Ro:Several Lines in Low Head & High Safety Injection Sys Were Not Analyzed for Effects of Fluid Temp Below 70 F. Review of New Nozzle Loads Showed Load on Pump Exceeded Vendor Allowable Load.Multiphase Program ProposedML18139A299 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Surry, North Anna |
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Issue date: |
06/06/1980 |
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From: |
Sylvia B VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
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To: |
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References |
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NUDOCS 8006110324 |
Download: ML18139A299 (18) |
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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18153B1351994-11-0303 November 1994 Ro:On 941028,total Suspended Solids Concentration in Spoil Discharge Reached 820 Mg/L.Permit Limitations Expressed as Values Exceeding Ambient Levels ML18153B4111993-12-15015 December 1993 Ro:On 931215,discovered Fault in Control Rod Drive Sys, Rendering Control Rod Assemblies in Shutdown Bank a Immovable W/Group 2 at 222 Steps & Group 1 Rods of Control Banks a & C Immovable by Faulted Conditions ML20046C3661993-08-0505 August 1993 Special Rept:On 930629,seven Blockout Type Penetration Fire Barriers & on 930713,six Sleeve Type Penetration Fire Barriers Determined to Be Nonfunctional.Repairs Completed & Fire Barriers Restored to Functional Status ML20044H3651993-06-0101 June 1993 Special Rept:On 930427,EDG Failed to Auto Start During Performance of Main Dam Auxiliary Power Diesel Periodic Test.Corroded Wires & Lugs Appeared to Be Loose.Control Wire Connections Cleaned & Aged Wires Replaced ML18153D1311992-09-15015 September 1992 Update to 920703 Special Rept Re Operational Difficulties W/ Waste Gas Decay Tank Hydrogen Monitors.Operability Intermittent & Reliability Not Yet Achieved.Ts Change to Delete Requirement to Monitor Hydrogen Sent on 920628 ML18153D0561992-07-0303 July 1992 Special Rept:Waste Gas Decay Tank Monitoring Instrumentation Out of Svc for More than 30 Days as Result of Replacement of Pressure Sensors Due to Instrument Drift.Replacement Pumps Received in June 1992.Updated Rept to Be Sent by 920731 ML18153D0221992-06-0303 June 1992 Special Rept:On 920503,quadrant to Average Power Tilt Exceeded 2% for Greater than 24 H.Caused by Loop Inlet Temp Imbalance.Power Range Nuclear Instruments Recalibr ML18153C9071992-02-24024 February 1992 Ro:On 920106,discovered That Portion of Wall Separating Cable Vault & Auxiliary Bldg Was of 4-inch Block Const Instead of Being Designated as Separate Fire Areas.Fire Watches Established Per Station Operating Procedures ML18153C7371991-09-13013 September 1991 Special Rept:On 910815 & 24,quadrant-to-average Power Tilt Exceeded 2% for More than 24 H.Caused by Blown Fuse & Dropped Rod Runback.Cable W/Insulation Damage & Rod Control Cabinet Repaired ML20024H6471991-05-31031 May 1991 Special Rept:On 910227,svc Water MOVs Associated W/ Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers Exceeded Torgue Limits & Stopped in Mid Position While Being Opened During Test.Event Reported on Voluntary Basis to Provide Info to NRC ML18153C5441991-02-15015 February 1991 Special Rept:On 901220,spurious Alarms Received Shortly After Placing ATWS Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry in Svc.From 901222-28,spurious Trouble Alarms Received.On 901231,improper Voltage Ratings Found on Relay Modules ML18153C5071991-01-23023 January 1991 Special Rept:On 901224,quadrant to Average Power Tilt Exceeded 2.0% for Greater than 24 H.Caused by Xenon Transient & Change in Tave Coupled w/pre-existing Core Asymmetry.Isophase Bus Duct Shunts Repaired ML20005E1601989-12-22022 December 1989 Special Rept:On 891218,heat Trace Sys for Kaman Vent Stack a Radiation Monitor RI-VG-179 Declared Inoperable.Sys Removed from Svc & Tech Spec 3.3.3.1 Action Statememt Entered.Sys Will Be Repaired & Returned to Svc by 900130 ML19332G0471989-12-11011 December 1989 Special Rept:On 891202,Kaman Process Vent Radiation Monitor Exceeded Action Statement of Tech Spec 3.3.3.1 Since Monitor Not Returned to Operable Status within 7 Days.On 891125, Monitor Alarmed in Control Room Every 15 to 30 Minutes ML18152B1331988-05-0505 May 1988 Ro:Safety Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident.Continued Operation of Station Based on Continuing Reanalysis of Impact of Steam Generator Tube Uncovery Justified for Listed Reasons ML18150A1631987-06-0909 June 1987 Ro:On 870516,automatic Shutdown on Low Reactor Coolant Flow in One Loop Experienced.Caused by Mechanical Failure of Reactor Coolant Loop Stop Valve.Effects of Event from Core DNB Standpoint Evaluated,Per 870527 Telcon W/Nrc ML20023D2181983-05-10010 May 1983 Ro:On 830509,w/unit at 100% Power,Severe Hydrogen Leak Discovered on Hydrogen inner-cooled Turbine Generator.Unit Rampdown Ordered & Hydrogen Vented to Atmosphere.Emergency Terminated When Pressure Reached Less than 10 Psig ML18139B9881982-08-0505 August 1982 Ro:On 820721,rate of Exchange of Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Reached Max of 12 F/Hour Exceeding Max Rate of Change of 3 F/Hour Per Tech Spec 4.14.A.3.Caused by Loss of Electrical Power to Four of Eight Circulating Water Pumps ML18139B8461982-04-16016 April 1982 Ro:On 820403,average Rate of Change of Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Permitted Rate.Caused by Operator Error.Personnel Reinstructed ML18139B8271982-03-26026 March 1982 Ro:On 820212,w/Unit 1 at 100% Power & Unit 2 at Hot Shutdown,Average Rate of Change of Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Tech Specs.Caused by Failure of Vacuum Priming Sys at River Intake.Sys Repaired ML18139B7241982-02-0505 February 1982 Ro:On 820122,average Rate of Change of Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Throttling of Water Flow Through Condenser Boxes to Preserve Reduced Canal Water Due to Vacuum Priming Pump Failure ML18139B4991981-08-25025 August 1981 Ro:On 810813,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Rate of Change of 3 F Per Hour Permitted by Tech Spec 4.14.A.3.Caused by Sheared Pin on Condenser Inlet Screen.No Damage to River Environ Found During Search ML18139B4971981-08-25025 August 1981 Ro:On 810810,rate of Change of Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Reached Max of 7 F/Hr Exceeding Tech Specs, & Causing Loss of Electrical Svc to 4 of 8 Circulating Water Pumps.Loss of Svc Caused by Ground Fault in Transformer ML18139B3261981-05-13013 May 1981 Ro:On 810428,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Average Rate of Change.Caused by Lack of Svc Water Flow. Event Caused No Detrimental Effect on River Environ ML18139B2871981-05-0101 May 1981 Ro:On 810418,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Average Rate of Change of 3F/hr Per Tech Spec 4.14.A.3. Lack of Svc Water Flow Believed to Be Contributing Factor. Tube Leaks Repaired.River Environ Not Affected ML18139B2501981-04-16016 April 1981 Ro:On 810406,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Average Rate of Change Permitted by Tech Specs.Lack of Svc Water Flow Believed to Be Contributing Factor.Search Conducted to Determine Temp Change Effect on River Environ ML18139B2311981-04-0101 April 1981 Ro:On 810322,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Lack of Svc Water Flow. Investigation Is in Progress ML20009F9751981-03-26026 March 1981 Ro:On 810325,station Personnel Discharged 22,000 Gallons of Condensate Water Over 14-h Period.Samples Taken at Beginning & End of Discharge.Results Listed ML18139A9641981-01-0505 January 1981 Ro:On 801220 at Full Power,Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Rate of Change Per Tech Specs.Cause Not Stated.Temp Decreased When Waterbox Outlet Valves Throttled Due to Vacuum Priming Problems ML18139A8481980-11-19019 November 1980 Ro:On 801102,during Cold Shutdown,Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Rate of Change of 3 F/Hr.Caused by Lack of Svc Water Flow Through Unit 1.No Detrimental Evidence Found Re River Environ ML19329F8811980-07-11011 July 1980 RO 80-55/O1T-0:during Review of FSAR Safety Analyses for Boron Dilution Accident Potential,Nonconservatism in Cold Shutdown Analysis Determined.Cause Unknown.Accident Analysis Review Initiated ML19329F9701980-06-27027 June 1980 RO-80-029/01T-0:on 800627,pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve PCV-2456 Inadvertently Opened in Mode 3 Following Valve Maint Activities.Corrective Action Will Be Taken Pending Completion of Investigation ML18139A2991980-06-0606 June 1980 Ro:Several Lines in Low Head & High Safety Injection Sys Were Not Analyzed for Effects of Fluid Temp Below 70 F. Review of New Nozzle Loads Showed Load on Pump Exceeded Vendor Allowable Load.Multiphase Program Proposed ML19312E5901980-06-0505 June 1980 RO 80-10/01T-0:on 800605,during Review of ECCS Piping, Loading on Low Head Safety Injection Pump Nozzles Was Discovered to Exceed Design Stress Allowable.Caused by Deficiency in Piping Sys Stress Analysis ML18139A2741980-05-23023 May 1980 Ro:On 800512,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Temp Change Rate of 3 F/H.During Power Escalation W/Only Three Circulating Water Pumps in Operation,Canal Intake Level Dropped & Groin Temp Reached Change Rate of 5.5 F/H ML18139A1731980-04-22022 April 1980 Ro:While Conducting PT 25.12,pump 1-FP-P2 in Fire Protection Sys Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria of 250 Ft at 2500 Gallons Per Minute.Cause Not Determined.Vendor Will Participate in Insp.Local Fire Depts Will Supply Assistance ML19290C6831980-02-0404 February 1980 RO 80-02/01T-0:during Review Required by IE Bulletin 79-14, Stress Discovered Over Design Allowable on Pipe Hangers & Snubbers.Caused by Incorrect Valve Weights Used in Design Calculations.Hangers & Snubbers Will Be Modified ML19270K2641980-01-25025 January 1980 RO-80-19:on 800124,during Equipment Qualification Review for IE Bulletin 79-01,qualification Discrepancy Discovered in Svc Water Radiation Pumps for Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers.Cause Unknown ML19290C6841980-01-21021 January 1980 RO-80-01/01T-0:on 800121,excess Letdown Lines Had Several Pipe Stress Points Above Normal or Upset Allowables.Caused by Incorrect Use of Valve Weight for HCV-1201 Pipe Stress Calculations.Snubber Will Be Added to Line ML18136A4031980-01-18018 January 1980 Ro:On 800108,while Unit 1 Was Operating at 50% Power,Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded 3 F/Hour Change Rate.While Returning Unit 1 to Svc,Discharge Coolant Temp Increased to 7 F/Hour.No Temp Effects on River ML18136A4591980-01-16016 January 1980 Ro:On 800116,during Power Operation,Boric Acid Flow in One of Two Required Flow Paths to Core Was Blocked for Approx 3-h.Caused by Inadvertent Closing of Discharge Valve.Valve Immediately Opened & Boric Acid Flow Verified ML18136A3371979-12-27027 December 1979 Ro:On 791217,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Temp Rate Change Permitted by Tech Specs.Caused by Removing Waterbox from Svc Too Rapidly.No Adverse Impact on Environ ML19270H7941979-12-14014 December 1979 Followup Suppl to Ler/Ro 79-15.Higher Pipe Stress Code Allowable Should Have Been Used by Teledyne.Pipe Stress on Kubes 1.5 inches-RC-105-1502-01 Not Over Code Allowable ML19257A3431979-12-12012 December 1979 RO 79-157/01T-0:during Review of Seismic Analyses Per IE Bulletin 79-14,nonconformance in Pipe Support Design Was Discovered by S&W.Caused by Incorrect Valve Weights Used in Support Calculations ML19257A3451979-12-12012 December 1979 RO 79-158/01T-0:during Review Required by IE Circular 78-08, S&W Discovered Pressure Differential Switches PDS-HV1228A & B Not Seismically Qualified.Cause Unknown.Problem Being Reviewed ML18136A3471979-12-10010 December 1979 Ro:On 791207,when Radiation Alarm Setpoint Reached in Discharge Line of Air Ejectors,Trip Valves Diverted Air Into Containment.Caused by Improper Initial Design Concept.Mods to Maintain Valve Closed Initiated ML19268C1711979-11-27027 November 1979 Supplements RO 79-141/01T-0:while Reviewing Operation of Secondary Ventilation Sys,Sys Discovered to Operate in Manner Not in Keeping W/Accident Analyses.Cause Unknown. Matter Under Review ML18136A2311979-11-26026 November 1979 Ro:On 791110,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Temp Change Rate of 3 F/H While Unit 1 Was at 100% Power & Unit 2 Was in Cold Shutdown.Caused by Valve Misalignment Permitting Sodium Fluid to Enter Sys ML19268C1741979-11-19019 November 1979 Followup to RO 79-152/01T-0:on 791118,Westinghouse Notified Util of Potential Reduction in Conservatism Re Error Allowances Assumed in Analysis for Power Range Neutron Flux High Negative Rate.Setpoints Will Be Changed ML19268C1701979-11-19019 November 1979 Supplements RO 79-141/1T-0:on 791114,determined,upon Review of Fsar,That Previously Reported Deficiency Re Nonautomatic Restart of Casing Cooling Pumps on Restoration of Onsite Emergency Power Is Not Deficiency 1994-11-03
[Table view] Category:LER)
MONTHYEARML18153B1351994-11-0303 November 1994 Ro:On 941028,total Suspended Solids Concentration in Spoil Discharge Reached 820 Mg/L.Permit Limitations Expressed as Values Exceeding Ambient Levels ML18153B4111993-12-15015 December 1993 Ro:On 931215,discovered Fault in Control Rod Drive Sys, Rendering Control Rod Assemblies in Shutdown Bank a Immovable W/Group 2 at 222 Steps & Group 1 Rods of Control Banks a & C Immovable by Faulted Conditions ML20046C3661993-08-0505 August 1993 Special Rept:On 930629,seven Blockout Type Penetration Fire Barriers & on 930713,six Sleeve Type Penetration Fire Barriers Determined to Be Nonfunctional.Repairs Completed & Fire Barriers Restored to Functional Status ML20044H3651993-06-0101 June 1993 Special Rept:On 930427,EDG Failed to Auto Start During Performance of Main Dam Auxiliary Power Diesel Periodic Test.Corroded Wires & Lugs Appeared to Be Loose.Control Wire Connections Cleaned & Aged Wires Replaced ML18153D1311992-09-15015 September 1992 Update to 920703 Special Rept Re Operational Difficulties W/ Waste Gas Decay Tank Hydrogen Monitors.Operability Intermittent & Reliability Not Yet Achieved.Ts Change to Delete Requirement to Monitor Hydrogen Sent on 920628 ML18153D0561992-07-0303 July 1992 Special Rept:Waste Gas Decay Tank Monitoring Instrumentation Out of Svc for More than 30 Days as Result of Replacement of Pressure Sensors Due to Instrument Drift.Replacement Pumps Received in June 1992.Updated Rept to Be Sent by 920731 ML18153D0221992-06-0303 June 1992 Special Rept:On 920503,quadrant to Average Power Tilt Exceeded 2% for Greater than 24 H.Caused by Loop Inlet Temp Imbalance.Power Range Nuclear Instruments Recalibr ML18153C9071992-02-24024 February 1992 Ro:On 920106,discovered That Portion of Wall Separating Cable Vault & Auxiliary Bldg Was of 4-inch Block Const Instead of Being Designated as Separate Fire Areas.Fire Watches Established Per Station Operating Procedures ML18153C7371991-09-13013 September 1991 Special Rept:On 910815 & 24,quadrant-to-average Power Tilt Exceeded 2% for More than 24 H.Caused by Blown Fuse & Dropped Rod Runback.Cable W/Insulation Damage & Rod Control Cabinet Repaired ML20024H6471991-05-31031 May 1991 Special Rept:On 910227,svc Water MOVs Associated W/ Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers Exceeded Torgue Limits & Stopped in Mid Position While Being Opened During Test.Event Reported on Voluntary Basis to Provide Info to NRC ML18153C5441991-02-15015 February 1991 Special Rept:On 901220,spurious Alarms Received Shortly After Placing ATWS Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry in Svc.From 901222-28,spurious Trouble Alarms Received.On 901231,improper Voltage Ratings Found on Relay Modules ML18153C5071991-01-23023 January 1991 Special Rept:On 901224,quadrant to Average Power Tilt Exceeded 2.0% for Greater than 24 H.Caused by Xenon Transient & Change in Tave Coupled w/pre-existing Core Asymmetry.Isophase Bus Duct Shunts Repaired ML20005E1601989-12-22022 December 1989 Special Rept:On 891218,heat Trace Sys for Kaman Vent Stack a Radiation Monitor RI-VG-179 Declared Inoperable.Sys Removed from Svc & Tech Spec 3.3.3.1 Action Statememt Entered.Sys Will Be Repaired & Returned to Svc by 900130 ML19332G0471989-12-11011 December 1989 Special Rept:On 891202,Kaman Process Vent Radiation Monitor Exceeded Action Statement of Tech Spec 3.3.3.1 Since Monitor Not Returned to Operable Status within 7 Days.On 891125, Monitor Alarmed in Control Room Every 15 to 30 Minutes ML18152B1331988-05-0505 May 1988 Ro:Safety Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident.Continued Operation of Station Based on Continuing Reanalysis of Impact of Steam Generator Tube Uncovery Justified for Listed Reasons ML18150A1631987-06-0909 June 1987 Ro:On 870516,automatic Shutdown on Low Reactor Coolant Flow in One Loop Experienced.Caused by Mechanical Failure of Reactor Coolant Loop Stop Valve.Effects of Event from Core DNB Standpoint Evaluated,Per 870527 Telcon W/Nrc ML20023D2181983-05-10010 May 1983 Ro:On 830509,w/unit at 100% Power,Severe Hydrogen Leak Discovered on Hydrogen inner-cooled Turbine Generator.Unit Rampdown Ordered & Hydrogen Vented to Atmosphere.Emergency Terminated When Pressure Reached Less than 10 Psig ML18139B9881982-08-0505 August 1982 Ro:On 820721,rate of Exchange of Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Reached Max of 12 F/Hour Exceeding Max Rate of Change of 3 F/Hour Per Tech Spec 4.14.A.3.Caused by Loss of Electrical Power to Four of Eight Circulating Water Pumps ML18139B8461982-04-16016 April 1982 Ro:On 820403,average Rate of Change of Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Permitted Rate.Caused by Operator Error.Personnel Reinstructed ML18139B8271982-03-26026 March 1982 Ro:On 820212,w/Unit 1 at 100% Power & Unit 2 at Hot Shutdown,Average Rate of Change of Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Tech Specs.Caused by Failure of Vacuum Priming Sys at River Intake.Sys Repaired ML18139B7241982-02-0505 February 1982 Ro:On 820122,average Rate of Change of Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Throttling of Water Flow Through Condenser Boxes to Preserve Reduced Canal Water Due to Vacuum Priming Pump Failure ML18139B4991981-08-25025 August 1981 Ro:On 810813,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Rate of Change of 3 F Per Hour Permitted by Tech Spec 4.14.A.3.Caused by Sheared Pin on Condenser Inlet Screen.No Damage to River Environ Found During Search ML18139B4971981-08-25025 August 1981 Ro:On 810810,rate of Change of Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Reached Max of 7 F/Hr Exceeding Tech Specs, & Causing Loss of Electrical Svc to 4 of 8 Circulating Water Pumps.Loss of Svc Caused by Ground Fault in Transformer ML18139B3261981-05-13013 May 1981 Ro:On 810428,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Average Rate of Change.Caused by Lack of Svc Water Flow. Event Caused No Detrimental Effect on River Environ ML18139B2871981-05-0101 May 1981 Ro:On 810418,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Average Rate of Change of 3F/hr Per Tech Spec 4.14.A.3. Lack of Svc Water Flow Believed to Be Contributing Factor. Tube Leaks Repaired.River Environ Not Affected ML18139B2501981-04-16016 April 1981 Ro:On 810406,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Average Rate of Change Permitted by Tech Specs.Lack of Svc Water Flow Believed to Be Contributing Factor.Search Conducted to Determine Temp Change Effect on River Environ ML18139B2311981-04-0101 April 1981 Ro:On 810322,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Lack of Svc Water Flow. Investigation Is in Progress ML20009F9751981-03-26026 March 1981 Ro:On 810325,station Personnel Discharged 22,000 Gallons of Condensate Water Over 14-h Period.Samples Taken at Beginning & End of Discharge.Results Listed ML18139A9641981-01-0505 January 1981 Ro:On 801220 at Full Power,Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Rate of Change Per Tech Specs.Cause Not Stated.Temp Decreased When Waterbox Outlet Valves Throttled Due to Vacuum Priming Problems ML18139A8481980-11-19019 November 1980 Ro:On 801102,during Cold Shutdown,Condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Rate of Change of 3 F/Hr.Caused by Lack of Svc Water Flow Through Unit 1.No Detrimental Evidence Found Re River Environ ML19329F8811980-07-11011 July 1980 RO 80-55/O1T-0:during Review of FSAR Safety Analyses for Boron Dilution Accident Potential,Nonconservatism in Cold Shutdown Analysis Determined.Cause Unknown.Accident Analysis Review Initiated ML19329F9701980-06-27027 June 1980 RO-80-029/01T-0:on 800627,pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve PCV-2456 Inadvertently Opened in Mode 3 Following Valve Maint Activities.Corrective Action Will Be Taken Pending Completion of Investigation ML18139A2991980-06-0606 June 1980 Ro:Several Lines in Low Head & High Safety Injection Sys Were Not Analyzed for Effects of Fluid Temp Below 70 F. Review of New Nozzle Loads Showed Load on Pump Exceeded Vendor Allowable Load.Multiphase Program Proposed ML19312E5901980-06-0505 June 1980 RO 80-10/01T-0:on 800605,during Review of ECCS Piping, Loading on Low Head Safety Injection Pump Nozzles Was Discovered to Exceed Design Stress Allowable.Caused by Deficiency in Piping Sys Stress Analysis ML18139A2741980-05-23023 May 1980 Ro:On 800512,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Temp Change Rate of 3 F/H.During Power Escalation W/Only Three Circulating Water Pumps in Operation,Canal Intake Level Dropped & Groin Temp Reached Change Rate of 5.5 F/H ML18139A1731980-04-22022 April 1980 Ro:While Conducting PT 25.12,pump 1-FP-P2 in Fire Protection Sys Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria of 250 Ft at 2500 Gallons Per Minute.Cause Not Determined.Vendor Will Participate in Insp.Local Fire Depts Will Supply Assistance ML19290C6831980-02-0404 February 1980 RO 80-02/01T-0:during Review Required by IE Bulletin 79-14, Stress Discovered Over Design Allowable on Pipe Hangers & Snubbers.Caused by Incorrect Valve Weights Used in Design Calculations.Hangers & Snubbers Will Be Modified ML19270K2641980-01-25025 January 1980 RO-80-19:on 800124,during Equipment Qualification Review for IE Bulletin 79-01,qualification Discrepancy Discovered in Svc Water Radiation Pumps for Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers.Cause Unknown ML19290C6841980-01-21021 January 1980 RO-80-01/01T-0:on 800121,excess Letdown Lines Had Several Pipe Stress Points Above Normal or Upset Allowables.Caused by Incorrect Use of Valve Weight for HCV-1201 Pipe Stress Calculations.Snubber Will Be Added to Line ML18136A4031980-01-18018 January 1980 Ro:On 800108,while Unit 1 Was Operating at 50% Power,Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded 3 F/Hour Change Rate.While Returning Unit 1 to Svc,Discharge Coolant Temp Increased to 7 F/Hour.No Temp Effects on River ML18136A4591980-01-16016 January 1980 Ro:On 800116,during Power Operation,Boric Acid Flow in One of Two Required Flow Paths to Core Was Blocked for Approx 3-h.Caused by Inadvertent Closing of Discharge Valve.Valve Immediately Opened & Boric Acid Flow Verified ML18136A3371979-12-27027 December 1979 Ro:On 791217,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Max Temp Rate Change Permitted by Tech Specs.Caused by Removing Waterbox from Svc Too Rapidly.No Adverse Impact on Environ ML19270H7941979-12-14014 December 1979 Followup Suppl to Ler/Ro 79-15.Higher Pipe Stress Code Allowable Should Have Been Used by Teledyne.Pipe Stress on Kubes 1.5 inches-RC-105-1502-01 Not Over Code Allowable ML19257A3431979-12-12012 December 1979 RO 79-157/01T-0:during Review of Seismic Analyses Per IE Bulletin 79-14,nonconformance in Pipe Support Design Was Discovered by S&W.Caused by Incorrect Valve Weights Used in Support Calculations ML19257A3451979-12-12012 December 1979 RO 79-158/01T-0:during Review Required by IE Circular 78-08, S&W Discovered Pressure Differential Switches PDS-HV1228A & B Not Seismically Qualified.Cause Unknown.Problem Being Reviewed ML18136A3471979-12-10010 December 1979 Ro:On 791207,when Radiation Alarm Setpoint Reached in Discharge Line of Air Ejectors,Trip Valves Diverted Air Into Containment.Caused by Improper Initial Design Concept.Mods to Maintain Valve Closed Initiated ML19268C1711979-11-27027 November 1979 Supplements RO 79-141/01T-0:while Reviewing Operation of Secondary Ventilation Sys,Sys Discovered to Operate in Manner Not in Keeping W/Accident Analyses.Cause Unknown. Matter Under Review ML18136A2311979-11-26026 November 1979 Ro:On 791110,condenser Cooling Water Outlet Temp Exceeded Temp Change Rate of 3 F/H While Unit 1 Was at 100% Power & Unit 2 Was in Cold Shutdown.Caused by Valve Misalignment Permitting Sodium Fluid to Enter Sys ML19268C1741979-11-19019 November 1979 Followup to RO 79-152/01T-0:on 791118,Westinghouse Notified Util of Potential Reduction in Conservatism Re Error Allowances Assumed in Analysis for Power Range Neutron Flux High Negative Rate.Setpoints Will Be Changed ML19268C1701979-11-19019 November 1979 Supplements RO 79-141/1T-0:on 791114,determined,upon Review of Fsar,That Previously Reported Deficiency Re Nonautomatic Restart of Casing Cooling Pumps on Restoration of Onsite Emergency Power Is Not Deficiency 1994-11-03
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217N9281999-10-20020 October 1999 Special Rept:On 991003,PZR PORV Actuation Mitigated RCS low- Temp Overpressure Transient.Caused by a RCP Facilitating Sweeping of Entrained Air Out of RCS Loops.Operating Procedure 2-OP-5.1 Will Be Revised ML20217H3631999-10-14014 October 1999 Rev 0 to COLR for North Anna 2 Cycle 14 Pattern Su ML18152A2811999-10-12012 October 1999 Technical Basis for Elimination of Nozzle Inner Radius Insps (for Nozzles Other than Reactor Vessel),Technical Basis for ASME Section XI Code Case N-619. ML20212J9251999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Relief Request IWE-3 for Second 10-year ISI for Plant ML20217D6851999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML18152B3531999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 991012 Ltr ML20211N2611999-09-0808 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Proposed Irradiation of Fuel Rods Beyond Current Lead Rod Burnup Limit & Clarification of Terminology with Respect to Reconstituted Fuel Assemblies Acceptable ML18152B6651999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.With 990915 Ltr ML20211J2561999-08-31031 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Elimination of Augmented ISI Program for Pressurizer Spray Lines at North Anna Unit 2 ML20211J2421999-08-31031 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Removal of Augmented Insp Program on RCS Bypass Lines from Licensing Basis of North Anna,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E5011999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Naps,Units 1 & 2. with ML18152B4411999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990731,effluent Radiation Monitors Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Degraded Heat Trace Circuits for Monitors Sample Suction Line.Degraded Heat Trace Circuit Was Replaced & Addl Heat Trace Is Being Installed ML18152B4421999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990802,determined That Plant Was Outside of App R Design Basis Due to Fire Barrier Deficiencies. Caused by Original Plant Design Deficiencies.Fire Watches Were Established & Mods Have Been Completed.With 990827 Ltr ML18151A3981999-08-13013 August 1999 SPS Unit 2 ISI Summary Rept for 1999 Refueling Outage. ML20210T0791999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Revised Withdrawal Schedules for North Anna Units 1 & 2 Satisfy Requirements of App H to 10CFR50 & Therefore Acceptable ML18152B3771999-08-13013 August 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990714,TS Violation Due to non-safety Related Fans Effect on CR Boundary Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Cable Spreading Room Doors Were Operned to Reduce Pressure in Rooms ML20210Q9931999-07-31031 July 1999 Rev 1 to COLR for North Anna Power Station,Unit 2 Cycle 13 Pattern Ud ML20210S1411999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for North Anna Power Station.With ML18152B3791999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990811 Ltr ML18152B3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20209E5641999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for North Anna Power Stations,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195E2401999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 2 to COLR for SPS Unit 2 Cycle 16 Pattern Ag ML20195G1901999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for NAPS Units 1 & 2. with ML18152B4341999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990614 Ltr ML18152B4181999-05-18018 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990425,MSSVs Tested Out of Tolerance for as Found Setpoint.Caused by Minor Setpoint Drift.No Immediate Action Required.Deviation Rept Submitted for Each Valve.With 990518 Ltr ML20206L4831999-05-10010 May 1999 SER Accepting Request to Delay Submitting Plant,Unit 1 Class 1 Piping ISI Program for Third Insp Interval Until 010430, to Permit Development of Risk Informed ISI Program for Class 1 Piping ML18152B4161999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2.With 990512 Ltr ML20206Q6671999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML18152B4111999-04-28028 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990331,potential Loss of Charging Pumps Was Noted.Caused by Main CR Fire.Station Deviation Was Issued on 990331.With 990428 Ltr ML20205S0391999-04-21021 April 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief IWE5,per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) & Proposed Alternatives for IWE2,IWE4,IWE6 & IWL2 Authorized Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML18152B6511999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2 ML20205K3041999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML18153A2741999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990301,prematurely Released Fire Watches Resulted in Violation of TS 3.21.B.7.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedure for Opening & Sealing Fire Stops Was Revised on 990212 ML18153A2681999-03-19019 March 1999 LER 98-013-01:on 981122,turbine/reactor Tripped on High Due to Short Circuit in Summator for MSL C Loop Channel III Flow Transmitter.Replaced 1-MS-FT1494 Summator & Module Repair Procedure Revised.With 9903190 Ltr ML20207K5921999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML18152B7331999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990310 Ltr ML20207E1731999-02-18018 February 1999 Informs Commission of Status of Preparations of IAEA Osart Mission to North Anna Nuclear Power Plant Early Next Year ML18152B5421999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990210 Ltr ML18151A3031999-01-29029 January 1999 ISI Summary Rept for 1998 Refueling Outage,Including Form NIS-1, Owners Rept for ISIs & Form NIS-2, Owners Rept for Repairs & Replacements. ML18152B7261999-01-21021 January 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 981222,auxiliary Feedwater Pipe Support Missed Surveillance.Caused by Personnel Error.Station Deviation Rept Was Submitted.Two Supports in Question Received Required Code Insp & Were Found Acceptable ML20199C8781998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for North Anna Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205A0241998-12-31031 December 1998 Summary of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of SEs Implemented at Plant During 1998,per 10CFR50.59(b)(2).With ML18152B6011998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Surry Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With 990115 Ltr ML18152B5781998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 981126,manual Reactor Trip in Response to Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure Occurred.Caused by Dislocation of Retaining Clip in Positioner.Control Room Operators Placed Unit in Safe,Shutdown Condition ML18152B5811998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 981122,turbine/reactor Trip on High SG Level Occurred.Caused by Instrument Failure.Control Room Operators Placed Unit in Safe,Shutdown Condition ML18152B7121998-12-0404 December 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 981105,noted Failure to Deactivate Station Access Badge.Caused by Human Error.Licensee Will Now Deactivate Station Badges Before Clearance Is Revoked & Process for Badge Deactivations Have Been Strengthened ML20198J5561998-12-0303 December 1998 ISI Summary Rept for North Anna Power Station,Unit 1 1998 Refueling Outage Owner Rept for Inservice Insps ML20198H9541998-12-0303 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative for Remainder of Second 10-yr Insp Interval for Plant ML18152B7041998-12-0101 December 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 981102,noted That EDGs Were Concurrently Inoperable.Caused by Required Testing Per TS 3.16.B.1.a.2. Redundant EDG Was Returned to Svc within Two Hour Period, Following Satisfactory Testing.With 981201 Ltr ML18152B7081998-11-30030 November 1998 Rev 0 to COLR for Surry 1 Cycle 16,Pattern Un. 1999-09-08
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e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND,VIRGINIA 23261 June 6, 1980 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Serial No. 510 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NO/JTR:smv Attn: Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief Docket Nos. 50-280 Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 50-281 Division of Licensing 50-338 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 50-339 Washington, D.C. 20555 License Nos. DPR-32 DPR-37 NPF-4 NPF:-7
Dear Mr. Denton:
NORTH .ANNA UNIT 1 MULTIPLE STRUCTURE ARS CONCERN Licensee Event Report LER/RO 80-034/0lT-0 submitted by the Virginia Electric and Power Company informed the NRC that several lines in the low head and high head safety injection systems installed at North Anna Unit 1 had not been analyzed for the effects of fluid temperature below 70°F. The subject lines transport water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to, the Reactor Coolant System cold legs during the injection phase of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) operation. Under certain conditions, these lines would be exposed to temperatures in the 40-50°F range. To verify adequate design of the pipe supports and equipment nozzles/supports in the affected piping sec-tions, the pipe stress analyses were rerun using the revised temperature conditions. Review of the new nozzle loads on the low head safety injection pumps revealed the load on pump 1-SI-P-lB exceeded the pump vendor's allowable load. In order to reduce nozzle loads to within the allowable, it was neces-sary to modify the function of some supports on the affected lines.
During discussions of this problem with the NRC staff on May 30, 1980, the NRC expressed a concern regarding the Amplified Response Spectra (ARS) curves used as a basis of analyses when a piping system is subjected to more than one ARS such as when the piping system traverses multiple building structures and contains piping supports from both structures. The original design basis selection of ARS for application to bounded piping problems was based upon a case by case evaluation process. This evaluation considered the potential sets of response spectra which might be applicable to the piping, the particu-lar geometry and support configuration of the piping itself, and the analyst's knowledge and experience of anticipated or predicted piping responses. This selection, by its nature, involved a comparison of the ARS curves themselves.
Our evaluation, during the past several days, has confirmed that this judgmen-tal selection process was applied on a wide scale, was effective, and produced conservative results when compared with the licensing requirements. We believe 8 0 0 6 1 1* 0 3;). '/
e e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY TO Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director that this was a reasonable and proper design basis for this era plant. Regu-latory guidance in this area was not available until 1975 and there were no FSAR questions or comments on this item following the FSAR submittal of 1973.
Our efforts since May 30 have included a compilation and examination of all pipe stress problems between buildings as well as those pipe stress problems involving piping runs between the containment internal and external struc-tures. Some stress analyses were performed by consultants other than Stone &
Webster (S&W) under contract to S&W. These problems are also part of the examination. Attachment 1 provides a list of the 68 stress problems involved.
In order to determine the effect of using an enveloped ARS curve on the piping systems and supports outside of the containment, several sample stress pro-blems on key safety-related systems were reanalyzed using an enveloped curve.
The problems were representative since at least one problem was reanalyzed for each building combination traversed by a critical system. Additionally, an evaluation was made of other key piping runs outside of containment as well as key piping runs inside of containment with supports on both the containment internal and external structures. This evaluation considered the actual ARS curves used, modes of response, frequencies of systems, and the resulting responses. The results of this evaluation and reanalysis are summarized in Attachment 2. To date, this effort has found no system, piping supports, or nozzles that are not operable.
Following our telephone discussions of June 3, 1980, and acknowledging our obligation to continue our efforts in this area, we propose a multi-phase plan to address NRC concerns. The sequence of events includes detailed engi-neering review of all piping problems subject to potential effect of more than one set of response spectra (Phase I) and calculational evaluation of these problems or of those localized problem areas, where necessary, to demonstrate suitability of design (Phase II).
Phase I The effort designated as Phase I consists of an engineering review and evaluation of all problems identified in Attachment 1 not already so evaluated (Attachment 2), thus completing all piping problems subject to the original expressed concern. This effort will commence immediately.
Piping located both inside and outside of containment will be included.
Additionally, this effort will also include an evaluation of the multiple ARS effect on small bore piping systems. This effort will then provide a comprehensive assessment of the effect of potential enveloping procedures should they be applied to the unit.
The evaluation will consider the original design basis, i.e., design basis code allowables, original support design loads and material allow-ables, vendor equipment allowables, design margin, etc., as a means to determine potential effect of enveloping criteria.
Results of the evaluation will be categorized as follows:
Category A problems consist of those which the evaluation has indicated would not be subject to increased responses beyond the capability of the piping, piping supports and equipment nozzles, and are thus not in doubt
e e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY TO Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director as far as adequacy of the piping or supports is concerned. Problems falling into this category will require no additional effort beyond the documented engineering evaluation activity.
Category B problems will consist of those problems where the engineering evaluation indicates that a determination cannot be made without further, more detailed evaluation and/or analysis which will be done in Phase II.
Phase I can be accomplished in approximately one month. Our anticipated completion date is July 15, 1980.
Phase II The evaluation procedure required for Phase II problems would typically consist of a computer reanalysis of the problem and detailed evaluation of pipe stresses, support loads and equipment nozzles. Support evalua-tions and possible reanalyses of existing designs would be done as well as reevaluation of the resulting equipment loads against existing vendor supplied allowables. Potentially, it may be necessary to submit revised equipment loads to vendors for a determination of acceptability.
Where necessary, the detailed evaluation procedure would be supplemented by additional engineering studies, or evaluations, which would provide justification of the original designs, Such additional studies might include, but not be limitied to, the introduction of Independent Support Methods of ARS (utilizing, for example, the NUPIPE-CDC program) in order to calculate the multi-support effect on a particular problem. In any event, the Phase II effort would justify the existing plant piping de-signs against a potentially imposed enveloping criteria for selecting amplified response spectra on an engineering basis.
At this time, it is difficult to predict the exact number of problems falling into the Phase II effort, but we believe that a minimum of two months would be required for Phase II. Therefore, our target date for completing Phase II is September 15, 1980.
If at any time during the detailed Phase I and II effort, results obtained clearly show that a design of a particular piping system or support cannot be justified against the concept of multiple structure ARS input, the system will be reviewed per Technical Specifications requirements and appropriate action taken, As the result of multiple structure ARS concerns on North Anna 1, we have reviewed the situation with regard to our other operating plants, Surry Units 1 and 2 and North Anna 2.
In the seismic analysis of Category I piping for Surry Units 1 and 2 where the piping is within one building, the ARS of the mass point above the highest elevation of the support point of the piping was used. Where the piping is supported by two separate buildings, it was analyzed for the envelope of the ARS of the appropriate elevations of the two buildings. For the containment
vrn01N1A ELECTRIC AND PowEH CoMPANY To e
Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director building, the internal structure and the containment shell were treated as two separate buildings and the enveloping procedure applied for the purpose of the response spectra analysis of piping.
On North Anna Unit 2, the same approach was used as on North Anna Unit 1. Due to the similarity of the units and the design methods used, the conclusions resulting from the evaluations completed thus far on Unit 1 apply to Unit 2.
If in the detailed Phase I and Phase II effort on Unit 1 discussed above a design of a piping system or support cannot be justified against the concept of multiple structure ARS, the system will be promptly evaluated on Unit 2 in this regard and the Unit 2 Technical Specification will be followed.
Please let us know if you have any questions or comments on the above. As we proceed, we would be happy to discuss our progress on this matter with you at any time. In any event, we plan to submit a final detailed report upon com-pletion of this effort.
Very truly yours,
- Vd-~~~
B. R. Sylvia Manager - Nuclear Operations JTR/smv:C4 Attachments cc: Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing Mr. S. A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II
ATTACHMENT 1 LIST OF MULTI-STRUCTURE PROBLEMS NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 Problem Analysis ARS No. System Fune t:lon Buildings Responsibility Curve Used 101A 101B Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam to Turbine Main Steam from "A" Containment-MSVH-Service Containment-Internal/External S&W S&W Containment Internal e
Generator lOlC Main Steam Hain Steam from "B" Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal Generator 101D Main Steam Hain Steam from "C" Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal Generator 102A Feedwater Feedwater to "A" Steam Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal Generator 102B Feedwater Feedwater to "B" Steam Containment-Internal/External S&H Internal Generator 102C Feedwater Feedwater to "C" Steam Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal Generator l02D Feedwater Fe.edwater to Generators Containment-MSVH-Service S&W Containment 103B Component Cooling Supply to "B" RHR Heat Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal Exchanger 103C Component Cooling Return from "A" RHR Heat Containment-Internal/External S&W External Exchanger l03D Component Cooling Return from "A RCP Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal
ATTACHMENT 1 (Continued)
LIST OF MULTI-STRUCTURE PROBLEMS NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 Problem Analysis ARS No. System Function Buildings Responsibility Curve Used 11 e
103E Component Cooling Re turn from "B RHR Containment"."'Internal/External S&W Internal Heat Exchanger 11 103F Component Cooling Return from C11 RCP Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal 103G Component Cooling
- Supply to "B II RCP Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal 103J Component Cooling Supply to "A" RHR Heat Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal Exchanger 103K Safety Injection Cold Leg Injection Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal 103R Safety Injection Cold Leg Injcccion Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal 103AC 103AE Safety Injection Safety Injection Hot Leg Injection Hot Leg Injection Containment-Internal/External Containment-Internal/External S&W S&W Internal Internal e
103At\.f Component Cooling Supply to "C" RCP Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal 103AN Component Cooling Supply to "A" RCP Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal 103AP Component Cooling Return from "B" RCP Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal 104A Low Head* Safety Pump Discharge to Containment-Safeguards S&W *Containment/
Injection Containment Safeguards
- Used containment horizontal and safeguards vertical
ATTACHMENT 1 (Continued)
LIST OF MULTI-STRUCTURE PROBLEMS NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 Problem Analysis ARS No. System Fune tion Buildings Responsibility Curve Used l04D Recirc. Spray Outside P:ump A Containment-Safeguards S&W Containment. -
Discharge 104F Residual Heat Pump Back. to RWST Containment-Safeguards S&W Containment Removal after an Outage 104G Quench Spray Flow to Spray Header- Containment-Safeguards S&W Containment B Pump 104H Quench Spray Flow to Spray Header- Containment-Safeguards S&W Containment A Pump lOSF Service Water Supply Recirc, Spray Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal Heat Exchanger 105G Service Water Return from Recirc. Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal 105H Service Water
. Spray Heat Exchanger Flow from the Contain- Containment-MSVH S&W Containment e
ment Recirc, Spray Heat Exchanger 105J Service Water Flow to the Containment Containment-MSVH S&W Containment Recirc, Spray Heat Exchanger 107B Safety Injection Low Head to High Head MSVH-Safeguards S&W MSVH Cross Connect
ATTACHMENT 1 (Continued)
LIST OF MULTI-STRUCTURE PROBLEMS NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 Problem Analysis ARS No. System Function Buildings Responsibility Curve Used 107C Quench Spray Pump Discharge to MSVH-Safeguards S&W MSVH Containment-B Pump l07D Quench Spray Pump Discharge to MSVH-Safeguards S&W MSVH Containment-A Pump lllB Safety Injection Low Head to High Head MSVH-Auxiliary S&W Auxiliary Cross Connect A Pump lllC Safety Injection Low Head to'High Head MSVH-Auxiliary S&W MSVH Cross Connect B Pump-RWST Suction 111N Safety Injection Hot Leg Injection Containment-Auxiliary S&W Containment lllQ Safety Injection Discharge of Boron Ir~j ect:i.on Tank Containment-Auxiliary S&W Containment e l llS Safety Injection Hot Leg Injection Containment-Auxiliary S&W Containment 114B .Quench Spray "B II Pump Discharge Containment-Internal/External S&W External to Spray He'ader.
11 ll4D Recirc. Spray D" Heat Exchanger Containment-Internal/External S&W External to Spray Hea'der 114E Quench Spray ,"A" Pump Discharge Containment-Internal/External S&W External to Spray Header
ATTACHMENT 1 (Continued)
LIST OF MULTI-STRUCTURE PROBLEMS NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 Problem Analysis ARS No. System .Function Buildings Responsibility Curve Used 114F Rec ire. Spray "A" Outs.ide Pump to Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal "D" Heat. Exchanger 114G Recirc. Spray "B" Outs.ide Pump to Containment-Internal/External S&W Internal 11 c II Heat Exchanger 114K Recirc. Spray "B" Cooler to Spray Containment-Internal/External S&W External Header 1141 Rec ire. Spray 11 A" Heat Exchanger Containment-Internal/External S&W External to Spray Header 114M Recirc, Spray rrc" Heat Exchanger Containment-Internal/External S&W External to Spray Header 118A Component Cooling Supply to RCP C Containment-Auxiliary S&W Envelope 118B Component Coolint Supply to RCP A and B Containment-J\uxil iary S&W Auxiliary e 118C Component Cooling Supply Header to Containment-Auxiliary S&W Auxiliary Containment 118D Component Cooling Return Header to Containment-Auxiliary S&W Auxiliary Containment 118E Component Cooling Return from RCP A and B Containment-Auxiliary S&W Auxiliary 118F Component Cooling Return*from RCP C Containment-Auxiliary S&W Auxiliary
ATTACHMENT 1 (Continued)
LIST OF MULTI-STRUCTURE PROBLEMS NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 Problem Analysis ARS No. System Function Buildings Responsibility Curve Used e
118G Component Cooling Return from Recirc. Containment-Auxiliary S&W Auxiliary Air Cooling 118H Component Cooling Supply to Recirc. Containment-Auxiliary S&W Auxiliary Air Cooling 118K Component Cooling Main Supply to Unit 2 Containment-Auxiliary S&W Auxiliary Containment 118N Component Cooling Mai.n Return froff1 unit 2 Containment-Auxiliary S&W Auxiliary Containment 121A Component Cooling Supply to Fuel Pool Fuel-Auxiliary S&W Fuel Heat Exchanger 121B Component Cooling Return from Fuel Pool Fuel-Auxiliary S&W Auxiliary
- neat Exchartger 121E Containment Vacuum Line to Air Ejector Containment-Auxiliary S&W Containment Used in Startup SSR-7 Seal Injection Iniection to "A"-RCP Containment-Internal/External Contract Envelope of SA-7223 Interior SSR-7 Seal Injection Injection to "B"-RCP Containment-Internal/External Contract Envelope of SA-7209 Interior SSR-7 Seal Inject ion Inject ion to "C 11 -RCP Containment-Internal/External Contract Envelope of SA-7198 "C" RCP Interior
ATTACHMENT 1 (Continued)
LIST OF MULTI-STRUCTURE PROBLEMS NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 Problem Analysis ARS No. System Fune tion Buildings Responsibility Curve Used SSR-7 SA-7236 Seal lnj ection Manifold to "A", * "B" 11 11 C RCP Containment-Auxiliary Contract Containment e SSR-8 Seal Return Combined return "A"' Containment-Internal/External Contract Envelope of SA-7217 "B II' 11c1i RCP Interior SSR-8 Seal Return Combined return IIAII' Containment-Internal/External Contract Containment SA-7234 IIB'1, "C II RCP SSR-11 Charging Piping upstream of Containment-Internal/External Contract Envelope Regenerative Heat Exchanger SSR-14 Letdown Piping downstream of Containment-Internal/External Contract Envelope Regenerative Heat Exchanger
ATTACHMENT 2 SAMPLE PROBLEMS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT STATUS AS OF JUNE 6, 1980 Problem N*o. System Status 104A Safey Injection One of six in:i.tial sample problems outside the containment.
prohlem with envelope curves.
Reraf' Preliminary review shows all pipe stresses and pipe supports and equipment loads are such that system operability is maintained.
104D Recirculation Spray One of six initial sample problems outside the containment. Reran problem with envelope curves. Preliminary review shows all pipe stresses, pipe supports and equipment are within allowables.
105J/105H Service Water Problem No. lOSJ was one of six initial sample problems outside the containment, Review of system frequencies show that the curve used in analyses envelopes the other possible curve for all system frequencies.
Therefore, no computer re~analysis with an enveloped ARS was required.
The same evaluation results apply to Problem No, lOSH. ~
107B Safety Injection One of six initial sample problems outside the containment, Reran problem with envelope curves. Preliminary review shows all pipe stresses and pipe supports loads are such that system operability is maintained, lllC Safety Injection One of six initial sample problems outside the containment, Reran problem with envelope curves. Preliminary review shows all pipe stresses and pipe supports loads are such that system operability is maintained,
SAMPLE PROBLEMS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT STATUS AS OF JUNE 6, 1980 Problem No. Status lllQ Safety Injection One <?f six initial sample problems outside the containment, Reran problem with envelope curves. Preliminary review shows all pipe s t r -
and pipe supports are within allowable. ~
e
ATTACHMENT 2 (Continued)
EVALUATION RESULTS - INSIDE CONTAINMENT PROBLEMS STATUS AS OF JUNE 6, 1980 Problem No. System Status 101B Main Steam In each of the three cases, no piping frequencies fall within t h ! '
lOlC portion of the curve subject to the Hz peak effect of the external 101D structure. Two system fundamental modes exist in the area of 6.5 Hz, but these can be clearly and distinctly attributed to response of the steam generator. These steam generator modes cannot be excited by the external struc.ture,. and the effect of these modes in the vicinity of the containment pen~tration is negligible.
102A Feedwater Detailed review indicates the presence of similar system generator 102B modes as in the main steam case, which cannot be excited by the 102C external structure.* There is a single mode in the area of 9 Hz which falls into the range of possible external structure excitation. A detailed review of this mode's potential contribution indicates that predicted responses due to a postulated envelope situation would be minimal, perhaps on the order of a one to five percent increased iiA seismic response. ...,
103K Safety Injection The system frequencies were reviewed and found to be of values such that the curve used envelopes the other possible curve for the fre-quencies in question.
105G Service Water The system fundamental frequency is greater than 10 Hz. Therefore, the curve used envelopes the other possibl~ curve.
ATTACHMENT 2 (Continued)
EVALUATION RESULTS - INSIDE CONTAINMENT PROBLEMS STATUS AS OF JUNE 6, 1980 Problem No. Status 114B Quench Spray Several modes could be potentially affected by the interior structure peak but the modal responses were in areas of the pipe system tha"A could only be excited by the external structure. ~
ll4D Recirc. Spray The system frequencies were reviewed and found to be of values such that the curve used envelopes the other possible curve for the fre-quencies in question.
114E Quench Spray A review of the modes of the problem indicated that only 1 mode occurred with significant increased response potential for the curve not used, Local load increases are expected but function will be maintained. The vertical curve used envelopes the other possible curve, Relatively low stresses exist in the area of modal response, 114K Recirc, Spray The system frequencies were reviewed and found to be of values sucJ;ja.
that the curve used envelopes the other possible curve for the freJIJIIII' quencies in question, 1141 Recirc. Spray The system frequencies were reviewed and found to be of values such that the curve used envelopes the other possible curve for the fre-quencies in questions, 114M Rec ire, Spray The system frequencies were reviewed and found to be of values such that the. curve used envelopes the other possible curve for the fre-quencies in question,
ATTACHMENT 2 (Continued)
EVALUATION RESULTS - LINES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT STATUS AS OF JUNE 6, 1980 Problem No. System Status 101A Main Steam The three main steam leads are treated individually for seismic anal~
sis and as a joint problem for thermal expansion and for combined loads analysis. The leads are very similar but not exactly identified in geometry and in location of pipe supports. Reactor containment external
- ARS were used in the analysis. Review of one of the three leads shows that 2 modes fall into areas subject to increased accele-ration due to MSVH peaks and loads will therefore increase. Prelimi-nary review of the potential increases indicates that the system will maintain operability. Review of the two remaining leads is continuing.
102D Feedwater The three feedwater leads outside of containment are treated indepen-dent for seismic analysis and as a join~ problem for thermal expansion for combined loads analysis, The leads are very similar but not exactly identical in geometry and in location of pipe supports. Reac-tor containment external ARS were used in the analysis. Prel imina7A review indicates that the load increases_ are expected but the syste!91!'
is complex and the effect of such increases cannot be reasonably determined. Priority effort is underway to complete this more detailed review.
I 104F Residual Heat Removal The containment building external structure ARS was used for analysis.
The responses of the modes which are not enveloped by that ARS are not expected to increase sufficiently so - as to significantly increase total response. Changes in support loads*and stresses are expected to be minimal,
ATTACHMENT 2 (Continued)
EVALUATION RESULTS - LINES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT STATUS AS OF JUNE 6, 1980 Problem No. System Status 104G Quench Spray The containment external structure ARS was used for the analysis.
Although some modal response could increase as a result of the appli~
cation of enveloped ARS, the low level of response in the presen,w analysis indicates that total support loading would not increase significantly and that stress levels would remain acceptable.
104H Quench Spray The ARS used for the analysis is for containment external structure.
This problem was rerun, using an ARS envelope of the containment and Safeguard building. As a result, the maximum stress increased mini-mally while the increase in resultant support loads was well within acceptable margins, 107C Quench Spray All supports except the last anchor on the Safeguard wall are connected to the Main Steam Valve House, The present analysis uses the Main Steam Valve House ARS, but review of potential changes due to use of 11n.envl;!loped Cl.!rve i.nd:l,c;,;it~s tha,t expe.<;ted changes a,re minimal, e
l07D Quench Spray All supports except the last anchor on the Safeguard wall are connected to the Main Steam Valve House. The present anlaysis uses the Main Steam Valve House ARS, but review of potential changes due to use of an enveloped curve indicates that expected changes are minimal,
ATTACHMENT 2 (Continued)
EVALUATION RESULTS - LINES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT STATUS AS OF JUNE 6, 1980 Problem No. Status lllB Safety Injection Both the Valve House and the Auxiliary building ARS were separatel, used for analysis. The results from the more severe Valve House curve were used for all supports except for two located at the opposite end of the system away from the Valve House anchor. Since only the anchor is located in the Valve House, the system response is controlled by the Auxiliary building. While further evaluation of a possible curve enveloping will be required, it is expected that supports would be within the functional range and stresses will be within faulted limits-.
111N Safety Injection The system is .bounded on one end by an anchor attached to the Reactor Containment external structure and on the other end by a containment penetrRtion. Since there are no other supports and since the contain-ment external structure ARS was used in the analysis, no enveloping of ARS is required, e
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