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| {{#Wiki_filter:e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA. | | {{#Wiki_filter:e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA. 23261 February 24, 1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 92-089 Region II SPS/RCB-CGL R7 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Docket Nos: 50-280 Suite 2900 50-281 Atlanta, GA, 30323 License Nos: DPR-32 DPR-37 Gentlemen: |
| 23261 February 24, 1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA, 30323 Gentlemen: . VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 10CFR50 APPENDIX ,R FIRE BARRIERS Serial No.: SPS/RCB-CGL Docket Nos: License Nos: 92-089 R7 50-280 50-281 DPR-32 DPR-37 During recent cable installation activities, an Appendix R discrepancy was discovered with regard to the thickness and fire *rating of a four-inch block wall between the auxiliary building and the Unit 1 cable vault. The same condition was found in Unit 2. While investigating these discrepancies, an additional discrepancy was discovered in a twelve-inch auxiliary building wall. These as-built configurations are not consistent with the considerations used in establishing compliance with 1 OCFRSO Appendix R. As *an interim measure, compensatory measures have been put in place and corrective measures are being planned to restore the fire_ ratings of these walls to the ratings specified in the Surry Appendix R Report. A more detailed discussion is provided in the attachment. | | . VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 10CFR50 APPENDIX ,R FIRE BARRIERS During recent cable installation activities, an Appendix R discrepancy was discovered with regard to the thickness and fire *rating of a four-inch block wall between the auxiliary building and the Unit 1 cable vault. The same condition was found in Unit 2. |
| We will *inform you of the status of our corrective actions by April 30, 1992. Should you have any questions, please contact us. Very truly yours, W. L. Stewart Senior Vice President | | While investigating these discrepancies, an additional discrepancy was discovered in a twelve-inch auxiliary building wall. These as-built configurations are not consistent with the considerations used in establishing compliance with 1OCFRSO Appendix R. |
| -Nuclear Attachment | | As *an interim measure, compensatory measures have been put in place and corrective measures are being planned to restore the fire_ ratings of these walls to the ratings specified in the Surry Appendix R Report. |
| -Inadequate Fire Rating of Auxiliary Building Block Walls cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. M.W. Branch Senior Resident Inspector Surry P~wer Station q203020240 920224 PDR ADDCK 05000280 PDR s e e INADEQUATE ,FIRE RATING OF-AUXILIARY BUILDING BLOCK WALLS . . . On January 6, 1992, while installing cables *between the Unit 1 cable vault and the auxiliary building,. | | A more detailed discussion is provided in the attachment. We will *inform you of the status of our corrective actions by April 30, 1992. Should you have any questions, please contact us. |
| construction personnel discovered that a portion of the wall separating the two areas was of four-inch block wall construction. | | Very truly yours, |
| The same condition was found to exist between the Unit 2 cable vault and the auxiliary building.- | | ~~J W. L. Stewart Senior Vice President - Nuclear Attachment - Inadequate Fire Rating of Auxiliary Building Block Walls cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. M.W. Branch Senior Resident Inspector Surry P~wer Station q203020240 920224 PDR ADDCK 05000280 s PDR |
| The Unit 1 cable vault, the auxiliary building, and the Unit 2 cable vault are designated as separate fire areas (Fire Areas 1, 17, and 2, respectively | | |
| -see Sketch 1 ). . . . During resolution of 1 OQFRSO Appendix R issues, Virginia Electric and Power Company had requested certain exemptions from Appendix R requirements | | e e INADEQUATE ,FIRE RATING OF- AUXILIARY BUILDING BLOCK WALLS . |
| .. Included were requests for exemptions from the specific requirements for a three-hour fire barrier for the walls described above. In our exemption request, the two walls of concern were described as eight-inch thick masonry, conservatively rated as two-hour fire barriers. | | . . |
| In the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated February 25, 1988, it was concluded that the eight-inch thick masonry wall, combined with the installed fire detection and suppression features, provided adequate justification for non-three-hour rated features. | | On January 6, 1992, while installing cables *between the Unit 1 cable vault and the auxiliary building,. construction personnel discovered that a portion of the wall separating the two areas was of four-inch block wall construction. The same condition was found to exist between the Unit 2 cable vault and the auxiliary building.- The Unit 1 cable vault, the auxiliary building, and the Unit 2 cable vault are designated as separate fire areas (Fire Areas 1, 17, and 2, respectively - see Sketch 1). |
| Consistent with the Generic Letter 86-1 O interpretation of Appendix R that non-fire-rated features in fire area boundaries may be evaluated by a fire hazards . analysis, the NRC SER concluded that no exemptions were required. | | . . . |
| Uncorrected, the discrepant conditions would adversely impact the basis for this SER conclusion. . . ' . . . As a result of this discovery, a review of Class. 1 block walls was conducted to determine if a similar discrepant condition existed at other fire areas which utilize such walls as barriers. | | During resolution of 1OQFRSO Appendix R issues, Virginia Electric and Power Company had requested certain exemptions from Appendix R requirements .. Included were requests for exemptions from the specific requirements for a three-hour fire barrier for the walls described above. In our exemption request, the two walls of concern were described as eight-inch thick masonry, conservatively rated as two-hour fire barriers. In the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated February 25, 1988, it was concluded that the eight-inch thick masonry wall, combined with the installed fire detection and suppression features, provided adequate justification for non-three-hour rated features. Consistent with the Generic Letter 86-1 O interpretation of Appendix R that non-fire-rated features in fire area boundaries may be evaluated by a fire hazards . |
| This review disclosed one other discrepancy in the block wall in the auxiliary building. | | analysis, the NRC SER concluded that no exemptions were required. Uncorrected, the discrepant conditions would adversely impact the basis for this SER conclusion. |
| This *discrepancy involved a wall of twelve-inch thickness, which | | ' |
| * had been breached for the .installation of a portable air conditioning* | | . . . . |
| unit (see Sketch 2). We have evaluated the discrepancies and have concluded that continued operation is acceptable based on a number of mitigating factors which are enumerated below. A Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) has been prepared and approved by the Station Nuclear Safety and Op~rating Committee (SNSOC). | | . |
| * Each of the fire areas contains fire detection equipment which annunciates in the main control room. * | | As a result of this discovery, a review of Class. 1 block walls was conducted to determine if a similar discrepant condition existed at other fire areas which utilize such walls as barriers. This review disclosed one other discrepancy in the block wall in the auxiliary building. This *discrepancy involved a wall of twelve-inch thickness, which |
| * The cable vaults contain fire suppression equipment which would actuate automatically in the event of a fire. * | | * had been breached for the .installation of a portable air conditioning* unit (see Sketch 2). |
| * Transient combustible loading is maintained at a low level. Also, upon discovery of the discrepant conditions, appropriate compensatory measures (i.e., the utilization of fire watches) were established in accordance with station operating procedures. | | We have evaluated the discrepancies and have concluded that continued operation is acceptable based on a number of mitigating factors which are enumerated below. A Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) has been prepared and approved by the Station Nuclear Safety and Op~rating Committee (SNSOC). |
| ,*, e Corrective actions to eliminate the problems with the fire barriers described above are* under evaluation. | | * Each of the fire areas contains fire detection equipment which annunciates in the main control room. * |
| Walkdowns of the remaining fire walls to confirm their compliance with the Appendix R Report are in progress. | | * The cable vaults contain fire suppression equipment which would actuate automatically in the event of a fire. * |
| Compensatory measures will remain in place until permanent corrective actions have been completed. | | * Transient combustible loading is maintained at a low level. |
| We will inform you of the. status of these .corrective actions by April 30, 1992. I* - | | Also, upon discovery of the discrepant conditions, appropriate compensatory measures (i.e., the utilization of fire watches) were established in accordance with station operating procedures. |
| UNIT 1 CNTMT I 15 1 . AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE AREA 17 AREAS OF CONCERN Sketch 1 (not to scale) 2 UNIT2 CNTMT 16 e AUXILIARY BLDG APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF BREACH (NOT TO SCALE) HALLWAY SERVICE BLDG (CLEAN CHANGE AREA) Sketch 2}}
| | |
| | ,*, |
| | e Corrective actions to eliminate the problems with the fire barriers described above are* |
| | under evaluation. Walkdowns of the remaining fire walls to confirm their compliance with the Appendix R Report are in progress. Compensatory measures will remain in place until permanent corrective actions have been completed. We will inform you of the. status of these .corrective actions by April 30, 1992. |
| | I* - |
| | |
| | .AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE AREA 17 UNIT 1 UNIT2 CNTMT CNTMT I AREAS OF CONCERN 15 16 1 2 Sketch 1 (not to scale) |
| | |
| | e AUXILIARY BLDG APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF BREACH (NOT TO SCALE) |
| | HALLWAY SERVICE BLDG (CLEAN CHANGE AREA) |
| | Sketch 2}} |
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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
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Investigation Is in Progress ML18139A9641981-01-0505 January 1981 Ro:On 801220 at Full Power,Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Rate of Change Per Tech Specs.Cause Not Stated.Temp Decreased When Waterbox Outlet Valves Throttled Due to Vacuum Priming Problems ML18139A8481980-11-19019 November 1980 Ro:On 801102,during Cold Shutdown,Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Rate of Change of 3 F/Hr.Caused by Lack of Svc Water Flow Through Unit 1.No Detrimental Evidence Found Re River Environ ML18139A2991980-06-0606 June 1980 Ro:Several Lines in Low Head & High Safety Injection Sys Were Not Analyzed for Effects of Fluid Temp Below 70 F. 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[Table view] Category:LER)
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Event Caused No Detrimental Effect on River Environ ML18139B2871981-05-0101 May 1981 Ro:On 810418,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Average Rate of Change of 3F/hr Per Tech Spec 4.14.A.3. Lack of Svc Water Flow Believed to Be Contributing Factor. Tube Leaks Repaired.River Environ Not Affected ML18139B2501981-04-16016 April 1981 Ro:On 810406,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Average Rate of Change Permitted by Tech Specs.Lack of Svc Water Flow Believed to Be Contributing Factor.Search Conducted to Determine Temp Change Effect on River Environ ML18139B2311981-04-0101 April 1981 Ro:On 810322,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Lack of Svc Water Flow. 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Review of New Nozzle Loads Showed Load on Pump Exceeded Vendor Allowable Load.Multiphase Program Proposed ML18139A2741980-05-23023 May 1980 Ro:On 800512,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Temp Change Rate of 3 F/H.During Power Escalation W/Only Three Circulating Water Pumps in Operation,Canal Intake Level Dropped & Groin Temp Reached Change Rate of 5.5 F/H ML18139A1731980-04-22022 April 1980 Ro:While Conducting PT 25.12,pump 1-FP-P2 in Fire Protection Sys Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria of 250 Ft at 2500 Gallons Per Minute.Cause Not Determined.Vendor Will Participate in Insp.Local Fire Depts Will Supply Assistance ML18136A4031980-01-18018 January 1980 Ro:On 800108,while Unit 1 Was Operating at 50% Power,Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded 3 F/Hour Change Rate.While Returning Unit 1 to Svc,Discharge Coolant Temp Increased to 7 F/Hour.No Temp Effects on River ML18136A4591980-01-16016 January 1980 Ro:On 800116,during Power Operation,Boric Acid Flow in One of Two Required Flow Paths to Core Was Blocked for Approx 3-h.Caused by Inadvertent Closing of Discharge Valve.Valve Immediately Opened & Boric Acid Flow Verified ML18136A3371979-12-27027 December 1979 Ro:On 791217,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Temp Rate Change Permitted by Tech Specs.Caused by Removing Waterbox from Svc Too Rapidly.No Adverse Impact on Environ ML18136A3471979-12-10010 December 1979 Ro:On 791207,when Radiation Alarm Setpoint Reached in Discharge Line of Air Ejectors,Trip Valves Diverted Air Into Containment.Caused by Improper Initial Design Concept.Mods to Maintain Valve Closed Initiated ML18136A2311979-11-26026 November 1979 Ro:On 791110,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Temp Change Rate of 3 F/H While Unit 1 Was at 100% Power & Unit 2 Was in Cold Shutdown.Caused by Valve Misalignment Permitting Sodium Fluid to Enter Sys ML18136A1781979-11-0909 November 1979 Ro:On 791026 & 27,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Temp Change Rate of 3 F/H.Caused When Waterbox Was Removed from Svc on 791026 & When Returned to Svc on 791027.No Detrimental Effects Found on River Environ ML18116A1741979-06-25025 June 1979 RO on 790622:radiography of Facility Steam Generator Feedwater Nozzles & Reducers Revealed Crack Indications at Counterbore Region.Westinghouse & Util to Evaluate Problem ML18116A1751979-06-22022 June 1979 RO on 790621:Westinghouse Notified Util of Nonconservatism in Accident Analysis.Increase in Steam Generator Ref Resulted from Rise in Containment Temp Not Properly Accounted For.Corrective Action Being Evaluated ML18114A6981979-06-0606 June 1979 RO on 790606:abnormal Degradation of Cable Insulation in Emergency Power Sys Battery Charges.Cause Unknown But Manufacturer Will Be Contacted 1994-11-03
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML18152A2811999-10-12012 October 1999 Technical Basis for Elimination of Nozzle Inner Radius Insps (for Nozzles Other than Reactor Vessel),Technical Basis for ASME Section XI Code Case N-619. ML18152B3531999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 991012 Ltr ML18152B6651999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.With 990915 Ltr ML18152B4421999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990802,determined That Plant Was Outside of App R Design Basis Due to Fire Barrier Deficiencies. Caused by Original Plant Design Deficiencies.Fire Watches Were Established & Mods Have Been Completed.With 990827 Ltr ML18152B4411999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990731,effluent Radiation Monitors Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Degraded Heat Trace Circuits for Monitors Sample Suction Line.Degraded Heat Trace Circuit Was Replaced & Addl Heat Trace Is Being Installed ML18151A3981999-08-13013 August 1999 SPS Unit 2 ISI Summary Rept for 1999 Refueling Outage. ML18152B3771999-08-13013 August 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990714,TS Violation Due to non-safety Related Fans Effect on CR Boundary Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Cable Spreading Room Doors Were Operned to Reduce Pressure in Rooms ML18152B3791999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990811 Ltr ML18152B3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990713 Ltr ML18152B4341999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990614 Ltr ML20195E2401999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 2 to COLR for SPS Unit 2 Cycle 16 Pattern Ag ML18152B4181999-05-18018 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990425,MSSVs Tested Out of Tolerance for as Found Setpoint.Caused by Minor Setpoint Drift.No Immediate Action Required.Deviation Rept Submitted for Each Valve.With 990518 Ltr ML18152B4161999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.With 990512 Ltr ML18152B4111999-04-28028 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990331,potential Loss of Charging Pumps Was Noted.Caused by Main CR Fire.Station Deviation Was Issued on 990331.With 990428 Ltr ML18152B6511999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2 ML18153A2741999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990301,prematurely Released Fire Watches Resulted in Violation of TS 3.21.B.7.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedure for Opening & Sealing Fire Stops Was Revised on 990212 ML18153A2681999-03-19019 March 1999 LER 98-013-01:on 981122,turbine/reactor Tripped on High Due to Short Circuit in Summator for MSL C Loop Channel III Flow Transmitter.Replaced 1-MS-FT1494 Summator & Module Repair Procedure Revised.With 9903190 Ltr ML18152B7331999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990310 Ltr ML18152B5421999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990210 Ltr ML18151A3031999-01-29029 January 1999 ISI Summary Rept for 1998 Refueling Outage,Including Form NIS-1, Owners Rept for ISIs & Form NIS-2, Owners Rept for Repairs & Replacements. ML18152B7261999-01-21021 January 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 981222,auxiliary Feedwater Pipe Support Missed Surveillance.Caused by Personnel Error.Station Deviation Rept Was Submitted.Two Supports in Question Received Required Code Insp & Were Found Acceptable ML18152B6011998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990115 Ltr ML18152B5781998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 981126,manual Reactor Trip in Response to Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure Occurred.Caused by Dislocation of Retaining Clip in Positioner.Control Room Operators Placed Unit in Safe,Shutdown Condition ML18152B5811998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 981122,turbine/reactor Trip on High SG Level Occurred.Caused by Instrument Failure.Control Room Operators Placed Unit in Safe,Shutdown Condition ML18152B7121998-12-0404 December 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 981105,noted Failure to Deactivate Station Access Badge.Caused by Human Error.Licensee Will Now Deactivate Station Badges Before Clearance Is Revoked & Process for Badge Deactivations Have Been Strengthened ML18152B7041998-12-0101 December 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 981102,noted That EDGs Were Concurrently Inoperable.Caused by Required Testing Per TS 3.16.B.1.a.2. Redundant EDG Was Returned to Svc within Two Hour Period, Following Satisfactory Testing.With 981201 Ltr ML18152B7081998-11-30030 November 1998 Rev 0 to COLR for Surry 1 Cycle 16,Pattern Un. ML18152B5721998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 981214 Ltr ML18152B6161998-11-0606 November 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 981008,diesel Driven Fire Pump Failed to Start During Performance of Monthly Operability Test.Caused by Faulty Overspeed Trip Device Failure.Diesel Driven Fire Pump Declared Inoperable ML18152B6241998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.With 981111 Ltr ML18152B6081998-10-23023 October 1998 LER 98-010-01:on 980715,intake Canal Level Probes Were Inoperable Due to Marine Growth.Caused by Design of Canal Level Instrumentation.Canal Level Probes Will Continue to Be Monitored More Closely ML18152B6881998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.With 981012 Ltr ML18153A3271998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML18152B7811998-07-31031 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980715,low Intake Canal Level Instrument Channel I Was Declared Inoperable to Allow Testing of Intake Canal Level Probe 1-CW-LE-102.Subject Probe Was Cleaned by Diver,Tested & Channel I Was Returned to Operable Status ML18153A3161998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.W/980807 Ltr ML18152B7621998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.W/980707 Ltr ML18153A2581998-06-0303 June 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980509,nonisolable Leak of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection Line Weld,Was Discovered.Caused by Lack of Fusion or Thermal Fatigue Coupled W/Vibration Stress Due to Loose Rod Hanger.Rcp Seal Injection Line Removed ML20248F7441998-05-31031 May 1998 Reactor Vessel Working Group,Response to RAI Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity ML18153A3141998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.W/980610 ML18152B8241998-05-22022 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980228,auxiliary Ventilation Fans Were Noted in Condition Outside of Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Recognize Potential Impact of Certain Design Basis Accident Scenarios.No Corrective Actions Needed ML18152B8161998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.W/980508 Ltr ML18152B7951998-04-29029 April 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980330,radiation Monitors Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Change in Operating Temperature Range. Preplanned Alternate Method of Monitoring Was Initiated IAW TS Table 3.7-6 ML18153A2511998-04-22022 April 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980324,unisolable Through Wall Leak of RCP Thermowell Was Noted.Cause of Leak Is Unknown.Rtd Will Be Replaced ML18153A2521998-04-22022 April 1998 LER 98-005-01:on 980212,fire Watch Insp Exceeded One Hour. Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail by Individual Involved.Individual Involved Was Coached on Requirement to Perform Fire Watch Patrols within Required Time Frame ML20217P9941998-04-0707 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Third 10-yr Inservice Insp Program Relief Requests SR-018 - Sr-024 ML18153A2951998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Sps,Units 1 & 2.W/ 980408 Ltr ML18153A2391998-03-13013 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980212,fire Watch Insp Frequency Exceeded One H Occurred.Category 2 Root Cause Evaluation Being Conducted to Determine Cause of Event.Station Deviation Issued ML18153A2341998-03-0909 March 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980226,no Procedural Guidance for Maintaining EDG Minimum Fuel Supply During Loop,Was Identified.Caused by Absence of Procedural Instructions. Deviation Rept Submitted to Document Deviating Condition ML18153A2301998-03-0606 March 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980206,fire Watch Was Released Prematurely Resulting in Violation of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Planning of Repair Activity.Work Orders Will Include Ref to Applicable Procedures Developed to Assist in Repairs ML18153A2251998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980202,automatic Turbine Trip Resulted in Automatic Reactor Trip.Caused Degraded Generator Voltage Regulator sub-component Failure.Placed Plant in Safe Hot SD & Replaced Intermittent Relay & Relay Socket 1999-09-30
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e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA. 23261 February 24, 1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 92-089 Region II SPS/RCB-CGL R7 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Docket Nos: 50-280 Suite 2900 50-281 Atlanta, GA, 30323 License Nos: DPR-32 DPR-37 Gentlemen:
. VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 10CFR50 APPENDIX ,R FIRE BARRIERS During recent cable installation activities, an Appendix R discrepancy was discovered with regard to the thickness and fire *rating of a four-inch block wall between the auxiliary building and the Unit 1 cable vault. The same condition was found in Unit 2.
While investigating these discrepancies, an additional discrepancy was discovered in a twelve-inch auxiliary building wall. These as-built configurations are not consistent with the considerations used in establishing compliance with 1OCFRSO Appendix R.
As *an interim measure, compensatory measures have been put in place and corrective measures are being planned to restore the fire_ ratings of these walls to the ratings specified in the Surry Appendix R Report.
A more detailed discussion is provided in the attachment. We will *inform you of the status of our corrective actions by April 30, 1992. Should you have any questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours,
~~J W. L. Stewart Senior Vice President - Nuclear Attachment - Inadequate Fire Rating of Auxiliary Building Block Walls cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. M.W. Branch Senior Resident Inspector Surry P~wer Station q203020240 920224 PDR ADDCK 05000280 s PDR
e e INADEQUATE ,FIRE RATING OF- AUXILIARY BUILDING BLOCK WALLS .
. .
On January 6, 1992, while installing cables *between the Unit 1 cable vault and the auxiliary building,. construction personnel discovered that a portion of the wall separating the two areas was of four-inch block wall construction. The same condition was found to exist between the Unit 2 cable vault and the auxiliary building.- The Unit 1 cable vault, the auxiliary building, and the Unit 2 cable vault are designated as separate fire areas (Fire Areas 1, 17, and 2, respectively - see Sketch 1).
. . .
During resolution of 1OQFRSO Appendix R issues, Virginia Electric and Power Company had requested certain exemptions from Appendix R requirements .. Included were requests for exemptions from the specific requirements for a three-hour fire barrier for the walls described above. In our exemption request, the two walls of concern were described as eight-inch thick masonry, conservatively rated as two-hour fire barriers. In the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated February 25, 1988, it was concluded that the eight-inch thick masonry wall, combined with the installed fire detection and suppression features, provided adequate justification for non-three-hour rated features. Consistent with the Generic Letter 86-1 O interpretation of Appendix R that non-fire-rated features in fire area boundaries may be evaluated by a fire hazards .
analysis, the NRC SER concluded that no exemptions were required. Uncorrected, the discrepant conditions would adversely impact the basis for this SER conclusion.
'
. . . .
.
As a result of this discovery, a review of Class. 1 block walls was conducted to determine if a similar discrepant condition existed at other fire areas which utilize such walls as barriers. This review disclosed one other discrepancy in the block wall in the auxiliary building. This *discrepancy involved a wall of twelve-inch thickness, which
- had been breached for the .installation of a portable air conditioning* unit (see Sketch 2).
We have evaluated the discrepancies and have concluded that continued operation is acceptable based on a number of mitigating factors which are enumerated below. A Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) has been prepared and approved by the Station Nuclear Safety and Op~rating Committee (SNSOC).
- Each of the fire areas contains fire detection equipment which annunciates in the main control room. *
- The cable vaults contain fire suppression equipment which would actuate automatically in the event of a fire. *
- Transient combustible loading is maintained at a low level.
Also, upon discovery of the discrepant conditions, appropriate compensatory measures (i.e., the utilization of fire watches) were established in accordance with station operating procedures.
,*,
e Corrective actions to eliminate the problems with the fire barriers described above are*
under evaluation. Walkdowns of the remaining fire walls to confirm their compliance with the Appendix R Report are in progress. Compensatory measures will remain in place until permanent corrective actions have been completed. We will inform you of the. status of these .corrective actions by April 30, 1992.
I* -
.AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE AREA 17 UNIT 1 UNIT2 CNTMT CNTMT I AREAS OF CONCERN 15 16 1 2 Sketch 1 (not to scale)
e AUXILIARY BLDG APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF BREACH (NOT TO SCALE)
HALLWAY SERVICE BLDG (CLEAN CHANGE AREA)
Sketch 2