ML17262A133

Responds to Violations & Several Unresolved Items Noted in SSFI Rept 50-244/89-81.Update of Appropriate Unresolved Items Encl.Specific Actions Re All NRC Unresolved Items Being Tracked to Completion

ML17262A133
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	09/11/1990
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	MARTIN T T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 9009200182
Download: ML17262A133 (2)

See also: IR 05000244/1989081

Text

k'LROCHESTER

GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION

ROBERTChtECREDYVi<ehetidentCinnet4uclee<Ptoduction

/'.tone>t*te~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER

N.Y.14649-0001

TELEPHONE

AREACODE71B5462700September

11,1990Mr.ThomasT.MartinRegionalAdministrator

U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

RegionI475Allendale

RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406'ubject:

120-dayResponsetoInspection

Report50-244/89-81

SafetySystemFunctional

Inspection

ontheRHRSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Reference:

(a)NRCInspection

Report50-244/89-81,

datedMay9,1990(b)RG&EletterfromR.C.Mecredy-toNRC,T.T.Martin,datedJune8,1990DearMr.Martin:Reference

(a)requested

aresponsetotwoNoticesofViolation

andseveralunresolved

itemswithin30daysandawrittenevaluation

ofthedeficiencies

identified

inSection2.1oftheInspection

Reportwithin120days.Inour30-dayresponsetotwoNoticesofViolation,

Ref.(b),wesummarized

ourproposedresolution

orscheduleforresolution

fortheunresolved

items89-81-01through10.TheNRCunresolved

itemdescription

andourproposedresolution

ofeachofthesewasdiscussed

inenclosures

CandEofRef.(b).Anupdateoftheappropriate

unresolved

itemsisprovidedasAttachment

Atothisresponse.

Specificactionsregarding

allNRCunresolved

itemsarebeingtrackedtocompletion

byRG&E.~U~cIQet\Aoo1'Q~C3oPo+Theidentified

weaknesses

inSection2.1oftheInspection

Reportcollectively

raisedanNRCconcernastotheeffectiveness

ofRG&E'scurrentpractices

toestablish

engineering

assurance.

Thiswasidentified

asunresolved

item89-81-11andisthefocusofthisresponse.

RG&Erecognizes

thatunresolved

item89-81-11,

engineering

assurance,

ischaracterized

bybroadprogrammatic

issues.RG&Ehascompleted

anevaluation

ofthedeficiencies

andconcernsraisedintheInspection

Reportbyperforming

aninternalassessment

oftheunderlying

issuesidentified

inSection2.1andtheexamplesdiscussed

inSection2.2.Ourassessment

hasbeendocumented

inangQ~o//(]

Cl

internalreportentitled"Systematic

Assessments

ofEngineering

Assurance

Issues'andRHRSSFIConcerns"

dated9/11/90.RG&Ebelievesthattheunderlying

concernsnecessitate

bothinterim.and

longtermactivities

toresolve.Ourapproachinperforming

the-internal

assessment

andasummaryofthehighpriorityactionsarepresented

inAttachment

B.Thisattachment

isasummaryoftheconsiderable

effortsofanRG&ESSFIAssessment

Teamcomposedofagroupofexperienced

RG&Estaffandmanagement

personnel.

Theprimarytaskof'theRG&ESSFIAssessment

TeamwastoprepareareporttoRG&E'smanagement

whichrecommended

themosteffective

interimactionsneededtobegintheprocessofstrengthening

theengineering

processes

and.controls.

TheRG&ESSFIAssessment

Teamwascomposedofnineseniorengineers

andstaff.Theteammettore-examine

theinspection

reportandcategorize

thedeficiencies

bytopicalareas.Theteamalsoevaluated

areportpreparedbyanRG&Econsultant

whoindependently

identified

theprogrammatic

concerns.

Theassessment

consisted

ofindividual

evaluations

byteammembersaswellasworkingsessionsasagroup.TheRG&EAssessment

TeamgroupedtheNRCidentified

deficiencies

intothefollowing

topicalareas:~Improved~Improved~Improved~Improved~Improved~ImprovedMethodofIdentifying

and.Assessing

SafetyConcernsDesignControlandReviewsDesignInterface

ControlDocumentation

Associated

withDesignBasesDocumentation

Associated

withModifications

Engineering/Plant

Communications

Theteamthenestablished

interimactionsandlongtermcorrective

actionsforeachtopicalarea.Theteamprioritized

theinterimactionsandestablished

aproposedschedule.

Theinterimactionswererecommended

baseduponachieving

afundamental

improvement

ontheengineering

process.Interimactionsarethoseactionswhichcanbeimplemented

immediately

orwithinaperiod.ofuptoayear.Long-term

corrective

actionswerealsorecommended,.

Manyofthelongertermrecommendations

arealreadyembodiedintwomajorprograms:

Configuration

Management

(CM)andtheEngineering

Procedures

UpgradeProgram.AreportontheConfiguration

Management

programdescriptions

andschedulewaspresented

tomembersofRegionIandNRRonMarch6andMarch27,1990,respectively.

(Individual

projectswithintheCMprogrammaybeexaminedwithintheenclosure

toInspection

Report90-03,datedApril18,1990).TheEngineering

Procedures

Upgradeprogramhasbeeninitiated

andwillincludeanexternalassessment

ofourcurrentprocedures

byanindependent

consultant.

Itisexpectedthatthisassessment

willbecompletebyyear-end.

TheresultsofRG&E'sinternalSSFIAssessment

willbecomeaninputtotheEngineering

Procedures

UpgradeandtheConfiguration

Management

Programs.

Attachment

BisasummaryreportoftheAssessment

Teamactivities

andrecommendations.

RG&Ebelievesthatmanyofthedeficiencies

notedundertheengineering

assurance

unresolved

item89-81-11hadbeenrecognized

priortotheRHRSSFIandhavebeenenveloped

underthevariousConfiguration

Management

Projects,

suchastheSetpointVerification

ProgramandDesignBasisDocumentation

Projects.

Wehaverecognized

thatinterimactionsarenecessary

tosufficiently

strengthen

theengineering

processes,

procedures

anddocumentation

ofinformation

tobridgethegaptotheselongertermprograms.

Wehavebeguntheprocesstoimplement

theseactionsandplantoexaminetheireffectiveness,

during1991.Webelievethattheinterimactionsplannedarethemosteffective

measuresforRG&Etoprovideadequateresolution

oftheidentified

deficiencies

whileweareimplementing

thelongtermConfiguration

Management

Programs.

TheNRCInspection

Reportidentified

theEngineering

A'ssurance

deficiencies

insections2.2.1.1,2.2.1.2,2.2.3.2,and2.2.3.3.TheRG&Eassessment

concentrated

ontherootcausesofthesedeficiencies

andnotjusttheexamplesthemselves.

Nevertheless,

thespecificanalyses,

reports,anddrawingsthatrequirerevisions

orcorrections

asdescribed

inthesesectionsarebeingrevisedorupdatedasnecessary,

including

forexample,thecalculations

discussed

insection2.2.1.2andthedrawingsidentified

insection2.2.3.3(B).

,Ourspecificevaluations

relativetotheexamplesfoundinthesefoursectionsarecontained

intheAssessment

Teamreport.Webelievethatthesystematic

assessment

discussed

inAttachment

Bisathoroughandappropriate

responsetounresolved

item89-81-11.Pleasenotifyusifyoubelievewehavenotinterpreted

theNRCreportcorrectly.

Verytrulyyours,GAHK118Atta'chment

RobertC.Mecredyxc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

(original)

DocumentControlDeskWashington,

D.C.20555AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14Dl)ProjectDirectorate

I-3Washington,

D.C.20555GinnaSeniorResidentInspector

Attachment

AUPDATEOFUNRESOLVED

ITEMSFROMRG&E'sENCLOSURE

EOF,JUNE8,1990URI89-81-02(Section2.2.1.4)Resolution

ofSafetyConcernsJune8,1990:Aninterimprocessforhandlingsafetyconcernsisunderdevelopment

andwillbediscussed

inour120dayresponse.

Update:RG&Ehasdeveloped

aformalprocessinProcedure

QE-1603,Documenting

andReporting

ofConditions

AdversetoQuality,forhandlingpotential

safetyconcernsidentified

byNuclearEngineering

Servicespersonnel.

Theseamongtheconditions

-whichwouldbereported,

are:nonconformances,

deviations,

deficiencies,

failures,

malfunctions,

defective

materialandequipment,

vendortechnical

reports,designbasisdocumentation,

andthematerialcondition

oftheplantstructures,

systemsorcomponents.

Theprocedure

requiresthatpotential

safetyconcernsbedocumented

andtrackedbyNuclearEngineering

Servicespersonnel.

Theprocessprovidesfor:ensuringthatapreliminary

safetyevaluation

isperformed

byNuclearSafetyandLicensing;

transmitting

information

concerning

conditions

thatinvolveasafetyconcerntotheTechnical

Manager,GinnaStation;disposition

ofsafetyconcernsthroughtheappropriate

processsuchasanonconformance

report(NCR),and.identified

deficiency

report(IDR);reviewing

thecondition

andpreliminary

safetyevaluation

byGinnaStationTechnical

Sectionagainstthecriteriaforreporting

events(A-25.1);

dispositioning

thecondition

throughtheappropriate

processsuchascorrective

actionreports(CAR),procedure

changenotice(PCN)andworkrequest/trouble

request(WR/TR);providing

theinitiator

withthefeedbackonthedisposition.

Potential

conditions

adversetoqualitythatarediscovered

byGinnaStationpersonnel

aredispositioned

byoneofthecurrentprocesses

undertheMaintenance

WorkRequestandTroubleReport(A-1603),

Corrective

ActionReport(A-1601),

andReporting

ofUnusualPlantConditions

(A-25).Interimandlongtermcorrective

actionsrecommended

aspartoftheRG&ESSFIAssessment

aredescribed

inAttachment

BunderthegeneraltopicalareaImprovedProcessforReporting

andAssessing

SafetyConcerns.

A-1

URI,89-81-05(Section2.2.2.2)Electrical

LoadGrowthProgramJune8,1990:Wearetakingactionstointegrate

thisprocessintotheappropriate

Engineering

(QE)procedures.,

Weanticipate

completion

oftheseactionsbythedateofour120dayresponse.

Update:RG&Eissuedachangetoengineering

procedure

QE-301Rev.11withissuanceofPDR0609dated7/9/90.Thischangerequiresthatourdesignprocessensurethattheeffectsofallloadchangesonthestationbatteries

ordiesel-generators

shallbeaddressed,

including

therequirement

thatthesebeevaluated

andshowntobewithinthemarginallowedbythecurrentloadinganalysis.

DuringtheRG&ESSFIReviewTeamAssessment

itwasnotedthatotherexampleswereidentified

whichcouldbeplacedwithintheissueofestablishing

amechanism

toevaluatethecumulative

effectsofmodifications.

Interimandlongtermcorrective

actionsaredescribed

withinAttachment

BunderthegeneraltopicalareaImprovedDocumentation

Associated

withModifications.

URI89-81-07(Section2.2.4.4.a.,

b.,andd.)ControlRoomP&ID'sJune8,1990:Aninterimprocessforenhancing

theupdateprocessforcontrolroominformation

.iscurrently

underreviewandwillbediscussed

inthe120dayresponse.

Update:Thisconcernwasmanifested

intwoareas,drawingchangerequests(DCRs)andtrainingmaterial.

DCRProcess:Thetimeliness

ofprocessing

drawingchangeshasbeenenhancedthroughimplementation

ofRevision3ofA-606,DrawingChangeRequestsprocedure.

Thisupgradedirectsthetimelyupgrading

ofdrawingsusedintheControlRoomandTechnical

SupportCenter.Postingofdrawingchangesisrequiredwithin2workingdaysfromtheirreceiptbyCentralRecords.(Generalpracticehasbeensamedayposting).

TheapprovalandtrackingoftheDCRprocessiscurrently

assignedtotheTechnical

SectionatGinnaStation.Plansarebeingmadetotransferdataentry,controlofthedatabaseanddistribution

totheDocumentControldepartment.

Anotherenhancement

includesamonthlyDCRstatusreportthatisdistributed

tomanagement.

TheDCRprocesshasbeengivenincreased

emphasisthroughprocedural

contr'ols.

Withitspresentmethod,RG&Ebelievesthattimelypostingandeffective

trackingandtrendingoftheDCRsystemwillbeachieved..

A-2

4

TraininMaterial:

RG&Eiscommitted

toensuringthatalltrainingmaterialavailable

toLicensedoperators

isascorrectandcurrentaspossible.

Duringtheinspection

weagreedthattheLessonTextRG&E-25contained

aninvalidvalueforthetimeavailable

toisolatea50gpmsealleaktopreventRHRpumpmotorflooding.

Otherinformation

relativetoplantmodifications

onvalve:numbers

(EWR4761)andpipingmodification

(EWR4675)alsohadnotyetbeenincorporated

intotheLessonTextbecausetheTrainingChangeRequesthadnotyetbeenimplemented.

Afterthediscrepancy

ontheisolation

timewasidentified

toRG&E,theLessonTextwasimmediately

corrected.

Forclarity,theLessonTextshavebeenrenamedTRAININGSYSTEMSDESCRIPTIONS.

However,thesearenotdefinedasControlled

Configuration

material.

Thesedocuments

arenotmeanttotaketheplaceofapprovedplantprocedures,

engineering

designdocuments,

plantdrawingsorvendortechnical

manuals.Theyareusedasreference

material,

arrangedbysystem,thatcontainaconceptual

overviewof.thatsystemdesignedtobeused.asajoband.trainingaid.Weunderstand

theNRC'sconcernoverthefactthatthismaterialisavailable

foruseinthecontrolroom,maybefrequently

used,andisnotdesignated

asbeingpotentially

outofdate.Webelievetheprimaryconcernisthetimeliness

ofupdatingthismaterialtoreflecttheplantconfiguration,

notoverthecontroloverthesedocuments.

Therefore,

strictcontrolhasbeenplacedoverthesedocuments.

Thereisamastercopycontrolled

b'ytheTrainingDepartment

andallchangesarecontrolled

byprocedure

TR5.9(Training

ChangeRequest/Notice).

Recordsarekeptofcontrolled

copyholdersofcontrolled

copies.Placement

ofthismaterialinthecontrolroomiscontrolled

bytheTrainingDepartment.

Thisisthenorm,nottheexception,

intheutilityindustry.

Weunderstand

andrecognize

theunderlying

concernidentified

overthetimeliness

ofproviding

currentandcontrolled

materialtothosewhomayuseit.Procedures

TR5.5.1(Tracking

PlantChanges)iscurrently

theprocessthathasbeendeveloped

andimplemented

toidentifyandtrackplantchangesandincludethosechangesintrainingmaterialwhereappropriate.

Wehavetakenadditional

stepsinordertoprovidetrainingmaterialthatisascurrentaspossibleandtobetterdefinethepurposeofthismaterial.

1.Placeacopyofthe"Information

Letter"inallTrainingSystemDescriptions

thatareaffectedbyaplantmodification.

Thisactionhasbeenimplemented

andwillbecontrolled

byConfiguration

A-3

2.Management

TrainingGuidelines,

CMTG-3.0,

Preparation

andUseofInformation

Letters.Theinformation

letterprovidescurrentinformation

onamodification.

Theletterwillremainpartofthesystemdescription

untilthesystemdescription

hasbeenrevised.toincorporate

thenewmodification.

IThefirstpageofeachTrainingSystemDescription

willbestampedTRAININGINFORMATION

ONLY.Thisactionhasbeeninitiated..

3.IncludethedateofrevisionforeachpageoftheTrainingSystemDescription.

Thisactionhasbeenimplemented.

Therewerenoadditional

interimremedialactionsrecommended

aspartoftheRG&ESSFIReviewTeamAssessment

otherthanthoseabove.Longtermcorrective

actionsaredescribed

inAttachment

BundergeneraltopicalareaPlantDesignInformation/Design

Bases.URI89-81-06(Section2.2.2.3)MoldedCaseCircuitBreakerJune8,1990:Theindustryiscurrently

examining

theneedfor,andbenefitsof,moldedcasecircuitbreakerstesting.RG&EwillcontinuetoworkcloselywiththeindustryandEPRItodetermine

theappropriate

testmethodsandrequirements.

Update:DuringAugustRG&Epersonnel

fromEngineering

andPlantMaintenance

visitedtheDiabloCanyonPowerPlanttoinspecttheequipment

andprocedures

forperiodictestingofmoldedcasecircuitbreakersusedbyPG&E.ResultsofthefirstcycleoftestingbytheDiabloCanyonstaffwerealsodiscussed.

AsimilarprogramforGinnaStationappearstobetechnically

feasible,

subjecttoadditional

evaluation

andprocurement

oftestequipment,

development

ofprocedures,

andperformance

ofatrialtestprogram.Itisanticipated

thatatrialprogramcanbeinitiated

withinthenextyear.Itisestimated

thatthefirstcycleofatestprogramwouldrequirefourormoreyearstocompletefollowing

thesuccessful

completion

ofatrialtest.A-4

Attachment

BSYSTEMATIC

ASSESSMENT

OFENGINEERING

ASSURANCE

ISSUESANDRHRSSFICONCERNSThisattachment

isasummaryoftheSSFIAssessment

Teamapproachandrecommended

actionsextracted.

fromtheRG&Ereportwiththesamename.

Systematic

Assessment

ofEngineering

Assurance

IssuesandRHRSSFIConcernsTABLEOFCONTENTS1.0INTRODUCTION

1.1~purose1.3ScoeofReviewandRecommendations

1.4ReviewTeam2.0SYSTEMATIC

ASSESSMENT

'I3.0ISSUESANDCONCERNSADDRESSED

4.0SUMMARYOFRECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDICES:

AppendixA,Programmatic

ConcernsListingPagei

0

Systematic

Assessment

ofEngineering

Assurance

IssuesandRHRSSFIConcerns1.0INTRODUCTION

1e2~PuroseThisdocumentprovidestheresultsofasystematic

assessment

ofissuesandconcernsraisedbytheNRC',sSafetySystemFunctional

Inspection

(SSFI)conducted

duringNovemberandDecember,

1989,whichfocusedontheGinnaStationResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)System.Thissummaryreportalsopresentsinterimremedialactionsandlong-term

corrective

actions.Otherstepstowardimprovements,

alreadyinprogress,

arealsolisted..BackroundAsafetySystemFunctional

Inspection

(SSFI)wasperformed

byanNRCteamfromNovember6toDecember8,1989,atRG&Efacilities

(GinnaStationandthecorporate

offices),

andisdocumented

inaletterfromtheNRCdatedMay9,1990.Theobjective

oftheSSFIwastoassessthecapability

oftheGinnaResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)systemtoperformitsdesignbasissafetyfunctions.

TheNRCinspection

teamevaluated

theadequacyofoperational

procedures,

testpractices,

,andmaintenance

policiesastheycontribute

toRHRsystemreliability.

TheNRCteamalsoaddressed

thequalityofengineering

supportactivities.

TheNRCteamdidnotidentifyanyconditions

thatwouldprohibittheRHRsystemfromperforming

itsintendedfunctions

undernormalanddesignbasisaccidentconditions.

However,itwasstatedbytheNRCthatcompleteverification

ofsystemreliability

wasnotpossiblesincethedesignbasiscalculations

fortheRHRsystemwerenotreadilyavailable.

TheNRCSSFIteamdidhaveoneimmediate

concernand,asaresult,RG&Ewasrequested

topromptlyresolveadiscrepancy

regarding

thepotential

floodingoftheRHRpumproom.Ouractionstakentoresolvethisweredocumented

inEnclosure

EtoourJune8,1990response(URI89-81-10).

InadditionitappearedtotheNRCinspection

teamthattwoactivities

werenotconducted

infullcompliance

withNRCrequirements,

asdescribed

intheNoticeofViolation

(NOV)enclosedasAppendixAtotheNRCSSFIInspection

Report.B-1

TheRG&EresponsetotheNOVincludedascheduleforresolving

theunresolved

items(exclusive

of89-81-11discussed

above)identified

intheNRCSSFIreport.TheRHRSSFIInspection

Reportalsocited,anumberofconcernswhichcouldbeassociated

withbroaderprogrammatic

issues.TheNRCinspection

teamconcluded

thatweaknesses

existinengineering

supportandplantmodification

activities.

Theseweaknesses

werelistedinSection2.1,andwerediscussed

inSection2.2,oftheNRCSSFIInspection

Report,andhavebeenassignedunresolved

itemnumber89-81-11.

TheSSFIInspection

Reportrequired'G&E

to"providetheirevaluation

ofthoseweaknesses

within120days".Theidentified

weaknesses

wereplacedunderthebroadcategoryof"engineering

assurance"

bytheNRC.RG&Ecommitted'n

theJune8,199030-dayresponsetoconductareviewofitsengineering

processusingasystematic

approach.

RG&Eelectedtoperformitsevaluation

ofthe"engineering

assurance"

issuesbyutilizing

areviewteamapproach.

Theresultsofthereviewteamapproachwasintendedtoprovidethebasistoward.resolution

ofNRCSSFIInspection

unresolved

item89-81-11.

1.3Scoe.oftheReviewand'Recommendations

ThescopeoftheSSFIreviewwasestablished

byRG&EManagement

priortotheinitiation

ofthereviewteameffort.RG&EManagement

providedgeneralguidanceforconductofthereview'teameffortaswellasspecificguidanceonthescopeofpotential

recommendations.

Toensurethatathoroughevaluation

wasconducted,

thereviewteamexaminedthematerialfoundinthefollowing

documents:

a~NRCSSFIReportno.50-244/89-81,

dated,May9,1990b.RG&E's30-dayresponselettertotheNRCdatedJune8,1990c~Commitment

andActionTrackingSystem(CATS)commitments

established

bytheNRCinspection

reportandRG&E'sJune8,1990letter.d.e.INPOGoodPractices,

"Guidance

fortheConductofDesignEngineering"

(INPO88-016)December,

1988GroveEngineering

ReviewReportdatedJuly10,1990Applicable

sectionsoftheRG&EConfiguration

Management

(CM)Plan.B-2

0

g,NRCSafetySystemFunctional

Inspection

Guidelines,

AppendixC(issued11/12/86).

h.EPRI,NuclearSafetyAnalysisCenterDocument,

NSAC/121,

"Guidelines

forPerforming

SafetySystemFunctional

Inspections

(November

1988).NQA-1"QualityAssurance

ProgramRequirements

forNuclearPowerPlants"(1979)j.ANSIN45.2.11,

"QualityAssurance

Requirements

fortheDesignofNuclearPowerPlants"(1974)k.NRC'egulatory

Guide1.64,"QualityAssurance

Requirements

fortheDesignofNuclearPowerPlants"l.QE-series

Engineering

Procedures

m.A-seriesGinnaStationAdministrative

Procedures

Withthisreference

materialasbackground

information

thereviewteammembersproceeded

toevaluatetheNRCconcernsandmakerecommendations

forcorrective

actiontoRG&EManagement

throughtheDepartment

Manager,NuclearEngineering

Services.

Thefollowing

is'summaryoftheguidanceprovidedbyRG&EManagement:

a.Issuesaddressed

weretofocuson,butnot,limitedto,thosecontained

intheNRCSSFIReport(IR89-81).b.c~ConcernscitedbytheNRCweretobeacceptedasvalid.Noeffortwastobeexpendedonquestioning

eitherthecitedconcernsortheexamplesusedintheNRCSSFIReport.Recommendations

weretotaketheformofinterimactionsandlong-term

corrective

actions.d.Recommendations

forinterimactionsweretobelimitedtothefollowing

items:i.Changesto~existinEngineering

andGinnaStationProcedures.

ii.CreationofalimitednumberofnewEngineering

QEorAdministrative

Procedures

and/orGinnaAdministrative

Procedures.

iii.Issuanceofpolicystatements

(atdiscipline,

department

orcorporate

level.)B-3

e.iv.Development

ofdiscipline-specific

implementing

documents

(suchasdesignguides,standards,

etc.).v.Reassignment

ofdutiestopersonnel

withinspecificdisciplines.

Recommendations

were'obeachievable

utilizing

stafflevelsthatarecurrently

authorized.

1.4ReviewTeamRG&EManagement

selectedareviewteamtoactontheirbehalfconsisting

ofagroupofnineexperienced

personnel

representing

thefollowing

areas:Mechanical

Engineering,

Electrical

Engineering,

Structural

andConstruction

Engineering,

NuclearSafetyandLicensing,

Configuration

Management,

DocumentControl/Records

Man'agement,

GinnaTechnical

Section,andNuclearEngineering

ServicesDepartment

staff.2.0SYSTEMATIC

ASSESSMENT

Themulti-discipline

RG&ESSPIReviewTeamperformed

anassessment

oftheissuesandconcernsgenerated

bytheNRCRHRSSFI.Theteambeganbyestablishing

thefollowing

definition

of"Engineering

Assurance":

EnineerinAssurance:

Theplannedandsystematic

actionsnecessary

toprovideadequateconfidence

thatengineering

activities

areperformed

inaconsistent

mannerwithadherence

toplantlicensing

basis,applicable

procedures,

regulations

andacceptedindustrystandards.

Thereviewteammembersformed."focusgroups"whichwereassignedindividual

detailitemsfromtheprogrammatic

concernslistingestablished

intheinitialbreakdown

ofissues(appendix

A).Individual

assessments

weremadeandtheissuesgroupedanddocumented

aspartofRG&Es"Systematic

Assessment

ofEngineering

Assurance

andRHRSSPIConcernReport."Thereviewwasbasedonthereviewteam'sownassessment

aswellasondetailedinformation

obtainedthroughdiscussions

withothercognizant

engineering

and,plantpersonnel.

3.0ISSUESANDCONCERNSADDRESSED

Thereviewteamregrouped

allissuesandprogrammatic

concernsintosixtopicalareas,aslistedbelow:s-4

3.1ToicalArea1:"Improved

ProcessforReporting

andAssessing

SafetyConcerns"

a:"ProcessforHandlingSafetyConcernsOutsidetheEWRProcess"3.2ToicalArea2:."Improved

DesignControlandReviews"a~b.cd.e.f."Engineering

Management"

"Engineering

Assurance"

"Timeliness

ofDCRProcessing"

"DesignReviews""PAIDUpgradeProgram""DesignControl"3.3ToicalArea3:"Improved

DesignInterface

Control"a."Procedural

Inconsistency"

3.4ToicalArea4:"Improved

DesignDocumentation/Design

Bases"a~b.cd.e.f.g,"Interdisciplinary

ReviewofNon-Mods"

"Calculations"

"Deletion

ofInformation

fromPGIDs""ValveIdentification

Differences"

"DesignBasisInformation"

Controlled

Instrument

ListTrainingMaterial3.5ToicalArea5:Modifications"

1"Improved

Documentation

Associated

witha."InvalidInformation

inUFSAR"b."Assessment

ofCumulative

EffectsofModifications"

c."Issuance

ofDesignOutputs"d."ControlofEWRs"3.6ToicalArea6:"Improved

Engineering/Plant

Communications"

a."Engineering/Plant

Interface"

b."Acceptance

Criteria"

c."Adequacy

ofSRVTestAcceptance

Criteria"

4.0SummarofRecommendations

Thefollowing

isageneralsummaryofthemostsignificant

interimactionsandlongtermcorrective

actions.4.1RG&E'smanagement

hasensuredclosecontrolandqualityengineering

servicesthroughtheirinteraction

andreviewofdesign,butwrittenprocedures

donotmakethatcontrolsufficiently-explicit.

B-5

Asinterimactions,asingleprocedure

willbedeveloped

thatoutlinestheentirescopeofthedesignprocess.Discipline

designguidesforgeneration

ofdesigncriteria,

designanalysesanddesignverification

documents

willbeinitiated.

Also,theintegrated.

assessment

processwillbeseparately

"proceduralized.

Applicable

procedures

willberevisedtoestablish

therequirements

forreview,'a'pproval,

andissuanceofvendordocuments.

In,thelongerterm,weplantocompletetheupgradeofengineering

procedures

andprocesses

toreflectindustrystandards

ofgoodpractice,

efficiency

andrapidresponse.

4.24.34.4Engineering

procedures

containastrongbiastomodification

design.Thishasprovedtobewellsuitedtowardmajorstandalonedesignprojectsbutisnotaseffectively

usedtoaggressively

supportalloftheengineering

activities

associated

withawell-maintained.

operating

plant.Close-out

EWRdocumentation

canbeprotracted,

becausethescopeofamodification

maybein'creased

overtime,causingdesigndocuments

toremainopen.Asinterimactions,weplantolimitthepracticeofincreasing

thescopeofadesignmodification

duringtheintervalbetweenturnoverofthemodification

intheplantandrecordsclose-out.

WewillbegintotransmitEWRDesignPackagestoDocumentControlconcurrent

withtheissuanceoftheconstruction

package.Inthisway,thelistofapplicable

designdocuments

willalsobeestablished

forthemodification

tobeinstalled..

TheUFSARchangeprocesswillbeproceduralized

andintegrated

withtheaboveturnoverprocess.Interimactivities

areneededtobegintocapture,retain,provideaccessto,andorganizedesignbasisinformation

aspartofthenormalongoingengineering

activities.

RG&Ehasincorporated

adesignbasisdocumentation

projectundertheConfiguration

Management

Program.Thisprogramwillbeimplemented

overthenextseveralyearsfocusingonthesafetysystems.Effortswillbemadetoidentifythetypesofmateri'al

anddocuments

thatcontaindesignbasisinformation

andtobegintoindexandorganizeitinDocumentControl.Inthelongerterm,theDesignBasisDocumentation

projectwilldevelopDesignBasisDocuments

forthemajorplantsystemsandequipment.

Becauseofthemajormodification

biasusedinthedevelopment

ofQEprocedures

andthemajorupgradeprogramsthathavetakenplaceovertheyears,theengineering

department

isnotformatted

onasystembasis.B-6

li1i

TheConfiguration

Management

Programisbeingdeveloped

onasystemsbasis.TheQ-Listhasdefinedsystemboundaries

thatwillbeusefulasweindexdesign.documents

inDocumentControlanddevelopDesignBasisDocuments.

4.5Manyoftheunderlying

'concerns

andlongtermcorrective

actionsarecurrently

partoftheexistingorplannedprogramswithinConfiguration'anagement

andEngineering

Procedures

UpgradePrograms.

TheDesignBasisDocumentation,

SetpointVerification,

Q-List,DocumentControlEnhancement,

and.Engineering

Controlled

Configuration

DrawingUpgradeProgramsareindividual

partsofthisprogram.Thespecificactionsrecommended

bytheSSFIAssessment

teamwillbereviewedbytheRG&Epersonnel

responsible

fortheCMprojectstogetherwithmanagement

tomakeanyneededrevisions

tothescopeoftheseprojects.

4.6Engineering

activities

areperformed

byNuclear,Engineering

Services(NES)andstationtechnical

staff.Thedesignprocessmustensureconsistency

betweentheseactivities.

Asinterimactions,weplantoincreasethecontrolsoversetpointchangesandreporting

ofsafetyconcerns.

Aprocesswillbedeveloped

toensurethatproposedsetpointchangesaregiventheappropriate

reviewpriortotheirissuance.

ThePCAQprocess(Potential

Condition

AdversetoQuality)hasbeenimplemented

inQE-1603forNuclearEngineering

Servicespersonnel

toprovideidentification

anddisposition

ofpotential

safetyconcernsandprovideavehicletoimprovetheinterface

withtechnical

personnel

attheplant.Wealsoplantodevelopastreamlined

approvalprocessfortechnical

supportprojectsnotinvolving

modifications.

Inthelongtermwewillexamineestablishing

asingleprocessforallNuclearDivisionpersonnel

toreportspecificconcernswhichmayhavesafetysignificance.

Processes

willbedeveloped

toensurecommonality

ofprocedures

betweenNESandtheTechnical

SectionatGinna.B-7

000

SYSTEMATIC

ASSESSMENT

OFENGINEERING

ASSURANCE

ISSUESANDRHRSSFICONCERNSAPPENDIXA

Cl0

ProrammaticConcernsAreasInvolvinSiificantIdentified

Weaknesses

ResonseScoeListinENGINEERING

MANAGEMENT

Weaknessinmanagerial

andadministrative

controlsManagement

reliesonengineer's

experience

insteadofformalcontrolsEngineering

management

hasnotprovidedclearguidanceandprocedural

controlsoverdesignchangeprocessLackofEngineering

Assurance

Practices

Organizational

Interfaces

w~Controlofdocumentation,

engineering

designinterfaces,

andengineering

communications

withexternalorganizations

ispoor.Lackofcriteriafor.determining

whenengineering

concurrence

isneededDCR'snotprocessed

inatimelymannerDesignoutputnotproperlydistributed

UFSARcontainsinvalidinformation

Noprocessforhandlingsafetyconcernsidentified

outsidetheengineering

processP&IDchangedidnotresultinanUFSARchangeasappropriate

Engineering

Discipline

Interfaces

Eachdiscipline

hasitsowninterpretation

ofengineering

procedure

requirements.

Engineering

Management

hasadifferent

perception

thantheengineering

staffP&IDchangesoccurredwithoutaninterdisciplinary

reviewCONFIGURATION

MANAGEMENT

PlantBaselineConfiguration

Lackofcompleteandconsistent

nomenclature

betweenP&IDsandprocedures,

UFSARandQAManualDeletionofinformation

fromP&IDsDesignBasesr~DesignBasisCalculation

notavailable

ordonotexist~Lackofdocumented

designbasisisagenericweakness~UFSARcontainsinvalidinformation

withoutasupporting

designbasis~Nocalculation

listorformalized

overalllisting

~Operating

procedures,

emergency

procedures,

andoperatortraining.,material

donotreflectthelimitingdesignbasisofthesystemDesignModifications

RG&Edoesnothaveamechanism

foraccounting

forsynergistic

effectsofmodifications

(electrical

calcs,pipestresscalcs)Numerousweaknesses

existinengineering

supportandplantmodification

activities

DocumentControl,~UFSARcontainsinvalidinformation

Lackofcomprehensive

controlled

instrument

listWeaknessinmanagement

controlsystemtoassurecompleteandconsistent

designoutputisissuedanddistributed

PSIDsissuedhaveremovedandrevisedinformation.

Teamconcerned

howRG6Emaintains

traceability

ofthisinformation

Informational

inconsistencies

existbetweendocuments

DCRprocessing

isnottimelyEWRsremaininpersonalcontrolofresponsible

engineerEWRslackindexCompleted

EWRsarenotprocessed

intothedocumentcontrolsysteminatimelymannerUncontrolled

trainingmaterialENGINEERING

PROCEDURES

DesignReviewsReviewprocesslacksdepthReviewandverification

doesnotstrictlyfollowANSIN45.F11Inadequate

ReviewIndependent

Verification

notdoneinaccordance

withengineering

procedures

Calculations-

Genericweaknessinreviewandapprovalofcalculations

Calculational

controlprogram(ANSIN45.2.11)

isweakNolistofcalculations,

nowaytotrackpastcalculations

Setpoints

~Instrument

loopsetpoints

maynotaccountforloopinaccuracies

~Acceptance

criterianotestablished

intestprocedure

forsetpointof

undervoltage

alarmrelaysOtherLackofformalcontrolofengineering

anddesigndocuments

RG&Edesigncontrolmeasuresdonotcomparefavorably

withacceptedindustrypractices

UFSARcontainsinvalidinformation

Lackofinterface

controlwithinternalandexternalorganizations

SRVtestingprocedures

containgeneralandminimalinformation

SAFETYCONCERNSInability

toproperlyidentifysafetyconcerns(batteryloadprofiledeficiencies

notdiscovered)

Inability

toassesssafetyconcerns(poorrootcauseanalysis)

Nomechanism

todisposition

safetyconcernsidentified

outsideofthenormalengineering

process(PIC-629EWRdidnotreflectanyactiontakenonidentified

concernTESTINGDCundervoltage

testinadequate

SRVtestinginadequate

MCCBsnottestedperiodically

SPECIFICDESIGNCONCERNSSWSingleFailureInadequate

RHRNPSHJumpercableexceededminimumallowedbendradiusBatteryrackdonothaveagrounding

cableRHRpumpsealfailure(Eg)RHRpumpsealfailurecausinglossofbothRHRpumps(singlefailure)