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{{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)'/ACCESSION NBR:9609170534 DOC.DATE: 96/09/06 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM           (RIDS)
NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION EADS,J.Carolina Power&Eight Co.DONAHUE,J.W.
'/
Carolina Power&Eight Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000400
ACCESSION NBR:9609170534         DOC.DATE:   96/09/06     NOTARIZED: NO         DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina                 05000400 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AFFILIATION EADS,J.             Carolina Power   & Eight Co.
DONAHUE,J.W.         Carolina Power   & Eight Co.
RECIP.NAME           RECIPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 96-014-00:on 891127,identified condition of two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps connected to same emergency electrical bus.Caused by failure to follow operating procedures.
LER 96-014-00:on 891127,identified condition of two                             C Charging/Safety Injection Pumps connected to same emergency i
Racked out 6.9 KV breaker.W/960909 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL I SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), incident Rpt, etc.C i E NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.05000400 G RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DSIR/EZB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E05~)SPD/RAB LE CENgER NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2 FILE 01 COPIES RECIPIENT LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME 1 1 LE,N COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Y D EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR 1 1 1 1 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC POOREEW.NUDOCS FULL TXT 2 2 1 1 1 1 C N NOTE TO ALL NREDS" REClPXENTS:
electrical bus.Caused by failure to follow operating procedures. Racked out 6.9 KV breaker.W/960909 ltr.
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EX'15-2083)
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL I SIZE:
TO ELXMENATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEEDI FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 Carolina Power R Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 SEP 9 1996 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Do'cument Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-96-150 10CFR50.73 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-400 LICENSE NO.NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-014-00  
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), incident Rpt, etc.                         E NOTES:Application for permit renewal         filed.                             05000400 G RECIPIENT         COPIES              RECIPIENT          COPIES ID CODE/NAME        LTTR ENCL          ID   CODE/NAME     LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD                 1    1      LE,N                    1    1 Y
INTERNAL: ACRS                       1    1        E05~)  SPD/RAB        2    2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB             1    1          LE CENgER            1    1 NRR/DE/ECGB               1    1      NRR/DE/EELB              1    1 NRR/DE/EMEB              1    1      NRR/DRCH/HHFB            1    1 NRR/DRCH/HICB            1   1     NRR/DRCH/HOLB            1    1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB            1    1      NRR/DRPM/PECB           1    1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB            1   1     NRR/DSSA/SRXB            1   1             D RES/DSIR/EZB              1   1     RGN2      FILE 01      1   1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD             1    1      LITCO BRYCE,J      H    2    2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A           1   1     NOAC POOREEW.            1   1             C NRC PDR                  1   1     NUDOCS FULL TXT         1   1 N
NOTE TO ALL NREDS" REClPXENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EX'15-2083) TO ELXMENATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEEDI FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR           26     ENCL   26
 
Carolina Power R Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 SEP       9 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                             Serial: HNP-96-150 ATTN: NRC Do'cument Control Desk                                                       10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-014-00


==Dear Sir or Madam:==
==Dear Sir or Madam:==
In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.
 
This report concerns a condition outside of the design basis in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPs)were inadvertently connected to the same emergency electrical bus.Sincerely, J.W.Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant JHE/jhe Enclosure c: Mr.J.B.Brady (NRC-HNP)Mr.S.D.Ebneter (NRC-RII)Mr.N.B.Le (NRC-PM/NRR)9609'l70534 960906 PDR ADOCK 05000400 S PDR State Road 1134 New Hill NC NRC FORM 366)LB5)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150<104 EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY NTH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS.REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED UITO THE UCENSING PROCESS ANO FEO BACK TO INDUSTRY.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDUIG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH rr 0 F331 US.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHUIGTDIL OC 205550001, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRO/ECT f3150 010IL OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET WASHUIGTON.
In accordance with Title   10 to the Code     of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is   submitted. This report concerns a condition outside of the design basis in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPs) were inadvertently connected to the same emergency electrical bus.
OC 205CL FACIUTY NAME lll Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 OOCKEY NUMBER l2l 50-400 PAGE I3)1 OF3 TITLE I4)Condition outside of design basis in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPS)were inadvertently connected to the same emergency electrical bus.EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR SEOUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION MONTH NUMBER DAY FACILITY NAME FACIUTY NAME OOCKETNUMBER 05000 OOCKEY NUMBER 11 27 89 96-014-00 09 06 96 05000 OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)000 50 73(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)
Sincerely, J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant JHE/jhe Enclosure c:     Mr. J. B. Brady (NRC - HNP)
(2)(v)20.2201(b) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 50.73(a)(2)(iil 50.73(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)
Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC - RII)
(2)(i)73.71 OTHER 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)
Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR) 9609'l70534 960906 PDR     ADOCK 05000400 S                       PDR State Road 1134   New Hill NC
(4)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 3BBA 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii]
 
50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
NRC FORM 366                               U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                           APPROVED BY OMB NO.        3150<104
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)TELEPHONE NUMBER llncNde Area Code)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANTTO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR B: (Chock one or more)(11)Johnny Eads Project Engineer-Licensing (919)362-2646 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yos, compioto EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH OAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.o., approximately 15 sing)a-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On November 27, 1989, with the plant shutdown in Mode-6, Operations personnel identified a condition in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPS)were inadvertently connected to same emergency electrical bus.Specifically, the 6.9 KV breakers for both the"B" CSIP and the"C" CSIP were simultaneously racked into the B-SB 6.9 KV Emergency Bus for approximately 10 minutes.This condition was determined to be reportable on August 7, 1996 as a condition outside the plant design basis.This condition was caused by a failure to follow operating procedures.
)LB5)                                                                                                               EXPIRES  04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE       TO COMPLY NTH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                            INCORPORATED UITO THE UCENSING PROCESS ANO FEO BACK TO INDUSTRY.
Immediate corrective actions in 1989 included racking out the breaker for the"B" CSIP.Additional corrective actions completed include placing clearance tags on the breakers to provide additional warning and revisions to operating procedures to provide additional caution.In addition, mechanical interlocks will be installed on CSIP breakers to mhibit racking in the breakers for the spare and dedicated pumps simultaneously.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDUIG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH rr 0 F331 US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, (See reverse for required number of                              WASHUIGTDIL OC 205550001, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRO/ECT f3150 digits/characters for each block)                              010IL OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET WASHUIGTON. OC 205CL FACIUTY NAME   lll                                                                       OOCKEY NUMBER l2l                                    PAGE I3)
NRC FORM 3BBA l(.BS)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION US.NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION FACIUTY NAME (I)Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant~Unit<F1 OOCXET 50100 lER NUMBER (B)YEAR SEOUENTIA(ROSS)ON NUMBER NUMBER 96-014-00 PAGE(3)2 OF 3 TEXT pr mars spscv i ssqvvaf, vsv vddiktvsr copies vl IFRC Fvvv 3SB()(I T)EVENT DESCRIPTION:
Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1                                                                   50-400                             1 OF3 TITLE I4)
On November 27, 1989, with the plant shutdown in Mode-6, Operations personnel identified a condition in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPs)were inadvertently connected to same emergency electrical bus.Specifically, the 6.9 KV breakers for both the"B" CSIP and the"C" CSIP (EIIS Code BQ-BKR)were simultaneously racked into the B-SB 6.9 KV Emergency Bus for approximately 10 minutes.This condition was determined to be reportable on August 7, 1996 as a condition outside the plant design basis.This condition was recognized as being outside the design basis while investigating an NRC identified concern related to interlocks for the spare and dedicated Component Cooling Water (CCW)pump breakers not being installed in the plant as described in the FSAR.This condition was determined to be not reportable in 1989 based on the fact that the plant remained in compliance with applicable Technical Specification Action requirements.
Condition outside of design basis in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPS) were inadvertently connected to the same emergency electrical bus.
At 2:30 p.m.on November 27, 1989, while returning the"C" CSIP to service to support an operation surveillance test, (OST-1801,"ECCS Throttle Valve, CSIP and Check Valve Verification
EVENT DATE (5)                   LER NUMBER (6)               REPORT DATE (7)                         OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)
-18 Month Interval-Mode 6"), the breaker for the"C" CSIP was racked into the B-SB 6.9 KV emergency electrical bus while the"B" CSIP was also racked into the same emergency bus.The plant was in Mode 6 in support of Refueling Outage No.2 with core reload completed.
FACILITYNAME                              OOCKETNUMBER SEOUENTIAL    REVISION MONTH       OAY     YEAR     YEAR                               MONTH    DAY NUMBER     NUMBER                                                                                 05000 FACIUTY NAME                               OOCKEY NUMBER 11         27       89       96     014           00         09       06     96                                                       05000 OPERATING                 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANTTO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR B: (Chock one or more) (11)
The upper internals were installed and the reactor vessel head was removed.Prior to the event the Senior Control Operator (SCO)in the control room contacted the Clearance Center and stated that he needed someone to rack in the"C" CSIP breaker.The SCO requested the Clearance Center personnel to find someone and have that person see him in the control room.The Clearance Center personnel dispatched an operator to go to the control room stating that they needed someone to rack in the"C" CSIP breaker.The operator went to the control room and asked, to no specific individual, which bus the"C" CSIP was being powered from.He received the answer from the Shift Technical Advisor (STA)and the Balance of Plant (BOP)Operator that it was wired to the B-SB bus.The operator then left the control room without speaking to the SCO and proceeded to rack the"C" CSIP breaker into the B-SB bus.The"CHARGING PUMPS B BOTH BKRS IN" annunciator in the control room lit and the Reactor Operator (RO)observed the control power indication for the"C" CSIP.The operator who racked in the"C" CSIP breaker returned to the control room to inform the SCO that the"C" CSIP breaker was racked in.The error was recognized and corrected.
MODE (9)                     20.2201(b)                     20.2203(a) (2)(v)                   50 73(a)(2)(i)                       50.73(a)(2)(viii)
At 2:40 p.m., the"B" CSIP breaker was racked out and declared inoperable.
POWER 20.2203(a)(1)                  20.2203(a)(3)(i)                   50.73(a)(2)(iil                       50.73(a)(2)(x)
Operating Procedure, OP-107,"Chemical and Volume Control System," contains procedural steps to prevent the racking in the spare and dedicated CSIP breakers simultaneous into the same emergency bus.The procedure requires that the"B" CSIP breaker be racked out prior to the"C" CSIP breaker being racked in.CAUSE: This condition was caused by a failure to follow operating procedures.
LEVEL (10)         000        20.2203(a) (2)(i)             20.2203(a)(3) (ii)                 50.73(a) (2) (iii)                   73.71 20.2203(a)(2) (ii)             20.2203(a) (4)                      50.73(a)(2)(iv)                       OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)            50.36(c) (1)                       50.73(a)(2)(v)                   Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 3BBA 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)             50.36(c) (2)                       50.73(a)(2)(vii]
NRC FORM 3BBA l4BS)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION US.NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME II)Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant~Unit Pl TEXT fff foarr opooo fi foFooef.oso odrBkool oofooo of ERG foes 3SS4I I)T)OOCRET 50400 LER NUMBER IB)SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 96-014-00 PAGE En 3 OF 3 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
There were no safety consequences for this event.This condition occurred in November 1989 while the plant was in Mode 6.During this event, the annunciator in the control room lit, the operator observed the control power indication for the spare pump, and the error was recognized and corrected.
TELEPHONE NUMBER llncNde Area Code)
Both the dedicated and spare CSIP breakers were racked in simultaneously for approximately 10 minutes.There were no adverse consequences as a result of this event and compliance with Technical Specifications were maintained.
Johnny Eads        Project Engineer - Licensing                                                         (919) 362-2646 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
REPORTABLE                                                                            REPORTABLE CAUSE         SYSTEM     COMPONENT     MANUFACTURER                           CAUSE         SYSTEM       COMPONENT       MANUFACTURER TO NPROS                                                                              TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)                                             EXPECTED MONTH        OAY          YEAR YES                                                                                               SUBMISSION (If yos, compioto EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).                         X NO                         DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.o., approximately 15 sing)a-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On November 27, 1989, with the plant shutdown in Mode-6, Operations personnel identified a condition in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPS) were inadvertently connected to same emergency electrical bus.
Specifically, the 6.9 KV breakers for both the "B" CSIP and the "C" CSIP were simultaneously racked into the B-SB 6.9 KV Emergency Bus for approximately 10 minutes. This condition was determined to be reportable on August 7, 1996 as a condition outside the plant design basis.
This condition was caused by a failure to follow operating procedures.
Immediate corrective actions in 1989 included racking out the breaker for the "B" CSIP. Additional corrective actions completed include placing clearance tags on the breakers to provide additional warning and revisions to operating procedures to provide additional caution. In addition, mechanical interlocks will be installed on CSIP breakers to mhibit racking in the breakers for the spare and dedicated pumps simultaneously.
 
NRC FORM 3BBA                                                                                                             US. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION l(.BS)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACIUTY NAME (I)                                     OOCXET        lER NUMBER (B)                 PAGE(3)
SEOUENTIA(     ROSS)ON YEAR NUMBER       NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant            ~
Unit  <F1                  50100                                      2     OF   3 96  -    014      -    00 TEXT   pr mars spscv i ssqvvaf, vsv vddiktvsr copies vl IFRC Fvvv 3SB() (I T)
EVENT DESCRIPTION:
On November 27, 1989, with the plant shutdown in Mode-6, Operations personnel identified a condition in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPs) were inadvertently connected to same emergency electrical bus.
Specifically, the 6.9 KV breakers for both the "B" CSIP and the "C" CSIP (EIIS Code BQ-BKR) were simultaneously racked into the B-SB 6.9 KV Emergency Bus for approximately 10 minutes. This condition was determined to be reportable on August 7, 1996 as a condition outside the plant design basis. This condition was recognized as being outside the design basis while investigating an NRC identified concern related to interlocks for the spare and dedicated Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump breakers not being installed in the plant as described in the FSAR. This condition was determined to be not reportable in 1989 based on the fact that the plant remained in compliance with applicable Technical Specification Action requirements.
At 2:30 p.m. on November 27,                             1989, while returning the "C" CSIP to service to support an operation surveillance test, (OST-1801, "ECCS Throttle Valve, CSIP and Check Valve Verification - 18 Month Interval - Mode 6"), the breaker for the "C" CSIP was racked into the B-SB 6.9 KV emergency electrical bus while the "B" CSIP was also racked into the same emergency bus. The plant was in Mode 6 in support of Refueling Outage No. 2 with core reload completed. The upper internals were installed and the reactor vessel head was removed.
Prior to the event the Senior Control Operator (SCO) in the control room contacted the Clearance Center and stated that he needed someone to rack in the "C" CSIP breaker. The SCO requested the Clearance Center personnel to find someone and have that person see him in the control room. The Clearance Center personnel dispatched an operator to go to the control room stating that they needed someone to rack in the "C" CSIP breaker. The operator went to the control room and asked, to no specific individual, which bus the "C" CSIP was being powered from. He received the answer from the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) and the Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator that it was wired to the B-SB bus. The operator then left the control room without speaking to the SCO and proceeded to rack the "C" CSIP breaker into the B-SB bus. The "CHARGING PUMPS B BOTH BKRS IN" annunciator in the control room lit and the Reactor Operator (RO) observed the control power indication for the "C" CSIP. The operator who racked in the "C" CSIP breaker returned to the control room to inform the SCO that the "C" CSIP breaker was racked in. The error was recognized and corrected. At 2:40 p.m., the "B" CSIP breaker was racked out and declared inoperable.
Operating Procedure, OP-107, "Chemical and Volume Control System," contains procedural steps to prevent the racking in the spare and dedicated CSIP breakers simultaneous into the same emergency bus. The procedure requires that the "B" CSIP breaker be racked out prior to the "C" CSIP breaker being racked in.
CAUSE:
This condition was caused by a failure to follow operating procedures.
 
NRC FORM 3BBA                                                                                                           US. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION l4BS)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME II)                                     OOCRET      LER NUMBER IB)                  PAGE En SEQUENTIAL      REVISION NUMBER        NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant           ~
Unit Pl                     50400                                    3      OF    3 96 -    014      -    00 TEXT   ffffoarr opooo fi foFooef. oso odrBkool oofooo of ERG foes 3SS4I I) T)
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
There were no safety consequences for this event. This condition occurred in November 1989 while the plant was in Mode 6. During this event, the annunciator in the control room lit, the operator observed the control power indication for the spare pump, and the error was recognized and corrected. Both the dedicated and spare CSIP breakers were racked in simultaneously for approximately 10 minutes. There were no adverse consequences as a result of this event and compliance with Technical Specifications were maintained.
This condition is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).
This condition is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: No similar plant events of simultaneously racking both the dedicated and spare CSIP breakers into the same emergency bus have been identified at the Harris Plant.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:
PREVIOUS SIMILAREVENTS:
1.Racked out the 6.9 KV breaker for the"B" CSIP at 2:40 p.m.on November 27, 1989.2.Clearance tags placed on breakers to provide additional warning.3.Operating procedures enhanced to provide additional caution.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED: 1.Install mechanical interlocks on CSIP breakers to inhibit racking in the breakers for the spare and dedicated pumps simultaneously prior to completion of the Spring 1997 Refueling Outage currently scheduled to begin March 1997.}}
No similar plant events of simultaneously racking both the dedicated and spare CSIP breakers into the same emergency bus have been identified at the Harris Plant.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:
: 1.           Racked out the 6.9 KV breaker for the "B" CSIP at 2:40 p.m.on November 27, 1989.
: 2.           Clearance tags placed on breakers to provide additional warning.
: 3.           Operating procedures enhanced to provide additional caution.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:
: 1.           Install mechanical interlocks on CSIP breakers to inhibit racking in the breakers for the spare and dedicated pumps simultaneously prior to completion of the Spring 1997 Refueling Outage currently scheduled to begin March 1997.}}

Latest revision as of 05:59, 22 October 2019

LER 96-014-00:on 891127,identified Condition of Two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps Connected to Same Emergency Electrical Bus.Caused by Failure to Follow Operating Procedures.Racked Out 6.9 Kv breaker.W/960909 Ltr
ML18012A354
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/06/1996
From: Donahue J, Johnny Eads
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-96-150, LER-96-014, LER-96-14, NUDOCS 9609170534
Download: ML18012A354 (5)
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Text

CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

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ACCESSION NBR:9609170534 DOC.DATE: 96/09/06 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION EADS,J. Carolina Power & Eight Co.

DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power & Eight Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 96-014-00:on 891127,identified condition of two C Charging/Safety Injection Pumps connected to same emergency i

electrical bus.Caused by failure to follow operating procedures. Racked out 6.9 KV breaker.W/960909 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL I SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), incident Rpt, etc. E NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 G RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 LE,N 1 1 Y

INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 E05~) SPD/RAB 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 LE CENgER 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 D RES/DSIR/EZB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POOREEW. 1 1 C NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 N

NOTE TO ALL NREDS" REClPXENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EX'15-2083) TO ELXMENATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEEDI FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

Carolina Power R Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 SEP 9 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-96-150 ATTN: NRC Do'cument Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-014-00

Dear Sir or Madam:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report concerns a condition outside of the design basis in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPs) were inadvertently connected to the same emergency electrical bus.

Sincerely, J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant JHE/jhe Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (NRC - HNP)

Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC - RII)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR) 9609'l70534 960906 PDR ADOCK 05000400 S PDR State Road 1134 New Hill NC

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150<104

)LB5) EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY NTH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INCORPORATED UITO THE UCENSING PROCESS ANO FEO BACK TO INDUSTRY.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDUIG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH rr 0 F331 US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, (See reverse for required number of WASHUIGTDIL OC 205550001, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRO/ECT f3150 digits/characters for each block) 010IL OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET WASHUIGTON. OC 205CL FACIUTY NAME lll OOCKEY NUMBER l2l PAGE I3)

Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 50-400 1 OF3 TITLE I4)

Condition outside of design basis in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPS) were inadvertently connected to the same emergency electrical bus.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)

FACILITYNAME OOCKETNUMBER SEOUENTIAL REVISION MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FACIUTY NAME OOCKEY NUMBER 11 27 89 96 014 00 09 06 96 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANTTO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR B: (Chock one or more) (11)

MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a) (2)(v) 50 73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(iil 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 000 20.2203(a) (2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3) (ii) 50.73(a) (2) (iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2) (ii) 20.2203(a) (4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 3BBA 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii]

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

TELEPHONE NUMBER llncNde Area Code)

Johnny Eads Project Engineer - Licensing (919) 362-2646 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH OAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION (If yos, compioto EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.o., approximately 15 sing)a-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On November 27, 1989, with the plant shutdown in Mode-6, Operations personnel identified a condition in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPS) were inadvertently connected to same emergency electrical bus.

Specifically, the 6.9 KV breakers for both the "B" CSIP and the "C" CSIP were simultaneously racked into the B-SB 6.9 KV Emergency Bus for approximately 10 minutes. This condition was determined to be reportable on August 7, 1996 as a condition outside the plant design basis.

This condition was caused by a failure to follow operating procedures.

Immediate corrective actions in 1989 included racking out the breaker for the "B" CSIP. Additional corrective actions completed include placing clearance tags on the breakers to provide additional warning and revisions to operating procedures to provide additional caution. In addition, mechanical interlocks will be installed on CSIP breakers to mhibit racking in the breakers for the spare and dedicated pumps simultaneously.

NRC FORM 3BBA US. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION l(.BS)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACIUTY NAME (I) OOCXET lER NUMBER (B) PAGE(3)

SEOUENTIA( ROSS)ON YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ~

Unit <F1 50100 2 OF 3 96 - 014 - 00 TEXT pr mars spscv i ssqvvaf, vsv vddiktvsr copies vl IFRC Fvvv 3SB() (I T)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On November 27, 1989, with the plant shutdown in Mode-6, Operations personnel identified a condition in which two Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIPs) were inadvertently connected to same emergency electrical bus.

Specifically, the 6.9 KV breakers for both the "B" CSIP and the "C" CSIP (EIIS Code BQ-BKR) were simultaneously racked into the B-SB 6.9 KV Emergency Bus for approximately 10 minutes. This condition was determined to be reportable on August 7, 1996 as a condition outside the plant design basis. This condition was recognized as being outside the design basis while investigating an NRC identified concern related to interlocks for the spare and dedicated Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump breakers not being installed in the plant as described in the FSAR. This condition was determined to be not reportable in 1989 based on the fact that the plant remained in compliance with applicable Technical Specification Action requirements.

At 2:30 p.m. on November 27, 1989, while returning the "C" CSIP to service to support an operation surveillance test, (OST-1801, "ECCS Throttle Valve, CSIP and Check Valve Verification - 18 Month Interval - Mode 6"), the breaker for the "C" CSIP was racked into the B-SB 6.9 KV emergency electrical bus while the "B" CSIP was also racked into the same emergency bus. The plant was in Mode 6 in support of Refueling Outage No. 2 with core reload completed. The upper internals were installed and the reactor vessel head was removed.

Prior to the event the Senior Control Operator (SCO) in the control room contacted the Clearance Center and stated that he needed someone to rack in the "C" CSIP breaker. The SCO requested the Clearance Center personnel to find someone and have that person see him in the control room. The Clearance Center personnel dispatched an operator to go to the control room stating that they needed someone to rack in the "C" CSIP breaker. The operator went to the control room and asked, to no specific individual, which bus the "C" CSIP was being powered from. He received the answer from the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) and the Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator that it was wired to the B-SB bus. The operator then left the control room without speaking to the SCO and proceeded to rack the "C" CSIP breaker into the B-SB bus. The "CHARGING PUMPS B BOTH BKRS IN" annunciator in the control room lit and the Reactor Operator (RO) observed the control power indication for the "C" CSIP. The operator who racked in the "C" CSIP breaker returned to the control room to inform the SCO that the "C" CSIP breaker was racked in. The error was recognized and corrected. At 2:40 p.m., the "B" CSIP breaker was racked out and declared inoperable.

Operating Procedure, OP-107, "Chemical and Volume Control System," contains procedural steps to prevent the racking in the spare and dedicated CSIP breakers simultaneous into the same emergency bus. The procedure requires that the "B" CSIP breaker be racked out prior to the "C" CSIP breaker being racked in.

CAUSE:

This condition was caused by a failure to follow operating procedures.

NRC FORM 3BBA US. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION l4BS)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME II) OOCRET LER NUMBER IB) PAGE En SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ~

Unit Pl 50400 3 OF 3 96 - 014 - 00 TEXT ffffoarr opooo fi foFooef. oso odrBkool oofooo of ERG foes 3SS4I I) T)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no safety consequences for this event. This condition occurred in November 1989 while the plant was in Mode 6. During this event, the annunciator in the control room lit, the operator observed the control power indication for the spare pump, and the error was recognized and corrected. Both the dedicated and spare CSIP breakers were racked in simultaneously for approximately 10 minutes. There were no adverse consequences as a result of this event and compliance with Technical Specifications were maintained.

This condition is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).

PREVIOUS SIMILAREVENTS:

No similar plant events of simultaneously racking both the dedicated and spare CSIP breakers into the same emergency bus have been identified at the Harris Plant.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. Racked out the 6.9 KV breaker for the "B" CSIP at 2:40 p.m.on November 27, 1989.
2. Clearance tags placed on breakers to provide additional warning.
3. Operating procedures enhanced to provide additional caution.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:

1. Install mechanical interlocks on CSIP breakers to inhibit racking in the breakers for the spare and dedicated pumps simultaneously prior to completion of the Spring 1997 Refueling Outage currently scheduled to begin March 1997.
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