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| {{#Wiki_filter:~--CA~~GORY 10 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ,(RIDS)'CCESSION NBR:9902090363 DOC.DATE: 99/02/05 NOTARIZED: | | {{#Wiki_filter:~ --CA~~GORY 10 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM I |
| NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFXLXATION ELL~NGTG8,M. | | ,(RIDS)'CCESSION NBR:9902090363 DOC.DATE: 99/02/05 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFXLXATION ELL~NGTG8,M. Carolina Power &, Light Co. |
| Carolina Power&, Light Co.CLARK,B.H. | | CLARK,B.H. Carolina Power & Tight Co. |
| Carolina Power&Tight Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFXLIATXON DOCKET I 05000400 | | RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFXLIATXON |
|
| |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER 99-001-00:on 990106,SF pool water level was not maintained greater than 23 feet above stored BWR fuel assemblies. | | LER 99-001-00:on 990106,SF pool water level was not maintained greater than 23 feet above stored BWR fuel assemblies. Caused by fasteners bending under specific A circumstances. Increased water:level-.With 990205 ltr. |
| Caused by fasteners bending under specific circumstances. | | DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: |
| Increased water:level-.With 990205 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event.Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.%is NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.A 0500040&0 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 RECIPIENT XD CODE/NAME FLANDERS,S COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HOHB NRR/DRPM/PECB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.NRC PDR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HXCB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RGN2 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 C, NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: | | TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event. Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. |
| PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DZSTRIBUTZON LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUXRED: LTTR 23 ENCL 23 Qpj+Qf'~~jw~~.- | | %is NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 0500040& |
| -,'"'-: 'OL Carolina Power 8 Ught Company Harris Nudear Plant P.O.Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 FEB s1999 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-99-015 10CFR50.73 Sir or Madam:.'HEARON HAMGS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50400 LICENSE NO.NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1999-001-00 t~J 4~~r In accordance with 10CFR50.73, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.
| | 0 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL XD CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 FLANDERS,S 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HXCB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOHB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB ,1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 C, NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| The report describes a Technical Specification violation pertaining to spent fuel pool water level.Sincerely, B.H.Clar General Manager Harris Plant Enclosure c: Mr.J.B.Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)Mr.L.A.Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)Mr.S.C.Flanders (NRC-.NRR Project Manager)cycy0g0q0363 9'90205 PDR ADQCK 05000400 S PDR 541 3 Shearon Harris Road New Hill NC U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Co ion~)Document Control Desk/HNP-99-015 Page 2 of 2 bcc: Ms.D.B.Alexander Mr.G.E.Attarian Mr.R.H.Bazemore Mr.T.C.Bell Mrs.P.P.Burns Mr.H.K.Chernoff (RNP)Mr.B.H.Clark Mr.W.F.Conway Mr.J.-M.Curley Mr.G.W.Davis Mr.W.J.Dorman (BNP)Mr.R.J.Field Ms.J.P.Gawron (BNP)Mr.K.N.Harris Ms.L.N.Hartz Mr.J.D.Henderson Mr.W.J.Hindman Mr.C.S.Hinnant INPO Mr-.W.D.Johnson Mr.M.B.Keef Mr.G.J.Kline Ms.W.C.Langston Mr.R.D.Martin Mr.J.W.McKay Mr.R.O.Moore Mr.T.C.Morton Mr.P.M.Odom (RNP)Mr.P.M.Sawyer (BNP)Mr.J.Scarola Mr.F.E.Strehle Mr.J.M.Taylor Harris Licensing File(s)Nuclear Records NRC FORM 366 U.S.NUCLEAR REGULA COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROV OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 Estimated n per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Information and Records Management Branch (Te F33), U.S.Nudear Regulatory Commission, Washington, Dc 205554001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Pro}ect (31504104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collecten.
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DZSTRIBUTZON LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUXRED: LTTR 23 ENCL 23 |
| FACILITY NAME l1 I TITLE (4l Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER I2)05000400 PAGE I3)1 OF 3 Spent Fuel Pool water level not maintained greater than 23 feet above stored BWR fuel assemblies.
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| MONTH DAY 01 06'EAR"1999 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1999.-001'00 MONTH 02 DAY 05 YEAR 1999 FACIUTY NAME PACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)100 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(1l 20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)
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| (2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(3)(I) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)
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| (4)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2) x 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(xl 73.71 OTHER Specify ln Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A NAME Mark Ellington, Senior Analyst-Licensing TELEPHONE NUMBER Ilnclude Ares Code)(919)362-2057 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE To EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE To EPIX YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).NO EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)At approximately 10:30 on January 6, 1999, with the unit at 100%power, personnel performing spent fuel handling operations noticed that one of the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)assemblies that they were moving did not fully seat in the storage rack.A question was raised regarding the administrative limit required to maintain 23 feet of water above the fuel assemblies as required by Technical Specification LCO 3.9.11.It was determined that the current limit did not consider the additional margin needed in the event of an assembly being hung on a BWR channel fastener;therefore, fuel movement was halted.An investigation revealed that eight additional assemblies in the pool were not fully seated.Measurements were taken on the nine assemblies to determine what the most limiting administrative requirement should have been.Based on these measurements, 23 feet of water had been maintained above the most limiting assembly since the problem was discovered on January 6, 1999;however, a subsequent review of the operating logs for the previous months showed that the revised administrative limit (1.25" higher than the previous limit)had not been met (by a maximum of 0.75")on more that one occasion.Therefore, the actions required by LCO 3.9.11 were not met on those occasions.
| |
| The root cause of this event is that the procedure provides ambiguous guidance regarding channel fastener tolerances and the fact that the fasteners could bend under specific circumstances.
| |
| Corrective actions taken have been: 1)Halted fuel movement and increased water level to ensure compliance; 2)Seated seven of the nine assemblies (i.e., these seven did not have bent channel fasteners, but were hung on the side of the fuel rack by the lower edge of the fastener);
| |
| 3)Revised the administrative limit such that 23 feet of water remained above the two BWR assemblies with bent channel fasteners (i.e., not fully seated);4)Performed an engineering analysis for a BWR assembly being suspended on a side of a rack by a channel fastener, and 5)Seated the two assemblies with bent channel fasteners.
| |
| Planned corrective actions are to revise procedures and to provide additional trainin for fuel handlin ersonnel.NRC FORM 366 I6.1998I ly NRC FORM 366A (6-98)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 FAGIUTY NAME (1)Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 DOCKET 05000400 LER NUMBER (6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1999-001-00 PAGE (3)2 OF 3 TEXT lit more spsce is reqofred, use eddidonsl copies of NRC Form 368AJ (17)I.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT In August of 1997, during an in-depth review of how the plant complies with technical specification surveillance requirements, the Harris Nuclear Plant made a conservative decision to include the handling bail on the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)(EIIS: AC)assemblies as part of'the assembly.'he top of this bail is approximately six inches over the top of the remainder of the fuel assembly (see LER 97-021-00, with an event date of 8/14/97).Since that determination, a revision to clarify the wording of the specification has been submitted to the NRC.That revision was still pending as of the date of this event.At approximately 10:30 on January 6, 1999, with the unit at 100%power, personnel performing fuel handling operations in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB)noticed that one of the BWR assemblies they were moving did not appear to be fully seated.The fuel handling personnel notified the Spent Fuel Shipping Director that they were, having difficulty getting a BWR assembly to fully seat in its location, apparently due to a bent channel fastener.A channel fastener is an attachment on one of the upper corners'of a BWR assembly, which holds the channel to the assembly and provides proper spacing for the cruciform control blades.Fuel handling procedures provided guidance for instances such as when an assembly was not fully seated, and that guidance was followed.In addition to those actions, one of the technicians assisting in the evolution questioned how this situation would affect the administrative limits established to maintain a minimum of 23 feet of water above the fuel assemblies, as required by Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)3.9.11~Through conversations with the Shipping Director and Engineering, it was determined that the current administrative limit did not" consider the additional margin needed in the event of an assembly being hung on the side of the rack by a channel fastener.The limit had been based on the most limiting design parameters, but did not assume that the assemblies were not fully seated in the racks.Fuel movement was immediately halted and water level was increased to ensure compliance with the technical specification LCO.An investigation found eight additional assemblies in the pool that were not fully seated.The position of these assemblies was not readily apparent with the naked eye, but underwater video images of the assemblies in the racks made the nine more readily distinguishable from those fully seated.Two of the nine had bent channel fasteners.
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| The remaining seven did not have bent channel fasteners, but were being supported on the top edge of the rack wall by the lower edge of the channel fasteners.
| |
| Measurements were taken on the nine assemblies to determine what pool level was needed to ensure compliance with technical specifications.
| |
| It was determined that the administrative limit needed to be increased by 1.25" for the most limiting assembly to be in compliance.
| |
| Based on these measurements, 23 feet of water had been maintained above the most limiting assembly since the problem was discovered on January 6, 1999;however, a review of the operating logs from August 14,1997, to the event date showed that the revised administrative limit had not been met on more than one occasion.The lowest water level recorded since August 14, 1997, was 22 feet and 11.25 inches above the bail of the most limiting BWR assembly (i.e., 0.75" less than the new administrative limit).Therefore, the actions required by technical specification LCO 3.9.11 were considered to have not been met on those occasions.
| |
| NRC FORM 366 (6-96)
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|
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| NRC FORM 366A IB-96)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I1I Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 DOCKET 05000400 LER NUMBER I6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1999-001-00 PAGE I3)3 OF 3 TEXT llf more space ls rerlulred, use addidonal copies of NRC Form 388AJ I17)II.CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause of this event is that the procedure provides ambiguous guidance regarding channel fastener tolerances and the fact that the fasteners could bend under specific circumstances. | | Qpj+Qf'~~jw~~.- -, |
| III.SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE There were no actual safety consequences. | | '"'-: 'OL Carolina Power 8 Ught Company Harris Nudear Plant P.O. Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 FEB s1999 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-99-015 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 HAMGS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 |
| Records indicate that the water level in the spent fuel pool did not decrease below 23 feet above the top of the fuel rods.Technical Specification bases states that"[t]he restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99%of the assumed 10'k iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis." Since at least 23 feet of water was maintained above the actual fuel rods, there was no degradation in the protection of the health or safety of the public, nor was there any threat of a radiological release as a result of this event.This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)for a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. | | .'HEARON DOCKET NO. 50400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1999-001-00 t ~ J 4 ~ ~ r Sir or Madam: |
| IV.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Completed corrective actions: 1.Halted fuel movement and increased water level to ensure compliance. | | In accordance with 10CFR50.73, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. The report describes a Technical Specification violation pertaining to spent fuel pool water level. |
| 2.Seated seven of the nine assemblies (i.e., these seven did not have bent channel fasteners, but were hung on the side of the fuel rack by the lower edge of the fastener)on 1/8/99.3.Revised the administrative limit such that 23 feet of water remained above the two BWR assemblies with bent channel fasteners (i.e., not fully seated).4.Performed an engineering analysis for a BWR assembly being suspended on a side of a rack by a channel fastener.5.Seated the two assemblies with bent channel fasteners on 2/2/99.Planned corrective actions: 1.Revise procedures and provide additional training for fuel handling personnel by 4/15/99.V.SIMILAR EVENTS There has been one previous condition identified related to required water level over BWR fuel.LER 97-021-00 , discussed an interpretation issue regarding what constitutes a fuel'assembly.'orrective actions for that event are not directly applicable to the channel fastener issue.NRC FORM 366A I6.99)}} | | Sincerely, B.H. Clar General Manager Harris Plant Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident) |
| | Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II) |
| | Mr. S. C. Flanders (NRC NRR Project Manager) |
| | -. |
| | cycy0g0q0363 9'90205 PDR ADQCK 05000400 S PDR 541 3 Shearon Harris Road New Hill NC |
| | |
| | U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co ion |
| | ~) Document Control Desk / HNP-99-015 Page 2 of 2 bcc: Ms. D. B. Alexander Mr. G. E. Attarian Mr. R. H. Bazemore Mr. T. C. Bell Mrs. P. P. Burns Mr. H. K. Chernoff (RNP) |
| | Mr. B. H. Clark Mr. W. F. Conway Mr. J.-M. Curley Mr. G. W. Davis Mr. W. J. Dorman (BNP) |
| | Mr. R. J. Field Ms. J. P. Gawron (BNP) |
| | Mr. K. N. Harris Ms. L. N. Hartz Mr. J. D. Henderson Mr. W. J. Hindman Mr. C. S. Hinnant INPO Mr-. W. D. Johnson Mr. M. B. Keef Mr. G. J. Kline Ms. W. C. Langston Mr. R. D. Martin Mr. J. W. McKay Mr. R. O. Moore Mr. T. C. Morton Mr. P. M. Odom (RNP) |
| | Mr. P. M. Sawyer (BNP) |
| | Mr. J. Scarola Mr. F. E. Strehle Mr. J. M. Taylor Harris Licensing File(s) |
| | Nuclear Records |
| | |
| | APPROV OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA COMMISSION Estimated n per response to comply with this mandatory information (6-1998) collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Information and Records Management Branch (Te LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) F33), U.S. Nudear Regulatory Commission, Washington, Dc 205554001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Pro}ect (31504104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not (See reverse for required number of display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or digits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collecten. |
| | DOCKET NUMBER I2) PAGE I3) |
| | FACILITYNAME l1 I 1 OF 3 Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 TITLE (4l Spent Fuel Pool water level not maintained greater than 23 feet above stored BWR fuel assemblies. |
| | REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER NUMBER 06'EAR PACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 "1999 1999. - 001' 00 02 05 1999 05000 OPERATING MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) |
| | POWER 100 20.2203(a)(1l 20.2203(a)(3)(I) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a) (2)(xl LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2) (i) 20.2203(a)(3) (ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a) (4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a) (2)(v) Specify ln Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a) (2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) |
| | NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Ilnclude Ares Code) |
| | Mark Ellington, Senior Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2057 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13) |
| | SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE To EPIX To EPIX EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES NO (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). |
| | ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) |
| | At approximately 10:30 on January 6, 1999, with the unit at 100% power, personnel performing spent fuel handling operations noticed that one of the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) assemblies that they were moving did not fully seat in the storage rack. A question was raised regarding the administrative limit required to maintain 23 feet of water above the fuel assemblies as required by Technical Specification LCO 3.9.11. It was determined that the current limit did not consider the additional margin needed in the event of an assembly being hung on a BWR channel fastener; therefore, fuel movement was halted. An investigation revealed that eight additional assemblies in the pool were not fully seated. Measurements were taken on the nine assemblies to determine what the most limiting administrative requirement should have been. Based on these measurements, 23 feet of water had been maintained above the most limiting assembly since the problem was discovered on January 6, 1999; however, a subsequent review of the operating logs for the previous months showed that the revised administrative limit (1.25" higher than the previous limit) had not been met (by a maximum of 0.75") on more that one occasion. Therefore, the actions required by LCO 3.9.11 were not met on those occasions. |
| | The root cause of this event is that the procedure provides ambiguous guidance regarding channel fastener tolerances and the fact that the fasteners could bend under specific circumstances. Corrective actions taken have been: 1) Halted fuel movement and increased water level to ensure compliance; 2) Seated seven of the nine assemblies (i.e., these seven did not have bent channel fasteners, but were hung on the side of the fuel rack by the lower edge of the fastener); 3) Revised the administrative limit such that 23 feet of water remained above the two BWR assemblies with bent channel fasteners (i.e., not fully seated); 4) |
| | Performed an engineering analysis for a BWR assembly being suspended on a side of a rack by a channel fastener, and 5) |
| | Seated the two assemblies with bent channel fasteners. Planned corrective actions are to revise procedures and to provide additional trainin for fuel handlin ersonnel. |
| | NRC FORM 366 I6.1998I |
| | |
| | ly NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 |
| | (6-98) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FAGIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| | SEQUENTIAL REVISION Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 2 OF 3 1999 001 00 TEXT litmore spsce is reqofred, use eddidonsl copies of NRC Form 368AJ (17) |
| | I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT In August of 1997, during an in-depth review of how the plant complies with technical specification surveillance requirements, the Harris Nuclear Plant made a conservative decision to include the handling bail on the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) (EIIS: AC) assemblies as part of 'the assembly.'he top of this bail is approximately six inches over the top of the remainder of the fuel assembly (see LER 97-021-00, with an event date of 8/14/97). |
| | Since that determination, a revision to clarify the wording of the specification has been submitted to the NRC. |
| | That revision was still pending as of the date of this event. |
| | At approximately 10:30 on January 6, 1999, with the unit at 100% power, personnel performing fuel handling operations in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) noticed that one of the BWR assemblies they were moving did not appear to be fully seated. The fuel handling personnel notified the Spent Fuel Shipping Director that they were, having difficulty getting a BWR assembly to fully seat in its location, apparently due to a bent channel fastener. |
| | A channel fastener is an attachment on one of the upper corners'of a BWR assembly, which holds the channel to the assembly and provides proper spacing for the cruciform control blades. Fuel handling procedures provided guidance for instances such as when an assembly was not fully seated, and that guidance was followed. In addition to those actions, one of the technicians assisting in the evolution questioned how this situation would affect the administrative limits established to maintain a minimum of 23 feet of water above the fuel assemblies, as required by Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.11 Through conversations |
| | ~ |
| | with the Shipping Director and Engineering, it was determined that the current administrative limit did not" consider the additional margin needed in the event of an assembly being hung on the side of the rack by a channel fastener. The limit had been based on the most limiting design parameters, but did not assume that the assemblies were not fully seated in the racks. Fuel movement was immediately halted and water level was increased to ensure compliance with the technical specification LCO. An investigation found eight additional assemblies in the pool that were not fully seated. The position of these assemblies was not readily apparent with the naked eye, but underwater video images of the assemblies in the racks made the nine more readily distinguishable from those fully seated. Two of the nine had bent channel fasteners. The remaining seven did not have bent channel fasteners, but were being supported on the top edge of the rack wall by the lower edge of the channel fasteners. Measurements were taken on the nine assemblies to determine what pool level was needed to ensure compliance with technical specifications. It was determined that the administrative limit needed to be increased by 1.25" for the most limiting assembly to be in compliance. Based on these measurements, 23 feet of water had been maintained above the most limiting assembly since the problem was discovered on January 6, 1999; however, a review of the operating logs from August 14,1997, to the event date showed that the revised administrative limit had not been met on more than one occasion. The lowest water level recorded since August 14, 1997, was 22 feet and 11.25 inches above the bail of the most limiting BWR assembly (i.e., 0.75" less than the new administrative limit). Therefore, the actions required by technical specification LCO 3.9.11 were considered to have not been met on those occasions. |
| | NRC FORM 366 (6-96) |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IB-96) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET LER NUMBER I6) PAGE I3) |
| | FACILITYNAME I1I SEQUENTIAL REVISION Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF 3 1999 001 00 TEXT llfmore space ls rerlulred, use addidonal copies of NRC Form 388AJ I17) |
| | II. CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause of this event is that the procedure provides ambiguous guidance regarding channel fastener tolerances and the fact that the fasteners could bend under specific circumstances. |
| | III. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE There were no actual safety consequences. Records indicate that the water level in the spent fuel pool did not decrease below 23 feet above the top of the fuel rods. Technical Specification bases states that "[t]he restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10'k iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis." Since at least 23 feet of water was maintained above the actual fuel rods, there was no degradation in the protection of the health or safety of the public, nor was there any threat of a radiological release as a result of this event. |
| | This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)( i ) for a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. |
| | IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Completed corrective actions: |
| | : 1. Halted fuel movement and increased water level to ensure compliance. |
| | : 2. Seated seven of the nine assemblies (i.e., these seven did not have bent channel fasteners, but were hung on the side of the fuel rack by the lower edge of the fastener) on 1/8/99. |
| | : 3. Revised the administrative limit such that 23 feet of water remained above the two BWR assemblies with bent channel fasteners (i.e., not fully seated). |
| | : 4. Performed an engineering analysis for a BWR assembly being suspended on a side of a rack by a channel fastener. |
| | : 5. Seated the two assemblies with bent channel fasteners on 2/2/99. |
| | Planned corrective actions: |
| | : 1. Revise procedures and provide additional training for fuel handling personnel by 4/15/99. |
| | V. SIMILAR EVENTS There has been one previous condition identified related to required water level over BWR fuel. LER 97-021-00 |
| | , discussed an interpretation issue regarding what constitutes a fuel 'assembly.'orrective actions for that event are not directly applicable to the channel fastener issue. |
| | NRC FORM 366A I6.99)}} |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18017A9181999-10-0808 October 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 991008,CR Emergency Filtration Sys Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Site Personnel Failed to Recognize That Blocking Open CR Emergency Filtration Sys.Procedures Revised.With 991008 Ltr ML18017A8671999-09-10010 September 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990811,determined That Cvis ARMs High Alarm Setpoints Were Not within TS Limit.Caused by Not Having Procedure to Verify If Cvis ARM High Alarm Setpoints Were within TS Requirements.Revised Procedures.With 990910 Ltr ML18016B0481999-08-0404 August 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 981124,noted Failure to Comply with TS 4.0.4 & TS 3/4.6.3, Civs. Caused by post-maint Testing That Did Not Adequately Test Control Circuitry & Verify Isolation Time Following Maint.Procedure Was Revised ML18016A9801999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 981124,failed to Comply with TS 4.0.4 & TS 3/4.6.3, Civ. Caused by post-maint Testing That Did Not Adequately Test Control Circuitry & Verify Isolation Time Following Maint.Procedure Will Be Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML18016A9111999-04-12012 April 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990313,plant Exceeded ESFAS TS 3.3.2,Action 21.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Rev Preparation.Licensee Revised Applicable Maint Surveillance Test Procedure (MST-10072) to Identify TS Required Actions.With 990412 Ltr ML18016A8971999-04-0808 April 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990312,unit Trip Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Condition of SG Water Level Flow Control Valve. Replaced Positioners on All Three FW Regulating Valves.With 990408 Ltr ML18016A8261999-02-22022 February 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990123,noted That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to Isolation of Fire Protection Containment Sprinkler Sys.Caused by Human Error.Restored Containment Sprinkler Sys to Operable Status.With 990222 Ltr ML18016A8111999-02-12012 February 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990114,RT Due to Not Removing Temporary Device from Relay Following Calibration Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Counseled Personnel Involved in Event.With 990212 Ltr ML18016A7971999-02-0505 February 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990106,SF Pool Water Level Was Not Maintained Greater than 23 Feet Above Stored BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Fasteners Bending Under Specific Circumstances.Increased Water Level.With 990205 Ltr ML18016A7941999-01-29029 January 1999 LER 98-004-01:on 980313,identified Design Deficiency Re Potential Runout of Tdafwp.Caused by Inadequate Original AFW Sys Design.Operability Evaluation Was Completed on 980313 & Addl Engineering Analysis Was Performed by Vendor ML18016A7211998-11-17017 November 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981023,turbine Control Anomaly Caused Manual Rt.Caused by Failure to Incorporate Verbal Vendor Guidance in Operating Procedures.Addl Vendor Guidance Will Be Verified & Added to Procedures.With 981117 Ltr ML18016A4841998-07-0707 July 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 970207,determined That Cold Weather Conditions Resulted in Mfiv Being Potentially Inoperable During Period 970117-20.Caused by Inadequate Design of HVAC Sys.Implemented Mods to Steam Tunnel HVAC Sys ML18016A4701998-06-30030 June 1998 LER 97-021-03:on 980210,discovered That SFP Water Level Had Not Been Verified Greater than 23 Feet Above BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Misinterpretation of TS Requirements. Will Submit TS Change Request to Revise TS 3.9.1.11 ML18016A4491998-06-0808 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980508,failure to Perform Insp & Preventive Maint on MCCB as Required by TS Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Sps.Tested 9 Pressurizer Heater Bank Breakers by Cycling each.W/980608 Ltr ML18022B0551998-05-20020 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980420,TS Verbatim non-compliance Was Determined.Caused by Misinterpretation of TS Requirements. Issued Memo to Reemphasize Need to Comply W/Literal Meaning of TS Requirements in Verbatim manner.W/980520 Ltr ML18016A4061998-04-30030 April 1998 LER 98-002-01:on 980121,determined Ssps (P-11 Permissive) Testing Deficiency.Caused by Inadequate Review of Initial Ts.Will Revise & Perform Surveillance Test Procedures to Verify Operability of P-11 Permissive ML18016A3841998-04-13013 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980313,design Deficiency Related to Indequate Runout Protection for Turbine Driven AFW Pump Was Identified.Caused by Inadequate Original AFW Sys Design. Evaluation (ESR 98-00100) Will Be completed.W/980409 Ltr ML18016A3441998-03-12012 March 1998 LER 97-021-02:on 980210,identified Failure to Properly Test non-safety Related Pressurizer Porv.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedures.Revised Operations Surveillance Test OST-1117 to Include Testing of Subject PORV ML18016A3291998-02-27027 February 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980129,failure to Perform Shutdown Margin Calculation Required by TS Surveillance Requirements Occurred.Caused by Ambiguity in TS 3.1.3.1.c.Procedures revised.W/980227 Ltr ML18016A3211998-02-20020 February 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980121,solid State Protection Sys Testing Deficiency Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Review of Initial Tech Specs.Ts Testing Frequency for P-11 Permissive Revised. W/980217 Ltr ML18016A3131998-02-0909 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980109,potential Condition Outside Design Basis Related to Instrument Air Sys Leak Causing SG pre- Heater Bypass Isolation Valves to Be Inoperable Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Generated Jco 98-01 ML18016A2641997-12-18018 December 1997 LER 97-024-00:on 971118,SSPS Testing Deficiency Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Testing Scheme Provided by Ssps Vendor. Revised procedure.W/971218 Ltr ML18016A2501997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-023-00:on 920721,RCS PIV Testing Deficiency Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Consider All Testing Variables During Initial Sp Development.Surveillance Tp OST-1506 Was Revised to Incorporate Correction factor.W/971124 Ltr ML18016A2201997-10-22022 October 1997 LER 97-021-01:on 970922,discovered That Spent Fuel Pool Water Level Was Not Maintained Greater than 23 Feet Above Stored BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Misinterpretation of TS Requirements.Revised Daily Surveillance Procedures ML18016A2081997-10-14014 October 1997 LER 97-016-01:on 970608,reactor Trip Occurred,Due to Personnel Error While Attempting to Adjust Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Following Performance of Calorimetric.Procedures revised.W/971014 Ltr ML18016A2111997-10-14014 October 1997 LER 96-008-02:on 960425,turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by High Resistance Connection Resulting from a Phase Switch Jaw & Blade Contacts.Failed a Phase Disconnect Switch on Breaker 52-7 Replaced ML18016A1931997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-022-00:on 970829,TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of AFW Lco.Caused by Personnel Error.Completed Repairs TDAFW Pump & Returned Plant to Svc on 970831. W/970926 Ltr ML18016A1891997-09-12012 September 1997 LER 97-020-00:on 970814,inadequate Fire Protection Provided for safety-related EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Cables Resulted in Operation Outside Design Basis.Caused by Engineering Oversight.Established Fire watches.W/970912 Ltr ML18016A1881997-09-12012 September 1997 LER 97-021-00:on 970814,spent Fuel Pool Water Level Was Not Maintained Greater than 23 Feet Above Stored BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Directions Provided to Operations.W/970912 Ltr ML18012A8641997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-019-00:on 970720,turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Three Phase Fault That Collapsed Excitation Field in Main Generator,Resulting in Generator Lockout.Exciter Rotor Assembly Was replaced.W/970818 Ltr ML18012A8581997-08-0808 August 1997 LER 96-018-01:on 960903,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Loss of Normal Sw.Caused by Mechanical Failure of B Water Pump & a Normal SW to Remain Running Once Manually Started.Restored a Normal SW Pump to Svc ML18012A8551997-08-0808 August 1997 LER 96-013-02:on 961028,condition Outside of Design Basis Where RWST Had Been Aligned w/non-seismically Qualified Sys Was Identified.Caused by Failure to Reconcile Operating Procedure Lineups.Established Administrative Controls ML18012A8471997-07-31031 July 1997 LER 97-018-00:on 970701,determined That Plant Procedures Had Not Received Proper Reviews & Approvals.Caused by Failure to Comply W/Plant Administrative Procedure AP-006.Counseled Involved individuals.W/970731 Ltr ML18012A8371997-07-24024 July 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970405,unescorted Access Inappropriately Granted to Contract Outage Workers Was Determined.Caused by Personnel Error.Access Files for Individuals Inappropriately Granted Unescorted Access Were Placed on Access Hold ML18012A8291997-07-11011 July 1997 LER 97-017-00:on 970612,failed to Recognize Inoperable Reactor Afd Monitor.Caused by Personnel Error.Operators Involved in Event Will Be Counseled Prior to Assuming Shift duties.W/970711 Ltr ML18012A8301997-07-0808 July 1997 LER 97-016-00:on 970608,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Personnel Error in Adjusting Power Range (Pr) Nuclear Instrumentation (Ni).Issued Night Order Prohibiting Pr Ni Adjustment When Redundant Channel inoperable.W/970708 Ltr ML18012A8241997-07-0202 July 1997 LER 97-015-00:on 970602,inadequate Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Flow Control Valve Surveillance Testing Deficiency Was Identified.Caused by Failure to Recognize Impact on TS 4.7.1.2.1.Readjusted AFW FCV Actuator spring.W/970702 Ltr ML18022B0181997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-014-00:on 970514,SI Occurred During Ssps Surveillance Testing.Caused by Inattention to Detail During Recent Rev to Surveillance Test Procedure Being Used.Revised Deficient Surveillance procedures.W/970613 Ltr ML18012A8081997-06-0909 June 1997 LER 97-013-00:on 970508,entry Into Mode-6 Without Operable Components,Resulting in TS 3.0.4 Violation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Involved counseled.W/970609 Ltr ML18012A8021997-06-0606 June 1997 LER 97-023-02:on 961114,design Deficiency Was Identified in Emergency DG Protection Circuitry.Caused by Inadequate Plant Design.Revised Surveillance Test Procedures OST-1013 & OST-1073.W/970606 Ltr ML18012A8011997-06-0404 June 1997 LER 97-012-00:on 970505,determined That Previous Auxiliary Control Panel Had Not Verified Operability of Interposing Relays.Caused by Misinterpretation of Tss.Reviewed Other Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer circuitry.W/970604 Ltr ML18012A7951997-05-29029 May 1997 LER 96-023-01:on 961114,design Deficiency in EDG Protection Circuitry Was Identified.Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Surveillance Test Procedures OST-1013 & OST-1073 revised.W/970529 Ltr ML18012A7891997-05-22022 May 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 970422,inappropriate TS Interpretation Resulted in Violations of ECCS Accumulator TS & Entry Into TS 3.0.3.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Tsi 88-001 Cancelled 970508 & Procedures revised.W/970522 Ltr ML18012A7871997-05-19019 May 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970418,design Deficiency Determined Re Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Collection Sys.Caused by RCP Ocs Design Detail.Rcp Ocs Enclosures for Each of Three Installed RCP Motors Have Been modified.W/970519 Ltr ML18012A7761997-05-0707 May 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970407,fuse Was Removed from CR Ventilation Isolation Signal Power Supply Circuitry Due to Personnel Error.Individuals Involved Were counseled.W/970507 Ltr ML18012A7751997-05-0505 May 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970404,safety-related AHU Not Declared Inoperable During Maintenance on Associated Temperature Switches Resulting in Violation of Ts.Caused by Incorrect Interpretation.Operations Night Order issued.W/970505 Ltr ML18012A6291997-04-24024 April 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970325,inoperable CCW Sys TS 3.0.3 Entry Made.Caused by Combination of Procedural Inadequacies, Improper Use of Procedure Guidance & Poor Communication. Applicable Individuals counseled.W/970423 Ltr ML18022B0151997-04-17017 April 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970318,breach Was Identified in Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Wall Due to Inadequate Initial Design,Poor Construction Methods & Incomplete as-built Design.Visual Insp of Thermo-Lag Barrier Walls performed.W/970417 Ltr ML18012A6041997-04-0303 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970304,in-plant Spent Fuel Cask Handling Activities Conducted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Lack of Understanding of Requirements.Operations Placed on Hold Pending NRC Review & Approval of procedures.W/970331 Ltr ML18012A6031997-03-31031 March 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970227,steam Generator Low Level Protection Circuitry Outside Design Basis Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Failure Modes & Effects Analysis Performed as-built Piping Configuration for S/G Level.Review performed.W/970331 Ltr 1999-09-10
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18017A9181999-10-0808 October 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 991008,CR Emergency Filtration Sys Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Site Personnel Failed to Recognize That Blocking Open CR Emergency Filtration Sys.Procedures Revised.With 991008 Ltr ML18017A8671999-09-10010 September 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990811,determined That Cvis ARMs High Alarm Setpoints Were Not within TS Limit.Caused by Not Having Procedure to Verify If Cvis ARM High Alarm Setpoints Were within TS Requirements.Revised Procedures.With 990910 Ltr ML18016B0481999-08-0404 August 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 981124,noted Failure to Comply with TS 4.0.4 & TS 3/4.6.3, Civs. Caused by post-maint Testing That Did Not Adequately Test Control Circuitry & Verify Isolation Time Following Maint.Procedure Was Revised ML18016A9801999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 981124,failed to Comply with TS 4.0.4 & TS 3/4.6.3, Civ. Caused by post-maint Testing That Did Not Adequately Test Control Circuitry & Verify Isolation Time Following Maint.Procedure Will Be Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML18016A9111999-04-12012 April 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990313,plant Exceeded ESFAS TS 3.3.2,Action 21.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Rev Preparation.Licensee Revised Applicable Maint Surveillance Test Procedure (MST-10072) to Identify TS Required Actions.With 990412 Ltr ML18016A8971999-04-0808 April 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990312,unit Trip Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Condition of SG Water Level Flow Control Valve. Replaced Positioners on All Three FW Regulating Valves.With 990408 Ltr ML18016A8261999-02-22022 February 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990123,noted That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to Isolation of Fire Protection Containment Sprinkler Sys.Caused by Human Error.Restored Containment Sprinkler Sys to Operable Status.With 990222 Ltr ML18016A8111999-02-12012 February 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990114,RT Due to Not Removing Temporary Device from Relay Following Calibration Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Counseled Personnel Involved in Event.With 990212 Ltr ML18016A7971999-02-0505 February 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990106,SF Pool Water Level Was Not Maintained Greater than 23 Feet Above Stored BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Fasteners Bending Under Specific Circumstances.Increased Water Level.With 990205 Ltr ML18016A7941999-01-29029 January 1999 LER 98-004-01:on 980313,identified Design Deficiency Re Potential Runout of Tdafwp.Caused by Inadequate Original AFW Sys Design.Operability Evaluation Was Completed on 980313 & Addl Engineering Analysis Was Performed by Vendor ML18016A7211998-11-17017 November 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981023,turbine Control Anomaly Caused Manual Rt.Caused by Failure to Incorporate Verbal Vendor Guidance in Operating Procedures.Addl Vendor Guidance Will Be Verified & Added to Procedures.With 981117 Ltr ML18016A4841998-07-0707 July 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 970207,determined That Cold Weather Conditions Resulted in Mfiv Being Potentially Inoperable During Period 970117-20.Caused by Inadequate Design of HVAC Sys.Implemented Mods to Steam Tunnel HVAC Sys ML18016A4701998-06-30030 June 1998 LER 97-021-03:on 980210,discovered That SFP Water Level Had Not Been Verified Greater than 23 Feet Above BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Misinterpretation of TS Requirements. Will Submit TS Change Request to Revise TS 3.9.1.11 ML18016A4491998-06-0808 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980508,failure to Perform Insp & Preventive Maint on MCCB as Required by TS Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Sps.Tested 9 Pressurizer Heater Bank Breakers by Cycling each.W/980608 Ltr ML18022B0551998-05-20020 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980420,TS Verbatim non-compliance Was Determined.Caused by Misinterpretation of TS Requirements. Issued Memo to Reemphasize Need to Comply W/Literal Meaning of TS Requirements in Verbatim manner.W/980520 Ltr ML18016A4061998-04-30030 April 1998 LER 98-002-01:on 980121,determined Ssps (P-11 Permissive) Testing Deficiency.Caused by Inadequate Review of Initial Ts.Will Revise & Perform Surveillance Test Procedures to Verify Operability of P-11 Permissive ML18016A3841998-04-13013 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980313,design Deficiency Related to Indequate Runout Protection for Turbine Driven AFW Pump Was Identified.Caused by Inadequate Original AFW Sys Design. Evaluation (ESR 98-00100) Will Be completed.W/980409 Ltr ML18016A3441998-03-12012 March 1998 LER 97-021-02:on 980210,identified Failure to Properly Test non-safety Related Pressurizer Porv.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedures.Revised Operations Surveillance Test OST-1117 to Include Testing of Subject PORV ML18016A3291998-02-27027 February 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980129,failure to Perform Shutdown Margin Calculation Required by TS Surveillance Requirements Occurred.Caused by Ambiguity in TS 3.1.3.1.c.Procedures revised.W/980227 Ltr ML18016A3211998-02-20020 February 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980121,solid State Protection Sys Testing Deficiency Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Review of Initial Tech Specs.Ts Testing Frequency for P-11 Permissive Revised. W/980217 Ltr ML18016A3131998-02-0909 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980109,potential Condition Outside Design Basis Related to Instrument Air Sys Leak Causing SG pre- Heater Bypass Isolation Valves to Be Inoperable Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Generated Jco 98-01 ML18016A2641997-12-18018 December 1997 LER 97-024-00:on 971118,SSPS Testing Deficiency Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Testing Scheme Provided by Ssps Vendor. Revised procedure.W/971218 Ltr ML18016A2501997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-023-00:on 920721,RCS PIV Testing Deficiency Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Consider All Testing Variables During Initial Sp Development.Surveillance Tp OST-1506 Was Revised to Incorporate Correction factor.W/971124 Ltr ML18016A2201997-10-22022 October 1997 LER 97-021-01:on 970922,discovered That Spent Fuel Pool Water Level Was Not Maintained Greater than 23 Feet Above Stored BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Misinterpretation of TS Requirements.Revised Daily Surveillance Procedures ML18016A2081997-10-14014 October 1997 LER 97-016-01:on 970608,reactor Trip Occurred,Due to Personnel Error While Attempting to Adjust Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Following Performance of Calorimetric.Procedures revised.W/971014 Ltr ML18016A2111997-10-14014 October 1997 LER 96-008-02:on 960425,turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by High Resistance Connection Resulting from a Phase Switch Jaw & Blade Contacts.Failed a Phase Disconnect Switch on Breaker 52-7 Replaced ML18016A1931997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-022-00:on 970829,TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of AFW Lco.Caused by Personnel Error.Completed Repairs TDAFW Pump & Returned Plant to Svc on 970831. W/970926 Ltr ML18016A1891997-09-12012 September 1997 LER 97-020-00:on 970814,inadequate Fire Protection Provided for safety-related EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Cables Resulted in Operation Outside Design Basis.Caused by Engineering Oversight.Established Fire watches.W/970912 Ltr ML18016A1881997-09-12012 September 1997 LER 97-021-00:on 970814,spent Fuel Pool Water Level Was Not Maintained Greater than 23 Feet Above Stored BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Directions Provided to Operations.W/970912 Ltr ML18012A8641997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-019-00:on 970720,turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Three Phase Fault That Collapsed Excitation Field in Main Generator,Resulting in Generator Lockout.Exciter Rotor Assembly Was replaced.W/970818 Ltr ML18012A8581997-08-0808 August 1997 LER 96-018-01:on 960903,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Loss of Normal Sw.Caused by Mechanical Failure of B Water Pump & a Normal SW to Remain Running Once Manually Started.Restored a Normal SW Pump to Svc ML18012A8551997-08-0808 August 1997 LER 96-013-02:on 961028,condition Outside of Design Basis Where RWST Had Been Aligned w/non-seismically Qualified Sys Was Identified.Caused by Failure to Reconcile Operating Procedure Lineups.Established Administrative Controls ML18012A8471997-07-31031 July 1997 LER 97-018-00:on 970701,determined That Plant Procedures Had Not Received Proper Reviews & Approvals.Caused by Failure to Comply W/Plant Administrative Procedure AP-006.Counseled Involved individuals.W/970731 Ltr ML18012A8371997-07-24024 July 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970405,unescorted Access Inappropriately Granted to Contract Outage Workers Was Determined.Caused by Personnel Error.Access Files for Individuals Inappropriately Granted Unescorted Access Were Placed on Access Hold ML18012A8291997-07-11011 July 1997 LER 97-017-00:on 970612,failed to Recognize Inoperable Reactor Afd Monitor.Caused by Personnel Error.Operators Involved in Event Will Be Counseled Prior to Assuming Shift duties.W/970711 Ltr ML18012A8301997-07-0808 July 1997 LER 97-016-00:on 970608,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Personnel Error in Adjusting Power Range (Pr) Nuclear Instrumentation (Ni).Issued Night Order Prohibiting Pr Ni Adjustment When Redundant Channel inoperable.W/970708 Ltr ML18012A8241997-07-0202 July 1997 LER 97-015-00:on 970602,inadequate Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Flow Control Valve Surveillance Testing Deficiency Was Identified.Caused by Failure to Recognize Impact on TS 4.7.1.2.1.Readjusted AFW FCV Actuator spring.W/970702 Ltr ML18022B0181997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-014-00:on 970514,SI Occurred During Ssps Surveillance Testing.Caused by Inattention to Detail During Recent Rev to Surveillance Test Procedure Being Used.Revised Deficient Surveillance procedures.W/970613 Ltr ML18012A8081997-06-0909 June 1997 LER 97-013-00:on 970508,entry Into Mode-6 Without Operable Components,Resulting in TS 3.0.4 Violation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Involved counseled.W/970609 Ltr ML18012A8021997-06-0606 June 1997 LER 97-023-02:on 961114,design Deficiency Was Identified in Emergency DG Protection Circuitry.Caused by Inadequate Plant Design.Revised Surveillance Test Procedures OST-1013 & OST-1073.W/970606 Ltr ML18012A8011997-06-0404 June 1997 LER 97-012-00:on 970505,determined That Previous Auxiliary Control Panel Had Not Verified Operability of Interposing Relays.Caused by Misinterpretation of Tss.Reviewed Other Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer circuitry.W/970604 Ltr ML18012A7951997-05-29029 May 1997 LER 96-023-01:on 961114,design Deficiency in EDG Protection Circuitry Was Identified.Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Surveillance Test Procedures OST-1013 & OST-1073 revised.W/970529 Ltr ML18012A7891997-05-22022 May 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 970422,inappropriate TS Interpretation Resulted in Violations of ECCS Accumulator TS & Entry Into TS 3.0.3.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Tsi 88-001 Cancelled 970508 & Procedures revised.W/970522 Ltr ML18012A7871997-05-19019 May 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970418,design Deficiency Determined Re Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Collection Sys.Caused by RCP Ocs Design Detail.Rcp Ocs Enclosures for Each of Three Installed RCP Motors Have Been modified.W/970519 Ltr ML18012A7761997-05-0707 May 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970407,fuse Was Removed from CR Ventilation Isolation Signal Power Supply Circuitry Due to Personnel Error.Individuals Involved Were counseled.W/970507 Ltr ML18012A7751997-05-0505 May 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970404,safety-related AHU Not Declared Inoperable During Maintenance on Associated Temperature Switches Resulting in Violation of Ts.Caused by Incorrect Interpretation.Operations Night Order issued.W/970505 Ltr ML18012A6291997-04-24024 April 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970325,inoperable CCW Sys TS 3.0.3 Entry Made.Caused by Combination of Procedural Inadequacies, Improper Use of Procedure Guidance & Poor Communication. Applicable Individuals counseled.W/970423 Ltr ML18022B0151997-04-17017 April 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970318,breach Was Identified in Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Wall Due to Inadequate Initial Design,Poor Construction Methods & Incomplete as-built Design.Visual Insp of Thermo-Lag Barrier Walls performed.W/970417 Ltr ML18012A6041997-04-0303 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970304,in-plant Spent Fuel Cask Handling Activities Conducted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Lack of Understanding of Requirements.Operations Placed on Hold Pending NRC Review & Approval of procedures.W/970331 Ltr ML18012A6031997-03-31031 March 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970227,steam Generator Low Level Protection Circuitry Outside Design Basis Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Failure Modes & Effects Analysis Performed as-built Piping Configuration for S/G Level.Review performed.W/970331 Ltr 1999-09-10
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML18017A9181999-10-0808 October 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 991008,CR Emergency Filtration Sys Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Site Personnel Failed to Recognize That Blocking Open CR Emergency Filtration Sys.Procedures Revised.With 991008 Ltr ML18017A9151999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Shearon Harris Npp. with 991012 Ltr ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18017A8671999-09-10010 September 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990811,determined That Cvis ARMs High Alarm Setpoints Were Not within TS Limit.Caused by Not Having Procedure to Verify If Cvis ARM High Alarm Setpoints Were within TS Requirements.Revised Procedures.With 990910 Ltr ML18017A8621999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Harris Nuclear Plant.With 990908 Ltr ML18016B0481999-08-0404 August 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 981124,noted Failure to Comply with TS 4.0.4 & TS 3/4.6.3, Civs. Caused by post-maint Testing That Did Not Adequately Test Control Circuitry & Verify Isolation Time Following Maint.Procedure Was Revised ML18017A8361999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.With 990811 Ltr ML18016B0151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Shearon Harris Npp. with 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18016A9801999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 981124,failed to Comply with TS 4.0.4 & TS 3/4.6.3, Civ. Caused by post-maint Testing That Did Not Adequately Test Control Circuitry & Verify Isolation Time Following Maint.Procedure Will Be Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML18016A9851999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990614 Ltr ML18017A8981999-05-12012 May 1999 Technical Rept Entitled, Harris Nuclear Plant-Bacteria Detection in Water from C&D Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Lines. ML18016A9581999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990513 Ltr ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML18016A9111999-04-12012 April 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990313,plant Exceeded ESFAS TS 3.3.2,Action 21.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Rev Preparation.Licensee Revised Applicable Maint Surveillance Test Procedure (MST-10072) to Identify TS Required Actions.With 990412 Ltr ML18016A8971999-04-0808 April 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990312,unit Trip Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Condition of SG Water Level Flow Control Valve. Replaced Positioners on All Three FW Regulating Valves.With 990408 Ltr ML18016A8941999-04-0505 April 1999 Revised Pages 20-25 to App 4A of non-proprietary Version of Rev 3 to HI-971760 ML18016A9101999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.With 990413 Ltr ML18016A8661999-03-31031 March 1999 Shnpp Operator Training Simulator,Simulator Certification Quadrennial Rept. ML18017A8931999-02-28028 February 1999 Risks & Alternative Options Associated with Spent Fuel Storage at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. ML18016A8551999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Shearon Harris Npp. with 990312 Ltr ML18016A8261999-02-22022 February 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990123,noted That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to Isolation of Fire Protection Containment Sprinkler Sys.Caused by Human Error.Restored Containment Sprinkler Sys to Operable Status.With 990222 Ltr ML18016A8531999-02-18018 February 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 3 to HI-971760, Licensing Rept for Expanding Storage Capacity in Harris SFP 'C' & 'D'. ML18016A8111999-02-12012 February 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990114,RT Due to Not Removing Temporary Device from Relay Following Calibration Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Counseled Personnel Involved in Event.With 990212 Ltr ML18016A7971999-02-0505 February 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990106,SF Pool Water Level Was Not Maintained Greater than 23 Feet Above Stored BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Fasteners Bending Under Specific Circumstances.Increased Water Level.With 990205 Ltr ML18022B0631999-02-0404 February 1999 Rev 0 to Nuclear NDE Manual. with 28 Oversize Uncodable Drawings of Alternative Plan Scope & 4 Oversize Codable Drawings ML20202J1161999-02-0101 February 1999 SER Accepting Relief Requests Associated with Second 10-year Interval Inservice Testing Program ML18016A8041999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.With 990211 Ltr ML18016A7941999-01-29029 January 1999 LER 98-004-01:on 980313,identified Design Deficiency Re Potential Runout of Tdafwp.Caused by Inadequate Original AFW Sys Design.Operability Evaluation Was Completed on 980313 & Addl Engineering Analysis Was Performed by Vendor ML18016A7801998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Shearon Harris Npp. with 990113 Ltr ML18016A7671998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Shnpp,Unit 1.With 981215 Ltr ML18016A9731998-11-28028 November 1998 Changes,Tests & Experiments, for Harris Nuclear Plant.Rept Provides Brief Description of Changes to Facility & Summary & of SE for Each Item That Was Implemented Under 10CFR50.59 Between 970608-981128.With 990527 Ltr ML18016A8351998-11-28028 November 1998 ISI Summary 8th Refueling Outage for Shearon Harris Power Plant,Unit 1. ML18016A7411998-11-25025 November 1998 Rev 1 to Shnpp Cycle 9 Colr. ML18016A7211998-11-17017 November 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981023,turbine Control Anomaly Caused Manual Rt.Caused by Failure to Incorporate Verbal Vendor Guidance in Operating Procedures.Addl Vendor Guidance Will Be Verified & Added to Procedures.With 981117 Ltr ML18016A7071998-11-0303 November 1998 Rev 0 to Harris Unit 1 Cycle 9 Colr. ML18016A7201998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.With 981113 Ltr ML20154F8701998-10-0606 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Requirements of OMa-1988,Part 10,Section 4.2.2.3 for 21 Category a Reactor Coolant Sys Pressure Isolation Valves ML18016A6201998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Harris Nuclear Power Plant.With 981012 Ltr ML18016A5971998-09-21021 September 1998 Rev 1 to Harris Unit 1 Cycle 8 Colr. ML18016A5881998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Shnpp,Unit 1.With 980914 Ltr ML18016A5071998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1998 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant.W/980811 Ltr ML18016A9431998-07-0707 July 1998 Rev 1 to QAP Manual. ML18016A4841998-07-0707 July 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 970207,determined That Cold Weather Conditions Resulted in Mfiv Being Potentially Inoperable During Period 970117-20.Caused by Inadequate Design of HVAC Sys.Implemented Mods to Steam Tunnel HVAC Sys ML18016A9371998-06-30030 June 1998 Technical Rept on Matl Identification of Spent Fuel Piping Welds at Hnp. ML18016A4861998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for SHNPP.W/980715 Ltr ML18016A4701998-06-30030 June 1998 LER 97-021-03:on 980210,discovered That SFP Water Level Had Not Been Verified Greater than 23 Feet Above BWR Fuel Assemblies.Caused by Misinterpretation of TS Requirements. Will Submit TS Change Request to Revise TS 3.9.1.11 ML18016A4491998-06-0808 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980508,failure to Perform Insp & Preventive Maint on MCCB as Required by TS Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Sps.Tested 9 Pressurizer Heater Bank Breakers by Cycling each.W/980608 Ltr ML18016A4521998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.W/980612 Ltr ML18016A7711998-05-26026 May 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 2 to HI-971760, Licensing Rept for Expanding Storage Capacity in Harris Spent Fuel Pools 'C' & 'D'. 1999-09-30
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~ --CA~~GORY 10 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM I
,(RIDS)'CCESSION NBR:9902090363 DOC.DATE: 99/02/05 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFXLXATION ELL~NGTG8,M. Carolina Power &, Light Co.
CLARK,B.H. Carolina Power & Tight Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFXLIATXON
SUBJECT:
LER 99-001-00:on 990106,SF pool water level was not maintained greater than 23 feet above stored BWR fuel assemblies. Caused by fasteners bending under specific A circumstances. Increased water:level-.With 990205 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event. Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
%is NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 0500040&
0 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL XD CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 FLANDERS,S 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HXCB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOHB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB ,1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 C, NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DZSTRIBUTZON LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUXRED: LTTR 23 ENCL 23
Qpj+Qf'~~jw~~.- -,
'"'-: 'OL Carolina Power 8 Ught Company Harris Nudear Plant P.O. Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 FEB s1999 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-99-015 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 HAMGS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1
.'HEARON DOCKET NO. 50400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1999-001-00 t ~ J 4 ~ ~ r Sir or Madam:
In accordance with 10CFR50.73, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. The report describes a Technical Specification violation pertaining to spent fuel pool water level.
Sincerely, B.H. Clar General Manager Harris Plant Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)
Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)
Mr. S. C. Flanders (NRC NRR Project Manager)
-.
cycy0g0q0363 9'90205 PDR ADQCK 05000400 S PDR 541 3 Shearon Harris Road New Hill NC
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co ion
~) Document Control Desk / HNP-99-015 Page 2 of 2 bcc: Ms. D. B. Alexander Mr. G. E. Attarian Mr. R. H. Bazemore Mr. T. C. Bell Mrs. P. P. Burns Mr. H. K. Chernoff (RNP)
Mr. B. H. Clark Mr. W. F. Conway Mr. J.-M. Curley Mr. G. W. Davis Mr. W. J. Dorman (BNP)
Mr. R. J. Field Ms. J. P. Gawron (BNP)
Mr. K. N. Harris Ms. L. N. Hartz Mr. J. D. Henderson Mr. W. J. Hindman Mr. C. S. Hinnant INPO Mr-. W. D. Johnson Mr. M. B. Keef Mr. G. J. Kline Ms. W. C. Langston Mr. R. D. Martin Mr. J. W. McKay Mr. R. O. Moore Mr. T. C. Morton Mr. P. M. Odom (RNP)
Mr. P. M. Sawyer (BNP)
Mr. J. Scarola Mr. F. E. Strehle Mr. J. M. Taylor Harris Licensing File(s)
Nuclear Records
APPROV OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA COMMISSION Estimated n per response to comply with this mandatory information (6-1998) collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Information and Records Management Branch (Te LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) F33), U.S. Nudear Regulatory Commission, Washington, Dc 205554001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Pro}ect (31504104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not (See reverse for required number of display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or digits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collecten.
DOCKET NUMBER I2) PAGE I3)
FACILITYNAME l1 I 1 OF 3 Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 TITLE (4l Spent Fuel Pool water level not maintained greater than 23 feet above stored BWR fuel assemblies.
REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER NUMBER 06'EAR PACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 "1999 1999. - 001' 00 02 05 1999 05000 OPERATING MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 100 20.2203(a)(1l 20.2203(a)(3)(I) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a) (2)(xl LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2) (i) 20.2203(a)(3) (ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a) (4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a) (2)(v) Specify ln Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a) (2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Ilnclude Ares Code)
Mark Ellington, Senior Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2057 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13)
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE To EPIX To EPIX EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES NO (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
At approximately 10:30 on January 6, 1999, with the unit at 100% power, personnel performing spent fuel handling operations noticed that one of the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) assemblies that they were moving did not fully seat in the storage rack. A question was raised regarding the administrative limit required to maintain 23 feet of water above the fuel assemblies as required by Technical Specification LCO 3.9.11. It was determined that the current limit did not consider the additional margin needed in the event of an assembly being hung on a BWR channel fastener; therefore, fuel movement was halted. An investigation revealed that eight additional assemblies in the pool were not fully seated. Measurements were taken on the nine assemblies to determine what the most limiting administrative requirement should have been. Based on these measurements, 23 feet of water had been maintained above the most limiting assembly since the problem was discovered on January 6, 1999; however, a subsequent review of the operating logs for the previous months showed that the revised administrative limit (1.25" higher than the previous limit) had not been met (by a maximum of 0.75") on more that one occasion. Therefore, the actions required by LCO 3.9.11 were not met on those occasions.
The root cause of this event is that the procedure provides ambiguous guidance regarding channel fastener tolerances and the fact that the fasteners could bend under specific circumstances. Corrective actions taken have been: 1) Halted fuel movement and increased water level to ensure compliance; 2) Seated seven of the nine assemblies (i.e., these seven did not have bent channel fasteners, but were hung on the side of the fuel rack by the lower edge of the fastener); 3) Revised the administrative limit such that 23 feet of water remained above the two BWR assemblies with bent channel fasteners (i.e., not fully seated); 4)
Performed an engineering analysis for a BWR assembly being suspended on a side of a rack by a channel fastener, and 5)
Seated the two assemblies with bent channel fasteners. Planned corrective actions are to revise procedures and to provide additional trainin for fuel handlin ersonnel.
NRC FORM 366 I6.1998I
ly NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4
(6-98)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FAGIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 2 OF 3 1999 001 00 TEXT litmore spsce is reqofred, use eddidonsl copies of NRC Form 368AJ (17)
I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT In August of 1997, during an in-depth review of how the plant complies with technical specification surveillance requirements, the Harris Nuclear Plant made a conservative decision to include the handling bail on the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) (EIIS: AC) assemblies as part of 'the assembly.'he top of this bail is approximately six inches over the top of the remainder of the fuel assembly (see LER 97-021-00, with an event date of 8/14/97).
Since that determination, a revision to clarify the wording of the specification has been submitted to the NRC.
That revision was still pending as of the date of this event.
At approximately 10:30 on January 6, 1999, with the unit at 100% power, personnel performing fuel handling operations in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) noticed that one of the BWR assemblies they were moving did not appear to be fully seated. The fuel handling personnel notified the Spent Fuel Shipping Director that they were, having difficulty getting a BWR assembly to fully seat in its location, apparently due to a bent channel fastener.
A channel fastener is an attachment on one of the upper corners'of a BWR assembly, which holds the channel to the assembly and provides proper spacing for the cruciform control blades. Fuel handling procedures provided guidance for instances such as when an assembly was not fully seated, and that guidance was followed. In addition to those actions, one of the technicians assisting in the evolution questioned how this situation would affect the administrative limits established to maintain a minimum of 23 feet of water above the fuel assemblies, as required by Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.11 Through conversations
~
with the Shipping Director and Engineering, it was determined that the current administrative limit did not" consider the additional margin needed in the event of an assembly being hung on the side of the rack by a channel fastener. The limit had been based on the most limiting design parameters, but did not assume that the assemblies were not fully seated in the racks. Fuel movement was immediately halted and water level was increased to ensure compliance with the technical specification LCO. An investigation found eight additional assemblies in the pool that were not fully seated. The position of these assemblies was not readily apparent with the naked eye, but underwater video images of the assemblies in the racks made the nine more readily distinguishable from those fully seated. Two of the nine had bent channel fasteners. The remaining seven did not have bent channel fasteners, but were being supported on the top edge of the rack wall by the lower edge of the channel fasteners. Measurements were taken on the nine assemblies to determine what pool level was needed to ensure compliance with technical specifications. It was determined that the administrative limit needed to be increased by 1.25" for the most limiting assembly to be in compliance. Based on these measurements, 23 feet of water had been maintained above the most limiting assembly since the problem was discovered on January 6, 1999; however, a review of the operating logs from August 14,1997, to the event date showed that the revised administrative limit had not been met on more than one occasion. The lowest water level recorded since August 14, 1997, was 22 feet and 11.25 inches above the bail of the most limiting BWR assembly (i.e., 0.75" less than the new administrative limit). Therefore, the actions required by technical specification LCO 3.9.11 were considered to have not been met on those occasions.
NRC FORM 366 (6-96)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IB-96)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET LER NUMBER I6) PAGE I3)
FACILITYNAME I1I SEQUENTIAL REVISION Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF 3 1999 001 00 TEXT llfmore space ls rerlulred, use addidonal copies of NRC Form 388AJ I17)
II. CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause of this event is that the procedure provides ambiguous guidance regarding channel fastener tolerances and the fact that the fasteners could bend under specific circumstances.
III. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE There were no actual safety consequences. Records indicate that the water level in the spent fuel pool did not decrease below 23 feet above the top of the fuel rods. Technical Specification bases states that "[t]he restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10'k iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis." Since at least 23 feet of water was maintained above the actual fuel rods, there was no degradation in the protection of the health or safety of the public, nor was there any threat of a radiological release as a result of this event.
This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)( i ) for a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Completed corrective actions:
- 1. Halted fuel movement and increased water level to ensure compliance.
- 2. Seated seven of the nine assemblies (i.e., these seven did not have bent channel fasteners, but were hung on the side of the fuel rack by the lower edge of the fastener) on 1/8/99.
- 3. Revised the administrative limit such that 23 feet of water remained above the two BWR assemblies with bent channel fasteners (i.e., not fully seated).
- 4. Performed an engineering analysis for a BWR assembly being suspended on a side of a rack by a channel fastener.
- 5. Seated the two assemblies with bent channel fasteners on 2/2/99.
Planned corrective actions:
- 1. Revise procedures and provide additional training for fuel handling personnel by 4/15/99.
V. SIMILAR EVENTS There has been one previous condition identified related to required water level over BWR fuel. LER 97-021-00
, discussed an interpretation issue regarding what constitutes a fuel 'assembly.'orrective actions for that event are not directly applicable to the channel fastener issue.
NRC FORM 366A I6.99)