ML17059B009

NMP Unit 2 Safety Evaluation Summary Rept.

ML17059B009
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	11/29/1995
From:	NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
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ML17059B010	List: ML17059B009 ML18041A034
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NUDOCS 9512060038
Download: ML17059B009 (134)

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EnclosuretoNhP2L1596NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONSUMMARYREPORTDocketNo.50-410LicenseNo.NPF-699512060038'951129PDRADOCK05000410,,K,,,PDR lCI SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage1of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-046Mod.PN2Y87MX063Figure10.1-5bCondensate(CND)AnAdditionofCycloneSeparatortoCondensateBoosterPumpSealWaterInjectionLinesDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationinstalledtwonewcycloneseparatorsonthesealinjectionwaterlinesofeachofthecondensateboosterpumps.Also,anewflowrestrictionorificewasinstalledupstreamofeachcycloneseparatorandassociatedvalves.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationisinaccordancewithANSIB31.1-1973.ThisnewequipmentinterfacesonlywiththeCNDsystemandhasnoimpacttoanyothersystems.Thismodificationwillensurecondensateboosterpumpreliabilityandpreventcostlypumpdowntimeformaintenanceonmechanicalseals.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage2of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-075Rev.7&8Mod.PN2Y87MX038Figures9.5-8Sh1&2,9.5-10Sh1,9.5-24,9.5-29System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:Communications(COJ,COP,COS)AdditionofCommunicationEquipmentModificationstotheGaitronicscommunicationssystemwerepreviouslyreportedwithUSARrevisionsdatedOctober30,1991,October29,1992,andOctober29,1993,underSafetyEvaluation89-075,Revisions3,4,5,6and7./Additionalmodificationstoadd/improvespeakers,jacks,andassociatedequipmenttotheGaitronicscommunicationssystemhavebeenmadeasevaluatedunderSafetyEvaluation89-075,Revisions7and8.SafetyEvaluationSummary:i/Thismodificationwilladd/improvecommunicationcapabilitiestomeettherequirementsinUSARSection9.5.2.Thesechangeswillimprovecommunicationcapabilitiesrequiredforsurveillancetesting,personneltorespondtoalarmsinareaswithhighnoiselevels,andaddcommunicationequipmentinareasthathavebeenidentifiedasneedingcommunicationcapabilities.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage3of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:91-003Rev.7,8,Ec9CalculationES-269N/ASecondaryContainmentSecondaryContainmentDrawdownAnalysisRevisions7,8,and9ofthesafetyevaluationevaluatedplantoperationfortheremainderofthefourthfuelcycle.ThefollowingparameterswerechangedforthehTrequirementsforthefourthcycleascomparedwiththepreviouscycle.1.Sentfuelhealoads:Aspentfuelpoolheatloadof4.49x10'tu/hrcorrespondingto50daysafterreactorshutdown(DARS)wasusedtodefinethehTrequirementsforthefourthfuelcycle.iInordertoreducetheETrequirementsand,hence,heatingofthe':buildingduringthesummermonths,alowerspentheatloadof2.31x10Btu/hrcorrespondingto180DARSwasusedtodefinethehTrequirementsfortheremainderofthefourthrefuelingcycle.2.Unicoolererformance:Basedontheperformancetestsperformedduringthe1992-93timeperiod,a2%degradationofunitcoolers2HVR"UC413A&.Bandanaveragedegradationof30%(sameaspreviouscycle)fortheremainingdrawdownrelatedunitcoolerswasusedfordefiningthehTrequirementsfortheentirefourthoperatingcycle.Thisprovidessufficientmargintoaccountforanyfurtherdegradationthatmayoccuroverthenextoperatingcycle.3.Piinhealoadreduons:ToreducethehTrequirements,pipingheatloadshavebeenreducedassumingaminimumtemperatureof80'F(Curve2)and90'F(Curves3and4)inthebuilding.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage4of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:DescriptionofChange:(cont'd.)91-003Rev.7,8,L9(cont'd.)4.Foradditionalflexibility,drawdownanalysisisdoneassumingemergencycorecoolingsystem,residualheatremovalheatexchangersandreactorcoreisolationcoolingcubiclesinsecondarycontainmentaremaintainedat8'Fabovetheservicewatertemperature.Thesecondarycontainmentin-leakagetestperformedonOctober27,1993,indicatedthatin-leakageislessthan90kofthevalueusedinthedrawdownanalysis.Thisprovidesamarginofabout10%(sameasthepreviouscycle)foranypotentialdegradationofin-leakageoverthenextcycle.NOTE:ThesechangesweresupersededbySafetyEvaluation94-049andassociatedLicenseAmendmentNo.56.SafetyEvaluationSummary:IThedrawdownanalysis(CalculationES-269andsubsequentdispositions)providesfourcurvesthatdefineATrequirementsfortheentirefourthfuelcycle.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthattheuseofnew6Tcurvesdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage5of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:91-068Mod.PN2Y89MX080Figures9.3-12h,9.3-12k,10.1-8bTurbineBuildingMiscellaneousDrainsReboilerSteamLineDrainValveInterlockTheturbineplantmiscellaneousdrainsystemremovescondensatebuildupfromthesteamsupplylineseitherthroughthedrainvalves2DTM-AOV128and2DTM-AOV144orthroughbypasslinesaroundthesedrainvalvesthroughrestrictingorificessizedtopasscondensate.Theoriginaldesignrequiredthedrainvalvestoopenwhenevertheauxiliarysteamsupplyvalves2ASS-STV112and/or2ASS-STV143close,orwheneverturbinefirst-stagepressureindicatedinsufficientextractionsteamwasavailable.Theinterlocksbetweentheauxiliarysteamsupplyvalvesandtheircorrespondingdrainvalvehavebeenremoved.Thismodificationallowsoperatorcontrolofthedrainvalvesirrespectiveofthesteamsupplytothecleansteamreboilersand/orthebuildingheatingintermediateheatexchangerswithintheboundariesallowedbytheturbinefirst-stagepressuresensor.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thedrainvalvesarenonsafetyrelatedandarenotrequiredforsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Thismodificationprovidesadditionalincreasedoperatorcontrolwhichwillresultinanenhancementtoplantefficiencythatwillnotimpactthesafeoperationorshutdowncapabilitiesoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage6of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:91-080Mod.PN2Y88MX1938.3-10Low-VoltageMolded-CaseCircuitBreakersforPowerDistributionTitleofChange:ReplacementofObsoleteITEMolded-CaseCircuitBreakersDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationreplacedsixdistributionpanelsintheirentiretyandvariousobsoletemolded-casecircuitbreakersinmotorcontrolcentersandotherdistributionpanels.Thesebreakersprovidecircuitprotectionforthelow-voltagepowerdistributionatUnit2.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUSAR.Replacementbreakersareproperlycoordinatedandadequatelysizedtotheirapplicationinaccordancewiththestandardratingsforthemolded-casecircuitbreakers.Replacementofobsoletebreakersandpanelswillprecludesystemoutages,LCOs,andplantoutageduetounavailablesparesshouldanyofthesecomponentsfailin-serviceorsurveillancetesting.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage7of'131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:91-089SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0140-90Figures1'1.2-1d,11.2-1grLiquidRadwasteManagement(LWS)RetireNon-functionalConductivityMonitorsThissimpledesignchangeretiredinplaceconductivityelementsandconductivityindicatingtransmittersfromthefloordraincollectorsubsystemandtheregenerantwastesubsystem.Theseinstrumentsprovidedisplayinputonlyandhavenologicfunction.Sparingtheconductivitymonitoringequipmenteliminatesrepetitivemaintenanceandcalibration.Grabsamplesareusedfordeterminingeffluentconductivityinthoseareaswhereelectronicmonitoringisdisabled.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheLWSsystemprovidesdiverseoptionsfortheprocessingofwastedependingonthequalityofthewaste.However,innocasecanthewastebypass.afiltrationorevaporationprocess.Theconductivityofthewasteisusedtoaidintheselectionofaprocessmethod.Althoughgrabsampleswillhavetobeusedinlieuofelectronicmonitoring,nosacrificetotheintegrityoifunctionoftheLWSwilloccurfromtheproposedchange.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage8of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:92-006Rev.1,2,465Mod.PN2Y89MX0774A-2,5.2-21,5.2-21a;Tables3B-3Sh2,6.2-56Sh7,9.4-1Sh4;Figures1.2-7Sh2,1.2-11Sh3,54-2b,5.4-16a,9.3-5g,12.3-7,12.3%0System:TideofChange:CrackArrestVerificationInstallationoftheCrackArrestVerificationSystemandRWCUExtensionTie-lnDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationimplementedthefollowingchanges:Installationofthecrackarrestverificationsystem(CAVS)includedacracklengthmonitor,waterchemistrystation,electrochemicalpotentialmonitorandtubing.ThesuctionsideoftheCAVSwasconnectedtothereactorrecirculationsystem(RCS)sampleline,downstreamfromtheoutboardisolationvalve,2RCSSOV105,beyondtheClass2lineclassification(i.e.,connectionwillbemadewherethelineisdesignatedasClass4).ThereturnlineoftheCAVSwasconnectedtothereactorwatercleanup(RWCU)extensiontie-inwhichisdownstreamfromoutboardisolationvalve2WCS"MOV112.2.TheRWCUextensiontie-inbeginsatline2-WCS-008-88-3,whichisdownstreamofoutboardcontainmentisolationvalve2WCS"MOV1'12intheRWCUvalvecubiclelocatedonelevation240',secondarycontainment.Existingvalves2WCS-V45and2WCS-V46werereplacedwith3/4-inchpipe.Thetestconnection,whichisusedduringtheleakratetestingofvalve2WCS"MOV112,wasmaintainedbyaddingathreadedcapandtwonewvalves,2WCS-V431and2WCS-V432.TheRWCUextensiontie-inalsoincludedthe3/4-inchpiperun,includingoneisolationvalve,2WCS-V390,andacheckvalve,2WCS-V392,whichareinsidetheRWCUvalvecubicle,apenetration(i.e.,W-7512-C)throughthecubiclewall,andanisolationvalve,2WCS-V391,outsidethecubicle,whichwereaddedviaTemporaryModification90-054andarenowpermanentperthismodification.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage9of'131SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:92-006Rev.l,2,4&5(cont'd.)TheCAVSisnotasafety-relatedsystemnordoesitperformanysafety-relatedfunction,anditsadditiontotheUnit2designdoesnotaffectthesafetyandreliabilityofUnit2.Thesystem'sfunctionistocollectdatatoprovideanindicationoftheperformanceofplantmaterialsintheboilingwaterreactorenvironment.TheClass3sectionofRWCUextensiontie-inisconsideredQandtheClass4sectionoftheRWCUextensiontie-inisnonsafetyrelated.Bothofthesesectionsareproperlydesignedandwillnotaffectthesafeoperationorsafeshutdowncapabilityoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage10of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:VSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:92-033Rev.2ProcedureN2-OSP-RHS-R@009N/AResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)ProcedureN2-OSP-RHS-R5009ThissafetyevaluationevaluatedchangestoprocedureN2-OSP-RHS-RQ009,whichallowsthetestingofthepressureisolationvalvesintheRHSsystemwhichisolatetheRHSheatexchangerfromthereactorcorecoolinginjectionsystem(ICS).ThestepsoftheproceduredelineatethemethodologyfortestingthesysteminordertocomplywithTechnicalSpecifications4.0.5and4.4.3.2.2.TestingofthevalvesintheRHSsystemwasconductedduringrefueloutages.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThisprocedureandmethodoftestingwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdownconditionbecausetheICSfunctionsarenotrequiredinoperationalconditions4or5andtheRHSsystemsafetyfunctionsareunaffected.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage11of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-004TemporaryMod.93-008N/A4.16-kVand600-VNormalAcDistributionAlternateFeedtoTransformer2NJS-X1FThe600-Vunitsubdistributiontransformer2NJS-X1F(feedertounitsub2NJS-US5)wastemporarilypoweredfrom4.16-kVstubbus2NNS-SWG015insteadofitsnormalsource,2NNS-SWG014,whichwasoutofserviceforrepairofacrackedbushingincubicle14-6.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thistemporarymodificationdoesnotaffectordealwithanysafety-relatedequipmentintheplant.AnEngineeringreviewoftheUSAR,TechnicalSpecificationsandrelateddocumentsindicatesthatthistemporarymodificationisacceptablewithproceduralcontrolsandlimitations.Withthischangein:place,thenormalacdistributionwillcontinueperformingitsintendedfunction.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage12of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-008SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0008-93Figure10.1-6cFeedwater(FWP)SealWaterInjectionStrainerDrainValveandPressureGageDescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeaddedadifferentialpressureindicatoranddrainvalvestothesealinjectionduplexstrainerstofacilitatedrainageforperiodicmaintenanceofthestrainers.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThischangeisspecifictotheFWPsystem.Nosignificanteffectsonanyotherplantsystemsand/orinterlocksarebeingintroduced.Theadditionofthedifferentialpressuregageanddrainvalveswillimprovetheperformanceofmaintenanceonthesubjectstrainers.Therefore,thesystemmaintainability/availabilityisimprovedduetotheeaseinperiodicchangeoutofthestrainerbaskets.Thesystemstructuralintegritywillnotbesignificantlyaffectedbythischangebecausetheweightofthevalvesandthedifferentialpressuregagearenegligiblerelativetothepipingsizeandschedule.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage13of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-011TemporaryMod.93-015N/AAuxiliaryBoilerDefeatSealCoolingLowFlowTripforAuxiliaryBoilerRecirculationPumpsDescriptionofChange:Thistemporarymodificationjumperedtheauxiliaryboilerrecirculationpumpsealcoolingwaterflowswitchesinordertoallowthepumpstorunwhensealwaterflowisthrottledback.Throttlingthesealwaterisdonetoreducethefrequencyofrequiredboilerblowdowns.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Althoughthistemporarychangemayresultindamagetothepumpseals,thereisnonuclearsafetysignificancetotheproposedchangesincetheauxiliaryboilersarenotrequiredforthesafeshutdownofthereactor.Theriskassociatedwithoperatingtheboilerwiththelowflowtripdefeatedisacceptablesinceplantimpactwillbelimitedtoboileroperability.Implementationoftheproposedchangedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage14of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-017Rev.2SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0375-91N/AStandbyLiquidControl(SLS)RRCSLogicChangetoPrecludeSLSInoperabilityDescriptionofChange:Thismodification'changedthestoragetanklevelzerologicintheredundantreactivitycontrolsystem(RRCS)panelsfromdeenergize-to-triptoenergize-to-trip.Previously,ifaRRCSpanelwastakenoutofservice,therespectiveSLSloopwouldbecomeinoperablebecauseSLSidentifiedtheRRCSout-.of-servicesignalasaSLStanklevelzero.TheSLStanklevelzerointerlockdisablestheSLSpumpstoprotectthemfromdamageduetorunningthemdry.Previously,temporaryjumpersneededtobeinstallediftheRRCSpanelsweretakenoutofservicetomaintainSLSoperability.Thischangeeliminatestheneedforthesejumpersandprovidesannunciationinthemaincontrolroomtoalerttheoperatorsifthestoragetanklevelzeroalaimisactivated.ThismodificationwasincorporatedintoSLSandRRCSbychangingthelogicinRRCSpanels2CEC"P001and2CEC"P002fromdeenergize-to-triptoenergize-to-trip.Thiswasdonebyminorpanelwiringchangestotheacloaddriverprintedcircuitboardinwhichitwillnolongerinvertthealarmsignal.Becauseofthislogicchange,newprogrammablereadonlymemoryintegratedcircuitswereinstalledintheselftestcircuitryofRRCS.IVlinorwi'ringchangestothestoragetanklevelzerointerlockcircuitryweremadeinpanels2CEC"PNL618and2CEC"PNL629toaccommodatethislogicchangeintheRRCSpanelstoenergize-to-trip.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationwillkeepSLSoperableregardlessofthestatusoftheRRCSpanelsandwithouttheneedfortemporaryjumpers.Thismodificationhasno.impactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.NuclearsafetyisenhancedinthattemporaryjumpersnowdonotneedtobeinstalledwhenaRRCSpanelisoutofservicetokeepSLSoperable.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage15of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-018Rev.0,1,2Bc3Mod.PN2Y91MX0545.4~,5.4&5;Figure5.4-16fReactorWaterCleanup(WCS)RWCUF/DImprovementsThismodificationchangedthereactorwatercleanup(RWCU)filterdemineralizer(F/D)systemasfollows:2.ReplacedseptainF/DvesselsA,B,C,Dwithanewdesign.Revisedresinfeedsystemtoincludereplacementofthemeteringfeedpumpswithaneductorarrangement.SafetyEvaluationSummary:/ThechangestotheRWCUF/Dsystemwillenhancethesystembymakingiteasierfortheoperatortocontrolandprovidemoreoperatoroptionstherebyincreasingflexibility,andimproveprecoatingoftheF/Dvessels.Ultimately,.thesystemruncycleswillincreaseandbetterutilizationofprecoatmaterialwillbeachieved.Theproposedchangesarenonsafetyrelatedandwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.ReactorwaterchemistrylimitsoutlinedinRegulatoryGuide1.56Rev.1,Table1,andspecifiedinTechnicalSpecificationsTable3.4.4-1,willbemaintained.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage16of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:4System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-020SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0049-93Figure9.4-10eRadwasteBuildingVentilationRadwasteControlRoomNoiseImprovementSafetyEvaluation93-020waspreviouslyreportedinOctober1994whentheUnit2USARwasrevisedtoreflectreplacementofthe7.5hpreturn/exhaustairfanswithnew3.0hpfans.ThisrevisiontotheUSARrevisestheflowdiagramtoshowareducedflowof10,700cfm.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThisdesignchangewillimproveenvironmentalandworkingconditionsintheRadwasteControlRoombyreducingnoiselevels.Theproposedchangedoesnotaffectorinvolveanysafety-relatedequipment.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage17of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-027Rev.2N/A9.1-25,9.1-44Fuel-PreparationMachineFull-Up-StopSettingsDescriptionofChange:Thissafetyevaluationaddresseschangingthepositionofthewestfuelpreparationmachine(FPM)full-up-stops.Thischangewillreducethetime/exposurespentduringthetransferofnewfueltothespentfuelpool.Additionally,thiswillreducethepotentialforpersonalcontaminationandplantcontamination.Thewest(2FNR"TL1B)FPMwillbechangedsothatitsnormalconfigurationwillbe:~Full-up-stopspermanentlyremoved~Motivepowerremoved(air-supplylinedisconnectedandblocked)~TobeactivatedandusedonlywithnewnonirradiatedfuelunderadministrativecontrolsandthendeactivatedaftercompletionofnonirradiatedfuelhandlingThewest(2FNR"TL1B)FPMwillhaveitsfull-up-stopsremovedsuchthatanewfuelassemblyloadedintoitscarriagewillhaveitsbailhandleabovethespentfuelpoolwaterlevel.PositivestoppingoftheFPlVIcarriageisperformedbytheendstopsonrollerchainmechanism.Afterthecraneisdisconnectedfromthenewfuelassembly,whichissittingintheFPM,theassemblywillbetransferredbytherefuelingplatformtoitstemporarystoragelocationinthespentfuelstoragerack.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thefunctionofthefull-up-stopsistoprovideenoughwatershieldingwhenusingaFPMtohandleirradiatedfuelassemblies.WhenaFPMisusedtotransferanonirradiatedfuelassemblyintothespentfuelpool,aspecificfull-uplimitisnotrequiredbecauseitsspecificfunction(i.e.,providewatershielding)isnotrequired.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage18of131.SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-027Rev.2(cont'd.)Therefore,thissafetyevaluationisintendedtoallowthewest(2FNR."TLIB)FPIVItobeconfiguredtosupporttheapplicationappropriatefornewfuelreceipt/transferactivitiesanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage19of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:93-037SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0251-927A.1-5ReactorBuildingHeatingandVentilation(HVR),ContainmentIsolation(ISC),MainSteam(MSS),ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS),ReactorProtection(RPS),StandbyLiquidControl(SLC),ServiceWater(SWP)TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:ReplaceP5BMDRRelaysThissimpledesignchangereplacedexistingPotterandBrumfield(PUB)ModelMDRrelaysthathave'beenusedasanisolationdevicetoisolatenonsafety-relatedcircuitsfromsafety-relatedcircuits,ortoisolateredundantsafety-relatedcircuits.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AThischangeenhancesthefunctionalityofPUBMDRrelaysusedasanis'olationdeviceinthesystemslistedabovebecausethenewP8cBMDRrelaysaredesignedtoprecludethefailuremodesoftheserelays.Replacementrelayswillbequalifiedtothesamerequirementsastheoldrelays.Thenewrelayswillbeofthesameformandfitsuchthattheycanreplacetheoldrelaysasoneforonereplacementwithoutrequiringanymajormodificationsduringtheinstallation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage20of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-044SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0102-91NIASystem:TitleofChange:NeutronMonitoringSystem(NIVIS)APRMUpscaleAlarmandRodBlock(SDCSC2-0102-91)DescriptionofChange:Thischangereplacedtheneutronfluxinputsignaltotheaveragepowerrangemonitor(APRIVl)upscalealarmandrodblockcircuitwiththefilteredsimulatedthermalpowersignal.Thepurposewastofilteroutandreducethenoiselevelsoftheneutronfluxsignal,whichinturnallowsUnit2operationalentryintotheExtendedLoadLineLimitAnalysis(ELLLA)regionofthepower'flowmapalongwithareductioninnuisanceupscalealarmsandrodwithdrawalblocks.,SafetyEvaluationSummary:/ThismodificationallowsoperationalentryintotheELLLAregionofthepowerflowmapwhichwasprohibitedbynuisancerodblocks.Thismodificationwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage21of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:93-055SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0342-929.5%,9A.3%6;Figure9.5-1bFireProtectionWater(FPW)TitleofChange:Install'CurbBoxesfor2FPW-V1060and2FPW-V1061DescriptionofChange:Thischangeinstalledcurbboxes(valveboxes)fortwoundergroundsectionalisolationvalvesinthefiremain.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thesubjectvalveswereaddedduringtheconstructionofthesitecafeteriabuilding.Duringfinalconstructionactivities,thevalveswereinadvertentlycoveredpriortotheinstallationofcurbboxesaswasintended.Thischangedoesnotaffectthepipingandwillallowforuseofthetwovalvesaskey-operated,sectionalisolationvalvesinaccordancewith10CFR50AppendixR,SectionIII.B.,Normalconstructionactivitiesinvolvingexcavationandfillarerequiredforthisinstallation.Whilethischangewilldisruptnormaltrafficflowintheareaofinstallation,noimpacttosystemorsafeplantoperationwillresult,andtheabilitytosafelyshutdowntheplantintheeventofafireisnotimpacted.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation'SummaryReportPage22of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-056Rev.1,2L3SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0328-92-Figures1.2-1,2.4-1N/AConstructaSpareTransformerFacilityThesparetransformerfacilitywasconstructedsouthwestoftheUnit2345-kVswitchyard.ThisfacilitywillbeusedforthestorageoftheadditionalsparetransformerforUnit2.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theconstructionofthesparetransformerfacilitydoesnotimpactthepertinentlicensingissuesthatareassociatedwithhydrologicalengineering;i.e.,flooding,localintenseprecipitation(probablemaximumprecipitation),andtheimpactontheairintakeaccidentX/0(Chi/0),theatmosphericdispersioncoefficient./Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage23of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-058Rev.2CalculationH21C-0279.1-39System:TitleofChange:FHSRemovalofReactorCavityShieldPlugsA,B,CandDat40%orLessReactorPowerDescriptionofChange:ThissafetyevaluationevaluatedtheremovalofreactorcavityshieldplugsA,B,CandDat40percentorlessreactorpower.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheremovalofthereactorcavityshieldplugsA,B,CandDat40percentorlessreactorpowerdoesnotaffectthestructuralintegrityoftheshieldplugbarrier.Theradiologicaleffectsoftheproposedchangehavebeencalculatedanddeterminedtobenegligibleforradiologicalconsequencestotherefuelingoperatorsduringnormalrefuelingoperations.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage24of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-060TemporaryMod.93-038N/AReactorBuildingVentilation(HVR)TemporaryCoolingforRWCUPumpRoomsThismodificationinstalledatemporaryairconditioningunitoutsidethereactorwatercleanup(RWCU)pumproomstoprovideadditionalcoolingtohelpalleviatehightemperatureconditionsintherooms.Theairconditioningunitispoweredfromaweldingreceptaclefedfromdistributionpanel2WPS-PNL200./SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationdoesnotaffectanysafety-relatedequipment,system,buildingorstructurerequiredtoperformitssafetyfunctionduringnormaloperationorfollowingaloss-of-coolantaccident.Ananalysisofcalculationsindicatesthataslightincreaseinthegeneralareatemperatureisinsignificantenoughtocauseanyeffectontheperformanceortheresponsetimeofasafety-relatedequipmentorsystemtoperformitsintendedfunction.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage25of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-065TemporaryMod.93-043N/ASystem:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:VentilationChilledWater(HVN)TemporaryRemovalof2HVN-TC17CThethermocouplewellpipeconnectionforthethermocouplebulbfromtransmitter2HVN-TC17Cwasleaking.Thethermowellconnectionwastemporarilyremovedandreplacedwithanisolationvalveandpipecomponentsuntilpermanentreplacementandmaintenancewasperformed.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thistemporarymodificationwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdowncondition.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage26of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Descriptionof-Change:93-075Rev.0h1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0014-938.3-72;Figure8.3-10Safety-Related125-VdcBatterySystemBatteryChargerOutputBifurcationThissimpledesignchangefacilitatesperiodictestingoftheDivisionIandIIbatterychargers,asrequiredbyTechnicalSpecificationsSection4.8.2.1,withminimalimpacttoplantoperations.Thissimpledesignchangerelocatedthebatterychargerelectricalconnectionstoseparatecubicleswithintheirassociatedswitchgear.Thisbifurcationwasdoneutilizingtheexistingelectricalpowercablingbetweenthebatterychargersandthe125-Vdcswitchgear,andreterminatingthecablingtoindividualcubicleloadstabswithintheswitchgear.Onlyonechargerwasconnectedtothe125-Vdcswitchgearbusatatime.Thiswasaccomplishedbyusingabreaker.alternatelybetweenthebreakerchargerswitchgearcubiclesorinstallingabreakerinbothofthebatterychargerswitchgearbreakercubicles.Intheeventthe125-Vdcswitchgearbreakersareinstalledforbothchargers(ofthesameDivision),oneofthebreakersshallbeplacedinA/C"Disconnect"positionandlockedoutwhiletheotherbreakerisclosed.Althoughtherewillbeanadditionalswitchgearcubicle/breakerinterfaceforbatterychargerconnectionstotheswitchgear,alarmsandoff-normalstatusdisplayswillbemaintainedatthoselocationswhichcurrentlyprovidesuchindications.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissimpledesignchangeenhancesthetestabilityofthebatterychargersbyeliminatingtheneedforliftingleadstoperformthesurveillancetesting.Thisdesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnot'nvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage27of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-081Rev.0,1,25.3SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0022-934.6-14;Figures4.6-6c,9.3-9a,9.3-9bSystem:ControlRodDrive(RDS),ReactorBuildingEquipmentDrain(DER),ResidualHeat(RHS),ReactorBuildingVentilation(HVR),ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(ICS)TitleofChange:EliminationofSteamEmissionfromtheReactorBuildingEquipmentDrainsandRDSScramDischargeVolumeCollectionTankInstallationDescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeinvolvedthefollowingchanges:1.Isolatedthehotpressurizeddrainlinesfromthecoolgravitydrains.2.AddedapressurereliefdeviceineachoftheReactorBuildingdrainloopstopreventoverpressurizationofthedrainheaderintheeventthatthedraincoolerinletvalvesareinadvertentlyclosed.3.ReroutedtheRDSscramdischargeheaderventlinetotheHVRsystemvia2DER-TK2B.Thisbypassesdraincooler2DER-E2Bandeliminatesapossibleblockageoftheventwhichwouldinhibitthescramdischargevolume(SDV)drainflow.4.SeparatedtheRDSSDVdrainlinefromtheRHSandICSpressurizedsteam-condensingheader,andreroutedthedraintoanewventedcollectiontank.SDVwaterenteringthenewcollectiontankpost-scramiscooledbymixingwiththeexistingwaterinthetank.Thenewtankthendrains,viaanoverflowline,intothegravitydrainheadertotheequipmentdraintank,2DER-TK2A.Thehot,pressurizeddrainlineswithinthe"A"loop(i.e.,ICS,RHS,andSDVdrains)havebeenseparatedfromthecoolgravitydrains,solvingtheALARAconcern.The"B"loop,hotpressurizeddrainsfromRHSandthemain SafetyEvaluation'ummaryReportPage28of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:DescriptionofChange:(cont'd.)93-081Rev.0,1,2&3(cont'd.)steamsystemwereseparatedfromtheDERsystem,theRDSventwasrerouted,.andthepressurereliefdeviceswereinstalledduringRefuelOutage4.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Allworkassociatedwiththischangewillbeperformedinthesecondarycontainmentelevations175'-0"and196'-0",inaccordancewithapprovedsiteWorkControlandRadiationProtectionprocedures.Theconstructibilityaspectsofthischangehavebeenreviewed,andappropriateworksequencinginstructionsincludedwithintheapplicableWorkOrders.Theuseofconstructionaids,i.e.,tankleveltygontube,pipebladder,catchcontainments,flexiblehose,etc.,tofacilitateinstallationofpermanentpipinghavebeenreviewedandfoundadequateforsystempressureretentionandstructuralintegrity.Temporaryremovalofpipespoolsisrequired;replacementbacktotheoriginaldesign,asrequired,willbecontrolledwithintheworkorderpackage.TemporarydiversionofReactorBuildingequipmentdraineffluenttotheReactorBuildingfloordrainsystemhasbeenapprovedandwillbemonitoredbytheRadwasteDepartment.iBasedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage29of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-097SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0078-93Tables9.3-1,11.5-2Sh2;Figures9.3-5c,10.1-9eSystem:TitleofChange:ProcessSamplingDeletionofProcessSamplePointsforURCEffluentsDescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangedeletedprocesssamplepointsforthecondensatedemineralizersystem(CND)attheultrasonicresincleaner(URC)effluent,theURCresineffluent,andtheURCresinreceivertankeffluent.These,processsamplelinesandassociatedvalvesarenonsafetyrelated.SafetyEvaluationSummary:EachoftheaboveprocesssamplepointsbeginsatarootvalveintheCNDsystemandproceedsvia1/4"tubingtosamplesinkSAS4.The1/4"tubingwasremoved(priortoissuanceoftheplant.OperatingLicense)bymodificationPN2Y86lVIX044inordertoreplaceitwith1/2"tubingtoalleviatepluggingofthesmallerdiametertubing.Themodificationwassubsequentlycanceledandclosedoutbeforeinstallingthe1/2"tubing.TheStandardReviewPlandescribessamplepointsforperformancemonitoringattheinletandoutletofthecondensatepolishingsystemandsamplepointsforradiologicalanalysisofURCwasteliquideffluentandbyresincapacityanalysisatpanelslocatedbetweenthedemineralizerandtheURCprocess.SamplepointsareprovidedforthecommoninfluentandcommoneffluentoftheCNDsystem.Inaddition,ChemistrymonitorsURCperformancebyconductivityanalysisattheresinmixandholdtankeffluentandbyresincapacityanalysisatpanelslocatedbetweenthedemineralizersandtheURCprocess.ThewastewaterfromtheURCissenttothelowconductivitywastetank,alongwithotherliquideffluentfromtheCNDsystem.Thedischargefromthelowconductivitywastetankisprovidedwithasamplepointbeforebeingsenttoeithertheanionregenerationtankorliquidradwaste.Therefore,asamplepointexistsforradiologicalanalysisofcommonCNDwasteeffluent,includingURCwastewater, SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage30of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-097(cont'd.)beforedischargefromthelowconductivitywastetank.Inaddition,thesamplerootvalvesstillremainsothattemporaryconnectionscouldbemadetomonitortheURCprocess.Therefore,eliminationoftheURCeffluent,URCresineffluentandtheURCresinreceivertankeffluentsamplepointsdoesnotviolateanydesignbasesorplantrequirements.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage31of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitfeofChange:93-113Unit1SimpleDesignChangeSC1-0173-91Table2.3&aWeatherStationReplacementof30'evelDewpointMonitoringSystematthelVlainIVleteorologicalTowerDescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangereplacedthe30'eveldewpointmonitoringsystematthemainmeteorologicaltower.AGeneralEasternModel'E1'onitorwitha1211HMPsensorand175'finterconnectingcablewereprocuredforthischange.Thedewpointtemperaturemeasurementismadewithadirect-measuringsensorutilizingaPeltier-cooledmirror,automaticallyheldatthedewpointtemperaturebyaphoto-sensing,condensate-detecting,opticalsystemincorporatingasolidstateLEDlightsourceanddirectandbiasphotodetectors.Themirrortemperature,ifabovefreezing,measuresthetruedewpointtemperatureand,ifbelow,measuresthefrostpointtemperature.Thetemperatureismeasuredbyanembeddedlinearthermistorsensor.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thefrequencyoftherepairsontheoldmodeldewpointhascausedtheneedtoreplacethemodel.Thenewmodeldewpointsystemisasaccurateastheoldsystemandmorereliable.Thelocationofthenewdewpointsensorisindependentofthe30-ft.levelboomandwasdeterminedtobelocatedonthesoutheastlegofthetower.Thislocationwaschosenbecauseofexistingboltholesinthetowersteel.Therelocationwillnotaffecttheaccuracyorvalidityofthedataprovided.Theholesarelocatedatthesamelevelastheboom.Puttingthedewpointsensoratthesamelevelastheboominstrumentsisrequiredforconsistencyininstrumentreadings.Maintainingthesurgeprotectionfactorisrequiredtoprotectthenewcontroller/monitor.Therefore,newsurgeprotectionboardswereprocuredandwillbeinstalledinthemonitoringsystemcircuit.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage32of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-129N/AFigures1.2-1,2.4-1,9A.3-1N/AConstructionoftheNewEngineeringServicesBuildingDescriptionofChange:TheEngineeringServicesBuildinghasbeenconstructedoutsidetheprotectedarea,northoftheP-BuildingwheretheR-BuildingandNorthOlympicBuildingstand.TheEngineeringServicesBuildingisatwo-story,nonsafety-relatedstructurewithaslabongrade.ThisfacilityprovidesadditionalspacerequirementsfordepartmentsrelocatedfromtheSalinaMeadowsfacility.Thisbuildinghasatotalareaof,approximately45,000squarefeetandprovidesofficespaceforabout250personnel.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatconstructionoftheEngineeringServicesBuildingdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage33of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-001SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0255-91Figure9.2-5eMakeupWaterTreatingSystem(WTS)TitleofChange:EcolochemFilteredandPurgeWaterConnectionsDescriptionofChange:TocontinuetheuseoftheEcolochemportabledemineralizedtrailer,permanentfilteredandpurgewaterconnectionswereaddedtotheexistingWTSsystempiping.TemporaryModification91-093wasemployedprovidingaconnectionforthepurgewaterfromtheEcolochemtothemakeupwasteneutralizingtank(2WTS-TK1).Thischangemadetheconnectionpermanentasinstalled.Inaddition,anewconnectionwasinstalledfromthewatertreatingfilterdrainline,2-WTS-002-134-4,tosupplytheEcolochemtrailer.MakeupwaterfromtheEcolochemdemineralizedtraileriscontrolledinaccordancewithprocedureN2-OP-15.ISafetyEvaluationSummary:AnengineeringreviewofthechangefoundthatinstallingadditionalconnectionstofacilitatetheEcolochemdemineralizedwaterprocesswillimprovethesystemperformancewithoutcausinganysafetyoroperabilityissues.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage34of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-006DER2-91Q-171811A-1through11A-6;Table11.4ASh1&2System:TitleofChange:SolidRadwasteAbandonmentIn-PlaceofAsphaltSolidificationEquipmentDescriptionofChange:Thischangeabandonedin-placeselectedportionsoftheoriginalasphalt-basedsolidradwasteprocessingsystem.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theoriginalplantdesignforradwastesolidification(i.e.,removaloffreewaterfrommiscellaneouswetwastes)utilizedtheWerner&Pfleiderer(WasteChem)asphaltvolumereductionsystemaddressedbyTopicalReportsWPC-VRS-001andWPC-VRS-002.Duetovariousdeficiencies,processproblems,andoffsitedisposalfacilityburialcriteriaassociatedwiththeuseofthissystem,theorigirialasphalt-basedsolidificationsystemwas"abandonedin-place."Theabandonmentin-placeoftheasphalt-basedsolidificationsystemwillhaveminimalimpactonradwasteprocessing,sincearadwastedewateringprocessprovidinganacceptablemethodofvolumereductionutilizingmethodologyandequipmentaddressedinChemNuclearSystems,Inc.,TopicalReportRDS-25506-01-P/NP(reviewedandapprovedbytheNRC)willbeutilized.Abandonmentin-placewasaccomplishedinsuchamannertoassureproperpressureboundaryconfinementofailprocessapplications.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage35of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:-ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-009Rev.0,I,253SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0015-94104-33,10.4-34;Figure10.1-6cFeedwater(FWP)TitleofChange:InstallThrottleValvesinFeedPumpsSealWaterInjectionLinesDescriptionofChange:Thischangeinstalledthrottlevalvesinfeedpumpssealwaterinjectionlines.Theadditionofthethrottlevalvesallowseachsealwaterinboardandoutboardinjectionlinetobeequallybalanced,providinggreaterreliabilityofthefeedpumpseals.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Anengineeringreviewofthischangehasbeenperformed.Thisreview,whichincludedtheeffectsofthechangeonthesystem'soperability,reliabilitymaintainability,structuralintegrity,andsysteminteractions,hasfoundthattheimplementationofthischangewillenhancesystemreliability/maintainabilitywithoutcausinganysignificantsafetyoroperabilityissues.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage36of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-012N/ATable9A.3-15Sh3;Figures1.2-1,2.4-1,9.5-1b,9A.3-1System:TitleofChange:N/ANewUnit2MaintenanceBuildingDescriptionofChange:TheUnit2MaintenanceBuildinghasbeenconstructedinsidetheprotectedarea,southoftheUnit2AccessControlBuildingandnorthofthenewOperationsBuilding.Thisbuildingconsolidatesmaintenancefacilitiesintoanewsinglestructurewhichislocatedclosertoexistingplantaccessways,enhancingtheMaintenanceDepartment'soverallefficiency.Thebuildingisatwo-story,nonsafety-relatedstructurewithapproximately42,000squarefeetoffloorarea.ThestructurehasaslabongradeandprovidesshopareasforElectrical,Mechanical,andInstrumentationandControlsMaintenanceGroups.Additionalareasforlockerrooms,materialissue,andofficespa'cesforMaintenanceManagementandSupportpersonnelareprovided.Also,aportionofthebuildingprovideshighbayvehicularaccessequippedwithoverheadcranes.ThenewMaintenanceBuildingandAccessControlBuildingareconnected,andanelevated'walkwaybetweentheMaintenanceBuildingandtheOperationsBuildinghasbeenconstructed.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThepertinentsafetyissuesidentifiedinthisSafetyEvaluationarefloodingandtheimpactontheControlRoomfreshairintakeradiologicalatmosphericdispersioncoefficient.TheMaintenanceBuildinglocationprovidesadequateseparationfromsafety-relatedsystemsandstructurestoprecludeanyadverseimpactfromanycompressedgasesorchemicalsstoredinthebuilding.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage37of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-013SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0035-94Figures10.1-9a,10.1-9b,10.1-9c,10.4-9Sh7,8,9System:TitleofChange:CondensateDemineraiizer(CND)CondensateDemineralizerFlowRecordersUpgradeDescriptionofChange:Thischangereplacedfivecondensatedemineralizerflowrecordersandtheresinstrainerdifferentialpressuremetersassociatedwitheachcondensatedemineralizerwithnewrecordersthataredesignedforimprovedreliability.Thischangealsoreplacedasixthrecorderwhichmonitorsthetotaldifferentialpressureacrossallofthecondensatedemineralizers,andanadditionalmeterwhichmonitorsresinrecyclestrainerdifferentialpressurewithanewrecorderthatperformsthesecombinedfunctions.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Uponimplementationofthissimpledesignchange,newrecorderswillhavebeeninstalledthatprovideimprovedreliabilityofmonitoringofflowthroughthecondensatedemineralizersaswellasadequatemonitoringofthestrainersdifferentialpressure.TheCNDsystemisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperationofreactorsafetyfeatures.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage38of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:94-017SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0004-91USARAffectedPages:Tables6.2-56Sh7,9A.3-15Sh5;Figures7.3-10Sh1,9.5-1gSystem:FireProtectionMonitoring(FPM),FireProtectionWater(FPW)TitleofChange:RemoveAbandonedFPWPipeSystemsfromFPMMonitoringDescriptionofChange:'TwoabandonedwaterdelugepipingsystemsoriginallydesignedtosuppressfiresatthereactorrecirculationpumpswereremovedfromtheFPM>system.This,changeremovednuisancespuriousalarms,troublesignals,horns,annunciations,andcomputerinputsfromtwopipingsystemswhichwereneverfunctionalandnotrequired.Thischangealsodisconnectedcablingtospareddevicesintheplant,removedfusesandrelaysinthelocal,firecontrolpanel,andincludedtheremovalofdeactivatedswitchesandindicationlightsintheMainControlRoom.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Sincethetwoaffectedwaterdelugepipingsystemshavebeeninactiveandcappedpriortoplantoperation,theassociatedcomponentsperformnousefulfunction.Theprimarycontainmentdoesnotrequirefireprotectionsystemsduringnormaloperationsinceitisinerted./Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage39of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:94-018TemporaryMod.94-020N/AHigh-PressureCoreSpray(CSH)JumperControlSignalfor2CSH"MOV118Atemporaryjumperwasinstalledinthecontrolcircuitofthehigh-pressurecorespray(HPCS)suppressionpoolsuctionvalve,2CSH"MOV118,tosimulateaclosedvalvesignalfromHPCStestreturnvalve2CSH"MOV112.Thisprovidedapermissivesignalfor2CSH"MOV118toopeneventhoughvalve2CSH"MOV112wasdeenergizedand/orbeingstrokedopen(notclosed).With,'2CSH"MOV118capableofopening,theHPCSwascapableoftransferringwaterfromthesuppressionpooltothereactorvesselandmettherequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3/4.5.1.c.TheHPCSwasdeclaredoperablewithout2CSH"MOV112functioning,whichallowedittoreceivemaintenanceandbeVOTEStestedpriortotherefuelingoutage.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheHPCSsystemcanbeconsideredoperablesincethisjumperinstallationwillallowittoperformitsdesignedfunctionswithoutanyimpactfrom2CSH"MOV112onthesystem'sflowrates,pressures,responsetimes,flowpaths,orsetpoints.Thejumperwillnotaffectanyothercomponentsorsystems.Therepairsandtestingof2CSH"MOV112canbeperformedsafelypriortotherefuelingoutage.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation'ummaryReportPage40of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocument=-No.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-020SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0405-91Figure10.1-5bCondensate(CNM)CondensateBoosterPumpMechanicalSealCavityDrainsDescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeaddeddrainlinestotheexistinginboardandoutboardmechanicalsealcavityconnections.Inaddition,theexistingdrainfromtheskidwasremovedandtheconnectioncapped.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Alldrainlines,whetherneworexisting,arenonsafetyrelatedandwillnotimpactthesafeoperationoftheplant.ThechangedoesnotaffecttheoperationoftheCNMsystem,TurbineBuildingequipmentandfloordrainsystems(DET,DFT),nordoesitaffectthesafeshutdownoftheplant.Bothsystemsaredesignedtohandleinfluentfromoilyornonoilywastefromradioactiveandpotentiallyradioactivesources.Bothsystemspumpwastefromtheirrespectivecollectiontanksorsumpstoradwasteforprocessing.ThecondensatepumpswillcontinuetofunctionasdesignedbecausethischangeinvolvesroutingwaterthatmaypassthroughthemechanicalsealstotheDFTsystemwithoutimpactingpumpperformancecharacteristics.Theexistingskiddrainlines2-CNM-150-330-4,2CNM-150-3314and2CNM-150-3324willberemovedandashortnippleandcapwillbeinstalled.Anywateroroilthatmaycollectontheskidmaybedrainedthroughthecappedconnectionorwipedaway.Shouldawaterleakdeveloparoundthecondensateboosterpumpsandsaidflowwassufficienttooverflowthepumpskidcontainment,theDFTsystemwouldcollecttheaddedvolume.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage41of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:94-021Rev.0Bc1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0031-94Table3.9A-12Sh12;Figure9.2-1fServiceWater(SWP)IST-SWPCheckValveInternalsRemovalThissimpledesignchangeremovedtheinternalsfromcheckvalves2SWP"V800A,BandV802A,B.Removaloftheinternalswillprecludesedimentationwithinthevalueandprecludetestfailuresduringin-servicetesting.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytokeeptheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.DeletionofthecheckvalveinternalswillnotpreventtheSWPsystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction,norwillthesystempressureintegritybedegradedduringanymodeofsystemorplantoperation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage42of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-023SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0174-93Table7.6-6NeutronMonitoringSystem(NMS)ReviseAPRMFlow-BiasedRodBlockSetpointSDCSC2-0174-93DescriptionofChange:Thisdesignchangerevisedtheaveragepowerrangemonitor(APRM)flow-biasedsimulatedthermalpower(STP)scramsetpointfrom0.66(W-hW)+51%to0.58(W-hW)+59%(theAPRMflow-biasedSTPupscalescramsetpointwasanalyzedunderTechnicalSpecificationAmendmentNo.51),andtheAPRMflow-biasedrodblocksetpointfrom0.66(W-hW)+42%to0.58(W-hW)+50%.ThischangeallowsUnit2tobetterutilizetheextendedloadlinelimitanalysis(ELLLA)regionofthepower/flowmap.SafetyEvaluationSummary:/ThischangeallowsOperationstoentertheELLLAregionofthepower/flowmap.OperationintheELLLAregionisrestrictedbecauseatlowerflowstheAPRMflow-biasedscramandtheAPRMflow-biasedrodblockencroachontheELLLAregion.Thischangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage43of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-024Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0361-91Tables1.8-1Sh52,7.5-2Sh1Ea8RegulatoryGuide1.97MonitoringandDisplayInstrumentationTitleofChange:Identification/MarkingofRegulatoryGuide1.97DisplayInstrumentationonPanelsintheControlRoomDescriptionofChange:ThischangeaddedtothepanelsintheMainControlRoomaredplastictrimplatearoundthecomponentidentificationlabeloftheRegulatoryGuide(RG)1.97Category1andCategory2displaydevicesforTypeA,B,andCvariables.ThischangewillassisttheControlRoomoperatorsandsupervisorsinquicklylocatingthemostimportantRG1.97displayinstruments(i.e.,thoseexpectedtobethemostusefulformonitoring,assessing,andrespondingtopostaccidentconditions).ThischangeimplementsandconformstoarecommendationspecifiedinRG1.97withthefollowingexceptions:(1)thepositionindicatinglightsfortheprimarycontainmentisolationvalveswerenotmarkedwiththeredtrimplate,and(2)themethodusedtoidentifytheRG1.97displaydevicesisthesameasthatusedtoidentifyseveralotherimportantsystemcontrolswitchesanddisplayinstruments.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangedoesnotmodifyinanywaytheoperationorperformanceofanyplantsystemsorstructures,nordoesitrequirethatanychangesbemadetoanyinstructionscurrentlyspecifiedinanyplantoperating,maintenance,orcalibrationprocedures.Thischangedoesnotrequirechangingthecurrentlyspecifiedsafetyclassificationorqualificationcriteriaofanysystemcomponent,andhasnoadverseimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Also,thestructuralintegrityofthereactorcoolantsystempressureboundary,theprimarycontainmentpressureboundary,andthesecondarycontainmentpressureboundaryisinnowayaffectedbytheinstallationoftheproposedchange.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage44of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)94-024Rev.1(cont'd.)ThetwonoteddeviationsfromfullconformancewiththesubjectrecommendationsofRG1.97haveeachbeenevaluated,andbothhavebeen.determinedtobeacceptableonaplant-specificbasis.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage45of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-026SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0134-93Figure9.2-8bDomesticWater(DWS)DomesticHotWaterRecirculationPumpAbandonmentDescriptionofChange:Thischangeabandonedinplacedomesticwatersystemrecirculationpump2DWS-P1andassociatedmotorandelectricalequipment.Theassociatedannunciatorinthecontrolroomwasalsoremoved.Continuingproblemsconcerningpumpleakageandmotoroverloadingwereresulting'.inannunciatorindicationinthecontrolroom.Pumpabandonmentincludednecessarychangestoassociatedequipment.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheDWSsystemisnotsafetyrelated,isnotconnectedtoanypotentiallyradioactiveprocesssystems,andisnonseismicexceptintheControlBuilding,whereappropriatedesignmeasureshavebeenimplemented.Systemwaterpressureisprovidedbythenormalsourceofdomesticwater,OswegoCityWater,andisnotaffectedbytherecirculationpump.Byabandoningthepump/motorandassociatedequipmentin-place,anunnecessaryannunciatorwillberemovedandtheneedforpumprepair/maintenance,whichhasproventobequiteextensiveinthepast,willbeeliminatedwhilenotadverselyaffectingsystemoperation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation'ummaryReportPage46of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-027DER2-94-01579.3-20TurbinePlantSampling(SST),ReactorPiantSampling(SSR)TitleofChange:ToleranceChangeforIsobathTemperatureinSamplePanelsDescriptionofChange:Thetemperatureoftheconstantisothermalbathsismaintainedat77Fa1Thetighttoleranceforthetemperaturerequiresconstantchangeinrefrigerationmodeandthisresultsinexcessivewearandtearontherefrigerationunits.Thischangeprovidedforawidertemperaturerange(77Fs5)tobemaintainedatthesamplesinkconstantbaths,therebyreducingtheconstantswitchingofrefrigerationmodesandthewearandtearontheunits.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theproposedchangewouldreducethewearandtearontherefrigerationunitsbyexpandingthetoleranceoftheallowableconstantbathtemperatureandnotsignificantlyaffecttheaccuracyoftheconductivitymeasuringinstrumentation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage47of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-028SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0020-949.5-84;Figures9.5-52a,9.5-52cAuxiliaryBoilerSystems(ABD,ABF,and'BH)TitleofChange:AdditionofAuxiliaryBoilerChemicalInjectionPipingandBoilerFeedandBlowdownSampleConnectionsDescriptionofChange:Thischangeprovidedameansofaddingsodiumsulfitedirectlytotheauxiliaryboilerswhentheboilersareinahotstandbycondition.Inaddition,waterchemistrysampleconnectionswereaddedtofacilitateboilerfeedwaterandblowdownanalysis.Allsamplepipinghasbeenroutedtoanewsamplesinkforconvenience.Restrictingorifice2ABF-RO128boredimensionhasbeendecreasedtoeliminateexcessivesteamlossfromtheauxiliaryboilerdeaerator.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangeupgradestheauxiliaryboilersystemtoimprovesystemreliabilityanditscapabilitytosupportplantoperations.Theauxiliaryboilersystemandtheimpactedboilersubsystemsareclassifiedasnonsafetyrelated.Thesechangeswillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplantsincethehardwarechangeshavebeendesignedinaccordancewiththeoriginalplantdesignbasis,andhavenoeffectonthefunctionalcapabilityoftheauxiliaryboilersystems.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage48of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-029TemporaryMod.94-022N/AMakeupWaterStorage(MWS),ChilledWaterVentilation(HVN)TitleofChange:TemporaryMakeupWatertotheHVNSystemDescriptionofChange:Thistemporarychangeprovidedanalternatesourceofmakeupwatertothechilledwaterventilationsystem.ThenewmakeupwaterisfromtheMWSsysteminlieuofthewatertreatment(WTS)system.TheWTSsystemisexperiencingareductionofflowduetopipingdegradationandisnotabletosupplytherequireddemand.MWSwaterwillberoutedfrom/toexistingconnectionsviatemporaryhoseandassociatedcomponents.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThealternatemakeupfromtheMWSsystemwillbesufficientthroughahoseofequalsizeasaminimum.Thenewsourceofmakeupwaterisdemineralizedwaterinlieuoffilteredwater,waterqualityisenhanced,andsupplywillbeadequatetomeetdemand.Allhosesandassociatedcomponentsshallberatedfortheirintendedserviceconditionsandwillbeadequatelysecured.The60gphofwaterfromtheMWSsystemwillnotaffectthemakeupwatersystemcapacitytofeedwatertoitsoriginallyintendedsystems.TheuseofMWSwaterinlieuoftheexistingWTSwaterwillnotcauseanyadversesafetyoroperabilityissues.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage49of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-032NUREG-01239A.3-31,9A.3-53,9A.3-56,9A.3-58N/AChangestotheUFSAR/USARActionsRequiredforInoperableFireProtectionSystemsDescriptionofChange:ThischangemodifiedtheUFSAR/USARactionstatementsforinoperablefirebarriers,water-basedextinguishingsystems,Halonsystemsandcarbondioxidesystems.Inaddition,thedefinitionoffirewatchpatrolwaschangedintheUnit1UFSARtoreflecttheactionstatementchanges.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thesafetyevaluationanalyzesthecurrentactionstatementsandaugmentstheoptionsforcompensatorymeasureswithadditionaloptionstoaccountforareaswherefiredetectionsystemsareinstalledandoperable.Further,theexpandeduseofengineeringevaluationforimpairments,whichiscurrentlyrecognizedwithintheUnit2USAR,isexpandedforapplicationwithintheUnit1andUnit2actionstatements.SuchimpairmentprovisionsallowgreaterflexibilityindealingwithsystemimpairmentswithoutadverselyaffectingtheFireProtectionProgram..Theexistingactionstatementoptionsalsoremainaspotentialcompensatorymeasures.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage50of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:VSARAffectedPages:94-033SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0164-939C.8-5;Appendix9CTables3-1,34,4-1Sh2;Appendix9CFigure5-1-System:'itleofChange:MainSteam(MSS)ReplaceSRVCrane2MHR-CRN66DescriptionofChange:Thefollowingchangeswereimplementedbythissimpledesignchange:1.Retiredcrane2MHR-CRN66andprovidedareplacementcrane.Thisreplacementcraneisanelectricaltrolleyandchainhoist,andisdesignated*ascrane2IVlHR-CRN66X.2.Reworkedandrepairedelectricaltrolleyandbus-barforreplacementcrane2MHR-CRN66X.3.Providedanadditionalweld(nonstructural)forSRVcrane2IVIHR-CRN65Xmonorailspliceatazimuth240toimprovecranetrolleyperformance.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Replacementcrane2MHR-CRN66XisbeingsuppliednonseismicandwillberemovedfromtheprimarycontainmentduringplantoperationstomeetcommitmentsmadeundertheGuidelinesfortheControlofHeavyLoads(NUREG-0612)andUSARAppendix9CatUnit2.Theloadpathhasnotchangedandhasbeenpreviouslyevaluatedsuchthatthefailureofthecraneduringaseismiceventwillnotaffectplantsafety.Replacementcrane2MHR-CRN66XisconsideredandincludedintheControlofHeavyLoadsAnalysis.'hereplacementcraneandinstallationconditionsmeetrequirementsforseismicevaluationofnonsafety-relatedcomponentsinsafety-relatedareas(insideprimarycontainment)anddoesnotaffectthesafetyandreliabilityofUnit2.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage51of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-034Rev.1N/A8.2-1,8.2-28;Figures8.1-1,8.2-1,8.2-1a,8.2-1b,8.2-9System:345-kVTransmissionOutput,115-kVOffsitePowerSourcesTitleofChange:Independence/Scriba345-kVTransmissionLineDescriptionofChange:Thischangeaddedasixth345-kVtransmissionlinetoScribaStationthroughtwonew345-kVcircuitbreakers.Thetwonew345-kVcircuitbreakersarethesameelectricalratingastheothereight345-kVcircuitbreakers.Constructionworkincludedtheelectricalinterconnectionofoneofthetwo345-kVcircuitbreakersintheSpringof1994whileUnit1andUnit2wererunning.Inadditiontotheenergizationofthisbreaker,relaytestingwasalsoperformed.TheelectricalinterconnectionofthesecondbreakerandassociatedrelaytestingtookplaceduringtheUnit2refueloutageintheSpringof1995.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThissafetyevaluationaddressestheimpactsonUnit1andUnit2resultingfromScribaSubstationconstructionactivities.Italsoanalyzestheeffectonthetransmissionsystemduetoincreasedgeneration.Worst-casescenarioswereidentifiedandfoundtobeboundedbypreviousaccidentsandtransientsanalyzedinboththeUnit1andUnit2UFSARs.AProbabilisticRiskAssessmentwasperformedtoquantifytherisksassociatedwiththelineoutages,constructionactivitiesandoperationofthenewtransmissionlines.Theresultsshowtherelativechangeincoredamagefrequencyissmallandisconsideredacceptable.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation'ummaryReportPage52of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-035Rev.2NIA8.1-3,8.2-2,8.2-7,8.2-24;Figures8.2-1,8.2-1b,8.2&a,8.2-6dthrough8.2-6uSystem:TitleofChange:115-kVOffsitePowerSourceAlternate115-kVTransmissionSupply"NMP2DescriptionofChange:ThismodificationallowstheUnit2115-kVtransmissionline,No.5orNo.6,tobeenergizedfromthe115-kVtransmissionsysteminsteadofScribaSubstation.Either115-kVtransmissionlineNo.5orlineNo.6wouldbeenergizedfromNIVIPC's115-kVtransmissionsystem'slineNo.2.EithertransmissionlinewillbeconnectedtotheScribaStation115-kVmainbus(Cfor5line,Dfor6line)andwillprovide115-kVoffsitesupplythroughexisting115-kVfeederbreakersR50orR60.NochangestoprotectivetripschemesatUnit2wouldberequired.Sinceexisting115-kVcircuitbreakerswouldstillbeenergized,relayprotective,,tripsignalsatUnit2willbefunctional.ISafetyEvaluationSummary:ThissafetyevaluationaddressestheimpactsonUnit1andUnit2resultingfromprovidinganelectricaloffsitepowersupplytoUnit2fromthe115-kVtransmissionsystem.ltalsoanalyzestheeffectonthetransmissionsystemduetotheincreaseinelectricalload.Worst-casescenarioswereidentifiedandfoundtobeboundedbypreviousaccidentsandtransientsanalyzedinboththeUnit1andUnit2USARs.Theanalysisperformedshowsthatthe115-kVtransmissionlineNo.2canbeusedasanalternatesupplytothe115-kVNo.5orNo.6lineunderworst-caseloadingconditionsaslongascertainadministrativecontrolsaremaintained.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage53of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-036SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0040-94Table10.2-1Sh2;Figure10.2-3Sh1Electro-HydraulicControl(EHC)KeylockSwitchAdditiontotheTurbineBackupOverspeedTestCircuitDescriptionofChange:Thischangeaddedakeylockswitchtotheturbinebackupoverspeedtestcircuit.Redundantswitchcontactswerenecessarytopreventtheoriginalpotentiallyfaultytestpushbuttonfromtrippingtheturbineduringnormaltesting.Thenewswitch,inthetestposition,disablesthetriprelayandservesasapermissiveforthetest.Initiationofthetestcontinuestobecontrolledbythepushbuttononlyafterthenewswitchisplacedinthetestposition.Inthenormalpositionthenewswitchhasnoimpactonthebackupoverspeedtripcircuit.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theturbinegenerator,designedtominimizethepossibilityofafailurethatcouldproducehigh-energymissiles,isnotrequiredtotripfornuclearsteamsupplyupsetsbutdoessotoprotectitselffromconditionsthatmaycausedamage.Theturbinegeneratorisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperationofreactorsafetyfeatures.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage54of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-039SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0113-94Figure10.1-9cCondensateDemineralizer(CND)CondensateDemineralizerSystemImprovements:ReplacementofValve2CND-PV188andRemovalof2CND-RV278DescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangereplacedvalve2CND-PV188,a1-1/2",3000flangedTuflineplugvalve,actuatorandpositionerwithaFisherControls2",3000flangedglobecontrolvalvewithactuatorandpositioner.TheTuflineplugvalvewasnotadequateforpressurecontrolandcontrollederratically.Valve'2CND-RV278wasremovedfromthesystem.Thevalveleaked,adverselyimpactingsystemperformance.ValveRV278isredundantandsystemoverpressurizationwasprovidedby2CND-RV352.Inaddition,pressureindicators2CND-PI282,PI303andPI304werereplacedwithalargerscalegauge.//SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangedoesnotaffectanysystem,equipmentorcomponentoftheplantwhichperformsasafety-relatedfunction.Nuclearsafetywillnotbeaffectedasthechangeimpactsthenonsafety-relatedCNDsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage55of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-043Rev.2NEP-POL-010113.1-4,13.1-5;Figure13.1-3N/AEngineeringTechnicalSupportOrganizationChangesDescriptionofChange:ThefollowingchangesweremadeintheUnit2Engineeringorganization:1.GeneralSupervisorNuclearDesign-positionabolished./~2.SiteEngineering-namechangedtoPlantSupport.3.4.SupervisorSafetyAnalysis-namechangedtoSupervisorAnalysis.SupervisorChemistry/RPSupport-positionabolished;RPSupportfunctionmovedunderSupervisorAnalysis(see3above)andthechemistryfunctionmovedtoSupervisorEnvironmentalProtection.LeadEngineerInspectionProgram-positionabolishedandthefunctionintegratedintoMechanicalDesign.6.LeadEngineerSpecialPrograms-positionabolishedandfunctionintegratedunderSupervisorAnalysis(see3above).7.GeneralSupervisorEngineeringPerformanceServices-functionintegratedunderManagerUnit2Engineering.8.SupervisorEngineeringPerformance-costestimatingandschedulingfunctionsintegratedunderSupervisorProjectManagementUnit2.9.SupervisorAdministrativeServices-positionabolished;eachEngineeringSupervisorwilloverseetheirownadministrativestaff.10.AssociateSeniorStaffTechBuildingServices-positionupgradedandmovedunderManagerInformationManagementas"SupervisorBuildingServices."

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage66of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:DescriptionofChange:(cont'd.)94-043Rev.2(cont'd.)11.ProgramDirectorIndependentSafetyEngineeringGroup-word"program"deletedfromthepositiontitle.Thefunctionremainsunchanged.12.SupervisorDocumentControl(site),SupervisorDocumentControl(Salina),SupervisorRecordsManagementandSupervisorResourceCenters-thesepositionshavebeenabolishedandtheirfunctionshavebeentransferredintoanewposition,"SupervisorDocumentControl/RecordsManagement."13.SupervisorSoftwareDevelopment-thisisanewpositionreportingtoManagerInformationManagement.ISafetyEvaluationSummary:-Afterimplementationofthesechanges,adequateresourceswillexisttoprovideEngineeringsupportforsafeoperationandmaintenanceofthefacilityunderbothnormalandoff-normalconditions.Consequently,thesafeoperationand'.maintenanceofthefacilityisnotadverselyaffected.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage57of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-044DER2-94-0036N/ASystem:N/ATitleofChange:BoraflexCouponRemovalwithNETCOProcedureSEP-093-01DescriptionofChange:Avisualinspectionwasmadeandmeasurementstakenofthefull-lengthsurveillanceassembly(SA)atUnit2.Theboraflexsheets,orcoupons,fromtheshort-lengthSAwereremovedandsenttoaqualifiedlaboratory(PennState)fortestingandanalysis.Thisanalysiswasusedtoestablishabaseline(the"original"datadescribedintheUSAR)tocomparefuturecoupontestsagainst.ThecouponswillalsobecomparedtounirradiatedcouponstakenfromtheoriginallotofBoraflexusedtomanufactureUnit2'sSAs.SafetyEvaluationSummary:PerformingabaselinecharacterizationoftheBoraflexcouponsinstalledinthespentfuelracksisnecessarytodevelopaBoraflexPoisonSurveillanceProgramtotrackborondepletion.Thelackofpreinstallationbaselinecharacterizationwillnothaveasignificantimpactonthedevelopmentofalong-termsurveillanceprogramandwillnotposeasafetyconcern.Standardindustrypracticeandstatisticalstudiesshowthatremovingalloftheshort-lengthcouponsfromthespentfuelracks,forthetimeperiodrequiredtotakethisbaselinedata,willnothaveasignificantimpactontheneutronandgammaexposuresseenbythesecoupons,andfuturecouponsurveillancewillbeaccurate.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage58of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:94-045N/AUSARAffectedPages:3.1-24,7.3-26,9.'l-18,9.3-16,9.4-54,9.5-73,and26.2-55,6.2-99,6.3-20,6.4-6,7.3-34,8.3-2,8.3-48,8.3-75,9.2-6,9.2-16,9.3-8,9.3-11,9.3-29,9.4-8,9.4-24,9.4-48,9.4-64,9.5-32,9.5%9,9.5-61,9.5-81,11.5-13;FMEAVolumes1System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:N/ARemovaloftheFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA),Book1and2,fromtheUSAR'/'heFMEAwasoriginallysubmittedtotheNRCin1983aspartoftheOperatingLicenseapplication,anditdocumentedthesingle-failureanalysesforsafety-relatedsystemsatthattime.TheFMEAisaverydetailed,component-level,computer-basedfaulttreeanalysis.ThetwoFMEAvolumeshavebeenremovedfromtheUSARandareretainedasaseparateengineeringdocumentwhichisreferencedintheUSAR.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisisadocumentation-onlychangewhichhasnoeffectontheplant,itssystemsorprocedures,anddoesnotaffectthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant,nordoesitaffecttherequirementtoconsidersingle-failurecriterionasanormalpartofthedesignprocess.RemovingtheFMEAfromtheUSAReliminatestherequirementtoupdatethisdocumentannuallywiththeUSAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage59of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-046Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0099-9310.2%,10.2-5;Figure1.2-40GeneratorHydrogenSupply(GMH)BulkHydrogenControlCabinetDescriptionofChange:Thischangereplacedallpiping,valves,andcontrolsassociatedwiththeexistingbulkhydrogenstorageunit.Changesincludedthereplacementofallcylinderisolationvalves,fabricationofanewstainlesssteeldischargemanifold,installationofanewtubetrailerdischargestation,installationofavendor-supplied(AirProducts)standardpressurecontrolstation,andreplacementof'theexcessflowcheckvalvewithaproperly-sizedunit.Inaddition,thedischargeheightforsafetyreliefventswasincreased.SafetyEvaluationSummary:/'hischangewasmadetoaddressleakageandsafetyconcernswiththe.previouspipingarrangement,andtomodifythesystemtoprovideadequatemakeupflowrateforgeneratorreplenishmentwithoutdefeatingtheprotectivefeaturesoftheexcessflowcheckvalve.Thedesignflowrateoftheexcessflowcheckvalvewasnotchanged.Themaingeneratorhydrogensupplysystemisanonsafety-relatedsystem.thatisusedtoprovidehydrogentothemaingeneratorafteranoutageoronanas-neededbasistomakeupforhydrogenlossfromthegenerator.Thesystemconsistsofavendor-suppliedbulkhydrogenstorageunitwithpressure-reducingcontrolslocatedintheyardareabetweenUnit2andUnit1,andanetworkofdistributionpipingandcontrolswhichconveythehydrogenintotheturbinebuildingwhereitisusedforgeneratormakeup.Thesystem'spurpose,function,methodofperformingitsfunction,anddesignbasiswasnotchanged.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage60of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-048SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0062-9270733PlantProcessComputerSystem(PMS)RemoveBalanceofPlantPerformanceCalculations(BOPCALC)andVesselTemperatureRateofChange(VTC)SoftwarefromthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PMS)DescriptionofChange:ThischangedisabledthecurrentBOPCALCandVTCfunctions~byremovingtheassociatedsoftwareprogramsfromthePMScomputer.SafetyEvaluationSummary:RemovingtheBOPCALCandVTCsoftwarewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.ThePMScomputerwillremainasasystemtoprovideoperatorswiththemeanstomonitornuclearsteamsupplysystem(NSSS)andBOPevents.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage61of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:.94-049Rev.05.1Mod.PN2Y89MX1466.2-66through6.2-71;Table6.2-54;Figures6.2-77,6.2-95Athrough6.2-95DSystem:SecondaryContainmentandStandbyGasTreatment(SGTS)TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:1-HourDrawdownAnalysisThissafetyevaluationsupportsplantoperationfor1-hourdrawdowntime.ThefollowingparametershavebeenchangedforthereducedhTrequirementsascomparedwiththefourthoperatingcycle.Theseparametersarediscussedbelow:2.SpentFuelHeatLoads:Adesignbasisspentfuelpoolheatload(16batchesoffuelwith12daysofcoolingandpoweruprate)isusedforthehTrequirements.Theuseofthedesignbasisheatloadisconservative./UnitCoolerPerformance:Fortypercentdegradationforallunitcoolersisassumed.Basedontheperformancetestsperformedduringthe1992-93timeperiod,theoveralldegradationofallunitcoolersincluding2HVR"UC413A5Bis13%.Thisprovidessufficientmargintoaccountforanyfurtherdegradationthatmayoccurinthefuture.3.SecondaryContainmentln-leakageRate:Themaximumallowablesecondarycontainmentin-leakageis2,670cfmtosupport1-hourdrawdowntimeandreducedhTrequirement.Thisis17%higherthanthefourthoperatingcyclebutstillmeetstheSRPSection6.2.3guideline.DecayHeatRemovalFlowReduction:The2,670cfmin-leakageselectionwillbemadesuchthatitwillpermitaflowdiversionupto300cfmforthedecayheatcoolingafter5hoursintoanaccident.The300cfmflowdivisionismorethanthecoolingflowrequirementof145cfm.5.EliminationofhTAnnunciation:Existingfour-hoursurveillanceprogramissufficienttoensurethatthehTrequirementwillbemet.ThehTannunciationisnolongerrequiredbecauseofsignificantlylowerCRTrequirement,andperiodicsurveillanceisadequate.Therefore,thehTannunciationcanbeeliminated.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage62of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:DescriptionofChange:(cont'd.)94-049Rev.0&1(cont'd.)6.SurveillanceAcceptanceCriteria:ThesecondarycontainmentandSGTSsystemsurveillanceacceptancecriteriaarerevisedtoreflect2,670cfmin-leakagerate.Theanalysismethodsarethesameasthoseusedpreviously.7.UseofElectricHeaters:Upto45kWofelectricheaterscanbeusedtomaintainproperemergencycorecoolingsystemroomtemperature(high-pressurecoresprayroomexcluded).Thischangedoesnotadverselyaffect60minutesdrawdowncapacity.Useofadditionalheatersmaybeallowed,followingEngineeringevaluationandwithApplicabilityReview.NOTE:Revision1totheSafetyEvaluationevaluatedtheuseoftheelectricheatersasdescribedinitem7.TheelectricheaterswereprohibitedfromuseinRevision0.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thedrawdownanalyses(Gale.ES-27,1,Rev.0andES-259,Rev.02)provideacurvethatdefineshTrequirementsbasedon1-hourdrawdowntimefortheremainderoftheplantlife.The6Trequirementvariesfrom5to10Fduringsummermonths.BecauseoflowALTrequirement,buildingheatingisnotanticipated.'uringwintermonths,theavailablehTwillbemorethanthemaximum6Trequirementof20'F.ThesafetyevaluationconcludesthatnosafetyconcernsareinvolvedandnounreviewedsafetyquestionsexistifthehTrequirementsofFigure1andotherrequirementsasstipulatedinthesafetyevaluationareadheredto.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage63of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-050EDC2E10933Figures5.4-13d,5.4-13gResidualHeatSystem(RHS}ReviseSafetyClassofControlComponentsforRHSSteamCondensingPressureReducingValves2RHS"PV21A/BfromSRtoQDescriptionofChange:ThischangerevisedthesafetyclassfromSR(SafetyRelated)toQ(Quality}forcomponentsoftheRHSsteam-condensingpressure-reducingvalveinstrumentloopswhichperformnosafetyfunction.Thesafetyclassificationwaschangedforthepressureindicatingcontroller,pressureindicatorandthecurrenttopneumaticconverterfor2RHS"PY218andthecurrenttopneumaticconverterfor2RHS"PV21A.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Changingthesafetyclassification,fromSRtoQ,ofcomponentswhichperformnosafetyfunction,willhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage64of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-053Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0283-91Figure7.4-1Sh1ICS-ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)AddTimeDelayinRCICInitiatedTurbineTripDescriptionofChange:TheRCICsystematUnit2isdesignedinsuchawaythatRCICinitiationprovidesautomaticsignaltotripthemainturbineinstantaneously,regardlessofthecauseofRCICactuation.Therefore,anyinadvertentRCICactuationduetohumanerrororequipmentmalfunctionwillcauseanunnecessarytripofthe'mainturbine.Ifatthatmomentthereactorisrunningat35%powerorhigher,thereactorscramwillfollow.Toresolvethisdiscrepancy,atimedelaywasaddedtotheturbinetripsignalinitiatedbyRCIC.Thischangeallowstheoperatortoverifythecauseof,startingRCICpriortotheturbinetripandtakeappropriateactions.Toprovidethistimedelay,thenonsafety-relatedauxiliaryAgastatrelaywasreplacedwithanonsafety-relatedtimedelayAgastatrelay.SafetyEvaluationSummary:GeneralElectric(GE)reportGE-NE-E51-00171-01,datedJune1994,andGEletters,dated8/29/94,8/30/94,and9/13/94,providedrequestedanalysisoftheproposedchangebasedoncalculatedmoisturelevelinthesteamandsteampipingconfiguration.TheGEreportconcludedthatatimedelayofuptofiveminuteswillnotcompromisetheturbineprotectionandcanbeintroducedtotheRCICinitiatedturbinetrip,providingthetotalaccumulatedtimeofRCICoperationismonitoredanddoesnotexceedeightminutesperyear.Itisconcludedthatthischangewillnotalterthedesignorfunctionofthemainsteamsystemormainturbineperformanceinawaythatadverselyaffectstheturbineprotectionorsystemperformanceorplantnuclearsafety.TheadditionofthetimedelaywillnotaffecttheRCICperformance.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage65of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)94-053Rev.1(cont'd.)Basedontheanalysisperformed,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangedoesnotalterdesign,function,ormethodofperformingthefunctionofthesafety-relatedsystemandisincompliancewithNRCrequirements.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

.SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage66of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:VSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:.94-055Rev.0&1Mod.PN2Y94MX004Figure6.2-71aContainmentAtmosphereIVlonitoring'(CMS)'liminateMoistureFromH~/O~AnalyzersWaterintrusioninthesamplelineshashadaconsistentdeleteriouseffectontheperformanceofbothTrainAandTrainBhydrogen/oxygen(H~/0,)analyzerpanels(2CMS"PNL66Aand2CMS"PNL66B).Problemsrangefromwaterintheanalyzingcomponents(whichresultininaccurateoutputs)toequipmentfailures(samplepumps,analyzers,etc.).Thesourceofwaterintrusionwasdeterminedtobeduetothehighhumidity(intheprimarycontainmentandtheareaabovethesuppressionpool)beingcarriedintothesamplesuctionlines.Surveillancedurationshaveincreasedasaresultofhavingtorepair/replacevariouscomponentswhicharepronetowaterincursiondamage.Inaddition,a7-dayLCOisstartedwheneverasurveillance/maintenanceisinitiatedoneitherH~/O~train.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationinstalledamoisturecollectorinboththesampleinletandreturnlinesforbothTrainsAandB.Whilethemoisturecollectorsareidentifiedassafetyrelated,theyhavenopermissiveorcontrolfunctions.TheyfunctiononlytopreventwaterintrusionintotheH~/O~analyzersystemcomponents.Themodificationwillincreasethesystems'eliabilityandavailabilityanddecreasemaintenance.IVlostofthemodificationwasinstalledpriortoRefuelingOutage4(RFOK)withfinaltie-instothesystemduringRFOK.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage67of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-056DER2-94-02176.4-2N/AChangeinNMP2ControlRoomSuppliesRequirementDescriptionofChange:Thischangeallowsfortheprovisionoffood,sleepingfacilities,andotherpersonalcomfortsuppliesfromoutsidetheControlRoomvitalareaenvelopeonanas-neededbasis.ProvidingfoodandsleepingfacilitiesfromeitheronsiteoroffsitesourcescanbereadilyperformedwhenUFSAR-identifiedaccessroutesareconsidered.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Providingpersonalcomfortsuppliestothe.ControlRoomfromoutsidethevitalareaenvelopeduringdesignbasisaccident(DBA)conditionsisinaccordance'withpreviouslyevaluatedaccessroutesdescribedintheUSAR.HabitabilityoftheControlRoomenvelopewithoutthesesupplieshasbeenevaluatedasconsistentwiththeguidelinessetby10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria19.ThischangedoesnotaffectanyequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUSARandhasnoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Thischangehasnoimpactonradiologicaleffluentsornonradiologicalconsequencestotheenvironment.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage68of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:94-058ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:-TitleofChange:~DrawingEY-8S'igure1.2-1N/ANewStructurestoConnectUnit2AccessControlBuildingtothePlantDescriptionofChange:TheUnit2AccessControlBuilding(Phase1)wasconstructedin1993.ThisstructurewasconnectedtotheReactorBuildingviatemporarywoodenstructure.ThiswoodenstructurehasbeenreplacedwithapermanentstructureandanadditionalenclosedwalkwayfromthisstructuretotheCardoxRoom/AuxiliaryServicesBuilding.Thesestructuresprovideadditionalentrypathstoboththeradiologically-controlledareasandthenonradiologicallycontrolledareasofUnit2.ThenewpassagewaytotheCardoxRoomisoutsidetheradiologically-controlledzone.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThepertinentsafetyissuesidentifiedinthissafetyevaluationareimpactontheControlRoomfreshairintake,impactontheFloodAnalysis,additionalloadsonAuxiliaryBayroof,ReactorBuildingandControlBuildingwalls,impactontheCO2tankruptureanalysis,andaccessibilityfortheremovaloftheAuxiliaryBayroofplugs.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatconstructionoftheseinterconnectingstructuresbetweentheAccessControlBuildingandtheUnit2Plantstructuresdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage69of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-059Rev.051Mod.PN2Y93MX004N/ASystems:CommonElectrical(CES),MoistureSeparatorVents/Drains(DSIVI),MoistureSeparatorReheaterVents/Drains(DSR),FeedwaterPumpRecirculation(FWR),Feedwater(FWS),HighPressureFeedwaterHeaterDrains(HDH),LowPressureFeedwaterHeaterDrains(HDL),HotReheat(HRS),MeteorologicalMonitoring(IVIMS),MainSteam(lVISS),ReactorWaterCleanup(WCS)TitleofChange:ModifiedASMEPTC6.1TurbineGeneratorPerformanceTestCapabilityforUnit2DescriptionofChange:lAmodifiedASMEPTC6.1TurbineGeneratorPerformanceTest(ASMETest)wasrequiredinorderforGeneralElectric(GE)towarranteerecoveringtheelectricalmegawattslostduetotheremovaloftwoL-1stagewheelsinlow-pressureturbines8andCbyreplacingrotorsforlow-pressureturbinesA,B,andC.Thismodificationinstalled50thermocouples,adataacquisitionterminal,and6condenser(baskettip)backpressuresensinglines(2percondenser).Theseitems,inadditiontoexistingplantinstrumentation,enabledtheASMEtesttobep'erformed.Throughtheoutputsofthedataacquisitionterminal,themodificationalsoenabledthetemperatures(sensedbythethermocouples)tobemonitoredonthesitemeteorologicalcomputer(METVAX).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationwilladdsupplementaryinstrument/pressureinputsinordertoenableamodifiedASMETesttobeperformedatUnit2.Thistestisrequiredinordertoevaluatetheefficiencyoftheturbinegeneratorbeforeandaftertheinstallationofthenewlow-pressureturbinemonoblockrotorsand,subsequently,theefficiencyduetoimplementingpoweruprate.Inaddition,thechangewillenableplantpersonneltopermanentlymonitortemperaturesatthepowercycle SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage70of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:94-059Rev.08c1(cont'd.)SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)blockvalves(PCBV)closetothecondensers.Significantincreaseintemperatures,whenthevalvesareclosed,wouldbeindicativeofPCBVleakage.Thechangeswillhavenoimpactonsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.ThemodifiedASMEtestisnotdiscussedintheUnit2USAR.TheUnit1USAR,Sectionll.C.,describesthemeteorologyrequirementsandwillnotbeimpactedbythedatalinkinputtedfromUnit2recorder2CES-TJR100.Unit2USARSection2.3.3.2.3describestheMETVAXasaweatherdataprocessingsystemanditwillnotbeimpacted.'Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage71of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-061PN2Y94MXOOSFigures9.2-1c,9.2-1e,9.2-1f,9.2-1g,9.2-1J,9.2-'1pSystem:TitleofChange:ServiceWater(SWP)InstallationofServiceWaterSystemChemicalCleaningValveTie-InsDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationprovidedtheisolationandinterfacetie-insnecessarytofacilitatechemicalcleaningofthesmalldiameterservicewaterpiping(i.e.,3-inchNPSandsmaller)intheReactorandControlBuildings.Thecleaningoperationwasimplementedtoremovecorrosionproductandsiltdepositionfromtheaffectedpipingandassociatedunitcoolercoils.Thecleaningprocesswasthefirststepinsuppressingfurtheraggressivecorrosionattackofthepipesurfaceduetomicrobiologicallyinfluencedcorrosion.Thisprecludesfuturecostlypipingrepairsduetoexcessivepitting.Thescopeofthissafetyevaluationaddressestheisolationvalvetie-insnecessarytoaccommodatefuturecleaning.Theactualcleaningoperationwillbeaddressedinseparatedocumentation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisdesignprovidesin-lineisolationvalvesandfittingsforuseinafuturechemicalcleaningoperation.Theisolationvalvessegmenttheaffectedheadersintosixindependentcleaningloops.Duringnormaloperation,theisolationvalvesaremaintainedinthefullopenpositionandperformnoactivethrottlingorisolationfunction.Duringthecleaningoperationthevalvesareclosed,isolatingtheaffectedloopfromthemainheader.Considerationforcomponentaccesswasaddressedinthedesignandplacementofthenewvalvesandfittings.Thesystemchangeshavebeenreviewedagainsttheexistingsystemflowcalculationsandsystempipestresscalculations.Thesechangesdonotchangeorimpedethefunctionoftheoriginalinstallation.Thenewdesignprovidesisolationcapabilitiesnotincludedintheoriginalinstallation,enhancingtheoperabilityandmaintainabilityofthesystem.Thisinstallationdoesnotchangetheoperationofthesystemoritsfunction.Thecleaningvalvetie-insprovidethecapabilitytosupportafuturechemicalcleaningoperation.Theaddedisolationcapabilityenhancessystemmaintenance SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage72of'l31SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)94-061(cont'd.)capabilities.TheseadditionstothesystemdonotchangeanylicensingordesignbasesrequirementsoftheSWPsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage73of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-062PN2Y94MX009Figures9.2-1c,9.2-1e,9.2-1g,9.2-1L,9.2-1m,9.2-1pSystem:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:ServiceWater(SWP)Resize/RerouteSWPPiping,Thismodificationupsizedapproximately1,100ft.ofSWPpipingintheReactorBuildingandAuxiliaryBaystoimprovethehydraulicperformanceofselectedunitcoolers.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisprojectwillreplaceapproximately1,100ft.ofthesafety-relatedpipe.Thispipewasidentified,throughhydraulicanalysis,tobeundersizedforthedutyrequirementsofthesystem.Thisreviewidentifiedportionsofpipingfor,unitcoolers2HVR"UC401AthroughF,UC406,UC407A,BandC,UC408A"andB,UC410A,UC411CandUC414AandBashavingmarginalcleanpipehydraulicperformance.Thisdesignchangesthesizeofthecurrentlyinstalledpipingandinmostcasesconformstotheoriginalroutingoftheexistingpipe.Therearesomesectionsofthepipingthatwillrequireminorreroutesforgreateraccessibility.Thepipingchangeshavebeenreviewedagainsttheexistingsystemflowcalculationsandsystempipestresscalculations.Thesechangesdonotaffectthefunctionoftheoriginalinstallation.Thenewdesignprovidesisolationcapabilitiesnotincludedintheoriginalinstallation,enhancingtheoperabilityandmaintainabilityofthesystem.Portionsofthenewpipingwillbeinstalledinparallelwiththeexistingpiping.Theexistingpipewillbeabandonedinplacefollowingthesystemtie-ins.Mostpipinginstallationwilltakeplaceduringnormalpoweroperation.TheremainderofthepipeandalltherequiredsystemconnectionswillbeinstalledduringRefuelingOutage4.Precautionswillbetakentoinsurethatinstallationactivitieswillnotinterferewithplantoperationorendangertheabilityofplantsystemstoperformtheirnecessaryfunctions.Thepipingsizeincreaseenhancesthecapabilityofthesystemtorespondtoplantneeds.Thisisaccomplishedbyincreasingthecapabilityofthesystemtosupply SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage74of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)94-062(cont'd.)servicewatertothecoolers.Theincreasesinpipesizewillnotchangeorimpactthefunctionofthesystem.ConsideringthedocumentsreviewedithasbeendeterminedthatthismodificationcomplieswithallofthedesignandlicensingrequirementsapplicabletotheUnit2SWPsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage75of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:94-063SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0029-94Figure9.4-9Sh1,2L3ReactorBuildingVentilation(HVR)HVRFansRepeatedlyFailedtoStartReactorBuildingnormalventilationsystemspare/standbysupplyandexhaustfanshaverepeatedlyfailedtoautostartormanuallystart.Thestartcircuitsforthefanscontainapermissivelogicrequiringrespectivedischargedamperstobegreaterthan40%open.Whenafanstartsignalisreceived,arelay/timerisinitiated.Also,thestartsignalinitiatestheopeningoftheasso'ciateddischargedampers.Iftheassociateddischargedampertakeslongerthan10secondstoopento40%openposition,thetimerwilltimeoutandsendasignaltoclosethedischargedamper;thefanwillnotautostart.Fieldtestingdemonstratedthestartsequencewasbetween,7.3and9.2secondswiththerelay/timertrippingin10.1seconds;relay/timerrangewas1.5.to15seconds.Themarginallowedbetween"Start"and"FailtoStart"wastoorestrictiveanddidnotallowforanyanomalyorvarianceofoperation.Therefore,therelay/timersetpointwasincreasedtoa12seconds.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangewillenhancetheperformanceofthenonsafety-relatedportionoftheReactorBuildingnormalheating,ventilatingandairconditioningsystemandwillnotaffecttheoperationofanysystemsimportanttothesafeoperationandshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation'SummaryReportPage76of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:Implementation'DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-064SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0118-949.5-33,9A.3-16,9A.3-17,9A.3-63;Table9A.3-7Sh2&3;Figure9A.3-5N/ADeletionofFireBarrierRating-DieselGeneratorDayTankRoomsDescriptionofChange:Thischangedeletedtherequirementforathree-hourratedfirebarrierseparatingeachdieselfueldaytankfromitsassociateddieselgenerator./SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThecurrentFireHazardsAnalysis,aspresentedinUSARSection9.A,postulatesafireineachdieselgeneratorareawhichincludestheentireinventoryofdieselfuelcontainedwithinthedaytank.Sincethedieselgeneratorwillnotfunctionwithoutthedaytanksupplyingfuelandthedaytankhasnovaluewithouttheavailabilityofadieselgenerator,theprovisionofafirebarriertoisolatethefuelsupplyfromthedieselgeneratorisoflittlevalue.Thepostulatedfiredoesnotcreditthefirebarrierwithisolatingthedaytankfromthedieselgenerator.Eliminationofthefirebarrierdoesnotplacetheareaoutsideofcompliancewithapplicablecriteriasincedikingandspillcontainment,inaccordancewithBTPCMEB9.5-1PositionC.7.i.(2),ismaintained.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage77of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-065SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0034-94Table3.9A-12Sh128c13;Figures9.2-1e,9.2-1f,9.2-1J,9.2-1LSystem:TitleofChange:ServiceWater(SWP)SWPCheckValveRemoval,RelocationorReplacementDescriptionofChange:TheSWPsystemwasreviewedbytheprojectteaminresponsetoindustryconcernsandUnit2performanceproblemsnotedduringSWPcheckvalveandunitcoolertests.Astudywasperformedwhichnotedseveralareasforimprovementofthesystemperformance.Thescopeofthisprojectaddressedoneaspectoftheproposedsystemimprovementsrecommendedbythestudy.Thisprojectaddressedcheckvalveperformanceenhancementswhichincluded:Removaloftheinternalsfromcheckvalves2SWP"V75Aand75B.Relocationofcheckvalves2SWP"V1024andV1025,and;theinstallationofblockingvalvesanddrainprovisions.Replacementofliftcheckvalves2SWP"V201Aand201Bwithnozzlecheckvalves,andreroutingtheassociatedpiping.Replacementofswingcheckvalves2SWP"V240Aand240Bwithnozzlecheckvalves.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thecheckvalvechangesenhancethecapabilityofthesystemtorespondtoplantneeds.Thisisaccomplishedbyimprovingvalvereliability,eliminatingunnecessarymaintenanceandtesting,andincreasingthecapabilityofthesystemtosupplyservicewatertotheassociatedheatloads.ThesechangesdonotadverselychangeorimpactthefunctionofthesystemandcomplywithallofthedesignandlicensingrequirementsapplicabletotheUnit2SWPsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage78of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-066TemporaryMod.94-039N/AReactorProtectionSystem(RPS),NuclearSteamSupplySystem(NSSS),MainSteamSystem(MSS)TitleofChange:DefeatofMainSteamLineRadMonitoringTripSignalChannelB1DescriptionofChange:Thistemporarymodificationinstalledajumperinpanel2CEC"PNL633BayBinordertodefeatatripsignal(ChannelB1)whichwouldnormally,beprovidedwheneverdetector2MSS"RE46Bisinoperable.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thistemporarymodificationallowsforampletimeforthereplacementof,thefaultydetectorwithoutenteringaLCOperTechnicalSpecifications3/4.3.1.aand3/4.3.2.b.1.b.Thischangereducestheplant'svulnerabilitytoafullscrambyprohibitingthehalfscramsignaltobepresentduringthetimeperiodthatthedetectorisbeingreplaced.Intheeventoffueldamage,theremainingmainsteamlineradiationmonitorswillfunctiontodetectthereleaseoffissionproductsandinitiatetheappropriatemitigatingactionstolimitthereleaseandtoshutdowntheplant.Thischangedoesnotimpacttheremainingdetectorsfromperformingtheirsafetyfunctionsasoriginallydesigned.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage79of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:=USARAffectedPages:System:TideofChange:94-067DER2-94-00369.1-9,9.1-10N/AUpdateUFSARDescriptionofaRevisedBoraflexSurveillanceProgramandUseofNewSurveillanceAssembliesDescriptionofChange:USTool&.Die(USTED)originallysuppliedasurveillancesampleconsistingof2-inchsquarepiecesofBoraflexfortheUnit2spentfuelstorageracks.Thiswasshippedin1984andwasthestandardsurveillancesamplesuppliedbyUSTEDatthattime.However,thesesampleswerelostandthereforeneverinstalledintheUnit2spentfuelpool.ReplacementBoraflexsurveillancesampleswerepurchasedin1990.Thesecouponswereinstalledpriortotheracksbeingputintouseandthehottestbundlesfromeachreloadhavebeenplacedaroundthem.ThissafetyevaluationupdatedthedescriptionintheSARoftheBoraflexcouponsurveillanceassembliestobeinagreementwiththeactualcouponswhichwereinstalledin1990.Inaddition,thelong-termBoraflexSurveillanceProgramhasbeenmodifiedtobeinagreementwiththemostrecentindustryguidanceforBoraflexsurveillance,issuedinareportbytheElectricPowerResearchInstitute(EPRI).SafetyEvaluationSummary:PerformingperiodictestingoftheBoraflexcouponsinstalledinUnit2'sspentfuelracksisnecessarytoprovideassurancethattheBoraflexmaterialinthespentfuelrackscontinuestoperformacceptablyovertheservicelifeoftheracks.ThereplacementcouponsandtheirassociatedsurveillanceprogramwillprovideadequateassurancethattheBoraflexmaterialisperformingasintendedandwillprecludetheoccurrenceofacriticalityaccidentduetodegradationoftheBoraflexmaterial.ThisrevisedsurveillanceprogramwillcontinuetoimplementtherequirementsofGDC61andisamoreconservativeprogramthantheoriginalonedescribedintheUSAR.NeithertheBoraflexcouponsortheirassociatedsurveillanceprogrampresentasafetyconcernforUnit2.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage80of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-068Rev.05,1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0040-939.1-23,9.1-24,9.1%0,9C.3-4,9C.3-5,9C.8-1,9C;8-2,9C.8-3;Tables3.9A-4Sh6,3-1Sh1,3-3Sh1;Figure5-2System:MHRTitleofChange:Upgradeof125TonPolarCraneto132TonCapacityDescriptionofChange:Thischangetothepolarcrane'suseandfunctionupgradedthemainhoistfrom125-tonto132-toncapacitytoallowforthefullutilizationofthereactorpressurevessel(RPV)headcarouselstrongbackwhichwasinitiallyemployedduringRefuelingOutage3.Theupgradingofthepolarcranemainhoistinvolvedmodificationsandrecertificationloadtestingofthehoistat125%ofthenewratedcapacityduringplantoperation.Theconstructibilityreview,theloaddropassessmentcalculation,andtheloadtestprocedureensuredthatplantequipmentwasnotaffectedbytheworkandtesting.TheupgradingofthepolarcranemainhoistreducespersonnelexposureandsavescriticalpathrefueloutagetimebypermittingtheremovalandreinstallationoftheRPVhead,thestudtensioners,the76studs,nuts,andwashersinoneliftingoperation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thedesignchangesandreanalysisofthepolarcranemainhoistfortheupgradeto132tonsmeetsthesamesingle-failureproofcriteriaofNUREG-0612,asdidtheexistingequipment.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage81of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-069ProcedureN2-CSP-2V10.4-2,10.4-22through10.4-27CondensateDemineralizerSystemCondensateDemineralizerWaterPurityMaintenanceDescriptionofChange:Thischangereplacedcondensatedemineralizerresinatintervalswhicharebasedoninletconductivityanditsrelationshiptothecompositionofthecirculatingwater,andcondensateflowratethroughthebedssinceregenerationofresinisnolongerperformedatUnit2.Thisapproachtotheoperationofthedemineralizerseliminatesthepotentialforcontaminationfromtheproductsformedduringacidandcausticregenerationoftheresin.SafetyEvaluationSummary:CThecondensatedemineralizerresinwillbereplacedsuchthatadequateremainingcapacitywitlexisttohandlethepostulatedmaincondenserleakeventwithinthetimepermittedforanorderlyshutdown.TheeffluentqualityofthedemineralizersystemwillsatisfytheacceptablelimitfoundinTable2ofRegulatoryGuide1.56,Rev.1,July1978.ThereplacementofcondensatedemineralizerresinsatthesefrequenciesisincompliancewithparagraphCoftheregulatoryguide.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage82of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-070SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0028-94Figure10.1-6bFeedwater(FWS)ReplacementofDrainValves2FWS"V89A&Band2FWS"V90A&BDescriptionofChange:Thischangereplaceddrainvalves2FWS"V89A&BandV90A&Bforcontainmentisolationvalves2FWS"V12A&B.Thesevalvesare3/4"NPSandarenormallyclosed.Thevalvesarenotactivecomponentsandtheironlysafetyfunctionispressureretention./Thesevalvesarelocatedintheprimarycontainmentandwerereplacedtoenhanceleak-tightnessandpreventleakageinthedrywell.SafetyEvaluationSummary:\InstallationofthereplacementdrainvalvesdoesnotimpactthedesignoftheFWSsystem.Thesystemcanstillprovideitsintendedflowandnewdrainvalves2FWS"V89A&BandV90A&Bwillassuresystemintegrity.Basedontheevaluation-performed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage83of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:94-071ImplementationDocumentNo.:N/AUSARAffectedPages:2.2-1,2.2-3,2.2-8;Table2.2-3;Figure2.1-2System:TitleofChange:N/AGasPipeline¹63toSitheEnergiesUSAPlantand¹58toIndeckEnergyDescriptionofChange:SitheEnergiesUSAhasconstructeda1000-MWnaturalgas-firedelectricalgeneratingstationknownasIndependenceGenerationPlant.ItisacogenerationplantlocatedinOswegoCounty,NewYork./Twonaturalgaspipelinesliewithin8km(5miles)oftheNineMilePointStation.Onepipeline(¹63)suppliesgastotheSitheplantandtheotherpipeline(¹58)toIndeckEnergy.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thenearestpointofthepipelinesisover2milesfromUnit2.DuetothedistancebetweenthepipelinesandNineMileStation,atmosphericdispersionwouldconservativelyreducethenaturalgasconcentrationbelowitslowerexplosivelimitmorethan1milefromNineMilePoint.Thedetonationofanunconfinednaturalgasdispersalinairisnotacredibleevent.DuetothedistancefromthepipelinestotheUnit2ControlRoomairintake(>2miles),theresultantatmosphericdispersionwouldconservativelyreducethenaturalgasconcentrationattheintakestolessthan9g/m'.Thisiswellwithinthenaturalgastoxicitylimitof287g/m'.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatinstallationofthegaspipelinesdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage84of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-073SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0142-949.4-71;Figures9.4-22bthroughdHeatingandGlycol(HVG),WaterTreatment(WTS)TitleofChange:WaterTreatingMakeupWaterSupplytoHVGDescriptionofChange:Thischangeisolatedthehotwaterheatingandglycol(HVG)system.frommakeupwatersuppliedbythemakeupwatertreatmentsystem(WTS)becauseWTShasbeenrepeatedlycontaminatedbyglycolintrusionthroughleaky/HVGvalves.TheneededmakeupwaterforHVGwassuppliedmanuallybyOperationsunderproceduralcontrols."Theisolationwasaccomplishedbyremovingthein-linecheckvalvesandblankingoffthelines.SafetyEvaluationSummary:I/NeithertheHVGnortheWTSsystemshaveanysafety-relatedfunctions.Failureormalfunctionofthesystemsorcomponentswillnotcompromiseanysafety-relatedsystemsorcomponentsorpreventasafereactorshutdown.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage85of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:94-076DER2-93-1935Table6.2-56Sh2,4,7,10,11,12,20,21PrimaryContainmentAppendixJDiscrepancies,DER2-93-1935DER2-93-1935addresseddiscrepanciesinvolvingeditorialchangestotheUfSARclarifyingtheUnit2AppendixJProgram.ThissafetyevaluationaddresseschangestoUSARTable6.2-56asfollows:II1.DeletedreferencetoTypeCtestingforthefollowingvalves:2RHS"MOY1A,2RHS"MOV1B,2RHS"MOV1C,2CSH"MOV118,2CSL"MOV112and2ICS"MOV1362.RevisedNotes23,24and25todeletereferencetoTypeAtestingofthefollowingrelief,safety,checkandvacuumbreakervalves:2RHS"SV34A/B,2RHS"SV62A/B,2RHS"RV56A/B,2RHS"V20,2RHS"V19,2RHS"V1'17,2RHS"V118,2RHS"RVV35A/B,2RHS"RVV36A/B,2RHS"RV108,2RHS"RV20A/B/C,2RHS"RV61A/8/C,2RHS"RV110,2CSL"RV123,2CSL"RV105,2RHS"RV139,2CSH"RV113and2CSH"RV1143.RevisedTable6.2-56toindicateaTypeCtestforvalves2CCP"RV170and2CCP"RV101.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThevalvesinItem1areECCSsuctionvalvesthattakesuctionfromthesuppressionpoolatanelevationbelowminimumsuppressionpoolwaterlevelof199'-6"and,assuch,'arewaterfilledpost-LOCA.ThevalvesinItem2arerelief,safety,checkandvacuumbreakervalvesthatterminateinthesuppressionpoolbelowtheminimumwaterlevelof199'-6".Thesuppressionpoolwatereffectivelysealsthesecontainmentisolationvalvesfromtheprimarycontainmentatmosphere,therebypreventinggaseousreleasesfromtheprimarycontainment.Sincethese SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage86of13194-076(cont'd.)SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:{cont'd.)'alvesdonotseecontainmentatmospherepost-LOCA,theydonotrepresent.,potentialcontainmentatmosphericleakagepathsandarenotsubjecttoleaktestingasdefinedinAppendixJ.Reliefvalves2CCP"RV170and2CCP"RV171arelocatedinsideprimarycontainmentandtheiroutletsterminateopenendedinsidetheprimarycontainmentatanequipmentdrainand,assuch,provideanatmosphericleakpathfromtheprimarycontainment.Therefore,thesevalvesareconsideredcontainmentisolationvalvesasdefinedinAppendixJandareTypeCtestedtosatisfytherequirementsofAppendixJ.ThischangerevisesUSARTable6.2-56toaccuratelydenotetheproperleaktestingprovisionsforthevalvesinItems1,2and3.ThisisaneditorialchangeanddoesnotchangeleaktestingrequirementsorleaktestingmethodsoftheUnit2AppendixJtestprogram.TheapplicablecontainmentisolationvalvesinItems1,2and3willcontinuetobeproperlyleaktestedperexistingprocedurestoensureleak-tightintegrityasrequired.by10CFRSOAppendixJandASMEXI.IBasedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage87of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:94-077ProcedureN2-OP-100B9.5%3,9.5-69EmergencyDieselGeneratorLubeOllDiv.3EDGLubeOilTemperatureThelubeoiltemperaturefortheDiv.3emergencydieselgenerator(2EGS"EG2)wasstatedintheUSARtobeabove120Fduringstandbyconditions.However,actuallubeoiltemperaturewasobservedtobebetween90Fand110'Fduringstandbyconditions.Withthevendor'sconcurrence,ithasbeenestablishedthattheminimumstandbylubeoiltemperaturerequirementfortheDiv.3dieselgeneratoris85F.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Establishingtherequirementof85'FastheminimumlubeoiltemperatureduringstandbyconditionsisconsistentwiththeacceptancecriteriainNUREG-0800,thatthetemperatureofthelubricatingoilismaintainedaboveaminimumvaluetoenhancethe"first-try"startingreliabilityoftheengineinthestandbycondition.Thischangeisalsoconsistentwiththevendor'srecommendationforminimumlubeoiltemperatureandwillsupplyproperstandbylubricationtotheengine.Therefore,theactuallubeoiltemperatureofbetween90Fand110Fissufficienttoverifythatenginelubeoiltemperaturerequirementsaremetunderstandbyconditions.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage88of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-078ProcedureN2-OPS-RPS-W001N/AMSS,HRSTitleofChange:TurbineSteamValveSurveillanceTestIntervalExtensionDescriptionofChange:Thissafetyevaluationevaluateschangingthetestingrequirementforturbinecontrol,stop,andinterceptvalvesfromweeklytomonthly.(NOTE:SubsequentchangeshavebeenevaluatedunderSafetyEvaluation95-032).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thepurposeofthistestingistodiscoveranyvalvemalfunctionsthatcouldcontributetoaturbineoverspeedeventcausingturbinecomponentstobecomehigh-energydebris(missiles)capableofstrikinganddamagingsafety-relatedequipment.TheNRCSafetyEvaluationReportforUnit2(NUREG-1047,Section3.5.1.3.10),withregardtotheturbinemissileissue,concludedthattheprobabilityofunacceptabledamagetosafety-relatedstructures,systemsandcomponentsduetoturbinemissilesisacceptablylow(i.e.,10peryear),providedthatthetotalturbinemissilegenerationprobabilityissuchthatconformancewiththeNRCcriteria(i.e.,P1(10forfavorablyorientedturbines,P1(10'orunfavorablyorientedturbines)ismaintainedthroughoutthelifeoftheplantbyacceptableinspectionandtestprograms.Inreachingtheconclusion,theNRCstafffactoredintoconsiderationthefavorableorientationoftheUnit2turbinegenerator.AlsointheUnit2SafetyEvaluation,theNRCidentifiedthattherelevantGeneralElectric(GE)missileprobabilityanalysismaybeusedindeterminingtheinspectionintervalfortheturbinediscsatUnit2..Theexistingrequirementforsurveillancetestingofturbinestopvalves(TSVs),turbinecontrolvalves(TCVs)andturbinecontainedstopandinterceptvalves(CIVs)istoperformthesetestsonaweeklybasis.Inordertoassureplantavailabilityanddecreaseanypotentialofplantscrams,thesurveillancetesting SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage89of13'1SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)94-078(cont'd.)frequencyofthesevalvesisbeingtemporarilyextended(uptoRefuelOutage4(RF04))fromaweeklytoamonthlyinterval.Justificationforthischangeinfrequencyisprovidedbelow.DuringRF04,thelow-pressureturbinerotorsarebeingreplacedbymonoblockrotors.Missilegenerationisnotaconcernformonoblockrotors.Aspartofthemonoblockrotormodification,aseparatesafetyevaluationwillbepreparedwhichwillidentifysurveillancetestingrequirementsforTSVs,TCVsandCIVs.Itisanticipatedthatwiththereplacementoftheexisting"built-up"low-pressurerotorswithmonoblockrotors,surveillancetestingfrequencyofTSVs,TCVsandCIVscanfurtherbereduced(frommonthlytoquarterly)~InresponsetoNiagaraMohawk'srequest,GErecalculatedwheelmissileprobabilitiesfortheUnit2low-pressureturbinerotors.Thesenewcalculationswerebasedonthe'revisedcalculationprocedurethat1)includedupdatedfailureratedataontheprimarysteamvalvesofGEnuclearunits,and2)includedthecapabilityofcalculatingwheelmissileprobabilitiesforextendedtimeintervalsbetweentheGEnormallyrecommendedfunctionaltestsofthesteamvalves.jtGEevaluationindicatesthat,basedonNRCcriteria(P1<1x10forfavorablyorientedunits),Q/Q/0testing,andwithnopre-warming,theinspectionintervalisreducedto5.7yearsfortheArotor.Consideringpre-warming,M/Q/Mtesting,andbasedonGErecommendation(P'I<1x10'ortheunit),theArotorinspectionintervalisreducedto2.8years.Theexistinginspectionintervalis6years.Basedonexistingfrequencyoftesting(W/W/Wf)andtestscheduleofM/M/M(conservatively,Unit2shallutilizeM/M/MscheduleinsteadofM/Q/ManalyzedbyGE),whichisanticipatedtobeutilizedforaveryshortdurationofthepresentoperatingcycle,thereducedinspectionintervalof2.8yearswouldrequireArotorinspectionbyR5.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage90of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-079ProceduresN2-FSP-FPM-A001-1through59.5-2,9A.3%3,9A.3~;Table9.5-3,Sh758System:TitleofChange:FireDetectionSystem.PerformanceBasedFireDetectorSurveillanceTestingDescriptionofChange:ThischangeaddedaclarifyingparagraphthatindicatesthatsubsequenteditionsofNFPAcodesandstandardsmaybeusedforsubsequentplantmodificationsandprogramrevisions.Clarificationwasalsoaddedthatadeviation;fromNFPA-72specifiedfiredetectortestfrequenciesisutilizedforfirezonesthatdonotcontainanyequipmentconsideredimportanttosafety.Also,adeviationfromNFPA-72codespecifiedtestingrequirementsinfirezonescontainingsafety-relatedequipmenthasbeenadopted.Thisdeviationisbasedonobtainingequivalentreliabilitybetweentestintervalsasallowedby'NFPAcodeequivalencyprovisions.Therevisedtestingschemeusesa10%,20%expanded,totalzoneexpanded,'otatingtestsamplepopulationfortestingthatisconductedonanannualbasis.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theclarificationsareinformationadditionsthatdonotaffectsafety-relatedequipmentandarenotchangesfrompresentoperatingpolicies.Thechangetothetestingschemeforfiredetectioninsafety-relatedequipmentareasisbasedontheplant-specificfailurerate(failuretoalarmundersimulatedfireconditions)offiredetectioninstruments.TheschemeadoptedprovidesanequivalentorreducedprobabilityofadetectorfailurebetweentestintervalsthanthatgenerallyassuredbyNFPA-72annualtestintervalsusinggenericfailureprobability.ThetestingschemechangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofapostulatedfireintheFireHazardsAnalysis,nordoesitincreaseordecreasetheseverityofthefire..Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage91of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:'94-080Mod.PN2Y94MX0063.7B-17,3.9A-3,3.9AM,3.9B%9;Table3.9B-2mSh1&2System:HydrogenRecombiner(HCS),ReactorWaterRecirculation(RCS),ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS),ServiceWater(SWP)TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:NMP2SnubberReductionThismodificationreducedthenumberofmechanicalsnubbersonUnit2safety-relatedpipingsystemsbyreanalyzingthepipingsystemsforsnubberremovalorsnubberreplacementwithstruts.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Duetofailureratesassociatedwithsnubbers,snubberremovalresultsinpipingsystemsthataremorereliable.Otherbenefitsoftheprogramincludereducedlong-termmaintenance,inspectionandtestrequirements.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage92of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94482DER2-93-2060-Figures10.1-9e,10.4-9Sh10CondensateDemineralizer(CND)CNDUltrasonicResinCleaner(URC)LevelElement2CND-LE225NotInstalledDescriptionofChange:Thissafetyevaluationdocumentstheas-builtplantconditionfortheCNDsystemultrasonicresincleanertankasnothavingalevelelementinstalledandthecorrespondinglevelalarmsinoperative.Additionally,theassociatedsluicingwaterflowcontrolvalvehasbeenmaintainedinthefullopenposition,sinceplantstartupwithapprovedholdouttagpreventingmisoperation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theultrasonicresincleaningequipmentdoesnotinterfacewithoraffectanyequipmentimportanttosafety,andtheCNDsystemisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperationofanyreactorsafetyfeatures.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage93of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-083ProcedureN2-FSP-FPM-R001Table9A.3-18Sh2FireDetection(FPM)EliminationofPeriodicTestRequirementsforThermalFireDetectorsinFireZone252SWDescriptionofChange:ThischangeremovedfourthermalfiredetectorsfromthescopeofUSAR-specifiedperiodictesting.ThethermaldetectorsarelocatedintheSFPPhaseSep'aratorTankRoomonReactorBuildingelevation289'-0"andimmediatelyoutsidetheroom.Theareaoutsidetheroomisalsoprovideddetectioncoveragebyionizationdetectorsinanotherloopofthedetectionzone.Thecombustibleloadingw'ithintheroomisinsufficienttowarrantfiredetection.Thischangeleftthethermaldetectorsinstalledbutwillnotrequireperiodictestinginorderforthezonetobeconsideredoperable.Inaddition,shouldoneofthedetectorsgointoalarmduetosomefuturefailure,thischangeallowsthelooptobebypassedinthepanelwithoutdeclaringthezoneofdetectioninoperable.ThischangewasimplementedsinceveryhighradiationlevelsnormallypresentintheSFPPhaseSeparatorTankRoompreventtestinginaccordancewithpreviousrequirements.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThereliabilityandmarginofsafetydiscussedinUSARSection9A.3.6.1.7willbemaintainedbythischangesinceredundantionizationdetectionintheareawillbemaintained.ThecombustibleloadingwithintheSFPPhaseSeparatorTankRoomisinsufficienttowarrantdetectionandhasbeendocumentedinafireprotectionengineeringevaluation.ThesafeshutdownanalysisisunaffectedbythischangeasistheFireHazardsAnalysis.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage94of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TrtleofChange:94-087NUREG-0654,NUREG-0696,NUREG-073713.3-2N/AEliminateCorporateEmergencyOperationsCenterDescriptionofChange:NUREGS0654,0696,and0737containcriteriapertainingtoemergencyresponsefacilities.ThereisnorequirementspecifictomaintaininganoffsiteCorporateEmergencyOperationsCenter(CEOC).Thereis,however,arequirementtomaintainabackupEmergencyOperationsFacility(EOF)shouldtheonsite,EOFbecomeuninhabitable.TheoffsitelocationpreviouslyusedtoobtainEngineeringsupportwasreferredtoastheCEOCintheSiteEmergencyPlan.TheCEOChashistoricallyprovidedaconvenientlocationforobtainingEngineeringsupportduringemergencyscenarios.TheCEOCcontainedresources(drawings,calculations,personalreferences)typicallyusedbyEngineeringpersonnel.Thelocationwasoutsidetheten-mileemergencyzoneanddedicatedphonelineswereusedtoensure/communicationwiththeTechnicalSupportCenter(TSC)andEOF.TheEngineeringDepartmentrecentlyrelocatedtoabuildingonsiteandcouldbeaffectedbyevacuationrequirements.Foremergencyeventswhichdonotrequireevacuation,communicationviaphonelinesensuresaccesstothesameleveloftechnicalsupportpreviouslyavailable.However,ifsiteevacuationisrequired,accesstotheresourcescontainedintheEngineeringBuildingcouldbelost.Underthesescenarios,technicalsupportwouldcomesolelyfromtheTSCandEOFandwouldbedependentontheamountoftechnicalinformationavailableinthosefacilities.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Conformancewithapplicablecriteriaisassuredsince:1)thereisnotaregulatoryrequirementforaCEOC,and2)exceptunderscenariosrequiringevacuation,theproximityofEngineeringresourcestotheplantwillimprovesupport.Therefore,thereisnonetnegativeimpactfromrelocatingtheEngineeringDepartmenttothesiteandeliminatingtheCEOC.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolve'anunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage95of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:94-088SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0167-94Page7.7-20;Figure7.7-6Sh3ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)TitleofChange:RecirculationFlowControlValveMinimumPositionChangeDescriptionofChange:Thereactorrecirculationflowcontrolvalvescanbecomestuckatminimumpositionduetothedifferentialpressureacrossthevalveaftertherespectivepumpistransferredtohighspeed.Thischangenowpermitsincreasingthevalvepositiontoamaximumof22%open(hotindicated)withthevalvelimitswitchbypassedwhilethefirstpumpwasupshifted,andamaximumof20%open(hotindicated)whilethesecondpumpwasupshifted.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thepeakneutronfluxthatwillresultfromtheincreasedflowwhentherecirculationpumpsareupshiftedisconservativelybelowthehighneutronfluxscram.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage96of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:94-089SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0019-94Figures104-1,10.4-2aCondensateAirRemoval(ARC)DesignChangeto2ARC-AOV104Valve2ARC-AOV104failedtoopenwhenrequired.Therootcauseforthisdeviationwasdeterminedtobeimproperlysizedspringforthedesigncondition.Themostcost-effectiverepairwastoretrofitthisactuatortoopen(andclose)onair.Thisdesignchangedeletedthefailopenrequirementforthisvalve.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Sincethevalveisnonsafetyrelated,nosafetyconcernsexistinallowingthisvalvetoopenonair.Theairwillprovidethenecessaryforcetobreakthevalveawayfromitsseat.Additionally,shouldthevalvefailonceopen,itwillremainopenmaintainingcondenservacuum.Allowingthevalvetoopenandcloseon:airwillnotadverselyaffectnuclearsafety.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthattheretrofitofthisvalvedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage97of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:95-005ProcedureNSAS-POL-01,ProcedureNEP-POL-0101USARAffectedPages:13.1-4,13.1-5,13.1.-7;Figures13.1-3,13.1-5System:TitleofChange:N/AReorganizationoftheInformation.ManagementBranchtotheNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportDepartmentDescriptionofChange:ThefunctionsoftheInformationManagementBranchhavebeenrelocatedfromtheNuclearEngineeringorganizationtotheNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupport(NSAS)organization.SafetyEvaluationSummary:RelocationoftheadministrativesupportfunctionsprovidedbytheInformationManagementBranchtotheNSASDepartmentisconsistentwiththecharterandresponsibilitiesofthatdepartmentandmaintainsclearmanagementcontrolandeffectivelinesofauthorityandcommunicationbetweentheorganizationalunitsinvolvedinthemanagement,operation,andtechnicalsupportfortheoperationofthefacility.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage98of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:9530ProceduresS-RTP-165,S-RPIP-3.11Tables1.8-2Sh6,1.9-1Sh49&50,12.5-3System:N/ATitleofChange:UseofAudibleAlarmDosimetersandPersonnelAirSamplersDescriptionofChange:ThischangerevisedtheUSARtoagreewithcurrentRadiationProtectionProgramproceduresfortheuseofaudiblealarmdosimetersandpersonnelairsamplers.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedchangestotheUnit2USARwillmeettheintentof10CFR20andcomplywithapplicableportionsofregulatoryguidelines.~Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoes>notinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage99of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-032Rev.0&1Mod.PN2Y93MX0053.5-8,3.5-9,3.5-16,10.2-1,10.2-8,10.2-9,10.2-10,10.2-11;10.2-12,10.2-13;Tables3.5-3,3.5-6,3.5-9,3.5'-12,3.5-15,3.5-16,10.2-1Sh1&2System:TitleofChange:TMSLow-PressureTurbineMonoblockRotorReplacementDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationreplacedthethreeexistinglow-pressureturbinerotors(2TMS-T2A,B,C)withGeneralElectric(GE)monoblockdesignrotors.Thepreviouslow-pressureturbinerotorswereofabuilt-updesign(shrunk-onwheels).Theshrunk-onwheeldesignhasapotentialofdevelopingcrackinginthekeyway,webandhubareaduetostresscorrosioncracking(SCC).ThemonoblockrotordesignhasbeenadoptedasacorrectivemeasureagainstSCC.Thebenefitofreplacementoftheexistinglow-pressureturbinerotorswithmonoblockrotorisasfollows:a.RecoveryoflostMWeduetowheelremoval.GEguaranteesa28.3MWerecovery.b.Reducedlow-pressureturbinerotorinspections.Therecommendedinspectionfrequencyreducesfrom6to10years.c.Reducedturbinevalvetesting.d.Replacementmonoblockrotorssupportreducedoutagedurations.e.Cobaltreduction.Thepreviouslow-pressureturbinelast-stagebucketsutilizedstelliteerosionshields.Thereplacementbucketsareflamehardened.Thereplacementlast-stagebucketsresultinareductioninradiationexposuretoplantpersonnel.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage100of1310SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:95-032Rev.0L1(cont'd.)Themonoblockrotorsweredesignedtomeettherequirementsofthepreviousdesign/operatingconditions,includingtransientoperatingconditions.Atthetimeofscheduledinstallation(1995),Unit2willbeundergoingapoweruprate.Themonoblockrotors,therefore,conformtothedesignrequirementsestablishedforpoweruprate.Therequirementsincludethefollowing:GuaranteedRating:InitialSteamConditions:ExhaustPressure:GuaranteedFlow:1,210,902kW1003psia2.0"HgAbsbackpressure13,583,244Ibs/hrTheturbinerotorsaredesignedwith5percentflowmarginabovetheflowrequiredtomeetthemaximumguaranteedoutputforpoweruprate.Theturbinegeneratorisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperationofreactorsafetyfeatures.Theturbinegeneratoris,however,designedtominimizethepossibilityofturbinerotorfailurethatmightproduceahigh-energymissilethatcoulddamageasafety-relatedcomponent.ReplacementwithmonoblockrotorsreducestheprobabilityofmissilegenerationbyremovingthepotentialforSCCattheinterfacebetweenarotorandwheelviatheuseofamonoblockconstruction.Theoverallprobabilityofdamagebyturbinemissiles(formonoblockrotors)willbewithintheacceptancevalueof10/yr,asoutlinedinSRP2.2.3,andtheacceptancevalueof107/yr,asspecifiedinRegulatoryGuide1.115.Theexistingoverspeedprotectioncontrolswillpreventtherotorfromexceedingthemaximumtransientspeedof120percent(designoverspeed)ofratedturbinespeed.Thissafetyevaluationalsore-evaluatedtestingrequirementsforvariousturbinedevicesbasedonmonoblockrotorreplacement.4Adequateproceduralcontrolsshallbemaintainedsuchthattherewillbenoadverseeffecttonuclearsafetybothduringthetransportationandinstallationofthemonoblockrotorsandduringstorageoftheremovedrotors.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage101of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-033Mod.PN2Y94MX003Figures9.2-8b,9.2-9bDomesticWater(DWS),SanitaryPlumbing(PBS),AuxiliaryServiceBuildingHVAC(HVL),PagingSystem(COP)TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:AuxiliaryBuildingRenovation,RFO4ScopeThischangerenovatedtheAuxiliaryServiceBuildingelevation261'-0"toallowuseascontrolledpersonnelingressandegressto/fromtheTurbineandReactorBuildingsviathelinkwayduringRefuelingOutage4(RFO4).Thischangeinvolvedmakinganopeninginthe13linewallatelevation261'eartheentrancetothesouthelectricaltunnelstairwell,installationofanadditional1.5-hr.fire-rateddoor(ET262-6)forstairwayisolation,removaloflockers,removalofthedrinkingfountainandwashbasins,thecappingoffloordrain(s)inthetemporaryaccesspassageway,andtheremovalofdoorAS261-7forimprovedaccess.Also,doorET262%wasremovedwhiletheareawasbeingusedonlyforaccessandegressduringRFO4.Thetemporaryaccesspassagewaywascreatedbyinstallingpaintedgypsumwallboardpartitions.Theceilingtilegridandassociatedserviceswererevisedintheareaofthepassageway.Thesechangesarepartialscopeforthismodification.Afterthe1995refueloutage(RFO4),themodificationwasresumedtoprovidearadiationprotectioncalibrationlaboratory,storageroom,separatemale/femalepersonneldecontaminationfacilities,removalofthe1,980-gallonhotwaterheaterandreplaceitwitha120-galloncapacity,installadifferentdesigndoorforET262-4,andinstallanequipmentliftfromTurbineBuildingelevation250'-0"andelevation261'-0"oftheAuxiliaryServiceBuilding.ThechangestobemadeaftercompletionofRFO4willbeaddressedinasubsequentsafetyevaluation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thechangesbeingmadetothesouthelectricaltunnelstairwellwereaddressedfor'onformancewithGeneralDesignCriterion(GDC)2andnoadverseimpactwascreated.Potentialimpacttoadjacentsafety-relatedareasandconformancetoGDC3andIOCFR50AppendixRwereevaluatedandconformancewasmaintained.Buildingserviceswererevisedanddidnotimpactanyoperationofequipmentimportanttosafety.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.II SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage102of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:95-034CalculationES-216-OOBCalculationH21C-038-01B'SARAffectedPages:System:Tables15.6-13Sh2through11,15.6-16bReactorContainmentPurge(CPS),Gas-Nitrogen(GSN)TitleofChange:RevisedBypassLeakageDesignBasis2GSN~V205DescriptionofChange:ThischangerevisedthedesignbasisanalysesfordeterminationofthebypassleakagethroughtheCPSwetwellanddrywellsupplylinesandresultantdosesdueftotheincreasedleakage.Theincreasedleakagewasduetoremovalofleakagemitigationcreditforcheckvalve2GSN"V205.Sincethisvalveisnotpartofaleaktestprogram,andwillnotbeaddedtoone,creditcannotbetakenforleakagereductionfollowingadesignbasisLOCA,ashadbeenassumedintheoriginaldesignbasisanalyses.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissafetyevaluationconcludesthatanunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistasaresultofremovingleakagemitigationcreditforcheckvalve2GSN"V205.Thisconclusionisbasedonthecalculationoftheadditionalleakageattributabletodeletingcreditforthecheckvalve,anddeterminationthattheresultantdoseswillnotcausethelimitsof10CFR100or10CFR50GDC19tobeexceeded.Thecalculateddosesattheexclusionareaboundary,lowpopulationzone,andintheControlRoomincreaseasaresultofthischange;however,theyremainbelowthelimitsof10CFRIOOandGDC19.SinceUnit2islicensedtothelimitsof10CFR100andGDC19,theconsequencesofadesignbasisaccidentaredeterminednottohaveincreased.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage103of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-035SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0148-94Figures9.2-6a,9.2-17bSystem:CondensateMakeupandDrawoff(CNS),MakeupWater(MWS)TitleofChange:EliminationofHoseConnectionHeadersforMWSandCNSSystemsDescriptionofChange:ThischangeeliminatedhoseconnectionheadersandinstallednewpermanenthoseconnectionstoallowmovementoflargeequipmentintothedecontaminationroomoftheDirtyWorkshoponelevation261'.IISafetyEvaluationSummary:AnengineeringreviewfoundthateliminatinghoseconnectionheadersinthedecontaminationroomandinstallingnewpermanenthoseconnectionswillimprovemovementoflargeequipmentandstillsupplyCNSandMWStothedecontaminationroom.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage104of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-036SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0157-949.5-17,9.5-18,9.5-21;Table8.3-1Sh354;Figures8.3-2,8.3-3,8.3%,8.3-6Sh58L27System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:LAR,EJS,NJSChangePowerSupplyto2LAR-PNL200ThischangeseparatedthenondivisionalReactorBuildingnormallightingsystemfromitspresentDivisionalClass1Epowersource2EJS"US1andconnectedittoitsoriginallydesignednondivisionalsource2NJS-US2.Thischangealsodisconnectedaloss-ofwoolantaccidentsignalcircuitryto2EJS"US1whichp'rovidedfortrippingthebreakerfeedingthelightingpanelandtheassociatedcomputerpointsandannunciationcircuitrytotheplantprocesscomputerandtopanel2CEC"PNL852,respectively.DuetoaNRCapprovedextensionintheamountoftimeallowedfortheReactorBuildingdrawdown,anewdrawdownanalysishasdeterminedthattheheatloadgeneratedfromtheReactorBuildingnormallightingsystemwouldnolongerpreventthedrawdownfrombeingachieved.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theworkscopeisminimalandinvolvesthedisconnectionandconnectionofexistingcablesandfunctionaltesting.Nonewcablesorracewayswillbeinstalledandthosecablestobesparedwillbeabandonedinplace.Separationcriteria,AppendixRrequirements,andelectricalprotectionwillbemaintained.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage105of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:95-037SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0019-95Figure9.5-42EGSRerouteoftheGovernorOilCoolingLineThecoolingarrangementforthegovernoroilcoolerwasfoundtobeinadequatetokeepthegovernor'soiltemperaturetothevendor'srecommendedvalues.Thecauseofthisconditionwasattributedtoinadequatecoolingwaterflowratethroughthecooler.Thissimpledesignchangeimprovedthiscoolingarrangementbyreroutingthereturntinefromthegovernoroilcoolertoalowpressurepointofthejacketwatersystemtoincreasethedifferentialpressureandtheflowrate.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangewillmaintaindieselgeneratorreliabilitybyprovidingpropercoolingwaterflowtothegovernoroilcooler.Inaddition,athrottlevalvewillbe.,addedtothereturnlinetoobtainoptimumgovernorcoolertemperature.OperationofthisvalvewillbecontrolledbyprocedureN2-OP-100Atomaintaingovernortemperaturebetween120Fand200F.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage106of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TdleofChange:95-038CalculationMS&3619.1-12,9.1-37,9.1-38FHSClarificationofDesignBasisforSpentFuelPoolRackExternalLoadingDescriptionofChange:Thischangecorrectedthediscrepancybetweenthedesignbasiscalculation,fuelhandlingprocedures,andSection9.1oftheUSAR.Thedesignbasiscalculationwasrevisedtoincludethecaseforthefuelbundledroppingontothespentfuelpoolrackswhilebeingmovedwiththepolarcrane1/2-tonhoist.Additionally,thecalculationrevisionaddressedthecaseofafuelbundleandgrapplebeingdroppedoverthespentfuelpoolracksfromamaximumheight-of30inchesabovetheracks.Useofthe25-tonauxiliaryhoistfortransferofnewfuelbundlesandthepositionofthefuelbundlecratewhenopenednowbetterdescribetheactualnewfuelreceiptactivities.Therequiredchangesindicatetheuseofthe1/2-tonhoistforthetransferofnewfuelbundlestoeitherthenewfuelstoragevaultorthenewfuelinspectionstand.-Also,thenewfuelbundlecratemaybeopenedinthehorizontalpositionprovidedthatthecratestillfunctionstosupportthefuelbundles.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Clarificationbetweentheprocedureandthedesignbasisdocumentsforthespentfuelstorageracks'xternalloadingwasdoneinaccordancewiththedesignbasisforthespentfuelpoolracksasreferencedinUSARSection9.1.ThecorrectionofUSARSection9.1regardingnewfuelreceiptactivitiesandassociatedprocedureswasdoneinaccordancewiththeheavyloadcommitmentsperNUREG-0612,asreferencedinUSARAppendix9C.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage107of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-043LDCR2-95-UFS-03815.7-8through15.7-14NIATitleofChange:UpdateSARDescriptionoftheBundleDropAccidentDescriptionofChange:ThefuelhandlingaccidentanalysisforthebundledropaccidentinSection15.7.4oftheUnit2USARhasbeenrevisedtoincorporateseveralchangesintheassumptionsoftheanalysis.Theaccidentoccurs'duringarefuelingoperationwhenafuelassemblyismovedoverthetopofthecore.Whilethefuelgrappleisintheoverhoistcondition(bottomoftheassembly32.95feetabovethetopofthecore),amainhoistcablefailsallowingtheassembly,thefuelgrapplemast,andheadtofallontopofthecoreimpactingagroupoffourassemblies.Thegrappleheadandmastarefixedverticallytothedroppedassemblysuchthatallthekineticenergyistransferredthroughthedroppedassemblytothegroupofimpactedassemblies.Thedroppedassemblyimpactsthecoreataslightangleandtherodsinthisassemblyaresubjectedtobending.Aftertheassemblyimpactsthecore,theassembly,grappleheadandmastfallontothecorehorizontallywithoutcontactingthesideofthepressurevessel.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thenumberoffailedfuelrodsforthebundledropaccidentisdeterminedbybalancingtheenergyofthedroppedassemblageagainsttheenergyrequiredtofailarod.Thedroppedassemblyisconsideredtoimpactatasmallangle,subjectingallthefuelrodsinthedroppedassemblytobendingmoments.Thefuelrodsareexpectedtoabsorblittleenergypriortofailureasaresultofbending.Forthisreasonitisassumedthatalltherodsinthedroppedassemblyfail.Therefore,thetotalnumberoffailedrodsoninitialimpactis62+33=95.Theassemblyisassumedtotipoverandimpacthorizontallyonthetopofthecore.Theenergyfromthissecondimpactwillresultin9morefailedrods.Consequently,thetotalnumberoffailedrodsfrombothimpactsisdeterminedtobe104.Thiscompareswith124failedrodsfromtheanalysispresentedinthecurrentUSAR.Sincethenewanalysisshowsfewerfailedrods,theradiologicalconsequencesareboundedbythoseofthepreviousanalysis.Therevisedbundledropaccidentmethodologyincorporatesseveralconservativeassumptions(i.e.,includingtheweightofthefuel SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage108of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)95-043(cont'd.)assemblyandthemastandassumingagreaterdropheight)whilemaintainingtheradiologicalconsequencesofthisaccidentwithinthelimitsofthecurrentanalysisintheUSAR.ThismethodologyisthestandardmethodologyusedbyGeneralElectric(GE)forthelicensingofallnewfueltypesandisincludedinGE'sStandardApplicationforReactorFuel(GESTAR-ll).Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage109of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:95-049Rev.05.1ProcedureN2-OP-526.2-66,6.2-68,6.2-69;Figure6.2-77StandbyGasTreatment(GTS)1-HourDrawdownAnalysisThissafetyevaluationaddressestherevisiontothedrawdownanalysisandproceduralchangestoreflecttheanalysis.Thereviseddrawdownanalysisremovedexistingconservatism(reducethespentfuelpoolheatload,andreduceallowable2HVR"UC413A,Bdegradationfrom40%to20%)forthefollowingsiximprovements:1.2.3.4.5.6.ReducehTrequirementandeliminateperiodicETmonitoringEliminatethenormallightingtripuponLOCAsignalUseonlyoneofthetwoECCSpumproomunitcoolersEliminatebTpenaltycurveforgeneralareaunitcoolersRestoreuseofelectricalheatersintheECCScubiclesandallowheatinginsecondarycontainmentbasedonspecificengineeringevaluationIncreasetheGTSandservicewater(SWP)systemsinitiationtimefollowingLOCAThesechangesweremadetoimproveplantflexibilityandeaseofmaintenancework.Thereviseddrawdownparametersareasfollows:Thelongestcalculateddrawdowntimeis57minutes.Emergencyunitcoolers2HVR"UC413A,Bdegradationcanbeashighas20%.~TheGTSandSWP/unitcoolerssysteminitiationtimefollowingaloss-of-coolantaccident(LOCA)canbeashighas60and90seconds,respectively,fromdrawdownconsiderationsonly.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theconsequencesofthesechangeshavebeenevaluatedagainstthecurrentrequirements.Itisconcludedthatthe1-hourdrawdowntimerequirementisnotimpacted.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage110of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)95%49Rev.0&1(cont'd.)TheseimprovementsdonotimpactGTS/HVRsystemscapacitytorestoreandmaintainrequiredvacuuminthesecondarycontainmentfollowingaLOCA.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotincludeanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage111of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:95-050N/AN/AHigh-PressureCoreSpray(CSH)TemporaryEnclosureforCSHStrainerThehigh-pressurecorespray(HPCS)systemtakeswaterfromthesuppressionpoolthroughsuctionstrainer2CSH"STR1,penetration2-12,andsuctionvalve2CSH"MOV118.PenetrationZ-12andsuctionvalve2CSHMOV118areatelevation194'-11'15/16"andsuctionstrainer2CSH"STR1isatelevation189'-8".Withminimumsuppressionpoolwaterlevelatelevation199'-6",,maintenance/repairworkon2CSH"MOV118cannotbeperformedwithoutisolatingthesuppressionpool.Thissafetyevaluationwasissuedtoaddresstheinstallationofatemporaryenclosureonthesuctionstrainer,2CSH"STR1,inordertosupportsubsequentrepairandmaintenanceworktobeperformedon2CSH"MOV118.Theenclosureonthestrainerwillensuresufficientisolationofthesuppressionpoolfromsuctionvalve2CSH"MOV118.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theenclosurewillbeutilizedonlyforrepairandmaintenanceactivitieson2CSH"MOV118.Administrativecontrolspertheworkordershallbeinplaceaspartofthemaintenanceworkpackage,whichwillnotallowforworktobedoneon2CSH"MOV118iftheenclosureleaks.TheplantwillbeinMode5withthereactorvesselheadremoved,thecavityflooded,thespentfuelpoolgatesremoved,andthewaterlevelmaintainedwithinthelimitsofTechnicalSpecifications3.9.8and3.9.9.Therefore,HPCSwillnotberequiredtobeoperationalperTechnicalSpecification3.5.2.ThesuppressionpoolisnotrequiredtobeoperableduringthisactivityperTechnicalSpecification3.5.3.However,suppressionpoollevelwillbemaintainedbetweenelevation199'-6"and201'-0"toensureadequatenetpositivesuctionheadforemergencycorecoolingsystempumpsneededforShutdownSafetyCriteriaN+1.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage112of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)95-050(cont'd.)ThevalvepitwalIelevationisequaltomaximumsuppressionpoolwaterlevel.Therefore,shouldthetemporaryenclosurefail,thevalvepitwillcontainleakagefromthesuppressionpool.Basedonthesizeofthevalvepit,thetotalleakagefromthesuppressionpoolwouldamounttoapproximately5,723gallons.Thiswouldresultinloweringthesuppressionpoolwaterlevelbyapproximately'l-1/2".Therefore,theavailabilityofthesuppression'poolforwaterinventorycontrolwillnotbeaffected.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage113of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-051Rev.0&1Mod.PN2Y94MX0138.3-15;Tables3.9A-12Sh8,6.2-56Sh2,8.3-1Sh17&20,8.3-2Sh16,17,20,8.3%Sh8,15,8.3-5Sh1,2,3,4,8.3-6Sh2,3,4System:ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)TitleofChange:NewLimitorqueActuatorsfor2RHSMOV15A/BandIVIOV25A/BDescriptionofChange:BasedonrevisedsizingcalculationsduetochangesmadetotheUnit2motor-operatedvalve(MOV)sizingcalculationmethodology,themotoroutputtorque/thrustcapabilityforcontainmentspayisolationvalves2RHS"MOV15A/BandMOV25A/Bunderreducedvoltageconditionwasnotadequatetoclosethevalvesagainstthemaximumexpecteddifferentialpressure.Containmentsprayinjectionvalves2RHS~MOV15A/BandIVlOV25A/BrequiredreplacementoftheirSIVIB-1-40Limitorquemotor/actuatorswithSIVIB-2-80motor/actuators.Thenewmotor/actuatorsareratedat5.2HPand80ft-lbs.Thenewmotor/actuatorsmeetvalveoperationtestandevaluationsystem(VOTES)testingrequirementsperGenericLetter89-10andverifyoperationunderdesignbasesconditions.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ReplacementoftheLimitorquemotor/actuatorsforvalves2RHS"MOV15A/BandMOV25A/Bwithlargersizemotor/actuatorswillprovideanacceptabletorqueswitchsettingthrustrangetoallowthevalvetooperateasintendedduringdesignbasisconditions.ThisnewrangewillalsoaccommodatetheuseoftheVOTESdiagnostictestequipmentandallowforactuatordegradation.QualificationforthenewLimitorquemotor/actuatorshasbeenperformedtoensurecontinuedstructuralintegrityandoperabilityofthemodifiedvalveassembly.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage114of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:-ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-053ProcedureN2-EMP-GEM-6608.3-74,8.3-81;Table1.8-1Sh63BYSTitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:ChangeofIEEE-Std484YearofIssueUnit2replacedtheDiv.Isafety-relateddcbatteryduringRefuelOutage3.TheDiv.IIbatterywasreplacedduringRefuelOutage4.Unit2iscommittedtocomplywithIEEE-Std484-1975,"IEEERecommendedPracticeforInstallationDesignandInstallationofLargeLeadStorageBatteriesforGeneratingStationsandSubstations,"fornewbatteryinstallation.Sincethetimeoftheinstallation,thestandardhasbeenrevisedseveraltimes.The1987issueisnowineffect.AccordingtoIEEE,thelatestissueofthestandardreflectsthecurrentstateoftheartandisrecommendedforuse.Thecriteriaprovidedinthe1987issueofthestandardgenerallyencompassorexceedthecriteriaofthe1975issue.Thenewcriteriawillincreasesafetyduringinstallationandtestingandreducetheinstallationtime.The1987issueprovidesawiderrangeofacceptancecriterionfortheintercellconnectorsresistancethatmayfacilitateinstallationandtesting.Thischangehasnoimpactonbatterycharacteristicsorperformance.Unit2dcsystemdesigncriterionistomaintain105Vdcminimumatthebatteryterminalsregardlessoftheintercellconnectionresistance.Thiscriterionissatisfied.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theanalysisperformedrevealedthatthenewresistancecriteriaforintercellconnectionsdoesnotcompromisetheabilityofthebatterytoperformthesafety-relatedfunctionasdesignedandasdescribedintheUSAR.Engineeringcalculationperformedforthemostloadedbatterydeterminedthattheimpactofthenewresistancecriteriononthetotalbatteryvoltageduringdischargecycleisnegligible.Thebattery'scapacity,shortcircuitcapability,andheatreleasearenotaffectedeither.TechnicalSpecificationoperabilitycriteriaandsurveillancerequirementsarealsosatisfied.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage115of'131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-055Rev.0&1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0107-949.2-14;Figure9.2-3C;ReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingWater(CCP)TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:AlternateDrywellCoolingInordertoprovideanalternatedrywellcoolingsystemtobeusedduringoutages,thissimpledesignchangeaddedtwopermanentchanges:~TwopipingpenetrationsthroughthesoutheastquadrantoftheReactorBuildingwall~New4"hoseconnectionontheCCPsupplyandreturnheadersDuringoutages,achiller(locatedintheyard)willbeconnectedtotheReactorBuildingpenetrations.HoseswillberoutedfromtheReactorBuildingpenetrationsthroughemergencyairlocktotheCCPconnectionsinthedrywell.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThepermanentchangesaredesignedinaccordancewithdesigncriteriaforCCP.TheReactorBuildingpenetrationsaredesignedtoASMEIIINC-3600requirementsandincluderedundantspring-loadedcheckvalves/blindflangestoassurethatsecondarycontainmentintegrityismaintainedwhenalternatedrywellcoolingisoperating/secured.Thehoseswillberoutedsoastopreventphysicalinteractionwithsafety-relateditemsintheeventofconnectorfailure.Allpotentiallyaffectedessentialequipmentorsystemsaredesignedforfloodorspray.Theimplementationofthischangewillensurethatdrywelltemperatureiscontrolledduringanoutagesuchthatpersonnelstaytimesaremaximized.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage116of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:95%56SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0114-94Table6.2-56,Sh4High-PressureCoreSpray(CSH)ReplaceValveStem,DiscandOperatorGearSetfor2CSHMOV105DescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangechangedtheoperatorgearsetandreplacedthevalvestemanddiscforsafety-relatedmotor-operatedvalve(IVIOV)2CSH"lVIOV105.ThenewgearsetwillincreasetheactuatoroutputcapacityunderreducedvoltageconditionsandthenewstemanddiscwillprovidehigherASMEallowablestresses.Thesechanges,inturn,willincreasethethrustwindowtoaccommodatediagnostictestequipmentfortorqueswitchsettingasrequiredbytheGenericLetter89-10program.Asaresultoftheactuatorgearsetchange,thevalveclosuretimewillbeincreased.ISafetyEvaluationSummary:AnengineeringevaluationoftheproposedchangeconcludedthatthereplacementofthestemanddiscwithahigherASIVlEallowableandanincreaseinthestroketimeduetothereplacementgearsetforthesubjectvalvehasnoimpactonthecontainmentisolationrequirementsandthehigh-pressurecorespraysystemoperationasdescribedintheUSAR.Thehigherstroketimeisstillwithinthedesignbasisofthesystemrequirements.TheIVIOVaswellasthesystemwillperformitsintendedsafetyfunctionduringandafteranaccident.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage117of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-057SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0095-943B-2,3B-3,3B-5,3B-6,5.4-24;Table6.2-56Sh5System:TitleofChange:ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(ICS)ActuatorGearSetChangesfor2ICS"MOV121and2ICS~INOV128DescriptionofChange:Thischangereplacedtheactuatorgearsetsforthesubjectvalvesinordertoprovideasufficientthrustwindowforthevalveoperationtestandevaluationsystem(VOTES)diagnosticequipment.Asaresultofthegearsetchange,thestroketimeforthesevalveswillincreasefrom15secondsto30seconds.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Anengineeringreviewoftherequestedchange,whichincludestheeffectsofthechangeonthesystem'soperability,reliability,maintainability,structuralintegrityandsysteminteractions,hasfoundthattheimplementationofthischangewillhavenochangeonthesafetyoroperabilityoftheICSsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage118of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:95-059Rev.08c1ProceduresN2-TSP-CNT-9001,N2-TSP-CNT-003,N2-TDP-IIT-0201,N2-TTP-CNT-001USARAffectedPages:6.2-104;Figures6.2-71a,6.2-7'Ib,6.2-73aSystem:TitleofChange:N/APrimaryContainmentIntegratedLeakRateTestDescriptionofChange:Theproceduresfortheintegratedleakratetestwererevisedfor.theTypeAtesttobeperformedinRefuelingOutage4(RFO4).Thechangesareasfollows:~lem1(Rev.0)ToallowtheuseofANSI/ANS-56.8-1987,ContainmentSystemLeakageTestingRequirements,forthe"MassPoint"method.NUREG-1047,SafetyEvaluationReportrelatedtotheoperationofNineMilePointNuclearStation,UnitNo.2,-Section6.2.6,statestheTypeAtestdatawillbeanalyzedusingthe"IVlassPoint"methodinANSI/ANS-56.8-1981.The"MassPoint"methodwillstillbeusedtoanalyzetheTypeAtestdata,butamorecurrentrevisiontoANSI/ANS-56.8wasused.Thereasonforthechangeisthat10CFR50AppendixJwasrevisedin1988toacceptthe"MassPoint"methoddescribedinANSI/ANS-56.8-1987butNineIVlilePointdidnotupdatethelicensingbasetoreflectthechangein10CFR50AppendixJ.Item2(Rev.0)ToallowtheinstallationanduseoftemporaryinstrumentationtomonitordrywellparametersduringtheTypeAtest.USARSection6.2.6statesthattwoindependentquartzdigital-typeabsolutepressuremanometersareconnectedtotheleakagemonitoringsystem(LMS)tomonitorprimarycontainmentpressureduringtheTypeAtest.USARSection6.2.6alsostatesthat18temperatureelementsand6humidityanalyzersareprovidedinthecontainmentatmospheremonitoringsystem(CMS)tomonitordry-bulbanddewpointtemperatures,respectively.Thetemporaryinstrumentationwillbeplacedinthesamelocationsasthepermanentplantequipment.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage119of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:DescriptionofChange:(cont'd.)95-059Rev.0&1(cont'd.)ThereasonforthechangeisthattheinstrumentationprovidesthetestdatafortheTypeAtest.Advancesinelectronictechnologyhaveresultedinmorereliableandreducedinstallationtimesoverconventionalinstrumentation.Theresultisreducedcostsinman-hoursandman-remduringtheinstallationandremovalphases.Item3(Rev.1)ProcedureN2-TSP-CNT-@001isbeingrevisedtoallowtheinstallationoftemporarydepressurizationflangeson2-CPS-014-9-4andpipingpenetration2PCB"Z74.TheseflangeswillbeusedduringtheTypeAtesttoreduceprimarycontainmentpressure.Thereasonforthechangeistoallowasafeandcontrolleddepressurizationoftheprimarycontainment.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissafetyevaluationhasconcludedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistasaresultofevaluatinga24-hourTypeAleakagerateinaccordancewiththe"MassPoint"methoddescribedinANSI/ANS-56.8-1987.ANSI/ANS-56.8-1987providesrecommendationsfortheTypeAtestinstrumentation.Theserecommendationsincludecalibrationrequirements,in-situchecks,andminimumquantitiesandlosscriteria.N2-TTP-CNT-001andN2-TSP-CNT4001werewrittentoensurethattherecommendationsofANSI/ANS-56.8-1987aremet.Also,thetemporaryinstrumentationwillbeplacedinthecorrespondinglocationsofthepermanentplantequipment.Therefore,anunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistasaresultofusingtemporaryinstrumentationtomonitorprimarycontainmentparametersduringtheTypeAtest.ThetemporaryflangeswillbeinstalledonlyinOperationalConditions4or5andareboundedbytheUSARloadcombinationsandstresslimitsforpipesandpipepenetrations.Therefore,thissafetyevaluationhasconcludedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistasaresultofconnectingtemporaryflangesto2-CPS-014-9-4and2PCB"Z74.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage120of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:95%60SimpleDesignChangeSC2028-9510A-30;Figure8.3-1Feedwater(FWS)FeedwaterPumpMotorsHPUpgradeOnJanuary17,1995,feedwaterpumpmotor2FWS-IVI1Btrippedwhilerunningatapproximatelyfullpower.Thetripoccurredduetotheactionofthemotorrelayprotection.Theinvestigationoftheeventrevealedthattheinsulationofthestatorwindingofthemotorfailedcausingtheactionoftherelayprotectionandmotortrip.ThemotorwassenttoMonarchElectricServiceCo.forrepair.RootcauseevaluationperformedbyMonarchCo.identifiedthatthemotorinsulationfailureoccurredduetocoronaerosionofgroundwallinsulation.ThemotorwasrewoundandreturnedtoUnit2.Intheprocessofrepair,anewtypeofinsulationwasusedandtheHPratingofthemotorwasincreasedfrom12,000to14,100.Sincethemotors2FWS-M1Aand2FWS-M1Cmayalsobesusceptibleto~thesamemodeoffailure,thedecisionwasmadetorewindthesemotorsandupgradetheHPrating.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheupgradingofHPofthefeedwaterpumpmotorssatisfiesfunctionalrequirementsofthesystem.Theperformanceofthepumpsisnotaffected.ThesystemandcomponentswillperformasdesignedandasdescribedintheUSAR.TheupgradedHPofthemotorsisadequateforthepoweruprateoftheplant.TheupgradedHPofthemotorsdoesnotadverselyaffectthemechanicalinterfacesystems.AccordingtoNMPCMechanicalEngineeringevaluation,themaximumHPrequirementforthepumpforpoweruprateconditionis13,190HP.Therefore,theupgraded14,100HPisadequate.Theelectricalequipmentsuchascables,circuitbreakers,currenttransformers,andrelaysratingswereevaluatedfortheupgradedHPofthemotorsandwerefoundtobeadequate.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage121of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)9560(cont'd.)Thefeedwaterpumpsarenonsafety-relatedcomponentsandarenotrequiredfor'afeshutdownoftheplant.TheupgradedHPofthemotorshasnoimpactonsafety-relatedsystemsandcomponents.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation'ummaryReportPage122of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:95-062SimpleDesignChangeSC2%029-95Appendix9CTable3-2MHRAlternateMeansfortheSRVRemoval(Replacing2MHR-CRN200With2MHR-CRN200Aand2MHR-CRN200B)DescriptionofChange:Thepurposeofthissimpledesignchangeistoprovideaninterchangeablehandlingsystemfortheremovalandreplacementofthesafetyreliefvalves(SRVs).Hoists2!VIHR-CRN200Aand2MHR-CRN200Bwillreplacecrane2MHR-CRN200fortheSRVremovalactivity.TheSRVswereoriginallyshippedtothesiteinthehorizontalpositionandcouldbehandledwithasingle4-tonhoist.TheSRVsnowarriveintheverticalposition,requiringasecondhoisttosafelyremovethevalvesfromtheirshippingcontainerandrepositionthevalveintothehorizontalposition.UponcompletionoftheremovalandreplacementoftheSRVs,hoists2MHR-CRN200Aand2lVIHR-CRN200Bcanberemovedfromthemonorailandcrane2MHR-CRN200canbereinstalled.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theimprovementbeingmadebythissimpledesignchangewiththeuseofalternatehoists2MHR-CRN200Aand2IVIHR-CRN200Bintheplaceofcrane2MHR-CRN200meetstherequirementsoftheseismicevaluationofnonsafety-relatedcomponentsinsafety-relatedareasanddoesnotaffectthesafetyandreliabilityofUnit2.Thereisnosafety-relatedequipmentthatwouldbeaffectedbyaloaddropinvolvinghoists2MHR-CRN200Aor2MHR-CRN200B.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage123of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo.:95-064CalculationsEC-044Rev.11,ECA45,Rev.7,EC-046Rev.5,EC-097Rev.2USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:8.3-76;Tables8.3-1.1through8.3-15BYS,BWSNonsafety-RelatedBatteriesLoadProfileUpdateDescriptionofChange:Thebatterysizingcalculationswereupdatedtoreflectas-builtdcloadsofthenonsafety-relatedsystem,andtoaccountfortheplantmodificationwhichwasimplementedwithoutrevisingthesecalculations.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Therevisedbatterysizingcalculationsconcludethatthechangeofthedcloadsiswithinthecapabilitiesofthebatteriesandthechargers.Thenonsafety-relateddcsystemwillcontinuetoperformasdesignedandasdescribedintheUSAR,withtheupdatedloadseachbatteryisstillcapableofperformingitsdutycyclefollowingthelossofchargerwhilefullychargedat65F,andwithcapacitydeterioratedto80percent.Eachbatterycanstartandoperateallrequiredloadsforthedurationofthedischargecycleaccordingtothebatteryloadprofilewithoutbatteryterminalvoltagefallingbelow105Vfor125Vdcsystem,and21Vfor24Vdcsystem.Eachbatterychargercanstillsupplythecontinuousupdatedloadonthebatterywhilerechargingthebatteryfromthedesignedminimumchargestatetothefullychargedstateinlessthan24hours.Theimpactofthischangeontheplantresponsetostationblackoutevent(SBO)hasalsobeenevaluated.Basedonadditionalbatterycalculationsperformedforthenewrevisedloads,theconclusionismadethatnonsafety-relatedbatteriesstillmeetthe.4-hourcapabilityrequirementasspecifiedinNUMARC87-00andRegulatoryGuide1.155,andasdemonstratedintheSBOstudyperformedbyGeneralElectric.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage124of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:95-066TemporaryMod.95-011USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:N/AReactorCoreIsolationCooling(ICS)ManualOperationof2ICSAOV130TheICSsystemisdesignedtoassuresufficientreactorwaterinventoryismaintainedinthereactorvesseltopermit'adequatereactorcorecooling.Thistemporarymodificationmanuallyopenedvalve2ICS"AOV130andmaintaineditintheopenpositionuntilthenextsystemoutagebecausethevalveactuatorisnotcapableofkeepingthevalveopenduetodiaphragmfailure.ThisvalveisoneofthetwonormallyopenvalvesinseriesonthedrainpotdrainlineofICSen-routetotheReactorBuildingequipmentdrainsystem(DER).SafetyEvaluationSummary:lBasedonareviewofthesystemdesignbasesandconfiguration,thereis~'nospecificreasonintheUSARforthedoubleisolationarrangement.AsystemdesignreviewbyGeneralElectricdeterminedthatdoubleisolationarrangementwasintendedtoprovideredundancyofthedrainvalveclosureduringICSoperation.ThisredundancywastominimizethespreadofcontaminationandradiationreleaseintheReactorBuildingincaseofhighradiationlevelsinthesteamsupplylinetotheICSturbine.Basedonthereviewsperformed,ithasbeendeterminedthatthisisolationcapabilitycanstillbemaintainedviaasinglevalvewithnoimpactonnuclearsafety.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage125of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-068ProcedureN2-MPM-GEN-R9019.1-39,9.1%1FHPTitleofChange:RevisiontoFuelPoolGateRemovalProcessinUSARSection9.1DescriptionofChange:ThischangerevisedtheUSARtoindicatetheoptiontoremoveboththeinnerandtheouterspentfuelpoolgatesaftercompletionofflood-upactivitiespriortorefueling,asdescribedinprocedureN2-MPM-GEN-R901,Rev.1.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TherevisionoftheUSARtoindicatetheoptiontoremoveboththeinnerandtheouterspentfuelpoolgatesafterthecompletionofflood-upactivitiesresultsinamoreconservativeplantconfigurationduringreactorvesseldisassemblyactivities.ThiswasperformedinaccordancewiththeGuidelinesfortheControlof,HeavyLoads(NUREG-0612)asdescribedinUSARAppendix9C.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage126of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocument'No.:USABAffectedPages:System:95-069N/AN/A345-kVTransmissionOutput,115-kV.OffsitePowerSourcesTitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:ScribaStation,345+VBBusConnectionAsixth345-kVtransmissionlinewasaddedtoScribaStationandconnectedtothe345-kVAbusinJune1994.ScribaStationisa345-kVbreakerand1/2stationwithanAandaBbus.Thenewtransmissionlinewasconnectedtothe345-kVBbus.ISafetyEvaluationSummary:Theplantwillbeshutdownforrefuelduringtheperiodwhentheworkwilltakeplace.AllapplicableTechnicalSpecificationrequirementswillbemet.Theworkandtheschedulehavebeenreviewedforsafeshutdowncriteria.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage127of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:95-071N/AA.0-1,A.4.3-1,A.4.4-3,A.5.2-1,A.5.2-2,A.5.2-4,A.6-1,A.6-2,A.'15.0-2,A.15.0-7,A.15.1-4,A.15.1-9,A.15.2-5,A.15.2-12,A.15.4-9,A.15B-1,A.15D-1;TablesA.5.2-1,A.5.2-2,A.6-2,A.15.0-4S}i1,2,3System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:VariousOperationofNIVlP2Reload4/Cycle5ThischangeaddednewfuelbundlesandestablishedanewcoreloadingpatternforReload4/Cycle5operationofUnit2.Twohundredforty-eight(248)newfuelbundlesoftheGE11designwereloaded.Also,32twice-burnedGE6BbundlesthatweredischargedattheendofReload1/Cycle2werere-inserted.All124oftheGE6BbundlesfromReload3/Cycle4,and156of196GE9Bbundles(PSCWB299),weredischargedtothespentfuelpool.Variousevaluationsandanalyseswereperformedtoestablishappropriateoperatinglimitsforthereloadcore.Thesecycle-specificlimitsweredocumentedintheCoreOperatingLimitsReport.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThereloadanalysesandevaluationsareperformedbasedontheGeneralElectricStandardApplicationforReactorFuel,NEDE-24011-P-A-10andNEDE24011-P-A-10-US(GESTARll).Thisdocumentdescribesthefuellicensingacceptancecriteria;thefuelthermal-mechanical,nuclear,andthermal-hydraulicanalysesbases;andthesafetyanalysismethodology.ForReload4,theevaluationsincludedtransientsandaccidentslikelytolimitoperationbecauseofminimumcriticalpowerratioconsiderations;overpressurizationevents;loss-of-coolantaccident;andstabilityanalysis.Appropriateconsiderationofequipmentoutofservicewasincluded.Limitsonplantoperationwereestablishedtoassurethatapplicablefuelandreactorcoolantsystemsafetylimitsarenotexceeded.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage128of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:95-077CalculationsH21C%38%1C,H21C-043OB,A10.1-E-130USARAffectedPages:15.6-13;Tables15.6-13Sh10&11,15.6-16bSystem:TitleofChange:ResidualHeat(RHS)Revise/DeletetheLeakRateAcceptanceCriteriaandTestFrequencyforRHSValves2RHS"MOV142,MOV149,SOV35A/BandSOV36A/BDescriptionofChange:IThischangerevisedtheleakrateacceptancecriteriaandtestfrequencyforvalves2RHS"MOV142,MOV149,SOV35A/B,andSOV36A/B.Theleakageacceptancecriteriaoflessthanorequalto1gpmtimesthenumberofhydrostaticallytestedvalveswasincreasedto20gpmfor2RHS"SOV35A/BandSOV36A/B,andto10gpmfor2RHS"MOV142andMOV149atnormalsystemoperatingpressure.Thetestfrequencywasrevisedfromonceevery18monthstoonceevery2years.LeaktestingrequirementsforthevalvesremainintheISTtestingprogram;however,changestoNIP-DES-04(byrevisingthefootnote"m")andsupportingoperationsprocedureswererequiredtoimplementthenewleakagecriteria.ImplementationofsimpledesignchangeSC2-0046-95toinstallASMEClass2reducerstoreplacetheleakagecontrolfunctionofthesolenoid-operatedvalves(SOVs)wasdeterminedtobeanacceptablealternativetoleaktestingtheSOVs.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissafetyevaluationhasconcludedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotresultfromtheproposedchange.ThisconclusionisbasedontheabilitytodemonstrateRHSsystemleakageboundaryintegritybysatisfyingthefunctionalrequirementsofthelow-pressurecoolantinjectionsystemwiththeincreasedleakage,anddeterminingthattheconsequencesoftheincreasedleakageintosecondarycontainmentpost-LOCAareradiologicallyacceptable.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage129of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:'TitleofChange:95-078ProcedureN2-FHP-021N/AFNR,FNS,GTSRevisiontoControlBladeMovementProcedureDescriptionofChange:ThissafetyevaluationwaswrittentoreviseprocedureN2-FHP21,"ControlRodUncoupling,Removal,andInstallation."Thisrevisionallowscontrolroduncoupling,removal,andinstallationwithoutsecondarycontainmentintegrityandSGTSoperability,providedsevendayshaveelapsedsincereactorshutdownandallmovementsareofobjectstotallinglessthan617pounds(theestimatedweightofafuelbundle).SafetyEvaluationSummary:TherevisedcontrolblademovementprocedureprovidesthesamelevelofsafetytotheControlRoomandpublicaswaspreviouslyavailable.ThechangedoesnotalterTechnicalSpecifications,orguidanceprovidedbythevendor.RadiologicalanalysishasshownthattheproposalallowsUnit2tomeet10CFR100limitsandremainincompliancewiththeplantsafetyanalysisreport.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage130of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:~USARAffectedPages:95-079DER2-95-11838.3-11,8.3-12System:TitleofChange:VBBReviseUPS2VBB-UPS1C/1DAcceptableVoltageOutputCriteriaDescriptionofChange:Uninterruptiblepowersupplies(UPSs)2VBB-UPS1Cand2VBB-UPS1Dfeedselectedlightingandcommunicationsloads.TheoriginalUPSunitsinstalledduringconstructionwerepurchasedfromExide.In1991,theseunitswerereplacedwithunitspurchasedfromHDRunderlVlodificationPN2Y89MX042.Duringthereplacement,itwasdiscoveredthattheseunitsdidnotmeettheoutputvoltageacceptancecriteriaofSpecificationE-147,i.e.,+2%ofoutputvoltagevariation.Engineeringevaluationofthedeficiencywasperformedandunitswereacceptedassuppliedbythevendorwithvoltageoutputacceptableupto+3%basedonthetypeofloadstheseunitsarefeeding.TheengineeringspecificationE-147wasrevisedtoallowthenewacceptancecriteriaforUPSs2VBB-UPS1Cand1D.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theproposedchangeofacceptingthe+3%ofoutputvoltagevariationdoesnotaffecttheperformanceoftheconnectedloads.ThepurposeofspecifyingpreciseoutputvoltageregulationfortheUPSsistomeettherequirementsoftheprecisioninstrumentationandcontrolequipmentwhichtheyfeed.Mostofthisequipmentwillrequirepowersupplyvoltagevariationnottoexceed2%.ThetwoUPSsinvolvedinthischange,2VBB-UPS1Cand2VBB-UPS1Dprovidepowersupplyonlytotheessentiallighting,egresslighting,andpageparty/publicaddress(PP/PA)communicationsystemloads.Theessentialandegresslightingsystemequipmentaredesignedfor+10%supplyvoltagevariation.ThePP/PAcommunicationsystemequipmentaredesignedfor90-140VasshowninGaitronicspecification.Therefore,anoutputvoltagevariationof+3%for2VBB-UPS1Cand2VBB-UPS1Dwillnotadverselyaffectoperationofanyoftheirconnectedequipmentandisacceptable.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage131of131SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:95-080Rev.0L1ProcedureN2-PM-S0123C-25,3C-28,3C-29N/ATitleofChange:ChangetheVisualLeak/FloodDetectionWalkdownstoaMinimumofOnceperCalendarDayDescriptionofChange:AsdepictedintheUSAR,areawalkdownsbyplantpersonnelforvisualleak/flooddetectionwereperformedonceevery8-hourshift.Inthepast,plantoperationspersonnelwerescheduledforthree8-hourshifts.Plantoperationshasrevisedtheirshiftworkschedulesfromthree8-hourshiftstotwo12-hourshifts.Calculationswererevisedtoreflecttheincreaseinwaterlevelsduetothechangeofthevisualleak/flooddetectionsfrom12hourstoaminimumofoncepercalendarday,nottoexceeda24-hourtimeperiod(36-hourtimeperiodfortheControlBuildingbasement)betweeninspections.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TherevisiontotheUSARtochangethetimeintervalsofthevisualflood/leakdetectionwalkdownsfromevery12khourstoaminimumofoncepercalendarday,nottoexceeda24-hourtimeperiod(36-hourtimeperiodfortheControlBuildingbasement)betweeninspections,doesnotaffectthesafetyandreliabilityofUnit2.Thelossofsafety-relatedequipmentduetofloodinghasalreadybeenevaluatedintheUSARAppendix3CSpray/FloodingEvaluationandwillnotbechanged.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

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