if:A)TheFeedwater ControlSystemisnotpoweredfromthesamesourceasoverfillprotection.

B)Overfillprotection andfeedwater controlarenotlocatedwithinthesamecabinets.

C)Overfillprotection andfeedwater controlsignalsareroutedsuchthatafireisnotlikelytoaffectbothsystems.D)Plantprocedures and.Technical Specifications includerequirements toperiodically verifyoperability ofoverfillprotection.

Thefollowing addresseachcriterion inthecontextoftheGinnadesign:5'003270i20 9003i9PDRADOCK05000244PDC001MjA)py4o$5~P Overfillprotection isprovidedthroughtripbistables inthereactorprotection racks,whicharepoweredfromA,B,CandD120VACinstrument buses.Uponbistableactuation, the120VACprotection relays(normally powered.bythebistable) arede-energized, andtherelaycontacts(configured ina2-out-of-3matrix)open,de-energizing theventsolenoids fromTrainAandTrainB125VDCpower,resulting inclosureofthemainfeedwater controlandbypassvalves.TheFeedwater ControlSystemreceivespowerfromtheAandC120VACinstrument buses.Separate-breakersareusedtoprovidepowertotheprotection racksandthefeedwater controlsystemexceptFeedwater LoopAandLevelLoop461shareacommoninstrument BusAbreakerandacommonregulator (TWINCO-MQ400A).Failureofthecommonbreakerorregulator wouldcausealossofLoopAfeedwater controland.makeupoftheLT-461portionofoverfillprotection logic.Lossofanyotherbreakerorregulator wouldonlyaffectitsassociated levelchannelorFeedwater ControlLoopB.Sinceoverfillprotection isfailsafe,actuation ofoverfillprotection willventthefeedwater controlvalvethusoverriding anyactionsoftheControlSystem.Thedesignofoverfillprotection isconsidered tobeadequatebecauseofthefailsafedesignandactuation willoverrideanyactionsofthefeedwater controlsystem.2.LocationOverfillprotection andfeedwater controlarephysically locatedinseparatecabinets.

3.Routin-OverfillProtection TheSGleveltransmitters, arelocatedinside,.containment.

Levelsignalsfromfourofthetransmitters exitcontainment intheAuxiliary BuildingIntermediate Floor(ABI).Twoofthelevelsignalsexitcontainment intheIntermediate BuildingBasement(IBB).Thetripbistables arelo'catedinprotection racksintheControlRoom.Thebasicrelaycontactsforsolenoidactuation arelocatedintheSIA&SIBracksintheRelayRoom.Routingfromthepenetration tothevalveisillustrated onTable1.Routin-Feedwater ControlTheFeedwater ControlSystemislocatedinthefeedwater rackintheRelayRoom.TheSGlevelsignalistakenfromLT-461and,LT-471channelsviaisolators locatedintheprotection racksintheControlRoomandsuppliedtothefeedwater rack.Thevalvecontrolsignalisroutedfromthefeedwater racktothecontrolvalvesasillustrated onTable1.Overfillprotection andfeedwater controlsharecommonfireareasbutarenotroutedinthesamecable.AreviewofGinna'ssafeshutdowncapability intheeventofanycrediblepostulated fire(whichincludethecommonareas)wasdocumented inourfireprotection andAppendixRconformance reviews,andapprovedbytheNRCinSafetyEvaluation Reportsdated02/14/79 (FireProtection) and02/27/85(Appendix R).Also,RG&Ehas~documented contingency actionsintheeventoffiresinspecificareas(e.g.,SC-3.30seriesprocedures andotherplanscoveringfire-fighting strategies forsafety-related fireareas).Thus,itisconsidered thatallrequiredsituations involving safeshutdownintheeventofafirehavebeenaddressed, andnoadditional changesarewarranted.

4.Technical Secifications/Surveillance Technical Specification 3.5.2requiresSGoverfillprotection tobeoperableandspecifies limitingconditions foroperation shouldthesystemorportionsofthesystembecomeinoperable.

Technical Specification Table4.1-1requiresSGlevelbetestedmonthly..

There'fore, Technical Specifications requireperiodicverification ofsystemoperability.

Procedures areinplacethatimplement theTechnical Specification requirements.

Also,functional logictestsareperformed thatverifyvalveresponse.

BaseduponTechnical Specification surveillance requirements, powersupplyconfiguration, fail-safe designofoverfillprotection, separatecabinetsandadequatecablerouting(fireshavebeenaddressed.

-inAppendixRreviews),

theGinnadesignprovidessufficient separation toensureautomatic SGoverfillprotection tomitigateamainfeedwater overfeedevent.Nosystemmodifications areplannedasaresultofthisGenericLetter.Vertrulyyours,RobertC.cdDivisionManagerNuclearProduction Subscribed andsworntobeforemeonthis19thdaofMarch,1990.g~l,HAUCK~~~&&aedNc YorkRWE/091MONROEcoU~

Attachment xc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorate I-3Washington, D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaSeniorResidentInspector TABLE1CABLEROUTINGOVERFILLPROTECTION LevelSicpalLT-4616LT-472LT-463GLT-471Containment Penetration (AE10)ABI(AEll)ABIR~outinABI,CT,CRABI,CT,CRProtection RackLocationCRSIASIBLocationRR.Routine[RR,AHR,TB,ValveRR,AHR,TB,ValveLT-462&LT"473(CE4)IBBIBB,CRCRRR,AHR,TB,ValveFEEDWATER CONTROLSYSTEHLevelSicgialSignalPickupLocationFeedwater RackLocation~RoutinLT-461LT-471CRCRRRRR,AHR,TB,ValveRR,AHR;'TB,Valve~Leenu:ABI-Auxiliary BuildingIntermediate FloorIBB-Intermediate BuildingBasementCT-CableTunnelCR-ControlRoomRR-RelayRoomTB-TurbineBuilding V>g~/C.r