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{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20147C971 | |||
| issue date = 02/23/1988 | |||
| title = Insp Rept 50-482/87-33 on 871119-880103.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Startup from Refueling, Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Maint Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation & Cathodic Protection Sys | |||
| author name = Bartlett B, Cummins J, Harrell P | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000482 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| document report number = 50-482-87-33, NUDOCS 8803030205 | |||
| package number = ML20147C930 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 12 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000482/1987033]] | |||
=Text= | |||
{{#Wiki_filter:, . . | |||
APPENDIX B | |||
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
REGION IV | |||
NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/87-33 License: NPF-42 | |||
Docket: 50-482 | |||
Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) | |||
P. O. Box 411 | |||
Burlington, Kansas 66839 | |||
Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) | |||
Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas | |||
Inspection Conducted: November 19, 1987 to January 3, 1988 | |||
I | |||
Inspectors: i | |||
fA JJLO hm b 13 | |||
E. Cumdi % 8qn,iop Resident Inspecto D(te [ | |||
er bs | |||
AMf} A / // | |||
B. L. Bartlett, Resident' Reactor Inspector, /Datfe | |||
Operations | |||
Approved: sJ _ | |||
P. an 211, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Section A D' ate | |||
8803030205 880301 | |||
PDR ADOCK 05000482 | |||
g PDR | |||
. . | |||
2 | |||
Inspection Summary | |||
Inspection Conducted November 19, 1987, through January 3, 1988 | |||
.(Report 50-482/87-33) | |||
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant ste tup from | |||
refueling, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance observation, | |||
monthly surveillance observation, onsite event followup, physical security | |||
verification, radiological protection, cold weather preparation, and cathodic | |||
protection system. | |||
Results: Within the nine areas inspected, one violation was identified | |||
(failure to report as required by 10 CFR 50.72, paragraph 7). | |||
e _ | |||
~ | |||
d' } | |||
*f L | |||
9_* B | |||
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s . | |||
._.' DETAILS | |||
l'. Persons Contacted | |||
-Principal Licensee Personnel | |||
*B. D. Withers, President and CEO | |||
. *R. M. Grant, Vice President, Quality | |||
*J. A. Bailey, Vice President, Engineering & Technical Services | |||
*F. T. Rhodes, Vice Presiden_t, Operations | |||
*G. D. Boyer,. Plant Manager | |||
*0; L. Maynard, Manager, Licensing | |||
C. M. Estes, Superir.tendent of Operations | |||
M. D. Rich, Superintendent of Maintenance | |||
*M. G. Williams, Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality, and | |||
Administrative Services | |||
- W.'J.'Rudolph,-QA Manager-WCGS | |||
A. A. Freitag, Manager,. Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE), WCGS | |||
M; Nichols, Plant Support. Superintendent | |||
K. Peterson, Licensing | |||
*G. Pendergrass, Licensing | |||
*W. M. Lindsay, Supervisor, Quality Systems | |||
*C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist | |||
*C. E. Parry, Superintendent of Quality Engineering | |||
. | |||
*J. M. Pippin, Manager, NPE | |||
The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff | |||
during the inspection period to discuss identified issues. | |||
*Donotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on | |||
-January-8, 1988. | |||
2. Plant Startup From Refueling | |||
The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the plant startup, | |||
following the first refueling outage. Portions-of the activities | |||
discussed below were observed. | |||
o Mode changes performed in accordance with Technical' Specification | |||
requirements and the procedures listed below: | |||
. GEN 00-001, Revision 7, "Mode 5, Fill and Vent of the RCS" | |||
. GEN 00-002, Revision 12, "Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby" | |||
o Portions of three core physics tests listed below were witnessed to | |||
verify that they were performed in accordance with technically | |||
adequate and approved procedures and requirements of Technical | |||
Specifications: | |||
a. Determination of reactor shutdown margin | |||
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | |||
_ _ | |||
. | |||
.. . | |||
4 | |||
Moderator temperature coefficient determination I | |||
b. | |||
c. Control rod worth measurements- | |||
> | |||
For a list of the procedures reviewed see paragraph 6, Monthly | |||
Surveillance Observation. | |||
o The NRC inspectors performed post maintenance walkdowns of the safety | |||
injection system (EM) and main feedwater (AE). | |||
The NRC inspectors review of core power physics test data will bc | |||
documented in a' future inspection report. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
4. Operational Safety Verification | |||
The NRC inspectors verified that the facility is being operated safely and | |||
in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observation of | |||
licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions | |||
with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status | |||
and limiting conditions for operations, and reviewing facility records. | |||
The NRC inspectors, by observation of randomly selected activities and | |||
interview of personnel, verified that physical security, radiation | |||
protection, and fire protection activities were controlled. | |||
By observing accessible components for correct valve position and | |||
electrical. breaker position, and by observing control room indication, the | |||
NRC inspectors confirmed the operability of_ selected portions of | |||
safety related systems. The NRC inspectors also visually inspected safety | |||
components for leakage, physical damage, and other impairments that could | |||
prevent them from performing their designed functions. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
5. Monthly Maintenance Observation | |||
The NRC inspector observed maintenance activities performed on | |||
safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities were | |||
conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical | |||
Specifications (TS), and applicable industry codes and standards. The | |||
following elements were considered by the NRC inspector during the | |||
observation and/or review of the maintenance activities: | |||
o Limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met and, where | |||
applicable, redundant components were operable. | |||
o Activities complied with adequate administrative controls, | |||
o Where required, adequate, approved, and up-to-date procedures were | |||
used. | |||
-_ ___ __ _ _ _ _ - | |||
_ | |||
, . | |||
5 | |||
.. | |||
o Craftsmen were cualified to accomplish the designated task and | |||
technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, operations) | |||
was.made available when appropriate. | |||
o Replacement parts and materials being used were properly certified. | |||
o Required radiological controls were implemented. | |||
o Fire prevention controls were implemented where appropriate. | |||
o Required alignments and surveillances to verify postmaintenance | |||
operability were performed. | |||
o Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used when | |||
appropriate and quality control personnel observed designated work | |||
activities. | |||
Selected portions of the maintenance activities accomplished on the work | |||
requests (WR) listed below were observed and related documentation | |||
reviewed by the NRC inspector: | |||
& Activity | |||
WR 05117-87 Core Subcooling T/C-inspect / repair Ray-Chem splice | |||
WR 04851-87 EBB 01A and B Steam generator possible feedring erosion | |||
caused by J-Tubes | |||
WR 05551-87 KKJ01B Diesel generator-replace item 15 on attached | |||
drawing | |||
WR 05685-87 TKJ04A "A" diesel generator lube oil tank, add oil | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
6. Monthly Surveillance Observation | |||
The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of | |||
surveillance testing and/or reviewed completed surveillance test | |||
procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in | |||
accordance with TS requirements and administrative procedures. The NRC | |||
inspectors considered the following elemerits while inspecting surveillance | |||
activities: | |||
o Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance | |||
with an approved procedure. | |||
o The surveillance procedure conformed to TS requirements. | |||
o Required test instrumentation was calibrated. | |||
_ _ | |||
. . | |||
6 | |||
o TS LC0 were satisfied. | |||
o Test data was accurate and complete. Where appropriate, the NRC | |||
inspectors performed independent calculations of selected test data | |||
to verify their accuracy. | |||
o The performance of the surveillance procedure conformed to applicable | |||
administrative procedures. | |||
o The surveillance was performed within the required frequency and the | |||
test results met the required limits. | |||
Surveillances witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed | |||
below: | |||
STS IC-502A, Revision 2, "Calibration of Pressurizer Pressure | |||
Transmitters," performed on November 28, 1987 | |||
STS RE-004, Revision 7, "Shutdown Margin Determination." performed | |||
December 22 and 31, 1987 | |||
STS KJ-001B, Revision 5, "Integrated D/G and Safeguards Actuation | |||
Test-Train B," performed on December 22, 1987 | |||
STS BB-004, Revision 5, "RCS Water Inventory Balance," performed on | |||
December 23, 1987 | |||
STS CR-002, Revision 7, "Shift Logs For Modes 4, S, and 6," performed | |||
on December 22, 1987 | |||
STS EG-201, Revision 6, "Component Cooling Water System Inservice | |||
Valve Test," performed on December 18, 1987 | |||
STS RE-002, Revision 5, "Determination of Estimated Critical | |||
Position," performed on December 31, 1987 | |||
RXE 01-002, Revision 0, "Reload Low Power Physics Testing," performed | |||
December 31, 1987, and January 1-4, 1988 | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
7. Onsite Event Followup | |||
The NRC inspectors performed onsite followup of nonemergency events that | |||
occurred during this report period. The NRC inspectors reviewed control | |||
room logs and discussed these events with cognizant personnel. The NRC | |||
inspectors verified the licensee had responded to the events in accordance | |||
with procedures and had notified the NRC and other agencies as required in | |||
a timely fashion. The NRC inspectors will review the LERs for these | |||
events and will report any findings in a subsequent NRC inspection report. | |||
_ _ _ ___ _ __ - | |||
, | |||
. . I | |||
; | |||
,. | |||
Selected NRC inspector observations are. discussed below: | |||
a. Lost Test Source | |||
On December 18, 1987, the licensee notified the NRC that a | |||
radioactive test source could not be located. The licensee | |||
determined that the source was missing on December 15, 1987, during a | |||
TS required inventory of radioactiva sources. The 400 microcurie , | |||
Strontium 90 and Yttrium 90 pure beta emitter source was | |||
cylindrically shaped and was 1/2- by 1/4-inch. The source was used | |||
for performing calibration checks of radiation monitoring | |||
instruments. Licensee records show that the source was last | |||
accounted for on August 1,1987. | |||
In | |||
The source | |||
October was | |||
1987, onemounted | |||
of the testinassemblies | |||
a test assembly (made of plexiglass.HPH-182) was | |||
the reactor building when a corner of the plexiglass housing was | |||
broken off. Test Assembly HPH-182 was taken-to the calibration | |||
laboratory to be exchanged with an identical test assembly, HPH-184. | |||
At that time the technician observed that the test source was missing | |||
from assembly HPH-184. The technician then removed the test source | |||
from the HPH-182 assembly and installed it in the HPH-184 assembly. | |||
The technician failed to. notify anyone that the test source was | |||
missing. | |||
The licensee made a search of the areas the source could have been | |||
used in, stored in, or transported through. The licensee's | |||
investigation of this matter is continuing, | |||
b. Diesel Generator Governor Settings | |||
On December 9,1987, at 8:20 a.m. (CST), the licensee declared the | |||
"A" emergency diesel generator (D/G) inoperable. This was because an | |||
operator had discovered that the mechanical governor settings were | |||
different from where they had been left. A D/G vendor representative | |||
onsite informed the licensee of the possibility of tampering. At | |||
this time the reactor was in cold shutdown with "A" train residual | |||
heat removal (RHR) in operation and "B" train RHR out-of-service for | |||
maintenance. The licensee notified NRC, state and county officials, | |||
-and the FBI. The licensee initiated their own investigation. The | |||
D/G was declared operable at 12:22 p.m. (CST) on December 9,1987, | |||
af ter the governor was reset. On December 11, 1987, during a test | |||
run the "A" D/G mechanical governor controls were observed to move. | |||
Investigation by the licensee, in consultation with the governor | |||
vendor, revealed a previously undetected failure in the governor. | |||
After consulting the governor vendor, the licensee suspended the | |||
tampering investigation. | |||
The licensee informed NRC that the governor settings were changed due | |||
to the failure of the governor and not due to tampering, | |||
.,-. | |||
- | |||
... . | |||
, | |||
c | |||
8 | |||
- | |||
On December 9, 1987, at'3:32 p.m. (CST), the licensee made a report | |||
to NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi). Review of this event | |||
by NRC has determined'that this event should have been reported as | |||
required by 10-CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) within 4 hours. | |||
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) required the reporting of "Any event, found | |||
while the reactor.is shut down, that, had it been found while the | |||
reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power | |||
plant, including-its principal safety barriers, being seriously | |||
degraded . . . ." | |||
As stated above D/G "A" was declared inoperable at 8:20 a.m. (CST), | |||
thus the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) should have been | |||
completed no later than 12:20 p.m. (CST). | |||
This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) is an apparent | |||
violation (482/8733-01). | |||
c. Spent Fuel Pool Pumpdown | |||
On December 22, 1987, the licensee accidentally reduced the water | |||
level in the spent fuel pool (SFP). Listed below is a sequence of | |||
events: | |||
o On December 17, 1987, the SFP cleanup system was secured from | |||
cleaning the refueling water storage tank (RWST). The valve | |||
lineup was left in the RWST cleanup mode, | |||
o After the performance of STS KJ-001B on December 22, 1987, the | |||
SFP cleanup suction valves (BN HCV-8800 A and B) were left | |||
closed. | |||
o At 11:40 a.m. (CST) on December 22, 1987, SFP cleanup was | |||
, established per Procedure SYS EC-120, "Fuel Pool Cooling and | |||
Cleanup System Startup." This procedure, however, does not | |||
verify the position of the '/alves to the RWST. | |||
o At 12:29 p.m. (CST) on December 22, 1987, SFP cooling pump "A" | |||
tripped, | |||
o At 12:34 p.m., SFP cooling pump "A" was restarted, | |||
o At 12:37 p.m., SFP cooling pump "A" tripped again. | |||
o At 12:54 p.m., SFP cooling pump "B" was started and an operator | |||
was sent to investigate why "A" tripped. | |||
o At 1:10 p.m. , the operator informed the control room of low SFP | |||
level and went to close Valve V-002. | |||
o At 1:31 p.m. , SFP cooling pump "B" was secured. | |||
m | |||
.-.: . | |||
9 | |||
o At 2:17 p.m., commenced filling SFP from RWST. | |||
o .At 3:21 p.m., secured filling SFP. | |||
The'cause of the pump down was that Valve BN V-002 was left open. | |||
BN V-002 is the manual isolation valve from the SFP cleanup system to | |||
the RWST. Major contributors to the pumpdown was that the SFP level | |||
indicators and low-level a'nnunciator located in the control room have | |||
been inoperable since December 31, 1986. When SFP cooling pump "A" | |||
tripped, it was caused by its low water level protective circuitry. | |||
However, with their level indication inoperative, the control room | |||
operators had no immediate means to determine this. The licensee's | |||
investigation has shown that the SFP level was below the TS limit of | |||
at least 23 feet above the fuel for approximately 90 minutes. The | |||
action statement states the level should be returned within 4 hours. | |||
~ | |||
'The lowest SFP level was approximately one foot below the 23-foot | |||
minimum. Passive design features would have prevented the pumpdown | |||
of the SFP below 22 feet above the' fuel even if the operators had not | |||
secured SFP cooling pump "B" and if it had failed to automatically | |||
trip on low-level. After the level was returned to normal, the pumps | |||
low-level trip setpoint was verified to be accurate. The | |||
investigation irito why SFP cooling pump "A" tripped early is still | |||
ongoing. | |||
The licensee's procedure for startup of the SFP is being changed to | |||
verify the positions of appropriate valves prior to starting SFP | |||
cooling pumps. | |||
d. Reactor Vessel 0-Ring Leakage | |||
On December 30, 1987, at 2:00 a.m. (CST), during a routine phone call | |||
to the shift supervisor, the NRC resident inspector was informed of a | |||
leaking o-ring. At 8:12 p.m. (CST), on December 26, 1987, the | |||
temperature indicator in the vessel o-ring indicated high. The valve | |||
to the inner o-ring was closed isolating the leakage. The valve to | |||
the outer o-ring was then opened placing its leakoff line inservice. | |||
The licensee has committed to the NRC that if the outer o-ring | |||
develops a leak that WCNOC will immediately initiate an orderly | |||
shutdown and cooldown to prepare for replacing both seai ,ings. This | |||
commitment was documented in Licensee Letter ET 88-0006, dated | |||
January 6,1988, from John Bailey to NRC. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
8. Physical Security Verification | |||
The NRC inspectors verified that the facility physical security plan (PSP) | |||
is being complied with by direct observation of licensee facilities and | |||
security personnel. | |||
-- .3 | |||
^ | |||
. | |||
;., # | |||
r | |||
10 | |||
; | |||
Th'e NRC inspectors observed randomly selected activities.to verify that | |||
, search equipment _is operable, that the protected area barriers and vital | |||
area barriers are well maintained,'that access control procedures are | |||
followed and that appropriate compensatory measures are followed if | |||
required. | |||
No violations or deviations'were identified. | |||
y' | |||
9 .' Radiological Protection | |||
By performing the following activities, the NRC inspectors verified that | |||
radiologically related activities were controlled in accordance with the | |||
licensee's procedures and regulatory requirements: , | |||
o Reviewed documents.such as active radiation work permits and the | |||
health physics shift turnover log. | |||
o Observed personnel activities in the ' radiologically controlled | |||
area (RCA) such as: | |||
. Use of the required dosimetry equipment | |||
. "Frisking out" of the RCA | |||
. Wearing of appropriate anti-contamination clothing where | |||
required | |||
o Inspected postings of radiation and contaminated areas. | |||
o Discussed activities with radiation workers and health physics | |||
supervisors.- | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
10. Cold Weather Preparation | |||
The NRC inspectors verified by discussions with licensee personnel and | |||
i review of licensee Procedure STN GP-001, Revision 2, "Plant Winterization" | |||
(performed on November 9-10, 1987) that the licensee had taken action to | |||
protect vital areas and equipment that could be subjected to freezing | |||
conditions. The procedure documented that heating systems and heat | |||
tracing were available and energized where appropriate to the areas and | |||
equipment. The NRC inspector walked down the areas adjacent to the | |||
refueling water storage tank, condensate tank, the reactor make-up water | |||
storage tanks, and verified that heating and instrument lines were | |||
insulated where they could be subjected to freezing conditions. Where | |||
appropriate heat was being supplied to the area. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
.. . | |||
11 | |||
11. Cathodic Protection System | |||
The NRC inspectors reviewed licensee activities related to problems with | |||
the cathodic protection system. From discussions with licensee personnel, | |||
review of documents and observation of components in the field; the NRC | |||
inspectors determined that there had been a problem with maintaining | |||
certain areas of the cathodic protection system in a fully operational | |||
status. This resulted in galvanic corrosion to a number of underground | |||
pipes. The following are two examples where the cathodic protection | |||
system not being fully operational could have been a contributing factor | |||
to failure of the pipes: | |||
o In September 1986, a 1!s-inch auxiliary boiler fuel oil line developed | |||
thru wall leaks apparently due to galvanic corrosion. Plant | |||
Modification Request 02141 documented repair of this line. | |||
o In June 1987, an 8-inch fire protection line developed a thru wall | |||
leak, apparently due to galvanic corrosion. Repair / replacement of | |||
this line was documented on Work Request (WR) 1164-87. | |||
In September 1986, Nuclear Plant Engineering and the Maintenance | |||
Department initiated actions to correct problems with the existing | |||
cathodic protection system. These actions included the following: | |||
o Selected areas were excavated so that pipes could be inspected. | |||
o Repairs were made to cathodic protection power supplies, header | |||
cables, and anode beds, | |||
o Damaged pipes were repaired / replaced, | |||
o A program to help insure the cathodic protection voltage levels were | |||
maintained at the level (0.85 volts) recommended to prevent galvanic | |||
corrosion was implemented. | |||
On October 8, 1987, Nuclear Plant Engineering issued engineering study | |||
"Engineering Piping at Wolf Creek Generating Station," Revision 0. This | |||
study determined, based on pipe corrosion data obtained from six | |||
excavations, that carbon steel when imbedded adjacent to piping of a | |||
different metal (i.e., ductile iron) appeared to be most susceptible to an | |||
accelerated galvanic corrosion rate. This problem apparently was also | |||
intensified when the cathodic protection system for the area in which the | |||
pipe was located had not been maintained at the recommended level. The | |||
study also delineated further excavations to bS performed during the fall | |||
1987 refueling outage. The purpose of these additional excavations was to | |||
inspect pipes in areas where conditions for accelerated corrosion rates | |||
existed. Another purpose was to confirm that conclusions, based on | |||
previous excavations, were accurate. The study concluded that further | |||
degradation of the piping system could be mitigated by an adequate | |||
cathodic protection system. The NRC inspectors will continue to monitor | |||
licensee activities in this area. | |||
. , ___ _ - - -. | |||
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | |||
, | |||
. .. . | |||
12 | |||
, | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
12. Exit Meeting | |||
The NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the scope and | |||
findings of this inspection on January 8, 1988. | |||
}} |
Latest revision as of 11:44, 27 October 2020
ML20147C971 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Wolf Creek ![]() |
Issue date: | 02/23/1988 |
From: | Bruce Bartlett, Cummins J, Harrell P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20147C930 | List: |
References | |
50-482-87-33, NUDOCS 8803030205 | |
Download: ML20147C971 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000482/1987033
Text
, . .
APPENDIX B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/87-33 License: NPF-42
Docket: 50-482
Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)
P. O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839
Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)
Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas
Inspection Conducted: November 19, 1987 to January 3, 1988
I
Inspectors: i
fA JJLO hm b 13
E. Cumdi % 8qn,iop Resident Inspecto D(te [
er bs
AMf} A / //
B. L. Bartlett, Resident' Reactor Inspector, /Datfe
Operations
Approved: sJ _
P. an 211, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Section A D' ate
8803030205 880301
PDR ADOCK 05000482
g PDR
. .
2
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted November 19, 1987, through January 3, 1988
.(Report 50-482/87-33)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant ste tup from
refueling, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance observation,
monthly surveillance observation, onsite event followup, physical security
verification, radiological protection, cold weather preparation, and cathodic
protection system.
Results: Within the nine areas inspected, one violation was identified
(failure to report as required by 10 CFR 50.72, paragraph 7).
e _
~
d' }
- f L
9_* B
,[ <
s .
._.' DETAILS
l'. Persons Contacted
-Principal Licensee Personnel
- B. D. Withers, President and CEO
. *R. M. Grant, Vice President, Quality
- J. A. Bailey, Vice President, Engineering & Technical Services
- F. T. Rhodes, Vice Presiden_t, Operations
- G. D. Boyer,. Plant Manager
- 0; L. Maynard, Manager, Licensing
C. M. Estes, Superir.tendent of Operations
M. D. Rich, Superintendent of Maintenance
- M. G. Williams, Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality, and
Administrative Services
- W.'J.'Rudolph,-QA Manager-WCGS
A. A. Freitag, Manager,. Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE), WCGS
M; Nichols, Plant Support. Superintendent
K. Peterson, Licensing
- G. Pendergrass, Licensing
- W. M. Lindsay, Supervisor, Quality Systems
- C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist
- C. E. Parry, Superintendent of Quality Engineering
.
- J. M. Pippin, Manager, NPE
The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff
during the inspection period to discuss identified issues.
- Donotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on
-January-8, 1988.
2. Plant Startup From Refueling
The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the plant startup,
following the first refueling outage. Portions-of the activities
discussed below were observed.
o Mode changes performed in accordance with Technical' Specification
requirements and the procedures listed below:
. GEN 00-001, Revision 7, "Mode 5, Fill and Vent of the RCS"
. GEN 00-002, Revision 12, "Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby"
o Portions of three core physics tests listed below were witnessed to
verify that they were performed in accordance with technically
adequate and approved procedures and requirements of Technical
Specifications:
a. Determination of reactor shutdown margin
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Moderator temperature coefficient determination I
b.
c. Control rod worth measurements-
>
For a list of the procedures reviewed see paragraph 6, Monthly
Surveillance Observation.
o The NRC inspectors performed post maintenance walkdowns of the safety
injection system (EM) and main feedwater (AE).
The NRC inspectors review of core power physics test data will bc
documented in a' future inspection report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. Operational Safety Verification
The NRC inspectors verified that the facility is being operated safely and
in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observation of
licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions
with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status
and limiting conditions for operations, and reviewing facility records.
The NRC inspectors, by observation of randomly selected activities and
interview of personnel, verified that physical security, radiation
protection, and fire protection activities were controlled.
By observing accessible components for correct valve position and
electrical. breaker position, and by observing control room indication, the
NRC inspectors confirmed the operability of_ selected portions of
safety related systems. The NRC inspectors also visually inspected safety
components for leakage, physical damage, and other impairments that could
prevent them from performing their designed functions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Monthly Maintenance Observation
The NRC inspector observed maintenance activities performed on
safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities were
conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical
Specifications (TS), and applicable industry codes and standards. The
following elements were considered by the NRC inspector during the
observation and/or review of the maintenance activities:
o Limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met and, where
applicable, redundant components were operable.
o Activities complied with adequate administrative controls,
o Where required, adequate, approved, and up-to-date procedures were
used.
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o Craftsmen were cualified to accomplish the designated task and
technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, operations)
was.made available when appropriate.
o Replacement parts and materials being used were properly certified.
o Required radiological controls were implemented.
o Fire prevention controls were implemented where appropriate.
o Required alignments and surveillances to verify postmaintenance
operability were performed.
o Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used when
appropriate and quality control personnel observed designated work
activities.
Selected portions of the maintenance activities accomplished on the work
requests (WR) listed below were observed and related documentation
reviewed by the NRC inspector:
& Activity
WR 05117-87 Core Subcooling T/C-inspect / repair Ray-Chem splice
WR 04851-87 EBB 01A and B Steam generator possible feedring erosion
caused by J-Tubes
WR 05551-87 KKJ01B Diesel generator-replace item 15 on attached
drawing
WR 05685-87 TKJ04A "A" diesel generator lube oil tank, add oil
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Monthly Surveillance Observation
The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of
surveillance testing and/or reviewed completed surveillance test
procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in
accordance with TS requirements and administrative procedures. The NRC
inspectors considered the following elemerits while inspecting surveillance
activities:
o Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance
with an approved procedure.
o The surveillance procedure conformed to TS requirements.
o Required test instrumentation was calibrated.
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o TS LC0 were satisfied.
o Test data was accurate and complete. Where appropriate, the NRC
inspectors performed independent calculations of selected test data
to verify their accuracy.
o The performance of the surveillance procedure conformed to applicable
administrative procedures.
o The surveillance was performed within the required frequency and the
test results met the required limits.
Surveillances witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed
below:
STS IC-502A, Revision 2, "Calibration of Pressurizer Pressure
Transmitters," performed on November 28, 1987
STS RE-004, Revision 7, "Shutdown Margin Determination." performed
December 22 and 31, 1987
STS KJ-001B, Revision 5, "Integrated D/G and Safeguards Actuation
Test-Train B," performed on December 22, 1987
STS BB-004, Revision 5, "RCS Water Inventory Balance," performed on
December 23, 1987
STS CR-002, Revision 7, "Shift Logs For Modes 4, S, and 6," performed
on December 22, 1987
STS EG-201, Revision 6, "Component Cooling Water System Inservice
Valve Test," performed on December 18, 1987
STS RE-002, Revision 5, "Determination of Estimated Critical
Position," performed on December 31, 1987
RXE 01-002, Revision 0, "Reload Low Power Physics Testing," performed
December 31, 1987, and January 1-4, 1988
No violations or deviations were identified.
7. Onsite Event Followup
The NRC inspectors performed onsite followup of nonemergency events that
occurred during this report period. The NRC inspectors reviewed control
room logs and discussed these events with cognizant personnel. The NRC
inspectors verified the licensee had responded to the events in accordance
with procedures and had notified the NRC and other agencies as required in
a timely fashion. The NRC inspectors will review the LERs for these
events and will report any findings in a subsequent NRC inspection report.
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Selected NRC inspector observations are. discussed below:
a. Lost Test Source
On December 18, 1987, the licensee notified the NRC that a
radioactive test source could not be located. The licensee
determined that the source was missing on December 15, 1987, during a
TS required inventory of radioactiva sources. The 400 microcurie ,
Strontium 90 and Yttrium 90 pure beta emitter source was
cylindrically shaped and was 1/2- by 1/4-inch. The source was used
for performing calibration checks of radiation monitoring
instruments. Licensee records show that the source was last
accounted for on August 1,1987.
In
The source
October was
1987, onemounted
of the testinassemblies
a test assembly (made of plexiglass.HPH-182) was
the reactor building when a corner of the plexiglass housing was
broken off. Test Assembly HPH-182 was taken-to the calibration
laboratory to be exchanged with an identical test assembly, HPH-184.
At that time the technician observed that the test source was missing
from assembly HPH-184. The technician then removed the test source
from the HPH-182 assembly and installed it in the HPH-184 assembly.
The technician failed to. notify anyone that the test source was
missing.
The licensee made a search of the areas the source could have been
used in, stored in, or transported through. The licensee's
investigation of this matter is continuing,
b. Diesel Generator Governor Settings
On December 9,1987, at 8:20 a.m. (CST), the licensee declared the
"A" emergency diesel generator (D/G) inoperable. This was because an
operator had discovered that the mechanical governor settings were
different from where they had been left. A D/G vendor representative
onsite informed the licensee of the possibility of tampering. At
this time the reactor was in cold shutdown with "A" train residual
heat removal (RHR) in operation and "B" train RHR out-of-service for
maintenance. The licensee notified NRC, state and county officials,
-and the FBI. The licensee initiated their own investigation. The
D/G was declared operable at 12:22 p.m. (CST) on December 9,1987,
af ter the governor was reset. On December 11, 1987, during a test
run the "A" D/G mechanical governor controls were observed to move.
Investigation by the licensee, in consultation with the governor
vendor, revealed a previously undetected failure in the governor.
After consulting the governor vendor, the licensee suspended the
tampering investigation.
The licensee informed NRC that the governor settings were changed due
to the failure of the governor and not due to tampering,
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On December 9, 1987, at'3:32 p.m. (CST), the licensee made a report
to NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi). Review of this event
by NRC has determined'that this event should have been reported as
required by 10-CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) required the reporting of "Any event, found
while the reactor.is shut down, that, had it been found while the
reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power
plant, including-its principal safety barriers, being seriously
degraded . . . ."
As stated above D/G "A" was declared inoperable at 8:20 a.m. (CST),
thus the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) should have been
completed no later than 12:20 p.m. (CST).
This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) is an apparent
violation (482/8733-01).
c. Spent Fuel Pool Pumpdown
On December 22, 1987, the licensee accidentally reduced the water
level in the spent fuel pool (SFP). Listed below is a sequence of
events:
o On December 17, 1987, the SFP cleanup system was secured from
cleaning the refueling water storage tank (RWST). The valve
lineup was left in the RWST cleanup mode,
o After the performance of STS KJ-001B on December 22, 1987, the
SFP cleanup suction valves (BN HCV-8800 A and B) were left
closed.
o At 11:40 a.m. (CST) on December 22, 1987, SFP cleanup was
, established per Procedure SYS EC-120, "Fuel Pool Cooling and
Cleanup System Startup." This procedure, however, does not
verify the position of the '/alves to the RWST.
o At 12:29 p.m. (CST) on December 22, 1987, SFP cooling pump "A"
tripped,
o At 12:34 p.m., SFP cooling pump "A" was restarted,
o At 12:37 p.m., SFP cooling pump "A" tripped again.
o At 12:54 p.m., SFP cooling pump "B" was started and an operator
was sent to investigate why "A" tripped.
o At 1:10 p.m. , the operator informed the control room of low SFP
level and went to close Valve V-002.
o At 1:31 p.m. , SFP cooling pump "B" was secured.
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9
o At 2:17 p.m., commenced filling SFP from RWST.
o .At 3:21 p.m., secured filling SFP.
The'cause of the pump down was that Valve BN V-002 was left open.
BN V-002 is the manual isolation valve from the SFP cleanup system to
the RWST. Major contributors to the pumpdown was that the SFP level
indicators and low-level a'nnunciator located in the control room have
been inoperable since December 31, 1986. When SFP cooling pump "A"
tripped, it was caused by its low water level protective circuitry.
However, with their level indication inoperative, the control room
operators had no immediate means to determine this. The licensee's
investigation has shown that the SFP level was below the TS limit of
at least 23 feet above the fuel for approximately 90 minutes. The
action statement states the level should be returned within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
~
'The lowest SFP level was approximately one foot below the 23-foot
minimum. Passive design features would have prevented the pumpdown
of the SFP below 22 feet above the' fuel even if the operators had not
secured SFP cooling pump "B" and if it had failed to automatically
trip on low-level. After the level was returned to normal, the pumps
low-level trip setpoint was verified to be accurate. The
investigation irito why SFP cooling pump "A" tripped early is still
ongoing.
The licensee's procedure for startup of the SFP is being changed to
verify the positions of appropriate valves prior to starting SFP
cooling pumps.
d. Reactor Vessel 0-Ring Leakage
On December 30, 1987, at 2:00 a.m. (CST), during a routine phone call
to the shift supervisor, the NRC resident inspector was informed of a
leaking o-ring. At 8:12 p.m. (CST), on December 26, 1987, the
temperature indicator in the vessel o-ring indicated high. The valve
to the inner o-ring was closed isolating the leakage. The valve to
the outer o-ring was then opened placing its leakoff line inservice.
The licensee has committed to the NRC that if the outer o-ring
develops a leak that WCNOC will immediately initiate an orderly
shutdown and cooldown to prepare for replacing both seai ,ings. This
commitment was documented in Licensee Letter ET 88-0006, dated
January 6,1988, from John Bailey to NRC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8. Physical Security Verification
The NRC inspectors verified that the facility physical security plan (PSP)
is being complied with by direct observation of licensee facilities and
security personnel.
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Th'e NRC inspectors observed randomly selected activities.to verify that
, search equipment _is operable, that the protected area barriers and vital
area barriers are well maintained,'that access control procedures are
followed and that appropriate compensatory measures are followed if
required.
No violations or deviations'were identified.
y'
9 .' Radiological Protection
By performing the following activities, the NRC inspectors verified that
radiologically related activities were controlled in accordance with the
licensee's procedures and regulatory requirements: ,
o Reviewed documents.such as active radiation work permits and the
health physics shift turnover log.
o Observed personnel activities in the ' radiologically controlled
area (RCA) such as:
. Use of the required dosimetry equipment
. "Frisking out" of the RCA
. Wearing of appropriate anti-contamination clothing where
required
o Inspected postings of radiation and contaminated areas.
o Discussed activities with radiation workers and health physics
supervisors.-
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Cold Weather Preparation
The NRC inspectors verified by discussions with licensee personnel and
i review of licensee Procedure STN GP-001, Revision 2, "Plant Winterization"
(performed on November 9-10, 1987) that the licensee had taken action to
protect vital areas and equipment that could be subjected to freezing
conditions. The procedure documented that heating systems and heat
tracing were available and energized where appropriate to the areas and
equipment. The NRC inspector walked down the areas adjacent to the
refueling water storage tank, condensate tank, the reactor make-up water
storage tanks, and verified that heating and instrument lines were
insulated where they could be subjected to freezing conditions. Where
appropriate heat was being supplied to the area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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11. Cathodic Protection System
The NRC inspectors reviewed licensee activities related to problems with
the cathodic protection system. From discussions with licensee personnel,
review of documents and observation of components in the field; the NRC
inspectors determined that there had been a problem with maintaining
certain areas of the cathodic protection system in a fully operational
status. This resulted in galvanic corrosion to a number of underground
pipes. The following are two examples where the cathodic protection
system not being fully operational could have been a contributing factor
to failure of the pipes:
o In September 1986, a 1!s-inch auxiliary boiler fuel oil line developed
thru wall leaks apparently due to galvanic corrosion. Plant
Modification Request 02141 documented repair of this line.
o In June 1987, an 8-inch fire protection line developed a thru wall
leak, apparently due to galvanic corrosion. Repair / replacement of
this line was documented on Work Request (WR) 1164-87.
In September 1986, Nuclear Plant Engineering and the Maintenance
Department initiated actions to correct problems with the existing
cathodic protection system. These actions included the following:
o Selected areas were excavated so that pipes could be inspected.
o Repairs were made to cathodic protection power supplies, header
cables, and anode beds,
o Damaged pipes were repaired / replaced,
o A program to help insure the cathodic protection voltage levels were
maintained at the level (0.85 volts) recommended to prevent galvanic
corrosion was implemented.
On October 8, 1987, Nuclear Plant Engineering issued engineering study
"Engineering Piping at Wolf Creek Generating Station," Revision 0. This
study determined, based on pipe corrosion data obtained from six
excavations, that carbon steel when imbedded adjacent to piping of a
different metal (i.e., ductile iron) appeared to be most susceptible to an
accelerated galvanic corrosion rate. This problem apparently was also
intensified when the cathodic protection system for the area in which the
pipe was located had not been maintained at the recommended level. The
study also delineated further excavations to bS performed during the fall
1987 refueling outage. The purpose of these additional excavations was to
inspect pipes in areas where conditions for accelerated corrosion rates
existed. Another purpose was to confirm that conclusions, based on
previous excavations, were accurate. The study concluded that further
degradation of the piping system could be mitigated by an adequate
cathodic protection system. The NRC inspectors will continue to monitor
licensee activities in this area.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Exit Meeting
The NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the scope and
findings of this inspection on January 8, 1988.